This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-1038R
entitled 'Various Issues Led to the Termination of the United States-
Canada Shared Border Management Pilot Project' which was released on
September 4, 2008.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
GAO-08-1038R:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 4, 2008:
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable David E. Price:
Chairman:
The Honorable Harold Rogers:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Hillary R. Clinton:
United States Senate:
Subject: Various Issues Led to the Termination of the United States-
Canada Shared Border Management Pilot Project:
In the years since the 2001 terrorist attacks, balancing the need to
secure U.S. borders while maintaining the flow of legitimate cross-
border travel and commerce has taken on an added importance. The United
States and Canada share a border that extends nearly 4,000 miles, and
one of the world's largest trading relationships. Each year,
approximately 70 million travelers and 35 million vehicles cross the
border from Canada into the United States, according to the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). Given the volume of cross-border travel and
trade between the United States and Canada, border congestion and the
resulting wait times have a substantial economic impact on both
nations. Furthermore, according to an analysis by DHS, the heightened
emphasis on border security following the 2001 terrorist attacks has
lengthened processing time for travelers and cargo crossing into the
United States. Recognizing the need to improve both border security and
border-crossing efficiency, the United States and Canada have
cooperated on various cross-border management initiatives intended to
increase the flow of legitimate travel across the border while
maintaining security. For example, to facilitate the travel of low-risk
prescreened individuals across the northern border, the United States
and Canada jointly operate the NEXUS program. The NEXUS program allows
registered border residents and frequent cross-border travelers
identified as low-risk individuals access to dedicated lanes and
expedited processing with minimal inspection. The United States and
Canada also coordinate on border law enforcement programs such as the
Integrated Border Enforcement Team Program (IBET), which is a bi-
national, multi-agency law enforcement initiative that (1) provides,
where necessary, support to national security investigations associated
to the Canada/United States border and (2) investigates illegal cross-
border activities.
A key collaborative effort to improve security and relieve congestion
at the ports of entry across the northern border is to move customs and
immigration inspection activities away from the border--a concept known
as "land preclearance" or "shared border management." In December 2004,
the United States and Canada announced that the two governments had
agreed to move forward with a land preclearance pilot project at the
Buffalo, New York-Fort Erie, Ontario Peace Bridge and at one other
border crossing site along the northern border, which had not yet been
determined.
The land preclearance pilot project flowed from the 2001 Smart Border
Declaration and its associated action plan, which was meant to enhance
the security along the northern border while facilitating information
sharing and the legitimate flow of people and goods, and securing
infrastructure. The preclearance pilot at the Peace Bridge would
involve the relocation of all U.S. border inspection operations for
both commercial and passenger traffic from the U.S. side of the border
in Buffalo, New York, to the Canadian side of the border in Fort Erie,
Ontario. The other preclearance location had not been determined, but
would have relocated Canadian border inspection functions to the U.S.
side of the border at a different port of entry. Currently, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--a component of DHS and the lead
federal agency in charge of securing our nation's borders--conducts
inspections of travelers and cargo at all U.S. ports of entry,
including the Buffalo port of entry at the Peace Bridge. Under the
preclearance pilot project, the Buffalo port of entry would be moved to
the Canadian side of the Peace Bridge, and all CBP inspections and
operations would take place before travelers and cargo entered the
United States.
From 2005 to 2007, the United States and Canada were engaged in
negotiations to implement land preclearance at the Buffalo-Fort Erie
Peace Bridge ports of entry. However, in April 2007, these negotiations
were officially terminated by DHS. Section 566 of the 2008 DHS
Appropriations Act mandates that we conduct a study on DHS's use of
shared border management to secure the borders of the United States.
[Footnote 1] In accordance with the mandate and discussions with
Committee staff, this report addresses the following questions:
(1) What negotiations have been conducted by the Department of Homeland
Security regarding the shared border management pilot project?
(2 What issues led to the termination of shared border management
negotiations?
