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entitled 'Chemical Weapons: Sustained Leadership, Along With Key 
Strategic Management Tools, Is Needed to Guide DOD's Destruction 
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Report to Congressional Committees:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

September 2003:

Chemical Weapons:

Sustained Leadership, Along with Key Strategic Management Tools, Is 
Needed to Guide DOD's Destruction Program:

GAO-03-1031:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-03-1031, a report to congressional committees 

Why GAO Did This Study:

Congress expressed concerns about the Chemical Demilitarization 
Program cost and schedule, and its management structure. In 2001, the 
program underwent a major reorganization. Following a decade long 
trend of missed schedule milestones, in September 2001, the Department 
of Defense (DOD) revised the schedule, which extended planned 
milestones and increased program cost estimates beyond the 1998 
estimate of $15 billion to $24 billion. GAO was asked to (1) examine 
the effect that recent organization changes have had on program 
performance and (2) assess the progress DOD and the Army have made in 
meeting the revised 2001 cost and schedule and Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) deadlines.

What GAO Found:

The Chemical Demilitarization Program remains in turmoil because a 
number of long-standing leadership, organizational, and strategic 
planning issues remain unresolved. The program lacks stable leadership 
at the upper management levels. For example, the program has had 
frequent turnover in the leadership providing oversight. Further, 
recent reorganizations have done little to reduce the complex and 
fragmented organization of the program. As a result, roles and 
responsibilities are often unclear and program actions are not always 
coordinated. Finally, the absence of a comprehensive strategy leaves 
the program without a clear road map and methods to monitor program 
performance. Without these key elements, DOD and the Army have no 
assurance of meeting their goal to destroy the chemical stockpile in a 
safe and timely manner, and within cost estimates.

DOD and the Army have already missed several 2001 milestones and 
exceeded cost estimates; the Army has raised the program cost 
estimates by $1.2 billion, with other factors still to be considered. 
Almost all of the incineration sites will miss the 2001 milestones 
because of schedule delays due to environmental, safety, community 
relations, and funding issues. Although neutralization sites have not 
missed milestones, they have had delays. DOD and the Army have not 
developed an approach to anticipate and influence issues that could 
adversely impact program schedules, cost, and safety. Unless DOD and 
the Army adopt a risk management approach, the program remains at 
great risk of missing milestones and CWC deadlines. It will also 
likely incur rising costs and prolong the public’s exposure to the 
chemical stockpile. 

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends that DOD develop an overall strategy for the Chemical 
Demilitarization Program that would articulate the program’s mission, 
identify the long-term goals and objectives, delineate the roles and 
responsibilities of all DOD and Army offices, and establish near-term 
performance measures. Also, DOD should implement a risk management 
approach that anticipates and influences internal and external factors 
that could adversely impact program performance.

DOD concurred with GAO’s recommendations and said it is taking steps 
to implement them.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1031.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click 
on the link above. For more information, contact Ray Decker at (202) 
512-6020.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

Long-Standing Management and Organization Weaknesses Continue to Hamper 
Program Progress:

Most Sites Will Miss Schedule Milestones due to Program's Inability to 
Anticipate and Influence Issues:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix II: Major Schedule Phases Associated with 
Chemical Demilitarization Process and Current Facility Status:

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Related GAO Products:

Tables:

Table 1: Stockpile Sites, Type of Agent, Original Agent Tonnage, and 
Percentage of Original Stockpile:

Table 2: CWC Deadlines:

Table 3: Comparison of DOD's 1998 and 2001 Milestones for Starting and 
Finishing Agent Destruction Operations:

Table 4: Transfer of Program Oversight Responsibilities between DOD and 
the Army, 1986-Present:

Table 5: Transfer of Program Oversight Responsibilities within the 
Army, 1986-Present:

Table 6: Slippage of 2001 Scheduled Milestone Dates, by Incineration 
Site:

Table 7: Program Cost Increases Resulting from Delays at Incineration 
Sites:

Table 8: Status of Chemical Demilitarization Facilities:

Figure:

Figure 1: Comparison of 1998 and 2001 Cumulative Program 
Cost Estimates:

Abbreviations:

ACWA: Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment:

CMA: Chemical Materials Agency:

CSEPP: Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program:

CWC: Chemical Weapons Convention:

DOD: Department of Defense:

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because 
this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission 
from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce 
this material separately.

United States General Accounting Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

September 5, 2003:

The Honorable John Warner 
Chairman 
The Honorable Carl Levin 
Ranking Minority Member 
Committee on Armed Services 
United States Senate:

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 
Chairman 
The Honorable Ike Skelton 
Ranking Minority Member 
Committee on Armed Services 
House of Representatives:

The United States, along with many other countries, is committed to 
ridding the world of chemical weapons. In fiscal year 1986, Congress 
directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to destroy the nation's 
chemical weapons stockpile in a safe manner, and DOD designated 
the Army to set up and operate the demilitarization program. On an 
international level, the United States and more than 150 countries 
since 1997 have become parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC), which prohibits the use of these weapons and mandates a deadline 
of April 2007 to destroy the existing stockpiles.[Footnote 1] With the 
events of September 11, 2001, heightened concerns over weapons of mass 
destruction have further raised the awareness of these chemical weapons 
and their potential danger to the public.

Since its inception, DOD's Chemical Demilitarization Program has been 
plagued by frequent schedule delays, cost overruns, and continuing 
management problems. In 2001, DOD and the Army[Footnote 2] once again 
undertook a major reorganization of the program's complex management 
structure and revised its schedule, extending the projected milestones 
beyond the 2007 CWC deadline. The revisions also increased the 
estimated costs for destroying the chemical weapons stockpile by 60 
percent, from $15 billion to $24 billion. Because DOD and the Army have 
had long-term problems in meeting past schedule milestones and are now 
entering a demanding phase of the program--the planned start of agent 
destruction operations at multiple sites, using both incineration and 
alternative (neutralization) technologies--there are growing concerns 
in Congress over DOD's ability to accomplish its mission.

In the House Report to the fiscal year 2003 defense authorization 
budget,[Footnote 3] Congress mandated that we review and assess the 
management and status of the program. In February 2003, we briefed your 
staffs on our preliminary findings. As agreed with your offices, this 
report (1) examines the effect that recent organizational changes have 
had on the program's performance and (2) assesses the progress that DOD 
and the Army have made in meeting the revised 2001 cost and schedule 
estimates and the 2007 CWC deadline.

Leading organizations embrace principles for effectively implementing 
and managing programs. Some key aspects of these principles include 
promulgating a comprehensive mission statement, long-term and annual 
performance goals, measurable performance indicators, and evaluation 
and corrective action plans. Combined with effective leadership, these 
principles provide decision makers with a means to manage risk, 
understand a program's evolution and implementation, and determine 
whether initiatives are achieving their desired results.

In assessing the program's management performance, we compared the 
elements of program management documents to the general tenets and 
management principles, such as those supported by the Government 
Performance and Results Act, to determine if the program has a 
framework to produce results. We also compared previous and current 
program organizational structures and obtained a rationale for changes 
from program officials and documents to determine if lines of authority 
were clear and if roles and responsibilities were articulated. To 
assess DOD's progress in meeting revised schedule and cost estimates, 
we reviewed current program estimates, destruction schedules, CWC 
provisions, and other documents. We determined issues that had caused 
delays and ascertained approaches being used to reduce the potential 
for delays in the future. We also met with DOD and Army program 
officials and interviewed officials at several destruction sites and 
state environmental offices. We conducted our review from August 2002 
to June 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. A detailed description of our scope and methodology is 
included in appendix I.

Results in Brief:

While DOD and the Army have recently initiated some organizational 
changes in the Chemical Demilitarization Program, the program remains 
in turmoil, affecting management performance because of long-standing 
and unresolved leadership, organizational, and strategic planning 
issues. The lack of sustained leadership at both the upper levels of 
oversight and at the program-manager level confuses the decision-making 
authority and obscures accountability.[Footnote 4] Moreover, the recent 
reorganization has done little to reduce the program's complex 
management structure. It continues to have multiple lines of management 
authority within the Army and separation of program components between 
the Army and DOD. These separations leave roles and responsibilities 
for the different parts of the program unclear. Finally, the absence of 
an overarching, comprehensive strategy has left the program without a 
clear, top-level road map to closely guide and integrate all activities 
and to monitor program performance. Without key elements such as 
effective leadership, streamlined organization structure, and 
important management tools including strategic planning, DOD and the 
Army have no assurances that they will be able to meet the program's 
principal goal--to destroy the chemical stockpile in a safe manner and 
by the Chemical Weapons Convention 2007 deadline.

The program has missed most schedule milestones and cost estimates 
following a decade long trend. Nearly all of the incineration sites 
will miss the DOD-approved 2001 schedule milestones because of 
substantial delays that stem primarily from a number of problems that 
DOD and the Army have not been able to anticipate or influence. These 
problems include plant safety issues, difficulties in meeting 
environmental permitting requirements, public concerns about emergency 
preparedness plans, and budgeting shortfalls. Although the 
neutralization sites have not missed their milestones yet, they too 
have experienced delays. Program officials told us that they have 
already raised preliminary total program cost estimates by 
$1.2 billion, and other factors, yet to be considered, could raise 
these estimates even more. DOD and the Army have not developed an 
approach to anticipate and address potential problems that could 
adversely affect program schedules, costs, and safety. Until DOD and 
the Army adopt a comprehensive risk management approach, the program 
remains at great risk of not meeting its schedule milestones and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention deadline, leading to rising costs and 
unnecessarily prolonging the potential risk to the public associated 
with the storage of the chemical stockpile.

