

REPORT BY THE U.S.

109392

# General Accounting Office



## Problems In Getting People Into The Active Force After Mobilization

During a full mobilization there will be large numbers of people reporting to the Active Forces from Reserve Components, as well as volunteers and inductees through the draft. The services' ability to handle this influx is questionable as there may be a shortage of physicians to process inductees through the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations, a shortage of qualified people and units to train the inductees, uncertainty as to the availability of training equipment needed to train the inductees, and inadequate or non-existent installation mobilization plans to handle reserve personnel reporting to active duty.



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UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

PROGRAM ANALYSIS  
DIVISION

IN REPLY  
REFER TO:

The Honorable Harold Brown  
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Brown:

As one of several reports on the effectiveness of the peacetime force, this report summarizes the services' ability to expand and accept an influx of people during mobilization.

The report contains recommendations to you. As you know, section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the House Committee on Government Operations and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget, and the Secretaries of the Services. Copies are also being sent to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services, the House Committee on Government Operations, and to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs.

We wish to acknowledge the courtesy and cooperation extended by your staff to our representatives during the review.

Sincerely yours,

*H. L. Krieger*

H. L. Krieger  
Director

D I G E S T

In the first 180 days after mobilization, approximately 1.8 million people are planned to be brought into the Active Force. These people will volunteer or be drafted (one-third) and called up through the Reserves (two-thirds). This influx will impact the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations, training centers, and active installations.

The Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES) will have to examine about 7,000 to 9,800 people a day. To do this, the AFEES need additional physicians. The AFEES headquarters, the Military Enlistment Processing Command (MEPCOM), is relying on the services to provide the additional physicians. However, the services will not be able to meet the need. MEPCOM needs to change its procedures, reducing the need for additional physicians. Even after the change MEPCOM will not have enough physicians and will have to find a different source. MEPCOM can do this by contracting with the physicians now being used parttime.

The Army training centers will receive and start training about 550,000 people of which about 450,000 will be drafted, during the first 180 days of mobilization. These training centers must begin accepting these draftees 30 days after mobilization. The training centers may be hindered in housing and will be unable to train these draftees because:

- Training centers' expansion plans have not been revised to reflect current technology and requirements.
- The Army's Active and Reserve structure is short 345 training units.

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--Most Army Reserve training units are undermanned, and all unit members may not report when ordered.

--Reserve trainers do not have skills to conduct One-Station Unit Training.

--The Army does not know what training equipment will be available or required during mobilization.

We did not evaluate what effect closing the Army Training Center at Fort Dix, New Jersey may have on the Army's ability to accept and train the draftees.

Sound mobilization planning is a key ingredient in ensuring that installations will be able to adequately receive, house, and train reserve forces during mobilization. We found weaknesses in the planning process. However, the actions which the Department of the Army intends to take as a result of GAO's report, "Can the Army and Air Force Reserves Support the Active Forces Effectively?" (LCD-79-404) April 25, 1979, should resolve the weaknesses we found in mobilization planning. Therefore, we have not included them in this report.

#### Recommendations

The Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower Reserve Affairs and Logistics), should ensure the services have adequately planned to expand their operations in the event of mobilization.

#### Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Army, as Executive Agent for the Secretary of Defense should ensure that MEPCOM has (1) devised ways to minimize the need for additional doctors at the AFEES during mobilization; (2) evaluated and approved AFEES mobilization plans based on current OSD determinations; and (3) determined ways to provide additional doctors in the event of mobilization.

The Secretary should also ensure that (1) training centers can expand to provide for current OSD determinations in untrained manpower reserves particularly since construction specifications are World War II or Korean War vintage and could require as much as 1 year to update, (2) the force structure contains the needed number of training companies, (3) reserve training companies are staffed at the level required in the event of mobilization, and (4) trainers are qualified to perform their assigned mission.

