Weapons systems (21 - 30 of 71 items)
Industrial Base: Inventory and Requirements for Artillery Projectiles
NSIAD-95-89: Published: Mar 20, 1995. Publicly Released: Apr 4, 1995.
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed selected aspects of the Army's industrial base for the production of artillery projectile metal parts, focusing on: (1) how Army and Marine Corps inventories of artillery projectiles compare with stated requirements; (2) the Army's production base for artillery projectiles; and (3) the Army's plans for procuring advanced artillery rounds and part...
Ballistic Missile Defense: Information on Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Other Theater Missile Defense Systems
T-NSIAD-94-167: Published: May 3, 1994. Publicly Released: May 3, 1994.
GAO discussed the Department of Defense's (DOD) Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, focusing on: (1) its status and estimated cost; (2) other missile defense systems proposed by the military services; and (3) the potential effects of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on THAAD system development. GAO noted that: (1) the THAAD system is designed to defend against nuclear, biolog...
Army Acquisition: Information on the Status and Performance of the Javelin Antitank Weapon
NSIAD-94-122BR: Published: Mar 9, 1994. Publicly Released: Mar 21, 1994.
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Army's Javelin antitank weapon system, focusing on its: (1) cost and acquisition plan; (2) projected effectiveness in certain countermeasure environments; (3) threat recognition capability; and (4) target recognition training plan.GAO found that: (1) although the Army's acquisition cost for the Javelin is estimated to be $4.2 bil...
Army Acquisition: Problems With the Sense and Destroy Armor Munition
NSIAD-94-59: Published: Nov 23, 1993. Publicly Released: Nov 23, 1993.
GAO reviewed the Army's Sense and Destroy Armor (SADARM) program to determine: (1) whether the SADARM projectile will be ready for low-rate initial production in fiscal year 1994; (2) the Army's current schedule and cost projections for SADARM; (3) whether the Army has fully justified its need for SADARM; and (4) whether other weapon systems exist that could satisfy the Army's mission.GAO found th...
1994 Defense Budget: Potential Reductions, Rescissions, and Restrictions to Procurement Programs
NSIAD-93-303BR: Published: Sep 30, 1993. Publicly Released: Sep 30, 1993.
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year (FY) 1994 budget request and prior years' appropriations for selected procurement programs, focusing on: (1) potential reductions to the DOD FY 1994 budget request; (2) rescissions to prior FY appropriations; and (3) congressional restrictions on DOD obligational authority for selected FY 1994 procurement programs.GAO found that: (1) DOD F...
Postol's Video Analysis
NSIAD-93-22R: Published: Oct 1, 1992. Publicly Released: Oct 1, 1992.
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the evidence upon which a professor of science, technology, and national security policy based his determination that the Army's Patriot missile system was ineffective during Operation Desert Storm. GAO noted that: (1) the professor stated that the Patriot was not as effective as the Army claimed, did not destroy any Scud missile warheads, and did...
Operation Desert Storm: Data Does Not Exist to Conclusively Say How Well Patriot Performed
NSIAD-92-340: Published: Sep 22, 1992. Publicly Released: Sep 29, 1992.
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) available information on the Patriot missile engagements that the Army is confident resulted in the destruction or disabling of Scud missiles during Operation Desert Storm; and (2) whether the Army's revised assessment of the Patriot's performance in these engagements was supported by data.GAO found that: (1) the Patriot computers collected ta...
Strategic Defense Initiative: Some Claims Overstated for Early Flight Tests of Interceptors
NSIAD-92-282: Published: Sep 8, 1992. Publicly Released: Sep 16, 1992.
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the accuracy of Strategic Defense Initiative Organization's (SDIO) claims concerning flight test results.GAO found that the: (1) Kinetic Kill Vehicle Integrated Technology Experiment (KITE) utilizes a shroud to protect the optical window sensor at the missile's front; (2) Army Strategic Defense Command inaccurately claimed that the K...
Operation Desert Storm: Project Manager's Assessment of Patriot Missile's Overall Performance Is Not Supported
T-NSIAD-92-27: Published: Apr 7, 1992. Publicly Released: Apr 7, 1992.
GAO discussed: (1) Army efforts to deploy an effective missile defense against Iraqi Scud Missiles; and (2) the Patriot Project Manager's analysis of the Patriot Missile's performance. GAO noted that: (1) in general, Army and supporting contractors overcame significant obstacles to provide tactical missile defense in Saudi Arabia and Israel, but two principal documents did not support the Project...
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: Observations on the Performance of the Army's Hellfire Missile
NSIAD-92-156: Published: Mar 30, 1992. Publicly Released: Mar 30, 1992.
GAO reviewed the Army's experience with the Hellfire missile during Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield, focusing on: (1) the Hellfire's performance; (2) whether the Army experienced any problems with the missile; and (3) actions the Army has taken or is planning to take to address any identified problems.GAO found that: (1) during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Hellfire miss...