


June 1992

# ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

## Need to Determine Changed Threat's Impact on Reserve Training Divisions



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**National Security and  
International Affairs Division**

B-248832

June 22, 1992

The Honorable Michael P.W. Stone  
The Secretary of the Army

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Army has 12 reserve training divisions, comprising about 35,000 soldiers, whose mission is to train new recruits should it become necessary to expand forces under a full mobilization. These divisions were created at a time when the greatest threat to U.S. national security interests was posed by the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Because the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Warsaw Pact have changed the type of military threats the United States is expecting to face in the future, we sought to determine the impact of these changes on the justification for the reserve training divisions.

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**Results in Brief**

The Army is planning to reduce the number of reserve training divisions from 12 to 9 and may be able to reduce this number further because the requirements for these divisions' primary mission has been substantially reduced with the changed national security environment. According to Department of Defense (DOD) planning documents, the potential challenges to U.S. national security interests have shifted from a global threat that would require an expansion of Army forces beyond those already in the active/reserve structure to an array of regional conflicts that would necessitate only a call-up of reserves under partial mobilization. Because it is unlikely that reserve training divisions would be activated under these scenarios, the primary justification for these divisions has been substantially reduced.

However, the Army is considering a new role for the reserve training divisions that could justify retaining some of these forces. During Operation Desert Storm approximately 5,000 reserve training division personnel (the equivalent of less than two divisions) were called on to provide refresher training to Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) personnel. This practice was a departure from past Army mobilization plans, which assigned the refresher training responsibility to the active Army units gaining the IRR personnel. However, during Desert Storm many of the gaining active Army units had already deployed, leaving a void in this training area.

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The Army plans to analyze its mobilization training needs to determine the impact of changing mobilization requirements on the reserve training divisions. However, the Army has not decided if the IRR refresher training mission will be permanently assigned to the reserve training divisions.

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## Background

The Army's reserve training divisions, which had an operating budget of about \$345 million in fiscal year 1991, were created in the mid-1950s at a time when the U.S. defense strategy was primarily focused on countering the military threat posed by the former Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. To counter this threat, the United States planned for a massive expansion of forces beyond those already in the active/reserve structure.

In the event of a national emergency or war, the Army would expand its combat capability through (1) the phased mobilization of existing Army Reserve and National Guard units and IRR personnel and (2) expansion of forces through increased recruiting efforts. The mission of reserve training divisions under this plan is to establish new Army training centers and expand existing centers to train new recruits.<sup>1</sup>

The reserve training divisions provide basic combat training and advanced training in infantry, armor, field artillery, military police, and other occupational specialties. Basic training is a program designed to teach combat survival skills. After completing basic training, new recruits attend advanced training to obtain specific military occupational skills. The reserve training divisions are to provide basic and advanced training for up to about 225,000 soldiers during the first 26 weeks of full mobilization. During peacetime the reserve training divisions are commanded by Forces Command; however, during wartime this responsibility is shifted to the Training and Doctrine Command. During annual training periods the reserve training divisions provide some peacetime benefits and capabilities, including the training of new recruits and augmentation of the active Army's training base.

Army officials could not provide documentation supporting the requirements for 12 training divisions. However, these officials stated that this number probably was insufficient to provide the necessary forces to counter the former Soviet threat. The Army's planned reduction to nine reserve training divisions was not based on an analysis of training

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<sup>1</sup>Army training centers consist of training facilities and instructors who teach survival and occupational specialty skills to new recruits.

requirements, but was part of an overall 25-percent force reduction initiated by DOD in 1990. As of March 1992, the Army had not yet begun this reduction.

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## Training Divisions' Primary Mission Is Greatly Diminished

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Warsaw Pact have lessened the possibility of a global war. In response to these events, the Joint Staff chaired a multi-organization working group that was responsible for identifying types of future events that illustrate circumstances that could draw U.S. forces into combat. The group developed seven illustrative scenarios that will serve as a basis for long-range budget planning and the type of forces the United States should maintain.

In general, the scenarios reflect a shift from a single global threat to an array of regional conflicts. Six of the seven illustrative scenarios are regional-based conflicts that would not likely require an expansion of forces beyond those already in the active and reserve structure.

Although it is not anticipated that reserve training divisions would routinely be activated under these scenarios, DOD officials believe that a major regional conflict could require the activation of some number of reserve training divisions for force expansion if the conflict expanded or became prolonged. Only one scenario envisions a conflict that would threaten U.S. interests on a global scale necessitating a force expansion capability. However, under this scenario the United States would have significant warning time—more than the Army believes is needed to reconstitute the reserve training divisions—to monitor the emergence of the global threat and prepare for the expansion of forces.