The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force

While this report deals solely with the Army, the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force should also ensure the weaknesses pointed out on training center expansion do not exist in their respective services.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

During the first 6 months of a full mobilization the Armed Forces may be faced with handling a sudden influx of approximately 1.8 million people. These people will be entering the Active Services as volunteers or from the draft (one-third) and from the Reserve Forces (two-thirds).

This influx will impact on the operations of Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES), training centers, and active installations. To handle the influx rapidly and effectively, these organizations need plans and procedures to determine what is available or needed in the way of equipment, people, and real property.

The AFEES must be in a position to examine about five times their current workload of applicants during the first 180 days of mobilization. These people the AFEES finds acceptable and inducts will require certain military related training before they can be effectively used by the services. To provide this training, the training centers will require facilities, personnel, and field training areas to expand their capacity to accept and initiate training for up to 650,000 non-prior service inductees during the first 6 months. The Army will be faced with the most significant training burden in receiving over two-thirds of the inductees, along with about 100,000 others entering as volunteers or through the Delayed Entry Program.

Installations must be prepared to accept the influx of Reserve, Guard, and Individual Ready Reserve personnel. Under the total force concept the Active Forces are the nation's first line of defense and are to be supported and augmented by the Selected Reserve--National Guard and Reserve units. Most Army Reserve and Guard units will be activated and moved to installations called mobilization stations where they will receive additional personnel, equipment, training, and processing prior to deployment. Thus installations that are prepared, should be able to accept and assist the Reserves in getting ready to provide timely relief or reinforcement to the Active Deployed Forces.

The service's ability to handle the influx of 1.8 million additional personnel is vital. Adequate mobilization planning at every level, sufficient medical personnel, adequately staffed and properly qualified training companies, and necessary training equipment are prerequisites to meeting and accomplishing the mobilization mission.

Several years ago, the Army recognized the need to test their ability to rapidly mobilize. MOBEX 76 was an Army level exercise in 1976 designed to test mobilization plans and procedures and evaluate the ability of the Active Force and Reserve Components to fully mobilize without actual movement of people or things. A lack of detailed planning, insufficient resources to provide the necessary support to mobilizing units, and shortages of physical facilities were defined in this exercise.

In October and November of 1978 the nations' ability, both civil and military, to fully mobilize in response to an attack on North Atlantic Treaty Organizations was tested. The Department of Defense portion, called Nifty Nugget, was a joint effort encompassing all the services. The services are still evaluating the results of Nifty Nugget. Therefore, we were not able to review their findings, conclusions, and recommendations. However, testimony by the Secretary of Defense on January 25, 1979, indicated that many of the same shortcomings in planning, execution, and resources still prevail.

#### SCOPE

We reviewed the services' ability to handle a mobilization influx of people by determining.

- What policies, procedures, practices, and plans are available to examine personnel the Selective Service System drafts.
- The capability to accept and initiate training for 650,000 non-prior service personnel during the first 6 months of mobilization.
- What plans installations have prepared to accept and support the reserve units being activated to augment the Active Force.

We focused our attention on the Army's efforts in mobilization because this service will have to handle most of the influx. Weaknesses exist in the Army's mobilization planning process, particularly at installations which must receive, house, and train reserve units at mobilization. Because of actions the Department of the Army intends to take as a result of our report, "Can the Army and Air Force Reserves Support the Active Forces Effectively?" (LCD-79-404) April 25, 1979, we did not discuss the subject in this report.



We did our work at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Marine Corps Headquarters, Headquarters Department of Army, Navy, and Air Force; at First United States Army, Fort Meade, Maryland; Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station, Baltimore, MD; and Military Enlistment Processing Command, Fort Sheridan, Illinois.

CHAPTER 2

ARMED FORCES EXAMINING


AND ENTRANCE STATIONS

The Department of Defense (DOD) currently maintains 66 Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES). Sixty-four stations are located in the Continental United States, one in Hawaii and one in Puerto Rico. Station personnel examine and induct people who meet the Armed Services' entrance qualifications.

