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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

October 2014: 

Spent Nuclear Fuel Management: 

Outreach Needed to Help Gain Public Acceptance for Federal Activities 
That Address Liability: 

GAO-15-141: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-15-141, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

DOE is responsible for disposing of commercial spent nuclear fuel. DOE
entered into contracts with owners and generators of spent nuclear 
fuel to begin disposing of it beginning in 1998, with plans for 
disposal in a national repository. DOE, however, was unable to meet 
the 1998 date and, as a result of lawsuits, the federal government has
paid out about $3.7 billion for storage costs. DOE proposed a new 
strategy in January 2013 to build consolidated interim storage 
facilities—-starting operations in 2021 and 2025. 

GAO was asked to review issues related to DOE's strategy for managing
spent nuclear fuel. This report (1) describes the expected rate of spent
nuclear fuel accumulation in wet and dry storage, (2) identifies the 
basis of federal liability for spent nuclear fuel management to date 
and of DOE's estimate of future liabilities, and (3) assesses 
challenges, if any, that experts and stakeholders have identified to 
the federal government's ability to meet DOE's time frames for 
managing spent nuclear fuel at consolidated interim storage facilities
and potential ways for DOE to mitigate the challenges. GAO reviewed
documents from DOE and other agencies, and interviewed experts and
stakeholders from industry, federal and state governments, interest 
groups, and independent entities. 

What GAO Found: 

Spent nuclear fuel—-the used fuel removed from nuclear power reactors-—
is expected to accumulate at an average rate of about 2,200 metric 
tons per year in the United States. This spent nuclear fuel is mostly 
stored wet, submerged in pools of water. However, since pools have 
been reaching their capacities, owners and generators of spent nuclear 
fuel (typically utilities and reactor operators) have been 
transferring it to canisters that are placed in casks on concrete pads 
for dry storage—which is an expensive and time-consuming process. When 
operating reactors' licenses begin to expire in the 2030s, the rate
of spent nuclear fuel accumulation is expected to decrease, but the 
amount in dry storage will increase as the pools are closed and all 
spent nuclear fuel is transferred to dry storage. By 2067, the 
currently operating reactors are expected to have generated about 
139,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel, nearly all of which is 
expected to be transferred to dry storage. 

Federal liability for managing spent nuclear fuel has been based on 
costs that owners and generators of this fuel have paid because the 
Department of Energy (DOE) has not met its contractual obligation to 
dispose of spent nuclear fuel. DOE's estimate of future federal 
liability is based on how long DOE expects the federal government to 
continue to pay the costs for managing spent nuclear fuel to plant 
owners and generators. Generally, the damages paid-—mostly for the
costs of transferring spent nuclear fuel from wet to dry storage-—have 
been for costs that owners and generators would not have incurred if 
DOE had begun disposing of the spent nuclear fuel. DOE's most recent 
estimate of future liability—-$21.4 billion through 2071-—assumes that 
DOE will begin taking title to and possession of spent nuclear fuel in 
2021 and complete the process in 2071, thereby ending the federal 
liability. DOE has extended the expected date that the last of the 
spent nuclear fuel will be picked up several times, and each extension
has added to the future federal liability. 

Spent nuclear fuel management experts and stakeholders GAO spoke with
identified several legislative, regulatory, technical, and societal 
challenges to meeting DOE's time frames for managing spent nuclear 
fuel at interim storage facilities. Although DOE has begun to take 
actions to address some of these challenges, officials noted that the 
department's strategy cannot be fully implemented until Congress 
provides direction on a new path forward. However, experts and 
stakeholders believe that one key challenge—-building and sustaining 
public acceptance of how to manage spent nuclear fuel-—will need to
be addressed irrespective of which path Congress agrees to take. In 
this context, they suggested the need for a coordinated public 
outreach strategy regarding spent nuclear fuel management issues, 
including perceived risks and benefits, which would be consistent with 
the Administration's directive to be more transparent and 
collaborative. DOE officials stated they currently do not have such a 
strategy. Without a better understanding of spent nuclear fuel 
management issues, the public may be unlikely to support any policy 
decisions about managing spent nuclear fuel. 

What GAO Recommends: 

DOE should implement a coordinated outreach strategy to better inform 
the public about federal spent nuclear fuel management issues. DOE 
generally agreed with the findings and recommendation in the report. 

View GAO-15-141. For more information, contact Frank Rusco at (202) 
512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

About 2,200 Metric Tons of Spent Nuclear Fuel Is Expected to 
Accumulate Annually, Mostly in Wet Storage, but This Pace Is Expected 
to Change as Reactors Shut Down: 

Federal Liability for Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Is Based on Costs 
Incurred Because DOE Has Not Met Contract Obligations: 

Experts and Stakeholders Identified Challenges to and Suggestions for 
Managing Spent Nuclear Fuel at Interim Storage Facilities within DOE's 
Time Frames: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Spent Nuclear Fuel Experts and Stakeholders We 
Interviewed: 

Appendix III: Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Stored in Wet, Dry, and 
Shutdown Storage Sites (Text for Interactive Figure 5): 

Appendix IV: Additional Information on the Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Settlement Agreements: 

Appendix V: Process and Costs of Transferring Spent Nuclear Fuel from 
Wet to Dry Storage (Text for Interactive Figure 7): 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Typical Reactor Characteristics, Canister Storage Capacity: 

Table 2: Typical Costs Associated with Transferring Spent Nuclear Fuel 
in Canisters from Wet to Dry Storage: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Nuclear Fuel Pellet and Fuel Rod Assembly for a Commercial 
Nuclear Power Reactor: 

Figure 2: Spent Nuclear Fuel in Wet Pool Storage: 

Figure 3: Dry Cask Storage System for Spent Nuclear Fuel: 

Figure 4: Spent Nuclear Fuel in Dry Storage: 

Figure 5: Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Stored in Wet, Dry, and 
Shutdown Storage Sites: 

Figure 6: Estimated Amount of Accumulation of Spent Nuclear Fuel in 
Wet and Dry Storage through 2067: 

Figure 7: Process and Costs of Transferring Spent Nuclear Fuel from 
Wet to Dry Storage: 

Figure 8: Four Major Types of Challenges Identified By Experts and 
Stakeholders on Federal Efforts to Manage Spent Nuclear Fuel at 
Consolidated Interim Storage Facilities: 

Abbreviations: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

NWPA: Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

October 9, 2014: 

The Honorable Fred Upton: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Energy and Commerce: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John Shimkus: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy: 
Committee on Energy and Commerce: 
House of Representatives: 

Spent nuclear fuel--used nuclear fuel that has been removed from the 
reactor core of a nuclear power plant[Footnote 1]--is an extremely 
harmful substance if not managed properly. Without protective 
shielding, its intense radioactivity can kill a person who is directly 
exposed to it or cause long-term health hazards, such as cancer. In 
addition, if not managed properly, or if it were released by a natural 
disaster or an act of terrorism, it could contaminate the environment 
with radiation. The nation's inventory of spent nuclear fuel from 
commercial nuclear power reactors is stored at 75 sites in 33 states, 
generally where it was generated. The spent nuclear fuel is stored 
either wet in pools of water or dry in storage systems that typically 
consist of stainless steel canisters within protective casks. Over the 
past several decades, the inventory of commercial spent nuclear fuel 
in storage in the United States has grown to about 72,000 metric tons. 

To address the growing inventory, Congress made disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel a federal responsibility with the passage of the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), which directed the Department of 
Energy (DOE) to investigate sites for a permanent repository.[Footnote 
2] The act also authorized DOE to enter into contracts with owners and 
generators of commercial spent nuclear fuel--typically utilities and 
reactor operators--to begin taking title to (legal ownership) spent 
nuclear fuel following commencement of a repository and disposing of 
spent nuclear fuel beginning no later than January 31, 1998. In 1987, 
Congress amended the act to direct DOE to focus its efforts only on a 
site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, about 100 miles northwest of Las 
Vegas. DOE did not begin disposing of spent nuclear fuel by 1998 
because of state and local opposition to a repository in Nevada, 
technical complexities, and funding uncertainties, among other 
reasons.[Footnote 3] 

Since 1998, owners and generators of spent nuclear fuel have sued DOE 
primarily in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for failing to meet its 
obligations under the contracts that DOE had entered into with them. 
The Department of Justice reported that as of March 2014, 90 such 
lawsuits had been filed. As of the end of fiscal year 2013, the 
federal government had reimbursed owners and generators about $3.7 
billion in connection with such lawsuits.[Footnote 4] The 
reimbursements come from the U.S. Department of Treasury's judgment 
fund,[Footnote 5] which is financed by U.S. taxpayers. DOE estimates 
that future federal liability for litigation related to storing spent 
nuclear fuel will amount to $21.4 billion through 2071. 

In 2008, DOE submitted a license application for a repository at Yucca 
Mountain to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which is 
responsible for regulating storage, transportation, and disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear power reactors. Then, in a 
change of policy in 2009, the Secretary of Energy said that a 
repository at Yucca Mountain was not a workable option, and in 2010, 
DOE terminated its efforts to license a repository there. In 2010, DOE 
chartered the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future to 
recommend a plan for management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. In 
January 2012, the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended that Congress 
create and fund a new organization dedicated solely to managing spent 
nuclear fuel.[Footnote 6] The commission also recommended development 
of a consent-based approach to locating or establishing (or "siting") 
future spent nuclear fuel management facilities, among other things. 
In January 2013, DOE issued a strategy for managing spent nuclear fuel 
in response to the commission's recommendations.[Footnote 7] The 
strategy calls for the federal government to begin accepting spent 
nuclear fuel for management at a pilot interim storage facility by 
2021 and at a larger consolidated interim storage facility by 2025, 
among other things. According to the strategy, it represents "an 
initial basis for discussions among the Administration, Congress and 
other stakeholders on a sustainable path forward for disposal" of 
spent nuclear fuel and other types of high-level radioactive waste. 
According to DOE's strategy, beginning operations at the pilot and 
larger interim storage facilities in 2021 and 2025, respectively, will 
allow the federal government to accept enough spent nuclear fuel to 
limit expected federal liabilities to DOE's fiscal year 2013 liability 
estimate of $21.4 billion. Delays in meeting the strategy's milestones 
for interim storage might result in additional liabilities. 

In light of the billions of dollars in liabilities being paid by 
taxpayers because the federal government has not begun disposing of 
spent nuclear fuel as it agreed to do, you asked us to review issues 
related to DOE's spent nuclear fuel strategy and the federal 
government's liabilities. This report (1) describes the expected rate 
of spent nuclear fuel accumulation in wet and dry storage, (2) 
identifies the basis of federal liability for spent nuclear fuel 
management to date and of DOE's estimate of future liabilities, and 
(3) assesses challenges, if any, that experts and stakeholders have 
identified to the federal government's ability to meet DOE's time 
frames for managing spent nuclear fuel at consolidated interim storage 
facilities and potential ways for DOE to mitigate the challenges. 

To answer these objectives, we reviewed documents and interviewed 
officials from DOE and NRC regarding their regulatory roles related to 
spent nuclear fuel management. We also consulted with Department of 
Justice officials regarding their role in defending the government in 
the owners' and generators' lawsuits. In addition, we obtained input 
from experts and stakeholders in spent nuclear fuel management. 
Specifically, to describe the expected rate of spent nuclear fuel 
accumulation in wet and dry storage, we obtained data from the Nuclear 
Energy Institute, an industry policy umbrella organization. This 
information contains the amounts of spent nuclear fuel currently in 
wet and dry storage, and projected amounts of spent nuclear fuel to be 
added to the current wet and dry storage inventory as spent nuclear 
fuel is removed from reactors until they shut down. To identify the 
basis of federal liability for spent nuclear fuel management to date 
and of DOE's estimate of future liabilities, we reviewed DOE documents 
and interviewed DOE officials. To assess the challenges, if any, that 
experts and stakeholders have identified to the federal government's 
ability to meet DOE's time frames for managing spent nuclear fuel at 
consolidated interim storage facilities and potential ways for DOE to 
mitigate these challenges, we identified individuals with spent 
nuclear fuel management experience and expertise. We obtained input 
from these experts and stakeholders by interviewing them and reviewing 
documents prepared by the organizations with which they are 
affiliated. Appendix I presents our scope and methodology in more 
detail and appendix II lists the experts and stakeholders with whom we 
consulted. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2013 to October 
2014, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors is typically made from low 
enriched uranium fashioned into thumbnail-size ceramic pellets of 
uranium dioxide. These pellets are fitted into 12-to 15-foot hollow 
rods, referred to as cladding, made of a zirconium alloy. The rods are 
then bound together into a larger assembly. A typical reactor holds 
about 100 metric tons of fuel when operating--generally from 200 to 
800 fuel assemblies. The uranium in the assemblies undergoes fission--
a process of splitting atoms into fragments and neutrons that then 
bombard other atoms--resulting in additional fission reactions and a 
sustainable chain reaction that creates an enormous amount of heat and 
radioactivity in the form of radioisotopes, or radioactive substances. 
The heat is used to generate steam to turn a turbine, which generates 
electricity. The radioisotopes produced in a reactor can remain 
hazardous from a few days to many thousands of years; these 
radioisotopes remain in the fuel assemblies and as components of the 
resulting spent nuclear fuel. Figure 1 shows what a fuel pellet for a 
commercial nuclear reactor and a fuel rod in an assembly look like. 

