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REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

Savings Attainable By
Eliminating Duplicate Stocks
In The U.S. Marine Corps B - 746828

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES

NOV. 10, 1970

700448



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-146828

To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This is our report on the savings attainable by eliminating duplicate stocks in the U.S. Marine Corps. Our limited review was made pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

Copies of this report are being sent to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Defense Supply Agency.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James B. Stacks".

Comptroller General
of the United States

D I G E S T

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

Previous work by the General Accounting Office (GAO) gave indications that the Marine Corps Supply Activity was managing items which were also managed by other Department of Defense supply components and the General Services Administration. This limited review was made to determine if the Marine Corps inventory was a duplication of inventories of the other supply components and to determine the potential for improvements in economy and effectiveness of supply management if any duplication were eliminated.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Marine Corps manages and stores large numbers of items that either have been designated for management under a single manager within the Department of Defense or are managed and stored for all Government users by the General Services Administration. This results in a sizable duplicate investment in inventories and in considerable additional costs due to duplicate management functions--computing requirements, buying, storing, and distributing. (See pp. 5, 6, and 7.)

As of June 30, 1969, the Marine Corps Supply Activity had 265,000 line items valued at \$280.5 million on hand and on order. An analysis of these items showed that 185,000 line items (70 percent) valued at \$148 million were also managed by the Defense Supply Agency, the Army Tank-Automotive Command, or the General Services Administration. (See p. 5.)

Elimination of the duplicate stocks would reduce the Marine Corps inventory investment by \$123 million--\$66 million representing potential excesses which could be disposed of and \$57 million representing savings on stocks which would not have to be replenished. (Another \$25 million would have to be retained since it consists of prepositioned war reserve stocks.) In addition, GAO estimates that annual savings of \$18.5 million in management costs could be realized by eliminating these duplicate stocks. (See pp. 7 and 8.)

Furthermore, the Marine Corps supply system is not providing as effective support for these items as other military customers are receiving directly from the designated managers. (See p. 8.)

The Marine Corps and the Department of Defense have been aware of this duplication for over 2 years, but attempts by the Department of Defense to correct the situation have met with only limited success. The Marine Corps has resisted efforts to require it to relinquish its management and stockage of these items. (See p. 9.)

RECOMMENDATIONS OR SUGGESTIONS

The General Accounting Office proposed that the Secretary of Defense either

- require the Marine Corps to reduce existing stocks and to direct using activities to requisition directly from the designated managers or
- direct the Defense Supply Agency and the Marine Corps to develop a plan which would retain the duplicate stocks at Marine Corps depots under the management of the Defense Supply Agency. (See p. 12.)

AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) agreed with the intent of GAO's first alternative but said neither of the proposals would be immediately implemented. He did not comment on the second alternative but stated that a materiel management system would be developed for the Marine Corps which would effectively and economically support deployable forces. (See p. 18.)

GAO believes that the proposed action is not responsive to the problem and that sufficient time has elapsed since the problem was made known for corrective action to have been taken. Therefore GAO recommends that prompt and aggressive action be taken to eliminate this inefficient and uneconomical practice.

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

This report is being issued to the Congress because of its interest in efficiency and economy in materiel management. In view of the lack of the corrective action, interested committees of the Congress may wish to discuss this matter further with the Department of Defense.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

INTEGRATED ITEM MANAGEMENT

The Department of Defense has long recognized the desirability of eliminating duplication in the supply systems of the military departments. A major step in this direction was the establishment, in the early 1960s, of the Integrated Material Management Program. This program was designed to eliminate duplication, effect economies, and increase supply effectiveness throughout the Military Establishment.

The program applies to the management of common-use items, those used by two or more services, in various commodity areas, and its focal point in the Department of Defense is the Defense Supply Agency. This agency, through its Defense Supply Centers acting as integrated managers, determines requirements and procures, distributes, stores, and issues common-use items for all military departments.

In addition to the Defense Supply Centers, other Department of Defense supply components, such as the Army-Tank Automotive Command, have been designated integrated managers for certain commodities. Duplication has been further reduced by assigning the integrated management of commodities used by all Government agencies to the General Services Administration.

Except for the Marine Corps, users of integrated manager items in the Department of Defense generally submit requisitions directly to the integrated managers. Material is shipped to the requisitioner from the nearest of several depots.

