

GAO

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and International Affairs Division

B-226595

October 9, 1987

The Honorable Jack Brooks Chairman, Legislation and National Security Subcommittee Committee on Government Operations House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your October 2, 1986, request, we reviewed the problems that the Department of State has experienced in constructing a six-story office building for the United States Information Agency (USIA) in Calcutta, India. Although construction began in November 1985, the foundation has not yet been completed. The project has already experienced extensive delay and significant cost overrun primarily because of problems with the diaphragm walls.¹

Specifically, we found that (1) confusion existed as to whether the Indian firm that was awarded the contract was the lowest bidder and what costs were included in the contract; (2) the diaphragm walls built by the contractor failed, halting construction for about 8 months and causing substantial damage to an adjacent property; (3) the contractor refused to cooperate with State's Office of Foreign Buildings Operations (FBO) in correcting the problem until FBO agreed to pay added costs; (4) FBO engineers lost confidence in the contractor's technical ability to resolve the problem and considered terminating the contract; and (5) after discussions with the Ambassador and the Embassy staff, FBO officials were convinced that contract termination was not a viable course of action because of "probable consequential political damage."

The building, originally scheduled to be completed by January 1988, at a contract cost of approximately \$7 million, is now scheduled for completion by September 1989 (a 21-month delay). The contractor has already submitted claims for delay costs and added work totalling about \$3.2 million beyond the contract price, but the FBO Director estimates that these claims can be settled for \$1.2 million. In addition, FBO has indicated that the added costs for certain items, underestimated by the contractor in his bid price, will increase the total project cost by another \$375,000. Thus, a cost overrun between \$1.6 million and \$3.6 million is anticipated.

¹Diaphragm walls are used to hold the soil back so that the basement foundation can be laid.

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GAO/NSIAD-88-8 Overseas Construction, Calcutta, India

Background	The USIA building in Calcutta is designed to be a reistructure with about 40,000 square feet of space. Twith a basement was to be paid for in excess Indian U.S. architect and engineering firm to perform the design the building. In June 1985, FBO sought poten July 1985, FBO had screened the prequalification da 12 contractors and concluded that 5 were qualified ference in August 1985, 3 of the 5 firms submitted firms were from Calcutta and one was from New D sand miles away from the construction site. Accord the New Delhi contractor (Ansal Properties and Ind known primarily as a real estate broker and develop the three bids.	The six-story building in rupees. ² FBO hired a site survey and tial contractors. By ata submitted by . After a pre-bid con- bids. Two of the elhi—about a thou- ling to FBO officials, dustries Ltd.) was
Table 1: Bids for Contract to Construct USIA Building		Did in H.O. dollar
USIA Building	Contractor	Bid in U.S. dollar equivalent
	Ansal Properties and Industries Ltd. (New Delhi)	\$6,978,903
	M. L. Dalmiya & Co. Ltd. (Calcutta)	7,766,949
	Larsen & Toubro Ltd. (Calcutta)	14,742,616
Confusion Over Contract	Ansal, as the low bidder, was awarded the contract In evaluating the bids, the U.S. Embassy contractin alerted FBO that, unlike the other two contractors, A provisional allowance items ³ worth about \$1,368,00 have been added to Ansal's bid. Had that amount b would not have been the lowest bidder.	g officer in Calcutta Ansal did not include 00, which should
	FBO records indicated that the matter was rechecke Embassy with the contractor, and the contractor sa were included in the bid. Ansal's bid indicated that were included in various cost components, but the a shown as a separate line item. However, since the c	id that these items allowance items amount was not ontract was awarded,
	FBO records show that the contractor has at times s	tated that allowance

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items were not included in the contract price; at other times the contract tor has acknowledged that the items were included. Thus, what the con- tract price includes and whether the contractor was the lowest bidder has been a controversial issue.
In August 1987, the FBO Director advised us that (1) allowance items were included in the bid price, but Ansal had claimed that it had under- estimated both the quantities and associated costs for such items; (2) these matters were being negotiated; and (3) he estimated that there would be an increase of \$375,000 in the cost for allowance items.
According to FBO officials and documents, the contractor was unfamilia with the construction environment in Calcutta, had problems mobilizing necessary equipment and using local subcontractors, and was uncooper ative with the FBO on-site Project Manager.
Between October 1985 and August 1986, the Project Manager repeated reported the contractor's uncooperative attitude to FBO officials in Washington. He also reported delays in the project because of the con- tractor's ineffective work planning and deficient knowledge of local an- site conditions.
FBO records indicate that on several occasions work was interrupted du to equipment breakdown. The Project Manager complained that work stoppage was due to faulty equipment, lack of material, and lack of per sonnel, which he considered "inexcusable and intolerable."
In August 1986, the diaphragm walls failed on two sides. The eastern wall bowed and threatened to collapse altogether. The northern wall failed and caused substantial damage to an adjacent parking structure and service building, owned by the Indian Tobacco Company. ⁴ According to State Department documents, the failure of the diaphragm walls on both sides of the property threatened the safety of people and property
For 5 months FBO officials in Washington and the Project Manager tried unsuccessfully to get the contractor to correct the problem. On August 12, 1986, the Project Manager gave the contractor a written notice of th

