

United States General Accounting Office Report to the Secretary of the Army

April 1987

ARMY MAINTENANCE

Continuing Problems in Performing Maintenance at the User Level



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GAO

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and International Affairs Division

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April 24, 1987

The Honorable John O Marsh, Jr. The Secretary of the Army

Dear Mr Secretary

Army maintenance is a key ingredient in the readiness of U.S. defense forces. This report focuses on problems the Army continues to have in maintaining equipment at the user level.

This report contains recommendations to you. As you know, 31 U.S C 236 requires the head of a federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the House Committee on Government Operations and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs not later than 60 days after the date of the report. A written statement must also be submitted to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with an agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen of the above Committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Director, Office of Management and Budget, and the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Armed Services

Sincerely yours,

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Frank C Conahan Assistant Comptroller General

Executive Summary

Purpose	Efficient, effective, and economical maintenance of equipment is essen- tial to the readiness of U S defense forces Consequently, the Army devotes considerable resources to equipment maintenance, most of which is performed at the lowest organizational level—the user		
	In the past, Army efforts to provide reliable organizational maintenance efficiently and economically have been hampered by inade- quate supervision, training, and resources, resulting in deficiencies in maintenance and reporting GAO undertook this review at units within 5 of the Army's 16 active divisions to determine whether the Army has increased the effectiveness and economy of its organizational mainte- nance program		
Background	Force readiness is highly dependent upon the quality and timeliness of maintenance, the success of which is measured by how long equipment remains in operation and how quickly it can be restored to service. The user is the foundation of the Army maintenance system, where equip- ment deficiencies should be detected early and corrected before more costly, time-consuming repairs are needed. Organizational efforts consist largely of minor repairs and preventive maintenance (such as inspec- tions, lubrication, and cleaning) by equipment operators and mechanics The Army's Maintenance Management System provides for the prepara- tion and management of equipment, forms, and records required to manage maintenance on, control the use of, and report deficiencies in, the equipment.		
Results in Brief	The Army is not effectively maintaining its equipment to ensure max- imum mission capability at the least cost A long-standing problem is poorly performed maintenance and repairs at the user level. In addition, inadequate recordkeeping and reporting provide Army management a more optimistic picture of equipment condition and status than actually exists. Ultimately, these conditions stem from inadequate supervision, training, and resource management at the local level, and insufficient monitoring of organizational maintenance operations by Army management.		

Principal Findings

Deficiencies in Equipment Often Not Detected	Operators are not detecting and reporting most of their equipment defi- ciencies. Though 82 to 93 percent of the vehicles at the sites reviewed were reported as ready for combat, 50 percent of those tested failed Inspector General and Maintenance Evaluation Teams inspections. At two installations, GAO found that operators did not detect as many as 81 and 93 percent, respectively, of all the defects in their vehicles, resulting in potentially greater maintenance costs, overstated equipment conditions, and inaccurate reports of condition and status.			
Maintenance Inadequately Performed	Inadequate maintenance is creating many equipment failures, greater maintenance costs, and unnecessary downtime Much of this is due to the operators who frequently do not perform preventive maintenance of even the most routine nature			
Training, Supervision, Resources	Optimal effectiveness of organizational maintenance is hindered by inadequate supervision, training, and resources. To illustrate, in Europe, 57 percent of the Army inspection reports cited a lack of preventive maintenance training for operators. Inadequate supervision was also a major factor in poor maintenance performance. Additionally, lack of repair parts was the cause for 42 to 79 percent of the downtime on selected equipment reported as not ready for combat. Together, these deficiencies can cause ineffective and uneconomical maintenance, unnecessary downtime, and inefficiencies due to supply excesses and shortages.			
Maintenance Records Inaccurate, Incomplete	Organizational maintenance records are being improperly maintained Of the 285 Army inspections analyzed by GAO, over half reported incom- plete or inaccurate records of downtime or maintenance. Because these records are the basis for informing commanders of mission capability, inaccuracies distort assessments of actual equipment condition and organizational readiness			

Diagnostic Equipment Not Used	Although the Army has purchased several million dollars worth of diag- nostic equipment (and is buying more) to isolate and identify failures, organizational mechanics are not using it to troubleshoot vehicle fail- ures. This equipment greatly increases the speed and accuracy with which a mechanic identifies defective components. Because this equip- ment is not regularly used, vehicle defects are often wrongly diagnosed at a cost in time, effort, and parts, while mechanics remain unfamiliar with diagnostic equipment and procedures regarded as essential to suc- cess on the future battlefield			
Maintenance Monitoring Systems Impaired	Army managers lack sufficient visibility over monitoring the perform- ance of organizational maintenance Because inspection results at the user level are not normally passed to higher command levels, these com- mands have insufficient information to systematically analyze and plan for effective user maintenance			
Recommendations	To improve the quality of organizational maintenance, GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army require commanders to ensure that (1) equipment operators and maintenance personnel are properly super- vised and trained in the correct procedures and practices; (2) mainte- nance personnel are properly trained on and required to use testing and diagnostic equipment, and (3) equipment operators and maintenance personnel are held accountable for and evaluated on how well they per- form their assigned duties			
	To address the deficiencies in the Army's maintenance monitoring system, GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army direct (1) the Army Inspector General to determine why the Army has not corrected the long-standing maintenance problems identified by previous inspec- tions and audits and (2) subordinate commands to summarize and pro- vide maintenance data to their major commands to enable them to identify organizational maintenance problems and trends			
Agency Comments and GAO's Evaluation	DOD agreed with all recommendations in GAO's draft report except for its recommendation that subordinate commands summarize and provide inspection results to the major commands for comparison to data con- tained in The Army's Maintenance Management System. (See app V) DOD was concerned that summarized inspection data would not provide meaningful information for comparison with the Maintenance Manage- ment System data because the inspections could have been performed			

for varying reasons using varying criteria whereas The Maintenance Management System data is accumulated on a centralized basis using a standardized format.

However, DOD agreed that another indication other than The Maintenance Management System data is needed to better assess maintenance performance. DOD suggested that the commands be given the flexibility to determine the type of data and the format for reporting the data by their subordinate units.

 $_{\rm GAO}$ agreed with DOD's concern and modified its recommendation to reflect DOD's suggested alternative. Agency comments are discussed in detail in chapters 2 and 3

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Abbreviations

DCSLOG	Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	U.S. General Accounting Office
PMCS	Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services
TAMMS	The Army Maintenance Management System

Introduction

	The Army spends several billion dollars annually for logistical mainte- nance and supply operations in order to carry out its responsibility for supporting and maintaining an operationally ready force that can per- form its assigned combat missions. In doing so, it must operate high quality and timely equipment maintenance activities to keep or restore equipment to a mission-capable condition.
	The Army has several levels of equipment maintenance. However, all maintenance starts at the lowest level—where the units that use the equipment perform preventive work and routine servicing Vehicle oper- ator and crew preventive maintenance is the cornerstone of the entire maintenance system By identifying and correcting faults early, they can prevent more serious and costly deficiencies
Army Maintenance System	The Department of Defense sets overall policy, procedures, and respon- sibilities to guide military maintenance efforts. Its policy is to maintain weapons and equipment in a state of operational readiness consistent with the mission requirements of the operating, strategic, or tactical ele- ments and at the least total cost consistent with readiness and sus- tainability goals.
	Responsibility for overall management of Army maintenance activities is centered in the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logis- tics (DCSLOG). DCSLOG is responsible for policy development and supervi- sion of logistics organization, operations, and systems worldwide, including logistics readiness, planning, policies, and resource determina- tion. Implementation is the responsibility of major commands—such as U.S. Forces Command and U.S. Army, Europe Additionally, DCSLOG is responsible for developing and supervising the Maintenance Assistance Instruction Team program. Major commanders are responsible for oper- ating this program which helps units identify and resolve problems of maintenance, maintenance management, and associated repair parts within their units.
	Maintenance and supply activities are monitored through Army inspec- tions. Inspections can take a variety of forms and are conducted by var- ious levels of command to (1) obtain firsthand information on the current status of maintenance and (2) ensure that personnel are prop- erly performing their maintenance tasks. The most common inspections are those performed annually by the Army's Office of the Inspector General Some commands also have a Maintenance Evaluation Team which conducts inspections. The unit attempts to be at its best for these