The <sup>AGC 00020</sup> Department of Army (DA) as Executive Agent for the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), administers the AFEES. Within the Army, the Military Enlistment Processing Command (MEPCOM) is responsible for AFEES day to day operations and providing them mobilization planning guidance. The following chart depicts the relationship between the OSD, DA, and the MEPCOM.

DLG  
00751  
DLG  
01602

1 Secy of Defense  
6 Secy of Army  
WAW  
JAF  
AGC 00001  
AGC 00035



Although MEPCOM has developed and is revising its mobilization plan, it has not provided this planning guidance to its sector headquarters or the individual AFEES. Thus these locations cannot determine what resources are available or will be required during mobilization. While the AFEES have more than adequate building capacity, the number of available physicians limits the number of people the AFEES staff can handle at mobilization.

OSD requirements for the draft

In October 1977, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) issued a memorandum to the Director of the Selective Service System. The Assistant Secretary stated that wartime requirements were being reevaluated and that interim studies show that people will be required sooner than previously planned. The following table shows the pre and post October 1977 mobilization personnel requirements based on a full mobilization. The numbers could be larger in the event of a total mobilization.

OSD PRE AND POST OCTOBER 1977 DRAFT REQUIREMENTS

<u>OCTOBER</u> <u>1977</u>	<u>M+30</u> <u>Days</u> <u>(note a)</u>	<u>M+60</u> <u>Days</u>	<u>M+110</u> <u>Days</u>	<u>M+150</u> <u>Days</u>	<u>M+180</u> <u>Days</u>	<u>M+230</u> <u>Days</u>	<u>Total</u>
PRE			First Individual	100,000		+380,000	480,000
POST	First Individual	100,000			+550,000		650,000

a/"M" refers to the first day of mobilization. Therefore, M+30 days means 30 days after beginning mobilization.

Selective Service System data shows that about 50 percent of the people pass the physical, mental and moral examinations and are brought into the services. So, to bring

in the numbers that OSD requires under its post October 1977 guidance, the AFEES will have to examine about 185,000 people by M+60 days and an additional 1 million by M+180 days. 1/

MOBILIZATION PLAN NOT  
DISTRIBUTED TO AFEES

MEPCOM'S mobilization plan is based on pre October 1977 mobilization guidance and:

- Provides guidance for expanding MEPCOM and sector headquarters and individual AFEES operations to meet mobilization requirements.
- Identifies personnel resource requirements needed to perform the MEPCOM mobilization mission. The personnel resource requirements are contained in the mobilization staffing plan.
- Shows the additional manpower each service must furnish to operate MEPCOM and the AFEES.
- Contains an estimate on the surge in voluntary enlistments after M-Day.
- Has workload projections based on the number of people to be examined and the number to be brought into the services during various time frames.
- Shows induction projections by service and various time frames.
- Sets specific tasks for DA, MEPCOM, and sector headquarters.

MEPCOM has not distributed its plan to sector headquarters and the AFEES because it is waiting for DA to approve the number of MEPCOM mobilization staff requirements (mobilization table of distribution and allowances). After DA

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1/Data available at the AFEES indicates that less than 50 percent fail but these data are based on peacetime accessions and do not reflect rejections for moral reasons. Adjusting for these differences makes the pass/fail percent very close to the 50 percent reflected in Selective Service System data.

approves the number, MEPCOM then will revise and distribute the plan to the AFEES. MEPCOM estimates that the plan will be distributed by June 1979. In the meantime, the sector headquarters and AFEES are operating with out of date mobilization planning guidance.

AFEES BUILDING CAPACITY

During mobilization, the AFEES will operate two shifts, 6 days a week to handle the mobilization personnel workload. The AFEES can accept about 22,000 people in their buildings during an operational day. The following table shows the 66 AFEES can accept the numbers of people to meet the OSD post October 1977 requirements.