MARINE CORPS SUPPLY SYSTEM

The Marine Corps Unified Materiel Management System, which was implemented in May 1967, has as its basic concept the centralized management of all stock-funded materials. Under this concept the Marine Corps Supply Activity has been designated the sole inventory control point in the

Marine Corps. Customers submit all requisitions to the Marine Corps Supply Activity which directs shipments from the appropriate Remote Storage Activity to the customer. Remote Storage Activities are the Marine Corps' wholesale inventory stock points. The Marine Corps maintains eight primary and 21 specialized Remote Storage Activities. All the primary activities are within the continental United States. Specialized activities are in the continental United States and overseas.

The Marine Corps Supply Activity, as the sole inventory control point, is responsible for acquiring and controlling almost all the materials needed by the Marine Corps. Exceptions to this procedure are principal end-items, such as trucks, tanks, and ammunition, which are currently procured and controlled by Headquarters, Marine Corps, and a few commodities, such as lumber, bulk fuel, and compressed gases, which can be bought locally. In addition, two major commodities, aeronautical spare parts and medical supplies, are supplied directly to the Marine Corps by the Navy. For items managed by the Department of Defense integrated managers or the General Services Administration, the Marine Corps Supply Activity functions as a middleman between Marine Corps using activities and the item managers.

The scope of our review is discussed on page 14. A list of principal officials of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy responsible for the administration of activities discussed in this report is shown as appendix III.

CHAPTER 2

DUPLICATION OF INVENTORIES

About 70 percent of the items stocked and managed by the Marine Corps Supply Activity are obtained from the Defense Supply Agency, the Army Tank-Automotive Command, or the General Services Administration. The others are obtained from commercial suppliers.

As of June 30, 1969, Marine Corps Supply Activity records showed 265,000 line items with stocks valued at \$280.5 million on hand and on order. An analysis of the sources of supply showed that 185,000 of these items with stocks valued at \$148 million were obtained from, and therefore managed by, the Defense Supply Agency, Army Tank-Automotive Command, or General Services Administration.

Following is a breakdown of the 265,000 items managed by Marine Corps Supply Activity indicating the number of items managed by other single managers in the Department of Defense or General Services Administration.

	<u>Number of items</u>	<u>Percent of total</u>	<u>Dollar value in Marine Corps inventory (millions)</u>
Managed by Marine Corps Supply Activity	<u>80,000</u>	30	<u>\$132</u>
Managed by Marine Corps Supply Activity and:			
Defense Construction Supply Center	34,000		28
Defense Electronics Supply Center	51,000		17
Defense General Supply Center	16,000		12
Defense Industrial Supply Center	58,000		15
Defense Personnel Support Center	<u>5,000</u>		<u>44</u>
Total Defense Supply Agency Ac- tivities	164,000		116
Army Tank-Automotive Command	13,000		26
General Services Administration	<u>8,000</u>		<u>6.5</u>
	<u>185,000</u>	<u>70</u>	<u>148.5</u>
Total	<u>265,000</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>\$280.5</u>

Following are examples of the type of duplication in inventories which exists between the Marine Corps Supply Activity and the Defense Personnel Support Center.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Unit price</u>	<u>Marine Corps Supply Activity</u>		<u>Defense Personnel Support Center</u>	
		<u>On hand and due in</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>On hand and due in</u>	<u>Value</u>
Field pack	\$ 3.30	28,495	\$ 94,033	42,247	\$ 139,504
Trunk, locker	12.90	10,858	140,068	59,237	764,157
Raincoat, man's (various sizes)	9.99	30,189	<u>301,588</u>	205,603	<u>2,053,974</u>
Total			<u>\$535,689</u>		<u>\$2,957,635</u>

Similar examples can be found relative to items managed by the other integrated managers.

SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN INVENTORY INVESTMENT POSSIBLE

By eliminating the duplicate stocks managed by the Marine Corps Supply Activity, the Marine Corps inventory investment could be significantly reduced. Following is the Marine Corps stratification of its inventory.

<u>Stratification of Marine Corps inventory at June 30, 1969</u>	<u>Total inventory value</u>	<u>Value of duplicated stock</u>
	(millions)	
Requisitioning objective	\$ 27	\$ 8
Prepositioned war reserve	38	25.2
Back orders and other special requirements	50.5	28
Retention assets	48	21
Potential Department of Defense excess	<u>117</u>	<u>65.8</u>
	<u>\$280.5</u>	<u>\$148.0</u>

Of the above inventory segments, only the \$25.2 million worth of duplicate stocks representing prepositioned war reserves need to be retained by the Marine Corps. The potential excess of stocks worth about \$66 million could be purged from the system through normal redistribution channels and procedures. Requirements for items in the other three segments could be obtained directly from the Department of Defense integrated managers or General Services Administration after existing stocks are used. This would reduce the inventory investment by \$123 million and would eliminate the need for the Marine Corps to replenish inventories valued at \$57 million.

SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS IN MANAGEMENT COSTS POSSIBLE

Department of Defense integrated managers determine replenishment requirements for stocks on the basis of usage experience, to which are added special program and mobilization requirements furnished by the military services to arrive at the total Department of Defense requirement. Adjustments are made for quantities already on hand and on order, and the result is the net requirement for procurement. Suppliers ship stocks to the various Defense depots, as directed by the integrated managers, where they are stored for issue. The integrated managers direct shipments from depots to users on the basis of requisitions received.

For those integrated manager items which are also stocked by the Marine Corps, the Marine Corps Supply Activity determines requirements for all Marine Corps users and obtains stocks from the appropriate integrated manager. These stocks are shipped from integrated manager depots to the eight Primary Remote Storage Activities as directed by the Marine Corps Supply Activity. The Marine Corps Supply Activity also directs shipments from the Primary Remote Storage Activities to the specialized remote storage activities or Marine Corps users on the basis of requisitions received.

The management of duplicate stocks by the Marine Corps not only results in increased handling, packaging, and shipping costs but also duplicates the costs incurred by integrated managers for requirements determinations,

procurement processing, inventory control, warehousing, and other functions related to inventory management. If the 185,000 items were eliminated from the Marine Corps inventory, savings of about \$18.5 million annually would be possible. This is based on a Department of Defense estimate of \$100 to manage an item.

BETTER SUPPORT AVAILABLE
FROM INTEGRATED MANAGERS

The primary purpose of its logistic support system, as stated by the Marine Corps, is to provide continuing effective support to the Fleet Marine Forces. The Marine Corps feels that dependence on other supply systems and managers would cause excessive coordination problems and would decrease responsiveness.

We found, however, that the integrated managers were generally more responsive to demands from their users than the Marine Corps had been to its units for similar items. The availability rate for items managed by the Marine Corps Supply Activity in fiscal year 1969 was 59 percent, that is, the percentage of requisitions filled from available stocks the first time they were presented to that activity for those items normally stocked. In contrast, the availability rate for all items managed by Defense Supply Agency integrated managers was 90 percent, ranging from a low of 77.5 percent for construction items to 98.4 percent for subsistence. These statistics indicated that Marine Corps units could have been better supported by submitting requisitions direct to integrated managers.

During a prior review of the Marine Corps supply system, we observed that high-priority and replenishment requisitions for numerous items were held by the Marine Corps Supply Activity for periods ranging from 30 to 131 days prior to ordering stocks from integrated managers. We also found that sufficient stocks were available to immediately fill a significant number of these requisitions if they had been placed directly with the integrated manager. We believe that this is a further indication of the better support available from integrated managers.

ATTEMPTS MADE TO ELIMINATE DUPLICATION

As a result of the review of the Marine Corps Stock Fund budget request for fiscal year 1969, the Secretary of Defense approved Program/Budget Decision No. 410. This provided for eliminating from the Marine Corps stocks those items which were centrally managed by the Defense Supply Agency, other Department of Defense integrated managers, and the General Services Administration.

The Marine Corps requested reconsideration of the action, however, stating that its combat mission would be seriously impaired. It was mutually agreed that the Department of Defense and the Marine Corps would conduct a joint study of the matter. A study report was issued in March 1968. The report concluded that three alternatives were possible (1) that the objective of Program/Budget Decision No. 410 be carried out, (2) that the Marine Corps be allowed to retain wholesale levels of integrated manager items but that stockage levels be reduced from 120 days' supply to 60 days' supply and the pipeline to be supported from 45 days to at most 30 days, or (3) that the Marine Corps and the Defense Supply Agency be directed to investigate the possibility of extending the Defense Supply Agency specialized support depot concept to selected Marine Corps bases. Under this concept, stocks would be under Defense Supply Agency management and control but would remain physically positioned at Marine Corps Primary Stock Points.

The Marine Corps accepted the second alternative and reduced its stockage levels and pipeline requirements in January 1969.

Early in 1969, we noted evidence of poor supply support to Marine Corps users in the Far East. There were delays in processing requisitions and suspension of high-priority requisitions by the Marine Corps Supply Activity. The major cause of these problems appeared to have been a shortage of stock funds at the Marine Corps Supply Activity. The requisitioning units had the necessary operations and maintenance appropriation funds available to order the material, but the Supply Activity did not have sufficient obligational authority in the stock fund to purchase wholesale stocks to be used to fill customers requests. We

discussed this with officials at Marine Corps Headquarters in April 1969 and suggested that users be permitted to submit requisitions directly to integrated managers. These officials informed us that the Marine Corps supply system could not be modified, not even temporarily, to permit this.

These problems were also discussed with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) who issued a memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy requesting that back-ordered requisitions for integrated managed items be passed to the cognizant integrated manager. The memorandum also requested the Marine Corps to reassess its position set forth in the 1968 study report, which related to stockage of integrated manager items.

The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics) on June 21, 1969, responded that a change in the Marine Corps supply system to provide temporary funding relief, such as passing back-ordered requisitions to integrated managers, was not necessary. On July 16, 1969, the Assistant Secretary of Defense informed the Assistant Secretary of the Navy that the Navy had not responded to the request for a reassessment of the Marine Corps position on stockage of integrated manager items. He cited several problems with the quality of Marine Corps supply support as disclosed by reviews made by GAO, the Navy Audit Office, and his own staff and requested a reappraisal.

After some delay, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy advised the Department of Defense in October 1969 that the Marine Corps planned to eliminate stockage of wholesale inventory levels of integrated manager items that were needed to support tenant activities at the eight major Marine Corps bases and that these tenant activities would requisition general purpose consumption items directly from the appropriate integrated manager. This would include housekeeping and individual clothing and equipment items provided by the bases to tenant units of the Fleet Marine Forces.

The action planned by the Marine Corps, when it is implemented, will, in our opinion, result in only a limited reduction in inventory. Department of Defense personnel

have estimated that the value of stocks involved is between \$10 and \$15 million. Although the planned action is a step forward, it does not accomplish the elimination of duplicate stocks to the maximum possible extent nor does it accomplish the related reduction in management costs.

CHAPTER 3

AGENCY COMMENTS, GAO EVALUATION, AND RECOMMENDATION

Our findings were submitted in March 1970 to the Secretary of Defense for comment. In view of the potential for improved supply support at less cost and the reluctance of the Marine Corps to take corrective action, we proposed that the Secretary of Defense either:

- require the Marine Corps to (1) remove control of integrated manager items from the Marine Corps Supply Activity, (2) draw down existing continental United States depot stocks except those held as prepositioned war reserves, and (3) direct using activities to requisition material directly from the integrated managers or
- direct the Defense Supply Agency and the Marine Corps to develop a plan which would retain integrated manager stocks at a sufficient number of the existing eight primary depots to provide adequate availability of material to users and to extend the Defense Supply specialized support concept to those depots.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) commented on our findings in letters of May 19 and June 24, 1970. (See apps. I and II.) That office advised us that it would not immediately implement either of our proposals. The letters stated that control of stockage and distribution was necessary to ensure "maximum capability and flexibility in the execution of the amphibious warfare function assigned to the Marine Corps by law." Further, the position was taken that current Marine Corps plans for a 60-day level of integrated manager items to be retained in support of deployable forces is minimal and necessary. With respect to future action, the Assistant Secretary advised GAO that his office agreed with the intent of our first alternative and would work in conjunction with the Department of the Navy to achieve a materiel management system in the Marine Corps to effectively and economically support deployable forces.

In our opinion the Department of Defense reply is not responsive to the problem of the Marine Corps' maintaining stocks, at substantial expense, which are duplicated in other inventories. We recognize the need to adequately support deployable forces and believe that implementation of either of our proposals would provide more effective support to these forces than is now being provided by the Marine Corps Supply System. Furthermore, this support could be provided more economically through one supply system rather than two.

The Marine Corps has resisted efforts to relinquish control over duplicate stocks for over 2 years. As an apparent concession, it has reduced levels of these stocks including pipeline requirements from 5-1/2 to 2 months, a move which has the concurrence of the Department of Defense pending development of a materiel management system. We believe that 2 years is a more than adequate period for studying the present system and determining a positive course of action for eliminating duplicate stocks.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense reconsider the position taken and require that prompt and aggressive action be implemented to eliminate the inefficient and uneconomical practice of retaining duplicate stocks in the Marine Corps.

CHAPTER 4

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Our review was performed primarily at Marine Corps Supply Activity, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. A limited amount of work was performed at the Defense Personnel Support Center and the Defense Industrial Supply Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In addition, visits were made to the Marine Corps Supply Center at Barstow, the Marine Corps Base at Camp Pendleton, and the Marine Corps Air Station at El Toro, California, and discussions were held with responsible officials at Marine Corps Headquarters and at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics).

We examined the regulations and procedures governing the Marine Corps Supply System. We also reviewed pertinent records and reports with the objective of ascertaining whether and the extent to which Marine Corps stocks unnecessarily duplicated the Government's investment in materials that were centrally managed and stocked by other activities. Our review was directed toward the management of duplicate stocks and the potential for improvements in economy and effectiveness of their management. We therefore did not consider the overall management of the Marine Corps Supply System.

APPENDIXES



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SR

INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS

19 MAY 1970

Mr. Charles M. Bailey
Director, Defense Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Bailey:

This is in reply to your letter of March 24, 1970, which forwarded a Draft Report entitled, "Need to Eliminate Duplicate Stocks, U.S. Marine Corps," (OSD Case 3102). This Draft Report has been carefully reviewed by our Office and is still under review by the Department of the Navy. As you know, we have been working closely with the Marine Corps over the past two and a half years to achieve a position relative to the stockage of integrated manager items in consonance with sound supply and financial practices as well as recognizing the immediate operational requirements of the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

On October 14, 1969, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics) advised this Office of a plan to partially achieve the objectives of Program Budget Decision 410. Evaluation of this plan reveals that, upon its execution, there will have been a reduction of approximately \$29 million in Marine Corps stock levels. While we concur with the intent of recommendation number one and recognize that there are additional savings to be realized through total elimination of duplicate stocks, we believe the best interests of the Department of Defense will be served in approaching this goal on a phased, well-planned basis.

The Department of the Navy has requested additional time to fully evaluate the Draft Report. Therefore, we plan to provide a final response in about thirty days.

Sincerely,

Glenn F. Gibson
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

APPENDIX II



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

24 JUN 1970

SR

INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS

Mr. Charles M. Bailey
Director, Defense Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548

Dear Mr. Bailey:

This is a further reference to your letter of March 24, 1970, which forwarded a Draft Report entitled, "Need to Eliminate Duplicate Stocks, U.S. Marine Corps," (OSD Case 3102). In our letter of May 19, 1970, we concurred with the intent of the first recommendation of the Report. We further stated that the best interests of the Department of Defense (DoD) would be served by a phased, well-planned approach to the ultimate objectives of Program Budget Decision 410. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics) has provided the Department of the Navy position in regard to the Report and has reiterated the economic benefits to be realized through implementation of the current Marine Corps plan while retaining asset and requisition control. Control of stockage and distribution is considered necessary to insure "... maximum capability and flexibility in the execution of the amphibious warfare function assigned the Marine Corps by law." It is the position of the Department of the Navy that the proposed sixty-day level of integrated manager items to be retained in support of deployable forces is minimal, necessary and is not duplicated in other Marine Corps authorized levels in CONUS.

Based on the information available and a continuing detailed analysis of the performance of the Marine Corps supply system, this Office does not concur with the immediate implementation of either recommendation in the Report. Reiterating our agreement with the intent of the first recommendation, this Office will work in conjunction with the Department of the Navy to achieve a materiel management system in the Marine Corps that will most effectively and economically provide an adequate level of support to deployable forces.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Barry J. Shultz".

BARRY J. SHULTZ
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Logistics)

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

	Tenure of office	
	From	To
<u>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE</u>		
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:		
Melvin R. Laird	Jan. 1969	Present
Clark M. Clifford	Mar. 1968	Jan. 1969
Robert S. McNamara	Jan. 1961	Feb. 1968
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:		
David Packard	Jan. 1969	Present
Paul H. Nitze	July 1967	Jan. 1969
Cyrus R. Vance	Jan. 1964	June 1967
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS):		
Barry J. Shillito	Jan. 1969	Present
Thomas D. Morris	Sept. 1967	Dec. 1968
Paul R. Ignatius	Dec. 1964	Aug. 1967
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY:		
Lt. Gen. Earl C. Hedlund	July 1967	Present
<u>DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY</u>		
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:		
John R. Chaffee	Jan. 1969	Present
Paul R. Ignatius	Sept. 1967	Jan. 1969
UNDERSECRETARY OF THE NAVY:		
John W. Warner	Feb. 1969	Present
Charles F. Baird	Aug. 1967	Jan. 1969

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT (continued)

Tenure of office
From To

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (continued)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS):

Frank Sanders	Feb. 1969	Present
Barry J. Shillito	Apr. 1968	Jan. 1969
Vacant	Feb. 1968	Mar. 1968
Graeme C. Bannerman	Feb. 1965	June 1968

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS:

Gen. Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.	Jan. 1968	Present
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