The Army recognizes that its training division structure needs to be in line with other Army restructuring, base realignment, and training center consolidations. Accordingly, the Army has directed subordinate agencies to conduct a mobilization training analysis to determine current training requirements.

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## A New Mission Could Be Assigned to the Training Divisions

During Operation Desert Storm approximately 5,000 reserve training division personnel were activated to provide refresher training to IRR personnel at nine Army installations. IRR personnel are a source of pre-trained soldiers who can be called upon to fill shortages in active and reserve units and to replace casualties. Since many units to which IRR personnel were to be assigned had already deployed to the Persian Gulf,

the Army mobilization plan calling for refresher training to be provided by gaining Army units had to be modified. According to Training and Doctrine Command officials, the training bases were not a viable option to provide this training because they were operating at full capacity. As a result, the Army called upon the reserve training divisions to perform this mission.

The reserve training divisions provided refresher training to about 17,000 IRR members. According to Desert Storm after-action reports, some reserve training division units had initial difficulties because the division headquarters were not mobilized and the divisions had not planned for mobilization of less than a division. However, the positive relationships that had been established between the reserve training divisions and the installations during annual training periods were beneficial in overcoming these difficulties. Another problem noted was the relatively low level of experience that some drill sergeants and other personnel had. Their inexperience hindered the ability of some reserve training division units to effectively provide refresher training to IRR members.

Because the Desert Storm practice for providing IRR refresher training was a departure from mobilization plans, the Army is currently reassessing the refresher training mission. Training and Doctrine Command officials told us that this mission is being considered for permanent assignment to the reserve training divisions. Before this decision can be finalized, however, Army officials told us that analyses must be performed to determine the extent of the IRR refresher training requirement for the most demanding war scenario. As of March 1992, the Army had no plans to conduct the refresher training analyses.

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## Recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army take the following actions:

- As part of the Army's mobilization training analysis, determine the viability of assigning the IRR refresher training mission to the reserve training divisions. If this is found to be viable, determine the number of reserve training divisions required to perform the mission.
- Deactivate those reserve training divisions not required for a mobilization training mission.

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## Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOD did not agree that the reserve training divisions' primary mission had vanished with the changed national security environment. DOD stated that, although unlikely, a major regional conflict could require some degree of force expansion beyond the active/reserve structure if the conflict expanded or became prolonged. We agree that a regional conflict could become prolonged and have modified the report accordingly.

DOD generally agreed with our recommendations. Concerning the first recommendation, it stated that the Army's mobilization training analysis will address the requirement for reserve training divisions to conduct their primary mission—initial entry training—as well as refresher training. The Department apparently interpreted our recommendation to mean that the Army's analysis should consider only the refresher training mission. This is not the case. Since the Army already planned to conduct an overall mobilization training analysis, we saw this as an opportunity to determine the refresher training requirement as well.

Concerning our second recommendation, the Department stated that it is premature to conclude what force structure is appropriate until the Army completes its analysis of current force structure in conjunction with evolving reserve training division missions. We agree. Our recommendation to deactivate reserve training divisions that are not required is contingent upon the Army's completion of its analysis.

Additional annotated evaluations of the Department's comments are presented in appendix I.

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## Scope and Methodology

To address our objective, we reviewed regulations and other key documents relating to the organizational structure, mission, and mobilization plan for the reserve training divisions. We interviewed officials regarding the assumptions supporting the number of reserve training divisions in the force structure and the impact of the changing threat on the divisions' mission. We examined the Joint Staff's illustrative scenarios that depict the types of new threats faced by the United States. We also examined Army after-action reports associated with the reserve training divisions' Desert Storm experience. We obtained our data and conducted interviews at the following locations:

- the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C;

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- the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Washington, D.C.;
  - the U.S. Army Personnel Command, Washington, D.C.;
  - the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia;
  - the U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia;
  - the Fifth U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas;
  - the 80th Division (Training), Richmond, Virginia; and
  - the 95th Division (Training), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

We conducted our review from October 1991 through March 1992 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.


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As you know, the head of a federal agency is required under 31 U.S.C. 720 to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Operations not later than 60 days after the date of this report, and to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of this report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen of the above committees and of the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request.

