

DOCUMENT RESUME

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[Response to the Northeast-Midwest Economic Advancement Coalition for Information on Military Base Closure Criteria]. LCD-78-319; B-168700. March 9, 1978. 3 pp. + 3 enclosures (13 pp.).

Report to Rep. Bob Traxler; Rep. Donald J. Mitchell; Rep. Frank Horton; Rep. James Oberstar; Rep. Michael Harrington; by Fred J. Shafer, Director, Logistics and Communications Div.

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Congressional Relevance: Rep. Bob Traxler; Rep. Donald J. Mitchell; Rep. Frank Horton; Rep. James Oberstar; Rep. Michael Harrington.

Criteria used by the three military services for military base alignment and closure decisions are discussed. The enclosures to the report provide material related to these criteria presented at hearings before the House Committee on Appropriations: Department of Defense Subcommittee and Military Construction Appropriations Subcommittee. Included in these criteria are: mission requirements, budget/manpower restraints, cost savings, personnel turbulence, civilian labor market, facilities/housing availability, capital investment, geographical location, land area, impacts on other services/agencies, community impact, reserve components support, mobilization and contingency requirements, encroachment, and long-range plans. (DB)

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UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

LOGISTICS AND COMMUNICATIONS
DIVISION

MAR 9 1978

B-168700

The Honorable Michael Harrington, House of Representatives
The Honorable Bob Traxler, House of Representatives
The Honorable Frank Horton, House of Representatives
The Honorable James Oberstar, House of Representatives
The Honorable Donald J. Mitchell, House of Representatives

I am responding to your letter of July 25, 1977 to the Comptroller General in which you asked what criteria are used by the Department of Defense in military base alignment/closure decisions; the weight given to each criterion; and the methodology utilized in the cost/benefit analysis in which the criteria are used.

The criteria used by the three military services for military base alignment and closure decisions are attached. We were informed by an official of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for installations and housing that there is no formula of weights applied to the criteria.

Our prior reviews of base alignment and closure decisions have confirmed that the services do not use a formula of weighted criteria in their decision process. Rather, as the Air Force stated it, the major considerations and criteria have been evaluated for each base alignment proposal in total, as opposed to evaluating each criteria independently. Additionally, the Army stated that its analysis of base alignment criteria do not necessarily produce clear-cut advantages for proposed realignments because decisions are often charged with great emotionism. For example, the Army noted that the decision-making criteria often work at cross-purposes to one another. On the one hand the Army is short of permanent facilities in every construction category; and if a base is to be closed, it usually means "walking away from" some permanent facilities. On the other hand, if the missions performed at the post can be performed satisfactorily by consolidating them with missions at other posts, then substantial overhead savings could

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generally be realized. We believe that both of these statements are realistic assessments of the base alignment decision process.

The cost/benefit methodology used by the military services to demonstrate the economic viability of proposed base alignment actions usually involves a comparison of the estimated one-time costs to implement the action with the estimated annual savings and cost avoidance which will result from the action. The Department of Defense policy is to recover the estimated costs of proposed realignments within a seven to ten year period.

While each service has its own regulations for estimating costs, and recognizing that each alignment action may be unique, we have found that there are certain fundamental elements generally common to the proposed alignment cost/benefit analyses.

The analyses utilize the concept of current dollars, which reflects the purchasing power of the dollar at the time the alignment is proposed. The analyses are usually restricted to those direct expenses for which the service or the Department of Defense obtains appropriations. The major element of annual recurring savings is the value of the eliminated positions, both civilian and military. Military positions eliminated are recognized as savings even though the personnel filling those positions may be used to meet other requirements rather than being eliminated from the budget and end-strength of the military. This is because the individual action is usually part of a broader change or restructuring action designed to provide for an overall more efficient and more effective base structure, and to develop economics that could be plowed back into combat capability or used for other higher priority purposes. The current series of restructuring actions has been on-going since fiscal year 1973.

Another commonality of the military services' cost analyses is that they do not include the estimated costs of other Federal agency aid programs, which are implemented as a result of the base closure or alignment action. In our reviews of the alignment actions, we are usually able to obtain expert estimates of some costs such as unemployment

B-168700

compensation and payments to school districts. We cannot, however, estimate the total Federal costs with any reasonable degree of certainty because specific information on the types and extent of aid which may be requested and provided is not usually available at the time of our review.

We trust that this information will meet your needs.