TOTAL AFEES BUILDING CAPACITY - ESTIMATED

<u>Time frame</u>	<u>Net OSD personnel requirement</u>	<u>Average daily accessions needed to meet requirement (note a)</u>	<u>Average daily input (note b)</u>	<u>Estimated gross daily capacity</u>
M+60	100,000	3,846	7,122	22,000
M+180	550,000	5,288	9,793	22,000

a/Average Daily Accession is the number of figures needed divided by the work days available in the period M+30 to M+60 day.

b/The Average Daily Input is the average daily accession adjusted by the Selective Service System data for mental, moral, and medical fail rates.

While the AFEES have the building capacity, their ability to process a sufficient number of people may be limited. We looked at whether the AFEES had an adequate number of physicians to examine the number of people needed during mobilization.

AFEES PHYSICIANS NEEDS AT MOBILIZATION

The AFEES require physicians to do medical examinations and see if people meet physical entrance standards. While medical technicians are available to assist, the physicians must be available to determine medical profiles. Currently

the AFEES have 68 fulltime <sup>1/</sup> physicians. MEPCOM has calculated that the AFEES will need 378 additional full-time doctors in the event of mobilization. However, these calculations were based on pre October 1977 OSD guidance and have not been revised to reflect new OSD determinations. Moreover, the services do not have enough physicians in the Active or Reserve Force to meet their own unique manpower requirements during mobilization. Consequently, the services will not be able to meet the AFEES needs. MEPCOM, though, has not considered alternate approaches to ensure sufficient physicians are available during mobilization.

Using the new OSD determinations and other factors such as average daily accession rate, average daily input rate, the examination rate of 30 people a day for each physician, average daily physician workload, and current and alternate processing procedures we estimated the minimum number of physicians the AFEES may require during mobilization (see app. I). Under their current processing procedures, the AFEES will require 122 additional physicians by M+30 and 71 more for a total of 193 by M+60. However, this assumes the Selective Service System delivers the first people by M+30. If the Selective Service System does not send the people to the AFEES until M+40 days, the need increases to 236 additional physicians during the M+40 to M+60 timeframe.

The number of additional physicians needed by the AFEES can be less than the foregoing if alternate processing procedures can be designed. We revised the procedures on a hypothetical basis to optimize the use of available physicians and permit them to examine only those who meet the mental and moral standards. If this simple change were applicable to all AFEES the need for additional physicians could be reduced to 74 by M+30 and 54 more for a total of 128 by M+60. If the Selective Service System does not deliver the first person until M+40, 160 additional doctors could be needed.

We suggested the revision as an example to MEPCOM and were advised that such a change could be made at 46 of the 66 AFEES. Since MEPCOM is most familiar with the AFEES operation, it is incumbent that they devise a processing procedure which minimizes the number of physicians needed during mobilization.

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<sup>1/</sup>The AFEES also use about 200 parttime physicians during peak peacetime workloads.

Minimizing the number of physicians is necessary because the Active and Reserve units have physician shortages to be filled during mobilization and this demands first priority. Also the physician is critical to the AFEES processing procedures and to meeting the new OSD determinations for draftees during mobilization.

One way that MEPCOM may be able to ensure sufficient physicians are available is to contract with their parttime physicians. Currently the AFEES use about 200 parttime physicians to help do medical work. Approximately 170 of these physicians do not have Reserve commitments. If MEPCOM could contract with these physicians to work fulltime after mobilization, the AFEES would be in a better position to meet their mobilization workload. MEPCOM told us the suggestion has merit and will be explored.

## CHAPTER 3

### TRAINING BASE EXPANSION

The Services need the capacity to accept, house, train, and equip up to 650,000 draftees non-prior service personnel in mobilization. The following chart depicts the current volunteer training base workload and the mobilization draftee workload.

<u>Service</u>	<u>Current volunteer load (000)</u>	<u>Mobilization draftee load (000)</u>
Army	113.3	450
Navy	67.3	100
Air Force	33.6	50
Marines	<u>22.7</u>	<u>50</u>
Total	<u>236.9</u>	<u>650</u>

Since the Army will receive over two-thirds of the people, we focused on Army efforts to prepare for the task.

