Terrorism (1 - 10 of 61 items)
Supply Chain Security: Providing Guidance and Resolving Data Problems Could Improve Management of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program
GAO-17-84: Published: Feb 8, 2017. Publicly Released: Feb 8, 2017.
Staff from U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program have faced challenges in meeting C-TPAT security validation responsibilities because of problems with the functionality of the program's data management system (Portal 2.0). In particular, since the system was updated in August 2015, C-TPAT staff have identified instances in which the...
Combating Terrorism: State Should Evaluate Its Countering Violent Extremism Program and Set Time Frames for Addressing Evaluation Recommendations
GAO-15-684: Published: Jul 22, 2015. Publicly Released: Jul 22, 2015.
The Department of State's (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism has had an annual increase in authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) positions since fiscal year 2011 and has recently undertaken efforts to reduce a persistent staffing gap. The bureau's authorized FTEs increased from 66 in fiscal year 2011 to 96 in fiscal year 2015, and over the same period, FTE vacancies ranged from 17 to 23 percent. T...
Aviation Security: TSA Should Take Additional Action to Obtain Stakeholder Input when Modifying the Prohibited Items List
GAO-15-261: Published: Feb 4, 2015. Publicly Released: Mar 6, 2015.
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) officials stated that TSA considers four factors when determining whether to make modifications to the Prohibited Items List (PIL), but the agency did not fully assess risk when considering its recent proposed PIL modifications, as GAO has previously recommended. TSA generally considers the following four factors when determining whether to modify the P...
Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Enhance Its Guidance and Oversight of High-Risk Maritime Cargo Shipments
GAO-15-294: Published: Jan 27, 2015. Publicly Released: Jan 27, 2015.
From fiscal years 2009 through 2013, less than 1 percent of maritime shipments arriving in the United States were identified as high risk by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), but CBP does not have accurate data on their disposition (i.e., outcomes). CBP officials (targeters) are generally required to hold high-risk shipments for examination unless evidence shows that an examination can be...
Federal Facility Cybersecurity: DHS and GSA Should Address Cyber Risk to Building and Access Control Systems
GAO-15-6: Published: Dec 12, 2014. Publicly Released: Jan 12, 2015.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken preliminary steps to begin to understand the cyber risk to building and access controls systems in federal facilities. For example, in 2013, components of DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) conducted a joint assessment of the physical security and cybersecurity of a federal facility. However, significant work remains.Lack o...
Secure Flight: TSA Should Take Additional Steps to Determine Program Effectiveness
GAO-14-531: Published: Sep 9, 2014. Publicly Released: Sep 18, 2014.
Since 2009, Secure Flight has changed from a program that identifies passengers as high risk solely by matching them against the No Fly and Selectee Lists to one that assigns passengers a risk category: high risk, low risk, or unknown risk. In 2010, following the December 2009 attempted attack of a U.S.-bound flight, which exposed gaps in how agencies used watchlists to screen individuals, the Tra...
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Action Needed to Enhance Integration and Coordination of Vulnerability Assessment Efforts [Reissued on September 17, 2014]
GAO-14-507: Published: Sep 15, 2014. Publicly Released: Sep 15, 2014.
During fiscal years 2011 to 2013, various Department of Homeland Security (DHS) offices and components conducted or required thousands of vulnerability assessments of critical infrastructure (CI), but DHS is not positioned to integrate them in order to identify priorities. Although the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) call for DHS to integrate...
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Additional Actions Needed to Increase the Security of U.S. Industrial Radiological Sources
GAO-14-293: Published: Jun 6, 2014. Publicly Released: Jun 12, 2014.
GAO found that challenges exist in reducing the security risks faced by licensees using high-risk industrial radiological sources. Specifically, licensees face challenges in (1) securing mobile and stationary sources and (2) protecting against an insider threat. Regarding mobile sources, their portability makes them susceptible to theft or loss, as the size of some of these sources is small enough...
Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges with Selected Port Security Programs
GAO-14-636T: Published: Jun 4, 2014. Publicly Released: Jun 4, 2014.
GAO's prior work has shown that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agencies—particularly the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—have made substantial progress in three key areas of port security since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11), but some challenges remain.Maritime domain awareness and information sharing. DHS agencies along with o...
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made; Significant Work Remains in Addressing High-Risk Areas
GAO-14-532T: Published: May 7, 2014. Publicly Released: May 7, 2014.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress in addressing high-risk areas for which it has sole responsibility, but significant work remains.Strengthening management functions. In this area, DHS has met two and partially met three of GAO's five criteria for removing areas from the high-risk list. Specifically, DHS has met the criteria for having (1) demonstrated leadership commitm...