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Selection And Use Of SS Manhattan As A Floating Silo During The Bangladesh Food Crisis

B-177521

Department of State
Agency for International Development

**BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES**

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OCT. 17, 1973



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-177521

The Honorable William Proxmire
United States Senate

Dear Senator Proxmire:

This is our report in response to your request of November 9, 1972, that we review the Agency for International Development's selection and use of the SS Manhattan as a floating silo during the Bangladesh food crisis. 47

In accordance with discussions with your office, we have not followed the customary practice of obtaining advance agency comment on this report. However, we have discussed the issues with agency officials and have considered their informal comments in preparing the report.

We plan to make no further distribution of this report unless copies are specifically requested, and then we shall make distribution only if you agree or make public its contents.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James B. Stacks".

Comptroller General
of the United States

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ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|----------|--|
| AID | Agency for International Development |
| GAO | General Accounting Office |
| UNROB/D | U.N. Relief Operation, Bangladesh/Dacca |
| UNROB/NY | U.N. Relief Operations, Bangladesh/New York |
| USCOR | U.S. Coordinator for Relief Office in Dacca, Bangladesh |

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM PROXMIRE
UNITED STATES SENATE

SELECTION AND USE OF SS
MANHATTAN AS A FLOATING SILO
DURING THE BANGLADESH FOOD CRISIS
Department of State
Agency for International Development
B-177521

D I G E S T

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

Senator Proxmire asked GAO to review the use of Government money for chartering the SS Manhattan, largest ship in the U.S. merchant marine, to carry grain to Bangladesh and to serve as a floating silo for receiving, storing, and discharging grain. (See p. 3.)

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Background

Bangladesh ports, Chittagong and Chalna, were clogged with wrecked ships and its inland transportation system was severely damaged after the civil turmoil which began in March and ended with the India-Pakistan war in December 1971. (See p. 3.)

The U.N. Relief Operation in Bangladesh was established in December 1971 with headquarters in New York to coordinate the international relief effort. It began chartering small ships, tugs, and barges to operate in the offshore and inland waterways.

Food distribution problems in Bangladesh centered around the massive congestion in the ports. The U.N. Relief Operation, Bangladesh, wanted a floating silo to offload grain from oceangoing vessels and to discharge into smaller vessels which

could bypass the congested ports. (See pp. 3 to 5.)

Need for a floating silo
in Bangladesh

The U.N. Relief Operation in New York requested that the Agency for International Development (AID) provide a silo ship of 30,000- to 35,000-ton capacity for 3 to 6 months beginning in mid-May 1972. 97

U.N. officials in Bangladesh preferred two smaller ships of 15,000- to 20,000-ton capacity because these could operate in shallow waters and would be affected less by storms during the monsoon period. They needed the silo ships because

--shore silos at Chittagong were limited,

--port facilities were not capable of moving grain in and out, and

--an increase in average monthly imports of grain was expected. (See pp. 5 and 6.)

Selection of the Manhattan

AID chartered the Manhattan to transport about 66,000 tons of wheat and to serve as a floating silo off the Bangladesh coast because

--it was the only ship offered that

was in a position to load wheat at gulf coast ports,

--it was offered at the lowest cost per deadweight ton, and

--it was a U.S.-flag ship. (See pp. 8 and 9.)

Use of the Manhattan

The Manhattan arrived off the Bangladesh coast in August 1972. However, before its arrival, the U.N. Relief Operation, Bangladesh, had significantly improved its grain-handling capabilities, reducing the need for a silo ship.

The Manhattan's operations were restricted because of rough seas and its ice armor protective belt.

While the ship was anchored as a silo in the Bay of Bengal, it received only about 44,000 tons of grain and, including its initial cargo, discharged about 110,000 tons. This was far less than originally expected. (See p. 12.)

Before the Manhattan arrived in Bangladesh, an AID-financed consultant recognized that the ship would be an expensive silo and suggested that it be used to make another grain-carrying trip during the charter period. AID's attempt to find another use for the vessel failed. (See p. 14.)