*DLG 00916* The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is responsible for planning and coordinating the initial training of new personnel both in peacetime and mobilization. In peacetime, nine Army Training Centers 1/ provide training to new service personnel. In mobilization, the Army Training Centers will expand to 14 by converting 5 additional installations, and augmenting the present 9 centers with 12 Army Reserve training units. These units during peacetime are under the command of U.S. Army Forces Command. Upon arrival at the training center during mobilization, they will come under the control of TRADOC. Our report "Can the Army and Air Force Reserves Support the Active Forces Effectively?" (LCD-79-404) April 25, 1979, recommended that these Training Divisions be affiliated with TRADOC in peacetime to reduce the mobilization turbulence and the Army agreed with the recommendation.

TRADOC has two programs of instruction that convert a civilian to a soldier, the one-station unit training (OSUT) company and the basic training (BT) company. Both are about the same size, and possess comparable organizational structures. The BT company trainees progress after 8 weeks of

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1/Our analysis does not include the proposed transfer of the Training Center from Fort Dix to Fort Jackson.



basic combat training into advanced individual training (AIT) companies for requisite military occupational specialty (MOS) training. Although basic training companies can and do feed into AIT companies specializing in armor, artillery, or infantry, they generally are for soldiers being trained in low-density MOSs who subsequently receive AIT in instructor-intense technical classes at the various branch schools.

The OSUT companies retain trainees for their entire initial entry training. TRADOC started one-station unit training in 1975 in an effort to enhance high-density MOS training with basic combat skills during a single shortened training cycle.

#### TRAINING CENTER EXPANSION

TRADOC's Mobilization Plan was issued in November 1977 under the pre October 1977 guidance. Subsequent determinations increased the number of people expected to be drafted from about 260,000 to about 450,000 by M+180. This resulted in a total workload change from 395,000 to about 550,000. Concurrently the amount of time available to the training centers to react to the arrival of draftees decreased from M+110 days to M+30 days. The TRADOC Mobilization Plan has not been revised to reflect these changes.

Under the pre October 1977 guidance TRADOC analyzed the training centers' maximum expansion capability based on utilities and housing. At each center the housing capacity limits were lower than the utility limits. In order to meet the maximum expansion capabilities, engineers would be required to construct emergency troop housing. The emergency troop housing standard drawings, or blueprints, used to increase the housing capacity were developed between 1940 and 1952 and need revising to reflect current construction technology and incorporate more efficient design. Army engineers estimate that with the current staffing, if funding were provided, 1 year would be required to accomplish the revisions. While the outdated TRADOC and engineer plans in and of themselves will not preclude the necessary mobilization, they may inhibit it.

#### TRAINING CENTERS CAPABILITY TO TRAIN INFLUX

Although the Army may be able to expand the training centers' physical capacity to accept inductees, it may not be able to provide training because the Army does not have:

- The number of training units TRADOC requires either in the Active or Reserve structure.
- The number of Reserve trainers required to fill current Reserve Training units.
- Reserve trainers skilled in the presentation of One-Station Unit Training.
- Knowledge of training equipment availability.

Training centers require added  
Force structure in mobilization

The training element of both the training center and the Reserve training division is the company. The following chart shows the Active and Reserve training companies in the present force structure and the number TRADOC estimates needing during the first 180 days of mobilization.

ARMY TRAINING COMPANIES

AS OF OCTOBER 1978

<u>Army training center</u>	<u>Present center active structure</u>	<u>Planned reserve augmentation in mobilization</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Mobilization structure requirements</u>	<u>Difference short (-) over (+)</u>
Ft. Benning	35	62	97	104	- 7
Ft. Bliss	9	49	58	81	-23
Ft. Bragg	0	26	26	120	-94
Ft. Dix (note a)	20	49	69	102	-33
Ft. Gordon	31	49	80	88	- 8
Ft. Hood	0	89	89	172	-83
Ft. Jackson	40	80	120	76	+44
Ft. Knox	42	58	100	109	- 9
Ft. Lewis	0	73	73	94	-21
Ft. McClellan	24	0	24	29	- 5
Ft. Ord	0	41	41	89	-48
Ft. Polk	0	80	80	94	-14
Ft. Sill	22	0	22	42	-20
Ft. Wood	<u>36</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>110</u>	<u>-24</u>
Total	<u>b/259</u>	<u>706</u>	<u>965</u>	<u>1,310</u>	<u>-345</u>

a/op cit p. 10.