Please call me on (202) 275-4141 if you have any questions concerning this report. The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Sincerely yours,



Richard Davis  
Director, Army Issues



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# Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MAY 22 1992

RESERVE AFFAIRS

Mr. Frank C. Conahan  
 Assistant Comptroller General  
 National Security and International  
 Affairs Division  
 U.S. General Accounting Office  
 Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Conahan:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report entitled--"ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE: Analysis Needed To Determine Changed Threat's Impact on Training Divisions," dated April 15, 1992 (GAO Code 393474/OSD Case 9039). The Department of Defense nonconcurrs with one finding and partially concurs with the remaining findings and recommendations.

The Department disagrees with the GAO conclusion that the Army requirement to maintain a peacetime capability to expand existing Active and Reserve forces has vanished with the changed national security environment. While the requirement for force expansion is assuredly far less demanding now than during the Cold War era, a potential need for reconstitution remains. Army Reserve Training Divisions support the reconstitution pillar of the National Security Policy and the Military strategy designed to support that policy. In addition, and not mentioned in the GAO report, are the peacetime benefits and capabilities of training divisions, which include the training of recruits and the augmentation of the Active component training base.


During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, training divisions demonstrated a readiness capability to conduct refresher training missions. In anticipation of other evolving missions, the Army is reviewing current force structure to determine how best to utilize the skills of trainers in peacetime, while preserving an ability to expand the training base upon mobilization. Reducing training divisions further without careful analysis could do irreparable damage to the Total Army.

A logical and recurring concern addressed by the GAO report is whether the existing, fully operational, Reserve training divisions are critically important to a shrinking Army, and its contribution to National Defense. Amid such times of unprecedented and seemingly chaotic world events, the Army should continue to rely on some number of training divisions to help reduce peacetime manpower dollar outlays, while maintaining the availability of those divisions to meet future force expansion requirements and other missions during a crisis.

**Appendix I**  
**Comments From the Department of Defense**

The DoD comments on each finding and recommendation are provided in the enclosure. The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on this draft report.

Sincerely,

  
Stephen M. Duncan

Enclosure  
As stated

GAO DRAFT REPORT--DATED APRIL 24, 1992  
(GAO CODE 393474) OSD CASE 9039-X

"ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE: ANALYSIS NEEDED TO DETERMINE CHANGED  
THREAT'S IMPACT ON TRAINING DIVISIONS"

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS

\* \* \* \* \*

FINDINGS

FINDING A: Army Reserve Training Divisions. The GAO explained that, in FY 1991, the 12 Army training divisions had an operating budget of about \$345 million. The GAO observed that the United States planned for a massive expansion of forces beyond those already in the Active/Reserve structure to counter the military threat posed by the former Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.

The GAO reported that the Army expands combat capability in the event of a national emergency or war through (1) phased mobilization of existing Army Reserve and National Guard units and the Individual Ready Reserve, and (2) the expansion of forces through increased recruiting efforts. The GAO noted the mission of the training divisions under that expansion plan was to establish new Army training centers and expand existing centers to train new recruits.

The GAO further explained that the training divisions provide basic combat training and one station unit training in infantry, armor, field artillery, Military police, and other occupational specialties. The GAO found that the training divisions can provide basic and advanced training to about 190,000 soldiers during a 12- to 24-week training cycle. The GAO noted that, during peacetime, the training divisions are commanded by Forces Command; however, during war time, the responsibility is shifted to the Training and Doctrine Command.

The GAO observed that Army officials could not provide documentation supporting the 12 training division requirement. The GAO noted that, according to Army officials, the 12 training division requirement was insufficient to provide the necessary forces to counter the former Soviet threat. The GAO observed that, although the Army plans to reduce the number of training divisions to nine, the reduction was not based on an analysis of training requirements, but rather on the overall 25 percent force reduction plan initiated in 1990. The GAO noted that, as of March 1992, the Army had not yet begun the reduction of the training divisions. (pp. 2-4/GAO Draft Report)

Enclosure

Now on pp. 2-3.

**DOD RESPONSE:** Partially concur. Until recently, the mission assigned to Army Reserve Training Divisions was to train soldiers and, in some cases, to operate training centers in order to permit the expansion of the Army in the event of a major crisis. The requirement for those divisions was established to meet a potential Soviet threat of global dimensions and was explicitly stated in the Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training.

See comment 1.