On October 13, 1972, an AID transportation specialist recommended, on the basis of a study of the overall transportation system in Bangladesh,

that the charter be terminated as soon as possible because costs exceeded benefits. After evaluating the recommendation, AID notified the Manhattan owners that the charter would be terminated November 12, 1972. For various reasons, the ship was not officially turned over to the ship's captain until December 6, or 6 days before the charter expired on December 12, 1972. (See pp. 14 and 15.)

AID obligated \$4 million for chartering the Manhattan. As of May 2, 1973, it had expended about \$3 million. The total value of the charter could not be determined at that time because final payments are subject to negotiation. (See p. 15.)

Monitoring of operations

The U.N. Relief Operation in Bangladesh accepted operational responsibility of the Manhattan. AID required that the United Nations report shortly after the ship's arrival off Bangladesh and make weekly operational reports thereafter. AID did not directly monitor the ship's operations. (See p. 15.)

Because the United States financed the Manhattan, GAO believes that AID should have more directly monitored the need for and the operations of the ship. GAO noted several indications which might have provided a basis for judging that the charter should have been terminated in mid-September. Charter costs between mid-September and November 12, 1972, AID's specified termination date, were about \$925,000. (See pp. 15 and 16.)

AVAILABLE

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Senator William Proxmire requested that we review the chartering by the Agency for International Development (AID) of the SS Manhattan, the largest ship in the U.S. merchant marine, to carry grain to Bangladesh and to serve as a floating silo for receiving, storing, and discharging grain. We examined the (1) need for a silo ship, (2) economy in selecting the Manhattan to carry and store grain, and (3) effectiveness of the Manhattan's silo operation.

BACKGROUND

Bangladesh's ports and inland transportation system were severely damaged as a result of the internal turmoil which began in March 1971. The civil disturbances ended with the India-Pakistan war of December 1971, resulting in Bangladesh's independence.

Bangladesh was faced with an emergency situation, and its primary concern was to prevent starvation on a massive scale. The United States and other donor countries pledged sufficient food to meet Bangladesh's immediate needs. Bangladesh, however, was confronted with the problem of distributing the donated food to its people.

The major ports of Chittagong and Chalna were clogged with wrecked ships, and the dock areas were incapable of handling normal shipping. Damage to roads and rail bridges virtually stopped land movement of cargo. Most of the burden of internal distribution of food and supplies, therefore, depended upon the inland water transportation system. In the past, railroads had been the primary mode for moving cargo and food grains from the port of Chittagong.

In December 1971 the United Nations established the United Nations Relief Operation, Dacca,¹ with headquarters in New York to coordinate the international relief effort in Bangladesh. The Dacca office immediately established a transportation task force to manage the movement of food into the country. It began chartering small ships, tugs, and barges to operate in the offshore and inland waterways. These vessels, carrying up to 1,900 tons a voyage to the inland river ports, became the major component in the food distribution system.

¹On March 31, 1973, the organization's name was changed to United Nations Relief Operation, Bangladesh, with offices in Dacca (UNROB/D) and with headquarters in New York (UNROB/NY). The new title is used throughout this report.

CHAPTER 2

NEED FOR A FLOATING SILO IN BANGLADESH

The problems of storing and prompt distribution of grain to the Bengalees centered around the congested port facilities. UNROB/D was expecting increased imports of food grain to meet Bangladesh's needs, and believed that a floating silo would help alleviate the problem. Even though UNROB/D and AID did not make a study to determine the feasibility of a floating silo, circumstances seemed to justify the need.

JUSTIFICATION FOR A SILO SHIP

In the spring of 1972, the United Nations projected that Bangladesh would need to import 2.5 million tons of food grain from April 1972 through March 1973. The average monthly import level of more than 200,000 tons was above (1) the previous monthly averages of 125,000 tons and (2) the amounts received in peak months in the past. Although some food grain was expected to arrive by land from India and ease the port problem somewhat, UNROB/D did not consider the damaged ports capable of efficiently handling the expected imports.

Smaller vessels initially chartered by UNROB/D in January 1972 helped to alleviate the congested port problem by distributing grain to the inland areas of Bangladesh; however, a storage problem still existed. An onshore grain silo with a capacity of 100,000 tons was completed at Chittagong in 1971, but its effectiveness was limited because port facilities were not capable of moving grain in and out.

UNROB/D believed that two silo ships would benefit its transportation system. It envisioned the silo ships receiving grain from oceangoing vessels in the Bay of Bengal and moving to the mouth of each of the two main rivers in Bangladesh. With the silo ships in this position, the number of trips smaller vessels could make upcountry would be increased. In addition, the silo ships would provide storage for expected heavy food grain arrivals.


UNROB/D REQUESTS A SILO SHIP

UNROB/D submitted a request for a silo ship to its headquarters, and on April 19, 1972, UNROB/NY requested AID's Disaster Relief Coordinator to provide a silo ship of 30,000- to 35,000-ton capacity for 3 to 6 months beginning in mid-May 1972. On April 26, AID asked the U.S. Coordinator for Relief (USCOR) and UNROB/D to assess the requirements. USCOR replied on April 28 that UNROB/D preferred two smaller ships of 15,000- to 20,000-ton capacity each with a 20- to 22-foot draft because they could operate in shallow waters and would be affected less by storms during the monsoon period.

USCOR supported UNROB/D's preference, stating that the port of Chittagong could not effectively handle river transport and that salvage operations at the port would continue for at least several months. AID and USCOR officials told us in August 1972 and April 1973 that they had not studied the feasibility of a silo ship but that, with the estimated heavy grain arrivals, an "expansion joint" for the ports seemed necessary. AID officials said they were reacting to an emergency situation and their primary objective was to get food to the Bengalees to prevent starvation. Moreover, AID assumed that the United Nations knew their requirements.

ALTERNATIVES TO A SILO SHIP

Alternate methods for increasing storage in Bangladesh were (1) paying demurrage (a penalty for not unloading a ship within a certain period after its arrival) and (2) chartering smaller vessels locally to store grain. AID considered paying demurrage but felt that delaying the unloading of vessels was defeating the objective of getting food to the Bengalees as quickly as possible. AID did not consider chartering smaller vessels locally. An UNROB/D official told us the use of smaller vessels required more grain-handling equipment and personnel than were available at the time the silo ship was requested. For this reason the United Nations did not consider the chartering of smaller vessels feasible.



Source USIS Dacca.

**THE SS MANHATTAN, THE LARGEST SHIP IN THE U.S. MERCHANT FLEET, WAS USED AS A FLOATING GRAIN SILO
IN THE BAY OF BENGAL.**

CHAPTER 3

AID'S EFFORT TO PROVIDE SILO SHIPS

In response to UNROB's request for silo ships, AID requested bids for U.S.-flag ships and selected the SS Manhattan which was the least expensive ship per deadweight ton. AID also believed that an increment of 100,000 tons of wheat had to be shipped to Bangladesh to respond to the food crisis. The Manhattan with a capacity of 114,700 tons was the only ship offered that was in a position to load wheat available at gulf coast ports and deliver it promptly.

SELECTION OF SS MANHATTAN

AID requested proposals for a silo ship of 30,000 tons or larger on April 21, 1972, as requested by UNROB/NY on April 19. On May 1, AID amended its request for proposals to reflect UNROB/D's preference for smaller ships as clarified on April 28 by USCOR. AID's request for proposals was restricted to U.S.-flag ships. According to an AID document of April 19, the Disaster Relief Coordinator wanted a U.S.-flag ship because "the powers upstairs want to increase the American visibility in the relief effort." Although AID recognized that U.S.-flag ships were generally more expensive than foreign ships, AID's general policy was to use grant funds on U.S. goods and services.

In response to its invitation to bid, AID received offers for nine U.S.-flag vessels and selected the SS Manhattan because it was the lowest bid per deadweight ton.

Proposed Costs for Floating Silos

| <u>Name of vessel offered</u> | <u>Capacity (deadweight ton)</u> | <u>Proposed daily cost</u> | <u>Proposed daily cost per deadweight ton (note a)</u> | <u>Estimated cost of 180-day charter (note b)</u> |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|--|---|
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| SS Manhattan | 114,700 | \$20,000 | \$0.174 | \$3.60 |
| SS Western Hunter | 72,254 | 15,140 | .210 | 2.73 |
| SS Vantage Horizon | 33,761 | 7,200 | .213 | 1.30 |
| SS Montpelier Victory | 49,451 | 12,800 | .259 | 2.30 |
| SS Monticello Victory | 49,299 | 12,800 | .260 | 2.30 |
| SS Platte | 26,070 | 7,850 | .301 | 1.41 |
| SS Potomac | 23,846 | 7,200 | .302 | 1.30 |
| SS Lumber Queen | 24,392 | 7,750 | .318 | 1.40 |
| SS Spitfire | 24,800 | 8,000 | .323 | 1.44 |

^aComputed by dividing column 3 by column 2.