b/ Through a surge effort on the part on the Active Army training cadres, training capacity could be doubled during the initial weeks following M-Day. While this surge capacity of the training base elements varies according to type of training, those elements producing the most needed skills have the capability to almost double their output with no increase in personnel and/or in equipment. This surge capacity involves some risk (potential for overworked cadre staff which could have detrimental effects on discipline and operations) and some degradation (demonstration in lieu of hands-on training) in the quality of the soldier.

Clearly 13 of the 14 training centers will lack sufficient training companies. While Ft. Jackson appears to have an excess of 44 infantry OSUT training companies, Ft. Bragg is short 94 companies. Ft. Sill is not scheduled to receive any additional training companies from the Reserves although it is allocated only about 52 percent of its mobilization requirement.

Further most of the administrative and logistical units needed to support initial entry training are not organic to Active or Reserve training units. These support units include adjutant general, finance, medical, ordnance, quartermaster, replacement, and transportation companies, most of which in the Active Army deploy overseas separately or as organic parts of large organizations. This support is to be supplied after current units depart by Reserve Component units which must be, in most instances, constituted from the Individual Ready Reserve at mobilization. Given the reduced state of the IRR, there is a low probability that the Reserve Component can meet this requirement.

Reserve training divisions  
lack personnel

The lack of sufficient training companies in the training structure is compounded by the fact that the present Reserve structure is staffed at 86 percent of authorized personnel. This strength could be further diluted at mobilization by "no - shows" and reporting delays of individuals in the Reserve units. Current Defense planning is that 95 percent of the reservists will report.

RESERVE TRAINING DIVISIONS STRENGTH

AS OF JUNE 30, 1978

<u>Mobilization Training Center</u>	<u>Reserve Training Division</u>	<u>Authorized Strength</u>	<u>Assigned Strength</u>	<u>Percent Authorized</u>
Ft. Benning	70th Division	3,107	2,492	80
Ft. Bliss	85th Division	2,423	1,774	73
Ft. Bragg	80th Division	2,423	2,785	115
Ft. Dix	78th Division	2,423	1,981	82
Ft. Gordon	76th Division	2,423	2,176	90
Ft. Hood	84th Division	3,104	2,226	72
Ft. Jackson	108th Division	3,107	3,382	109
Ft. Knox	100th Division	2,571	2,447	95
Ft. Lewis	104th Division	3,107	2,456	79
Ft. McClellan	-	-	-	-
Ft. Ord	91st Division	2,423	1,820	75
Ft. Polk	95th Division	3,107	2,431	78
Ft. Sill	-	-	-	-
Ft. Wood	98th Division	<u>3,090</u>	<u>2,773</u>	90
Total		<u>33,308</u>	<u>28,743</u>	86

The effects of Ft. Bragg's structural shortage of 94 training companies will be lessened by employing the 80th Division which is manned at 115 percent of authorized strength. Ft. Jackson's excess structure will be further increased by using the 108th Division which is manned at 109 percent of its authorized manning.

An analysis of the mobilization training workload at each training center disclosed some extensive variances. Assuming that the Active Duty Training personnel will remain at mobilization and handle at least their peacetime workload, some Reserve Training Divisions were projected to have an infantry OSUT training workload (to assigned personnel) of 3 to 1 at Ft. Jackson while Ft. Ord will have an infantry OSUT workload of 11 to 1.