Sincerely yours,



F. J. Shafer
Director

Attachment

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1974

4/3/73

HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

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PART 1

Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff
Reprogramings, Fiscal Year 1973



CRITERIA FOR BASE REALIGNMENT ACTIONS

1. **PURPOSE.** The purpose of this document is to present the criteria and major considerations used within the Army to determine which bases and activities should be consolidated, reduced, realigned or closed.

2. **BACKGROUND.**

a. Army missions involve the accomplishment of a wide variety of functions requiring both general and specialized accommodations. The base structure varies from administrative office space to production/rebuild plants; from troop bases with tens of thousands of acres to small complexes in urban areas. As missions and the size of the Army vary, so do the requirements for bases and facilities.

b. The Army continually reviews its missions, strength and structure and, concomitantly, the base structure requirement to insure that it is in proper balance. Some requirements are relatively fixed because they support more stable missions such as military schools, research and development activities, materiel testing and specialized depot activities. These bases may experience variations in workload, however, the need for the bases, and their physical plants, is a continuing requirement. On the other hand, some Army missions are subject to large variations and may either generate additional requirements or reduce requirements for bases. Examples are training centers for basic and advanced individual training, aviation training facilities, production facilities, administrative space to support specialized activities and troop unit bases.

c. The Army also reviews its missions to determine where and in what manner it can consolidate, realign and reduce resource requirements and still operate efficiently. This review may or may not result in a change in the base structure.

d. Inherent in these analyses are consideration of the following criteria (not rank-ordered):

MISSION REQUIREMENTS	IMPACTS ON OTHER SERVICES/AGENCIES
BUDGET/MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS	COMMUNITY IMPACT
COST SAVINGS	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
PERSONNEL TURBULENCE	RESERVE COMPONENTS SUPPORT
CIVILIAN LABOR MARKET	MOBILIZATION AND CONTINGENCY
FACILITIES/HOUSING AVAILABILITY	REQUIREMENTS
CAPITAL INVESTMENT (SUNK COST)	ENCROACHMENT
GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION	LONG RANGE PLANS
LAND AREA	

e. The Army does not wish to convey that the analyses will produce clear-cut advantages for proposed realignments vis-a-vis related alternatives. This is not always the case. Decisions are often charged with great emotionalism for the decision makers, the public and Congress. There are formidable realities that must be confronted. Some examples follow:

(1) Investment in Facilities. The decision making criteria often work at cross-purposes to one another. On the one hand, the Army is short of permanent facilities in every construction category; and, if a base is to be closed, it usually means "walking away from" some permanent facilities. On the other hand, if the missions performed at that post can be performed satisfactorily by consolidating them with missions at other posts, then substantial overhead savings could generally be realized.

(2) One-time Realignment Cost. A factor complicating the execution of realignment actions, regardless of the long range savings associated with the actions, is their one-time costs. These costs must be amortized within a reasonable period of time.

(3) Emergency Expansion. The Army often finds itself in a "cross-fire" with respect to base management and pressing facilities requirements. In some cases, the urgency of the moment forces the Army to adopt courses of action which run counter to the long range (pacetime) objectives. For example, during the Vietnam war the Army expended funds on aviation facilities at a number of bases, all of which will not be required by a peacetime Army.

3. **MISSION REQUIREMENTS.** The base structure of the Army exists to support Army missions. These missions are influenced by many factors, e.g., strategy, budget, force level, Department of Defense guidance, weapons systems, new

technology, etc. As mission changes occur, an analysis of the resources, including bases, allocated to accomplish that mission is made by the Department of the Army staff agency having proponentcy for the mission. Existing resources are weighed against the new requirements and adjusted accordingly. It is here that those bases no longer required for accomplishment of the changed mission are most frequently identified. It is here that the economies of consolidation, realignment or reduction in scope of operations are identified. The ability of each base to meet the unique operational and training requirements of the assigned force or function is of paramount importance.

4. BUDGET/MANPOWER CONSTRAINTS. These constraints permit retention of only the minimum number of bases; demand the avoidance of costs for unnecessary personnel relocations; and militate against construction of those bases with limited land area and outdated, old, functionally inefficient facilities requiring large investments for replacement facilities. Significant annual savings may result from the closure of such bases. Consolidation of missions on a single multi-mission base which subsequently results in a base closure generally produces significant annual savings. However, these savings are offset in some instances by additional investment at the gaining base. Additionally, one-time relocation costs become a factor. In evaluating the budget implication of base realignments it is necessary to weigh initial and annual savings against the one-time construction and movement costs of the various options. In general, large outlays in construction or equipment funds are not feasible and options which depend on such outlay are avoided unless no other viable alternative exists.