^bComputed by multiplying column 3 by 180 days.

At the time of selection, AID officials knew that about 100,000 tons of wheat were available for the Bangladesh emergency. An AID official stated that no other vessel offered was in position to load wheat available at gulf coast ports and deliver it promptly. Most of the other vessels were in Southeast Asian waters. AID decided that it could save substantially by transporting the wheat to Bangladesh on the Manhattan instead of hiring several vessels. Additionally, AID officials wanted to provide the largest vessel at the least cost per ton for silo operations to insure that Bangladesh had sufficient storage capacity.

In late May 1972, AID decided to have the Manhattan carry only 70,000 tons of wheat because of U.S. gulf port draft limitations. According to AID, loading to the ship's full capacity would have had to be done on the high seas. This would have taken a number of weeks, increased costs, and delayed the ship's arrival in the Bay of Bengal. The 70,000-ton limit was later reduced to about 66,000 tons.

AID negotiated with the Manhattan owners to (1) deliver the ship at the gulf coast instead of Chester, Pennsylvania, where it was dry-docked, (2) clean the storage hold, and (3) reduce the proposed daily rate.

| <u>Grain to be carried</u> | <u>Daily charter rate</u> | <u>Other costs</u> | <u>Total charter cost for 180 days</u> |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|--|
| Up to 70,000 tons | \$17,500 | - | \$3,150,000 |
| 70,000 to 100,000 | 18,250 | ^a \$600,000 | 3,885,000 |

^aFor loading on the high seas.

Two other ships, however, more closely met UNROB preference for 2 ships of 15,000- to 20,000-ton storage capacity; namely, the SS Lumber Queen and the SS Potomac. The capacities of the SS Lumber Queen and the SS Potomac were 24,392 tons and 23,846 tons, respectively. At the time AID selected the Manhattan, the estimated savings would have been \$2.19 million, as illustrated in the following schedule based on negotiated rates for the Manhattan and bid proposals for the other two vessels.


Estimated Savings by Selecting
SS Manhattan

| | <u>Lumber Queen</u> (1) | <u>Potomac</u> (2) | Estimated cost for UNROB/D's <u>requirements</u> (3) | <u>Manhattan</u> (4) | Estimated savings by selecting Manhattan (note a) (5) |
|--|----------------------------|-----------------------|---|-------------------------|---|
| | ----- (millions) ----- | | | | |
| Estimated cost for 180-day charter | \$1.40 | \$1.30 | \$2.70 | \$3.15 | \$0.45 |
| Estimated cost to ship 66,000 tons of wheat at \$40 a ton (note b) | | | <u>\$2.64</u> | - | <u>\$2.64</u> |
| Total | | | <u>\$5.34</u> | <u>\$3.15</u> | <u>\$2.19</u> |

^aComputed by subtracting column 4 from column 3.

^bThe cost to ship wheat to Bangladesh in May 1972, when AID was selecting a silo vessel, was about \$40 a ton.

The Manhattan was not expected to reach Bangladesh until late July or early August 1972. Therefore, AID requested additional proposals on June 1 to provide ships on an interim basis. On June 5, however, UNROB/NY informed AID that interim ships were not needed because sufficient storage capacity was available until the arrival of the Manhattan.



Source USIS Dacca.

THE SS MANHATTAN ANCHORED IN THE BAY OF BENGAL OFFLOADING FOOD GRAIN INTO A LIGHTERING VESSEL.

CHAPTER 4

UTILIZATION OF SS MANHATTAN

The SS Manhattan was never fully utilized as a floating silo because of rough seas, the dangerous ice armor protective belt around the vessel, and UNROB/D's increased grain-handling capability. While anchored in the Bay of Bengal, the Manhattan received only about 44,000 tons of grain and, including its initial cargo, discharged about 110,000 tons. This was far less than expected.