Figure 1: Nuclear Fuel Pellet and Fuel Rod Assembly for a Commercial 
Nuclear Power Reactor: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 illustrations] 

Depicted: 
Fuel Assembly; 
Fuel Rod; 
Fuel Pellet (actual size). 

Source: Nuclear Energy Institute. GAO-15-141. 

[End of figure] 

Each fuel assembly is typically used in the reactor from 4 to 6 years, 
after which most of the uranium dioxide is no longer cost-efficient at 
producing energy. Reactor operators typically discharge about one-
third of the fuel assemblies from a reactor every 18 months to 2 years 
and place the spent nuclear fuel in a pool to cool. Most commercial 
spent nuclear fuel is stored immersed in pools of water designed to 
cool and isolate it from the environment. Water circulates in the pool 
to remove the heat generated from the radioactive decay of some of the 
radioisotopes. In recent years, reactor operators have used fuel that 
is burned longer in the reactor under the same operating conditions, 
resulting in higher "burn-up" and higher decay heat in comparison to 
the lower burn-up fuel that had been in use.[Footnote 8] The pools of 
water for cooling spent nuclear fuel are typically about 40 feet deep, 
with at least 20 feet of water covering the spent fuel. Figure 2 shows 
a typical spent nuclear fuel pool. 

Figure 2: Spent Nuclear Fuel in Wet Pool Storage: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Nuclear Energy Institute. GAO-15-141. 

[End of figure] 

Industry practice has been to store the spent nuclear fuel in the 
pools for at least 5 years, with an industry expectation that, at some 
point, DOE would begin to accept it. Spent nuclear fuel typically must 
remain in a pool for at least 5 years to decay enough to remain within 
the heat limits currently allowed for dry cask storage systems. Spent 
nuclear fuel can be sufficiently cool to load into dry storage systems 
earlier than 5 years, but doing so is generally not practical. Some 
dry storage systems, depending on the rated heat load, may not 
accommodate a full load of spent nuclear fuel. High burn-up fuel may 
have to remain in a pool longer than low burn-up fuel to cool 
sufficiently. 

The pools at commercial nuclear power reactors have largely reached 
their maximum capacities, however. When spent nuclear fuel is 
discharged from a reactor at a plant where the spent nuclear fuel pool 
is at maximum capacity, spent nuclear fuel equal to the amount of 
spent nuclear fuel discharged from the reactor must be transferred to 
dry storage. The dry storage systems typically consist of either a 
thick-walled, bolted steel vertical cask, or a welded steel canister 
inside a vertical or horizontal steel-reinforced concrete cask. Dry 
storage systems are designed with thick steel and concrete walls to 
provide radiation shielding and passive pathways for removal of spent 
nuclear fuel decay heat, such as air vents in the casks. In one 
typical process of transferring spent fuel to dry storage, reactor 
operators place a steel canister inside a larger steel transfer cask 
and lower both into a pool. Spent nuclear fuel is loaded into the 
canister, a lid is placed on the canister, and then both the canister 
and transfer cask are removed from the pool. The transfer cask shields 
nearby workers from the radiation produced by the spent nuclear fuel 
in the canister. The water is drained and a lid is welded onto the 
canister. Then the canister and transfer cask are aligned with a 
storage cask and the canister is maneuvered into the storage cask. The 
transfer cask can be re-used. The storage casks, in either vertical or 
horizontal designs (see figure 3), are usually situated on a large 
concrete pad with safety and security measures, such as radiation 
detection devices and intrusion detection systems. 

Figure 3: Dry Cask Storage System for Spent Nuclear Fuel: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration and data] 

At some nuclear reactors across the country, spent fuel is kept on 
site, above ground, in systems basically similar to the ones shown 
here. Once the spent fuel has cooled, it is loaded into special 
canisters. Each canister is designed to hold approximately 2-6 dozen 
spent fuel assemblies, depending on the type of assembly. Water and 
air are removed. The canister is filled with inert gas, and sealed 
(welded or bolted shut). 

1. Some canisters are designed to be placed vertically in robust above-
ground concrete or steel structures. 

Depicted: 
Bundle of used fuel assemblies; 
Canister; 
Storage cask. 

2. Some canisters are designed to be stored horizontally in above-
ground concrete modules, each of which is about the size of a one-car 
garage. 

Depicted: 
Concrete storage module. 

Source: NRC. GAO-15-141. 

[End of figure] 

NRC requires that spent fuel in dry storage be stored in approved 
systems that offer protection from significant amounts of radiation. 
NRC requires storage systems to demonstrate compliance with its 
regulations, including through physical tests of the systems, scaled 
physical tests, and computer modeling. Once a dry storage system is 
approved, NRC issues a certificate of compliance for a cask design or 
a specific license. Figure 4 shows spent nuclear fuel on a concrete 
pad in dry storage. 

Figure 4: Spent Nuclear Fuel in Dry Storage: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: Portland General Electric Co. GAO-15-141. 

[End of figure] 

Most U.S. reactors were built during the 1960s and 1970s and, after a 
40-year licensing period have received a 20-year license extension, 
and some may apply for subsequent extensions. Nevertheless, these 
reactors may begin permanently shutting down in large numbers by about 
2030 and emptying their pools by about 2040 absent additional license 
renewals. In the absence of a repository, the reactors' accumulated 
spent nuclear fuel will be "stranded" in a variety of different dry 
storage systems, with no easy way of repackaging the spent fuel should 
repackaging be required to meet future storage or disposal 
requirements. NRC regulations require radioactive contamination to be 
reduced at a reactor to a level that allows NRC to terminate the 
reactor's license and release the property for other use after a 
reactor shuts down permanently. This cleanup process is known as 
decommissioning.[Footnote 9] 

About 2,200 Metric Tons of Spent Nuclear Fuel Is Expected to 
Accumulate Annually, Mostly in Wet Storage, but This Pace Is Expected 
to Change as Reactors Shut Down: 

Spent nuclear fuel is expected to accumulate at an average rate of 
about 2,200 metric tons per year in the United States, mostly in wet 
storage, but this rate and the amount in wet storage are expected to 
decrease as more reactors, as projected, begin to shut down in the 
2030s. More specifically, according to data provided by the Nuclear 
Energy Institute, the rate of accumulation will be about 2,100 metric 
tons in 2031, decreasing to about 1,200 metric tons in 2040, about 200 
metric tons in 2050, and less than 100 metric tons per year from 2051 
through 2055, when the last one of the currently operating nuclear 
power reactors is expected to shut down. These rates assume that 
except for the few reactors that have announced early permanent 
shutdown dates, the nation's current reactors continue to operate 
through a 20-year extended license period without any further license 
extensions and continue to produce spent nuclear fuel at the same 
rate, and that no new reactors are brought online.[Footnote 10] 

Side bar: 

Shutdown of Nuclear Reactors in the United States: 
Of the 118 nuclear reactors in the United States, 18 reactors have 
permanently shut down. Three of these reactors are located on a site 
that also has an operating reactor. The remaining 15 reactors are 
located on 12 sites where the reactors have been or will be dismantled 
and decontaminated. After this decommissioning, the site can be used 
for other purposes and the only relic remaining at the site will be 
the spent nuclear fuel storage facility and the associated safety and 
security infrastructure. 
Source: DOE. GAO-15-141. 

[End of table] 

By the end of fiscal year 2013, DOE reported that it had signed 
contracts with owners and generators of spent nuclear fuel involving 
118 reactors. The spent nuclear fuel from these 118 reactors is stored 
at 75 sites in both wet and dry storage systems. Several reactors 
share the same site. For example, the Palo Verde site in Arizona has 3 
operating reactors. 

In 2013, about 70 percent of accumulated spent nuclear fuel--about 
50,000 metric tons--was stored in pools, with the remaining 30 
percent--about 22,000 metric tons--in dry storage. Figure 5 shows the 
75 spent nuclear fuel wet and dry storage sites, including shut-down 
sites, in the United States. 

Figure 5: Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Stored in Wet, Dry, and 
Shutdown Storage Sites: 

[Refer to PDF for image: interactive graphic] 

Instructions: Online, hover over the symbols in the key for more 
information. To print a version containing text, see appendix III, 
page 46. 

Sources: GAO analysis of NRC and DOE data, as of July 2014. GAO-15-141. 

Note: The rates in the figure assume that except for the few reactors 
that have announced early permanent shutdown dates, the nation's 
current reactors continue to operate through a 20-year extended-
license period without any further license extensions and continue to 
produce spent nuclear fuel at the same rate that no new reactors are 
brought online, and that generation of spent nuclear fuel declines as 
reactors shut down. 

[End of figure] 

In the future, more spent nuclear fuel is expected to be put into dry 
storage for two reasons. First, since most spent nuclear fuel pools 
have reached their maximum capacities, reactor operators must transfer 
fuel from the pools to dry storage to make room for newer spent 
nuclear fuel, a time-consuming and costly process. Second, the amount 
of spent nuclear fuel transferred to dry storage is expected to 
increase as reactors shut down and their pools are closed. According 
to data from the Nuclear Energy Institute, by 2024, the proportion of 
spent fuel in wet storage and dry storage from currently existing 
reactors should be roughly equal--about 48,000 metric tons each. By 
2040, about 70 percent of the spent fuel is expected to be in dry 
storage, or about 89,000 metric tons, compared to about 39,000 metric 
tons in wet storage. By 2067--after the last of the currently 
operating reactors have shut down--nearly all the 139,000 metric tons 
of spent fuel expected to be generated by currently operating reactors 
is expected to be in dry storage. Figure 6 shows the estimated amounts 
of spent nuclear fuel accumulation and transfer from wet storage to 
dry storage through 2067. 

Figure 6: Estimated Amount of Accumulation of Spent Nuclear Fuel in 
Wet and Dry Storage through 2067: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Accumulation of spent nuclear fuel (in metric tons): 

Year: Through 2013; 
Total Spent Fuel: 71,680; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 21,715; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 49,965. 

Year: 2014; 
Total Spent Fuel: 74,020; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 24,300; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 49,720. 

Year: 2015; 
Total Spent Fuel: 76,303; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 26,805; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 49,498. 

Year: 2016; 
Total Spent Fuel: 78,257; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 29,023; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 49,234. 

Year: 2017; 
Total Spent Fuel: 80,567; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 31,372; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 49,195. 

Year: 2018; 
Total Spent Fuel: 82,856; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 33,814; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 49,042. 

Year: 2019; 
Total Spent Fuel: 84,899; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 36,072; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 48,827. 

Year: 2020; 
Total Spent Fuel: 87,183; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 38,405; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 48,778. 

Year: 2021; 
Total Spent Fuel: 89,465; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 40,741; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 48,724. 

Year: 2022; 
Total Spent Fuel: 91,386; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 43,130; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 48,256. 

Year: 2023; 
Total Spent Fuel: 93,697; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 45,575; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 48,122. 

Year: 2024; 
Total Spent Fuel: 95,953; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 47,990; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 47,963. 

Year: 2025; 
Total Spent Fuel: 97,900; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 50,338; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 47,562. 

Year: 2026; 
Total Spent Fuel: 100,184; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 52,592; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 47,592. 

Year: 2027; 
Total Spent Fuel: 102,467; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 54,752; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 47,715. 

Year: 2028; 
Total Spent Fuel: 104,388; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 56,966; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 47,422. 

Year: 2029; 
Total Spent Fuel: 106,867; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 59,183; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 47,684. 

Year: 2030; 
Total Spent Fuel: 109,310; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 61,451; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 47,859. 

Year: 2031; 
Total Spent Fuel: 111,300; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 63,691; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 47,609. 

Year: 2032; 
Total Spent Fuel: 113,927; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 65,933; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 47,994. 

Year: 2033; 
Total Spent Fuel: 116,623; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 68,172; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 48,451. 

Year: 2034; 
Total Spent Fuel: 119,132; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 70,563; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 48,569. 

Year: 2035; 
Total Spent Fuel: 120,882; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 73,440; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 47,442. 

Year: 2036; 
Total Spent Fuel: 122,863; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 76,354; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 46,509. 

Year: 2037; 
Total Spent Fuel: 124,187; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 79,421; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 44,766. 

Year: 2038; 
Total Spent Fuel: 125,761; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 82,674; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 43,087. 

Year: 2039; 
Total Spent Fuel: 127,029; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 85,978; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 41,051. 

Year: 2040; 
Total Spent Fuel: 128,192; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 89,245; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 38,947. 

Year: 2041; 
Total Spent Fuel: 129,690; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 92,498; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 37,192. 

Year: 2042; 
Total Spent Fuel: 130,886; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 95,811; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 35,075. 

Year: 2043; 
Total Spent Fuel: 132,258; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 98,984; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 33,274. 