To address these objectives, we visited the Peace Bridge site in April
2008. We observed the current U.S. inspection facility in Buffalo as
well as where the shared border management site would have been located
in Fort Erie, Ontario, Canada. In addition, we analyzed available
documentation from DHS, CBP, and the Peace Bridge Authority (PBA), a
public benefit corporation solely responsible for the maintenance and
upkeep of the Peace Bridge and for building or expanding both Canadian
and U.S. ports of entry at the Peace Bridge. The documentation included
a 2004 CBP report on shared border management, a 2005 CBP
infrastructure and strategic needs assessment of the U.S. port in
Buffalo, a 2005 DHS analysis of shared border management, DHS
correspondence to congressional staff on the status of the shared
border management negotiations, DHS memos to the Canadian government,
and the PBA's U.S. port of entry expansion plans. We did not seek
access to documents from the Canadian government because GAO does not
have a right of access to documents from foreign governments. However,
we interviewed key officials from both countries who participated in
the negotiations to gather their views on shared border management at
the Peace Bridge site. Specifically, we met with officials from the
Department of State, DHS, and Public Safety Canada (PSC), which was the
lead Canadian agency involved in shared border management. We also met
with officials from the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the
General Manager of the PBA, the Canadian Consul General-Buffalo, and
the Mayor of Fort Erie. In addition, we met with three local community
leaders within the Buffalo/Fort Erie area to obtain their views on
shared border management. We conducted this performance audit from
January 2008 through September 2008 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
From 2005 to 2007, the United States and Canada were engaged in
negotiations to implement a land preclearance pilot project (also
referred to as "shared border management"), which would have relocated
the U.S. border inspection facility from the Buffalo, New York, side of
the Peace Bridge to the Fort Erie, Ontario, side. All CBP inspections
and operations would then take place before travelers and cargo entered
the United States. The Peace Bridge site was selected for the pilot
because it is one of the busiest commercial crossings between the
United States and Canada,[Footnote 2] yet the existing border
infrastructure at the Peace Bridge contributes to a number of security
and border crossing inefficiencies, according to DHS. Specifically, DHS
had concluded that the U.S. inspection facility, which is located near
the center of downtown Buffalo, is outdated, undersized, and lacks the
modern amenities a port of its size should have to operate efficiently
and securely. The facility is located on 17 acres of land, as opposed
to the 80 acres that CBP recommends for a large port of entry. DHS has
reported that additional inspection space is needed to address these
infrastructure issues, but there is no easily available land adjacent
to the facility in Buffalo. On the Canadian side of the Peace Bridge in
Fort Erie, there are approximately 70 acres of land available on which
the U.S. inspection facility could have been co-located with Canadian
inspection facilities.
In April 2007, DHS officially terminated negotiations with Canada
because a mutually acceptable framework for United States-Canada shared
border management could not be reached. Officials from both countries
agreed that negotiations were conducted in good faith, and the two
governments were able to reach accommodations on several key issues
raised during the negotiations, such as the approval of all of the
authorities Canada sought for its U.S.-based preclearance area,
[Footnote 3] and the arming of CBP officers at the preclearance site on
Canadian soil. However, certain issues pertaining to each country's
sovereignty and the law enforcement authorities of U.S. CBP officers
operating on Canadian soil could not be resolved. These issues included
concerns over arrest authority; the right of individuals to withdraw an
application to enter the United States while at the land preclearance
site in Canada; mutually agreeable fingerprinting processes; how
information collected by U.S. officials at the land preclearance site
would be shared; and concerns that future interpretations of the
Canadian Charter could adversely impact U.S. authorities at the
preclearance site.[Footnote 4]
DHS Entered into Shared Border Management Negotiations to Address Space
Constraints at the Buffalo Port of Entry:
From 2005 to 2007, DHS engaged in bi-national negotiations with Canada
to create the first North American land border preclearance pilot
project at the Peace Bridge site. The pilot project would have
relocated the U.S. border inspection facility from Buffalo, New York,
to Fort Erie, Ontario, Canada. The overarching goal of shared border
management at the Peace Bridge site was to facilitate cross-border
coordination and collaboration, while eliminating the need to expand
the outdated inspection facility in Buffalo and the impact that
expansion would have on the surrounding community. The current facility
in Buffalo sits on 17 acres and is confined on three sides by the
Niagara River, a historic park, and a residential neighborhood, as
shown in figure 1 and figure 2.
Figure 1: Overhead View of Buffalo Land Port of Entry:
[See PDF for image]
Aerial photograph of the Buffalo Land Port of Entry, with the following
sites specifically noted:
Buffalo Land Port of Entry;
Residential community;
Park;
Interstate I-190;
Niagara River;
Peace Bridge.
Source: Peace Bridge Authority.
[End of figure]
Figure 2: Photograph: Close-up View of Buffalo Land Port of Entry:
[See PDF for image]
Close-up View of Buffalo Land Port of Entry, with the following sites
specifically noted:
Buffalo Land Port of Entry;
Residential community;
Park;
Interstate I-190;
Niagara River;
Peace Bridge.
Source: Peace Bridge Authority.