The 12 Army Reserve Training Divisions are capable of training up to 225,520 soldiers during the first 26 weeks of full mobilization--80 percent of requirements established under previous plans--but greater than the number of 190,000 cited in the GAO report. In peacetime, the training divisions routinely conduct initial entry training during annual training tours and augment Active component training units. In performing those missions, resources are available to the Total Army that would have to be otherwise provided by Active duty forces.

See comment 2.

The planned reduction of training divisions from 12 to nine was confirmed by the Total Army Assessment 99 effort, completed in 1991. Total Army Assessment 99 was conducted to meet potential future requirements associated with the Department's new Military strategy. Those requirements will be refined as planning continues to adjust Defense capabilities to new realities. The strategy for reductions includes the merger of six of the divisions into three, and will begin during FY 1993.

**FINDING B: Training Division Primary Mission Has Vanished.** The GAO concluded that the requirement for the Army to maintain a peacetime capability to expand existing active and reserve forces has vanished with the changed national security environment. The GAO asserted six of the seven regional scenarios that could draw the U.S. forces into combat likely would not require expansion of forces beyond those in the active and reserve structure. The GAO noted only one scenario envisions a conflict that would threaten U.S. interests on a global scale. The GAO pointed out, however, that under the global scenario, the United States would have significant warning time to monitor the emergence of the global threat and prepare for the expansion of forces--more than the Army believes is needed to reconstitute the training divisions. The GAO found that the Army had directed subordinate agencies to conduct a mobilization training analysis to determine whether current training requirements are in line with other Army restructuring. (pp. 1-2, pp. 4-6/GAO Draft Report)

Now on pp. 1, 3.

**DOD RESPONSE:** Nonconcur. Training Division missions have not vanished; they have been reduced and altered. One of the pillars of U.S. National Security Policy, and the Military strategy designed to implement that policy, is a requirement to be able to reconstitute smaller future Military forces if the need arises. While unlikely, a major regional crisis could require some extent of force expansion should the conflict expand or be prolonged. A reemergent global threat, while a remote possibility, would surely require force expansion. Some number of Army Reserve

Training Divisions are a low cost hedge against such potential future requirements.

Training Division requirements to support future force expansion will evolve as the Department continues to assess the implications of changes in the international security environment. At the same time, the Army is examining the potential additional role of training divisions to meet peacetime training needs, both in continuing to augment active duty training units (as has been the practice for some time) and in providing training to Reserve components. Until all of those assessments have been completed, the ultimate number and structure of the training divisions cannot be determined.

**FINDING C: A New Mission Could Be Assigned To The Training Divisions.** The GAO found that the Army is considering assigning the mission of the Individual Ready Reserve refresher training to the training divisions. The GAO noted that, during Operation DESERT STORM, approximately 5,000 training division personnel were activated to provide refresher training to Individual Ready Reserve personnel at nine Army installations. The GAO reported, however, that according to Training and Doctrine Command officials, the training bases were being operated at full capacity and, therefore, could not support the Individual Ready Reserve training. The GAO noted that, as a result, the Army called upon the Reserve training divisions to perform the mission.

The GAO found that the training divisions provided refresher training to about 17,000 Individual Ready Reserve members. The GAO reported that Operation DESERT STORM after-action reports indicated that some training division units had initial difficulty because the division headquarters were not mobilized and the divisions had not planned for mobilization of less than a division. The GAO noted, however, the positive relationships that had been established between the training divisions and the installations were beneficial in overcoming the planning difficulties. The GAO reported that one of the more significant problems encountered was the relatively low level of experience for some of the drill sergeants and other personnel, which affected the ability of some training division units to perform their wartime mission effectively.

The GAO observed that, because the DESERT STORM experience proved the mobilization plan for the Individual Ready Reserve refresher training to be unworkable, the Army currently is reassessing the refresher training mission. The GAO reported that Training and Doctrine Command officials indicated that the mission is being considered for permanent assignment to the training divisions. The GAO pointed out, however, that before the decision can be finalized, Army officials must perform an analysis to determine the Individual Ready Reserve refresher training requirement for the most demanding war scenario. The GAO noted that, as of March 1992, the Army had no plans to conduct the analyses. (p. 2, pp. 6-8/GAO Draft Report)

Now on pp. 1, 3-4.

Appendix I  
Comments From the Department of Defense

**DOD RESPONSE:** Partially concur. Based on evolving mobilization plans, Training and Doctrine Command will assume the mission of conducting Individual Ready Reserve refresher training. Training and Doctrine Command will then use whatever training resources are available to execute the mission. The Army expects that training divisions will be employed to meet part of this requirement in addition to other missions, such as Military Occupational Specialty refresher training.