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	announced inspections, and if deficiencies are found, the unit corrects them The units are also encouraged to use the local Maintenance Assis- tance Instruction Teams to help identify and correct maintenance- related problems.
	While it is general Army policy to perform maintenance at the lowest authorized level, the basic purpose and orientation of all levels of equip- ment maintenance are to maintain equipment in a state of readiness to support the combat forces. Although the Army is changing its mainte- nance system, at the time of our review the maintenance levels, in ascending order of difficulty, were as follows
	Organizational. Equipment operators and unit mechanics perform pre- ventive maintenance, make minor repairs, and replace modules and parts
	• Direct support Maintenance personnel diagnose and isolate equipment malfunctions, repair or replace defective items, perform light body repairs, and provide highly mobile maintenance support teams to help keep equipment working
	• General support End items are overhauled, heavy body repairs are made to major equipment, components are repaired in support of the supply system and lower maintenance levels, and technical assistance is
	 provided. Depot The life of equipment is extended through restorative maintenance
Army Maintenance at the User Level	Organizational maintenance is regarded as the foundation of the Army's maintenance system and is the responsibility of and performed by a using organization. It supports the needs of the equipment user and nor- mally consists of inspecting, lubricating, cleaning, and preserving equip- ment, making minor adjustments, and replacing easily accessible parts. Maintenance success is measured by how well the equipment remains in operation and by how quickly it can be returned to service if it becomes inoperable.
	Through frequent preventive maintenance checks and servicing (PMCS), equipment operators and unit mechanics are to use systematic proce- dures to detect early signs of equipment failure and ensure that defi- ciencies are corrected before more costly and time-consuming repairs are needed. Operators are supposed to make certain preventive mainte- nance checks each time they use the equipment. Unit mechanics, assisted by the operators, also make preventive maintenance checks

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	quarterly, semiannually, and annually. These checks provide systematic care, inspection, and servicing to (1) prevent breakdown, (2) detect faults and failures, and (3) maintain needed equipment conditions. Addi- tionally, mechanics perform corrective equipment maintenance con- sisting of adjustments, repairs, and replacements when operators report deficiencies.
	Under The Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS), operators record only those deficiencies that are beyond their capability to correct or for which they need parts. Unit mechanics record all deficiencies found, including those which must be referred to a higher maintenance level. When deficiencies prevent the equipment from being used for daily operations, the defects should be promptly reported to the unit commander so that he is constantly aware of the equipment's condition. TAMMS also provides for active Army units to report the condition status of assigned equipment to management on a monthly basis. Under TAMMS the Army also receives actual performance data for selected equipment under a sample data collection program.
Prior Audits	The Army's problems with maintenance performance, parts support, and reporting are not new The Army has a history of such problems, as pointed out by us, the Army Audit Agency, and other groups reviewing maintenance in past years. For instance, in a 1978 report ¹ on organiza- tional maintenance at three installations in the United States, we noted

- maintenance had not been properly performed;
- equipment deficiencies were not properly recognized, corrected, and reported;
- · planned on-the-job training programs had not been developed, and
- parts were not always available and sometimes were not correctly ordered

The Army Audit Agency found similar deficiencies in maintenance, supply, and reporting during numerous reviews of organizational maintenance at several stateside and overseas sites in 1982-84. Additionally, a 1983 Logistics System Program Review panel appointed by DCSLOG cited inadequate operator maintenance as the most serious maintenance problem in the Army


¹<u>The Key to Improving Maintenance of Army Equipment</u> Commanders Must Motivate Their Personnel, LCD-78-428 (Dec. 22, 1978)

that


	Chapter 1 Introduction		
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology	Our overall review objective was to determine whether the Army was effectively, efficiently, and economically performing equipment mainte- nance at the organizational level. Our review was performed primarily at four Army installations in the United States and two major overseas activities in West Germany. Our review covered 5 of the Army's 16 active divisions plus armored cavalry, artillery, and other non-divisional units. (See appendix I for a complete list of activities visited.) We inter- viewed Army officials and reviewed relevant documents including instructions, regulations, and directives, technical and field manuals; inspection and audit reports, management reports; and organizational procedures and practices for managing maintenance operations		
	We analyzed 285 inspection reports for the various commands and units we visited, including Corps-level command inspections and Inspector General results We also considered Maintenance Assistance Instruction Team summary data on inspections performed between October 1983 and December 1985 which covered more than 5,500 wheel and track vehicles (see photographs on pages 13 through 16 for some of the vehi- cles included in our work) assigned to 602 company-size units. We also reviewed procedures for conducting inspections and accompanied the teams on selected inspection visits. Because the Army bases mainte- nance effectiveness on equipment reported to be fully operational and ready for combat use, we also documented deficiencies identified by the inspectors that would remove the equipment from operation (i.e., "dead- line" it).		
	To determine whether maintenance recordkeeping and reporting were accurate, reliable, and complete, we compared inspection results with equipment mission-capable rates as reported by the commands inspected. We documented the management problems related to mainte- nance performance, scheduled services, parts supply, training, record- keeping, and reporting. We also reviewed maintenance failure and cost data from the Army's sample data collection program on towed and self- propelled howitzers.		
	During site visits, we obtained comments from about 100 inspectors, officials, and maintenance personnel concerning the causes of organiza- tional maintenance problems, as well as possible solutions. We con- ducted an analysis of several units that inspectors had cited for their successful maintenance operations. By comparing the results of this analysis to possible solutions, we were able to identify improvements in organizational maintenance that local commanders or higher commands could implement.		

We assessed the reliability of Army data essential to our review, including reported mission-capable figures and information obtained from sample data on howitzer maintenance failures. We did not assess the reliability of the cost data used to estimate the cost of maintenance actions or to attribute such costs to personnel-related failures. The cost data is not intended to be exact, but to provide a range of possible maintenance costs incurred Errors and inconsistencies found in the data were of relatively minor importance, so we considered the reported data to be reasonable and acceptable for our purposes. (See appendix II for further details on the reliability assessment.) Our review was conducted between February 1985 and August 1986 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Chapter 1 Introduction Figure 1.1: M-113A1 Personnel Carrier ⇔∰≯ * 1 * 1 * 1




Chapter 1 Introduction



Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 1 Introduction



Improvements Needed in Organizational Maintenance to Increase Effectiveness and Equipment Availability

The success of combat forces depends to a large extent on the quality and timeliness of equipment maintenance Accordingly, the Army measures maintenance effectiveness largely by the percentage of vehicles that it reports as mission-capable Vehicles are classified as fully mission-capable if the unit commander judges them able to perform their combat mission. This decision is influenced by the type and extent of equipment faults found on the vehicles by operators and mechanics at the user level

Army inspection reports indicate that mission-capability rates may be overstated due to organizational personnel failing to identify critical deficiencies. The inspectors looked at 5,539 vehicles, of which 4,915 or 89 percent were assigned to five Army divisions. From December 1983 to December 1985, these five divisions reported that 82 to 93 percent of their wheel and track vehicles were fully mission-capable. During approximately the same period (October 1983 to December 1985) the Inspector General and Maintenance Evaluation Teams periodically inspected vehicles considered mission-capable at these sites and found that an average of 50 percent of the vehicles contained deficiencies which placed them in an inoperable status. Although the inspections reflect the status at a point in time, the magnitude of the wide-variance between the rates reported and those found during inspections indicate that maintenance problems are not being identified and reported.

The identified organizational maintenance problems stemmed primarily from the lack of command emphasis over supervision, training, and resource management Those noted were

- · failure to properly detect and correct equipment deficiencies,
- improper maintenance performance, and
- insufficient use of diagnostic equipment

As a result of the Army's maintenance problems, its equipment availability is considerably less than it could be and maintenance costs are higher than necessary. Improperly performed preventive maintenance can have other undesirable effects as well. These include an increase in maintenance work load as poorly maintained vehicles experience more serious failures, a greater demand for parts as more vehicles experience such failures, and an increase in downtime as more deadlined vehicles await repairs and parts.