Year: 2044; 
Total Spent Fuel: 133,770; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 102,110; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 31,660. 

Year: 2045; 
Total Spent Fuel: 134,982; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 105,257; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 29,725. 

Year: 2046; 
Total Spent Fuel: 135,940; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 108,202; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 27,738. 

Year: 2047; 
Total Spent Fuel: 136,623; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 111,009; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 25,614. 

Year: 2048; 
Total Spent Fuel: 136,800; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 113,938; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 22,862. 

Year: 2049; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,053; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 116,615; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 20,438. 

Year: 2050; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,205; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 119,210; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 17,995. 

Year: 2051; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,278; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 121,750; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 15,528. 

Year: 2052; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,278; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 124,271; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 13,007. 

Year: 2053; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,392; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 126,653; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 10,739. 

Year: 2054; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,427; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 128,878; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 8,549. 

Year: 2055; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,516; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 130,949; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 6,567. 

Year: 2056; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,516; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 132,837; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 4,679. 

Year: 2057; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,516; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 134,271; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 3,245. 

Year: 2058; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,516; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 135,313; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 2,203. 

Year: 2059; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,516; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 135,871; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 1,645. 

Year: 2060; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,516; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 136,184; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 1,332. 

Year: 2061; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,516; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 136,411; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 1,105. 

Year: 2062; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,516; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 136,539; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 977. 

Year: 2063; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,516; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 136,627; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 889. 

Year: 2064; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,516; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 136,715; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 801. 

Year: 2065; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,516; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 136,796; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 720. 

Year: 2066; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,516; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 136,838; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 678. 

Year: 2067; 
Total Spent Fuel: 137,516; 
Spent Fuel in Dry Storage: 136,874; 
Spent Fuel in Wet Storage: 642. 

Source: GAO analysis of Nuclear Energy Institute data. GAO-15-141. 

[End of figure] 

Federal Liability for Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Is Based on Costs 
Incurred Because DOE Has Not Met Contract Obligations: 

Federal liability for managing spent nuclear fuel has been based on 
costs that owners and generators of this fuel have paid because DOE 
has not met its contractual obligations to begin disposing of this 
fuel, and DOE's estimate of future liability--$21.4 billion through 
2071--is based on how long the federal government is expected to pay 
these costs. This estimate is based on DOE's strategy to begin 
accepting spent nuclear fuel in 2021 and assumes no delays in their 
schedule. 

Generally, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims has held that the federal 
government's liability covers the cost of managing the spent nuclear 
fuel that DOE was obligated to begin disposing of in 1998. The 
Department of Justice has also agreed to pay such costs as a result of 
settlement agreements.[Footnote 11] (See appendix IV for additional 
information on the settlement agreements.) Under the standard 
contract, DOE was obligated to take title to and dispose of a certain 
quantity of spent nuclear fuel beginning in 1998. The order in which 
spent nuclear fuel was to be picked up is based on the order in which 
it was removed from reactors--or the oldest fuel first. The owner or 
generator was expected to pay continued storage costs for the spent 
nuclear fuel that DOE was not obligated to pick up. 

Some of the costs for which the federal government has been liable 
have related to expanding wet storage of spent nuclear fuel. For 
example, the federal government has compensated owners and generators 
for replacing lower-density storage racks with higher-density storage 
racks in pools to increase the capacity of the pools. The capacity of 
nearly all the spent nuclear fuel pools in the country has been 
expanded to the extent practical, and according to NRC, most pools 
have been filled to their maximum prudent capacities. 

The majority of the types of costs for which the federal government 
has been liable have pertained to dry storage costs of spent nuclear 
fuel. Some have been one-time costs, such as the cost of constructing 
a concrete pad for storing spent nuclear fuel once it has been 
transferred from the pools to dry canisters or casks. Constructing a 
concrete storage pad typically costs from about $5.5 million to $6.5 
million, but can range higher if additional equipment or special 
design requirements are needed. Other dry storage costs are recurring; 
for example, the cost of the canisters themselves, which depends on 
the size of the canister and type of spent nuclear fuel stored in it. 
Table 1 shows the differences in sizes of canisters, which typically 
cost from $700,000 to $1.5 million, and how the numbers of canisters 
for which the federal government may have to pay can vary from site to 
site. 

Table 1: Typical Reactor Characteristics, Canister Storage Capacity: 

Type of reactor: Pressurized water reactor[A]; 
Typical core size: 193 assemblies; (87 metric tons); 
Typical discharge: 72 to 84 assemblies (32 to 38 metric tons); 
Typical capacity of dry storage canister: 32 assemblies; (14.4 metric 
tons); 
Typical number of canisters to be loaded to keep pace with discharge: 
3-6 canisters annually. 

Type of reactor: Boiling water reactor[A]; 
Typical core size: 650 assemblies (101 metric tons); 
Typical discharge: 224 assemblies every 24 months (40 metric tons); 
Typical capacity of dry storage canister: 61 assemblies (11 metric 
tons); 
Typical number of canisters to be loaded to keep pace with discharge: 
4 canisters biennially. 

Source: GAO analysis of Electric Power Research Institute and Nuclear 
Energy Institute data. GAO-15-141. 

[A] Fuel for nuclear reactors differs according to the type of 
reactor. In the United States, about two-thirds of the 100 operating 
reactors are pressurized water reactors, with the remainder being 
boiling water reactors. Fuel assemblies for both types of reactors are 
typically 14 feet tall, but such assemblies for pressurized water 
reactors are about 8.5 inches square compared with about 6 inches 
square for boiling water reactors. 

[End of table] 

Another recurring cost is the cost of transferring spent nuclear fuel 
in the canisters from the pools to dry storage. Table 2 reflects 
typical costs associated with the transfer of spent nuclear fuel from 
wet to dry storage that may contribute to federal liabilities. 

Table 2: Typical Costs Associated with Transferring Spent Nuclear Fuel 
in Canisters from Wet to Dry Storage: 

Component: Labor costs to transfer spent nuclear fuel from pool to dry 
storage[A]; 
Typical Costs: $150,000 to $550,000. 

Component: Transfer cask; 
Typical Costs: $1.5 million to $3 million. 

Component: Crawler-type transporter; 
Typical Costs: $1 million to $1.5 million. 

Component: Vertical storage cask; 
Typical Costs: $250,000 to $350,000. 

Component: Horizontal storage module; 
Typical Costs: $500,000 to $600,000. 

Component: Design, licensing, and construction; 
Typical Costs: $5.5 million to $42 million. 

Component: Annual operations; 
Typical Costs: $100,000 to $300,000 for operating reactor site; 
$2.5 million to $6.5 million for permanently shutdown reactor site. 

Source: GAO analysis of Nuclear Energy Institute data. GAO-15-141. 

Note: Some items, such as a transfer cask and a transporter can be re-
used and may reflect one-time costs. In addition, costs for the 
transfer cask and transporter reflect purchase costs, but this 
equipment could be leased, rather than purchased. The costs for 
canisters, ranging from $700,000 to $1.5 million, are not included in 
this table. 

[A] Labor costs also include training, set-up, and cleanup. 

[End of table] 

Figure 7 illustrates how the components used in spent nuclear fuel 
management fit into each stage of the process of transferring spent 
nuclear fuel from wet to dry storage. 

Figure 7: Process and Costs of Transferring Spent Nuclear Fuel from 
Wet to Dry Storage: 

[Refer to PDF for image: interactive graphic] 

Instructions: Online, hover over the number in the figure for more 
information. To print a version containing text, see appendix V, page 
52. 

Source: GAO analysis of Nuclear Energy Institute data. GAO-15-141. 

[End of figure] 

Interactive Graphic: Online, hover over the number in the figure for 
more information. To print a version containing text, see appendix V. 

DOE's estimate of future liability is based on how long DOE expects 
the federal government to continue to pay for managing spent nuclear 
fuel that DOE was obligated to have begun disposing of if it had begun 
picking up the fuel in 1998. DOE's most recent estimate of this 
liability is $21.4 billion through 2071. This estimate assumes that 
DOE will begin accepting spent nuclear fuel in 2021 and complete the 
process in 2071, ending the federal government's liability. However, 
DOE has previously extended the dates in its liability estimates 
several times. For example, in the fiscal year 2006 liability 
estimate, DOE estimated (1) that the federal liability was $6.9 
billion, (2) that DOE would begin accepting spent nuclear fuel in 
2017, and (3) it would complete the process by 2055. Each time 
extension adds to the federal government's liability. 

Experts and Stakeholders Identified Challenges to and Suggestions for 
Managing Spent Nuclear Fuel at Interim Storage Facilities within DOE's 
Time Frames: 

Experts and stakeholders in the area of spent nuclear fuel management, 
including DOE and other government officials, identified four major 
types of challenges to the federal government's ability to meet DOE's 
time frames for managing spent nuclear fuel at consolidated interim 
storage facilities. First, DOE does not have legislative authority to 
fully implement its strategy, although DOE officials said they are 
conducting some planning activities that are allowed by the NWPA. 
Second, the licensing process could take more time than DOE has 
allowed. Third, there are several technical challenges to transporting 
some spent nuclear fuel. Fourth, achieving sustainable public 
acceptance of transporting and storing spent nuclear fuel is a 
societal challenge that will need to be addressed irrespective of any 
policy that is implemented and that experts said DOE could mitigate 
with a coordinated outreach strategy. Figure 8 summarizes the four 
major types of challenges identified by experts and stakeholders with 
whom we spoke. 

Figure 8: Four Major Types of Challenges Identified By Experts and 
Stakeholders on Federal Efforts to Manage Spent Nuclear Fuel at 
Consolidated Interim Storage Facilities: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Legislative: 
* Siting, licensing, constructing, and operating of interim storage 
facilities included in the Department of Energy's strategy have not 
been authorized; 
* Development of a new waste management and disposal organization has 
not been authorized; 
* Funding for the Department of Energy's past work on spent nuclear 
fuel management was unpredictable. 

Regulatory: 
* The Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing process could take more 
time than the Department of Energy has allowed. 

Technical: 
* High burn-up fuel has uncertainties related to long-term storage and 
future transportation; 
* Some stored spent nuclear fuel may not be readily transportable; 
* Current transportation infrastructure may not be adequate; 
* Repackaging requirements, if any, are uncertain. 

Societal: 
* Development of interim storage facilities depends on achieving 
sustainable public acceptance, which may be difficult without a 
coordinated outreach strategy. 

Source: GAO. GAO-15-141. 

[End of figure] 

DOE Does Not Have Legislative Authority to Fully Implement Its 
Strategy: 

In general, experts identified the legislative challenges as critical 
to implementing DOE's strategy within the time frames proposed. In 
particular, the experts pointed out that new legislative authority is 
needed for developing interim storage that is not tied to Yucca 
Mountain, creating a new waste management organization, and providing 
predictable funding for carrying out spent nuclear fuel management. 
However, experts and stakeholders generally noted that because the 
Congress has not agreed on a new path forward for managing spent 
nuclear fuel since funding was suspended in 2010, nor have DOE 
officials proposed legislation requesting new authority, obtaining 
specific legislative authority in time to meet DOE's proposed time 
frames might be challenging. 

Siting, Licensing, Constructing, and Operating of Interim Storage 
Facilities Included in DOE's Strategy Have Not Been Authorized: 

As we reported in November 2009 and August 2012,[Footnote 12] 
provisions in NWPA that authorize DOE to arrange for consolidated 
interim storage have either expired or are unusable because they are 
tied to milestones in the development of a repository at Yucca 
Mountain that have not been met. DOE officials and experts from 
industry agreed with this assessment, and they noted that the federal 
government's ability to site, license, construct, and operate a 
consolidated interim storage facility is dependent upon new 
legislative authority. Some industry representatives we spoke with 
said that such authority would be needed by the end of 2014 to meet 
DOE's 2021 goal to begin operations at a pilot interim storage 
facility. DOE officials noted that their strategy is available to 
Congress and is intended to initiate discussions on developing a 
future path forward or future policy to be implemented. However, 
experts and stakeholders generally noted that there is not agreement 
between the House and Senate on a path forward, and therefore 
obtaining such authority in 2014 is unlikely. Pending such agreement, 
the agency has been planning what it can do, and the agency has 
undertaken some activities allowed under current authority to inform 
the development of an interim storage facility. For example, the 
agency is reviewing reports submitted by contractors in 2013 on design 
concept alternatives for a consolidated interim storage facility. DOE 
officials said, however, that the agency's strategy could not be fully 
implemented until Congress provides direction on a path forward. 

Development of a New Waste Management and Disposal Organization Has 
Not Been Authorized: 

DOE's strategy calls for a new waste management and disposal 
organization for managing spent nuclear fuel; however, Congress has 
not authorized such an organization. According to DOE, a new 
organization separate from DOE is needed to "provide stability, focus, 
and credibility to build public trust and confidence." Industry 
representatives and presenters at a Bipartisan Policy Center 
Conference in 2014 agreed that DOE is not the right organization to 
implement its strategy because the public lacks confidence in the 
agency and its ability to move forward in managing spent nuclear fuel. 
In addition, an expert from industry said that a new organization 
designed to implement a consent-based process would be better suited 
to site a consolidated storage facility--a view that is generally 
consistent with one of our past matters for congressional 
consideration noting that an independent organization, outside DOE, 
could be more effective in siting and developing a permanent 
repository for the nation's nuclear waste.[Footnote 13] Similarly, the 
Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future recommended 
establishing a new federal corporation or similar independent 
organization to implement, among other things, a consent-based siting 
process. Such an organization would be more effective because it would 
be less vulnerable to political interference, according to the 
commission. 