OPERATION OF SS MANHATTAN

The Manhattan's 180-day charter began June 15, 1972, when it started loading grain in Galveston, Texas. It was to be redelivered to its owners on December 12, 1972, in Bangladesh, unless AID extended the charter for another 90 days. The Manhattan sailed on June 26 carrying about 66,000 tons of food grain and arrived in Bangladesh on August 5, where it anchored about 50 miles from Chittagong.

The ship was in the Bay of Bengal for 124 days, and almost from the start, troubles plagued operations. Poor weather, strong tidal currents, and the ice armor protection limited its grain silo operations. By August 30, the end of the first 4-week period, only 30,000 of the 66,000 tons of grain had been offloaded. Weekly UNROB/D operation reports to AID indicated that rough seas permitted unloading for only 10 days. No grain was delivered to the Manhattan by other ships during that period.

In the following 4-week period, ended September 27, only about 7,500 tons were offloaded into two vessels, and about 44,000 tons were received from three other vessels, the only grain the Manhattan received during its silo operations. Rough seas and strong tidal currents restricted operations to only 14 days. On the other hand, during the first 90 days of the Manhattan's silo operation in Bangladesh waters, about 400,000 tons of food grain arrived in Bangladesh and 350,000 tons were offloaded directly from oceangoing vessels into smaller ships.

As shown in the following photograph, the thick ice armor, which helped SS Manhattan to cut a path through the

frozen northwest passage, surrounds the ship and protrudes from its sides. This special feature created an added hazard in rough seas which persisted around Bangladesh longer in 1972 than usual because of the extended monsoon season. Three smaller ships attempting to receive grain and one ship discharging into the silo ship were damaged by the ice armor. After the Manhattan and the Eagle Voyager collided on September 18, the silo ship became even less effective when owners and masters of other ships claimed the Manhattan was an unsafe berth and resisted going alongside.¹

Weather was no longer a problem in October and November 1972; however, use of the Manhattan continued to be limited. Between the date silos were requested in April 1972 and the Manhattan's arrival offshore at Bangladesh in August 1972, UNROB/D had improved its grain-handling capabilities. By obtaining minibulkers,² lightering vessels, and grain-moving machines, UNROB/D was able to handle about 425,000 tons of food grain during June and July 1972 which far exceeded its expectations. The minibulkers performed above expectations, grain machines worked at capacity, and no labor problems were encountered. UNROB/D's capabilities were enhanced even further in August 1972 by the arrival of additional smaller vessels. Subsequent monthly grain imports were not expected to exceed those of July 1972.

An UNROB/D official stated in April 1973 that it could have operated without the Manhattan and still have incurred no demurrage. However, since AID provided the Manhattan as a silo ship, UNROB/D tried to use it for storage as much as possible and unload only when necessary. An UNROB/D official³ added "that it is better to have a white elephant halfloaded than to have an empty white elephant."

¹As of May 2, 1973, no claims had been filed against AID for damages caused to the three smaller vessels. Only the SS Eagle Voyager, which was under charter by the Department of Agriculture, had indicated that a claim for damages would be submitted. The claim was estimated to be between \$200,000 and \$300,000.

²A small ship of about 2,000-ton capacity capable of operating in open sea and river channels.

We were advised that UNROB/D did not incur any demurrage costs during 1972. Moreover, in 1972, UNROB/D earned about \$1 million in dispatch fees (fees paid by the owners when a ship is unloaded ahead of schedule).

TERMINATION OF SS MANHATTAN CHARTER

An AID-financed consultant stated in a report dated July 1972 that the Manhattan could be unloaded upon arrival in Bangladesh and could make another grain-carrying trip during the charter period. He considered the Manhattan an inexpensive grain hauler but an expensive silo. At that time, the consultant reported that the United States still had 150,000 tons of food grain to be delivered under its pledge to Bangladesh. According to an AID official in May 1973, AID decided not to send the ship back to the United States for more grain because the Department of Agriculture said that the supply of wheat for delivery at the northwest Pacific seaports, where the Manhattan could have been fully loaded, was limited. According to this official, the short supply of wheat resulting from the wheat sale to Russia caused high prices and reduced purchases of wheat to be donated.

On October 13, 1972, an AID transportation specialist reported on a study of the overall transportation system in Bangladesh. He recommended that the Manhattan charter be terminated as soon as possible because "the costs exceed the benefits." AID asked UNROB/D and USCOR to evaluate the recommendation. By October 31, 1972, USCOR, UNROB/D, and the Government of Bangladesh agreed that the charter should be terminated as soon as possible. On November 8, AID notified the Manhattan's owners that the charter was terminated at U.S. Government convenience, as provided for in the charter contract, effective November 12, 1972, or upon discharge of relief cargo onboard the ship, whichever was earlier. The Manhattan's owners objected to early termination and expected full payment through December 12.

The Manhattan did not leave Bangladesh until December 7, 1972, 25 days after AID's declared termination date and only 5 days before December 12. According to AID, delays were caused by:

--The ship was not completely offloaded until November 18, 1972.

- Its grain storage tanks were not cleaned until November 23, 1972.
- An AID survey of damages to the Manhattan was not completed until November 23, 1972.
- The Manhattan's owners wanted AID-owned fuel and lubricating oils removed.¹
- A redelivery certificate was not given to the Manhattan's captain until December 6, 1972.

The owners had not submitted a termination proposal to AID as of May 4, 1973. Therefore the total cost of the charter is still in question. Of the \$4 million obligation for the charter, about \$3 million had been expended as of May 2, 1973. The owners submitted vouchers claiming \$525,000 reimbursement for their daily charter fee of \$17,500 from November 12 through December 12, 1972. As of May 2, 1973, AID had not paid these vouchers. An AID official advised us in April 1973 that payment on these vouchers would be subject to negotiation.

MONITORING OF SS MANHATTAN OPERATIONS

UNROB/D accepted operational responsibility of the Manhattan to facilitate the overall management of food grain imports and developed an operating plan to make the vessel an integrated element of the grain storage and movement plan. AID required that UNROB/D report shortly after the ship's arrival and make weekly operational reports thereafter. These reports were to be forwarded to AID through USCOR, whose prime responsibility was to act as a liaison office between AID and UNROB/D. USCOR did not take an active role in monitoring the ship's operation because it did not have adequate staff.

¹Fifty-one drums of lubricants washed overboard during rough weather and the remainder of the fuel was disposed of in March 1973 in Beaumont, Texas. The net proceeds, as of May 14, 1973, from the sale of the fuel and lubricants was about \$31,500.

It is our opinion that, since the United States financed the Manhattan, AID should have more directly monitored the need for and the operations of the vessel. Had it done so, AID possibly could have recognized earlier that the ship was not needed as a floating silo and could have arranged for terminating the contract as early as mid-September.

As shown in this report, we noted several indications which might have provided a basis for judging about September 1972 that the Manhattan was not needed as a floating silo and that the charter should have been terminated. An AID consultant reported in July 1972, before the ship arrived in Bangladesh, that the Manhattan would be an expensive silo. Also, between April 1972 when a silo was requested and the arrival of the Manhattan in August, UNROB/D had improved its grain-handling capabilities beyond its expectations. Estimated future monthly arrivals of grain were not expected to exceed the grain handled during July. Another factor that developed at that time was a reduced availability of wheat in the United States for shipment to Bangladesh. And by September it had become evident that the ice armor protective belt around the vessel interfered with its operation as a silo.

Charter costs between mid-September and November 12, 1972, the specified termination date, were about \$925,000.



Source USIS Dacca.

THE SS MANHATTAN OFFLOADING FOOD GRAIN. NOTICE THE ICE ARMOR PROTRUDING FROM ITS SIDE. THIS ARMOR DAMAGED SEVERAL VESSELS WHILE ONLOADING AND OFFLOADING GRAIN.

CHAPTER 5

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Our review was made at AID headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at the USCOR office in Dacca, Bangladesh. We reviewed available records and interviewed U.S. officials at both locations. We also interviewed officials of UNROB/D, who had operational control of the Manhattan while in Bangladesh waters.

From November 1972 through March 1973, the AID Auditor General made a review of AID's activities in Bangladesh. The Auditor General's records concerning the Manhattan operations were made available to us. The Auditor General's report had not been issued as of May 14, 1973.