5. COST SAVINGS. The objective of the Army is to accomplish the assigned mission at the least cost. Where alternatives exist it is essential that the "least cost" both in terms of dollars and manpower, be selected. The decision maker must not be lulled into thinking that the proposed action will save an amount approximately equaling the base's operating budget and military pay if he closes the base. In cases where the mission requirement for the base is eliminated, a savings equaling the operations cost prior to phase down and closure cannot be achieved. As the activity phases down, fewer plumbers, carpenters, supply clerks, etc. are needed and utility costs also decrease. Those savings would be realized with or without closure. In cases where the mission is not eliminated the savings at the base to be closed must be offset by the increased costs at the base (or bases) assuming the mission to determine net savings. In this connection, a base function easily overlooked is that of area support. Many bases provide support to the Reserves, ROTC, recruiting activities, air defense and a host of other Army and other service activities in the geographical area. Although it is feasible to provide many of these services from another location, or through contract, these alternatives carry offsetting costs.

6. PERSONNEL TURBULENCE. The adverse impact of military and civilian personnel turbulence must be given significant consideration because of both the high cost and the adverse effect on morale.

7. CIVILIAN LABOR MARKET. Many Army missions involve utilization of a highly specialized and unique civilian work force. Many of these people establish deep roots in the local community and are reluctant to dislocate with the transfer of the functions they perform. The lack of appropriate labor market thus becomes a factor in evaluating proposed realignment actions.

8. FACILITIES/HOUSING AVAILABILITY. Maximum utilization of existing government facilities with minimum expenditures for new facilities is the primary goal in realignment actions. This includes both mission related facilities and support facilities. The facility types that are of prime concern in base realignment actions vary dependent on the mission under consideration. For combat and combat support units, the firing ranges, vehicle maintenance space, parking area and maneuver area are of major concern in evaluating realignment proposals. Conversely, for administrative and headquarters activities, adequate administrative space is essential. For training activities, classroom and student housing are key factors. For all actions, availability of housing (bachelor and family) is a significant element. However, facility availability varies in importance and influence on base realignment actions. In some cases, mandatory requirements exist. For example, adequate firing ranges and maneuver area are an absolute requirement for combat and combat support units. Certain unique facility requirements are generated by intelligence, communications, logistical, and research and development activities. Relocation of these functions which do not have facilities available to accommodate them may not be feasible due to the cost of new facilities. Also, due

to mission requirements, the required facilities must often be available prior to transfer of the function. This can often be expensive in terms of delay in savings to be realized as well as redundancy in equipment and facilities. Additionally, in considering bases for closure, the overall condition of the real property facilities at the base is an important element in the selection process. Relocation of an activity housed on a base with considerable substandard facilities - both prime mission as well as support - may be most effective even if certain facility criteria cannot be initially met. Over a period of time provision of a few additional facilities could prove economically beneficial as opposed to a large expenditure for expensive replacement facilities at the former base. An additional facility consideration is the extent of area support to other bases. For example, if a base provides hospital, housing, and other support facilities for surrounding bases, then it may not be possible to completely close the base. As a result, savings from the realignment are significantly less than at a base where all activities can be shut down and facilities declared excess.

9. **CAPITAL INVESTMENT (SUNK COST).** Realignment actions are designed to achieve the best utilization of permanent facilities at large, multi-mission bases. If relocation of a function or mission requires new construction of duplicate facilities, then the cost reduction sought must be carefully weighed against movement and construction costs that result from the proposed realignment. This consideration is especially important in view of the shortage of construction funds and the large construction backlog. Where mission changes dictate relocation of a particular function utilizing permanent facilities at a large, multi-mission base, attempts are made to backfill the vacated facilities with other compatible activities from small, single-mission, high cost bases or from leased facilities.

10. **GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION.** The geographic location influences the ability of assigned forces to execute their mission. Weather, terrain, vegetation, proximity to strategic airfields, transportation networks, etc., all contribute to retention of bases which enhance operational effectiveness. In some cases certain mandatory elements may present themselves. For example, basic combat training and aviation training require good weather in order to maintain course schedules. Combat and combat support training activities require appropriate firing ranges and maneuver area. Each type unit has its unique requirements. A geographical location which is adequate for the training of the infantryman would not necessarily be adequate for the training of tank crews.