However, experts from industry told us that even with congressional 
authorization, such an organization would take time to create, in 
part, according to an industry expert, because a new organization 
would need to acquire personnel, implement a quality assurance 
program, and develop an implementation plan. These could take from 2 
to 5 years, according to the experts. 

Funding for DOE's Past Work on Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Was 
Unpredictable, and Experts Said More Predictability Is Essential: 

In 2011, we reported that funding for DOE's work related to Yucca 
Mountain was unpredictable, noting that DOE's annual appropriations 
related to spent nuclear fuel management had varied by as much as 20 
percent from year to year;[Footnote 14] further, DOE's average annual 
appropriations fell about $90 million short of the amount DOE 
requested each year.[Footnote 15] We reported that this 
unpredictability made long-term planning difficult, and we suggested 
that Congress may wish to consider whether a more predictable funding 
mechanism would enhance future spent nuclear fuel management efforts. 
According to experts from industry and community action groups we 
interviewed, having sufficient funds consistently available is 
essential for any spent nuclear fuel management effort. However, as 
noted earlier, there is not agreement on a path forward--including 
developing a more predictable funding mechanism. DOE reported in 2001 
that the budgetary requirements enacted by Congress,[Footnote 16] 
subsequent to the creation the Nuclear Waste Fund,[Footnote 17] 
reduced financial flexibility. These funding challenges were also 
echoed by the Blue Ribbon Commission, which recommended that a new, 
more predictable, funding mechanism be developed.[Footnote 18] 

Experts and Stakeholders Identified Regulatory Challenges Related to 
Licensing a Consolidated Interim Storage Facility: 

Because the NRC licensing process is time consuming, it may be 
difficult for DOE or an alternative waste management and disposal 
organization to begin operations at a pilot interim storage facility 
in 2021 and a consolidated interim storage facility in 2025, as called 
for in DOE's strategy. The NRC licensing process cannot begin until an 
interim storage site has been selected, which, as stated previously in 
this report, cannot happen under existing legislative authority. Some 
industry experts, as well as a scientist from a national laboratory, 
told us licensing an interim facility could be achieved within 5 to 7 
years of site selection. Other industry experts and a community action 
group told us licensing will more likely be an 8-to 10-year process 
because of the potential for legal concerns raised by the public. Such 
concerns may originate with an environmental impact statement--such a 
statement is required before a license can be granted, and it allows 
for public input that may require adjudication. The NRC hearing 
process could also lengthen the licensing process. For example, in 
2006, after a 9-year licensing process, a consortium of electric power 
companies called Private Fuel Storage obtained an NRC license for a 
private consolidated storage facility on an Indian reservation in 
Utah.[Footnote 19] As we previously reported, the delay in licensing 
Private Fuel Storage was due to state opposition and to challenges 
raised during the license review process. 

Experts and Stakeholders Identified Technical Challenges That Could Be 
Resolved over Time: 

Experts described technical challenges that could be resolved with 
sufficient time. In particular, there are uncertainties regarding 
transportation of spent nuclear fuel, including the uncertainties 
related to the safety of high burn-up fuel during 
transportation,[Footnote 20] readiness of spent nuclear fuel to be 
transported under current guidelines, and sufficiency of the 
infrastructure to support transportation. In addition, there are 
uncertainties related to repackaging spent nuclear fuel for 
transportation. According to DOE officials, the agency is taking steps 
to begin addressing technical challenges, but not all of the 
challenges can be addressed until uncertainties regarding the path 
forward are resolved. 

High Burn-Up Fuel Has Uncertainties Related to Long-term Storage and 
Future Transportation: 

According to some industry experts, more information is needed about 
how to safely store and transport high burn-up fuel. Before 2000, most 
fuel discharged from U.S. nuclear power reactors was considered low 
burn-up fuel, and consequently, the industry has had decades of 
experience in storing and transporting it. In addition, the first dry 
storage canisters were loaded in 1986. One of these, containing low 
burn-up fuel, was opened 15 years later and the spent nuclear fuel 
inspected. The spent nuclear fuel was found to be in good condition, 
giving NRC additional confidence in the safe storage and transport of 
spent nuclear fuel. According to NRC, there has been considerable 
analysis performed on high burn-up fuel, but because it has only been 
used for about the past 10 years, there has been little testing 
performed on it. According to various reports from DOE, NRC, the 
Electric Power Research Institute, and the Nuclear Waste Technical 
Review Board, as well as experts we spoke with, uncertainties exist on 
how long high burn-up fuel can be stored and then still be safely 
transported. Once sealed in a canister, the spent fuel cannot easily 
be inspected for degradation. 

Text box: 

Description of Concerns Related to High Burn-Up Fuel: 

According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), burn up is 
considered as part of NRC's reviews of spent nuclear fuel cask designs 
because each dry storage system has limits on temperature and 
radiation, both of which are higher for high burn-up fuel. While in 
the reactor, hydrogen gas is generated and is absorbed by the 
cladding. Then, during the transfer from wet to dry storage, the spent 
nuclear fuel is loaded into a storage cask, which is removed from the 
storage pool and drained of water to dry the fuel. During the drying 
process, the fuel heats up, dissolving the hydrogen in the cladding 
structure. While the spent nuclear fuel is still hot and the cladding 
is still supple, there is little uncertainty in storing or 
transporting it, as long as temperature and radiation limits are met. 
However, as the spent nuclear fuel cools over extended periods in dry 
storage, the dissolved hydrogen can change the characteristics of the 
cladding and, if certain conditions exist, can cause the cladding to 
become brittle over time. The extent of the changes in cladding depend 
on the burn-up of the fuel, the type of cladding, and the temperatures 
reached during the drying process, and need to be accounted for in the 
storage and transportation of high burn-up spent nuclear fuel. There 
is not the same level of concern about changes in the cladding causing 
brittleness with low burn-up fuel because not as much hydrogen becomes 
dissolved in the cladding. In addition, there is more data available 
on the performance of low burn-up fuel during storage, since low burn-
up fuel has been stored for long periods. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from the Electric Power Research 
Institute, NRC, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, and Pacific 
Northwest National Laboratory. GAO-15-141. 

[End of text box] 

As of August 2014, NRC officials told us that they had analyzed 
laboratory tests and models developed to predict the changes that 
occur during dry storage and the results indicate that high burn-up 
fuel will maintain its integrity over very long periods of storage and 
can eventually be safely transported. However, NRC officials said they 
continue to seek additional evidence to confirm their position that 
long-term storage and transportation of high burn-up spent nuclear 
fuel is safe. In an effort to obtain evidence confirming the test and 
modeling results, DOE and the Electric Power Research Institute have 
planned a joint development project to load a special dry cask storage 
system with high burn-up fuel in mid-2017 and, using instrumentation 
built into the cask, monitor the spent nuclear fuel over a period of 
about 10 years. At that point, DOE and the Electric Power Research 
Institute expect to transport the canister to an appropriate facility 
and open it to inspect the high burn-up fuel and its cladding, as well 
as the cask, for any indication of damage or degradation. According to 
DOE and the Electric Power Research Institute, the project's execution 
has been planned through 2018 and many future elements of the project 
still need to be developed. Experts and stakeholders expressed various 
views regarding the level of uncertainty of the safe transportation of 
high burn-up fuel after long-term storage. But one theme conveyed 
during our discussions with them was that high burn-up fuel would 
continue to be stored in dry storage canisters without knowing how 
long the spent nuclear fuel would be stored or how safe future 
transportation would be. DOE officials stated that their strategy 
would not involve transportation of large amounts of high burn-up fuel 
until at least 2025 and that even then, there is likely going to be 
enough low burn-up fuel to ship for the first several years, giving 
more time for the development project to yield results. 

Some Stored Spent Nuclear Fuel May Not Be Readily Transportable: 

Because the guidelines governing dry storage of spent nuclear fuel 
allow higher temperatures and external radiation levels than 
guidelines for transporting the fuel, some of the spent nuclear fuel 
in dry storage may not be ready to be moved to an interim storage 
facility in time to meet DOE's time frames. For example, according to 
the Nuclear Energy Institute, as of 2012, only about 30 percent of 
spent nuclear fuel currently in dry storage is cool enough to be 
directly transportable. For safety reasons, transportation guidelines 
do not allow the surface of the transportation cask to exceed 185 
degrees Fahrenheit (85 degrees Celsius) because the spent nuclear fuel 
is traveling through public areas using the nation's public 
transportation infrastructure.[Footnote 21] NRC's guidelines on spent 
nuclear fuel dry storage limit spent nuclear fuel temperature to 752 
degrees Fahrenheit (400 degrees Celsius).[Footnote 22] Reactor sites, 
where spent nuclear fuel dry storage systems are typically found, are 
usually in secluded areas with a buffer zone between the spent nuclear 
fuel and the public. Dry storage sites are also usually located so 
that workers and the public have minimal exposure to radiation from 
the spent nuclear fuel. According to experts from industry, spent 
nuclear fuel has typically been stored in large dry storage canisters 
to maximize storage capacity and minimize costs. Spent nuclear fuel 
stored in the large canisters, however, may have temperatures that 
exceed the limits of transportation guidelines. 

Scientists from the national laboratories and experts from industry 
suggested three options for dealing with the stored spent nuclear fuel 
so it can be transported safely: (1) the spent nuclear fuel may be 
left to cool and decay at reactor sites, (2) the spent nuclear fuel 
may be repackaged into smaller canisters that reduce the heat and 
radiation, or (3) a special transportation "overpack" may be developed 
to safely transport the spent nuclear fuel in the current large 
canisters. Since Congress has not agreed on a new path forward since 
funding was suspended in 2010, it may be difficult to assess the 
options. 

Current Transportation Infrastructure May Not Be Adequate: 

In a 2013 report, DOE states that the preferred mode for transporting 
spent nuclear fuel to a consolidated interim storage facility would be 
rail.[Footnote 23] However, several experts from industry pointed out 
that not all of the spent nuclear fuel currently in dry storage is 
situated near rail lines; also, one of these experts said that 
procuring qualified rail cars capable of transporting spent nuclear 
fuel will be a lengthy process. Storage sites without access to a rail 
line may require upgrades to the transportation infrastructure or 
alternative modes of transportation to the nearest rail line. 
Constructing new rail lines or extending existing rail lines could be 
a time-consuming and costly endeavor. In addition, an industry 
official noted that if spent nuclear fuel were trucked to the nearest 
rail line, the federal government would have to develop a safe method 
of transferring the spent nuclear fuel from heavy haul trucks onto 
rail cars. In September 2013, DOE completed a preliminary technical 
evaluation of options available and needed infrastructure for DOE or a 
new waste management and disposal organization to transport spent 
nuclear fuel from shut-down sites to a consolidated interim storage 
facility. According to DOE officials, currently there is no need to 
make a decision regarding how best to move forward with the study 
results because there is, at this time, no site and no authorization 
to site, license, construct, and operate a consolidated interim 
storage facility.[Footnote 24] 

Text box: 

DOE's Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Spent Nuclear Fuel from 
Shutdown Sites: 

DOE's "Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel from 
Shutdown Sites" looked at 12 permanently shutdown sites, which 
included Maine Yankee, Yankee Rowe, Connecticut Yankee, Humboldt Bay, 
Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Trojan, La Crosse, Zion, Crystal River, 
Kewaunee, and San Onofre. The evaluation found that some shut-down 
sites, because the facilities have been decommissioned and lack onsite 
infrastructure, required multiple transportation modes such as heavy-
haul-truck to rail, barge to rail, and in the cases of Kewaunee and 
Humboldt Bay, potentially heavy-haul-truck to barge to rail. For 
example, Trojan's rail spur was removed during the decommissioning 
process and Big Rock Point will probably need to truck its spent 
nuclear fuel 52 miles to Gaylord, Michigan. Some of the sites 
evaluated have no rail spur, and heavy haul trucking will be required 
for anywhere from 7.5 miles to potentially 260 miles, depending on the 
site. 

Source: DOE. GAO-15-141. 