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Early FBO Problems With the Contractor	According to FBO officials and documents, the contractor was unfamiliar with the construction environment in Calcutta, had problems mobilizing necessary equipment and using local subcontractors, and was uncooper- ative with the FBO on-site Project Manager.
	Between October 1985 and August 1986, the Project Manager repeatedly reported the contractor's uncooperative attitude to FBO officials in Washington. He also reported delays in the project because of the con- tractor's ineffective work planning and deficient knowledge of local and site conditions.
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Failure of Diaphragm Walls	In August 1986, the diaphragm walls failed on two sides. The eastern wall bowed and threatened to collapse altogether. The northern wall failed and caused substantial damage to an adjacent parking structure and service building, owned by the Indian Tobacco Company. ⁴ According to State Department documents, the failure of the diaphragm walls on both sides of the property threatened the safety of people and property.
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FBO and Embassy Differ on How Best to Resolve Situation	Although FBO officials were grappling with how to resolve the technical problems with Ansal, U.S. Embassy officials wanted FBO to withdraw the stop-work order and resume construction for nontechnical reasons. Notes made by the Project Manager on various meetings with Embassy officials held in November 1986 show that Embassy officials tried numerous approaches to convince FBO not to terminate the contract with Ansal. Embassy officials were concerned that such an action (1) would strain the Indo/American relationship, ⁵ (2) could present legal problems, ⁶ and (3) might cause a scandal. According to these notes, the Embassy officials indicated that the Ambassador was not concerned about costs and he recommended that FBO go beyond contract requirements to help Ansal solve its problems. These notes also indicate that the Embassy officials said that they would seek to have the Project Manager replaced if he recommended the contract with Ansal be terminated. Our discussion with Embassy officials and a review of other documents generally corroborate that these were the positions taken by the Embassy.
	According to the Project Manager's report covering September 1986 through February 1987, the Ambassador claimed that FBO could not ter- minate Ansal's contract under any circumstances—a fact that the con- tractor had expressed to the Project Manager on several occasions. The report concluded that the project must therefore continue with a con- tractor who has frequently violated the contractual requirements.

⁵Calcutta is in the state of West Bengal, where the Marxist state government is unfriendly to the United States. Embassy officials felt that if the contractor refused to willingly withdraw from the project, the U.S. difficulties with the contractor would probably receive extensive publicity and this could exacerbate U.S. relations with the host government.

⁶The legal problem alluded to concerns the prospect of the contractor suing FBO and tying up the project for years in the Indian court system, similar to what is happening on the New Delhi senior officer residences. Feeling that an Indian contractor had provided shoddy workmanship and had overcharged for certain items in the senior officer residences, FBO refused to pay certain charges. The contractor then refused to relinquish possession of two units, and the case is expected to be in legal dispute for several years.

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A January 13, 1987, cable from the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi reminded FBO that "the President has delegated to the Ambassador the duties of the coordinator of U.S. policies and activities in India, and that all offices of the government here are to keep him fully informed at all times about their activities. The Ambassador feels, therefore, that the activities of FBO fall within his purview." According to the cable, the Ambassador wanted to delay delivery of the show-cause letter until all the risks had been fully explored.

By cable dated January 16, 1987, the Director of FBO again cited the history of the problems with Ansal. He told the Ambassador that FBO's decision to send a show-cause letter to the contractor was made after a careful and thorough review of all the facts. He also said he hoped that the Ambassador would permit the Project Manager to proceed with the letter. After receiving this cable, the Ambassador authorized the delivery of the show-cause letter. On January 23, 1987, FBO delivered the letter to Ansal. Ansal then contacted U.S. Embassy officials in New Delhi and requested that FBO permit Ansal to complete the project in Calcutta. The Embassy arranged for FBO and Ansal to meet and discuss the problems.

FBO Decides to Continue With Contractor

In early February 1987, an FBO team met with Embassy officials and discussed the Calcutta project and the contractor's performance. The FBO team then met with the contractor to hear his detailed response to the specific deficiencies identified in the show-cause letter. The FBO Director advised us that FBO decided to retain the contractor based on the report prepared by the team leader after these discussions.

The team leader reported that the contractor was unsuccessful in his attempt to persuade the FBO team of the validity and technical merits of his proposal to correct the problems with the diaphragm walls, and the FBO team continued to have no confidence in the contractor's proposed solution. However, he concluded:

"It is a fact of life in these parts that to terminate Ansal for cause will result in a highly visible and extremely acrimonious contest between U.S. government and Ansal. It is also a fact of life that such a contest is anathema to post for reasons of two occasions, construction engineers from A/FBO [in Washington] visited Calcutta to specifically review project problems with the Project Manager and with Ansal. Both engineers concur with and verify the accuracy of the Project Manager's reports."

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
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Conclusion	The foundation has not yet been completed and the project is already encountering substantial delay and cost overrun. The diaphragm walls had to be rebuilt and braced; FBO estimates that the project will be com- pleted 21 months later than originally anticipated; the original cost of the contract of \$7 million will be increased by \$1.6 to \$3.6 million; and the adjacent property has been damaged. These factors seem to provide reasonable technical justification for terminating the contract. However, concern about probable consequential political damage appears to be the basic reason the contract was not terminated.
Objective, Scope, and Methodology	Our objective was to review the problems being experienced in con- structing the USIA building in Calcutta, India. Our review was conducted at the Department of State and USIA from January to August 1987 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We performed fieldwork at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, India, and the American Consulate in Calcutta, India. As requested, we did not obtain official agency comments.
	As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of State

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