11. **LAND AREA.** The need for adequate and suitable land area to support major combat units and their supporting forces is a major consideration. Bases must be capable of supporting the readiness and deployment of the assigned forces as envisioned in the United States strategy. This requirement often determines which bases will be retained in the active inventory. Where mission compatibility can be achieved, the consolidation of activities at large, multi-mission bases, takes precedence over utilization of small single-mission bases.

12. **IMPACT ON OTHER ACTIVITIES/AGENCIES.** The Army provides support to many units and activities of the Department of Defense, the other Services, and other Federal agencies. Inherent in any base realignment action is consideration of the impact on these agencies. The personnel turbulence and costs associated with relocating or supporting these type activities are an integral part of any analysis conducted.

13. **COMMUNITY IMPACT.** Civilian support resources (e.g., community housing, medical, schools, and recreational facilities) are a consideration in developing base realignment actions. Of particular importance is family housing. Areas which have residual capability to adequately house families negate the cost of providing government housing and facilitate rapid completion of the proposed action. Adequate support should exist on or off a gaining installation to avoid a realignment action being counter productive in terms of morale. Since personnel support capability on our installations is limited, the contribution of the civilian community in this area is important. Conversely, realignment actions, which reduce the Army presence in an area, seriously impact on communities, particularly those in which the major source of the economic base is the military installation. When possible, realignment actions are designed to minimize the impact on local communities. Where appropriate, assistance is provided to local community leaders in their negotiations with the Office of Economic Adjustment, Department of Defense, whose function is to assist communities in re-establishment of an economic base where reduction in Defense expenditures has been severe.

14. **ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT.** All actions must be assessed to determine their impact on the environment. Base realignment options must have an initial assessment during the preliminary planning. If significant environmental impact is indicated or the action is determined to be controversial, an either a gaining or losing base, then an environmental impact statement must be prepared.

15. **RESERVE COMPONENTS SUPPORT.** The increased emphasis on utilization of Reserve Component forces to meet future contingency requirements must be considered. Reserve units are generally constituted in areas where there are population resources. Their readiness depends upon availability of adequate ranges and training areas. This requires that the range facilities and training areas not only be of the proper size and configuration, but also that they be within reasonable commuting distance. Readiness is adversely affected by increased commuting time and corresponding decreased training time availability. Concomitantly, personnel job satisfaction is lowered and personnel recruiting and retention rates decreased. Many of our bases, both active and inactive, are used extensively for support of these units, both for week-end training and annual summer training. The impact on these type units is an integral part of any analysis conducted.

16. **MOBILIZATION AND CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS.** The type and number of bases required are determined by the need to be capable of supporting the strategy directed by national policy, the operational and training requirements of the Army, and the retention of sufficient flexibility to support unprogrammed increases in troop strengths. Coupled with this is the uncertainty as to when a base might be needed again. The costs of inactivating and reactivating a base can offset savings derived from its closure. Although we hope that we are entering upon a prolonged period of peace -- a hope and expectation which is not unlike that after World War II and the Korean War -- any decision to inactivate a base, whether it is retained in standby status for mobilization and contingency requirements, or is disposed of, is made without positive assurance that the decision -- in the long term -- will prove to be a good one.

17. **ENCROACHMENT.** Urban and airspace encroachment into vital areas surrounding installations is of continuing concern. Some installations which were originally remote have attracted major population growth and, as a result, continued operations have been threatened through urban expansion. Civilian aviation activity has served to restrict the airspace available for military operations. Encroachment, therefore, is an element in determining the future viability of an installation. Currently, programs to protect installations from encroachment are being instituted. These are comprised of efforts to obtain properties adjacent to bases so that only activities compatible with military operations will be developed in these areas. It is also possible that major weapons changes may bring about encroachment "from within". For example, ranges now adequate for artillery firing, may become too small for artillery weapons which may be introduced in the future. However, where encroachment has become a problem, its impact is considered during development of base realignment actions.

18. **LONG RANGE PLANS.** Since the future forces cannot be predicted with certainty and are subject to unprogrammed changes, flexibility to accommodate these changes within the base structure should be preserved when possible and economical. This entails developing reasonable assumptions on what unprogrammed force changes might occur and determining how the various options could support the assumed force changes. However, flexibility is difficult to quantify and, as a result, tends to be a subjective consideration. There are some instances though which do lend themselves to objective analysis. For example, basic combat training production capability at each training center can be determined. Based on the required level of production, the degree of flexibility (unused production capacity) within the structure can be determined and the degree that the structure can meet increases can be calculated. Similarly, workload versus capacity can be determined in a quantifiable manner for production and depot activities. Conversely, the degree of flexibility of the installation structure to meet other program changes not the result of clear cut workloads is difficult to determine. For example, the flexibility of the base structure to accommodate major combat units currently deployed overseas, depends on many variables. These variables include, type of unit, equipment density, mission requirements of the unit, if they are to be retained as active duty forces, or as reserve forces. Realignment alternatives are weighed in terms of their potential to meet unprogrammed force changes.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1974

5/29/73

HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

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PART 2 AIR FORCE

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CRITERIA FOR BASE REALIGNMENT ACTIONS

PURPOSE: The purpose of this document is to present the major considerations and criteria used within the Air Force in developing basing programs which result in realignment actions.