[End of text box] 

A DOE official and experts from industry also told us that DOE needs 
to begin procuring qualified rail cars capable of transporting spent 
nuclear fuel. DOE officials stated that the agency is beginning to 
request information from the rail car industry on the rail car design, 
testing, and approval for the transportation of commercial spent 
nuclear fuel and anticipates getting responses from interested parties 
by July 2014. According to an industry representative, the Association 
of American Railroads established the S-2043 standard, which sets 
higher standards for transportation of spent nuclear fuel than for 
normal rail operations. S-2043 requires, for example, on-board safety 
protection technology unique to spent nuclear fuel shipments and a 
high performance structural upgrades to accommodate the extra weight 
of spent nuclear fuel as well as the transportation cask, which 
according to the industry representative, can weigh up to 500,000 
pounds. Industry experts said it may be challenging to design and 
fabricate rail cars that meet the S-2043 standard for transporting 
heavy, fully loaded spent nuclear fuel canisters within DOE's time 
frames. According to industry experts, it will take, at a minimum, 2 
years to design and fabricate a new rail car, in addition to an 
extensive quality control process to ensure the car meets the S-2043 
standard. For example, an industry representative estimated that the 
entire rail car procurement process may take up to 9 years and another 
agreed that it may be feasible to begin to move the spent fuel by 2025 
if DOE initiates the necessary planning soon. Another option would be 
for DOE to use what the U.S. Navy has learned from its rail cars 
designs for its nuclear navy program, which also generates spent 
nuclear fuel. DOE officials told us they would consider this 
suggestion as they proceed. 

Repackaging Requirements, If Any, Are Uncertain: 

According to experts, some spent nuclear fuel in dry storage may need 
to be repackaged before it can be transported, and the repackaging is 
likely to be costly and difficult to accomplish. More specifically, as 
noted earlier, some dry storage canisters may be too hot or 
radioactive to meet transportation regulations. If the decision were 
made to transport the spent nuclear fuel before it had a chance to 
cool sufficiently, the canisters may have to be repackaged into 
smaller canisters that meet the transportation regulations. In 
addition, an industry expert and an expert from a community action 
group told us repackaging may also be required if current storage 
canisters, or the spent nuclear fuel in them, has degraded. For 
example, we previously reported that canisters are likely to last 
about 100 years,[Footnote 25] after which the spent nuclear fuel may 
have to be repackaged because of canister degradation.[Footnote 26] By 
the time such repackaging might be needed, reactor operators may no 
longer have pools or the necessary infrastructure to undertake the 
repackaging. 

According to DOE, under provisions of the standard contract, the 
agency does not consider spent nuclear fuel in canisters to be an 
acceptable form for waste it will receive. This may require utilities 
to remove the spent nuclear fuel already packaged in dry storage 
canisters. Nuclear power reactors that have closed their spent nuclear 
fuel pools would likely have to transport their spent nuclear fuel to 
operating reactors with pools, build a new pool, or repackage it in a 
yet-to-be-developed dry transfer facility. Cutting open these 
canisters is likely to be an expensive process for utilities that 
would require using specialized equipment to open welded lids, placing 
the assemblies back into a wet pool, and then packaging the assemblies 
into a new cask that DOE would provide under the terms of the standard 
contract. Such a process would require personnel and equipment, 
increase worker radiation exposure, increase the potential for fuel 
damage, produce additional low level waste,[Footnote 27] and, may, 
according to an industry expert, hinder electricity generating 
activities. In addition, another industry expert also expressed 
concerns that re-wetting and re-drying during the repackaging process 
may lead to cladding degradation issues. However, NRC officials stated 
that prior to NRC's granting a storage license, each system is 
analyzed by the applicant and reviewed by the NRC to ensure it can be 
re-flooded safely with no damage to the spent fuel. Until decisions 
have been made regarding a new path forward--storage and disposal--
repackaging requirements will remain uncertain. However, according to 
scientists from national laboratories, given a path forward, technical 
challenges, such as repackaging, can be overcome with time and 
sufficient funding. 

Experts and Stakeholders Said Developing Interim Storage Facilities 
Depends on Achieving Sustainable Public Acceptance, Which May Be 
Difficult without a Coordinated Outreach Strategy: 

Experts and stakeholders with expertise in spent nuclear fuel 
management identified achieving sustainable public acceptance as a 
challenge that needs to be overcome to implement a spent nuclear fuel 
management program, and they stated that public acceptance cannot be 
achieved without a coordinated outreach strategy. 

Development of Interim Storage Facilities Depends on Achieving 
Sustainable Public Acceptance: 

Reports spanning several decades cite societal and political 
opposition as key obstacles to siting and building a permanent 
repository for disposal of spent nuclear fuel. For example, in 1982, 
the congressional Office of Technology Assessment[Footnote 28] 
reported that public and political opposition were key factors to 
siting and building a repository.[Footnote 29] The National Research 
Council of the National Academies reiterated this conclusion in a 2001 
report, stating that the most significant challenge to siting and 
commencing operations at a repository is societal.[Footnote 30] Our 
analysis of stakeholder and expert comments indicates the societal and 
political factors opposing a repository are the same for a 
consolidated interim storage facility. 

This lesson has been borne out in efforts to site, license, build, and 
commence operations at a consolidated interim storage facility. As we 
reported in 2011 and as experts and stakeholders reiterated, it may be 
possible to find a willing community to host a consolidated interim 
storage facility, but obtaining and sustaining state support may be 
more difficult because of broader state constituencies and state-
federal relations. For example, the Office of the Nuclear Waste 
Negotiator, established by the NWPA amendments in 1987, tried to 
broker an agreement for a community to host a repository or interim 
storage facility. Two negotiators worked with local communities and 
Native American tribes for several years, but neither was able to 
conclude a proposed agreement with a willing community by January 
1995, when the office's authority expired. In one siting effort, in 
1992, a county in Wyoming sought to host a consolidated interim 
storage facility, but the Wyoming governor stopped that effort. The 
governor expressed concerns that despite the assurances of federal 
officials, even those with "personal integrity and sincerity," he 
could not be sure that the federal government's attitudes or policies 
would remain the same over the next 50 years or that the state would 
have any future say in the program. The experience of Private Fuel 
Storage is another example in which a consortium of owners and 
generators of spent nuclear fuel found a willing community to host a 
consolidated interim storage site on the Goshute Indian reservation in 
Utah. The state of Utah opposed the effort and although the Private 
Fuel Storage site received a license in 2006, operations never began 
there because of ongoing legal battles and land use issues. A 
spokesperson for the State of Utah stated that if the owners and 
generators renewed their efforts to begin operations at Private Fuel 
Storage, Utah would continue to fight the effort. Furthermore, in 
2014, the Western Governors Association--an association representing 
19 western states--passed a resolution stating that the Governor of a 
state must agree in writing if an interim storage site for spent 
nuclear fuel is to be considered in the state. Experts and 
stakeholders we spoke with reiterated this position, stating that 
states, and many local communities, are concerned that a consolidated 
interim storage site could become a de facto permanent storage site. 

In 2011, we reported that no nation had ever succeeded in building a 
permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel, in part due to societal 
concerns, and that there was no model or set of lessons that would 
guarantee success in such a complex, decades-long endeavor.[Footnote 
31] Based on our discussions with experts and stakeholders and a 
review of relevant documents on spent nuclear fuel management, those 
same societal concerns apply to building a consolidated interim 
storage facility. However, as we reported in 2011, efforts to site and 
commence operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico 
succeeded largely because a contractor addressed public opposition to 
the facility. Specifically, the contractor involved local communities 
situated along the transportation routes throughout the state, 
providing education and training programs and equipment related to the 
safe transportation of radioactive waste.[Footnote 32] The project 
might have ended because of state opposition if DOE had not conceded 
some oversight authority to the state. 

Experts and Stakeholders Said Coordinated Outreach May Help Achieve 
and Sustain Public Acceptance: 

In our discussions with experts and stakeholders, one common theme was 
apparent: public acceptance cannot be achieved without a coordinated 
outreach strategy, which would include components such as transparent 
transportation planning, and a defined consent-based process. 
According to these experts and stakeholders, a coordinated outreach 
strategy could include, among other things, sharing information with 
specific stakeholders and the general public about DOE's ongoing 
activities related to managing spent nuclear fuel. The experts and 
stakeholders said that DOE has no coordinated outreach strategy, which 
DOE officials confirmed. A coordinated outreach strategy would be an 
important aspect of informing the public about spent nuclear fuel 
management plans and DOE's current management efforts irrespective of 
which path Congress agrees upon. 

DOE officials confirmed that they do not have a coordinated outreach 
strategy for communicating with specific stakeholders and the general 
public about their activities related to spent nuclear fuel 
management. Instead, DOE officials said they communicate regularly 
with certain stakeholders. For example, DOE officials told us that 
they actively obtain the input of state and tribal representatives on 
spent nuclear fuel transportation-planning issues. In addition, DOE 
officials told us they plan to continue to participate in meetings 
with technical experts and industry stakeholders and to post 
information online. For example, DOE officials made several 
presentations on issues related to storage, transportation, and 
disposal at the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board's meeting in 
November 2013. Some experts we spoke with were critical of DOE efforts 
to involve stakeholders. For example, experts who represent multi-
state, regional organizations active in spent-nuclear-fuel 
transportation planning said DOE has not been transparent or effective 
in its communication with stakeholders. Furthermore, although DOE had 
issued fact sheets related to spent nuclear fuel management related to 
work on Yucca Mountain, DOE has not recently developed spent nuclear 
fuel information for the general public, such as a fact sheet 
explaining issues related to transporting spent nuclear fuel, nor does 
DOE have plans to do so in the upcoming fiscal year. DOE officials 
said that recently they have stepped up their outreach efforts with 
stakeholders. For example, in April 2014, DOE completed a Draft 
National Transportation Plan for moving spent nuclear fuel. 

In terms of DOE's efforts to inform specific stakeholders and the 
general public about spent nuclear fuel issues by posting information 
online, DOE has two websites devoted to spent nuclear fuel issues. 
However, we found that the information on those sites either does not 
provide information about the agency's ongoing activities or is not 
easily accessible.[Footnote 33] DOE also has an online library where 
it has posted selected technical studies;[Footnote 34] however, the 
agency has done little to explain how it plans to use these studies. 
DOE officials acknowledged that they could better explain the studies 
posted. They indicated that it is premature to conduct more extensive 
public outreach until the timing and logistics of transporting spent 
nuclear fuel have been determined. Experts from multi-state 
organizations disagree, stating that if DOE does not engage the public 
soon, then DOE could appear to be unilaterally making decisions 
without considering public input. 

According to experts from industry and an entity representing state 
regulatory agencies, DOE officials have not defined a consent-based 
process or engaged interested communities in discussions on hosting a 
consolidated interim storage facility. An expert from an entity 
representing state regulatory agencies said that in order to consent, 
potential host communities need to know what consent entails, both in 
the short and long term, including the perceived risks and benefits 
and the planned duration and proposed capacity of the facility before 
any decisions can be made. Furthermore, a few experts told us that 
they had heard of some community representatives who approached DOE to 
express their interest in hosting a storage facility, but DOE did not 
engage in substantive discussions with them. DOE has requested funding 
in its fiscal year 2014 and 2015 budget requests to plan for consent-
based siting, but DOE officials said they had not developed a formal 
siting process for an interim storage facility. 

A 2013 report by the University of Oklahoma, in collaboration with 
Sandia National Laboratory, documented the importance of social media, 
[Footnote 35] such as Twitter postings and Google searches, as public 
attention to both nuclear energy and nuclear waste management spiked 
immediately after the earthquake and tsunami struck the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant complex in Japan on March 11, 2011, 
causing widespread concern of a potential release of radiation. 
[Footnote 36] Furthermore, according to experts and stakeholders, 
social media have been used effectively to provide information to the 
public through coordinated outreach efforts by organizations with an 
interest in spent nuclear fuel policy. Some of these organizations 
oppose DOE's strategy and the information they distribute reflects 
their position. In the absence of a coordinated outreach strategy by 
DOE, including social media, DOE does not effectively provide a forum 
to share information and offer greater transparency. DOE promotes the 
use of social media platforms to engage in open discussions about 
energy issues, but has posted only a few reports and descriptions of 
spent nuclear fuel management on its web page. 

Experts and stakeholders suggested that it would be beneficial for DOE 
to begin developing a plan and materials for communicating with the 
specific stakeholders and the general public about the benefits and 
concerns with issues related to moving and storing spent nuclear fuel. 
An expert from a multi-state organization added a particular focus 
should be on the communities, including elected officials, living near 
shutdown sites. Such communication would be consistent with the Office 
of Management and Budget's Open Government Directive, which directs 
agencies to create and institutionalize a culture of transparency, 
participation, and collaboration in order to create a more open 
government.[Footnote 37] Furthermore, as we reported previously in 
2011 on lessons learned from spent nuclear fuel management,[Footnote 
38] we found that transparency and cooperation are important in 
overcoming opposition to spent nuclear fuel storage. Without greater 
transparency and a coordinated outreach program, specific stakeholders 
and the general public may not have confidence in DOE's efforts to 
manage spent nuclear fuel and may continue to distrust DOE. 