In addition to providing Individual Ready Reserve refresher training during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM as cited by the GAO, elements of the training divisions also conducted One Unit Station Training for selected military skills, Common Task Training, and selected combat support/combat service support Military Occupational Specialty refresher training.

The GAO states that, during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM training divisions had difficulty because division headquarters were not mobilized and divisions had not planned for mobilization of less than a division. During peacetime operations, subordinate brigades of the training divisions routinely activate for training augmentations of Active duty training centers, and perform their assigned missions, without parent headquarters. During Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, relationships established by the divisions and installations were instrumental in overcoming planning difficulties and are a direct result of the conduct of Mobilization Army Training Centers.

Prior to Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, Army Reserve Training Divisions were not tasked or trained to execute the Individual Ready Reserve refresher training missions. Some drill sergeants within the training divisions, accustomed to training basic recruits with no prior military experience, may have encountered initial difficulties in adjusting to refresher training of experienced soldiers of the Individual Ready Reserve.

The GAO reported the Individual Ready Reserve refresher training plan unworkable and that the Army is reassessing the refresher training mission. This is not an accurate assessment. To assure refresher training was well executed, in a December 28, 1990 message, Training and Doctrine Command directed the strategy that would be used by its proponent schools. The strategy was principally based on the existing post-mobilization training strategy for Individual Ready Reserve soldiers found in Training and Doctrine Command's Individual Ready Reserve Training Model. Some adjustments were made to the this strategy, but it provided the refresher training foundation. Training and Doctrine Command is continuing to refine the model in order to incorporate Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM lessons learned and enhance its methodology.

It is inaccurate to conclude the Army has had no plan to conduct an analysis of refresher training requirements. An analysis of refresher training requirements for existing mobilization

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

Appendix I  
Comments From the Department of Defense

planning scenarios recently has been finalized by the Army Personnel Command. That analysis may be adjusted because of emerging Joint Chiefs of Staff planning scenarios, which will be provided to the Army. Such an analysis, however, would not determine if refresher training missions would be given solely to the training divisions.

\* \* \* \* \*

RECOMMENDATIONS

**RECOMMENDATION 1:** The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army, as a part of the Army's mobilization training analysis: (1) determine the viability of the Individual Ready Reserve refresher training mission for the training divisions, and (2) if found viable, determine the number of training divisions required to perform the mission. (p. 8/GAO Draft Report)

Now on p. 4.

**DOD RESPONSE:** Partially concur. The primary mobilization mission of training divisions remains Initial Entry Training for new soldiers. The divisions provide the sole expansion capability for the peacetime training base. However, during the recent Gulf crisis, training divisions demonstrated that it is viable for them to conduct refresher training missions. In the aftermath of the announced Base Force and emerging mobilization planning scenarios, an analysis of appropriate missions for training divisions will be fully considered. It is, therefore, the Department's position that to determine the number of training divisions needed solely for Individual Ready Reserve refresher training, as opposed to how many are needed for their primary mission in addition to that refresher training, would represent inadequate mobilization planning.

**RECOMMENDATION 2:** The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army deactivate those training divisions not required for a mobilization training mission. (p. 8/GAO Draft Report)

Now on p. 4.

**DOD RESPONSE:** Partially concur. The Army QUICKSILVER reductions were intended to deactivate or merge training division structure not needed for future mobilization training missions. Reducing training divisions further without careful analysis could do irreparable damage to the Total Army. The Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, in coordination with Forces Command and the Training and Doctrine Command, is reviewing current force structure in anticipation of evolving training division missions. Until that analysis is complete, it is premature to conclude what force structure is appropriate.



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The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's letter dated May 22, 1992.

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## **GAO Comments**

1. We revised the report to reflect the number of soldiers who can be trained in the first 26 weeks of full mobilization.
2. Department officials told us that the confirmation attributed to Total Army Assessment 99 is based on the fact that no objections were raised to the planned reduction during the assessment.
3. Our conclusion that the Individual Ready Reserve refresher training plan was unworkable is based on the Army's departure from the refresher training strategy contained in the mobilization plan that existed prior to Desert Storm, not the plan used for the operation.
4. The refresher training requirements analysis discussed by the Department pertains to the outdated mobilization planning scenarios. Our conclusion is based on refresher training requirements associated with the new illustrative scenarios developed by the Joint Staff. Army officials told us that they expected to receive the new scenarios in June 1992.

# Major Contributors to This Report

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