Moreover, these factors could have a serious negative interplay, each one contributing to a spiral of declining effectiveness For instance, a

	Chapter 2 Improvements Needed in Organizational Maintenance to Increase Effectiveness and Equipment Availability			
	decrease in training could mean that mainten which in turn could result in more breakdown which could leave less time for training, and addresses the maintenance performance prob organizational mechanics and suggests remed	ns and improper so on. This chapt dems by operato	repairs, ter rs and	
Organizational Personnel Are Not Accurately Detecting and Correcting Equipment Deficiencies	Our analysis of inspection reports at four installations in the United States and two major activities overseas disclosed that units were not identifying equipment defects during operator PMCS, and were not always performing the PMCS prescribed for their vehicles. As a result, many vehicles reported by the units as fully mission-capable contained deficiencies which placed them in an inoperable status upon inspection. In addition, units often were not scheduling or performing periodic ser- vicing as required, thereby increasing the likelihood of more costly cor- rective maintenance and lower equipment availability rates in the future. This inadequate performance of organizational maintenance— along with inaccurate recordkeeping and reporting (see chapter 3)— accounted for the most numerous problems noted by the 285 Inspector General and Maintenance Evaluation Team inspection reports we ana- lyzed (see table 2.1)			
Table 2.1: Problems in Organizational Maintenance Noted Most Frequently in Inspection Reports ^a		Number of reports citing problem	Percent of total reports	
	Daily PMCS not completed or recorded	181	64	
	Maintenance forms incomplete or inaccurate	149	52	
	Periodic servicing not scheduled or performed	100	35	
	Vehicle downtime not recorded or reported	97	34	
	^a Based on 285 reports			

inoperable (see table 2.2). We could not determine the effect these deficiencies would have had on the reported mission-capable rates, because some vehicles classified as inoperable could be mission-capable

Moreover, with the exception of one site (see table 2.2, note b), the inspections were conducted on vehicles that the units had reported as fully mission-capable. Any vehicles identified as inoperable by the inspectors, therefore, were in addition to those already identified by the units

Table 2.2: Total Vehicles Classified Inoperable by Inspectors at Five Sites

	Number vehicles	Vehicles made inoperable upon inspection		Total inoperable
Inspected site ^a	inspected	Number	Percent	defects
A	1,105	617	56	1,040
В	1,320	508	39	734
C ^b	449	330	73	716
D¢	•	•	•	•
E	466	248	53	483
F	2,199	1,067	49	1,636
Total	5,539	2,770	50	4,609

 $^{a}\text{Site}$ A consists of a division and a brigade, site B, two divisions, C and F, a division each, and E, nondivisional units

^bInspectors also looked at some non-operational vehicles

^cNo detailed vehicle inspection data were maintained for site D

The problem with unit personnel not identifying maintenance defects is illustrated by the fact that at one site (table 2.3), less than 20 percent of the equipment problems found by inspectors had been identified by unit personnel.

Table 2.3: Comparison of EquipmentProblems Found by Inspectors and byUnit Personnel (Site A)			Total making	a identified	
		Number of vehicles	Total problem		
	Type of vehicle	inspected	Inspectors ^a	Personnel	Percent
	1/4 ton jeep	454	1,896	308	16
	1-1/4 ton truck	352	1,741	358	21
	2-1/2 ton truck	165	1,215	227	19
	5-ton truck	96	519	110	21
	Other	38	45	7	16
	Total	1,105	5,416	1,010	19

^aincludes problems identified by unit personnel

	Chapter 2 Improvements Needed in Org Maintenance to Increase Effe Equipment Availability	anizational ectiveness and			
	The results of inspect second installation fro ilar PMCS performance identified only 7 perce tors. These reports als the wheel and track ve When inspectors gave operational status not Inspector General at o	m December 19 . The inspection ent of the total of to showed that 6 ehicles had one the units time t iceably improve	83 through 3 is showed the deficiencies f 57 and 52 pe or more faul to correct defe ed. For exam	July 1984 sh at unit perso found by the rcent, respec lts. fects, the vel ple, when th	owed sim- onnel had inspec- ctively, of hicles'
	the number of operational and the the number of operational terms a unit's vehicles, any of would remain undetection of the terms of	onal vehicles in st inspections co defects on the re	creased from over only fro emaining uni	n 51 to 83 pe om 10 to 50 p	rcent. percent of
Sample Data on Howitzer Failures Corroborates Inspection Findings of Poor Performance	The sample data colled and Army managers a ment, including the to maintenance tasks red other Army vehicles maintenance problems tracked over a period severity of Army main	ctual performa wed and self-pr juired for the ho According to co s, which the san of about 5 to 9 ;	nce data on s opelled how owitzer are s ntractor offi nple data col years, typify	specific type itzers. Organ similar to the cials, the ho lection prog the kinds a	s of equip- uzational ose for witzer ram has nd
	According to data coll correcting failures tha 70 percent of the main nature (see table 2.4). ment failures more of	in preventing th itenance perfor In effect, the A	nem. The figu med on hown .rmy is react:	ires show th itzers is corr ing to howit:	at 53 to ective in
Table 2.4: Preventive and Corrective Maintenance for Howitzers			Total maintenance	Percent of m	
	Type of howitzer	Number of vehicles	hours performed	Preventive	Corrective
	M-198	68	16,354	30	70
	M-109A2	64	24,177	42	58

 $^1\mathrm{See}$ appendix IV for a list of common maintenance problems concerning howitzers

44

75

251

20,725

63,843

125,099

40

47

43

60

53

57

M-109A3

M-110

Total

Chapter 2 Improvements Needed in Organizational Maintenance to Increase Effectiveness and Equipment Availability

Army sample data collection results² disclosed that 37 to 47 percent of howitzer and M578 recovery vehicle failures are caused by improper preventive and corrective maintenance, carelessness, and operator error Hardware—or equipment design—failures accounted for the rest. Such maintenance comprises a considerable part of the Army's cost for howitzer maintenance. Using maintenance costs accumulated on howitzers included in the Sample Data Collection program, we estimated that the Army spends at least \$1.7 million annually (see table 2 5) for howitzer maintenance, and over \$715 thousand is incurred on maintenance failures due to improper preventive and corrective maintenance practices, carelessness, and operator error. These costs are based on repair as opposed to replacement of the repairable items. The maintenance costs could be as much as \$4.1 million annually, and the costs due to improper practices could be as much as \$1 7 million annually if the parts were replaced rather than repaired

Table 2.5: Estimated Additional							
Maintenance Costs Incurred Due to			Equi	oment ty	pes		
Improper Maintenance and Operational Practices®(Dollars in Thousands)		M109	M110	M198	M102	M578	Tota
	Total vehicles in sample data collection program	108	75	68	18	32	301
	Annual maintenance costs	\$681	\$791	\$90	\$31	\$118	\$1,711
	Percent due to improper maintenance and use	43	41	42	32	42	
	Estimated additional costs due to improper practices	\$294	\$324	\$38	\$10	\$49	\$715

^aComputed from data available in the Army's Sample Data Collection Program

Lack of Supervision, Training, and Resource Management Contributes to Inadequate Organizational Maintenance Through analysis of inspection reports and discussions with maintenance and management officials, we concluded that first-line supervision, training, and resources (for example, parts and maintenance publications) were major factors in determining how well a unit performed organizational maintenance. We identified several units that inspectors cited for having effective organizational maintenance operations. We analyzed these successful operations to determine which elements were essential to an effective program, and then discussed our results with numerous maintenance officials and inspectors. From our analysis and discussions, the principal elements of effective organizational maintenance operations appeared to be

²See U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command second semiannual management report for fiscal year 1984, titled <u>AMCCOM Artillery Controlled Sample Data Collection (SDC)</u> <u>Program</u>

Supervision		Emphasis by the local command on the importance of vehicle maintenance. Thorough first-line supervision of operator PMCS
Training	•	Sufficient operator and first-line supervisor PMCS training (both formal and on-the-job training)
Resources	•	Sufficient parts, tools, publications, personnel, and time for maintenance activities
		The absence of these elements could result in the maintenance perform- ance problems the inspectors identified. We found that inspection reports for units with organizational maintenance problems repeatedly cited deficiencies which could be attributed to these areas. Maintenance and management officials agreed that these elements are important fac- tors in a unit's organizational maintenance performance. Since the suc- cessful units we reviewed covered a variety of unit types ³ and had employed these elements, we believe that units throughout the Army could benefit by application of the same elements.
Local Supervision of Maintenance Operations Is Cited		To perform work that meets standards, personnel must have clear instructions, adequate facilities, and necessary equipment and tools. It is equally important that they know what the work standards are and what constitutes acceptable work quality Ensuring that these needs are met is the responsibility of the supervisor.
		The lack of supervision appears to be a continuing problem in organiza- tional maintenance Previous GAO and Army Audit reports have cited the lack of supervision as a major contributing factor to ineffective mainte- nance at the organizational level. According to recent Army Audit reports, supervisors were frequently not on hand during scheduled maintenance workdays During our review, almost 85 percent of the officials we interviewed at installations in the United States considered the lack of supervision an important factor in the inadequate perform- ance of PMCs Also, inspection reports by Inspector General and Mainte- nance Evaluation Teams of 45 units in Europe showed that lack of first- line supervision contributed to poor maintenance performance

 $^{3}\ensuremath{\text{These}}$ included armor, field artillery, signal, engineering, aviation, maintenance, and cavalry units

Chapter 2 Improvements Needed in Organizational Maintenance to Increase Effectiveness and Equipment Availability