We are recommending that DOD develop an overall strategy for the 
Chemical Demilitarization Program that would articulate the programís 
mission, identify the long-term goals and objectives, delineate the 
roles and responsibilities of all DOD and Army offices, and establish 
near-term performance measures. Also, DOD should implement a risk 
management approach that anticipates and influences internal and 
external factors that could adversely impact program performance.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 
recommendations and said it is taking steps to implement them.

Background:

In fiscal year 1986, Congress directed DOD to destroy the U.S. 
stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions.[Footnote 5] DOD 
designated the Department of the Army as its executive agent for the 
program, and the Army established the Chemical Demilitarization (or 
Chem-Demil) Program, which was charged with the destruction of the 
stockpile at nine storage sites. Incineration was selected as the 
method to destroy the stockpile.[Footnote 6] In 1988, the Chemical 
Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) was created to enhance 
the emergency management and response capabilities of communities near 
the storage sites in case of an accident; the Army and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) jointly managed the program. In 
1997, consistent with congressional direction, the Army and FEMA 
clarified their CSEPP roles by implementing a management structure 
under which FEMA assumed responsibility for off-post (civilian 
community) program activities, while the Army continued to manage 
on-post chemical emergency preparedness. The Army provides CSEPP 
funding to FEMA, which is administered via grants to the states and 
counties near where stockpile sites are located in order to carry out 
the program's off-post activities.

Agent destruction began in 1990 at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. 
Subsequently, Congress directed DOD to evaluate the possibility of 
using alternative technologies to incineration. In 1994, the Army 
initiated a project to develop nonincineration technologies for use at 
the two bulk-agent only sites at Aberdeen, Maryland, and Newport, 
Indiana. These sites were selected in part because their stockpiles 
were relatively simple--each site had only one type of agent and this 
agent was stored in bulk-agent (ton) containers. In 1997, DOD approved 
pilot testing of a neutralization technology at these two sites. Also 
in 1997, Congress directed DOD to evaluate the use of alternative 
technologies and suspended incineration planning activities at two 
sites with assembled weapons in Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass, 
Kentucky. Furthermore, Congress directed that these two sites be 
managed in a program independent of the Army's Chem-Demil Program and 
report to DOD instead of the Army. Thus, the Assembled Chemical Weapons 
Assessment (ACWA) program was established. The nine sites, the types of 
agent, and the percentage of the original stockpiles are shown in 
table 1.

Table 1: Stockpile Sites, Type of Agent, Original Agent Tonnage, and 
Percentage of Original Stockpile:

Site: Johnston Atoll; Type of agent[A]: Blister and nerve; Original 
agent tonnage: 2,031; Percent of original stockpile: 6.

Site: Tooele, Utah; Type of agent[A]: Blister and nerve; Original agent 
tonnage: 13,616; Percent of original stockpile: 44.

Site: Anniston, Ala; Type of agent[A]: Blister and nerve; Original 
agent tonnage: 2,254; Percent of original stockpile: 7.

Site: Umatilla, Oreg; Type of agent[A]: Blister and nerve; Original 
agent tonnage: 3,717; Percent of original stockpile: 12.

Site: Pine Bluff, Ark; Type of agent[A]: Blister and nerve; Original 
agent tonnage: 3,850; Percent of original stockpile: 12.

Site: Aberdeen, Md; Type of agent[A]: Blister; Original agent tonnage: 
1,625; Percent of original stockpile: 5.

Site: Newport, Ind; Type of agent[A]: Nerve; Original agent tonnage: 
1,269; Percent of original stockpile: 4.

Site: Pueblo, Colo; Type of agent[A]: Blister; Original agent tonnage: 
2,611; Percent of original stockpile: 8.

Site: Blue Grass, Ky; Type of agent[A]: Blister and nerve; Original 
agent tonnage: 523; Percent of original stockpile: 2.

Site: Total; Original agent tonnage: 31,496; 
Percent of original stockpile: 100.

Source: DOD data.

[A] The stockpile includes two nerve agents, GB and VX, and blister 
agents.

[End of table]

In 1997, the United States ratified the CWC, which prohibits the use of 
these weapons and mandates the elimination of existing stockpiles by 
April 29, 2007.[Footnote 7] A CWC provision allows that extensions of 
up to 5 years can be granted. The CWC also contains a series of interim 
deadlines applicable to the U.S. stockpile[Footnote 8] (see table 2).

Table 2: CWC Deadlines:

Required percentage of agent destroyed: 1; Deadlines for destruction: 
April 29, 2000; Date United States met deadline: September 1997.

Required percentage of agent destroyed: 20; Deadlines for destruction: 
April 29, 2002; Date United States met deadline: July 2001.

Required percentage of agent destroyed: 45; Deadlines for destruction: 
April 29, 2004; Date United States met deadline: NA.

Required percentage of agent destroyed: 100; Deadlines for destruction: 
April 29, 2007; Date United States met deadline: NA.

Sources: CWC and U.S. Army.

Legend: NA - Not applicable.

[End of table]

The United States met the 1 percent interim deadline in September 1997 
and the 20 percent interim deadline in July 2001. As of June 2003, the 
Army was reporting that a total of about 26 percent of the original 
stockpile had been destroyed.[Footnote 9]

Three other countries (referred to as states parties)--India, Russia, 
and one other country--have declared chemical weapons stockpiles and 
are required to destroy them in accordance with CWC deadlines as well. 
As of April 2003, two of these three countries (India and one other 
country) had met the 1 percent interim deadline to destroy their 
stockpiles.[Footnote 10] Of the three countries, only India met the 
second (20 percent) interim deadline to destroy its stockpile by April 
2002. However, Russia, with the largest declared stockpile--over 40,000 
tons--did not meet the 1 percent or the 20 percent interim deadlines, 
and only began destroying its stockpile in December 2002. In 2001, 
Russia requested a 5-year extension to the 2007 deadline.[Footnote 11] 
Russia did destroy 1 percent of its stockpile by April 2003, although 
it is doubtful that it will meet the 2012 deadline if granted.[Footnote 
12]

Traditionally, management and oversight responsibilities for the 
Chem-Demil Program reside primarily within three levels at DOD--the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) who 
is the Defense Acquisition Executive for the Secretary of Defense, the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, Technology) 
who is the Army Acquisition Executive for the Army, and the Program 
Manager for Chemical Demilitarization--because it is a major defense 
acquisition program.[Footnote 13] In addition to these offices, since 
August 2002, the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical 
Demilitarization and Threat Reduction), has served as the focal point 
responsible for oversight, coordination, and integration of the Chem-
Demil Program.

In May 2001, in response to program cost, schedule, and management 
concerns, milestone decision authority was elevated to the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). DOD 
stated that this change would streamline future decision making and 
increase program oversight. DOD indicated that the change was also 
consistent with the size and scope of the program, international treaty 
obligations, and the level of local, state, and federal interest in the 
safe and timely destruction of the chemical stockpile.

In September 2001, after more than a yearlong review, DOD revised the 
programís schedule milestones for seven of the nine sites and the cost 
estimates for all nine sites[Footnote 14] These milestones represent 
the target dates that each site is supposed to meet for the completion 
of critical phases of the project. The†phases include design, 
construction, systemization, operations, and closure. (Appendix II 
describes these phases and provides the status of each site.) The 2001 
revision marked the third time the program extended its schedule 
milestones and cost estimates since it became a major defense 
acquisition program in 1994. The 2001 revision also pushed the 
milestones for most sites several years beyond the previous 1998 
schedule milestones and, for the first time, beyond the April 2007 
deadline contained in the CWC. Table 3 compares the 1998 and 2001 
schedule milestones for starting and finishing agent destruction 
operations at the eight sites with chemical agent stockpiles in 
2001.[Footnote 15] The planned agent destruction completion date at 
some sites was extended over 5†years..

Table 3: Comparison of DOD's 1998 and 2001 Milestones for Starting and 
Finishing Agent Destruction Operations:

Site: Tooele; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: Ongoing; 
Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 2001: Ongoing[B]; Change (no. 
of months): NA; Planned agent destruction completion date: 
1998: Oct. 2003; Planned agent destruction completion date: 2001: Feb. 
2008; Change (no. of months): + 53.

Site: Anniston; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: Jan. 
2002; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 2001: July 2002; Change 
(no. of months): + 7; Planned agent destruction completion 
date: 1998: Nov. 2005; Planned agent destruction completion date: 2001: 
May 2011; Change (no. of months): + 67.

Site: Umatilla; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: Feb. 
2002; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 2001: July 2003; Change 
(no. of months): + 18; Planned agent destruction completion 
date: 1998: June 2005; Planned agent destruction completion date: 2001: 
Jan. 2011; Change (no. of months): + 68.

Site: Pine Bluff; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: June 
2002; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 2001: Oct. 2003; Change 
(no. of months): + 17; Planned agent destruction completion 
date: 1998: Oct. 2005; Planned agent destruction completion date: 2001: 
Nov. 2009; Change (no. of months): + 50.