Conclusions: 

DOE has made efforts to share information about its ongoing spent 
nuclear fuel management activities by presenting at technical meetings 
and posting information on its website. Sharing information is made 
more difficult for DOE by uncertainties about the future path of spent 
nuclear fuel management. DOE intends for its strategy to provide an 
initial basis for discussions on a sustainable path forward. Until the 
federal government proceeds with a new policy to meet its contractual 
obligations, the federal liability for litigation related to spent 
nuclear fuel management will continue to grow. Our analysis of expert 
and stakeholders comments indicates four types of challenges to 
implementing DOE's January 2013 strategy to manage spent nuclear fuel 
within the time frames projected. DOE has begun to address aspects of 
these challenges, but the challenges cannot be fully addressed until 
uncertainties regarding a path forward are resolved. The societal 
challenge of building and sustaining public acceptance of the federal 
government's spent nuclear fuel management activities, however, will 
need to be addressed irrespective of the path the federal government 
agrees upon. Unless and until there is a broad understanding of the 
issues associated with transporting spent nuclear fuel and managing it 
at consolidated facilities, specific stakeholders and the general 
public may be unlikely to support any spent nuclear fuel management 
program that is decided on in the future. According to experts and 
stakeholders, organizations that oppose DOE's strategy have reached 
the public by effectively using social media to promote their 
positions. In contrast, DOE currently has no coordinated outreach 
strategy. In the absence of a coordinated outreach strategy by DOE, 
specific stakeholders and the general public may not have complete and 
accurate information about the agency's activities, making it more 
difficult for the federal government to move forward with any policy 
to manage spent nuclear fuel and address federal liability. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To help achieve and sustain public acceptance for future spent nuclear-
fuel management efforts, the Secretary of the Department of Energy 
should develop and implement a coordinated outreach strategy for 
providing information to specific stakeholders and the general public 
on federal activities related to managing spent nuclear fuel. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided DOE with a draft of this report for review and comment. In 
written comments, which are reproduced in appendix VI, DOE generally 
agreed with our findings and the recommendation in our report. DOE 
said that it plans to continue to engage states, tribes, and other 
stakeholders regarding planning for future transportation of spent 
nuclear fuel and that it would improve its outreach to the general 
public. DOE also said it would make an effort to provide the public 
with more complete information about its ongoing activities and the 
issues associated with spent fuel management. DOE also provided 
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Energy, the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Attorney 
General, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the 
Secretary of Transportation, and other interested parties. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website 
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report 
are listed in appendix VII. 

Signed by: 

Frank Rusco: 
Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To describe the expected rate of spent nuclear fuel accumulation in 
wet and dry storage, we obtained data from the Nuclear Energy 
Institute, an industry policy umbrella organization. These data 
included information on the amounts of spent nuclear fuel currently in 
wet and dry storage and projected amounts of spent nuclear fuel to be 
added to the current wet and dry storage inventory as it is removed 
from a reactor until it is permanently shut down. We updated the data 
as necessary to account for, among other things, reactors shutting 
down early. In describing the rate at which spent nuclear fuel 
accumulates, we assumed that except for the few reactors that have 
announced early permanent shutdown dates, the nation's current 
reactors continue to operate through a 20-year extended license period 
and continue to produce spent nuclear fuel at the same rate; that no 
new reactors are brought online, and that the generation of spent 
nuclear fuel declines as reactors shut down. To ensure the accuracy of 
our estimates, we provided selected sections of the draft report to 
representatives from the Nuclear Energy Institute for their review and 
comment. We incorporated their comments, as appropriate, in the final 
report. 

To identify the basis of federal liability for spent nuclear fuel 
management to date and of DOE's estimate of future liabilities, we 
reviewed documents from the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Justice. 
These documents included a generic Department of Justice settlement 
agreement, DOE's annual memorandums that described the liability 
estimate, and DOE's annual financial reports that include the figures 
on the cumulative amounts paid to settle with utilities for DOE's 
inability to accept spent nuclear fuel for disposal and the estimated 
remaining liability. In addition, we interviewed officials from DOE 
and the Department of Justice. We also relied on our prior work (GAO-
10-48) to provide information on the typical costs that may contribute 
to the federal government's future liabilities. To ensure that we had 
complete and accurate information on these costs, we provided selected 
sections of the draft report to representatives from the Nuclear 
Energy Institute for their review and comment. We incorporated their 
comments, as appropriate, in the final report. 

To assess the challenges, if any, that experts and stakeholders have 
identified to the federal government's ability to meet DOE's time 
frames for managing spent nuclear fuel at consolidated interim storage 
facilities and potential ways for DOE to mitigate the challenges, we 
identified individuals with spent nuclear fuel management experience 
and expertise. In our prior work (GAO-10-48), we had already 
identified experts in spent nuclear fuel management. Starting with 
this group and using a snowballing technique, we asked experts about 
their own expertise and also asked each expert or stakeholder to 
recommend other individuals that we might consider including in our 
discussions. We determined that we had a sufficient sample of relevant 
experts and stakeholders when the names of experts and stakeholders 
recommended to us became repetitive and when we determined that we had 
a balanced set of viewpoints represented. In total, we interviewed 
over 90 individuals, including federal officials, who represented a 
wide range of viewpoints and expertise. However, our selection of 
experts is nongeneralizable, in that opinions cannot be generalized to 
other experts or tallied, either within or across types of expertise. 

Once identified, we contacted the individuals and confirmed their 
familiarity with the issues. Before we began each interview, we asked 
the individual to provide information on his or her background, 
including education, employment history, and experiences related to 
spent nuclear fuel management to assess their level of expertise. In 
addition, we asked all interview participants to self-assess their 
expertise in various aspects of spent nuclear fuel management such as 
the political, technological, and regulatory issues related to spent 
nuclear fuel management. Using our professional judgment, we assessed 
the level of expertise for each individual in the different issues we 
considered in our analysis. Opinions of experts on a topic outside 
their own area of expertise are sometimes presented as the opinions of 
"stakeholders." In some cases, the same individual might be considered 
an expert in one specific issue, but a stakeholder on another issue. 

Generally, the experts and stakeholders represented their 
organization's views. The experts and stakeholders we consulted 
included: 

* DOE in headquarters, field offices, and scientists from several 
national laboratories, including Argonne National Laboratory, Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and 
Sandia National Laboratories; 

* officials from other federal agencies and organizations involved 
with spent nuclear fuel management activities, including the 
Department of Navy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Nuclear 
Waste Technical Review Board; 

* state, local, and regional governments or organizations, including 
the states of Nevada, Texas, and Utah; the State of Minnesota Public 
Utilities Commission; Eddy County, New Mexico; and Nye County, Nevada; 
Council of State Governments, Eastern Regional Conference; National 
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners; the National 
Conference of State Legislatures; Southern States Energy Board; The 
Council of State Governments, Midwestern Office; Western Governors' 
Association; Western Interstate Energy Board; 

* industry: including AHL Consulting; AREVA; Association of American 
Railroads; Chicago Bridge & Iron; Dairyland Power Cooperative; 
Dominion; Duke Energy; Energy Resources International, Inc.; Energy 
Solutions, Inc.; Exelon Corporation; Kouts Consulting; L. Barrett 
Consulting; Nuclear Energy Institute; Nuclear Waste Strategy 
Coalition; Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP; PSEG Nuclear, LLC; 
Tennessee Valley Authority; The Brattle Group; Governmental 
Strategies, Inc.; The Yankee Nuclear Power Companies: Yankee Atomic, 
Connecticut Yankee, and Maine Yankee; Van Ness Feldman LLP; and Xcel 
Energy; 

* representatives from a range of interest groups, including Beyond 
Nuclear, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, 
Southwest Research and Information Center, Union of Concerned 
Scientists, U.S. Chamber of Commerce - Institute for 21st Century 
Energy; and: 

* independent entities, including Black Mountain Research; Carnegie 
Institution for Science; Kadak Associates; Leroy Law Office; National 
Research Council, National Academy of Sciences; TA Frazier LLC; and 
University of Oklahoma. 

To ensure we asked consistent questions among all the identified 
experts and stakeholders, we developed a data collection instrument 
that included broad questions related to the challenges, if any, to 
the federal government's ability to meet DOE's time frames for 
accepting spent nuclear fuel at consolidated interim storage 
facilities. We pre-tested the instrument with a few individual experts 
and stakeholders to ensure that our questions were clear and would 
provide us with the information that we needed. After each pretest, we 
refined the instrument, accordingly. We analyzed the interviews to 
identify consistent themes and issues that emerged. See appendix II 
for a list of the experts and stakeholders whom we interviewed and 
their affiliations. 

In addition to the interviews, we reviewed relevant documents, such as 
DOE's January 2013 strategy for the management and disposal of used 
nuclear fuel and high level waste and the January 2012 Blue Ribbon 
Commission on America's Nuclear Future's report to the Secretary of 
Energy. We also reviewed documents prepared by the organizations that 
we interviewed and attended conferences sponsored by relevant 
organizations, including: 

* the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board's Technical Workshop 
on the Impacts of Dry Storage Canister Designs on the Future Handling, 
Storage, Transportation, and Geologic Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel 
in the United States; 

* the Nuclear Energy Institute's Used Fuel Management Conference; and: 

* the Bipartisan Policy Center's regional meeting of Identifying a 
Path Forward on America's Nuclear Waste. 

We also interviewed officials from the Department of Transportation 
and the Environmental Protection Agency. According to officials from 
these agencies, each agency has a specified role with respect to 
regulating transportation and interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. 
According to Department of Transportation officials, the agency 
coordinates and shares responsibility with the NRC on issues related 
to transporting spent nuclear fuel as stipulated in a memorandum of 
understanding between the two agencies. According to Environmental 
Protection Agency officials, the agency has a regulatory framework in 
place for storage of spent nuclear fuel that will allow NRC to license 
interim storage facilities. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2013 to October 
2014, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Spent Nuclear Fuel Experts and Stakeholders We 
Interviewed: 

Name: Lake Barrett; 
Affiliation: L. Barrett Consulting. 

Name: Evaristo J. (Tito) Bonano; 
Affiliation: Sandia National Laboratories. 

Name: David Boyd; 
Affiliation: State of Minnesota Public Utilities Commission. 

Name: William Boyle; 
Affiliation: Department of Energy. 

Name: Tom Brookmire; 
Affiliation: Dominion. 

Name: John Butler; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Energy Institute. 

Name: Robert (Bob) Capstick; 
Affiliation: The Yankee Nuclear Power Companies: Yankee Atomic, 
Connecticut Yankee, and Maine Yankee. 

Name: Jack Clemmens; 
Affiliation: Chicago Bridge & Iron. 

Name: Pamela Cowan; 
Affiliation: Exelon Corporation. 

Name: Susan Crockett; 
Affiliation: Eddy County, New Mexico. 

Name: Martha Crosland; 
Affiliation: Department of Energy. 

Name: Kevin Crowley; 
Affiliation: National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences. 

Name: Matthew (Matt) Crozat; 
Affiliation: Department of Energy. 

Name: Kris Cummings; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Energy Institute. 

Name: Peter Davies; 
Affiliation: Sandia National Laboratories. 

Name: Alan Denko; 
Affiliation: Department of Navy. 

Name: Fred Dilger; 
Affiliation: Black Mountain Research. 

Name: Geoffrey (Geoff) Fettus; 
Affiliation: Natural Resources Defense Council. 

Name: Tim Frazier; 
Affiliation: TA Frazier LLC. 

Name: Derrick Freeman; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Energy Institute. 

Name: Bob Fronczak; 
Affiliation: Association of American Railroads. 

Name: James George; 
Affiliation: Department of Energy. 

Name: John Gercy; 
Affiliation: Dominion. 

Name: Mariko Geronimo; 
Affiliation: The Brattle Group. 

Name: Ellen Ginsberg; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Energy Institute. 

Name: Frank Graves; 
Affiliation: The Brattle Group. 

Name: Christopher Guith; 
Affiliation: U.S. Chamber of Commerce - Institute for 21st Century 
Energy. 

Name: Kuhika Gupta; 
Affiliation: University of Oklahoma. 

Name: Brian Gustems; 
Affiliation: PSEG Nuclear, LLC. 

Name: Robert Halstead; 
Affiliation: State of Nevada. 

Name: Don Hancock; 
Affiliation: Southwest Research and Information Center. 

Name: Brady Hanson; 
Affiliation: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. 

Name: Christopher (Chris) Hanson; 
Affiliation: Department of Energy. 

Name: Scott Hendrick; 
Affiliation: National Conference of State Legislatures. 

Name: Nate Hickman; 
Affiliation: State of Texas. 

Name: Brian Holian; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Name: Rob Howard; 
Affiliation: Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 

Name: Lisa Janairo; 
Affiliation: The Council of State Governments, Midwestern Office. 

Name: Josh Jarrell; 
Affiliation: Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 

Name: Hank Jenkins-Smith; 
Affiliation: University of Oklahoma. 

Name: Bradley Jones; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Name: Steve Jones; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Name: Andrew Kadak; 
Affiliation: Kadak Associates. 

Name: Kevin Kamps; 
Affiliation: Beyond Nuclear. 

Name: Christopher Kouts; 
Affiliation: Kouts Consulting. 

Name: Darrell Lacy; 
Affiliation: Nye County, Nevada. 

Name: Doug Larson; 
Affiliation: Western Interstate Energy Board. 

Name: Ned Larson; 
Affiliation: Department of Energy. 