Unit Personnel Not Receiving Sufficient Training	In organizational maintenance, the manager is responsible for training the people who work in the maintenance shops. The training of greatest importance is that which develops the technical skills of equipment operators, mechanics, and TAMMS and supply clerks; they are the people whose skills will most affect maintenance performance. Operators, espe- cially, as the first line of defense against equipment failures, should be well-trained in vehicle operation and PMCS.
	We visited two Army equipment maintenance schools and found that they do not teach operators and mechanics all the critical tasks, but only those needed to reach apprenticeship. Consequently, these people cannot perform at the desired job level (journeyman) immediately upon assignment to the field. The Army expects local commanders to fill the training gap between apprentice and journeyman through supervised on-the-job training and other local training programs. For example, since the Army provides no formal training (including PMCS) for operators of most wheeled vehicles, it relies upon unit and battalion commanders to provide this training. The Army teaches system mechanics only 16 per- cent of the critical tasks for the M60 tank, and 29 percent for the M1 tank—enough for apprenticeship. Unit commanders must provide the experience and on-the-job training needed to attain a more experienced level
	However, operators and mechanics do not appear to be receiving suffi- cient training at the local level. Inspection results at the sites reviewed indicated that operators lacked PMCS training. For example, at two sites inspectors found that unit personnel had identified only 7 and 19 per- cent of the vehicle defects identified by the inspectors. Forty-four per- cent of the inspection reports at all sites cited the units for improper scheduled servicing and corrective maintenance. Discussions with main- tenance officials indicated that they fault the Army's training system for lack of proper training. Of the 41 maintenance and inspection offi- cials we interviewed at U.S. sites, 59 percent cited insufficient formal training as a cause for PMCS non-performance. In Europe, 57 percent of the inspection reports cited insufficient PMCS training for operators
Units Need to Improve Management of Repair Parts and Other Resources	Supply of parts is a very important element of effective maintenance and mission-capability rates. Without parts to replace defective compo- nents, maintenance can not be performed. Consequently, the Army pro- vides basic guidance on managing the supply of parts at the organizational level—how to compute required levels, when and how much to order, which requisitioning priorities to use, and how to manage

Chapter 2 Improvements Needed in Organizational Maintenance to Increase Effectiveness and Equipment Availability

stock levels However, many of the sites in our study were not effectively following this guidance. Our analysis of the 285 inspection reports showed that improper parts supply practices were common among the units, contributing to the lack of timely, economical, and effective performance of organizational maintenance. The most frequently occurring supply deficiencies for all six sites were as follows:

- Required parts not on hand. An inspection of one battalion disclosed that three of its companies had no parts on hand for 41 to 63 percent of the type of parts they were required to stock.
- Required parts not on order At one unit, inspectors found no repair parts on hand or only partial balances on hand for 18 different parts, and the items had not been reordered
- Abuse of the priority system for ordering parts. One unit exceeded Army criteria by using high-priority requests for 23 to 43 percent of its total part orders in 4 out of 6 months.
- Excess parts on hand One battalion was stocking over \$100,000 worth of items, including expensive fire-control items not normally authorized at the organizational level. Officials responsible for monitoring the stock were unaware that the unit had the items.

Deficiencies in parts supply can increase downtime, decrease missioncapable time, and increase supply costs. Downtime due to unavailability of parts can be determined through equipment condition status reports consolidated by the Army Materiel Readiness Support Activity These reports show that 42 to 79 percent (see table 2.6) of total downtime on selected equipment for two major commands was because parts were lacking for necessary repairs.⁴

⁴We could not determine the extent of downtime due to not having the authorized parts on-hand versus the downtime attributed to parts the units were not authorized to stock

Table 2.6: Percent of Total Downtime Attributed to Lack of Parts for Selected Equipment (For Year Ending June 1985)

Vehicle	Major command	Range of downtime due to unavailability of parts (percent)
M1 tank	1 2	6579 6475
M-109 howitzer	1 2	53-64 52-72
M-113 armored personnel carrier	1 2	42-49 70-73
2-1/2 ton truck	1 2	53-57 57-59

The five divisions we reviewed had similar losses in operational time due to inadequate parts supply. For the 2 years ending in December 1985, these divisions reported over 1.5 million non-mission-capable days for all their ground equipment (including wheel and track vehicles) and missiles. Sixty-five percent of this downtime, or almost one million days, was attributed to lack of parts. These figures may well be understated, since the majority of equipment deficiencies were not identified and recorded.

Inspection reports and discussions with officials also disclosed that maintenance publications were frequently in short supply. Publications are a necessary reference for operators, mechanics, TAMMS, and supply clerks. Publications such as technical manuals, supply manuals, catalogs, and bulletins convey standards and specifications for maintenance, repair, parts supply, and inspections. Yet, inspection reports frequently showed that maintenance publications were missing, outdated, or not ordered. Chapter 2 Improvements Needed in Organizational Maintenance to Increase Effectiveness and Equipment Availability

Increased Use of Diagnostic Equipment Would Facilitate More Effective Organizational Maintenance	The Army has provided its units with 6,000 sets of diagnostic equip- ment, at costs exceeding \$23 million, for use in troubleshooting vehicles. However, we found that these sets were used very little at the sites we visited In addition, we learned from inspection reports that the sets were not always properly calibrated, and personnel were not properly trained or supervised in their use Reasons given for the limited use at one activity were that the sets were too cumbersome and time- consuming to use and personnel did not know how to use them
	An Army study ⁵ of maintenance at 5 installations found that the diag- nostic sets were used to identify only 2 of 537 maintenance failures on 150 commercial utility cargo vehicles during a 6-month period. According to officials who were responsible for the study, the diagnostic sets had been used for less than 20 percent of the maintenance failures for which they were designed.
	According to one inspection team chief, organizational mechanics do not receive adequate training in the use of diagnostic sets during their formal maintenance training at Army schools. Some mechanics increase their skills in this area through self-study and practical application, but most cannot or do not Moreover, most mid-level maintenance supervi- sors have never received formal training on current diagnostic sets, so they do not require their mechanics to use them. Instead, many still rely on repair by trial and error
Conclusions	The Army continues to have problems in performing preventive and cor- rective maintenance on its equipment at the user level, with operators and maintenance personnel not identifying and correcting vehicle defi- ciencies or performing periodic scheduled services. Principal reasons for these situations include the lack of command emphasis on supervision, training, and management of repair parts and other resources. Addition- ally, the Army is heavily reliant on the use of test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment to quickly diagnose a maintenance failure and replace the failed part or component to keep the equipment operational and minimize out-of-service time. Currently, the Army is making only limited use of the diagnostic equipment at the organizational level, relying instead on trial and error substitutions—a practice that is not only time-consuming but is also costly in terms of parts. The ultimate effects are a decrease in the mission capability of equipment as vehicles

⁵Logistic Management Analysis Summary for the Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle (Sept. 30, 1985)

	Chapter 2 Improvements Needed in Organizational Maintenance to Increase Effectiveness and Equipment Availability
	are deadlined for repairs and parts, and maintenance costs are higher due to the more serious repairs required from the delay
Recommendations to the Secretary of the Army	We recommend that the Secretary of the Army reemphasize to com- manders at all levels the importance of maintenance in supporting an effective combat force, and direct the commanders to ensure that equipment operators and maintenance personnel are properly super- vised and trained in the correct procedures and practices; maintenance personnel are properly trained on and required to use test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment, and equipment operators and maintenance personnel are held accountable for and evaluated on how well they perform their assigned duties.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation	DOD concurred with our recommendations and provided information on on-going and planned actions to implement them. For example, with regard to the need to reemphasize the importance of maintenance, DOD stated that the Army had established the Chief of Staff Award for Main- tenance. These awards are presented annually to emphasize Army lead- ership's interest and emphasis on maintenance. In addition, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics conducts a world-wide maintenance conference every 2 years to discuss maintenance problems, concepts, and approaches. The next conference is scheduled for April 1987
	In response to our recommendations that equipment operators and maintenance personnel be properly trained and supervised, DOD out- lined several actions intended to increase the amount of training for these individuals. Furthermore, supervisors are to receive increased training, and Army regulations are being revised to more directly state maintenance duties and responsibilities. DOD also stated that additional training would be provided to supervisors on the use of test, measure- ment, and diagnostic equipment. In its opinion, this is the best way to ensure the proper use of such equipment by maintenance personnel.
	In commenting on our last recommendation that operators and mainte- nance personnel should be held accountable for and evaluated on how well they perform their duties, DOD stated that appraisals and effi- ciency reports are now used to evaluate maintenance personnel in those cases when maintenance is a stated portion of an individual's duties. In those cases where maintenance is a collateral responsibility of officers, they are to be counseled by their raters on the importance of and their

Chapter 2 Improvements Needed in Organizational Maintenance to Increase Effectiveness and Equipment Availability

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responsibilities for effective equipment maintenance. In addition, the Chief of Staff, as part of his weekly newsletter will reemphasize the important role and responsibility that maintenance personnel and supervisors have toward keeping the forces combat ready.