Reserve training division  
personnel lack skills

In 1977 most Reserve training divisions were given the mobilization mission of conducting OSUT instead of basic training. TRADOC, realizing this would require trainers to acquire new skills, instructed the units to accomplish a 2- to 3-year requalification program for the trainers. Examples of this are that trainers of mechanics, administrative

clerks, and cooks are now expected to train people in infantry, armor, and artillery combat skills. An analysis of five Reserve training divisions, as of October 1978, showed 52 to 92 percent of the personnel were career field qualified; but only 32 to 68 percent had the proper skill level for the position. In some cases privates were receiving on the job training to fill trainer positions normally held by sergeants.

The skill development of these trainers is not helped by the fact that in four of the divisions approximately 16 percent of the company sized units had unsatisfactory attendance as reported on the FY 78 Inspector General's Reports. Although this cannot be projected to the other divisions, it indicates there may be difficulty in accomplishing the OSUT mission.

Mobilization Training Equipment  
Availability/Unknown

It is not possible to train the number of inductees in the required timeframe without sufficient equipment. The mastery of military skills forms the basis for all Army training courses and is generally equipment related. Simulators or other training devices can be used in lieu of actual equipment to develop hand-eye dexterity. To provide an effective soldier, sufficient training time on the equipment the individual will ultimately be called upon to use is essential. TRADOC has stated that, "essential equipment availability rather than structure, housing, or training facilities will become the governing constraint for determining training base capacity. Due to current . . . equipment constraints, the current (peacetime) training base is not capable of expansion beyond their assigned training load without personnel and equipment augmentation."

Neither the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve, who assists in budgeting for the training divisions, nor the TRADOC, who will control the mobilized training bases could state what equipment was available in the Reserve training divisions. The Office of the Chief of Army Reserve is undertaking an analysis of the equipment available to the training base in mobilization.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The military plans to mobilize Reserve Forces in addition to accepting and training volunteers and other people delivered by the draft in the event of war or national emergency. While the Secretary of Defense plans to bring in 1.8 million volunteers, draftees, and reservists in the first 6 months of a full mobilization; neither the quantity nor the timeframe can be met under current plans and procedures.

The AFEES lack plans or guidance from MEPCOM to expand their operations. The 68 physicians in the AFEES, based on the 30 exam rate, can examine about 2,000 of the average daily mobilization workload of 7,000 and 9,800. MEPCOM is relying on the services to provide additional physicians during mobilization, but they cannot meet the need. Also, MEPCOM has not updated its requirements to the current OSD determinations. MEPCOM needs to reduce the workload on physicians so as to need as few as possible. Based on our calculations this can be done. MEPCOM, rather than relying on the Services to provide physicians, needs to find a different source. One method available is to contract with the physicians now being used parttime.

The 650,000 untrained drafted personnel will require basic military training. The Army will have difficulty expanding from 9 training centers handling about 113,000 people during peacetime to 14 training centers capable of training 550,000 people in mobilization because

- the centers' expansion plans have not been updated;
- the Army force structure is short 345 training units;
- <sup>the</sup> personnel assigned to the Reserve training units are less than authorized;
- the Reserve trainers <sup>cannot handle the peak mobilization</sup> have not been trained adequately or developed skills to conduct one-station unit training; and
- TRADOC has not determined equipment requirements, availability, shortages, and alternatives for obtaining these needs.

In addition, our report "Can the Army and Air Force Reserves Support the Active Forces Effectively?" (LCD-79-404) April 25, 1979, recommended that the Training Division be affiliated with TRADOC in peacetime to reduce the mobilization turbulence. The Department of the Army agreed with this recommendation.

The mix of reservists and draftees to meet the OSD mobilization requirements will affect the magnitude of the problems faced by AFEES, training centers, and installations. If OSD requires more than 650,000 people to be drafted, the problems with the AFEES and training centers will increase significantly and decrease the problems at the installations. If less than 650,000 people are drafted, the problems at the AFEES and training centers will decrease, while the problems will increase at the installations.

