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U.S. Disaster Relief To Pakistan  
Following The November 1970 Cyclone  
In East Pakistan B-173651

Agency for International Development  
Department of State

**BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL  
OF THE UNITED STATES**

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FEB. 23, 1972



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-173651

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Dear Senator Kennedy:

In response to your request of July 14, 1971, the accompanying report presents the results of our inquiry into United States disaster relief to Pakistan following the November 1970 cyclone in East Pakistan.

Our review covered the cyclone relief program through September 30, 1971. In certain instances, however, after the outbreak of the civil strife in March 1971, cyclone relief could not be readily distinguished from civil strife relief. The inseparable matters will be covered as one topic when we report later on our review of United States humanitarian assistance to Pakistan since the March 1971 civil strife. We have not followed our usual practice of submitting a report draft to the Agency for International Development for their formal comments. 52

We believe that the contents of this report would be of interest to committees and other members of Congress. Release of the report, however, will be made only upon your agreement or upon public announcement by you concerning the contents of the report.

Sincerely yours,

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Comptroller General  
of the United States

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The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy  
United States Senate

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#### ABBREVIATIONS

AID	Agency for International Development
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	General Accounting Office
GOEP	Government of East Pakistan
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (now United Nations Children's Fund)
WFP	World Food Program

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D I G E S T

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

Senator Edward M. Kennedy requested the General Accounting Office (GAO) to examine into U.S. assistance to East Pakistan following the November 12 and 13, 1970, cyclone. (See app. I.) The GAO inquiry preceded the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan in December 1971, and therefore events occurring as a result of the hostilities have not been treated in this report.

This report discusses U.S. cyclone relief assistance; a subsequent report will discuss U.S. humanitarian assistance to Pakistan after the March 1971 civil strife. In certain instances cyclone relief assistance and civil strife relief assistance cannot be readily distinguished. These inseparable assistance efforts will be discussed as one topic in the other report.

GAO did not submit a report draft to the Agency for International Development (AID) for formal comment. Because of the civil strife, GAO did not directly observe conditions in the cyclone affected area.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The storm affected a total area of nearly 4,000 square miles with an estimated population of 4.8 million. The most severely ravaged area, the delta islands and low-lying coastal plains, measures about 1,700 square miles and contains about 2 million people. (See map, p. 5.) The people in this area are poor. Densely packed together on land just a few feet above sea level, they eke out a meager existence as fishermen, boatmen, or small-scale farmers.

U.S. officials estimate that the cyclone killed some 300,000 people and destroyed or damaged about \$158 million in crops and livestock and over \$30 million in other property. (See p. 4.)

U.S. assistance

An Interdepartmental Working Group on East Pakistan was established in Washington 3 days after the storm to expedite and coordinate U.S. Government assistance for the areas in East Pakistan stricken by the cyclone. Included were representatives of AID, the Departments of State and Defense, and other agencies. Within AID/Washington, a special action group was set

up to coordinate the activities of the various AID divisions and to provide cyclone relief information. (See p. 13.)

The U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan established an interagency task force in Islamabad, West Pakistan, to handle political and foreign relations, transportation, and communication. The task force formed a committee to manage U.S. assistance and to coordinate it with that of other donors and of the Pakistan Government. (See p. 15.)

As of September 30, 1971, the United States had provided about \$39 million for cyclone relief. This amount included \$2.2 million for emergency relief (helicopters, blankets, tents, etc.), \$30 million for food grain, and \$6.7 million for reconstruction projects--housing, coastal embankments, and cyclone shelters. (See p. 6.)

#### Assistance of others

Although the Pakistan Government was responsible for managing the cyclone relief efforts, about 70 countries in addition to the United States, numerous voluntary agencies, and the United Nations took part by supplying tents, clothing, food, and transport services. By early in March 1971, about \$28.5 million worth of assistance had been contributed. (See p. 40.) As of September 1971 an additional \$23.1 million worth of aid had been contributed by other sources. (See p. 40.)

#### Reconstruction and rehabilitation assistance

In December 1970 the Pakistan Government, in conjunction with the World Bank, developed a reconstruction and rehabilitation plan for the cyclone area. The United States proposed a grant of \$100 million in U.S.-owned rupees toward the plan, but as of September 1971 a grant agreement had not been reached. The Pakistan Government was reluctant to accept the rupees because it did not consider them to be real economic assistance. (See p. 31.)

Rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts were seriously disrupted by the civil strife. In September 1971 AID did not know how much the Government of East Pakistan had spent for reconstruction programs or the status of the programs. (See p. 32.)

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

At the request of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, we have inquired into the U.S. disaster relief assistance to East Pakistan following the cyclone in November 1970.

This report deals with U.S. cyclone assistance up to September 30, 1971. In another report, which also was requested by the Senator, we will discuss all U.S. humanitarian assistance to East Pakistan since the March 1971 civil strife. In certain instances cyclone and civil strife relief efforts cannot readily be separated. Therefore we will discuss those efforts, when inseparable, as one topic in the other report.

Our review included discussions with U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and in Islamabad and Dacca, Pakistan, with officials of U.S. voluntary agencies, with a U.N. official, and with private persons who were in the cyclone area during the relief operations. We also drew information from AID files and from reports of the United Nations, the World Bank, and the Pakistan Government. A scheduled trip to the cyclone affected area had to be canceled because of the civil strife.

### CYCLONE EFFECTS

The cyclone that swept up the Bay of Bengal on November 12 and 13, 1970, was the ninth severe cyclone to strike East Pakistan in 10 years and the most damaging that had been recorded. Winds up to 150 miles an hour combined with a 20- to 30-foot-high sea surge swept across the delta area, causing severe damage.

The storm affected a total area of nearly 4,000 square miles with an estimated population of 4.8 million. The most severely ravaged area, the delta islands and low-lying coastal plains, measures about 1,700 square miles and contains about 2 million people. (See map, p. 5.) The people in this area are poor. Densely packed together on land just a few feet above sea level, they eke out a meager existence as fishermen, boatmen, or small-scale farmers.

There are no reliable estimates of how many lives were lost. An 11-year lapse since the last census, the presence of thousands of migratory workers in the area, the flight of people inland after the storm, and the influx of people to claim abandoned land precluded anything but a rough estimate.

The Pakistan Government reported an official body count of 191,951 with 14,834 more persons reported missing, but the actual death toll was undoubtedly higher because many bodies were washed out to sea and never found. On the basis of a February 1971 statistical survey, an AID-commissioned team estimated that at least 230,000 people were killed in the cyclone. According to U.S. officials, the figure was a minimum because the sample included only families with surviving member(s) still living in the cyclone area. U.S. officials estimated the death toll at about 300,000.

Besides human lives, nearly everything else in the path of the storm was destroyed. The major estimated economic losses are shown below.


	<u>Losses</u>	Value ( <u>millions</u> )
Houses (destroyed or damaged)	335,000	\$ 26.6
Rice (tons)	550,500	125.1
Livestock	470,000	33.3
Fishing boats	9,000	<u>3.6</u>
 Total		 <u>\$188.6</u>

The storm left thousands of survivors with just their lives as it ruined or swept away their personal belongings-- clothes, blankets, dishes, cooking utensils, and agricultural tools, in short, the basic day-to-day needs.

About 70 countries, numerous voluntary agencies, and the U.N. took part in the relief effort. The Government of East Pakistan decided what supplies were needed and where they were needed, and it supplied most of the medical and support personnel in the cyclone area. Donor countries and voluntary agencies contributed blankets, tents, food, and, most important in the initial relief phase, helicopters.



# EAST PAKISTAN



■ Area devastated by wind and tidal wave during cyclonic storm, 13 November


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The U.S. response, as of September 30, 1971, to the disaster is summarized in the following table.


	<u>Millions of dollars</u>
Emergency assistance:	
U.S. Civil Defense donation of over 1 million pounds of biscuits	\$ 0.4
Blankets, tents, miscellaneous relief supplies, commercial airlifts, and helicopter operations	1.8 <sup>a</sup>
Donation of 250,000 U.S.-owned rupees to Pakistan Government by Ambassador	.1
Food grain assistance:	
Public Law 480, title I, sales	17.1
Public Law 480, title II, grants	12.8
Reconstruction and rehabilitation assistance:	
Release of rupees to various voluntary agencies	1.0
Dollar grant to Pakistan Government for housing, coastal embankments, and cyclone shelters	4.7 <sup>a</sup>
Dollar grant to Pakistan Government for coastal and river boats to carry food and commodities	<u>1.0<sup>a</sup></u>
Total U.S. assistance	<u>\$38.9</u>

<sup>a</sup>The noted figures total \$7.5 million, which was the amount of the special congressional appropriation for cyclone relief and rehabilitation in fiscal year 1971.


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
AERIAL VIEW OF VILLAGES DAMAGED BY THE CYCLONE-TIDAL SURGE OF NOVEMBER 1970. Source USIS, Dacca.



THATCH ROOFED HOUSES LAID LOW BY THE NOVEMBER 1970  
CYCLONE, IN NOAKHALI DISTRICT. Source USIS. Dacca.



REMAINS OF A COASTAL VILLAGE'S MARKET THE DAY AFTER THE  
NOVEMBER 12-13, 1970 CYCLONE. Photo by Al Black, Leeds Hill-DeLeuw,  
Dacca, East Pakistan.



V I E W O F C O A S T A L E M B A N K M E N T D E S T R O Y E D B Y W A V E S O V E R L A P P I N G I T .

S o u r c e U S A I D / D a c c a  
D a c c a , E a s t P a k i s t a n



VIEW OF DEMOLISHED WALL BEHIND COASTAL EMBANKMENT ENCLOSING  
EAST PAKISTAN WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (EPWAPDA)  
COMPOUND  
Source USIS, Dacca

## CHAPTER 2

### U.S. ORGANIZATION TO RESPOND TO DISASTER

#### LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY

Department of State Delegation of Authority No. 104, of November 3, 1961, delegates to the Administrator, AID, authority for funding and operational coordination of emergency disaster relief operations. This authority is derived from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and from the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (otherwise known as Pub. L. 480).

#### Public Law 480

Section 201 authorizes the President, on behalf of the people of the United States, to determine requirements and furnish agricultural commodities to meet famine or other urgent or extraordinary relief requirements.

Section 202 states that:

"\*\*\* the President may furnish commodities for the purposes set forth in section 201 through friendly governments and such agencies, private or public, including intergovernmental organizations such as the World Food Program and other multilateral organizations in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as he deems appropriate. The President shall, to the extent practicable, utilize nonprofit voluntary agencies registered with and approved by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid."

Section 101 provides that, to carry out the policies and accomplish the objectives set forth in section 2 of the act, including combating hunger and malnutrition, the President is authorized to negotiate and carry out agreements with friendly countries to provide for the sale of agricultural commodities for dollars on credit terms or for foreign currencies.



## Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended

Section 451 provides for certain amounts from the President's contingency fund to be used for relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance. Of the \$30 million made available for the contingency fund of fiscal year 1971, \$15 million is specifically for the benefit of cyclone, tidal wave, and flood victims in East Pakistan.

Section 639, regarding famine and disaster relief, states: "No provision of the Act shall be construed to prohibit assistance to any country for famine or disaster relief."

### POLICY

The President expressed a desire to make promptly the most generous possible offer of U.S. assistance to Pakistan; the basic U.S. objective was to alleviate human suffering. To meet the short-term needs of the devastated area, food, blankets, tents, and other items, along with transport for these items, were provided by the U.S. Government. The long-range U.S. objectives for helping the cyclone victims included reconstruction and rehabilitation assistance. (See ch. 3.)

In seeking the broadest possible support, the Pakistan Government asked the United Nations to begin a multilateral food grain assistance program. Within the context of this international effort, the United States pledged additional food grain shipments. Details of U.S. food grain assistance are discussed in chapter 3.

### ORGANIZATION

On November 16, 1970, the Interdepartmental Working Group on East Pakistan Disaster Relief was established to determine the assistance needed, to coordinate U.S. Government assistance, and to assist Pakistan promptly in its disaster relief efforts for the areas in East Pakistan stricken by the cyclone of November 12 and 13, 1970. U.S. Government agencies, including AID and the Departments of State and Defense, were represented in this group. The group's functions included reviewing the cyclone disaster situation and

relief efforts of the United States and others. The working group also considered potential areas for further U.S. assistance, including the levels and types needed, in response to anticipated Pakistan Government requests and plans for rehabilitation and reconstruction projects.

#### AID responsibility

Under normal operating conditions, the AID Disaster Relief Division is responsible for coordinating foreign disaster relief operations during an emergency. In addition, a special joint AID and Department of State East Pakistan Disaster Action Group was established within AID's Disaster Relief Division to carry out relief actions and to serve as a focal point of information for the public.

The action group, besides preparing interagency situation reports and providing public information, requested and coordinated relief activities of various AID divisions.

- Regional Office of South Asian Affairs, which helped assess the extent of the disaster and determine the most practical means of assistance.
- Food for Peace Division, which arranged for the composition and acquisition of foodstuffs to meet disaster relief needs under title II of Public Law 480.
- Industrial Resources Division, which helped determine the availability of disaster supplies and services from U.S. Government sources, such as the Departments of Defense and of Health, Education, and Welfare. When direct procurement was necessary, the assistance of the General Services Division was obtained.
- Resources Transportation Division, which helped arrange the transport of relief supplies.
- Voluntary Agencies Division, which maintained liaison with U.S. nonprofit voluntary agencies and plans for the use of their resources.

### Department of State responsibility

The Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs assessed field reports describing the nature and extent of the disaster. Recommendations were made to the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs on the basis of their evaluations. This bureau serves as a central point for policy coordination concerning the political desirability of emergency relief, maintains liaison with AID's Disaster Relief Division, and advises the Department of Defense (DOD) of any special political considerations.

### DOD responsibility

The Foreign Disaster Relief Coordinator in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) coordinated the emergency relief activities in the military agencies. The responsibilities of the DOD relief coordinator included monitoring the cyclone disaster operation to provide effective liaison between DOD and the Department of State, AID, or other concerned federal agencies.

### U.S. organization in Pakistan

On November 16, 3 days after the storm, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan established an interagency task force which handled matters concerning political and foreign relations, transportation, and communications. A four-man committee in Islamabad was set up to manage AID's operations and provide a mechanism for exchanging information with other assistance donors and with the Pakistan Government. The committee turned out six coordinating bulletins, which tabulated relief commodities of the major donors and which kept Washington informed of the flow of relief supplies from other countries. In Dacca the AID Provincial Director acted as the keyman in assessing and coordinating U.S. cyclone relief efforts.

After the task force was disbanded early in December 1970, an AID relief coordinator was appointed for each side of Pakistan (East and West) to work with the Pakistan Government, other countries, and voluntary agencies in planning rehabilitation activities.

CHAPTER 3

U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR CYCLONE VICTIMS

EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE

Immediately following the storm of November 12 and 13, 1970, the United States provided helicopters and boats as requested by the Pakistan Government. Relief supplies also were made immediately available for distribution to the cyclone victims. The following schedule shows the assistance provided shortly after the cyclone.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Date of arrival</u>	<u>Amount</u> <u>(000 omitted)</u>
Transportation:			
U.S. military helicopters (including their transport and crew expenses)	8	Nov. 20 through 23	\$772
AID helicopters--Nepal	2	" 20	100
Small boats with motors	50	" 23	63
Chartered airlifts	10	" 19 through 26	571
Other			<u>17</u>
Total cost			\$1,523
Relief supplies:			
Tents	1,000	" 19	89
Blankets	10,000	Do.	22
Plastic water bottles	60,000	" 23 through 26	13
Vegetable seeds (pounds)	23,000	Dec. 15	35
Other			<u>10</u>
Total cost			169
U.S. Mission support costs			<u>20</u>
			1,712
Donation of 250,000 U.S.-owned rupees by Ambassador on November 17, 1970			50
Survival biscuits		Nov. 21 through Dec. 15	<u>400</u>
Total emergency assistance			<u>\$2,162</u>

Cyclone relief efforts, which were provided by the United States prior to the outbreak of the March 1971 East Pakistan civil strife, are discussed below.

#### Helicopter assistance

U.S. helicopters were the first foreign craft to arrive in the disaster area and to begin moving relief supplies. On November 16, 1970, the Government of East Pakistan (GOEP) requested the United States to send helicopters. The American consul general in Dacca, the capital of the province of East Pakistan, immediately relayed this request to Washington and asked for two to four craft to move relief supplies already in Dacca to the outlying stricken areas.

Four U.S. Army helicopters, each with a 2,000-pound capacity, were made available for shipment from the United States on November 18. One of the copters became operational for disaster relief on November 20, and the others were placed into service the following day. Subsequently six additional copters (two from AID, Nepal, and four from the U.S. Army) were provided and were operating by November 25.

By late November a total of 38 helicopters were involved in the initial relief efforts. The United Kingdom supplied 12; the United States, 10; Pakistan, six, Federal Republic of Germany, five; France, three; and Saudi Arabia, two. As of December 9, the helicopters and local trucks had moved about one fifth of the total relief supplies; the remaining four fifths was moved by existing East Pakistan water transport equipment.

According to U.S. officials in Dacca, this force was adequate to meet the short-term emergency relief needs. They believed that the deployment of more helicopters would overstrain the already taut Pakistan support capability.

For safety reasons and to avoid duplication, the disaster area was divided into four zones. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany were each designated a zone in which it had responsibility for movement of relief supplies, while the remaining zone was serviced by Pakistan, France, and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. zone consisted of North Hatia and South Hatia Islands and the small islands between

South Hatia Island and Sandwip. (See map, p. 5.) The estimated predisaster population in the U.S. zone was 450,000.

U.S. helicopters operated in East Pakistan for 27 days. Six U.S. craft, operating from Noakhali, concentrated on delivering relief supplies within the U.S. zone, while the other four, operating from Dacca, carried relief supplies and medical personnel. A total of 80 U.S. military support and communications personnel manned and supported these craft.

Eight U.S. Army helicopters flew 1,250 missions at a cost of about \$772,000, and carried--in addition to medical personnel--Pakistan Government personnel, press personnel, and over 1 million pounds of relief supplies. Although the copters carried less than 50 percent of the maximum load of relief supplies on their sorties, a State Department inspector, who spent 3 days in the disaster area, reported that only essential passengers were carried. He reported also that the other two U.S. helicopters, which cost \$100,000, usually were out of operation.

U.S. officials in Dacca noted certain problems in the use of the U.S.-provided copters.

1. The hauling of medical personnel and supplies to the disaster area at the urging of Pakistan relief officials instead of using the craft for food distribution. A medical survey had shown that medical needs were far less than thought by the Pakistan Government and reported by the press.
2. The necessity for frequent airdrops of small quantities of supplies because Pakistan relief officials did not have enough ground personnel to store and distribute larger amounts.

The question of whether U.S. helicopters could have been put into action more quickly if they had been shipped from Vietnam or other locations closer to the disaster area was raised. The Department of State explained that the helicopters located in Asia were already committed to military operations and were critically needed, while those in the continental United States were readily available for

the complex process of disassembly, packing, and shipment. The Department of State mentioned that the only time possibly saved by shipping from Asia would have been flight time; but this timesaving would have been offset by the time required to identify available craft, support equipment, and men.

DOD officials stated that airlifting from the continental United States was the fastest way to obtain the needed craft. DOD estimated that it would have taken about 120 hours to move the helicopters already in Asia to East Pakistan and to have them ready for operation; whereas, the helicopters shipped from the United States were operating between 48 and 72 hours after DOD received the request.

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### Boat assistance

On November 20, 1970, AID/Washington notified the American consul general in Dacca that 50 U.S. Army assault boats (16-footers with 2-ton capacities) were available and could be shipped within 24 hours. U.S. officials relayed the offer to GOEP, which replied that the boats were needed urgently and asked that they be shipped as soon as possible.

Although the boats arrived in Dacca on November 23, 1970, about 72 hours after they were requested, they were not sent to the disaster area until 2 weeks later. The police, the military, and the Inland Waterways Commission all wanted to take possession of the boats and all intended to retain them after the relief operation ended. GOEP finally settled the matter by assigning the boats to the relief commissioners in the three districts hardest hit by the cyclone.

An AID official reported in January 1971 that the boats were being efficiently used, but AID did not receive any operational reports concerning the boats' use.

With the outbreak of civil strife in East Pakistan late in March 1971, the boats were seized by the West Pakistan military. After an unsuccessful effort to persuade the military to return the boats to Pakistan civilian officials, U.S. officials attempted to arrange for their transfer to U.N. control.

An AID official informed us late in September that the military was still in control of these boats, even though a Pakistan Government official reported in August that 44 or 45 of these boats were available for service and that the majority were being used for relief work.

### Chartered airlift assistance

Ten commercially chartered airlifts were made from the United States to Dacca from November 19 to November 26, 1970, at a cost of \$571,000. Relief supplies flown to Dacca were those most urgently needed and included 1,000 tents, 10,000 blankets, almost 600,000 pounds of ready-to-eat biscuits donated by the U.S. Civil Defense, 50 boats and motors, 60,000 plastic bottles, can openers, and donated supplies from non-profit agencies.



In addition to the chartered airlifts, a Boeing 747 (on a demonstration flight to Pakistan) carried some relief supplies without cost. The plane was to stop in Karachi, and its cargo was to be transhipped by smaller aircraft to Dacca because the latter's airfield was thought to be too small to handle the large craft. The information available to us indicated that, as it turned out, the plane unloaded only Boeing spare parts in Karachi and then flew on to Dacca where its relief cargo of 29,000 pounds of food was off-loaded on December 4, 1970.

### Supply assistance

About \$169,000 in relief supplies, which included tents, blankets, plastic water bottles, vegetable seeds, and other miscellaneous items, were given to the Pakistan Government during the emergency relief stage. Except for inadequate recordkeeping outside the Dacca area, no problems were noted in the distribution of these items, according to U.S. officials.

Supplies arriving at Dacca airport were turned over to the GOEP Relief Commissioner and were trucked to government warehouses. From the warehouses, the supplies either were sent to a river port about 10 miles from Dacca for loading onto river barges or were sent back to the airport for loading onto Pakistan Air Force planes or helicopters for airdrops within the cyclone area. The supplies sent by boat went to various depots downriver, where they were transferred into smaller boats, helicopters, or trucks for distribution to the disaster area.

The disaster area was divided into four sections, each of which was under the direction of a divisional commissioner responsible for planning and coordinating relief efforts. Seven major supply depots were established in or around the disaster area. The depots were responsible for receiving relief goods from Dacca and for arranging, within a 48-hour period, transport to 425 centers for final distribution.

An AID official stated that he had checked daily on the U.S. relief supplies received and on the movement of the supplies into warehouses. He informed us that the supplies were moved quickly without being stacked up at the airfield. U.S. officials reported that the security and flow of relief

supplies in and out of Dacca appeared excellent; they noted that the operation was continuous and that no delays had occurred. We were told that all U.S. supplies had been dispatched to supply depots in the disaster area within 2 weeks after the last air shipment by U.S. military planes on December 18, 1970.

Audits by AID several weeks after the arrival of U.S. supplies showed that the supplies were adequately safeguarded and accounted for in the central warehouse. Warehouse records of U.S. supplies in most cases agreed with airport receipt records. Beyond Dacca the major supply depots did not record the donor source of commodities and, in some cases, did not even have adequate records as to what had been received and distributed. Since U.S. supplies were commingled with relief commodities from other countries, AID could not ascertain when or where U.S. supplies had been distributed. Although the AID Provincial Director in Dacca asked for this information on December 24, 1970, the Pakistan Government had not responded as of September 1971. Because the records compiled by the Pakistan Government during the relief operation and the civil disturbances several months later were inadequate, complete distribution information may never be fully known.

U.S. officials and representatives of U.S. voluntary agencies believed that diversion of relief supplies in East Pakistan was minimal. The officials stated that it was impossible to stop black-market activities altogether, particularly in a time of crisis. They believed that relief officials were generally successful in keeping supplies off the black market. Officials of the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) were aware of a few instances of diversions but felt that on the whole, the relief supplies were distributed fairly, without any significant diversions. These officials had toured the cyclone area extensively about 2 weeks after the storm. On the basis of their observations, they were quite satisfied with the GOEP handling of CARE commodities.

## Medical survey and results

Medical surveys were made by the U.S. Army and the Pakistan-SEATO<sup>1</sup> Cholera Research Laboratory in collaboration with Pakistani civil and military relief personnel between November 24 and December 2, 1970. These surveys indicated that there were no significant acute medical problems requiring immediate attention. Eight survey employees covered several localities in a 2,000-square-mile area which received the brunt of the cyclone damage.

With the large number of cyclone deaths, there was an immediate concern for the health of the survivors. It soon became evident, however, that there were few injuries among the survivors and that essentially all deaths were due to drowning. The survivors' injuries were mostly minor cuts, bruises, and lacerations.

The threat of epidemics generated considerable concern and many unsubstantiated reports of outbreaks of disease; particularly feared were outbreaks of typhoid, cholera, and smallpox. The survey personnel, however, found no significant increase in the likelihood of disease outbreaks. Sanitary conditions before the cyclone were such that cholera and dysentery were common events, and, in spite of the destruction of property and loss of lives, sanitary conditions did not further deteriorate. The cholera incidence was considered normal for that time of year, and there was no evidence to suggest that postcyclone epidemics of cholera, typhoid, or any other infections were likely. An important reason why epidemics did not occur was that the survivors continued to remain dispersed in their individual homesteads under whatever shelter they could scrape together, instead of crowding into towns or relief centers.

Another medical problem was the supply of safe water. The survey teams found that the storm had had little effect on tube wells and the flooding of surface tanks and ponds had not significantly added to the water contamination. The major problem that provoked complaints was the increase in the salinity content of water in surface tanks. Occasionally the salt caused the algae and other vegetation to die and to give the water a bad smell. The survey team found that, despite the increased salinity in surface tanks, the water was

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<sup>1</sup>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

usually potable. The explanation for the low salt content in spite of the tidal surge was that the flood waters were an influx of river or delta water and not of ocean water.

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## FOOD GRAIN ASSISTANCE

### Distribution system

Food grains in East Pakistan were normally distributed through three channels--private sales, government sales, and government relief programs.

Most, 88 to 96 percent, of the food grain consumed, primarily rice, was grown in East Pakistan and was distributed and sold through commercial channels. To supplement internal production and to stabilize free-market prices, the government imported food grains from the United States and other foreign countries.

The imported food grain was handled by the provincial food department, which received the grain at the port, moved it throughout the province by a system of storage depots, and marketed it through a complex of privately owned ration shops. The shop operators bought food grains from food department warehouses and were allowed to retail them at slightly higher prices. The shopowner paid, out of the markup margin, transportation and other expenses.

There were two types of ration shops. One type, located only in large cities, was allowed to sell a set amount of grain to all residents of the area. Sales by the other type, located province-wide even in food grain surplus areas, were usually limited to the poorest people, but occasionally, when free-market supplies were disrupted, they were opened to all residents. The determination of who was eligible to buy was made by local government officials.

The food department operation served several purposes. It augmented the inadequate provincial production, ensured a continuous supply of food for the poorer people at a set price, and stabilized free-market food grain prices.

Relief feeding was instituted during such emergencies as floods and cyclones. Requests from local officials for relief feeding were processed through the provincial relief department. If approved, the local officials drew food grain from food department warehouses and operated free distribution centers (separate from ration shops).

Food provided

Donations

Since the November 1970 cyclone, the United States has donated to the Pakistan Government about \$12.8 million worth of food for the devastated area. The donations are summarized in the following table.

Title II, Public Law 480--Government-to-Government Donations

		<u>Value (millions)</u>
November 17, 1970	Wheat--50,000 metric tons (note a)	\$3.8
	Ocean freight	<u>2.6</u>
		\$ 6.4

Title II, Public Law 480--Donations to World Food Program (U.N.) (note b)

December 9, 1970	Wheat--20,000 metric tons	1.6
	Edible oil--5,000 metric tons	1.9
	Ocean freight	<u>2.9</u>
		<u>6.4</u>
Total		<u>\$12.8</u>

<sup>a</sup>One metric ton is equivalent to about 2,205 lbs.

<sup>b</sup>The World Food Program (WFP), a joint undertaking by the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization, was established experimentally in 1962 and was placed on a continuing basis in 1965. Contributions to WFP are mainly food, but they also include cash and such services as ocean transportation. Donors in the 1969-70 period totaled 76 countries. U.S. contributions of commodities and shipping services are provided under the Food for Peace Act (Pub. L. 480).

About 77,000 tons of U.S.-granted food arrived in East Pakistan from December 1970 through March 1971. About 30,000 tons of this amount were part of the 75,000 tons granted for cyclone relief; the other 47,000 tons were made up of food shipments resulting from grants made before the cyclone. Because of port congestion following the civil strife, about 20,000 tons of granted food grain as well as title I food grain shipments were diverted from East Pakistan ports to Karachi and other Asian ports. We will discuss this subject in another report dealing with U.S. humanitarian assistance to East Pakistan since the March 1971 civil strife.

### Sales

In December 1970 President Nixon pledged an additional 150,000 tons of Public Law 480 food grain--100,000 tons of wheat and 50,000 tons of rice. The agreement with the Pakistan Government, however, was not signed until August 1971. The main cause of the negotiating delay was the breakdown of civil government before and after the March civil strife. The inability of the main East Pakistan ports to handle more cargo than scheduled also contributed to the delay.

When the agreement totaling the equivalent of \$17.1 million was finally signed, it took the form of a title I sale instead of a title II donation. The sale, however, was made entirely for Pakistan rupees, 93 percent of which were to be granted to the Pakistan Government for disaster relief and rural development.

On November 25, 1970, the United States--besides pledging food directly for cyclone relief--sold to Pakistan 722,000 tons of wheat valued at \$42.7 million, as part of its normal sales program. Of this wheat, \$21.6 million worth was sold for hard currency and \$21.1 million worth for Pakistan rupees, and 80 percent of the rupees were to be granted to the Pakistan Government for rural development and family planning. About 250,000 tons of this sale had been discharged in East Pakistan prior to the outbreak of civil strife and the subsequent suspension of all Public Law 480 shipments because of congestion in the ports and the interruption of inland distribution.

## Controls over distribution

U.S. shipments of food grain to Pakistan (whether the result of title I sales or title II grants) were put directly into the Food Department system, as described above, for distribution through ration shop sales or relief feeding programs. U.S. food grains were not handled or routed separately from other imported food grains, and the United States was not directly involved in the distribution of the food.

Although the United States had no direct control over its food grains after they arrived in East Pakistan, U.S. food grain grants could indirectly influence Pakistan Government food grain distribution. When the United States announced a food grain grant following the cyclone, it, in effect, allowed the Pakistan Government to use its existing stocks for relief feeding with the assurance that the U.S. shipments would replace the quantity distributed. For example, the 75,000 tons of food granted by the United States after the cyclone can be construed as direct relief for the cyclone area, even though the actual grain shipment may occur months later and may be distributed in another part of the province. The U.S. shipments will simply replace the grain distributed to the cyclone area or to other parts of the province which normally depended on grain exported from the cyclone affected area.

Although AID could not directly influence the movement and/or the distribution of food grains within the country, it received regular reports from the GOEP Food Department concerning food grain inventories and sales and relief programs.

The food channeled through WFP was handled in the same manner as the bilateral grant. On December 3, 1970, WFP informed the Pakistan Government that it was making immediate arrangements for the shipment of 20,000 tons of wheat and 2,000 tons of edible oil and that the food was for free distribution for 9 months among the victims of the cyclone. WFP specified that the distribution was to include able-bodied persons employed in the rehabilitation and reconstruction program and asked the Pakistan Government to



supply proposed per capita daily ration information. WFP did not have people directly involved in the giveaway program.

An AID official in East Pakistan expressed the belief that, at least up to the time of the civil disturbances in March, the supply and distribution of food grains in the cyclone affected area was adequate. Although there may have been a few outlying islands and isolated coastal area which should have been provided more food, the official expressed the view that the GOEP Relief Department did a good job, considering the normal transportation difficulties of the area and the shortage of boats after the cyclone. The official based his conclusion on reports on numerous field trips by AID personnel into the affected area during the December through March period and on GOEP Food Department data on ration shop sales and relief distribution.

On the basis of a February 1971 statistical survey, an AID-commissioned research team reported that, although only 14.5 percent of the surveyed families was essentially totally dependent on relief food, 72 percent of the surveyed population was getting some food from relief distribution centers.

For the areas mentioned above which may not have received enough food grain, the problem appeared to be a distribution problem within the cyclone area rather than an insufficient food supply. Our review indicated that at no time during the December through March period was there a shortage of food grains in the cyclone area.

During the 4 months following the cyclone, the Food and Relief Departments distributed in the cyclone area about 123,000 metric tons of food grain compared with about 48,000 metric tons distributed during the prior year, an increase of about 75,000 metric tons. Distributions of food grains were made in other parts of the province because of the lack of food grains normally received from the area hit by the cyclone. The province-wide increase in food grain distribution during the 4-month period over total distributions for the previous year was about 149,000 tons.

A September 1971 report by a U.S. official in East Pakistan stated that, although food grain consumption levels might be low during the critical months of September through November, there would not be widespread starvation throughout the province. The report noted that hunger might prevail in some communities if the private and public distribution systems broke down or if the people did not have enough money to buy from ration shops. The report made no mention of particular problems in the cyclone affected area.

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## RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE

In December 1970 a reconstruction and rehabilitation plan for the cyclone affected area was prepared with the help of the World Bank staff. The program was to be carried out under the control of a Cyclone Reconstruction Board chaired by the Provincial Governor and was to be divided into four major areas.

1. Coastal embankments, transportation, drainage, and desalination of lands.
2. Agriculture.
3. Housing and water supply.
4. Public health and sanitation services.

The program provided for a massive rehabilitation and construction program including houses, public buildings, cyclone shelters, embankments, drainage canals, and roads. These projects would require intensive labor and would provide a means of putting cyclone survivors back to work rebuilding their own region and earning wages.

The cost of the program was estimated at \$180 million in equivalent local currency, including a direct foreign exchange requirement of about \$32 million. To carry out the plan, the Pakistan Government asked for assistance from the World Bank, other international agencies, and interested nations.

In response an International Development Association credit of \$25 million was approved on January 12, 1971. Proposed projects under the credit included fisheries, roads, boats, cyclone shelters, and agricultural rehabilitation.

An AID official informed us that the GOEP Public Works Department undertook certain programs which were set forth under the reconstruction and rehabilitation plan for the cyclone area. The official said that new roads had been built on several of the islands, some of the coastal embankments had been rebuilt, and food-for-work projects had been set up in selected areas.

We understand that since March 1971 reconstruction activities in the cyclone area have been seriously disrupted by the civil strife. AID officials in Dacca told us in September 1971 that they did not know how much money GOEP had spent on cyclone reconstruction or the status of the ongoing projects.

The United States has granted \$5.7 million and U.S.-owned Pakistan rupees equivalent to about \$9.7 million to the Government of Pakistan for reconstruction and rehabilitation in the cyclone disaster area. Implementation of most of the U.S. rehabilitation projects, however, was interrupted by the March 1971 civil strife.

A U.S.-owned-rupee grant of up to \$100 million has been authorized by the Congress for reconstruction in the cyclone area. It was proposed that the first \$21 million released be used for rebuilding coastal embankments; establishing agricultural and fishing cooperatives; replacing fishing boats; constructing housing, roads, schools, and hospitals.

The Pakistan Government was reluctant to accept the proposed grant because it did not consider the grant as any real economic assistance. An AID official reported in March 1971 that the Pakistan Government viewed the expenditure of large amounts of U.S.-owned rupees as a substantial political problem involving a decision at the highest level. As of September 30, 1971, no agreement with the Pakistan Government had been reached.

The following schedule shows the allocation of U.S. funds granted for reconstruction and rehabilitation assistance as of September 30, 1971.

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<u>Item or project</u>	<u>Assistance provided</u>	
	<u>Dollar grant</u>	<u>Local currency</u>
	(000 omitted)	
Chartering of coastal vessels	\$1,000	\$ -
Construction of low cost housing	3,300	8,650 <sup>a</sup>
Repair of coastal embankments	500	-
Replacement of power cable	50	-
Tube wells for drinking water	-	150
Replacement of fishing nets	-	100
Restoration of living conditions	-	750
Medical assessment	-	20
Unallocated dollars	850	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$5,700</b>	<b>\$9,670</b>

<sup>a</sup>Funds to be provided from Title I of Public Law 480 sales agreement of August 6, 1971.

#### Chartering of coastal vessels

AID believed that, in view of the shortage of boats needed to move food into the cyclone area following the emergency relief period, it was necessary to furnish the Pakistan Government with coastal vessels.

AID granted the Pakistan Government \$1 million on June 10, 1971, to lease coastal vessels and crews. These boats were to be used to move food into the disaster area. As of September 30, 1971, the Pakistan Government had leased nine vessels; however, only three had arrived and had been put into service.

The grant agreement stated that (1) the vessels would carry only foodgrains and other relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction commodities, (2) a qualified navigator would be furnished, (3) AID personnel would be permitted to travel freely where the vessels were in operation, and (4) records would be kept on the use of the vessels and would be given periodically to AID. The Pakistan Government agreed that the vessels would not be held unduly at the port of discharge to receive relief commodities, other than food, for the return trip. If the commodities were not available for loading within a certain time, the vessels would return to the seaport empty.

Weekly reports on the movement of vessels were received by AID from the East Pakistan Inland Water Transportation Authority. AID had assigned staff members to monitor the reports and look into any unusual delays.

As of September 30, 1971, the three coastal vessels had completed 16 voyages and carried over 10,000 metric tons of relief commodities since July 29, 1971. The other coastal vessels were expected to arrive in East Pakistan by the first of November and to go into service immediately.

#### Construction of low-cost housing

Housing in the cyclone area was constructed mostly of thatch and bamboo and did not withstand very strong winds. To help solve the problem, the United States allocated to CARE \$3.3 million and \$8.6 million of U.S.-owned Pakistan rupees to construct 30,000 permanent homes. The houses were to be 10 by 20 by 7 feet and were to be made of soil-cement blocks with brick floors and corrugated iron sheet roofs. Construction was to be completed by 1975.

The project was discussed initially in February 1971 with officials of CARE and the Pakistan Government. Before the project discussions could be finalized, however, the civil strife occurred, and nothing further was accomplished until about mid-August. The interlude was marked by (1) the flight of civil strife victims from East Pakistan, (2) evacuation of U.S. civilians in April 1971, (3) indecision about further AID assistance to the Pakistan Government, and (4) the lack of a functioning civil government in East Pakistan.

#### Repair of coastal embankments

On September 18, 1971, AID granted \$500,000 to the Pakistan Government to finance a 17-month extension of the Leedshill-Deleuw contract. Leedshill-Deleuw had been the consulting engineer on construction of coastal embankments for several years. The contract extension was delayed by the civil strife of March 1971.

The grant was to be used for contract labor services and the purchase of new equipment, such as vehicles, boats, and spare parts, in connection with repair and reconstruction

of embankments and sluices damaged by the November 1970 cyclone.

Replacement of power cable

In September 1971, AID agreed to finance up to \$50,000 for importing a replacement power cable needed to operate the food grain loading equipment at Chittagong. This project also had been delayed because of the March 1971 civil strife.

Tube wells for drinking water

The United States granted \$150,000 of U.S.-owned Pakistan rupees to United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) to build 1,200 deep tube wells to supply safe drinking water for the cyclone affected population in East Pakistan. The work was to be done by the Directorate of Public Health Engineering, GOEP, through local contractors. As of September 30, 1971, no expenditures had been made on this project.

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### Replacement of fishing nets

The diet of the people in the cyclone area included fish and rice. Because much of the fishing equipment was destroyed by the cyclone, the United States granted UNICEF \$100,000 in U.S.-owned Pakistan rupees on December 12, 1970, for the purchase of 52,546 pounds of nylon twine for fishing net. The first 22,000 pounds of twine was distributed among 5,000 fishermen in Patuakhali, Barisal, and Noakhali districts. The second allotment of 30,546 pounds was also distributed; however, the recipients were not identified to AID. The final expenditure report for the full amount of the grant was submitted by UNICEF on March 17, 1971.

### Restoration of living conditions

The United States has made four rehabilitation grants of U.S.-owned Pakistan rupees, totaling the equivalent of about \$750,000, to voluntary organizations. The Catholic Relief Services received two of the grants. The first grant of \$417,000, to which Catholic Relief Services was to add an equal amount, was for assistance to about 15,000 victims within an 18-square-mile area. Although a formal agreement with AID was not signed until August 13, 1971, AID reported that, as of June 30, 1971, the Services had spent \$337,000 in Pakistan rupees. It reported also that 842 acres had been ploughed by power tillers; 603 bullocks (draft animals) had been distributed to 1,207 farmers; 28-1/2 miles of road had been constructed; 7 miles of road had been repaired; 19 culverts had been repaved; 2 wells had been sunk; and 5 miles of drainage canals had been built. The project was to have been completed by February 1972.

The second grant to Catholic Relief Services amounted to \$171,000. According to this agreement, the Services was to provide about \$85,000 of local currency from its own resources. The project was to reach 2,500 families in a 16-square-mile area with a population of 18,750. Although this agreement also was not signed until August 13, 1971, the Service reported on June 30, 1971, that it had spent \$21,000 in local currency and was responsible for rebuilding 30 houses, constructing 1 mile of road, draining 20 ponds, reclaiming 9 acres of land, distributing 40,590 pounds of rice seed to



311 farmers, planting 60 acres of hybrid rice, and purchasing a motorized fishing boat.


Another voluntary agency, CARE, received a grant of about \$100,000 in U.S.-owned Pakistan rupees during December 1970. CARE provided corrugated sheeting for roofing, local building materials, seeds, materials for fishnets, and goats; and CARE also paid the transportation costs of these items. The distribution of these supplies to the cyclone victims was made by local organizations in cooperation with the GOEP Relief Commissioner. The final report on this project was expected from CARE in January 1972.

AID also granted \$60,000 to Heartland Emergency Life-saving Project, a local voluntary relief group, to assist the people of Manpura Union which had a population of about 13,550 and covered about 80 square miles. The project was to construct temporary campsites for protection of cyclone victims against monsoons, to reintroduce draft animals, cattle, and poultry, and to provide powered tillage equipment. AID believed that all the funds had been expended; however, as of September 1971, AID had not received a final report.

#### Medical assessment

A medical relief assessment of the cyclone area in February 1971 was made by 10 two-man teams of the Pakistan-SEATO Cholera Research Laboratory. The survey was financed by an AID grant equivalent to about \$20,000 and covered 2,973 families. AID received a preliminary summary report in April 1971, but, as of September 1971, a final report had not been submitted.

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AIRDROPPING OF FOOD IN AN ISOLATED COASTAL ISLAND OF EP  
AFTER THE NOVEMBER CYCLONE, BY U.S. HELICOPTER.

Source USIS, Dacca

## CHAPTER 4

### CYCLONE RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF OTHERS

The international response to Pakistan's plight in the wake of the cyclone was quick and abundant. Relief supplies and food poured in so rapidly and in such profusion that the Pakistan Government had all it could do to keep the supplies moving to the cyclone area. At no point during the relief operation was there any indication that relief supplies were lacking. Once the helicopters began operating, the main concern was the dearth of personnel in the disaster area to distribute the supplies. On November 29, 1971, President Yahya Khan told the U.S. Ambassador that relief supplies from all over the world were arriving in adequate quantities and that any undue amounts would complicate, rather than speed, the relief effort because of the minimal personnel and the limited distribution facilities in the devastated areas.

#### MARKING OF RELIEF SUPPLIES

Pakistan relief officials stated that markings on some relief supplies were too vague. For example, blanket shipments were labeled in pounds or bales instead of by units. The officials said unit markings would help them tailor relief supplies to victims and thereby would speed distribution. An AID official told us that the United Nations could play a valuable role in future relief efforts by ensuring that supply shipments were carefully and fully identified.

#### OTHER NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The following list shows major contributions, in kind or cash, from sources other than the United States. About 70 nations, plus international relief and church organizations, had contributed cash, supplies, and services valued at about \$28.5 million, as of early in March 1971.

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In millions  
of dollars

Government, private sources, and  
nonprofit agencies within country:

Australia	\$0.6	
Belgium	.2	
Canada	2.2	
China People's Republic	1.2	
West Germany Federal Republic	1.6	
Great Britain	5.4	
India	1.3	
Iran	.2	
Italy	.3	
Japan	2.1	
Kuwait	.3	
Netherlands	.8	
Norway	.2	
Saudi Arabia	.5	
Sweden	.6	
Switzerland	.3	
U.S.S.R.	.7	
Other countries	<u>1.5</u>	\$20.0

Other groups and organizations:

Vatican	.2	
Caritas, Internationalis	.9	
United Nations	4.9	
European Common Market	2.3	
Other groups	<u>.2</u>	<u>8.5</u>

Total \$28.5

As of September 27, 1971, an additional \$21 million in contributions had been made by other nations and international organizations for both cyclone and civil strife victims within East Pakistan. AID, however, could not readily identify the contributions which specifically applied to cyclone relief assistance. A listing of the donors and their contributions to the humanitarian assistance to East Pakistan, following the March 25, 1971, civil strife, will be included in our follow-on report.

Relief assistance being provided by the major international organizations in response to the cyclone disaster in East Pakistan are outlined below.

#### United Nations

The United Nations granted \$4.9 million in food and relief supplies to East Pakistan, as follows:

	<u>In millions of dollars</u>
Cereals, vegetable oil, and dry fish	\$4.0
Vegetable seeds, poultry, livestock, and animal vaccines	.5
Drugs, medical supplies, and water supply equipment	.2
Other assistance (educational buildings, \$50,000; kitchen equipment; rice and blankets, \$77,000; and other items, \$50,000)	<u>.2</u>
Total	<u>\$4.9</u>

#### European Common Market

The European Common Market contributed 200 tons of baby food and 1,000 tons of enriched cereals, valued at about \$2.3 million, to the relief effort.

#### Caritas, Internationalis

A worldwide Christmas-time appeal for funds to carry out recovery and rehabilitation programs in Pakistan resulted in cash donations of about \$900,000.

AID reported that The Emergency Relief Commission of Caritas would establish a \$300,000 bank guarantee in favor of the Committee on Relief and Rehabilitation for planned projects.

#### Vatican

A cash donation of \$200,000 was made by the Vatican--\$100,000 to the Pakistan Government and \$100,000 to the Catholic Church in East Pakistan.

## League of Red Cross Societies

The Pakistan Red Cross Society had asked the League to resume its long-term rehabilitation program of assistance for cyclone victims. The program included participation in the reestablishment of the cyclone warning system, construction and stocking of Red Cross warehouses, and erection of storm-proof community centers. More than \$3 million was pledged by affiliated societies for this assistance.

Although many Red Cross supplies were reported to be on hand and certain supplies were in the port of Chittagong, distributions will continue to be limited until transport and other difficulties are resolved.

The Red Cross planned to make limited distributions of perishable food stuffs to mothers and children through Red Cross maternity stations.

## U.S. VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

During the emergency relief operations, voluntary agencies provided food, clothing, medicine, blankets, and other supplies. In a program for recovery and rehabilitation, voluntary agencies have supplied seeds, tools, boats, fish-net twine, and roofing.

The following schedule shows the reported amounts of funds contributed and the value of supplies purchased and shipped by nonprofit agencies for both the emergency relief and the rehabilitation programs as of September 27, 1971. Included in these amounts is an allocation of \$150,000 made by the Pakistan Relief Committee, the citizens' committee announced by the White House.

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American Red Cross	\$ 274,000
CARE	1,027,000
Catholic Relief Services	229,000
Church World Service	321,000
Seventh Day Adventist Welfare Service	86,750
Mennonite Central Committee	70,000
Lutheran World Relief	55,000
Salvation Army	40,000
Other voluntary agencies	<u>84,533</u>
Total	<u>\$2,187,283<sup>a</sup></u>

<sup>a</sup>The value of supplies shipped and cash donations made prior to the eruption of the civil strife is about \$944,000.

The major relief assistance programs administered by nonprofit agencies since the cyclone disaster and March civil disturbances are described below.

#### American Red Cross

Contributions for rehabilitation and reconstruction in the cyclone area were to be resumed through the League of Red Cross Societies.

#### CARE

Immediately after the cyclone, CARE donated food, medicine, clothing, blankets, kitchen supplies, and rehabilitation goods valued at about \$500,000. As discussed in chapter 3, CARE also distributed AID-financed building materials, seeds, and other relief supplies at a cost of approximately \$100,000. (See p. 37.)

CARE had five staff members in Dacca responsible for the housing and rehabilitation program in Bhola--one of the islands recovering from the effects of the cyclone disaster. AID allocated \$11.9 million (\$3.3 million and \$8.6 million of U.S.-owned Pakistan rupees) to CARE for this low-cost-housing construction; this project is discussed in chapter 3, page 34.

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## Catholic Relief Services

Catholic Relief Services had permanent professional personnel in East Pakistan including an experienced full-time program coordinator. The Services had planned reconstruction projects in conjunction with the Committee on Relief and Rehabilitation, an agency set up by four Catholic bishops in East Pakistan to help the cyclone survivors. The Committee was supervising the implementation of projects valued at about \$1.5 million covering three districts, which were to benefit eventually more than 25,000 people in the cyclone affected area. AID was providing to Catholic Relief Services \$588,000 of U.S.-owned Pakistan rupees for these projects. (See p. 36.)

The Catholic Relief Services had financed daily motor launch service from Mohipur, which provided medical and food services for people on the island of Khepupara. They also had delivered 50 tons of roofing materials for construction of housing and community shelters. These projects were to provide able-bodied survivors with employment and income while rebuilding their homes and villages.

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EDWARD M. KENNEDY  
MASSACHUSETTS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 14, 1971

The Honorable Elmer B. Staats  
Comptroller General of the United States  
General Accounting Office  
441 "G" Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Staats:

In conjunction with my activities as Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees and its current concern over the humanitarian aspects of the Pakistan civil war, I have also been concerned over the shipments of United States military equipment to the central Pakistan Government. I have raised this issue, both publicly and privately, with officials in the Department of State, but thus far comprehensive information has not been forthcoming.

In light of widespread Congressional and public interest in this issue, I would like to request that an inquiry be made into the policy, authorization, volume and content of United States military aid to Pakistan since 1965. I am especially interested in developments since April 1 of this year.

In addition to this inquiry into United States military aid to Pakistan, I would also like to request separate inquiries into the following items:

1. United States disaster relief aid to Pakistan following the cyclone in East Pakistan in the fall of 1970;
2. United States humanitarian aid to Pakistan following the outbreak of civil war in late March of this year; and
3. United States humanitarian aid in support of relief efforts among the Pakistani refugees in India resulting from the present conflict.

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APPENDIX I

The Honorable Elmer B. Staats  
July 14, 1971  
Page Two

To facilitate these inquiries, it would be helpful if you would designate a representative of the General Accounting Office to get in touch with Mr. Dale de Haan, Counsel to the Subcommittee on Refugees, for additional information.

Many thanks for your consideration and best wishes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Edward M. Kennedy".

Edward M. Kennedy

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