DOD and the Army were responsive to our recommendations, and their on-going and planned actions should help correct the problems we identified We believe, and DOD and Army officials agree, that a key ingredient for improving maintenance responsiveness is command emphasis

Maintenance Reporting and Monitoring Should Be Improved to Provide Complete and Reliable Information

	Improvements are needed in recording and reporting organizational maintenance data via TAMMS According to inspection reports, mainte- nance records were often inaccurate or incomplete, resulting in erro- neous reports of equipment condition Consequently, fewer vehicles were available for operations than reported, resulting in overstated mis- sion-capability rates for equipment Inspector General and other command inspections, which have consist- ently reported the problems of organizational maintenance at individual units, should have served to alert Army management to the inadequate performance and reporting of organizational maintenance. However, because these inspection results are not routinely reported above the battalion level, the scope and implications of organizational maintenance problems often remain obscure to higher management officials
Maintenance Records and Reports Are Often Inaccurate and Incomplete	Our analysis of 285 inspection reports for the six sites over a 27-month period identified numerous instances of the maintenance records showing daily PMCS improperly recorded or completed, failing to include all vehicle downtime, and failing to include all scheduled and performed maintenance servicing As shown by our analysis of inspection reports for 5,539 wheel and track vehicles from October 1983 to December 1985, 50 percent, or 2,770 vehicles, had defects which made them unsuitable for operation. During this same period, the commands reported that 82 to 93 percent of their equipment was fully mission-capable—or conversely, that only 7 to 18 percent was unsuitable for operation. These discrepancies occurred largely because the units were not thoroughly detecting and reporting PMCS deficiencies. (See table 2 2, for the condition of the equip- ment as found by the inspectors.)
Maintenance Monitoring Should Provide Management Complete and Accurate Information	Ideally, a good maintenance information system should alert managers to general trends and persistent problems with vehicle upkeep. There should also be some means of cross-checking or monitoring the system's accuracy to ensure that decisions are based on reliable information TAMMS and command inspections can be used for such purposes. TAMMS provides management at all levels an indicator of the general effectiveness of equipment maintenance by reporting whether those vehicles that the units have inspected are mission-capable. TAMMS

Chapter 3 Maintenance Reporting and Monitoring Should Be Improved to Provide Complete and Reliable Information

prescribes the records and procedures to be used to control and manage Army equipment and maintenance. These include equipment operational, maintenance, and historical records such as (1) the Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet, (2) the Preventive Maintenance Schedule and Record, and (3) the Materiel Condition Status Report.

While the first two records are used predominately by the local level, the latter report—the Materiel Condition Status Report—is prepared for all levels This report provides unit commanders a worksheet for figuring equipment status and readiness. Active Army units prepare this report monthly to inform commanders of the equipment status of their units, thereby enabling them to predict equipment availability. The report provides an overall assessment of organizational maintenance effectiveness and also provides a tool to monitor important items that need considerable maintenance on a continuing basis. Finally, this report is used in compiling the Unit Status Report, which gauges the overall readiness of Army units in equipment, personnel, and supply. Army management can use this report to indicate the general maintenance effectiveness—which it does through the percentage of equipment reported as mission-capable.

The Army monitors maintenance performance at the organizational level through a variety of inspections, the most common being annual inspections by its Inspector General. Most local Inspector General offices provide battalion and unit commanders formal reports of their inspections, detailing deficiencies on specific equipment. Corps-level commands also use Maintenance Evaluation Teams to conduct inspections. However, in contrast to the Materiel Condition Status Reports, neither the Inspector General nor the Maintenance Evaluation Team reports are routinely given to command levels above battalion

TAMMS alone does not ensure the accuracy of a unit's mission-capable status, nor does it clearly indicate the general effectiveness of organizational maintenance or the existence of equipment problems TAMMSgenerated status reports can be overstated, and, although inspections detect gaps between the reported status and the actual condition of equipment in individual units, the channel for informing Army headquarters and major commands of such gaps is not effectively used. At present the Army does not require inspection results to be compiled and summarized for submission to upper management. Consequently, managers may remain unaware of widespread problems in organizational maintenance, as they do not receive sufficient data to detect differences existing between reported and actual equipment condition. Chapter 3 Maintenance Reporting and Monitoring Should Be Improved to Provide Complete and Reliable Information

Conclusions	Inadequate performance of organizational maintenance persists, in part, because of reporting and monitoring systems weaknesses. As a result, the poor maintenance performance is not being reported to responsible Army management. Though the Army can monitor maintenance through TAMMS and command inspections, recordkeeping errors, compounded by the manner in which the data are compiled and reported, greatly limit the management utility of TAMMS and inspections.
	While TAMMS reports show Army vehicles to be in a high state of readi- ness, Inspector General and other command inspections show otherwise. As a result, commanders and managers are assessing equipment status and making management decisions based on invalid, incomplete data Moreover, the Army's monitoring of equipment condition and status through its inspections does not routinely provide for submission of summary data needed by Army management to detect and correct sub- stantial problems and trends in maintenance performance and equip- ment status
	If higher level managers received periodic summaries of inspection reports—such as those regularly issued by the Inspector General and Maintenance Evaluation Teams—they could identify and monitor the existence, scope, and impact of the many problems in organizational maintenance Management would thereby be more assured of the availa- bility of materiel and have a better basis for instituting corrective actions in organizational maintenance
Recommendations to the Secretary of the Army	We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Army Inspector General to evaluate the causes of inadequate equipment status reporting and determine why the Army has not cor- rected the long-standing maintenance problems, and direct subordinate commands to summarize and provide maintenance data to major commands so as to identify organizational maintenance problems and trends.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation	DOD concurred with our first recommendation and proposed actions that are responsive. To illustrate, DOD said that the basic causes for the maintenance problems seem to be the lack of compliance, interest, training, and supervision. The Army Inspector General will emphasize these problems to all of its Inspectors General In addition, inspection results will be furnished to the Department of Army Inspector General,

Chapter 3 Maintenance Reporting and Monitoring Should Be Improved to Provide Complete and Reliable Information

summarized, and provided annually to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics.

DOD did not concur with a proposal in our draft report that the Secretary of the Army direct subordinate commands to summarize and provide their inspection results to their major commands for comparison with TAMMS data in order to identify organizational maintenance problems and trends, and develop corrective actions The intent of our proposal was to provide Army commanders at the major command level with a basis for comparing how their subordinate commands were carrying out their maintenance responsibilities, and to provide an indicator, in addition to TAMMS data, for identifying problem areas

DOD's concern was that summarizing the results of numerous inspections which may have been performed for varying reasons using varying criteria could not be directly correlated with the TAMMS data which is accumulated on a centralized basis using a standardized format. Furthermore, DOD was concerned that the voluminous number of inspections would inundate the commands with paperwork

DOD agreed, however, that another indicator besides TAMMS data was needed to better assess maintenance performance and suggested that a better approach would be for the commands to determine the type of maintenance data that should be summarized and forwarded to them by their subordinate commands

After considering DOD's comments, and in view of the actions DOD plans to take to implement our first recommendation, we agreed with DOD's suggested alternative. We revised the language of our recommendation accordingly

Army Bases in the United States	 XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas III Corps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky Ordnance Center and School, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland
Army Activities in Europe	 V Corps Headquarters, Frankfurt, Germany 8th Infantry Division, Bad Kreuznach, Germany
Headquarters and Other Army Activities	 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Washington, D C Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D C Logistics Evaluation Agency, New Cumberland, Pennsylvania Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Virginia Materiel Readiness Support Activity, Lexington, Kentucky Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, Rock Island, Illinois Tank Automotive Command, Warren, Michigan

Reliability Assessment of Information Obtained From Two Computer Data Bases

Our review of Army organizational maintenance included the use of computerized data involving reports and data bases maintained by two Army materiel managers. The reports are as follows.

- Unit Equipment Status and Serviceability Report
- Equipment Historical Availability Trends.
- · Rehability, Availability and Maintainability reports
- Maintenance cost reports

To ensure that the data used in our review were reasonable and accurate, we conducted reliability assessments of the two computerized data bases from which these four reports are derived. The first two reports are generated from the Readiness Integrated Data Base maintained by the Materiel Readiness Support Activity and concern reported equipment condition and status. The latter two reports are prepared from the Artillery Sample Data Collection data base maintained by the Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command and concern procedural problems on howitzers and cost data associated with corrective maintenance.