Site: Aberdeen; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: Jan. 
2004; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 2001: Mar. 2005; Change 
(no. of months): + 15; Planned agent destruction completion 
date: 1998: Dec. 2004; Planned agent destruction completion date: 2001: 
Mar. 2008; Change (no. of months): + 40.

Site: Newport; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: Jan. 
2004; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 2001: Dec. 2006; Change 
(no. of months): + 36; Planned agent destruction completion 
date: 1998: Dec. 2004; Planned agent destruction completion date: 2001: 
Nov. 2009; Change (no. of months): + 60.

Site: Blue Grass; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: NA[C].

Site: Pueblo; Planned agent destruction start date[A]: 1998: NA[C].

Sources: DOD and U.S. Army. 

[A] The 2001 schedule milestones reflect both Army and DOD changes.

[B] Tooele was already conducting destruction operations when the 1998 
and 2001 estimates for this phase were made.

[C] NA - Not available. Schedules are to be determined after technology 
decisions for Blue Grass and Pueblo are made.

[End of table]

DOD extended the schedule milestones to reflect the Armyís experience 
at†the two sitesóJohnston Atoll and Tooeleóthat had begun the 
destruction process prior to 2001. It found that previous schedule 
milestones had been largely based on overly optimistic engineering 
estimates. Lower destruction rates stipulated by environmental 
regulators, and increased time needed to change the facilityís 
configuration when switching between different types of chemical agents 
and weapons, meant destruction estimates needed to be lengthened. 
Moreover, experience at Johnston Atoll, which began closure activities 
in 2000, revealed that previous closure estimates for other sites had 
been understated. In addition, DODís Cost Analysis Improvement Group 
modified the site schedules based on a modeling technique that 
considered the probabilities of certain schedule activities taking 
longer than anticipated. In particular, the group determined that the 
operations phase, where agent destruction takes place, has the highest 
probability for schedule delays and lengthened that phase the most. 
Because the costs of the program are directly related to the length of 
the schedule, DOD also increthe projected life-cycle costs, from 
$15 billion in 1998 to $24 billion in 2001 (see fig. 1).ased:

Figure 1: Comparison of 1998 and 2001 Cumulative Program 
Cost Estimates:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

In December 2001, after the program schedule and costs were revised, 
the Army transferred primary program oversight from the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology) to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Installations and Environment). According to the Army, this move 
streamlined responsibilities for the program, which were previously 
divided between these two offices. In January 2003, the Army reassigned 
oversight responsibilities to the Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) for all policy and direction 
for the Chem-Demil Program and CSEPP. The Secretary of the Army also 
directed the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, 
and Technology) and the Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command, 
to jointly establish an agency to perform the chemical demilitarization 
as well as the chemical weapons storage functions. In response to this 
directive, the Army announced the creation of a new organization--the 
Chemical Materials Agency (CMA)--which will merge the demilitarization 
and the storage functions.[Footnote 16] During this transition process, 
the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization was redesignated as 
the Program Manager for the Elimination of Chemical Weapons and will 
report to the Director of CMA and have responsibility for each site 
through the systemization phase. The Director for Operations will 
manage the operations and closure phases. As of June 2003, the Program 
Manager for the Elimination of Chemical Weapons was providing day-to-
day management for the sites at Anniston, Umatilla, Newport, and Pine 
Bluff; the Director for Operations was providing day-to-day management 
for the sites at Tooele, Aberdeen, and Johnston Atoll, and the Program 
Manager, ACWA, was managing the sites at Pueblo and Blue Grass.

Since 1990, we have issued a number of reports that have focused on 
management, cost, and schedule issues related to the Chem-Demil 
Program. For example, in a 1995 testimony we cited the possibility of 
further cost growth and schedule slippage due to environmental 
requirements, public opposition to the baseline incineration process, 
and lower than expected disposal rates. We also testified that 
weaknesses in financial management and internal control systems have 
hampered program results and alternative technologies were unlikely to 
mature enough to meet CWC deadlines.

In 1995, we noted that the emergency preparedness program had been slow 
to achieve results and that communities were not fully prepared 
to respond to a chemical emergency. In 1997, we found high-level 
management attention was needed at the Army and FEMA to clearly define 
management roles and responsibilities. In 2001, we found that the Army 
and FEMA needed a more proactive approach to improve working relations 
with CSEPP states and local communities and to assist them in preparing 
budgets and complying with program performance measures.

In 2000, we found that the Chem-Demil Program was hindered by its 
complex management structure and ineffective coordination between 
program offices. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to clarify the management roles and 
responsibilities of program participants, assign accountability for 
achieving program goals and results, and establish procedures to 
improve coordination among the program's various elements and with 
state and local officials.

A detailed list of these reports and other products is included in 
Related GAO Products at the end of this report.

Long-Standing Management and Organization Weaknesses Continue to Hamper 
Program Progress:

Despite recent efforts to improve the management and streamline the 
organization of the Chem-Demil Program, the program continues to falter 
because several long-standing leadership, organizational, and 
strategic planning weaknesses remain unresolved. The absence of 
sustained leadership confuses decision-making authority and obscures 
accountability. In addition, the Army's recent reorganization of the 
program has not reduced its complex organization nor clarified the 
roles and responsibilities of various entities. For example, CMA 
reports to two different offices with responsibilities for different 
phases of the program and left the management of CSEPP divided between 
the Army and FEMA. The ACWA program continues to be managed outside of 
the Army as directed by Congress. Finally, the lack of an overarching, 
comprehensive strategy has left the Chem-Demil Program without a top-
level road map to guide and monitor the program's activities. The 
absence of effective leadership, streamlined organization, and 
important management tools, such as strategic planning, creates a 
barrier to the program accomplishing the safe destruction of the 
chemical stockpile and staying within schedule milestones, thereby 
raising program costs.

Shifts in Leadership Confuse Decision-Making Authority and Obscure 
Accountability:

The Chem-Demil Program has experienced frequent shifts in leadership 
providing oversight, both between DOD and the Army and within the Army, 
and frequent turnover in key program positions. These shifts have led 
to confusion among participants and stakeholders about the program's 
decision making and have obscured accountability. For example, program 
officials were not consistent in following through on promised 
initiatives and some initiatives were begun but not completed. Also, 
when leadership responsibilities changed, new initiatives were often 
introduced and old initiatives were abandoned, obscuring accountability 
for program actions.

Changes in Oversight Responsibilities Confuse Decision-Making Role:

The program has lacked sustained leadership above the program level 
as demonstrated by the multiple shifts between DOD and the Army 
for providing oversight that affects consistent decision making. The 
leadership responsible for oversight has shifted between the Army and 
DOD three times during the past two decades, with the most recent 
change occurring in 2001. Table 4 summarizes these changes. As 
different offices took over major decision authority, program emphasis 
frequently shifted, leaving initiatives pursued but not completed, 
consistency of initiatives was not maintained, and responsibility for 
decisions shifted. For example, we reported in August 2001 that the 
Army and FEMA had addressed some management problems in how they 
coordinated emergency preparedness activities after they had 
established a memorandum of understanding to clarify roles and 
responsibilities related to CSEPP.[Footnote 17] However, according to 
FEMA officials, DOD did not follow the protocols for coordination as 
agreed upon with the Army when making decisions about emergency 
preparedness late in 2001. This led to emergency preparedness items 
being funded without adequate plans for distribution, which delayed the 
process. These changes in oversight responsibilities also left the 
stakeholders in the states and local communities uncertain as to the 
credibility of federal officials.

Table 4: Transfer of Program Oversight Responsibilities between DOD and 
the Army, 1986-Present:

Year: 1986; Oversight authority: Army; Action: DOD designates the Army 
as the executive agent for the Chem-Demil Program.

Year: 1994; Oversight authority: DOD; Action: DOD makes the program a 
major defense acquisition program and oversight is elevated to control 
cost and schedule increases and to raise program visibility.

Year: 1998; Oversight authority: Army; Action: DOD delegates decision-
making authority to the Army, primarily as part of its overall effort 
to reduce responsibilities and staffing of its offices.

Year: 2001; Oversight authority: DOD; Action: DOD reinstates its 
position as the program's top decision maker. According to DOD, this 
was done to streamline decision making, which is consistent with the 
cost of the program and national and state interest in the safe and 
timely destruction of the stockpile.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

[End of table]

Leadership responsibilities for the program within the Army have 
also transferred three times from one assistant secretary to another 
(see table 5). During this time, there were numerous CSEPP issues that 
the Army took positions on with which FEMA did not concur. For example, 
in August 2002, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and 
Environment) officials committed to funding nearly $1 million to study 
building an emergency operations center for a community near Umatilla 
with additional funds to be provided later. Since the program shifted 
to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology) in 2003, program officials have been reconsidering this 
commitment. The problem of Army and FEMA not speaking with one voice 
led to confusion among state and local communities. Further, dual or 
overlapping authority by the Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) and the Assistant Secretary of 
the Army (Installations and Environment) in 2001 was not clarified. 
Without clear lines of authority, one office took initiatives without 
consulting the other. As a result, stakeholders were unclear if 
initiatives were valid.

In addition to these program shifts, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
the Army (Chemical Demilitarization)--an oversight office moved from 
DOD to the Army in 1998--reported to the Assistant Secretary of the 
Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) from 1998 until 2001, 
then to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and 
Environment) until 2003, and now again to the Assistant Secretary of 
the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology). These many shifts in 
this oversight office with responsibility for programmatic decisions 
left stakeholders confused about this office's oversight role and about 
the necessity of funding requests it made. As a result, the 
accumulation of extra funding ultimately caused Congress to cut the 
program's budget.[Footnote 18]

Table 5: Transfer of Program Oversight Responsibilities within the 
Army, 1986-Present:

Year: 1986; Army organization: Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Installations and Environment); Action: The Secretary of the Army 
assigned oversight of the Chem-Demil Program to the Assistant Secretary 
of the Army (Installations and Environment).

Year: 1994; Army organization: Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Research, Development, and Acquisition); Action: When DOD designated 
the program a major defense acquisition program, the Army transferred 
oversight to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, 
Development, and Acquisition).

Year: 2001; Army organization: Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Installations and Environment); Action: To streamline the program's 
organizational structure, the Army transferred oversight back to the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment).

Year: 2003; Army organization: Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology); Action: The Army transfers 
the program back to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, 
Logistics, and Technology) when CMA was established.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.

[End of table]

Frequent Changes in Key Program Officials Obscure Accountability:

The Chem-Demil Program has experienced a number of changes and 
vacancies in key program leadership positions, which has obscured 
accountability. This issue is further compounded, as discussed later, 
by the lack of a strategic plan to provide an agreed upon road map for 
officials to follow. Within the Army, three different officials have 
held senior leadership positions since December 2001. In addition, five 
officials have served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Chem-Demil) during that time.[Footnote 19] The program manager's 
position remained vacant for nearly 1 year, from April 2002 to February 
2003, before being filled. However, in June, after only 4 months, the 
program manager resigned and the Army named a replacement.

Frequent shifts in key leadership positions led to several instances 
where this lack of continuity affected decision making and obscured 
accountability. For example, in June 2002, a program official promised 
to support future funding requests for emergency preparedness equipment 
from a community, but his successor did not fulfill this promise. This 
promise caused communities to submit several funding requests that 
were not supported. The lack of leadership continuity makes it unclear 
who is accountable when commitments are made but not implemented. 
Moreover, when key leaders do not remain in their positions long enough 
to develop the needed long-term perspective (on program issues) or to 
effectively follow through on program initiatives, it is easy for them 
to deny responsibility for previous decisions and avoid current 
accountability.

Recent Reorganization Has Not Reduced Organizational Complexity:

The recent reorganization by the Army has not streamlined the program's 
complex organization or clarified roles and responsibilities. For 
example, the Director of CMA will now report to two different senior 
Army organizations, which is one more than under the previous 
structure. This divided reporting approach is still not fully 
developed, but it may adversely affect program coordination and 
accountability. The reorganization has also divided the responsibility 
for various program phases between two offices within CMA. One 
organization, the Program Manager for the Elimination of Chemical 
Weapons, will manage the first three phases for each site and a newly 
created organization, the Director of Operations, will manage the final 
two phases. This reorganization changes the cradle-to-grave management 
approach that was used to manage sites in the past and has blurred 
responsibities for officials who previously provided support in areas 
such as quality assurance and safety. Moreover, the reorganization did 
not address two program components--community-related CSEPP and ACWA. 
CSEPP will continue to be jointly managed with FEMA. ACWA, as 
congressionally directed, will continue to be managed separately from 
the Army by DOD.

During the transition process, no implementation plan was promulgated 
when the new organization was first announced in January 2003. As of 
June 2003, the migration of roles and responsibilities formerly 
assigned to the office of the Program Manager for Chemical 
Demilitarization into the new CMA had not been articulated. For 
example, several key CMA officials who had formerly been part of the 
former program office told us that they were unsure of their new roles 
within CMA and the status of ongoing program initiatives. Furthermore, 
past relationships and responsibilities among former program offices 
and site activities have been disrupted. Although the establishment of 
CMA with a new directorate responsible for operations at Tooele and 
Aberdeen is underway, former program office staff told us they did not 
know how this new organization would manage the sites in the future.

Program Lacks Strategy and Implementation Plan:

While DOD and the Army have issued numerous policies and guidance 
documents for the Chem-Demil Program, they have not developed an 
overarching, comprehensive strategy or an implementation plan to guide 
the program and monitor its progress. Leading organizations embrace 
principles for effectively implementing and managing programs. Some key 
aspects of this approach include promulgating a comprehensive strategy 
to include mission, long-term goals, and methods to accomplish these 
goals and an implementation plan that includes annual performance 
goals, measurable performance indicators, and evaluation and corrective 
action plans. According to DOD and Army officials, the Chem-Demil 
Program relies primarily on guidance and planning documents related to 
the acquisition process.[Footnote 20] For example, the former program 
manager drafted several documents, such as the Program Manager for 
Chemical Demilitarization's Management Plan and Acquisition Strategy 
for the Chemical Demilitarization Program, as the cornerstone of his 
management approach. Our review of these and other key documents showed 
that they did not encompass all components of the program or other 
nonacquisition activities. Some documents had various elements, such as 
a mission statement, but they were not consistently written. None 
contained all of the essential elements expected in a comprehensive 
strategy nor contained aspects needed for an implementation plan, such 
as an evaluation and corrective action plan. Further, all documents 
were out of date and did not reflect recent changes to the program.

DOD and Army officials stated that the program's strategy would be 
articulated in the updated program's acquisition strategy to be 
completed by the new Director of CMA. According to the draft 
acquisition strategy, the focus is to acquire services, systems, and 
equipment. Again, this approach does not address all components of the 
Chem-Demil Program, such as CSEPP and ACWA.

More importantly, a strategic plan would ensure that all actions 
support overall program goals as developed by the appropriate senior-
level office with oversight responsibility for the program. An 
implementation plan would define the steps the program would take to 
accomplish its mission. Further, a strategy document, coupled with an 
implementation plan, would clarify roles and responsibilities and 
establish program performance measurements. Together, these documents 
would provide the foundation for a well-managed program to provide 
continuity of operations for program officials to follow.

Most Sites Will Miss Schedule Milestones due to Program's Inability to 
Anticipate and Influence Issues:

The program continues to miss most milestones, following a decade long 
trend. Nearly all of the incineration sites will miss the 2001 
scheduled milestones because of substantial delays during their 
systematization (equipment testing) or operations (agent destruction) 
phases. Delays at sites using incineration stem primarily from a number 
of problems that DOD and the Army have not been able to anticipate or 
control, such as concerns involving plant safety, difficulties in 
meeting environmental permitting requirements, public concerns about 
emergency preparedness plans, and budgeting shortfalls. The 
neutralization sites have not missed milestones yet but have 
experienced delays as well. DOD and the Army have not developed an 
approach to anticipate and address potential problems that could 
adversely affect program schedules, costs, and safety. Neither DOD nor 
the Army has adopted a comprehensive risk management approach to 
mitigate potential problems. As a result, the Chem-Demil Program will 
have a higher level of risk of missing its schedule milestones and CWC 
deadlines, incurring rising costs, and unnecessarily prolonging the 
potential risk to the public associated with the storage of the 
chemical stockpile.

Substantial Delays at Incineration Sites Led to Missed Milestones:

Most incineration sites will miss important milestones established in 
2001 due to schedule delays. For example, delays at Anniston, Umatilla, 
and Pine Bluff have already resulted, or will result, in their missing 
the 2001 schedule milestones to begin chemical agent destruction 
operations (operation phase). [Footnote 21] Johnston Atoll will miss 
its schedule milestone for shutting down the facility (closure 
phase).[Footnote 22] The Tooele site has not missed any milestones 
since the 2001 schedule was issued; however, the site has undergone 
substantial delays in destroying its stockpile primarily due to a 
safety-related incident in July 2002.[Footnote 23] If additional delays 
occur at the Tooele site, it could also exceed its next milestone as 
well. Table 6 shows the status of the incineration sites that will miss 
2001 schedule milestones.

Table 6: Slippage of 2001 Scheduled Milestone Dates, by Incineration 
Site:

Site: Anniston; Next project milestone: Operations; 2001 schedule date 
to begin next milestone: July 2002; Estimated[A] date to begin next 
phase: July 2003; Difference between 2001 schedule and estimate (no. of 
months): +12.

Site: Umatilla; Next project milestone: Operations; 2001 schedule date 
to begin next milestone: July 2003; Estimated[A] date to begin next 
phase: Dec. 2003; Difference between 2001 schedule and estimate (no. of 
months): +5.

Site: Pine Bluff; Next project milestone: Operations; 2001 schedule 
date to begin next milestone: Oct. 2003; Estimated[A] date to begin 
next phase: Apr. 2004; Difference between 2001 schedule and estimate 
(no. of months): +6.

Site: Johnston Atoll; Next project milestone: End of closure; 2001 
schedule date to begin next milestone: Sept. 2003; Estimated[A] date to 
begin next phase: Jan. 2004; Difference between 2001 schedule and 
estimate (no. of months): +4.

Sources: DOD and the U.S. Army.

[A] Program manager's official estimate for Pine Bluff and Johnston 
Atoll; unofficial estimates for other sites based on discussions with 
site officials as of June 2003.

[End of table]
The delays at the incineration sites have resulted from various 
longstanding issues, which the Army has not been able to effectively 
anticipate or control because it does not have a process to identify 
and mitigate them. An effectively managed program would have an 
approach, such as lessons learned, to identify and mitigate issues. 
Although the program now has extensive experience with destroying 
agents at two sites, the Chem-Demil Programmatic Lessons Learned 
Program has been shifted to individual contractors from a headquarters 
centralized effort. In†September 2002, we reported on the effectiveness 
of the centralized lessons learned program and found it to be generally 
effective, but it should be improved and expanded.[Footnote 24] By 
decentralizing the program, it is uncertain how knowledge will be 
leveraged between sites to avoid or lessen potential delays due to 
issues that have previously occurred. In addition, program officials 
told us that they were concerned that lessons from the closure at 
Johnston Atoll were not being captured and saved for future use at 
other sites.

Many delays have resulted from incidents during operations, 
environmental permitting, community protection, and funding issues. 
This†continues to be a trend we identified in previous reports on the 
program. The following examples illustrate some of the issues that have 
caused delays at incineration sites since 2001:

* Incidents during operations: Agent destruction operations at Tooele 
were suspended from July 2002 to March 2003 because of a chemical 
incident involving a plant worker who came into contact with a nerve 
agent while performing routine maintenance. Subsequent investigations 
determined that this event occurred because some procedures related to 
worker safety were either inadequate or not followed. A corrective 
action plan, which required the implementation of an improved safety 
plan, was instituted before operations resumed. Since it resumed 
operations in March 2003, Tooele has experienced several temporary 
shutdowns. (These shutdowns are discussed further in app. II.):

* Environmental permitting: The start of agent destruction operations 
at Umatilla and Anniston sites has been delayed because of several 
environmental permitting issues.[Footnote 25] Delays at the Umatilla 
site have resulted from several unanticipated engineering changes 
related to reprogramming software and design changes that required 
permit modifications. An additional delay occurred at the Umatilla site 
when the facility was temporarily shut down in October 2002 by state 
regulators because furnaces were producing an unanticipated high amount 
of heavy metals during surrogate agent testing. The testing was 
suspended until a correction could be implemented. Delays at the 
Anniston site occurred because state environmental regulators did not 
accept test results for one of the furnaces because the subcontractor 
did not follow state permit-specified protocols.

* Community protection: Destruction operations at the Anniston site 
have been delayed because of concerns about emergency preparedness for 
the surrounding communities. These concerns included the inadequacy of 
protection plans for area schools and for special needs residents. 
Although we reported on this issue in July 1996[Footnote 26] and again 
in August 2001 and a senior DOD official identified it as a key concern 
in September 2001, the Army was unable to come to a satisfactory 
resolution with key state stakeholders prior to the planned January 
2003 start date. As of June 2003, negotiations were still ongoing 
between the Army and key public officials to determine when destruction 
operations could begin.

* Funding: Systemization and closure activities were delayed at Pine 
Bluff and Johnston Atoll sites, respectively, because program funds 
planned for demilitarization were redirected in fiscal year 2002 by DOD 
to pay for $40.5 million for additional community protection equipment 
for Anniston. This was an unfunded budget expense, and the Army reduced 
funds for the Pine Bluff site by $14.9 million, contributing to 
construction and systemization milestones slipping 1 year. The Pine 
Bluff site was selected because the loss of funding would not delay the 
projected start of operations during that fiscal year. Program 
officials told us that the total program cost of this schedule slip 
would ultimately be $90 million. Additionally, funds were reduced for 
the Johnston Atoll site by $25.1 million because it was in closure.

According to an Army official, delays increase program costs by 
approximately $250,000 to $300,000 a day or about $10 million per 
month. Since 2001, delays have caused cost increases of $256 million at 
the incineration sites shown in table 7.

Table 7: Program Cost Increases Resulting from Delays at Incineration 
Sites:

Dollars in millions.

Johnston Atoll; Cause of delay: Funding; Cost increase: $26.

Tooele; Cause of delay: Incident during operation; Cost increase: 75.

Anniston; Cause of delay: Environmental permitting; Cost increase: 45.

Umatilla; Cause of delay: Environmental permitting; Cost increase: 20.

Pine Bluff; Cause of delay: Funding; Cost increase: 90.

Total; Cost increase: $256.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data. 

Note: Data as of March 2003.

[End of table]

Due to the delays, the Army is in the process of developing new 
milestones that would extend beyond those adopted in 2001. According to 
an Army official, the program will use events that have occurred since 
2001 to present new cost estimates to DOD in preparation for the fiscal 
year 2005 budget submission. Program officials told us that they 
estimate costs have already increased $1.2 billion. This estimated 
increase is likely to rise further as additional factors are 
considered.

Delays at Neutralization Sites Have Not Led to Missed Milestones:

The two bulk-agent only sites, Aberdeen and Newport, have experienced 
delays but have not breeched their milestones. The schedules were 
revised in response to concerns about the continued storage of the 
chemical stockpile after the events of September 11, 2001. In 2002, DOD 
approved the use of a modified process that will accelerate the rate of 
destruction at these two sites. For example, the Army estimates that 
the modified process will reduce the length of time needed to complete 
destruction of the blister agent stockpile at Aberdeen from 20 months 
to 6 months. The Army estimates that this reduction, along with other 
changes, such as the off-site shipping of a waste byproduct, will 
reduce the scheduled end of operations by 5 years, from 2008 to 2003. 
Similarly, projections for agent destruction operations at Newport were 
reduced from 20 months to 7 months, and the destruction end date moved 
up from 2009 to 2004.

While the Aberdeen site did begin destruction operations, as of June 
2003, it had only achieved a peak rate of 2 containers per day, which 
is far less than the projected peak daily rate of 12, and had 
experienced unanticipated problems removing residual agent from the 
containers. After 2 months of processing, Army officials said it had 
initially processed 57 of the 1,815 containers in Aberdeen's stockpile 
and will have to do additional processing of these containers because 
of a higher amount of unanticipated hardened agent. Even if the peak 
daily rate of 12 is achieved, the site will not meet the October 2003 
Army estimate.

At the Newport site, construction problems will delay the start of 
operations, missing the program manager's October 2003 estimate for 
starting agent destruction operations. Another possible impediment to 
starting operations is the program's efforts to treat the waste 
byproduct at a potential off-site disposal facility in Ohio. These 
efforts have met resistance from some community leaders and residents 
near the potential disposal site. If the Army is unable to use an off-
site facility, the disposal may have to be done on site, requiring the 
construction of a waste byproduct treatment facility, further causing 
delays and increasing costs.

Schedule milestones were not adopted for the Pueblo and Blue Grass 
sites in the 2001 schedule because DOD had not selected a destruction 
technology. Subsequently, DOD selected destruction technologies for 
these sites; however, these decisions were made several months beyond 
the dates estimated in 2001. For example, while program officials 
indicated that the technology decision for the Kentucky site would be 
made by September 2002, the decision was not made until February 2003. 
Significantly, DOD announced initial schedule milestones for these 
two sites that extended beyond the extended April 2012 deadline of the 
CWC. According to DOD officials, these schedules are preliminary and 
will be reevaluated after the selected contractors complete their 
initial design of the facilities. Plans for these sites are immature, 
and changes are likely to occur as they move closer to the operations 
phase still at least several years away.

Risk Management Approach Needed to Reduce Schedule Delays:

DOD and the Army have not implemented a comprehensive risk management 
approach that would proactively anticipate and influence issues that 
could adversely affect the programís progress. The program managerís 
office drafted a risk management plan in June 2000, but the plan has 
not been formally approved or implemented. According to program 
officials, a prior program official drafted the plan and subsequent 
officials did not approve or further develop the plan. The draft plan 
noted that DODís acquisition rules require program managers to 
establish a risk management plan to identify and control risk related 
to performance, cost, and schedule.[Footnote 27]

Such a plan would allow managers to systematically identify, analyze, 
and influence the risk factors and could help keep the program within 
its schedule and cost estimates.

DOD and Army officials have given several reasons for not having an 
overall risk management plan. A DOD official indicated that the 
approach that has been used to address program problems has been crisis 
management, which has forced DOD to react to issues rather than control 
them. The deputy program manager stated that the programís focus has 
been on managing individual sites by implementing initiatives to 
improve contractor performance as it relates to safety, schedule, and 
cost. The official also said that establishing a formal, integrated 
risk management plan has not been a priority. However, an official from 
the program managerís office said the infrastructure is in place to 
finalize an integrated risk management plan by October 2003, which 
coincides with the date CMA takes over leadership of the program. 
However, due to the transition that the organization is undergoing, the 
status of this effort is uncertain.

The Army defines its risk management approach as a process for 
identifying and addressing internal and external issues that may have 
a†negative impact on the programís progress. A risk management 
approach†has five basic steps, which assist program leaders in 
effective decision†making for better program outcomes. Simply stated, 
the first step is to identify those issues that pose a risk to the 
program. For example, a problem in environmental permitting can 
significantly delay the program schedule. The second step is to analyze 
the risks identified and prioritize the risks using established 
criteria. The third step is to create a plan for action to mitigate the 
prioritized risks in some order of importance. The fourth step is to 
track and validate the actions taken. 

The last step is to review and monitor the outcomes of the actions 
taken to†ensure their effectiveness. Additional remedies may be needed 
if actions are not successful or the risks have changed. Risk 
management is†a continuous, dynamic process and must become a regular 
part of the leadership decision process. Without developing such an 
approach, the Chem-Demil Program will continue to manage by addressing 
issues as they†arise and not by developing strategies or contingency 
plans to meet†program issues. As the program complexity increases with 
new technologies and more active sites, a comprehensive risk management 
approach, as the acquisition regulations require, would facilitate 
program success and help control costs. Such a proactive approach would 
allow the program to systematically identify, analyze, and manage the 
risk factors that could hamper its efforts to destroy the chemical 
stockpile and help keep it within its schedule and cost estimates.

Conclusions:

For more than a decade, the Chem-Demil Program has struggled to meet 
schedule milestones--and control the enormous costs--for destroying 
the nation's chemical weapons stockpile. The program will also miss 
future CWC deadlines. Despite several reorganizations of its complex 
structure, the program continues to flounder. Program leadership at 
both the oversight and the program manager levels has shifted 
frequently, contributing to the program's continued instability, 
ineffective decision making, and weak accountability. The repeated 
realignments of the program have done little to resolve its awkward, 
hydra-like structure in which roles and responsibilities continue to be 
poorly defined, multiple lines of authority exist, and coordination 
between various entities is poor. These shifts and realignments have 
taken place without the benefit of a comprehensive strategy and an 
implementation plan that could help the program clearly define its 
mission and begin working toward its goals effectively. If the program 
had these key pillars, such as a strategy to guide it from its 
inception and an implementation plan to track performance, it would be 
in a better position to achieve desired outcomes. The program will have 
a low probability of achieving its principal goal of destroying the 
nation's chemical weapons stockpile in a safe manner within the 2001 
schedule unless DOD and Army leadership take immediate action to 
clearly define roles and responsibilities throughout the program and 
implement an overarching strategic plan.

The Chem-Demil Program is entering a crucial period as more of its 
sites move into the operations phase. As this occurs, the program faces 
potentially greater challenges than it has already encountered, 
including the possibilities of growing community resistance, 
unanticipated technical problems, and serious site incidents. Unless 
program leadership is proactive in identifying potential internal and 
external issues and preparing for them, or in reducing the chances that 
they will occur, the program remains at great risk of failing to meet 
its scheduled milestones and the deadlines set by the CWC. These 
problems, and subsequent delays, are likely to continue plaguing the 
program unless it is able to incorporate a comprehensive risk 
management system into its daily routine. Such a proactive approach 
would allow the program to systematically identify, analyze, and manage 
the risk factors that could hamper its efforts to destroy the chemical 
stockpile and help keep it within its schedule and cost estimates. 
Without the advantage of having a risk management tool, the program 
will continue to be paralyzed by delays caused by unanticipated issues, 
resulting in spiraling program costs and missed deadlines that prolong 
the dangers of the chemical weapons stockpile to the American public.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction 
with the Secretary of the Army, to:

* develop an overall strategy and implementation plan for the chemical 
demilitarization program that would: :

* articulate a program mission statement,

* identify the program's long-term goals and objectives,

* delineate the roles and responsibilities of all DOD and Army offices, 
and:

* establish near-term performance measures, and :

* implement a risk management approach that anticipates and influences 
internal and external factors that could adversely impact program 
performance.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 
recommendations. In concurring with our recommendation to develop an 
overall strategy and implementation plan, DOD stated that it is in the 
initial stages of developing such a plan and estimates that it will be 
completed in fiscal year 2004. In concurring with our recommendation to 
implement a risk management approach, DOD stated that the CMA will 
review the progress of an evaluation of several components of its risk 
management approach within the next 120 days. At that time, DOD will 
evaluate the outcome of this review and determine any appropriate 
action. 

We believe these actions should improve program performance provided 
DOD's plan incorporates a clearly articulated mission statement, long-
term goals, well-delineated assignment of roles and responsibilities, 
and near-term performance measures and the Army's review of its risk 
management approach focuses on anticipating and influencing internal 
and external factors that could adversely impact the Chem-Demil 
Program. 

DOD's comments are printed in appendix III. DOD also provided technical 
comments that we incorporated where appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Secretary of the Army; 
and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies 
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

For any questions regarding this report, please contact me at 
(512) 512-6020. Key contributors to this report were Donald Snyder, 
Rodell Anderson, Bonita Oden, John Buehler, Pam Valentine, 
Steve Boyles, Nancy Benco, and Charles Perdue.

Raymond J. Decker 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:

Signed by Raymond J. Decker: 

[End of section]

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

This report focuses on the Chemical Demilitarization (Chem-Demil) 
Stockpile Program, one of the components of the Chem-Demil program. 
Other components, such as the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness 
Program, were only discussed to determine their effects on the 
destruction schedule.

To determine if recent changes in the stockpile program's management 
and oversight have been successful in improving program progress, we 
interviewed numerous officials and reviewed various documents. Through 
a review of previous and current organizational charts, we noted a 
number of changes in the program from 1986 to the present. We 
interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) and Army officials to determine 
what effect organizational changes and management initiatives had on 
the program and to determine if a strategic plan had been developed to 
manage the program. We identified organizational changes between DOD 
and the Army, determined the rationale for changes, and ascertained the 
effect of these changes on program performance. We reviewed Defense 
Acquisition System directives to determine the roles and 
responsibilities of DOD and the Army in managing the Chemical 
Demilitarization Program. We assessed Chem-Demil Program's Acquisition 
Strategy and Management and Program Performance plans to identify 
elements of a strategic plan and evaluated and compared them to the 
general tenets and management principles embraced by the Government 
Performance and Results Act. Additionally, we interviewed Office of 
Management and Budget officials to discuss their assessment of the 
program's performance and its adherence to a results-oriented 
management approach and reviewed DOD directives and regulations to 
determine the criteria for strategic planning.

To determine the progress that DOD and the Army have made in 
meeting revised 2001 cost and schedule estimates and Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) deadlines, we interviewed relevant program officials 
and reviewed a number of documents. We reviewed the Army's current 
program office estimates to destroy the chemical weapons stockpile and 
weekly and monthly destruction schedules to understand how sites will 
perform and synchronize activities to meet milestones. We interviewed 
DOD's Cost Analysis Improvement Group to determine how DOD developed 
estimates for the 2001 milestone schedules for each site. However, we 
did not independently evaluate the reliability of the methodology the 
Cost Analysis Improvement Group used to develop its estimate. Further, 
we interviewed program officials to determine the status of the 
destruction process at incineration and neutralization sites and the 
impact of delays on schedule and cost.

We reviewed Selected Acquisition Reports and Acquisition Program 
Baselines to identify the increase in program cost estimates in 1998 
and 2001 and to determine the relationship between changes to schedule 
milestones and increased program cost. Our analysis identified the 
effect that schedule delays would have on schedule milestones at 
incineration and neutralization sites. Additionally, the analysis also 
identified types of schedule delays and the impact on program cost. 
Through interviews with program officials, we discussed the status of 
factors that increase program life-cycle cost estimates. We examined 
the Chem-Demil Program's draft risk management plans to determine if 
the Army had developed a comprehensive risk management approach to 
address potential problems that could adversely affect program 
schedules, cost, and safety. Through an analysis of other risk 
management plans, we identified elements of a risk management process. 
We reviewed CWC documents to determine deadlines for the destruction of 
the chemical weapons stockpile. We interviewed program officials to 
discuss the potential implications of not meeting interim milestones 
and CWC deadlines.

During the review, we visited and obtained information from the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretaries of the 
Army (Installations and Environment) and (Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology); the Office of Management and Budget, the Department 
of State, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the DOD 
Inspector General in Washington, D.C. and met with the Director of 
Chemical Materials Agency and the Program Managers for Chemical 
Demilitarization and Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment in Edgewood, 
Maryland. We also met project managers, site project managers, state 
environmental offices, and contractors associated with disposal sites 
in Aberdeen, Maryland; Anniston, Alabama; Umatilla, Oregon; and Pine 
Bluff, Arkansas. We also interviewed Federal Emergency Management 
Agency officials concerning funding of emergency preparedness program 
activities.

We conducted our review from August 2002 to June 2003 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Major Schedule Phases Associated with 
Chemical Demilitarization Process and Current Facility Status:

When developing schedules, the Army divides the demilitarization 
process into five major phases. The five major phases are facility 
design, construction, systemization, operations, and closure. Some 
activities of one phase may overlap the preceding phase. The nine sites 
are at different phases of the process.

The Army's Demilitarization Process:

Design:

During the design phase, the Army obtains the required environmental 
permits. The permits are required to comply with federal, state, and 
local environmental laws and regulations to build and operate chemical 
disposal facilities. The permits specify construction parameters and 
establish operations guidelines and emission limitations. Subsequent 
engineering changes to the facility are incorporated into the permits 
through formal permit modification procedures. During this phase, the 
Army originally solicited contract proposals from systems contractors 
to build, and operate, the chemical demilitarization facility and 
selected a systems contractor. Now, the Army uses a design/build 
approach, whereby the contractor completes both phases. The Army 
originally provided the systems contractors with the design for the 
incineration facilities; however, systems contractors developed the 
facility design for the neutralization facilities. 

Construction:

During the construction phase, the Army, with the contractor's input, 
develops a master project schedule that identifies all major project 
tasks and milestones associated with site design, construction, 
systemization, operations, and closure. For each phase in the master 
project schedule, the contractor develops detailed weekly schedules to 
identify and sequence the activities necessary to meet contract 
milestones. Army site project managers review and approve the detailed 
schedules to monitor the systems contractor's performance. After 
developing the schedules, the contractor builds a disposal site and 
acquires, installs, and integrates the necessary equipment to destroy 
the stockpile and begins hiring, training, and certifying operations 
staff.

Systemization:

During systemization, the systems contractor also prepares and executes 
a systemization implementation plan, which describes how the contractor 
will ensure the site is prepared to conduct agent operations. The 
contractor begins executing the implementation plan by testing system 
components. The contractor then tests individual systems to identify 
and correct any equipment flaws. After systems testing, the contractor 
conducts integrated operations tests. For example, the contractor uses 
simulated munitions to test the rocket processing line from receipt of 
the munitions through incineration. Army staff observe and approve key 
elements of each integrated operations test, which allows the 
contractor to continue the systemization process. Once the Army 
approves the integrated operations test, the contractor tests the 
system by conducting mini and surrogate trial burns. During minitrial 
burns, the contractor adds measured amounts of metals to a surrogate 
material to demonstrate the system's emissions will not exceed 
allowable rates. In conducting surrogate trial burns, the contractor 
destroys nonagent compounds similar in makeup to the agents to be 
destroyed at the site. By using surrogate agents, the contractor tests 
destruction techniques without threatening people or the environment. 
Both the minitrial burn test results and the surrogate trial burn test 
results are submitted to environmental regulators for review and 
approval. When the environmental regulators approve the surrogate trial 
burns, the contractor conducts an Operational Readiness Review to 
validate standard operating procedures and to verify the proficiency of 
the workforce. During the Operational Readiness Review, the workforce 
demonstrates knowledge of operating policies and procedures by 
destroying simulated munitions. After systemization, the contractor 
begins the operations phase; that is, the destruction of chemical 
munitions.

Operations:

The operations phase is when weapons and agents are destroyed. Weapons 
are destroyed by campaign, which is the complete destruction of like 
chemical weapons at a given site. Operations for incineration and 
alternative technologies differ. The following examples pertain to an 
incineration site. In its first campaign, Umatilla plans to destroy its 
stockpile of M55 rockets filled with one type of nerve agent. Then a 
second campaign is planned to destroy its stockpile of M55 rockets 
filled with another type of nerve agent. After each campaign, the site 
must be reconfigured. The Army refers to this process as an agent 
changeover. During the changeover, the contractor decontaminates the 
site of any prior nerve agent residue. The contractor then adjusts the 
monitoring, sampling, and laboratory equipment to test for the next 
nerve agent. The contractor also validates the operating procedures for 
the second agent destruction process. Some operating procedures may be 
rewritten because the processing rates among chemical agents differ. 
Although the operations staff have been trained and certified on 
specific equipment, the staff are re-trained on the operating 
parameters of processing VX agent.

In the third and forth campaigns at Umatilla, the contractor plans to 
destroy 8-inch VX projectiles and 155-millimeter projectiles, 
respectively. Because the third campaign involves a different weapon 
than the second campaign (i.e., from rockets in the second campaign to 
projectiles in the third campaign), the contractor will replace 
equipment during the changeover. For example, the machine that 
disassembles rockets will be replaced with a machine that disassembles 
projectiles. Additionally, a changeover may require certain processes 
to be bypassed. For instance, if a changeover involved changing 
processes from weapons with explosives to weapons without explosives, 
the explosives removal equipment and deactivation furnace would be 
bypassed. For the changeover to the fourth campaign at Umatilla, the 
contractor will adjust equipment to handle differences in weapon size. 
For example, the contractor will adjust the conveyor system to 
accommodate the 155-millimeter projectiles. The contractor also will 
change the location of monitoring equipment.

Closure:

After destruction of the stockpile, the systems contractor begins 
closing the site. During the closure phase, the contractor 
decontaminates and disassembles the remaining systems, structures, and 
components used during the demilitarization effort, and the contractor 
performs any other procedures required by state environmental 
regulations or permits. The contractor removes, disassembles, 
decontaminates, and destroys the equipment, including ancillary 
equipment such as pipes, valves, and switches. The contractor also 
decontaminates buildings by washing and scrubbing concrete surfaces. 
Additionally, the contractor removes and destroys the surface concrete 
from the walls, ceilings, and floors. With the exception of the 
Umatilla site, the structures will remain standing. Any waste generated 
during the decontamination process is destroyed.

Status of the Demilitarization Sites:

The Army's nine chemical demilitarization sites are in different phases 
of the demilitarization process. The Johnston Atoll site completed the 
destruction of its stockpile and closure is almost complete. The sites 
at Tooele, Utah, and Aberdeen, Maryland, are in the operations phase, 
each using different technologies, to destroy chemical agent and 
munitions. The remaining six facilities are in systems design, 
construction and/or systemization. Table 8 provides details on the 
status of each of the nine chemical demilitarization sites.

Table 8: Status of Chemical Demilitarization Facilities:

Incineration site: Johnston Atoll; Current phase: Closure; Status as of 
June 30, 2003: * The Army completed operations in November 2000 and 
began closure activities in January 2001; * The DOD schedule milestone 
to complete closure is September 2003; however, the Army expects to 
complete closure in January 2004.

Incineration site: Tooele, Utah; Current phase: Operations; Status as 
of June 30, 2003: * The Army began operations in August 1996; * After 
a 9-month shutdown, operations resumed in March 2003. Operations were 
suspended from July 2002 to March 2003 because a worker was exposed to 
chemical agent; * Subsequent to resuming operations in March 2003, the 
Army suspended agent operations five times, for a total of 12 days. The 
suspensions occurred because of various operational problems including: 
contamination of an agent collection tank, air monitors erroneously 
reporting the presence of agent, problems associated with processing 
spent decontaminate solution, a power outage, and a chemical event; * 
The DOD schedule milestone to complete operations is February 2008; 
however, the Army expects to complete operations in January 2006; * 
The DOD schedule milestone to complete closure is September 2010; 
however, the Army expects to complete closure in May 2008.

Incineration site: Anniston, Ala; Current phase: Systemization; Status 
as of June 30, 2003: * The Army completed systemization in January 
2003. However, due to congressional concerns that the Chemical 
Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) had not adequately 
prepared the community for an accidental release of agent, the Army did 
not begin agent operations as planned and agreed to address the 
following four CSEPP issues before beginning operations: (1) 
overpressurize schools and community facilities located within a 12-
mile radius of the stockpile, (2) establish protection for individuals 
who are unable to carry out protective action recommendations because 
of disability, illness, inability to understand instructions in 
English, or are underage and unattended, (3) assume responsibility for 
turning on the sirens for zones located closest to the Anniston Army 
Depot, and (4) use the Environmental Protection Agency's new Acute 
Exposure Guideline Levels; * On June 5, 2003, the Army sent official 
30-day notification, as required, to Congress that the site is ready to 
begin operations; * The DOD schedule milestone to complete operations 
is May 2011; however, the Army expects to complete operations in July 
2009; * The DOD schedule milestone to complete closure is December 
2013; however, the Army expects to complete closure in November 2011.

Incineration site: Umatilla, Oreg; Current phase: Systemization; 
Status as of June 30, 2003: * The DOD schedule milestone to start 
operations is July 2003; however, the Army now expects to begin 
operations in December 2003 because of a minitrial burn failure; * The 
Army is conducting surrogate trial burns, which are expected to be 
complete in August 2003; * The DOD schedule milestone to complete 
operations is January 2011; however, the Army expects to complete 
operations in May 2009; * The DOD schedule milestone to complete 
closure is June 2014; however, the Army expects to complete closure in 
February 2012.

Incineration site: Pine Bluff, Ark; Current phase: Systemization; 
Status as of June 30, 2003: * The DOD schedule milestone to begin 
operations is October 2003; however, because of funding reductions, the 
Army expects to begin operations in April 2004; * The Army is 
conducting systems testing, which is expected to be complete in August 
2003; * The Army expects to begin surrogate trial burns in June 2003 
and complete the trial burns in April 2004; * The DOD schedule 
milestone to complete operations is November 2009; however, the Army 
expects to complete operations in January 2009; * The DOD schedule 
milestone to complete closure is December 2011; however, the Army 
expects to complete closure in December 2010.

Neutralization site: 

Neutralization site: Aberdeen, Md; Current phase: Operations; Status as 
of June 30, 2003: * The Army began operations in April 2003 and the DOD 
schedule milestone to complete operations is March 2004; however, the 
Army expects to complete operations in September 2003; * The DOD 
schedule milestone to complete closure is December 2006; however, the 
Army expects to complete closure in July 2005.

Neutralization site: Newport, Ind; Current phase: Systemization; Status 
as of June 30, 2003: * The Army began systemization in September 2002 
and the DOD schedule milestone to complete systemization is February 
2005; however, the Army expects to complete systemization in October 
2003; * The DOD schedule milestone to start operations is February 
2005; however, the Army expects to start operations in October 2003. 
The DOD schedule milestone to complete operations is January 2006; 
however, the Army expects to complete operations by April 2004; * The 
DOD schedule milestone to complete closure is April 2009; however, the 
Army expects to complete closure in September 2006.

Neutralization site: Pueblo, Colo; Current phase: Design; Status as of 
June 30, 2003: * The Army awarded a systems contract in September 2002 
to design a demilitarization site; * The Army is reviewing a proposed 
design and build plan with the systems contractor. After the Army 
approves the design and build plan, the contractor will begin site 
preparation activities; * The DOD schedule estimates operations will 
be completed by April 2010. (The Army has not developed an estimated 
destruction schedule.).

Neutralization site: Blue Grass, Ky; Current phase: Design; Status as of 
June 30, 2003: * The Army solicited systems contractor proposals in 
February 2003; * The Army selected a systems contractor in June 2003; 
* The DOD schedule estimates operations will be completed by May 2014. 
(The Army has not developed an estimated destruction schedule.).

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Army data.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:

NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS:

ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 3050 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, 
DC 20301-3050:

18 AUG 2003:

Mr. Raymond J. Decker:

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management U.S. General Accounting 
Office:

441 G Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Mr. Decker:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report GAO-03-1031, CHEMICAL WEAPONS: Sustained Leadership Along With 
Key Strategic Management Tools Are Needed to Guide DOD's Destruction 
Program, dated July 30, 2003.

Thank you for providing us the opportunity to review your draft report. 
We understand your stated concerns, and will weigh each recommendation 
during all upcoming management and programmatic reviews. We reviewed 
the subject document and provide the attached comments to the 
recommendations and recommended administrative changes.

Patrick J. Wakefield

Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical Demilitarization 
& Threat Reduction):

Signed by Patrick J. Wakefield: 

Enclosure:

GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED JULY 30, 2003 GAO CODE 350255/GAO-03-1031:

"CHEMICAL WEAPONS: SUSTAINED LEADERSHIP ALONG WITH KEY STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT TOOLS ARE NEEDED TO GUIDE DOD'S DESTRUCTION PROGRAM":

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army, to develop an 
overall strategy and implementation plan for the chemical 
demilitarization program that would:

* articulate a program mission statement,

* identify the program's long-term goals and objectives,

* delineate the roles and responsibilities of all DOD and Army offices, 
and 

* establish near-term performance measures. (p. 28/GAO Draft 
Report):

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. DoD is in the initial stages of planning this 
document. Preliminary estimated completion date is second quarter 
fiscal year 2004.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army, to implement 
a risk management approach that anticipates and influences internal and 
external factors that could adversely impact program performance. (p. 
28/GAO Draft Report):

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Army Chemical Materials Agency is evaluating 
several components of their risk management approach and will review 
their progress within the next 120 days. DoD will evaluate the outcome 
of this review and determine the appropriate action.

[End of section]

Related GAO Products:

Chemical Weapons: Lessons Learned Program Generally Effective but Could 
Be Improved and Expanded. GAO-02-890. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 
2002.

Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States 
for Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001.

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Improvements Needed in Program 
Accountability and Financial Management. GAO/NSIAD-00-80. 
Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2000.

Chemical Weapons: DOD Does Not Have a Strategy to Address Low-Level 
Exposures. GAO/NSIAD-98-228. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 1998.

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management of the 
Emergency Preparedness Program. GAO/NSIAD-97-91. Washington, D.C.: 
June 11, 1997.

Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and 
Schedule. GAO/T-NSIAD-97-118. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1997.

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Emergency Preparedness in Alabama 
Is Hampered by Management Weaknesses. GAO/NSIAD-96-150. 
Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1996.

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Issues Related to DOD's Management. GAO/T-
NSIAD-95-185. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 1995.

Chemical Weapons: Army's Emergency Preparedness Program Has Financial 
Management Weaknesses. GAO/NSIAD-95-94. Washington, D.C.: 
March 15, 1995.

Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Review. GAO/NSIAD-95-66R. 
Washington, D.C.: January 12, 1995.

Chemical Weapons: Stability of the U.S. Stockpile. GAO/NSIAD-95-67. 
Washington, D.C.: December 22, 1994.

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Plans for Nonstockpile Chemical Warfare 
Materiel Can Be Improved. GAO/NSIAD-95-55. Washington, D.C.: December 
20, 1994.

Chemical Weapons: Issues Involving Destruction Technologies. GAO/T-
NSIAD-94-159. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 1994.

Chemical Weapons Destruction: Advantages and Disadvantages of 
Alternatives to Destruction. GAO/NSIAD-94-123. Washington, D.C.: 
March 18, 1994.

Arms Control: Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. GAO/NSIAD-94-136. Washington, D.C.: 
March 15, 1994.

Chemical Weapon Stockpile: Army's Emergency Preparedness Program Has 
Been Slow to Achieve Results. GAO/NSIAD-94-91. Washington, D.C.: 
February 22, 1994.

Chemical Weapons Storage: Communities Are Not Prepared to Respond to 
Emergencies. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-18. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 1993.

Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Affecting Program Cost, Schedule, 
and Performance. GAO/NSIAD-93-50. Washington, D.C.: January 21, 1993.

Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Related to Environmental 
Permitting and Testing Experience. GAO/T-NSIAD-92-43. 
Washington, D.C.: June 16, 1992.

Chemical Weapons Disposal. GAO/NSIAD-92-219R. Washington, D.C.: 
May 14, 1992.

Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Cost Growth and 
Schedule Slippages Are Likely to Continue. GAO/NSIAD-92-18. 
Washington, D.C.: November 20, 1991.

Chemical Weapons: Physical Security for the U.S. Chemical Stockpile. 
GAO/NSIAD-91-200. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 1991.

Chemical Warfare: DOD's Effort to Remove U.S. Chemical Weapons From 
Germany. GAO/NSIAD-91-105. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 1991.

Chemical Weapons: Status of the Army's M687 Binary Program. GAO/NSIAD-
90-295. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 1990.

Chemical Weapons: Stockpile Destruction Delayed at the Army's Prototype 
Disposal Facility. GAO/NSIAD-90-222. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1990.

Chemical Weapons: Obstacles to the Army's Plan to Destroy Obsolete 
U.S. Stockpile. GAO/NSIAD-90-155. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 1990.

FOOTNOTES

[1] In April 1997, the United States Senate ratified the Convention on 
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, commonly known as the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. S. Res. 75, Apr. 24, 1997. 

[2] DOD reorganized the program by elevating its oversight while the 
Army consolidated functions at the Assistant Secretary level 
(Installations and Environment).

[3] Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, 
Report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 
H.R. Rept. No. 107-436, May 3, 2002.

[4] For purposes of this report, upper level refers to the offices of 
the assistant secretary or above in the Departments of the Army and 
Defense.

[5] The Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986, 
P.L. 99-145 (Nov. 8, 1985), sec. 1412(a).

[6] The Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization was originally 
referred to as the U.S. Army Chemical Demilitarization and Remediation 
Activity.

[7] The CWC implementing legislation, P.L. 105-277 (Oct. 21, 1998), 
provides the statutory authority for domestic compliance with the 
convention's provisions.

[8] This report solely focuses on the weapons the convention defines as 
category 1, which are the most dangerous chemicals in the stockpile.

[9] As of June 2003, agent had been destroyed at Johnston Atoll, 
Tooele, and Aberdeen. 

[10] One other state party is not included in this assessment because 
it is expected to submit a detailed declaration of the chemical weapons 
stockpile that was recently discovered on its territory.

[11] The CWC's implementing body, the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons, is in the process of negotiating future Russian 
destruction deadlines.

[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to 
Improve Security of Russian Sites, GAO-03-482 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 
24, 2003).

[13] DOD Directive 5000.1, the Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 
2003, and DOD Instruction 5002.2, Operations of the Defense Acquisition 
System, May 12, 2003.

[14] The cost estimates for the Pueblo and Blue Grass sites were based 
on incineration technology pending a technology decision.

[15] Johnston Atoll is not included because its stockpile has been 
destroyed.

[16] According to Army officials, CMA is provisional, but the Army 
expects to have this agency fully established by October 2003.

[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army 
Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for Emergencies GAO-01-850 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 2001).

[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons Disposal: 
Improvements Needed in Program Accountability and Financial 
Management, GAO/NSIAD-00-80 (Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2000).

[19] This position is now the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army 
(Elimination of Chemical Weapons).

[20] Acquisition programs establish program goals for cost, schedule, 
and performance parameters over the program's life cycle.

[21] At the time of the 2001 schedule revision, all three of these 
sites were in the systemization phase; thus, their next milestone was 
to begin agent destruction operations.

[22] At the time of the 2001 schedule revision, agent destruction 
operations had been completed and its next milestone was to complete 
closure of the facility. 

[23] According to Army officials, the United States will not meet the 
45 percent interim CWC deadline by April 2004.

[24] U.S General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons: Lessons Learned 
Program Generally Effective but Could Be Improved and Expanded, GAO-02-
890 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2002).

[25] We have reported on permitting delays in Chemical Weapons And 
Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and Schedule, GAO/NSIAD-
97-18 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 1997).

[26] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons Stockpile: 
Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is Hampered by Management 
Weaknesses,GAO/NSIAD-96-150 (Washington, D.C: July 23, 1996) and 
Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States 
for Emergencies, GAO-01-850 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 2001).

[27] Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Oct. 30, 2002 (formerly DOD 
5000.2-R, Apr. 5, 2002).

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