[End of figure]
As a result, there is limited real estate available for the port to
expand. On the Canadian side of the Peace Bridge, however, there is
more land available on which a U.S. inspection facility could be
located, as shown in figure 3.
Figure 3: View of Fort Erie, Ontario, Canada Land Port of Entry:
[See PDF for image]
Photographic view of Fort Erie, Ontario, Canada Land Port of Entry,
with the following sites specifically noted:
Fort Erie Land Port of Entry;
Proposed site for U.S. land preclearance facility.
Source: Peace Bridge Authority.
[End of figure]
According to DHS, the existing infrastructure at the Buffalo port of
entry contributes to a number of border crossing and security
inefficiencies. In 2005, a DHS cost-benefit analysis of shared border
management stated that infrastructure constraints and limitations at
the Buffalo port of entry were major impediments to the smooth flow of
traffic and trade across the Peace Bridge border crossing from Canada
to the United States. Specifically, the size of the inspection facility
site--17 acres--does not allow for a sufficient number of inspection
lanes to accommodate and process the volume of traffic that crosses the
bridge daily, according to DHS.
In 2005, infrastructure improvements were made to the Buffalo
inspection facility, which local officials told us have eased
congestion. However, DHS stated that additional capacity--that is, more
inspection lanes--is still needed. In 2005, the number of lanes for
primary processing at the facility was increased from 8 car lanes and 4
commercial vehicles lanes to 10 for cars and 7 for commercial vehicles
(and 1 dedicated NEXUS lane). Furthermore, the new lanes are "hi/low"
to allow for flexibility in converting them to commercial lanes for
trucks ("hi") or passengers ("low"), depending on the specific demand.
However, DHS stated that the renovations cannot eliminate the
congestion at the port because additional inspection lanes are still
needed to accommodate the volume of traffic that enters the port daily.
Officials from CBP-Buffalo also noted that increased inspection lanes
are necessary to improve the operation of the port.
Because the 2005 renovations only included one lane dedicated to NEXUS,
expanding the port was expected to help maximize other trusted traveler
programs such as Free and Secure Trade (FAST), according to DHS. FAST
is an expedited clearance program for known low-risk shipments. DHS
reported that a dedicated FAST lane would enable greater processing
efficiency, thereby reducing queue length and wait time. For example,
lanes dedicated to FAST have average primary processing times of 30
seconds versus Non-FAST lanes at 2 minutes, according to DHS.
DHS has also stated that expansion of the Buffalo port is necessary to
improve enforcement and security operations. According to CBP, the
current port has inadequate space to handle the number of vehicles
(both passenger and commercial) referred for secondary inspections,
which are separate, more thorough screenings of selected travelers and
cargo. CBP officials told us that if the secondary inspection area is
full, CBP officers must hold vehicles referred for secondary inspection
in the primary lane, causing congestion that could be avoided if there
were sufficient space for secondary inspections. In addition, because
of the configuration of the port, vehicles referred to secondary
inspections must cross paths with commercial vehicles exiting the
primary inspection area, thus creating an obstructive intersection as
well as safety and security risks. However, because of space
constraints at the facility, this is the only area that can handle
secondary inspections, according to CBP. CBP officials also noted that
the administration building at the port is not sufficient or effective
for their operations. For example, these officials stated that the
building has limited space for security and management operations, such
as secondary inspection processing and agriculture inspections.
Although DHS recognizes that increasing the size of the Buffalo
inspection facility is necessary to address these issues, there is
limited room adjacent to the facility for expansion without adversely
affecting the surrounding community. According to the PBA--which would
manage any port expansion project--expanding the port in Buffalo would
require the acquisition and demolition of approximately 83 adjacent
residential homes, some of which are historical.[Footnote 5] However,
on the Canadian side of the Peace Bridge in Fort Erie, there is land
available that could be used for a U.S. inspection facility without
requiring the taking of any residential properties. Relocating the U.S.
inspection facility from Buffalo to Fort Erie under shared border
management was intended to address the need for improvements and
expansion of the U.S. inspection facility while minimizing adverse
impacts on the surrounding community in Buffalo. With sufficient land
available, the facility was expected to include a total of 25
commercial and passenger primary inspection lanes and booths, which is
the standard for a large port of entry, according to CBP officials. In
addition, DHS stated that shared border management would have also
enabled informal information sharing between U.S. and Canadian border
inspection officials because the inspection facilities would be located
adjacent to each other. According to the PBA, another benefit of shared
border management was that constructing a new U.S. inspection facility
in Fort Erie would cost approximately $100 million less and take less
time than expanding the inspection facility in Buffalo. Local community
officials we spoke with also noted that relocating the U.S. inspection
facility to Fort Erie would allow for better accommodation of future
growth or new security measures that may be added, as more space is
available for facility expansion.