Results and Conclusions	We assessed the reliability of input and output documents and internal processing controls for each of the data bases. Specifically, we
	 identified the computer data to be used and its importance to the audit product,
	 reviewed the procedures used to collect, record, and process the data, as well as internal controls,
	 reviewed agency policy, procedures, and other documentation;
	 interviewed agency officials, including a source data collector, computer programmer, and operator, as well as administration and review officials;
	 administered questionnaires regarding the computer system, data flow, management and internal controls, and
	 tested the reliability of a sample of source documents that included 1,440 computer entries for 24 source documents
	Our assessment of the Sample Data Collection system did not include an evaluation of the reliability of the cost data used to expand reliability, availability, and maintainability data into a cost report. However, we did discuss the content of the cost report with agency officials and per- formed limited tests on the man-hour dollar rates used as a basis for the report.

Appendix II Reliability Assessment of Information Obtained From Two Computer Data Bases

We found that some of the procedures did not precisely follow generally accepted practices However, the differences would not materially alter the reliability of the four reports. Based on our assessment, we concluded that the input, processing, and output controls are adequate in the production of these four reports. Internal controls provide reasonable assurance that data are accurately and completely processed Consequently, we considered the reports reliable for the purposes of our review.

List of Track and Wheel Vehicles Included in Review by Equipment Type and Location^a

		Vehic	e locatio	n ^b		
Track vehicle	A	В	C	E	F	Tota
Tanks						
M-1	•	115	•	•	•	115
M-60	•	9	81	•	198	288
M-48/551	3	1	•	•	•	4
Total	3	125	81	•	198	407
Armored recovery vehicles						
M-578	•	2	2	2	23	29
M-88 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —	-	21	12	•	31	64
Total	•	23	14	2	54	93
Armored carriers						
M-113	•	108	28	14	343	493
M 2/3	•	70	2	•	•	72
M-548	•	36	2	1	51	90
M-577	•	37	14	9	92	152
M-901	•	16	5	•	86	107
Total	•	267	51	24	572	914
Artillery vehicles						
M-106	•	8	3	1	40	52
M-109	•	46	12	•	42	100
M-110	•	11	•	•	7	18
M-125A2	•	•	2	•	•	2
Total	•	65	17	1	89	172
Air defense vehicles						
	•	8	•	•	•	8
M-730	•	4	•	•	٠	4
Total	•	12	•	•	•	12
Miscellaneous				·		
M-728	•	•	1	•	•	1
Total	3	492	164	27	913	1,599

Appendix III List of Track and Wheel Vehicles Included in Review by Equipment Type and Location

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		Vehic	le locatio	on¤		
Wheel vehicle	A	В	C	E	F	Total
Jeeps	454	169	85	74	393	1,175
Trucks					•	
1/2 ton	13	•	•	•	•	13
3/4 ton	4	75	8	75	39	201
1 1/4 ton	352	201	32	71	237	893
2 1/2 ton	165	240	105	147	428	1,085
5 ton	96	116	45	72	136	465
8 ton	1	20	6	•	53	80
10 ton	•	7	4	•	•	11
Total	631	659	200	365	893	2,748
Miscellaneous						
M-198 towed howitzers	17	•	•	•	•	17
Total	1,102	828	285	439	1,286	3,940
Total	1,105	1,320	449	466	2,199	5,539


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^aThe Army inspections generally covered a 15 to 27 month period ranging from October 1983 to December 1985

^bNo detailed vehicle inspection data was maintained for location D

Common Problems and Their Causes for the M109-Series Howitzer

Problem	Cause
Batteries dead or damaged	Overused without recharge Power left on overnight Electrolyte not checked or corrected
	Posts or case damaged
Part assembly electrically shorted or mechanically seized	Internal corrosion from water forced in during high- pressure cleaning and then trapped
Fire control equipment (including cases) damaged	Rough handling
Part unnecessarily removed (i.e. not defective)	Troubleshooting incorrect or not performed
Idler/roadwheels damaged (e.g. elongated holes, bolts sheared), wheel/track fell off	Loose or improperly torqued attaching hardware
Starter motor burned out	Insuffic ent cool-down time allowed between start attempts
Radiator punctured, leaks	Radiator hit, dropped, etc. (usually during power pack exchange)
Fan bearings or bevel gears failed	Not lubricated per lubrication order
Rammer tray support cracked	Rammer not securely stowed when tube elevated, or round dropped on end of tray
Air filters torn or damaged	Beaten against object



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	(GAO CODE 393104) OSD CASE 7186
	"ARMY MAINTENANCE: THE ARMY CONTINUES TO HAVE PROBLEMS PERFORMING EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE AT THE USER LEVEL
I	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE
	* * * *
1	FINDINGS
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	FINDING A: Army Maintenance. The GAO observed that efficient, effective, and economical maintenance is essential to the readiness of U.S. defense forces, and a major Army responsibility is supporting and maintaining an operationally ready force. The GAO further observed that the Army must depend on quality and timely equipment maintenance to keep or restore material to a mission capabl condition. The GAO also observed that the Army spends several billions of dollars annually for logistical maintenance and supply operations. The GAO reported that responsibility for overall management of Army maintenance i centered in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), which develops policy, while maintenanc implementation is the responsibility of major commands. Th GAO found that maintenance and supply activities are monitored through Army inspections conducted by various levels of command. While the most common inspections are those conducted annually by the Army Inspector General, the GAO learned some commands also have a Maintenance Evaluatio Team that conducts inspections. In addition, the GAO found that units are also encouraged to use the local Maintenance Assistance Instruction Teams. (p. 2, pp. 8-10/GAO Draft Report)
	DoD RESPONSE: Concur. Unit level maintenance is the cornerstone of the maintenance program.
•	FINDING B: Maintenance At The User Level. The GAO observed that organizational maintenance is the foundation of the Army's maintenance system. The GAO reported that maintenance success is measured by how well the equipment remains in operation and how quickly it can be returned to
ł	service. The GAO further reported that through preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), equipment operators and unit mechanics use systematic procedures to detect early
1	signs of equipment failure and ensure that deficiencies are corrected before more costly and time-consuming repairs are
	needed. The GAO also reported that under the Army
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I	Maintenance Management System (TAMMS), operators record only those deficiencies beyond their capability to correct or for which they need parts, while unit mechanics record

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	Enclosure
Jowpp 9-10	all deficiencies found. The GAO found that the Army is in the process of changing its maintenance system, and a key element is the forward-support maintenance concept. According to the GAO, the objective of the new concept is to minimize maintenance turn around time. The GAO concluded, however, that the forward maintenance concept will not materially affect the problems it identified. In addition, the GAO concluded that vehicle operator and crew preventative maintenance is the cornerstone of the entire maintenance system and that by identifying and correcting faults early, they can prevent more serious and costly deficiencies. (pp. $8-12/GAO$ Draft Report)
	<u>DoD RESPONSE</u> : Concur. Forward support doctrine is a concept to quickly return an item to use which has suffered damage or breakdown. The concept primarily applies to support maintenance rather than to unit level maintenance.
	FINDING C: Prior Audits. The GAO noted that prior audits by the GAO, the Army Audit Agency, and other groups indicate that the Army's problems with maintenance performance, parts support and reporting are not new. The GAO specifically referred to its December 22, 1978 report, "The Key To Improving Maintenance Of Army Equipment: Commanders Must Motivate Their Personnel." The GAO observed that in the prior report it had found (1) maintenance had not been properly performed, (2) equipment deficiencies were not properly recognized, corrected and reported, (3) planned on-the-job training programs had not been developed, and (4) parts were not always available and sometimes were not correctly ordered. The GAO noted that the Army Audit Agency had found similar deficiencies in maintenance, supply and reporting during numerous reviews of organizational maintenance during the period 1982 through 1984. In addition, the GAO reported that a 1983 Logistics System Program Review Panel cited inadequate operator maintenance as the most serious maintenance problem in the Army. Despite the prior program review and the findings in the earlier reports, the GAO concluded that the Army continues to have problems in performing preventative and corrective maintenance on its equipment at the user level. (pp. 12-13,
Now pp 10, 27	p. 30/GAO Draft Report)
	<u>DoD_RESPONSE</u> : Concur. Unit maintenance will always need to compete for resources and command emphasis. The current condition will, however, be improved. During the period covered by the GAO report, many initiatives have been taken to improve unit level maintenance. The Maintenance

Management Improvement Program (MMIP) was established to provide for the exchange of maintenance information, problems and solutions, between maintenance managers in a systematic manner. Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 750-1, "Organizational Maintenance Guide for Leaders," was revised to provide more specific guidance on how to establish and supervise a good unit level program. The US Army Ordnance Center and School organized a Unit Level Maintenance Staff Office (ULMSO). Under this charter the ULMSO is the single focal point in developing solutions for problems associated with ground support maintenance at the unit level. In 1985, a pamphlet, "Functional Users Guide for Motor Pool Operations" was published to provide guidance for operation of motor pools. Guides for the Battalion Maintenance Officer are now being developed. Mission Capability Rates Overstated. The FINDING D: GAO found that Army inspection reports indicate that mission-capability rates may be overstated due to organizational personnel failing to identify critical deficiencies. The GAO reported that, for instance, from October 1983 to November 1985, Army inspectors looked at 4,915 vehicles assigned to five divisions and found an average of 50 percent of the vehicles reported as mission capable contained deficiencies that placed them in inoperable status. During this same period, however, the divisions had reported that 82 to 93 percent of their wheel and track vehicles were fully mission-capable. The GAO concluded that as a result of the Army's maintenance problems, its equipment availability is considerably less than it is reported to be or it could be, and maintenance costs are higher than necessary. The GAO also concluded that other effects of poor maintenance are (1) increased maintenance workload, (2) greater demand for parts, and (3) an increase in downtime. Now pp 18-19, 27-28 (pp. 16-17, p. 30/GAO Draft Report) DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The DoD agrees that rates may be overstated. The direct equation of maintenance inspections and readiness rates, however, is not correct. A maintenance deficiency may not cause an item to be not mission capable. The deficiency may be immediately corrected and thus not require a not mission capable day to be recorded. Maintenance emphasis is often placed on correction of the mission ready items at the expense of other maintenance work. Thus the status of maintenance may degrade before a drop in readiness rates. FINDING E: Organizational Personnel Not Detecting And Correcting Deficiencies. The GAO found that, at the f installations in the U.S. and the two major activities The GAO found that, at the four it visited overseas, units were not identifying equipment defects during operator Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS). The GAO further found that operators were not always performing the PMCS prescribed for their specific

Now pp 3, 19-21	<pre>vehicles. In addition, the GAO found that units often were not scheduling or performing periodic servicing, as required. The GAO observed that inadequate performance of organiza- tional maintenance (along with inaccurate recordkeeping and reporting) accounted for the greatest number of citations in the Inspector General and Maintenance Evaluation Team inspection reports analyzed by the GAO. The GAO also found that at one site, less than 20 percent of the equipment problems found by inspectors had been identified by unit personnel. At a second site, the GAO reported that inspections of 17 units by the Inspector General (from December 1983 through July 1984) showed that unit personnel had identified only 7 percent of the total deficiencies found. The GAO concluded that operators are not detecting and reporting most of their equipment deficiencies, and are not performing periodic scheduled services. (p. 3, pp. 17-21, p. 30/GAO Draft Report)</pre>
	DoD RESPONSE: Concur. This situation is symptomatic of the need to improve training and supervision addressed in other findings, and will resolve itself as problems of training, supervision, and command emphasis are solved.
Now pp 21-22	 FINDING F: Data On Howitzer Failures. The GAO noted that the sample data collection program provides actual performance data on specific equipment to developers and Army managers. The GAO reported that, according to contractor officials, Howitzer maintenance problems (tracked by the sample data collection program over a period of 5 to 9 years) typify the kinds and severity of Army maintenance problems found by the GAO. The GAO observed that according to data collected, 53 to 70 percent of maintenance is corrective, thus Army maintenance shops spend more time correcting failures than preventing them. The GAO further observed that according to this data, a large portion of Howitzer and M578 recovery vehicle failures is caused by improper preventative and corrective maintenance. The GAO estimated that of the \$1.7 million the Army spends for Howitzer maintenance annually, \$715,000 is incurred on failures due to improper preventative and corrective maintenance practices, carelessness and operator error. (p. 3, pp. 21-23/GAO Draft Report)
	DOD RESPONSE: Concur. Some clarification is appropriate, however. The GAO states that 53 to 70 percent of maintenance is corrective rather than preventive. It implies that spending more time correcting than preventing is not desirable, which is theoretically correct. It should be recognized however, that the Army must train with its equipment and thus it will require repairs. The Department nonetheless des agree that it is desirable to eliminate and prevent any maintenance that is not necessary or cost effective. Many hours of preventive servicing have been saved, for example, by changing oil on the basis of analysis


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	rather than time/miles. This has changed the ratio of corrective to preventive time. Optimum ratios are not,
	however established for Army equipment.
Đ	FINDING G: Unit Personnel Not Receiving Sufficient Training. Through analysis of inspection reports and discussions with maintenance and management officials, the GAO found that training was a major factor in determining how well a unit performed organizational maintenance. The GAO also found that sufficient operator and first-line
ì	supervisor PMCS training were essential in those units conducting effective training, and that the absence of such training could result in maintenance performance problems observed by inspectors. The GAO found that personnel effectiveness is largely determined by the training they received. The GAO reported that the two Army equipment
	maintenance schools it visited did not teach operators and mechanics all critical tasks. The GAO found that, instead, only those tasks needed to reach apprenticeship were taught and, consequently, these people cannot perform at the journeyman level upon reaching the field. The GAO reported that the Army provides no formal training (including PMCS) for operators of most wheeled vehicles, and teaches systems mechanics for only 16 percent of the critical tasks for the M60 tanks and 29 percent for the MI tank. In addition, the
	GAO found that operators and mechanics do not appear to be receiving sufficient training at the local level. Of the maintenance and inspection officials the GAO interviewed, 59 percent of those located in the U.S. cited insufficient formal training as a cause for PMCS non-performance. In Europe, 57 percent of the inspection reports cited insufficient PMCS training for operators. The GAO concluded
	that units throughout the Army could benefit by receiving sufficient training. The GAO further concluded that lack of command emphasis on training contributes to the Army's continuing maintenance problems, (p. 3, pp. 23-26, p.30/GAO Draft Report)
•	DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Army did make a conscious decision to train to the entry level rather than to the journeyman level. Additional schooling is expensive and would result in an increase to the requirement for student
	spaces. There would also be a loss of On-the-Job-Training time in the units, and time used to maintain equipment. To further enhance operators skills, unit level maintenance courses have integrated the Basic Knowledge and Skills (BK&S) concept into the training base. Training now is nine
	hours in duration, and is being increased to fourteen hours between now and FY 1988. Based on the experience gained from the Master Diagnostician program, the Army is now moving to increase the Basic Non-commissioned Officer course class time to pick up additional maintenance expertise. To
	enhance training in units, the Unit Maintenance Management System was published in 1984. It provides the unit level

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commander with a program of instruction, which allows training by level of involvement, for unit personnel. FINDING H: Lack Of Supervision. As with training, the GAO found that first-line supervision, as well as emphasis by the local command on the importance of vehicle maintenance, was a major factor in successful maintenance. The GAO observed that, to perform the required maintenance work so as to meet standards, personnel must have clear instructions, adequate facilities, and necessary equipment and tools. The GAO further observed it is equally important that personnel know what the work standards are and what constitutes acceptable work quality, and this is the responsibility of the supervisor. The GAO found, however, that lack of supervision appears to be a continuing problem in organizational maintenance. The GAO noted that, according to recent Army Audit reports, supervisors were frequently not on hand during scheduled maintenance work days. The GAO reported that 85 percent of the personnel it interviewed at U.S. installations considered lack of supervision an important factor in the inadequate performance of PMCS. The GAO concluded that units throughout the Army could benefit by the application of adequate supervision of maintenance. The GAO also concluded that the lack of command emphasis on supervision is a primary reason the Army continues to have problems in performing organizational maintenance. (pp. 23-25, p. Now pp 22-23, 27 30/GAO Draft Report) DOD RESPONSE: Concur. Line supervisors must be more knowlegeable and supportive of operator maintenance. Many units now have programs training supervisors. A pamphlet on how to do unit level maintenance has been published. Also, the Army has consolidated maintenance references into the "Unit Maintenance Management UPDATE" to provide a single source document. Other training improvements are described in the response to Finding G above. In addition, AR 750-1 is being changed to use language that is more direct and positive in stating maintenance duties, responsibilities, and supervision. FINDING I: Improved Management Of Resources Needed. The GAO found that the availability of resources, such as parts, is a major factor in the success of organizational maintenance. As with training and supervision, the GAO observed that sufficient parts, tools, publications, personnel and time for maintenance activities constitute effective maintenance operations. The GAO found, however, that ineffective parts management routinely showed up in deficiencies cited in inspections. While the Army provides guidance on managing parts at the organizational level, the GAO found that many sites were not effectively following this guidance and improper parts supply practices were common. The GAO reported that the most frequently occurring



diagnostics at Army schools. The GAO also found that most mid-level maintenance supervisors have never received formal training on current diagnostic sets. The GAO concluded that, instead of using diagnostics, the organizational level still relies on trial and error -- a practice that is not only time consuming but is also costly in terms of parts. (pp. 29-31/GAO Draft Report) Now p 27 $\underline{\text{DoD RESPONSE}}$: Concur. Training and increased emphasis is needed in the area. The Army has been working on several issues. Progress has been made in simplifying new test equipment and procedures. Efforts to improve skills and confidence at the supervisory level resulted in a Master Diagnostician training program. It has been so successful that the additional training in test and diagnostic procedures will be made part of all (E6) Basic NCO courses for ground maintenance occupational specialties. Having NCOs skilled in using TMDE will increase their supervisory abilities and troubleshooting techniques. FINDING K: Maintenance Records and Reports Are Often Incomplete. The GAO noted that according to the inspection reports it reviewed, maintenance records were often inaccurate or incomplete, resulting in erroneous reports of equipment condition. According to the GAO, these inaccurate or incomplete records meant that fewer vehicles were available for operations than reported--ie., missioncapability rates for equipment were overstated. Also, the GAO analysis of 285 inspection reports for the six sites it studied over a 27-month period identified numerous instances of maintenance records which indicated (1) PMCS completed, although it had not actually been performed and (2) failure Į. to include all vehicle downtime shown on the Preventive Maintenance Schedule and Record on the Material Condition and Status Report. The GAO found that the discrepancies between command reports and the results of inspections (discussed in Finding D above) occurred largely because units were not thoroughly detecting and reporting PMCS deficiencies. The GAO concluded that inadequate performance of organizational maintenance persists, at least in part, because of reporting and monitoring system weaknesses. The ł GAO also concluded that, although the Army can monitor maintenance through the TAMMS and command inspections, recordkeeping errors, compounded by the manner in which the data are compiled and reported, greatly limit the utility of TAMMS and inspections to have the necessary impact on management. (pp. 32-33, p. 35/GAO Draft Report) Now pp 36 32 DoD RESPONSE: Concur. A system for uniformly evaluating maintenance is needed. Maintenance compliance inspections are needed to correctly and uniformly determine maintenance status. They also serve as a motivating factor to improve maintenance quality. This issue will be examined

	by the World Wide Maintenance Conference in April 1987, and in other forums. A decision on policy for maintenance compliance inspections will be made by 30 July 1987.
	• FINDING L: Maintenance Monitoring Should Provide
	Management With Complete and Accurate Information. The GAO observed that, ideally, a good maintenance information
ļ	system should alert managers to general trends and persistent problems with vehicle upkeep. The GAO noted
I	there should also be some means of cross-checking or
	monitoring the system's accuracy to ensure that decisions are based on reliable information. The GAO found that TAMMS
1	and command inspections can be used for such purposes. The
	GAO noted that TAMMS prescribes the records and procedures
	to be used to control and manage Army equipment and maintenance. These include equipment operational,
	maintenance, and historical records such as (1) the
	Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Schedule and Worksheet,
	(2) the Preventative Maintenance Schedule and Record, and (3) the Material Condition Status Report. The GAO found
	that, while the first two records are used predominately by
	the local level, the latter reportthe Material Condition Status Reportis prepared for all levels. The GAO further
1	found that, while the Army monitors maintenance performance
	at the organizational level through inspections, neither the
	individual inspection report nor a summary of the data is routinely given to command levels above battalion. The GAO
	concluded that, even though TAMMS reports show Army vehicles
	to be in a high state of readiness, Inspector General and
	other command inspections show otherwise and, as a result, commanders and managers are assessing equipment status and
	making management decisions based on invalid, incomplete
	data. The GAO further concluded that if higher level managers received periodic summaries of inspection
	reportssuch as those regularly issued by the Inspector
	General and Maintenance Evaluation Teamsthe reliability of
	TAMMS could be monitored over a broad base and the existence, scope, and impact of the many problems in
	organizational maintenance identified. The GAO observed
1	that management would thereby be more assured of the
	availability of material and have a better basis for instituting corrective action in organizational maintenance.
	(pp. 32-35/GAO Draft Report)
	DoD RESPONSE: Concur. Complete and adequate
1	maintenance monitoring requires valid comparison of unit maintenance program/status against standards or other units.
1	Care must be used, however, not to confuse equipment
I	readiness reporting with maintenance status. There are elements in TAMMS that may be used as maintenance
ł	indicators; for example, the turn around time of support
	maintenance and the frequency and severity of support
	necessary to comparable units. Local inspection teams, summaries and trends provided by Maintenance Assistance and

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1 Instruction Teams (MAIT) and Command Logistics Review Teams (CLRT) also provide program indicators. The pending automation of maintenance forms and records under the Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS) and the Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS1 and SAMS2) will greatly improve maintenance management. The ADP systems will validate trends, indicate common faults, and evaluate the status of equipment maintenance in a more timely, accurate and uniform manner.

	RECOMMENDATIONS
Now p 28	• <u>RECOMMENDATION 1</u> : The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army reemphasize to commanders at all levels the importance of maintenance in supporting an effective combat force. (p. 31/GAO Draft Report)
	DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Chief of Staff Army Award for Maintenance Excellence was established in 1982 to emphasis maintenance and demonstrate the interest of Army leadership. Additional measures will be reviewed in the April conference.
Now p 28	• <u>RECOMMENDATION 2</u> : The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army reemphasize to commanders at all levels the need to ensure that equipment operators and maintenance personnel are properly supervised and trained in the correct procedures and practices. (p. 31/GAO Draft Report)
	DOD RESPONSE: Concur. Improvement in training and supervision accomplished and planned has been discussed (See Findings G & H). The reinstatement of standardized compliance inspection may provide the solution.
Nowp 28	 <u>RECOMMENDATION</u> 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army reemphasize to commanders at all levels the need to ensure that maintenance personnel are properly trained on and required to use test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment. (p. 31/GAO Draft Report)
	DoD RESPONSE: Concur. Training to provide proficiency and confidence in supervising NCOs, is the best way to insure proper use of TMDE. (See DoD response to Finding J).
Nowp 28	• <u>RECOMMENDATION 4</u> : The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army reemphasize to commanders at all levels the need to ensure that equipment operators and maintenance personnel are held accountable for and evaluated on how well they perform their assigned duties. (p. 31/GAO Draft Report)
	• <u>DoD RESPONSE</u> : Concur Use of performance appraisals and efficiency reports in connection with maintenance of equipment is now required in cases where maintenance is a stated portion of an individuals duties. It will also be reemphasized where it is an implied, or collateral, responsibility. Maintenance responsibilities should be covered, when appropriate, during the required counseling of officers by their raters using the Officer Evaluation Report Support Form.

ow p 32	• <u>RECOMMENDATION 5</u> : The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army direct the Army Inspector General to evaluate the causes of inadequate equipment reporting and determine why the Army has not corrected the long-standing maintenance problems (p. 36/GAO Draft Report)
	DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The basic causes seem to be compliance, interest, training, and supervision, as indicated by the proceeding recommendations. The Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) will make this subject an item of special emphasis for IGs worldwide. The results of their inspections will be furnished to the DAIG, summarized, and provided to the DCSLOG annually. Logistic system changes are the purview of the DCSLOG.
wp 32	• <u>RECOMMENDATION 6</u> : The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Army direct subordinate commands to summarize and provide inspection results to major commands for use with TAMMS data in identifying organizational maintenance problems and trends, and taking action necessary to resolve them. (p. 36/GAO Draft Report)
	DoD RESPONSE: Nonconcur. Summarizing inspection results from the current decentralized system would not provide meaningful information. The inspections reflect widely varying interests and criteria. Other information to identify maintenance problems and trends is now available to the major commands. Summarized TAMMS data is available from the Army Materiel Command (AMC). For example; the Materiel Readiness Support Activity (MRSA) maintains the Readiness Integrated Data Base (RIDB), complied from Equipment Readiness Reports. This provides on line capability to compare units by equipment readiness as well as comparing readiness by system. MRSA has the capability to draw Sample Data Collection (SDC) data from the AMC commodity commands. Standard SDC management reports normally show the top 20 repair parts by frequency, and the top 20 by total dollar value. This provides an excellent highlighting of current problems.

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