The services have identified mobilization problems through exercises such as "Nifty Nugget." Since we were not given access to the exercise results, we were unable to tell whether what we examined was included in the exercise and, if so, what were the results of that exercise. However, testimony by the Secretary of Defense on January 25, 1979, indicated that many of the same shortcomings in planning, execution, and resources still prevail.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense, through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower Reserve Affairs, and Logistics), should ensure the services have adequately planned to expand their operations in the event of mobilization.

### Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Army, as Executive Agent for the Secretary of Defense should ensure that MEPCOM has (1) devised ways to minimize the need for additional doctors at the AFEES during mobilization; (2) evaluated and approved AFEES mobilization plans based on current OSD determinations; and (3) determined ways to provide additional doctors in the event of mobilization.

The Secretary should also ensure that (1) training centers can expand to provide for current OSD determinations in untrained manpower resources particularly since construction specifications are World War II or Korean War vintage



and could require as much as 1 year to update, (2) the force structure contains the needed number of training companies, (3) Reserve training companies are staffed at the level required in the event of mobilization, and (4) trainers are qualified to perform their assigned mission.

The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force

While this report deals solely with the Army, the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force should also ensure the weaknesses pointed out on training center expansion do not exist in their respective services.

ESTIMATED PHYSICIANS THE AFEES  
REQUIRE DURING MOBILIZATION

We made three estimates (see chart on page 22) based on various factors discussed below. The first estimate assumes retention of the current AFEES processing procedures. The second assumes a change in the procedures to reduce the number of people requiring a medical examination. The third assumes the Selective Service System will not deliver the first inductee until M+40 and uses MEPCOM accession rate data under the current and revised procedures.

Under current procedures, the AFEES give half of the people the mental and moral examinations before the medical examination and the other half the medical examination before the mental and moral examinations. Based on Selective Service System historical data about 40 percent of the people will not pass the mental and moral examinations. If these processing procedures could be changed so that only those individuals who pass the mental and moral examinations would be given a medical examination fewer physicians will be needed.

We did not consider the following in our estimates

- medical examinations for women;
- increasing the physician examination rate;
- lowering entrance examination standards;
- reducing the time to give the mental examination test; and
- medical examinations for individuals in the Delayed Entry Pool and Marine Corps Individual Ready Reserve, standby Reservists and all Retired Reservists called to active duty.

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PHYSICIANS

NEEDED DURING MOBILIZATION

<u>Time frame</u>	<u>OSD requirement</u>	<u>Average Daily</u>			<u>Physician exam rate</u>	<u>physicians required (note c)</u>	<u>Less No. Available</u>	<u>No. additional physicians</u>
		<u>Accession rate (note a)</u>	<u>Input rate (note a)</u>	<u>Physician workload</u>				
A. Current procedures								
M+30 - M+60	100,000	3,846	7,122	b/ 5,698	30	190	68	122
M+60 - M+180	<u>550,000</u>	5,288	9,793	<u>b/ 7,835</u>	30	261	190	<u>71</u>
Total	<u>650,000</u>							<u>193</u>
B. Alternate procedures								
M+30 - M+60	100,000	3,846	7,122	4,273	30	142	68	74
M+60 - M+180	<u>550,000</u>	5,288	9,793	5,876	30	196	142	<u>54</u>
Total	<u>650,000</u>							<u>128</u>
C. Both procedures with Selective Service System sending first person at M+40 (note d)								
Current								
M+40 - M+60	<u>100,000</u>	e/ 6,154	11,396	9,117	30	304	68	<u>236</u>
Revised								
M+40 - M+60	<u>100,000</u>	6,154	11,396	6,838	30	228	68	<u>160</u>

(965010)

a/See page 7 of this report.

b/Results from applying Selective Service System data for mental and moral fail rates to people given medical exam first and adding to those who are given the mental exam first.

c/Found by dividing physician workload by the exam rate.

d/The M+60 to M+180 timeframe not calculated as we assume it would drop back to a level similar in A and B.

e/Established by MEPCOM.

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