The United States and Canada Were Unable to Find an Acceptable
Framework for Shared Border Management:
According to U.S. and Canadian officials, shared border management
negotiations were terminated in April 2007 because an acceptable
agreement that would satisfy both countries could not be accomplished.
Specifically, DHS stated that it would not have been able to exercise
the same law enforcement authorities in Canada that it currently has at
ports of entry in the United States. Officials from both countries
agreed that negotiations were conducted in good faith, and the two
governments were able to reach accommodations on several key issues
raised during the negotiations. For example, all of the authorities
sought by Canada for its preclearance area--which would have been
located on U.S. soil--could be provided with minimal changes to U.S.
laws, according to DHS. Another issue that was resolved was the arming
of CBP officers at the pre-clearance site. When negotiations began in
2005, CBP officers would not have been permitted to carry firearms at
the pre-clearance site because Canadian border officers did not carry
firearms. This was a concern for U.S. officials because CBP officers
carry firearms at U.S. ports of entry. During negotiations, this issue
was resolved as a result of a change in Canadian government policy that
permitted the arming of Canadian border officers which allowed for the
arming of CBP officers, according to Canadian officials.
Despite agreement on the authorities sought by Canada and the arming of
CBP officers, officials stated that an acceptable agreement that would
satisfy both countries' sovereignty could not be accomplished.
According to DHS, the overarching issue was the subordination of U.S.
law enforcement personnel and authorities to Canadian law rather than
U.S. law and the inability to ensure necessary U.S. law enforcement
authorities under Canada's legal framework. One of the guiding
principles of shared border management was that the inspecting
country's operations would be consistent with the constitutional and
legal frameworks of the host country. However, DHS officials stated
that for shared border management to meet their requirements, U.S.
border inspection personnel would require full legal authority,
comparable to that provided under U.S. law, to replicate the inspection
and enforcement activities DHS engages in today. DHS officials stated
that operating under Canadian law would have limited DHS's ability to
manage and secure the border. The following are key issues that
surfaced during negotiations:
* Arrest authority: According to officials from both countries, the
host country would have sole authority to make arrests at the
preclearance site, because of the sovereignty of the host government.
These officials stated that for the majority of possible scenarios,
negotiators agreed on how these arrests might work. However, U.S.
officials told us they were concerned that the U.S. government would
not have the ability to arrest and then prosecute high profile/high
value terrorists or criminals who might present themselves at the
border. For example, if a high value target of interest to the United
States presented himself at the preclearance site, U.S. authorities
could not arrest him; rather, Canadian authorities would make the
arrest. The individual would then have to be extradited to the United
States for prosecution. Canadian officials told us that they offered
the United States the ability to prioritize cases in order to expedite
the extradition process in such circumstances.
* Right of withdrawal: Under Canadian law, individuals have the right
to withdraw an application to enter Canada at a port of entry,
according to Canadian and U.S. officials. For example, in a land
preclearance scenario if an individual begins the inspection process at
the port of entry and then decides that he or she no longer wants to
enter into Canada, under Canadian law that person has the right to
withdraw from inspection. However, U.S. negotiators wanted the ability
to inspect and fingerprint individuals who present themselves to CBP
officers for admission into the United States and then request to
withdraw their application to enter the country. Under U.S. law, CBP
officers have the discretion to allow an individual they have
determined to be inadmissible to withdraw an application for admission
in place of formal removal proceedings, but the individual does not
have the right to withdraw from inspection and fingerprinting. U.S.
officials stated that they were strongly opposed to providing a
guaranteed right to withdraw because doing so could allow individuals
to "probe for weaknesses" at the preclearance site. According to
Canadian officials, they proposed an alternative whereby U.S. Customs
and Border Protection would be permitted to search and question
individuals who request withdrawal, but not take fingerprints. To
address this point of disagreement, Canadian officials stated that they
offered U.S. negotiators a compromise position whereby Canadian border
authorities would investigate any suspicious person who requests
withdrawal. However, U.S. officials told us that this approach was not
satisfactory. Officials from both countries noted that the right of
withdrawal issue was a major issue during negotiations.