Name: David Leroy; 
Affiliation: Leroy Law Office. 

Name: Adam Levin; 
Affiliation: AHL Consulting. 

Name: Mark Lombard; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Name: Edwin Lyman; 
Affiliation: Union of Concerned Scientists. 

Name: Arjun Makhijani; 
Affiliation: Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. 

Name: Zita Martin; 
Affiliation: Tennessee Valley Authority. 

Name: Ben McRae; 
Affiliation: Department of Energy. 

Name: Rodney (Rod) McCullum; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Energy Institute. 

Name: Katrina McMurrian; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition. 

Name: Richard Meserve; 
Affiliation: Carnegie Institution for Science. 

Name: Mike Morrissey; 
Affiliation: State of Texas. 

Name: Nigel Mote; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. 

Name: Paul Murray; 
Affiliation: AREVA. 

Name: Connie Nakahara; 
Affiliation: State of Utah. 

Name: Steve Nesbit; 
Affiliation: Duke Energy. 

Name: Cyrus Nezhad; 
Affiliation: Department of Energy. 

Name: Robert Nordhaus; 
Affiliation: Van Ness Feldman LLP. 

Name: Mark Nutt; 
Affiliation: Argonne National Laboratory. 

Name: Brian O'Connell[A]; 
Affiliation: National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. 

Name: Mary Olson; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Information and Resource Service. 

Name: Rob Palmberg; 
Affiliation: Dairyland Power Cooperative. 

Name: Aaron Perea; 
Affiliation: Department of Energy. 

Name: Christopher (Chris) Phillips; 
Affiliation: Energy Solutions, Inc. 

Name: Terry Pickens; 
Affiliation: Xcel Energy. 

Name: Lara Pierpoint; 
Affiliation: Department of Energy. 

Name: Everett Redmond; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Energy Institute. 

Name: James Rubenstone; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Name: Chris Scolari; 
Affiliation: Western Governors' Association. 

Name: Jay Silberg; 
Affiliation: Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP. 

Name: Tim Smith; 
Affiliation: Governmental Strategies, Inc. 

Name: Norman St. Amour; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Name: Eileen Supko; 
Affiliation: Energy Resources International, Inc. 

Name: Peter Swift; 
Affiliation: Sandia National Laboratories. 

Name: Sheiba Tafazzoli; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Name: Jane Kelley Taylor; 
Affiliation: Department of Energy. 

Name: Leigh Trocine; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Name: Uldis Vanags; 
Affiliation: Council of State Governments, Eastern Regional Conference. 

Name: Jack Volpato; 
Affiliation: Eddy County, New Mexico. 

Name: ohn Wagner; 
Affiliation: Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 

Name: Sandra Wastler; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Name: Christopher Wells; 
Affiliation: Southern States Energy Board. 

Name: Jim Wiggins; 
Affiliation: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Name: Jeffrey (Jeff) Williams; 
Affiliation: Department of Energy. 

Name: Jim Williams; 
Affiliation: Western Interstate Energy Board. 

Name: David (Dave) Zabransky; 
Affiliation: Department of Energy. 

Source: GAO. GAO-15-141. 

[A] Brian O'Connell retired in 2013 as director of the Nuclear Waste 
Program. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Stored in Wet, Dry, and 
Shutdown Storage Sites (Text for Interactive Figure 5): 

Wet storage sites: 

1. Beaver Valley.
2. Callaway.
3. Clinton.
4. Fermi.
5. Shearon Harris.
6. Pilgrim.
7. South Texas Project.
8. Virgil C. Summer.
9. Three Mile Island.
10. Watts Bar.
11. Wolf Creek.
12. GE Morris. 

Wet and dry storage sites: 

1. Arkansas Nuclear One.
2. Braidwood.
3. Browns Ferry.
4. Brunswick.
5. Byron.
6. Calvert Cliffs.
7. Catawba.
8. Columbia Generating Station.
9. Comanche Peak.
10. Cooper.
11. Davis-Besse.
12. Diablo Canyon.
13. Donald C. Cook.
14. Dresden.
15. Duane Arnold.
16. Joseph M. Farley.
17. James A. FitzPatrick.
18. Fort Calhoun.
19. R.E. Ginna.
20. Grand Gulf.
21. Edwin I. Hatch.
22. Hope Creek.
23. Indian Point.
24. La Salle.
25. Limerick.
26. McGuire.
27. Millstone.
28. Monticello.
29. Nine Mile Point.
30. North Anna.
31. Oconee.
32. Oyster Creek.
33. Palisades.
34. Palo Verde.
35. Peach Bottom.
36. Perry.
37. Point Beach.
38. Prairie Island.
39. Quad Cities.
40. River Bend.
41. H. B. Robinson.
42. St. Lucie.
43. Salem.
44. Seabrook.
45. Sequoyah.
46. Surry.
47. Susquehanna.
48. Turkey Point.
49. Vermont Yankee.
50. Vogtle.
51. Waterford. 

Shut-down storage sites[A]: 

1. Big Rock Point.
2. Maine Yankee.
3. Yankee Rowe.
4. Haddam Neck.
5. Crystal River.
6. Kewaunee.
7. La Crosse.
8. Zion.
9. Trojan.
10. Humboldt Bay.
11. Rancho Seco.
12. San Onofre. 

33 states with accumulated spent fuel: 

1. Alabama.
2. Arizona.
3. Arkansas.
4. California.
5. Connecticut.
6. Florida.
7. Georgia.
8. Illinois.
9 Iowa.
10. Kansas.
11. Louisiana.
12. Maine.
13. Maryland.
14. Massachusetts.
15. Michigan.
16. Minnesota.
17. Mississippi.
18. Missouri.
19. Nebraska.
20. New Hampshire.
21. New Jersey.
22. New York.
23. North Carolina.
24. Ohio.
25. Oregon.
26. Pennsylvania.
27 South Carolina.
28. Tennessee.
29. Texas.
30. Vermont.
31. Virginia.
32. Washington.
33. Wisconsin. 

Source: GAO analysis of NRC and DOE data, as of July 2014. GAO-15-141. 

[A] In addition, there are three permanently shutdown reactors at 
sites that continue to have operating reactors. The sites that have 
both shutdown and operating reactors include the Dresden, Indian 
Point, and Millstone sites. Of the 12 shutdown reactor sites, the Zion 
site has two permanently shutdown reactors and the San Onofre site has 
three permanently shutdown reactors. Also, the operator at the Vermont 
Yankee site has announced that it plans to shut down the reactor at 
the end of 2014. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Additional Information on the Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Settlement Agreements: 

The settlement agreements between the Department of Justice and the 
owners or generators of spent nuclear fuel have not been identical and 
have changed over time. For example, from 2004 through 2009, the 
Department of Justice settled with six owners and generators 
representing 40 of the 118 reactors covered under the standard 
contract. Under the settlement agreements--known as the Exelon 
Settlement agreements--it was assumed that the Department of Energy 
(DOE) would have accepted spent nuclear fuel for disposal at a rate of 
900 metric tons per year from 1998 through 2014, and at a rate of 
2,100 metric tons per year thereafter. Under the Exelon Settlement 
agreements, DOE is liable for spent nuclear fuel storage costs that 
owners and generators would not have incurred if DOE had accepted and 
disposed of the fuel at this rate. Beginning in 2011, the Department 
of Justice began using a new settlement agreement--called the New 
Framework Settlement agreement. As of September 8, 2014, the 
Department of Justice reported that it has executed New Framework 
Settlement Agreements with 20 litigants representing 45 reactors 
covered under the standard contract. These settlement agreements do 
not supersede the Exelon agreements, which remain effective for the 
parties that settled through 2009. The New Framework Settlement 
agreements assumed a higher rate of acceptance of spent nuclear fuel, 
based on an appellate decision. Specifically, the new settlement 
agreements assumed that DOE would have accepted spent nuclear fuel for 
disposal at a rate of 1,200 metric tons per year from 1998 through 
2002; 2,000 metric tons in 2003; 2,650 metric tons per year from 2004 
through 2007; and 3,000 metric tons per year beginning in 2008. The 
result is that some types of spent nuclear fuel storage costs for 
which owners and generators were deemed responsible under the Exelon 
Settlement agreement are now a DOE liability under the new settlement 
agreements.[Footnote 39] 

According to a Department of Justice document used to discuss 
settlements for the owners and generators covered by the New Framework 
Settlement agreements, there are five categories of reimbursable costs: 

1. Additional Pool Storage: Costs to purchase, license, and install 
new, additional, or replacement storage racks or to make available 
additional storage spaces to the extent, and only to the extent, 
necessary to provide additional capacity in the spent nuclear fuel 
pool at the site. 

2. Dry Storage Costs: Costs to purchase canisters and casks, including 
canisters that may be licensed for transport and casks for 
transferring spent nuclear fuel to the dry storage facility;[Footnote 
40] costs to load spent nuclear fuel into and to transport canisters 
and casks to the dry storage facility; costs of ancillary equipment 
for casks and cask loading, such as crawler-type transporters, 
dollies, and vacuum-drying equipment; costs to conduct initial loading 
demonstrations required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); 
costs for training and development of procedures; costs for cask-
loading campaign mobilization and demobilization; costs to study and 
to evaluate spent nuclear fuel storage options; costs for quality 
assurance inspections of cask vendors; costs for security improvements 
required by NRC for the dry storage facility; costs of maintaining and 
operating the dry storage facility; costs for security improvements or 
upgrades required to comply with utility's security plan approved by 
the NRC; and costs to design, license and build the dry storage 
facility, including costs of building the portion of the facility that 
will be required for the dry storage of the utility's spent nuclear 
fuel in addition to utility's allocations, provided that the utility 
can demonstrate that it was more cost effective to incur the costs to 
design, license and build the dry storage facility during the claim 
period rather than after termination of the agreement. If the utility 
previously constructed a dry storage facility for reasons other than 
to store the utility's allocations or needs to place, or places, items 
other than canisters or casks containing the utility's allocations in 
dry storage, only the costs attributable to the portion of the dry 
storage facility needed to store the utility's allocations will be 
allowable. 

3. Modifications of the Existing Plant: Costs paid to modify cranes to 
the extent, and only to the extent, necessary to increase the rated 
lifting capacity of the crane(s) used in the loading of spent nuclear 
fuel from the fuel storage pool, provided that the utility can 
establish that these modifications would not have been necessary to 
meet the requirements of NUREG-0612 or load spent nuclear fuel in 
casks or canisters provided by DOE had DOE begun performance in 1998; 
building modifications that the utility can establish would not have 
been necessary to load spent nuclear fuel into casks or canisters 
provided by DOE (e.g., seismic restraints for fuel pool or upgrades to 
floor of cask-loading area); and costs to improve the haul path from 
the fuel building to the dry storage facility, to the extent that the 
haul path is different from the path that the utility would have used 
to deliver fuel to DOE. If the utility incurs costs for site 
modifications or equipment purchases to store the utility's 
allocations that otherwise benefit the operation of the plant, 
including crane modifications for purposes other than loading storage 
canisters or casks, the cost reimbursed will be proportional to the 
benefit to the operation of the plant. 

4. Property Taxes: Costs paid as a result of any increase in assessed 
property tax resulting from and traceable to projects, as identified 
in the preceding three paragraphs, that were undertaken to provide 
additional storage for the utility's allocations. 

5. Labor and Overhead: The cost of labor charged directly by the 
utility's employees to any project that is otherwise allowable shall 
be considered allowable, provided that the hours expended on such 
project are charged in accordance with utility's standard time 
recordation system and are identified at the individual employee 
level. In addition, the following types of overhead charges will be 
deemed allowable provided that the charges are calculated in 
accordance with the utility's established accounting practice and 
policy: (a) payroll overheads or "burdens" associated with labor hours 
charged to allowable projects and (b) non-payroll overheads allocated 
to allowable projects claimed up to a maximum of 5 percent of the 
portion of the utility's claim which is otherwise allowable and to 
which such non-payroll overheads are allocated. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Process and Costs of Transferring Spent Nuclear Fuel from 
Wet to Dry Storage (Text for Interactive Figure 7): 

1. Nuclear power reactor and spent nuclear fuel pools; 
Nuclear power reactor and spent nuclear fuel pools--Spent nuclear fuel 
typically cools for at least 5 years in a pool before a canister 
($700,000 to $1.5 million) is placed in the pool, filled with spent 
nuclear fuel, removed from the pool, and dried. A reusable steel 
transfer cask ($1.5 million to $3 million) provides shielding for 
nearby workers as the spent nuclear fuel is transferred from the pool 
and placed into either a vertical or horizontal dry storage system. 
The process of transferring spent nuclear fuel, excluding the 
canister, transfer cask, and storage system costs $150,000 to 
$550,000. Then the canister is placed into either a vertical or 
horizontal dry storage system. 

2. Transporter; 
Transporter--For vertical storage, a crawler-type transporter ($1 
million to $1.5 million) carries the entire canister and storage cask 
in a vertical orientation to a storage pad. For horizontal storage, a 
tractor with a transfer trailer carries the canister in a reusable 
transfer cask in a horizontal orientation ($1.5 million to $3 million) 
to the horizontal module. 

3. Vertical storage cask/horizontal storage module; 
Vertical storage cask/horizontal storage module--Utilities typically 
choose either a vertical storage system ($250,000 to $350,000 per 
cask) or a horizontal storage system ($500,000 to $600,000 per module) 
for a particular site. 

4. Safety and security systems and annual operations; 
Safety and security systems and annual operations--Design, licensing, 
and construction of the dry storage facility and safety and security 
systems ($5.5 million to $42 million). Annual operations include costs 
of security, operations, and maintenance cost. Annual operations at an 
operating reactor site: $100,000 to $300,000 and at a shutdown reactor 
site: $2.5 million to $6.5 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of Nuclear Energy Institute data. GAO-15-141. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Department of Energy: 
Washington, DC 20585: 

September 26, 2014: 

Mr. Frank Rusco: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Rusco: 

Thank you for providing a draft copy of the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report, "Spent Nuclear Fuel Management: Outreach Needed 
to Help Gain Public Acceptance for Federal Activities that Address 
Liability," (GAO-14-715). We have reviewed the draft report and 
provide general comments below. 

GAO was charged by the Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee and the Chairman of the Environment and the Economy 
Subcommittee of the I-louse Energy and Commerce Committee to 
determine: (1) at what rate is spent nuclear fuel accumulating and how 
do the components of spent nuclear fuel management contribute to
federal liabilities; (2) what factors, if any, might affect DOE's 
ability to meet its time frames to begin taking custody of spent 
nuclear fuel at interim storage facilities; (3) how might delays, if 
any, in DOE's taking custody of spent nuclear fuel at interim storage
facilities affect future federal liabilities. We recognize that 
conducting a review of the Department's spent nuclear fuel activities 
and federal liabilities is a difficult undertaking, and we appreciate 
the time and thoroughness GAO took during its review. 

The Department has the following comments regarding the draft report's
recommendation. 

Recommendation: To help achieve and sustain public acceptance for 
future spent nuclear fuel management efforts, the Secretary of the 
Department of Energy should develop and implement a coordinated 
outreach strategy for providing information to specific stakeholders 
and the general public on federal activities related to managing spent 
nuclear fuel. 

The Department agrees that effective and coordinated outreach and 
communicat ion to affected stakeholders and the general public will be 
critical to help achieve and sustain public acceptance of future spent 
nuclear fuel management efforts. 

Currently the Department is actively engaged with States, Tribes and 
other stakeholders in planning for future transportation of spent 
nuclear fuel. The Department plans to continue these interactions and 
improve its outreach to the general public. It will also make an 
effort to provide the public with more complete information about its 
ongoing activities and the issues associated with spent fuel 
management. 

Additionally, the Department requests that GAO address the following 
factual inaccuracies in the draft report: 

* The report implies (on pages 15 and 19) that there are technical 
challenges and uncertainties with the transportation of all spent 
nuclear fuel, which is not true. There are in fact such challenges and 
uncertainties with respect to some spent nuclear fuel. The overly 
broad statements should be so qualified. 

* On page 19, the report incorrectly states that high bum-up fuel has 
only recently been used. In fact, high burn-up fuel has been used for 
more than 20 years. 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments on this draft. We 
look forward to receiving your final report. If you have any questions 
related to this letter, please feel free to contact Mr. John Herczeg 
at (202) 586-3715. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Peter B. Lyons: 
Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Frank Rusco, (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Karla Springer (Assistant 
Director), Arkelga Braxton, Kevin Bray, Ross Gauthier, Diana C. Goody, 
Armetha Liles, Wendell Matt, Mehrzad Nadji, Cynthia Norris, Katrina 
Pekar-Carpenter, Timothy Persons (Chief Scientist), Anne Rhodes-Kline, 
and Robert Sánchez made key contributions. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Spent (or used) nuclear fuel can no longer efficiently generate 
power in a nuclear reactor. However, it is potentially a resource 
because it can be reprocessed to separate out uranium and plutonium to 
be used again as fuel in a reactor. Reprocessing, however, still 
results in high-level radioactive waste that requires disposal, and 
the United States does not currently reprocess spent nuclear fuel from 
commercial nuclear power reactors. The federal government generates 
spent nuclear fuel from power, research, and navy shipboard reactors. 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission considers spent nuclear fuel 
that is accepted for disposal to be high-level radioactive waste. High-
level radioactive waste also includes byproducts of weapons production 
and other defense-related activities generated from reprocessing spent 
nuclear fuel. The scope of this review only includes commercial spent 
nuclear fuel. 

[2] Pub. L. 97-425 §§ 112. 113. NWPA also addressed disposal of high-
level radioactive waste other than spent nuclear fuel. 

[3] See GAO, Commercial Nuclear Waste: Effects of a Termination of the 
Yucca Mountain Repository Program and Lessons Learned, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-229] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 
2011). 

[4] In addition to the $3.7 billion reimbursed to owners and 
generators through fiscal year 2013, the Department of Justice, which 
defends DOE in the lawsuits, has expended approximately $219.5 million 
in defense-related costs, as of December 31, 2013. Industry officials 
said that, for proprietary reasons, they could not provide a total for 
their litigation costs but that they are also incurring similar 
expenses. While the courts have not ordered the federal government to 
reimburse utilities for attorneys' fees, the Court of Federal Claims 
generally has awarded court costs to utility plaintiffs. 

[5] The fund is a permanent, indefinite appropriation for the payment 
of judgments against the United States. 

[6] Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, Report to the 
Secretary of Energy, (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2012). The Blue 
Ribbon Commission's recommended plan was to cover spent nuclear fuel 
and other high-level waste. 

[7] DOE, Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel 
and High-Level Radioactive Waste, (Washington, D.C.: January 2013). 

[8] Reactor fuel "burn-up" is a measure of the energy that has been 
produced by the fuel. High burn-up fuel generally has been in a 
reactor longer than low burn-up fuel and is defined as having a burn-
up higher than 45,000 megawatt days per metric ton. 

[9] See GAO, Nuclear Regulation: NRC's Oversight of Nuclear Power 
Reactors' Decommissioning Funds Could Be Further Strengthened, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-258] (Washington, D.C.: 
Apr. 5, 2012). Decommissioning must generally be completed within 60 
years of cessation of reactor operations. Reactor operators may either 
immediately decontaminate and dismantle their reactor sites or monitor 
and maintain them as the spent nuclear fuel cools and decays over a 
longer period. 

[10] NRC has issued licenses for the construction of four new reactors 
in South Carolina and Georgia. The Nuclear Energy Institute data did 
not include spent nuclear fuel that is expected to be generated from 
these reactors. The Nuclear Energy Institute data also did not include 
spent nuclear fuel that might be generated from a second license 
extension of existing nuclear power reactors. The Nuclear Energy 
Institute stated that some operators of reactors are considering a 
second license renewal. 

[11] According to a Department of Justice official, the department has 
settled as many of the cases brought by owners and generators of spent 
nuclear fuel as possible out of court to reduce the time and expense 
of litigation and to achieve some consistency in what the government 
should expect to pay in potential future claims. 

[12] GAO, Spent Nuclear Fuel: Accumulating Quantities at Commercial 
Reactors Present Storage and Other Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-797] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 
2012) and Nuclear Waste Management: Key Attributes, Challenges, and 
Costs for the Yucca Mountain Repository and Two Potential 
Alternatives, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2009). 

[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-229]. 

[14] Established by the NWPA in 1983, DOE's office responsible for 
spent nuclear fuel was in the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 
Management (OCRWM), which was dismantled when DOE terminated Yucca 
Mountain. Currently, DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy is responsible for 
spent nuclear fuel related activities. 

[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-229]. 

[16] See Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 
Management, Alternative Means of Financing and Managing the Civilian 
Radioactive Waste Management Program, DOE/RW-0546 (Washington, D.C.: 
August 2001). 

[17] In return for the federal government's taking responsibility for 
disposing of the spent nuclear fuel, the owners and operators agreed 
to make quarterly payments, beginning in 1983, into a Nuclear Waste 
Fund statutorily established under NWPA. According to DOE, the current 
value of the fund is approximately $28.2 billion, which--until this 
year--included annual deposits of approximately $750 million in fee 
collections and $1.5 billion in accrued interest. 

[18] Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, Report to the 
Secretary of Energy (January 2012). 

[19] Private Fuel Storage obtained a 20-year license from NRC with an 
option for an additional 20-year extension. The license allowed 
storage of up to 40,000 metric tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel. 
Though Private Fuel Storage was licensed in 2006, it never began 
operations, in part because of other land-use decisions restricting 
new construction. 

[20] Reactor fuel burn-up is a measure of the energy that has been 
produced by the fuel. High burn-up fuel generally has been in a 
reactor longer than low burn-up fuel and is defined as having a burn-
up higher than 45,000-megawatt days per metric ton. 

[21] See NRC, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, 
Standard Review Plan for Transportation Packages for Spent Nuclear 
Fuel, NUREG-1617 (Washington, D.C.: March 2000). 

[22] See NRC, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, 
Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems at a General 
License Facility, NUREG-1536 Rev.1 (Washington, D.C.: July 2010). 

[23] See DOE, Office of Fuel Cycle and Research Development, A Project 
Concept for Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation, FCRD-NFST-2013-
000132 Rev. 1 (June 15, 2013). 

[24] See DOE, Preliminary Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel 
from Shutdown Sites, PNNL-22676 Rev.1 (Sep. 30, 2013) 

[25] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-48]. 

[26] In 2010, NRC updated its waste confidence decision and 
accompanying interim storage rule supporting generic findings of the 
impacts of storing spent nuclear fuel beyond the licensed life for 
operation of a nuclear power plant. The 2010 determination found, 
among other things, that spent nuclear fuel can be stored safely and 
without significant environmental impacts for at least 60 years beyond 
the licensed life of a reactor. In 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit held that the rulemaking required 
either an environmental impact statement or a finding of no 
significant environmental impact and remanded the determination and 
rule back to NRC for further analysis. NRC subsequently completed a 
generic environmental impact statement and published final revisions 
to the rule on September 19, 2014. 

[27] Low-level waste can range from just-above-natural background 
levels to much higher levels and generally consists of equipment used 
in day-to-day management of radioactive materials. Some examples 
include radioactively contaminated cleaning rags, mops, filters, 
protective shoe covers, and protective clothing. 

[28] The Office of Technology Assessment was an office of Congress 
from 1972 to 1995 that provided congressional members and committees 
with analysis of scientific and technical issues. 

[29] Office of Technology Assessment, Managing Commercial High-level 
Radioactive Waste (Washington, D.C.: 1982). 

[30] National Research Council of the National Academies, Disposition 
of High-Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel: The Continuing Societal 
and Technical Challenges (Washington, D.C.: 2001). 

[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-229]. 

[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-229]. 

[33] One website is for DOE's Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation 
Planning Project that among other things, plans for and implements the 
agency's activities related to the transportation and storage aspects 
of its strategy and lists four documents: (1) the Blue Ribbon 
Commission on America's Nuclear Future Report to the Secretary of 
Energy, (2) DOE's Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used 
Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, (3) DOE's Preliminary 
Evaluation of Removing Used Nuclear Fuel From Shutdown Sites, and 
Public Preferences Related to Consent-Based Siting of Radioactive 
Waste Management Facilities for Storage and Disposal. The website is 
available at [hyperlink, http://energy.gov/ne/fuel-cycle-
echnologies/nuclear-fuels-storage-transportation-planning-project]. 
The other website--known as the Centralized Used Fuel Resource for 
Information Exchange website--was launched in March 2013 and shares 
documents and data about the storage, transportation, and disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel. However, as of July 2014, the website is not 
readily accessible from DOE's website and must be found using public 
search engines, such as Google. This second website is available at 
[hyperlink, http://curie.ornl.gov]. 

[34] The library can be found at [hyperlink, 
http://energy.gov/ne/listings/document-library]. 

[35] Prepared for DOE, Nuclear Fuel Storage and Transportation 
Planning Project, Public Preferences Related to Consent-Based Siting 
of Radioactive Waste Management Facilities for Storage and Disposal: 
Analyzing Variations over Time, Events, and Program Designs; (February 
2013). 

[36] As reported by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 
(Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, Special Report on the Nuclear 
Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (Atlanta, GA: 
November 2011), Tokyo Electric Power Company personnel determined that 
water levels in the spent fuel pool at Fukushima Daiichi did not drop 
below the top of the fuel. An NRC order noted that during the 
Fukushima event, there was concern that the spent fuel was 
overheating, and the concern persisted primarily because of a lack of 
readily available and reliable information on water levels in spent 
fuel pools. 

[37] Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum for the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies, Open Government Directive 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 8, 2009). 

[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-229]. 

[39] The Department of Justice has also entered into four other 
settlement agreements with former owners of spent nuclear fuel who 
have since exited the industry. While there is no pending litigation 
concerning the settled claims, litigation continues with the new 
owners of the reactors in three of these cases. 

[40] The dry storage facility is known as the independent spent fuel 
storage installation. 

[End of section] 

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