BACKGROUND: The base posture of the Air Force exists to support the assigned forces. Since forces are a dynamic element, the base posture is also dynamic in its nature. As forces change, base requirements change, and as a result realignments in the base posture are required. The major considerations and criteria used to determine base realignments must insure that the action selected from the available alternatives best meets the various operational, geographic, facility, environmental and economic parameters and is the most consistent with the overall mission requirements of the Air Force. The Air Force has pursued a policy of achieving an optimum base structure to support the currently assigned and projected forces. As force levels and overseas deployments have reduced during the last twelve years, the number of Air Force bases has also reduced. The following table reflects the reduction in Air Force major installations since FY 1960.

<u>MAJOR INSTALLATION</u>	<u>FY 60</u>	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 72</u>	<u>FY 73</u>
CONUS	163	15	129	116	112	111
Overseas	90	65	69	62	49	46
Total	253	216	198	178	161	157

The reduction in the number of Air Force bases world-wide has been the result of a continual evaluation of the forces' base requirements. The most effective bases are selected for retention when base closure actions are initiated.

MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS AND CRITERIA: In determining the effectiveness of an installation, several major considerations are germane. First is the need to provide installations which meet the various operational and training requirements of assigned forces. Second, there is the need to provide bases to support the force deployments envisioned in the United States strategy. Third is the policy that multi-mission bases, i.e., ones at which various force types (strategic, logistical, airlift, etc.) are stationed, will be used to the maximum extent possible. Fourth, that the base posture should retain the flexibility to beddown the force when unprogrammed changes occur.

The above considerations have evolved into broad criteria which are used in the Air Force in developing and evaluating base realignment actions. These are: geographic location; facility availability; and condition; community support available for Air Force activities/population; potential to accommodate future force requirements; existing or future encroachment which might impact Air Force operations; budgeting considerations inherent in the proposed realignment action; possible adverse environmental impact; and mission degradation as a result of force turbulence.

In developing realignment actions, the major considerations and criteria have to be evaluated for each proposal in total, as opposed to each one being independent, with the goal of achieving an optimum balance. A discussion of the four major considerations and the resultant criteria is provided below.

MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS:

Operational and Training Requirements: Since the Air Force base posture exists to support the mission of the assigned forces, the ability of each base to meet the unique operational and training requirements of the assigned force is of paramount importance. Each force element, such as strategic offense, tactical fighter, strategic airlift, etc., has its own peculiarities in terms of mission and training which manifests itself in terms of airspace, range requirements, deployment and employment routes, availability of lines of communications, survivability, facility requirements, etc. The current base posture reflects a force beddown in which the forces' operational and training requirements are best supported. Realignment of forces can make alterations of the base posture necessary, however, the resulting beddown must, to the extent possible, enhance the ability of the force to meet its unique operational and training requirements. These requirements are summarized below.

Strategic Offense (Bombers/Tankers): Pre-launch survivability of the alert force coupled with geographic locations which allow proper bomber-tanker mating after launch and optimum entry into primary employment routes to target areas.

Strategic Defense (Fighter Interceptors): Peripheral coverage of the Continental United States.

Tactical Fighter: Accessibility of weapons ranges (air-to-air and air-to-ground) plus sufficient airspace to allow for extensive operational training in flight maneuvers such as formation flying. Maximum "good weather" days to facilitate operational flight training under visual conditions.

Tactical Airlift: Accessibility to training areas for assault landing and drop zones and close proximity to Army elements which use tactical airlift support in training and during deployment.

Strategic Airlift (MAC): Accessibility to transportation networks which can carry cargo/passengers to and from the terminal complex, coupled with proximity to cargo generation areas.

Pilot Training: Availability of a large area of dedicated airspace which is required for student flight activities coupled with minimal poor weather days which could preclude visual flight activities.

Air Reserve Forces: Potential to man assigned units.

Force Deployment: The Air Force force structure is based on the national strategy. This strategy determines potential areas in which forces would be used and determines which forces should be deployed forward in overseas locations and which forces would be deployed or employed from the CONUS. This strategy then serves to determine how many and what kind of bases we need overseas versus the CONUS.

Use of Multi-Mission Bases: A major expense of each installation is the resources required to "open the door". That is the basic number of people and things needed to support any assigned mission. This base operating and support force, however, does not increase in a direct proportion to a growth in assigned base missions. Addition of new missions to an existing base results in significantly less base operating and support resources than does establishing a new base or retaining and operating a single-mission installation which is not limited by geographic or other requirements. Therefore, when missions are compatible and facilities available or obtainable, it is cost-advantageous to develop multi-mission bases. This is particularly true when one of the missions is of a support nature such as headquarters, material depot, or research and development activity and the other is operational such as tactical fighter, strategic bomber, etc. Additionally, missions which have a relatively small number of personnel or equipment are most economically accommodated on bases which have other major missions. An example is the stationing of ADC fighter interceptor squadrons on bases which have other major missions such as airlift or strategic offense. Although multi-mission bases are economical, the compatibility of missions must be given prime consideration. Certain missions, such as pilot training, do not lend themselves to multi-mission installations. Additionally, the more missions assigned to an installation the greater the difficulty in closing the installation if a major mission at the base is reduced, since relocation of residual missions often proves impractical. In this sense, on the basis of a reduced base structure, multi-mission bases may inhibit future flexibility in restructuring the overall base posture.

Future Flexibility: Base realignment actions which result in base closures or contribute to the maximum utilization of an installation, especially Air Force bases which contain a relatively small amount of land, can result in a limiting of future flexibility to meet various programmed and non-programmed force adjustments. Although base closures and maximum base utilization are economically sound objectives, the selection of bases to be closed, should, to the extent possible, therefore, result in closure of the least flexible bases. If flexibility were the sole determinant, bases which have constraints in the nature of airspace, encroachment of civilian activities, single missions, limited real estate, poor community support facilities, poor physical facilities, etc., should logically be considered for closure prior to bases which have the potential to accommodate additional or new missions.

CRITERIA:

Geographic Location: The geographic location of an installation influences many factors which bear on the ability of assigned forces to execute their mission. These include weather, availability of training areas, proximity to employment/deployment routes, survivability, airspace availability, transportation networks, etc. For each mission there are optimum geographic locations which provide maximum operational effectiveness. These locations, to the extent possible, should be used in selecting bases to beddown missions. In some cases certain

Mandatory elements may present themselves. For example, Undergraduate Pilot Training requires 216 good weather work days during each year in order to maintain the course schedule. Locations which cannot meet this weather criteria should not be considered for such a mission. Tactical fighter activities require that appropriate air-to-ground and air-to-air ranges be in close proximity (200 miles). Lack of these ranges requires that training be decreased by reduced mission time as a result of increased ferry time to and from the range. Therefore, lack of a range in close proximity to a base eliminates it from consideration as a tactical fighter base. However, other geographic factors are not as binding in developing base realignments. For example, survivability of strategic offensive forces is a prime consideration. If submarine launched missiles are postulated to be the most critical threat, inland bases provide the greatest survivability due to the longer flight time of the missiles. However, this does not imply only inland base should be considered for strategic offensive forces. Consideration of factors such as the inability of the runway complex to support strategic operations, lack of needed large maintenance facilities to house strategic bombers and tankers, poor quantity and quality of personnel support facilities, and lack of munitions storage capability all may negate the use of an existing inland base for a strategic force main operating base and dictate continual use of a coastal base where these facilities are available. In this case, survivability can be achieved through reposturing and dispersal of the alert force at satellite locations to achieve the needed time to safely launch the force.

Facility Availability: Maximum practical utilization of existing government facilities with minimum expenditures for new facilities should be a primary goal in realignment actions. This includes mission related facilities as well as support facilities. The facility types that are of prime concern in base realignment actions vary dependent on the mission under consideration. For example, if the unit is an operational flying activity, the runway complex (number, width, length, load bearing capacity), capacity of the aircraft parking ramp, and a maintenance complex capable of supporting the assigned aircraft (e.g., proper sized docks and hangers, sufficient communications-electronics and avionics maintenance space, etc.) are of major concern in evaluating the proposed action. Conversely, for administrative and headquarters activities, the proper amount of administrative space is essential. For training activities, classroom and student housing are key factors. For all actions, availability of housing (bachelor and family) for any increase in population is a significant element. However, facility availability varies in importance and influence on base realignment actions. In some cases, mandatory requirements exist. For example, parallel runways are an absolute requirement for Undergraduate Pilot Training since the mix of training aircraft and number of air movements cannot be accommodated on a single runway. Bases with single runways do not meet the facility requirements for this mission and generally would not be considered as a feasible alternative in realignment of pilot training bases without construction of additional runways. Additionally, certain unique facility requirements are generated by intelligence, communications, logistical, and research and development activities; relocation to installations which do not have facilities available to accommodate these functions may be infeasible due to the cost of new facilities. This, however, is a matter of economics. Also, due to mission requirements, these facilities must often be duplicated and in being prior to shutting down the current activity. This can often be expensive in terms of delay in savings to be realized as well as redundancy in equipment and facilities. Similar circumstances exist in relocating other missions such as strategic airlift which requires large terminal complexes to receive and process cargo. However, other facility requirements might not be less critical. Requirements for small missions may be provided with minor modification. This is particularly true if the unit's equipment consists of small aircraft or if no aircraft are assigned. Requirements for administrative space can be met in various ways such as conversion of excess space in other functional areas. Additionally, in considering bases for closure, the overall condition of the real property facilities at the base is an important element in the selection process. Often, if an activity is housed on an installation which has a great deal of substandard deteriorated facilities - both prime mission as well as support - then relocation to a base with permanent facilities may be most effective even if certain facility criteria cannot be initially met. Over a

period of time, provision of a few additional facilities would prove economically beneficial as opposed to providing a large number of expensive replacement facilities at the previous base. An additional facility consideration is the extent a base's facilities support other installations in the area. For example, if a base provides hospital, housing, and other support facilities for surrounding installations, then it may not be possible to completely close the base. As a result, savings from the realignment may be significantly less than at a base where all activities can be shut down and facilities declared excess.

Community Support: Civilian support resources (e.g., community housing, medical, schools, and recreational facilities) are a consideration in developing base realignment actions. When possible, base realignment actions should take maximum advantage of already developed civilian resources which can be used to support the assigned personnel. Of particular importance is family housing. Areas which have residual capability to adequately house Air Force families will negate the cost of providing government housing and facilitate rapid completion of the proposed action. Conversely, areas in which community support facilities are limited place an increasing degree of importance on the base facilities. Adequate support should exist on or off a gaining base to avoid a realignment action being counter productive in terms of personnel morale. Since excess personnel support capability on our installations is limited, the contribution of the civilian community in this area is very important.

Potential: Since the future forces cannot be predicted with certainty and are subject to unprogrammed changes, flexibility to accommodate these changes within the base posture should be preserved when possible and economical. This entails developing reasonable assumptions on what unprogrammed force changes might occur and determining how the various basing options could support the assumed force changes. However, flexibility is difficult to quantify and, as a result, tends to be a subjective consideration. There are some instances though which do lend themselves to objective analysis. For example, pilot production capacity at each Undergraduate Pilot Training base can be determined. Based on the required levels of pilot production, the degree of flexibility (unused production capacity) within the system can be determined and the degree that the system can meet increases can be calculated. As a result, the degree of flexibility in the system can be predicted and controlled. Similarly, workload versus base capacity can be determined in a quantifiable manner for other training activities and depot activities. As a result, flexibility in these areas is to some degree quantifiable. Conversely, the degree of flexibility of the base system to meet other program changes not the result of clear cut workloads is difficult to determine. For example, the flexibility of the base system to accommodate tactical units in the (CSUS currently deployed overseas depends on many variables such as type of unit, activity levels of the unit, if they are to be retained as active duty forces or as reserve forces, etc. In these instances the underlying assumptions are subjective and the requirement for flexibility is also subjective. Notwithstanding the subjectivity, it is important that base realignment alternatives be weighed in terms of their potential to meet unprogrammed force changes.

Encroachment: Urban and airspace encroachment into vital areas surrounding installations is of continuing concern. Some installations which were originally remote have attracted major population growth and, as a result, continued air operations have been threatened through urban expansion. The increased civil and private air activity has served to restrict the airspace available for military operations. Encroachment, therefore, is an element in determining the future viability of an installation and is a consideration in determining base realignment actions. Currently, programs to protect installations from encroachment are being instituted. These are comprised of efforts to obtain zoning, easements, or fee ownership of properties adjacent to bases so that only activities compatible with air operations will be developed in these areas. As a result, encroachment should be brought under control. However, where encroachment has become a major problem, its impact should be considered during development of base realignment actions.

Budget: High-cost, single-mission installations with limited real estate and outdated, old, functionally inefficient facilities requiring large investments for replacement facilities are prime candidates for closure. Significant annual savings result from the closure of such bases. However, the relative cost effectiveness of retaining installations is also a major factor in determining base realignments. Consolidation of missions on a single multi-mission

Installation which allows a base closure generally results in significant annual savings. However, these savings are offset in some instances by the required investment, particularly in facilities needed to consolidate. Additionally, one-time relocation costs are a factor. In evaluating the budget implication of base realignments it is necessary that initial and annual savings be weighed against the one-time construction and movement costs of the various options. Consideration should be given to consolidations which minimize the investment in new facilities while maximizing the annual savings. In general, large outlays in construction or equipment funds are not feasible and options which depend on such outlays should be avoided unless no other viable alternative exists.

Environment: All actions must be assessed to determine their impact on the environment. Base realignment options must have an initial assessment during the preliminary planning. If significant environmental impact is indicated, for example at a gaining installation, as a result of the assessment, then an environmental impact statement must be filed.

Mission Degradation: Realignment actions, by their very nature, result in turbulence both in personnel and in mission output. The degree of turbulence is a consideration if the resulting mission degradation is of such a proportion as to be significant. Certain activities cannot be allowed to "stand down" and, as a result, realignments of these activities require in being capability at the new location. Also, work force composition is a consideration in that a highly specialized or unique work force of civilians may not facilitate relocation. These factors should be considered in evaluating realignment actions.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1974

6/3/73

HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS

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ROBERT C. NICHOLAS III, *Staff Assistant*

PART 3 NAVY

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CRITERIA

In the development of the Navy's shore establishment realignment proposals the following significant factors were considered.

1. *1974-1980 force levels/mis.*—Includes the numbers and type of each ship and aircraft, their weapon systems and specialized support required.

2. *Ship homeporting/aircraft basing excess capacities.*—Includes the identity of requirements for pier space, anchorages, boat landings, runways, taxi strips, parking aprons, hanger spaces and ship and aircraft support.

3. *Navigational limitations.*—Includes, restrictive drafts (depth of water), transit time, shipping congestion, length and breadth of channel, specialized navigational aids required, periods of reduced visibility and seasonal weather conditions.

4. *Air space restrictions.*—Includes, approach patterns, air space congestion (civilian), noise factors, civilian encroachment, periods of reduced visibility and seasonal weather conditions.

5. *Nuclear clearances.*—Includes nuclear area clearances existing by type and future clearances required.

6. *Shipyards locations and capabilities.*—Includes nuclear surface/sub-surface repair capabilities and requirements, weapon and electronic systems repair capabilities and requirements, specialized drydock requirements by number and type, civilian work force availability and general repair/design capabilities.

7. *Accessibility to operating areas.*—Includes, transit time, air and surface congestion, periods of reduced visibility, seasonal weather conditions and availability of services.

8. *BEQ/BOQ requirements.*—Includes increases in base complex population entitlements, availability and desirability of private rentals and adequacy of messing requirements.

9. *Cold war facilities.*—Includes availability of steam, water, air, and electricity including nuclear ship electrical power requirements, pollution abatement and nuclear waste disposal requirements.

10. *Aviation support facilities.*—Includes air frame and engine rework requirements, new and future aircraft introductions and contractor operations.

11. *Medical and supply support.*—Includes active and retired triservice military populations, CHAMPUS/military hospital cost comparison, location of supply centers vis-a-vis force concentrations, supply control centers, usage data, and type, depth of supply support requirements.

12. *Personnel support facilities.*—Includes availability and adequacy of social and recreational facilities, public transportation, and distances from quarters to facilities, commissaries and exchanges.

13. *Private and public family housing.*—Includes availability and adequacy of public quarters and public rentals/sales. Excesses and short-falls have been identified.

14. *Impact on the civilian economy.*—Includes loss of job availability, payroll reductions, housing surpluses and unemployment.

15. *Environmental impact.*—Includes, decreases in solid waste, water, air, and noise pollutants at losing complexes.

16. *Costs to implement.*—Includes, severance pay and unused leave pay to discharged civilian employees, transportation costs for relocated employees, PCS costs for military personnel and dependents, preservation and caretaker costs, equipment transportation costs, and Milcon requirements at gaining activities.

17. *Savings achievable.*—Includes eliminated military and civilian salary avoidance, overhead and maintenance costs and approved Milcon costs avoidance.