* Fingerprinting: According to officials involved, both countries
differed on how and when fingerprints could be taken at the
preclearance site. Currently, CBP has the authority to fingerprint any
individuals who present themselves to CBP officers for admission into
the United States, and CBP wanted to maintain this ability at the
preclearance site. For example, CBP may fingerprint individuals who
cross the border to determine if a person may be a wanted felon.
However, according to Canadian officials, in a land preclearance
scenario, fingerprints could not be taken unless the individual
volunteers or has been charged with a crime. According to Canadian
officials, they proposed that CBP would have the ability to take
fingerprints only if certain criteria had been met. According to
officials involved in the negotiations, this was not a viable
alternative to U.S. negotiators, and this issue was not resolved.
* Information sharing: According to officials from both countries,
there was disagreement over how information collected by U.S officials
at the land preclearance site could be shared. U.S. officials told us
they wanted to maintain the ability to share information collected at
the preclearance site with appropriate U.S. law enforcement agencies,
which they can do under U.S. law. However, Canadian officials told us
that the ability of U.S. authorities to share information collected in
Canada would be guided by Canadian laws. As a result, under Canadian
law, DHS would not be permitted to share all information collected at
the preclearance site with U.S. law enforcement agencies, according to
DHS officials.
* Canadian Charter: According to DHS officials involved in the
negotiations, future interpretations of the Canadian Charter could
adversely impact U.S. authorities at the preclearance site. In
addition, DHS officials stated that the Canadian Charter, as it has
been interpreted by Canadian courts, would limit the use of certain law
enforcement tools available to CBP. For example, under U.S. law, CBP
officers can search individuals, conveyances, and cargo at the border
without a warrant or probable cause. However, according to Canadian
officials, under Canadian law, reasonable grounds are needed to conduct
searches. According to DHS, these limitations would make it difficult
for CBP officers to fully carry out their duties.
Officials from both countries stated that these issues could not be
resolved through negotiations because operating a U.S. port of entry in
Canada under land pre-clearance/shared border management would have
required the United States to abide by Canadian law--which U.S.
officials stated would have limited the ability of U.S. law enforcement
personnel to secure the border. DHS wanted to operate the shared border
management facility according to the same standards as all other U.S.
ports of entry, but to operate in Canada would have meant that those
standards could not have been achieved, according to officials from
both governments.
According to officials from both countries, the best way to address
U.S. concerns related to having a U.S. inspection facility located on
Canadian soil would be to conduct what they termed a "land swap." Under
a land swap, the United States would be granted land in Canada to place
the inspection facility and Canada would be granted reciprocal land in
the United States for placement of its inspection facility. Since the
U.S. inspection facility would therefore be technically located on U.S.
soil, CBP would be able to conduct its inspections with full U.S. legal
authority and could operate the port of entry according to the same
standards as all other U.S. ports. However, both U.S. and Canadian
officials told us a land swap was never seriously pursued as an option
because of the legal and political issues involved. Therefore,
officials involved in the negotiations did not believe this was a
realistic possibility.
In June 2008, Canadian and U.S. officials told us there are currently
no plans to re-open negotiations regarding shared border management at
the Peace Bridge site. With the conclusion of the negotiations, the
PBA, with the support of DHS, is moving forward with its plans to
improve and expand the U.S. inspection facility in Buffalo. According
to the PBA, the timeline for beginning construction on the new facility
has not been finalized.
We provided a draft of the report to DHS for its review and comment.
CBP provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We also met with relevant officials within the Canadian Government who
confirmed the accuracy of the report and provided technical comments,
which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at Stanar@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key
contributions to this report are listed in the enclosure.
Signed by:
Richard M. Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Enclosure:
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Mike Dino, Assistant Director,
and Adam Hoffman, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. Bintou
Njie, Sally Williamson, Frances Cook, and Michele Fejfar made
significant contributions to the work.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-161, § 566, 121 Stat. 2042, 2092 (2007).
[2] According to the PBA, approximately $700 million in goods crosses
the Peace Bridge weekly, making it the third busiest crossing by truck
volume. In 2007, about 1.3 million trucks crossed the Peace Bridge
accounting for 16 percent of all Great Lakes border crossings.
[3] The site for the Canadian preclearance facility had not been
finalized.
[4] The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms defines the rights and
freedoms guaranteed to Canadians.
[5] The PBA was granted limited eminent domain power by New York State
in 2004 to acquire property surrounding the Buffalo inspection
facility. The PBA stated that because of the historic significance of
Front Park (which is adjacent to the Buffalo inspection facility),
expanding the inspection facility into the park was not a viable
option.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room LM:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548: