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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

September 2014: 

Bureau of Prisons: 

Information on Efforts and Potential Options to Save Costs: 

GAO-14-821: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-821, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

BOP is responsible for the custody and care of 216,000 federal 
inmates—-an almost 9-fold increase since 1980. At the same time, 
BOP appropriations increased more than 20-fold. DOJ states that 
the costs of the growing population are BOP's greatest challenge. 
BOP's population size is driven by several factors, such as law 
enforcement policies and sentencing laws. 

GAO was asked to review BOP's opportunities to save costs. This 
report (1) describes BOP's major costs and actions to achieve 
savings, (2) assesses the extent to which BOP has mechanisms to 
identify additional efficiencies, and (3) describes potential 
changes within and outside of BOP's authority that might reduce costs. 

GAO analyzed BOP financial data for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, 
reviewed but did not test its internal control system and processes 
for achieving efficiencies, and interviewed BOP officials. On the 
basis of sentencing reform options identified by experts and actions 
by the Attorney General, GAO developed a list of policy options that 
could reduce BOP's population. GAO gathered views on their potential 
effects from entities and 4 states selected for their criminal justice 
expertise. The views are not generalizable, but provide insights. 

What GAO Found: 

Correctional services-—which includes salaries and benefits for 
correctional officers-—is the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Bureau 
of Prisons' (BOP) largest operational cost, and BOP has undertaken 
a number of initiatives to reduce costs. Specifically, on the basis 
of GAO 's analysis of BOP's fiscal year 2013 obligations of 
approximately $6.6 billion, BOP obligated the largest share—-about 
$3.9 billion, or 59 percent-—for personnel compensation and benefits. 
Further, BOP has undertaken a number of initiatives, such as 
renegotiated contracts, to achieve cost savings of about $61 million 
over the last 3 years. 

BOP has designed internal processes to identify opportunities for 
additional cost efficiencies, but could improve themonitoring of 
corrective actions to achieve them. For example, BOP focuses on cost 
efficiency and innovation in its strategic plan and has developed 
mechanisms for staff to share information on best practices and cost 
savings efforts. BOP also employs an internal control system with 
processes, such as program reviews, that allows it to identify 
opportunities for cost efficiencies. However, when program reviews 
repeatedly cited frequent deficiencies or significant findings that 
could increase costs—-such as insufficient contract monitoring—- 
responsible BOP Central Office divisions did not provide specifics or 
documentation for how they always monitor the effectiveness of 
corrective actions to prevent the same deficiency or issue from 
reoccurring. Establishing a mechanism for relevant Central Office 
divisions to consistently monitor the progress of bureau-wide 
corrective actions in the presence of repeated frequent deficiencies 
or significant findings could help BOP better ensure that it is 
resolving such deficiencies or issues promptly and, ultimately, 
operating more efficiently. 

BOP's current authorities to reduce inmate sentence length result 
in limited cost savings, but potential actions outside of its authority 
could have a greater impact on costs. GAO has reported previously on 
BOP authorities to reduce inmate sentences, and thus its costs, in 
detail, and found that inmate eligibility for certain programs and 
lack of capacity affect BOP's use of them. For example, greater use 
of programs such as Compassionate Release for terminally ill inmates 
could reduce sentences, but cost savings relative to BOP's budget 
would be small—-about $651,000 in 2013. Additional opportunities 
outside of BOP's authority, including those requiring legislative or 
executive action, such as options to reduce sentence length, could 
reduce BOP's population, and thus potentially significantly reduce 
its costs. For example, an option to reduce sentences of incarcerated 
drug offenders by an average of 44 percent could save about $4.1 
billion. Potential savings could be even higher if the changes 
sufficiently reduced the inmate population to allow BOP to reduce its 
staff or close facilities. Expert entities GAO consulted reported that 
all of the options GAO reviewed also have advantages and disadvantages 
unrelated to costs that should be taken into consideration, such as 
potential effects on public safety if released inmates reoffend. GAO 
is not taking a position on any of these options, but presents 
information on estimated cost savings and experts' views of advantages 
and disadvantages for such options to inform policymakers as they 
weigh whether and how to address rising costs at BOP. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that BOP establish a mechanism to consistently monitor 
if bureau-wide corrective actions address repeated deficiencies and 
findings. DOJ concurred. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-821]. For more 
information, contact David C. Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or 
maurerd@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Correctional Services Is BOP's Largest Operational Cost, and BOP 
Has Initiated a Number of Efforts to Reduce Costs: 

BOP Has Designed Internal Processes to Identify Opportunities for 
Additional Cost Efficiencies, but Could Improve the Monitoring of 
Corrective Actions: 

Authorities within BOP's Control to Reduce Costs Are Limited; Options 
outside of BOP's Authority Could Have a Larger Impact on Costs: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Letter Sent to Select States and Expert Entities: 

Instructions: 

Appendix III: Data on the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Largest 
Cost Centers: 

Appendix IV: Data on the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Largest 
Subobject Class Expenses: 

Appendix V: Additional Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Efforts to 
Achieve Cost Savings and Efficiencies: 

Appendix VI: Expert Entities Providing Input on Prison Population 
Reduction Options: 

Appendix VII: Analyses of Options Provided by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission (USSC): 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Examples of Cost-Savings Initiatives Adopted by the Bureau 
of Prisons (BOP): 

Table 2: Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Internal Control Processes That 
Provide Opportunities to Identify Cost Efficiencies by Internal 
Control Standard: 

Table 3: Key Statutory Provisions Available to the Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP) to Reduce a Federal Prisoner's Period of Incarceration or Time 
in BOP Custody: 

Table 4: Options for Changes to Sentencing Processes, Number of 
Eligible Inmates, Estimated Cost of Options, and Assessment of 
Potential Advantages and Disadvantages by Expert Entities and Four 
States with Sentencing Change Experience: 

Table 5: Annual Obligations for Each of the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) 
20 Largest Cost Centers, Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013: 

Table 6: Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Obligations by Its 20 Largest 
Subobject Classes, Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013: 

Table 7: Additional Cost-Savings Efforts Under Way or Being Pursued 
by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP): 

Table 8: Expert Entities That GAO Consulted in Reviewing Selected 
Policy Options: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Fiscal Year 2013 Obligation Levels 
by Cost Center: 

Figure 2: Descriptions of Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Largest Cost 
Centers: 


Figure 3: Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Fiscal Year 2013 Obligation Levels 
by Object Classification: 

Abbreviations: 

ABA: American Bar Association: 
BOP: Bureau of Prisons: 
DOJ: Department of Justice: 
FSA: Fair Sentencing Act: 
GCT: good conduct time: 
HHS: Department of Health and Human Services: 
HRMD: Human Resource Management Division: 
HSD: Health Services Division: 
IG: Inspector General: 
IPTP: International Prisoner Transfer Program: 
JRI: Justice Reinvestment Initiative: 
OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 
PRD: Program Review Division: 
RDAP: Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program: 
RRC: residential reentry center: 
RRM: Residential Reentry Management: 
RRMB: Residential Reentry Management Branch: 
RSD: Reentry Services Division: 
USSC: U.S. Sentencing Commission: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 30, 2014: 

Congressional Requesters: 

The inmate population at the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP)--the primary cost driver of BOP's budget--
has increased almost 9-fold since the early 1980s--from about 25,000 
in fiscal year 1980 to about 216,000 as of July 2014. Given these 
population increases, and inflation, BOP's appropriations have 
increased more than 20-fold during the same time period--from $330 
million in fiscal year 1980, about 14 percent of DOJ's total budget 
that year, to almost $7 billion requested for fiscal year 2015, or 
about one-quarter of DOJ's requested fiscal year 2015 budget.
[Footnote 1] According to the DOJ Inspector General, the rising 
costs for BOP threaten the department's ability to fulfill its 
mission in other areas, including maintaining national security, 
enforcing criminal law, and defending civil rights. Moreover, DOJ 
projects that BOP costs will increase if the federal prison 
population grows through 2019 as forecast by DOJ in its Fiscal Year 
2015 Performance Budget Congressional Submission for the Federal 
Prison System.[Footnote 2] 

BOP's mission is to confine federal offenders in safe and secure 
prisons and community-based facilities, and to provide work and 
other self-improvement opportunities to assist offenders in becoming 
law-abiding citizens. Additionally, one of BOP's strategic goals is 
to continually strive toward improvements in its effective use of 
resources and its efficient delivery of services. As of June 2014, 
BOP operates 120 prison institutions nationwide, as well as paying 
for and monitoring 14 prisons and, as of July 2014, 200 residential 
reentry centers (RRC) (halfway houses)--operated by private 
contractors. According to officials, BOP's biggest challenge is 
managing the increasing federal inmate population, and related 
responsibilities, within budgeted levels. 

We have previously reported that the size of the federal prison 
population is a function of many factors, including the nation's 
crime levels, federal sentencing laws, and law enforcement policies, 
all of which are beyond the control of BOP.[Footnote 3] In addition, 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 abolished parole for federal 
offenders, and subsequent legislation established mandatory minimum 
sentences for many federal offenses, facts that limit the authority 
BOP has to affect the size of the prison population or the length of 
prison sentences.[Footnote 4] BOP has discretionary authorities, or 
flexibilities, to reduce a federal prisoner's period of incarceration 
through programs such as the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program 
(RDAP).[Footnote 5] BOP also has statutory authority to award "good 
conduct time" credit toward reducing an inmate's sentence up to 54 
days per year of sentence served, if the inmate has displayed 
exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations. 
[Footnote 6] To help alleviate costs associated with an increasing 
inmate population and inflation, as noted in its fiscal year 2015 
Performance Budget Congressional submission, BOP continues to 
streamline operations and increase efficiency in order to operate as 
efficiently and effectively as possible. 

Additionally, actions involving policy changes outside of BOP's 
authority could reduce BOP's inmate population and therefore its 
costs. These include potential legislative actions by Congress, 
executive orders by the President, policy changes implemented by the 
Attorney General, or changes in federal sentencing guidelines by the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC).[Footnote 7] 

The Attorney General's August 2013 Smart on Crime Initiative is an 
example of a policy change that will affect the size of the BOP 
population. The Attorney General issued a memorandum to the U.S. 
Attorneys and Assistant Attorneys for the Criminal Division 
instructing prosecutors to decline to charge the quantity necessary to 
trigger a mandatory minimum sentence for certain defendants in cases 
involving the applicability of drug law mandatory minimum sentences 
based on drug type and quantity.[Footnote 8] 

Growth in the federal inmate population and its effects on BOP's 
budget are a matter of continuing congressional interest. You asked us 
to review the transparency of BOP's budget justification and 
opportunities for BOP to realize operational efficiencies. In December 
2013 we reported that by providing additional funding data to Congress 
in its budget justification, BOP could clarify what it proposes to 
spend on specific categories and subcategories.[Footnote 9] We 
recommended that the Attorney General consult with congressional 
decision makers on providing additional BOP funding detail in future 
budget justifications, and in conjunction with BOP, take action as 
appropriate. DOJ concurred with this recommendation and is taking 
action to implement it. This report responds to the latter part of 
your request by further describing BOP's major costs and the actions 
it has taken to identify and implement cost efficiency opportunities 
and reduce costs. Specifically, this report addresses the following 
questions: 

1. What are the major costs for BOP operations, and what actions has 
BOP taken to implement cost savings? 

2. To what extent does BOP have mechanisms to identify opportunities 
for cost efficiencies and to take corrective actions that may improve 
cost efficiency? 

3. What potential changes, both within and outside of BOP's authority, 
could lead to cost reductions or improved efficiencies in BOP 
operations, and what might be the potential impact of these changes? 

To address the first question, we obtained historical obligation data 
from BOP's Financial Management Information System for fiscal years 
2009-2013--a 5-year time frame to provide us with an adequate 
understanding of trends in BOP obligation levels--to identify the 
major costs incurred by BOP for its Salaries and Expenses account, 
which generally represents 98 percent of BOP's budget.[Footnote 10] We 
have assessed the reliability of these data and determined them to be 
reliable for the purposes of this report. This assessment included 
performing checks on the data received and interviewing officials 
responsible for compiling and maintaining these data. We also 
collected data (e.g., cost savings estimates prepared by BOP) and 
documentation, such as memos and concept papers approved by executive 
staff from fiscal years 2009 through 2013; through review of these 
data and documents and interviews with relevant agency officials, we 
determined that these data are also reliable for the purposes of this 
report. In addition, we interviewed Central Office-, regional-, and 
institutional-level officials to identify to the extent possible 
all existing cost efficiency and savings initiatives adopted by BOP and 
their impact on its overall budget. 

To address the second question, we reviewed the processes and tools at 
BOP during the same time period (fiscal years 2009-2013) that are used 
to identify, implement, and promote cost-efficiency and savings 
initiatives throughout its institutions, such as executive staff 
meetings and a catalog compiling cost-savings initiatives. With 
respect to identifying additional opportunities to realize cost 
efficiencies or reduce costs, using our financial analysis as 
context, we analyzed elements of BOP's internal control system related 
to the control objective of achieving operational efficiencies and 
interviewed relevant officials to assess whether BOP has designed a 
management structure and processes to routinely assess its 
administrative and operational activities for possible corrective 
action. Specifically, we reviewed BOP's mechanisms and processes 
leading to its internal review of operational and administrative 
functions, including its process for taking corrective action related 
to high-cost areas, and compared these characteristics with those 
called for in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government.[Footnote 11] 

To address the third question, on potential policy changes both within 
and outside BOP's authority that could lead to BOP cost savings, we 
collected and reviewed analysis and documentation from DOJ, BOP, the 
USSC, and entities that we selected for their expertise in criminal 
justice issues, and, in particular, potential changes to federal 
sentencing policies, and to ensure that a wide range of views on the 
advantages and disadvantages of these potential changes.[Footnote 12] 
These entities may not be representative of the universe of expert 
entities in the criminal justice field and therefore may not represent 
all views on this topic; however, their views provide insights. We 
obtained data from BOP for 2013 and 2014 on the impact on BOP's 
population and costs resulting from changes within BOP's authority. We 
assessed the reliability of these data by reviewing documentation and 
interviewing knowledgeable officials, and determined the data to be 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

Further, on the basis of our assessment of proposals put forward by 
several sources, including the Attorney General, expert entities, 
states with experience with criminal justice reform, and advocacy 
entities with a range of views on criminal justice reform, we 
identified eight options outside of BOP's authority that could 
reduce the size of the inmate population. GAO is not taking a position 
on any of these options, but presents information on estimated cost 
savings and experts' views of advantages and disadvantages for such 
options to inform policymakers as they weigh whether and how to 
address rising costs at BOP. 

For each of these eight options, we asked the USSC to estimate the 
impact on the size of the BOP inmate population and, using the USSC 
estimates, we then calculated cost savings or cost avoidance that 
could result from implementing a given option.[Footnote 13] According 
to our audit objectives, we determined that based on the expertise of 
the USSC, the evidence obtained from the USSC provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions. 

In addition, we asked the 14 expert entities to comment on the options 
with regard to their view of the advantages or disadvantages of 
implementation of the eight options. We also asked 4 states to comment 
on the potential options for change. One of the 4 was Texas, which had 
the largest number of incarcerated offenders in the nation (as of 
2012) and which was identified as a model for changes in state 
criminal justice systems by the Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI), 
a public-private partnership of DOJ and the Pew Charitable Trusts, to 
provide technical assistance and financial support for system-wide 
criminal justice reform efforts.[Footnote 14] The other states were 
chosen on the basis of having had at least 1 year's experience in 
implementing JRI programs; of these 8, we chose the 3 that had the 
largest annual corrections budgets as of the year in which JRI started 
in those states. We received acknowledgment of receipt from 17 of the 
18 entities (the 14 expert entities and 4 states) to which we sent the 
letter.[Footnote 15] 

Further details on our scope and methodology are contained in appendix 
I. See appendix II for the letter sent to expert entities asking for 
their assessment of options, which provides a list of the proposals 
that were used to develop the selected options. 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 to September 2014 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

BOP's Cost-Accounting Methods: 

BOP uses a network of cost centers--individual accounting units in 
which costs can be segregated--to obligate, account for, and manage 
various costs.[Footnote 16]Managers of each cost center are provided 
with information to control and manage costs within their area of 
responsibility. Cost centers can be structured along different 
dimensions, such as organizational units, operating processes, and 
activities.[Footnote 17] For example, BOP cost centers include 
Correctional Services, Inside Medical Services, and Food Services at 
each institution. 

BOP also tracks its obligations and expenditures by budget object and 
subobject classification.[Footnote 18] Object classes are categories 
used in budget preparation to classify obligations by the items or 
services purchased by the federal government (e.g., personnel 
compensation, contractual services). Within these object classes, 
the Department of Justice has assigned subobject class codes that 
further define the nature of services or articles obligated and 
provide DOJ with a detail of expended funds. For example, under the 
personnel compensation object class, BOP has defined subobject class 
codes for items such as compensation for full-time, permanent 
appointment employees; overtime; and holiday pay. Object and subobject 
classes are used for direct tracking of specific items on which funds 
are being spent (e.g., salaries, supplies, pharmaceuticals, etc.) and 
are used across all cost centers. 

BOP Organizational Structure: 

To carry out its responsibility for the custody and care of federal 
offenders, as of June 2014, BOP houses inmates across six geographic 
regions in 120 federal institutions, 14 privately operated secure 
contract facilities, home detention, and as of July 2014, 200 
residential reentry centers.[Footnote 19] These federal institutions 
and other facilities are managed and overseen through the following 
offices: 

* Central Office. The Central Office, which serves as BOP's 
headquarters, consists of nine divisions that provide oversight of 
major BOP program areas and operations, such as correctional programs 
and health services, as well as the National Institute of 
Corrections.[Footnote 20] BOP's Program Review Division, which leads 
BOP's process for conducting internal reviews of each program or 
operation at each BOP institution, is among these nine divisions. 

* Grand Prairie Office Complex. This complex, located in Grand 
Prairie, Texas, was created to consolidate various processes into one 
location. It consists of three components: human resource services, 
designation and sentence computation, and field acquisitions exceeding 
$100,000. 

* Regional offices. BOP has six regional offices, each led by a 
regional director, covering the Mid-Atlantic, North Central, 
Northeast, South Central, Southeast, and Western regions of the United 
States. These offices provide oversight, technical assistance, and 
training to the BOP facilities located within each region. 

* Residential Reentry Management field offices. BOP has 25 field 
offices that administer contracts for community-based programs and 
serve as liaisons with various federal, state, and local groups within 
their judicial districts. Staff at these offices also monitor 
residential reentry centers (RRCs), which provide offenders with 
community-based services to assist with their reentry needs. 

BOP generally houses sentenced inmates in its long-term institutions. 
Male long-term institutions include four security level designations-- 
minimum, low, medium, and high--and female institutions include three 
security designations--minimum, low, and high. The security-level 
designation of a facility depends on the level of security and staff 
supervision that the institution is able to provide, such as the 
presence of security towers; perimeter barriers; the type of inmate 
housing, including dormitory, cubicle, or cell-type housing; and 
inmate-to-staff ratio. Additionally, BOP designates some of its 
institutions as administrative institutions, which house male and 
female inmates and specifically serve inmates awaiting trial, or those 
with intensive medical or mental health conditions, regardless of the 
level of supervision these inmates require. 

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 

Prior to passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, federal judges 
generally had broad discretion in sentencing.[Footnote 21] Most 
criminal statutes provided only broad maximum terms of imprisonment. 
Federal law outlined the maximum sentence, federal judges imposed a 
sentence within a statutory range, and the federal parole official 
eventually determined the actual duration of incarceration. The 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 changed the federal sentencing 
structure. The act was effective for offenses committed on or after 
November 1, 1987. The act abolished parole for federal offenders 
sentenced after its effective date, and subsequent legislation 
established mandatory minimum sentences for many federal offenses. 

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 also established the independent 
USSC within the judicial branch and charged it with, among other 
things, developing federal sentencing guidelines.[Footnote 22] USSC 
establishes sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal 
justice system that provide certainty and fairness in meeting the 
purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities 
among defendants with similar criminal records who have been found 
guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient 
flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted. 
[Footnote 23] To foster this goal, the guidelines specify 
sentencing guideline ranges--a range of time (in months) that 
offenders should serve given the nature of their offense and other 
factors--but also permit sentences to depart upward or downward from 
guideline ranges because of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 
In 2005, the Supreme Court found the Sentencing Guidelines, which had 
previously been binding for federal judges to follow in sentencing 
criminal defendants, to be advisory in nature. [Footnote 24] Regardless 
of the guidelines' advisory nature, judges are still required 
to calculate properly and consider the Sentencing Guidelines and other 
sentencing goals.[Footnote 25] 

In applying the USSC's guidance, federal district judges are to 
determine the appropriate sentencing guideline range for an offender 
based on various factors related to (1) the offense and (2) the 
offender. The offense is assigned an offense level; drug offenses 
are based on several factors, such as the quantity and type of drug 
involved and whether the offense involved violence. 

The offender is also assigned a criminal history category based on the 
number of criminal history points. USSC sentencing guidelines assign 
criminal history points based on a defendant's criminal record: 

* A single point is assigned for every other federal or 
state prior sentence of conviction, subject to certain exceptions. 
[Footnote 26] 

* Two or more points are assigned for every prior sentence of 
imprisonment or juvenile confinement of 60 days or more or for 
offenses committed while the defendant was in prison; 
was an escaped prisoner; or was on probation, parole, or supervised 
release; 

* Three points are assigned if an offender has been previously 
sentenced or is being sentenced to a prison term of 13 months or more. 

Taken in combination, the offense level and criminal history category 
correlate with a sentencing guideline range, expressed in months. For 
certain types of offenses, including certain drug and weapons 
offenses, statutorily specified mandatory minimum sentences supplant 
the lower end of the otherwise applicable guidelines range. While 
federal law generally requires a sentencing judge to impose a minimum 
sentence of imprisonment following conviction for any of a number of 
federal offenses, there are two statutorily provided exceptions. 
One--the substantial assistance exception--is available upon motion of 
the government, and allows the court to impose a sentence below the 
level established by statute as a minimum to reflect a defendant's 
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another 
person who has committed an offense.[Footnote 27] The other, commonly 
referred to as the safety valve, was created by the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and is available for certain 
types of defendants for certain drug offenses that carry minimum 
sentences.[Footnote 28] 

Correctional Services Is BOP's Largest Operational Cost, and BOP Has 
Initiated a Number of Efforts to Reduce Costs: 

BOP's Correctional Services, Private Prison Contracts, Medical Care, 
and Food Services Account for the Majority of Its Costs, with the 
Largest Share of Spending on Personnel: 

During fiscal year 2013, BOP obligated approximately $6.6 billion for 
all its programs and operations. According to our analysis of BOP's 
fiscal year 2013 obligations by cost center, correctional services, 
privately operated secure contract facilities, medical care, and food 
services represent the majority (approximately $3.56 billion, or 54 
percent) of BOP's expenses, as illustrated in figure 1. See appendix 
III for a breakout of cost trends in these and other key cost centers 
over the last 5 fiscal years. 

Figure 1: Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Fiscal Year 2013 Obligation Levels 
by Cost Center: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Food service: $408 million: 6%; 
Non-BOP medical care: $420 million: 6%; 
BOP medical care[A]: $595 million: 9%; 
Privately operated secure contract facilities: $624 million: 10%; 
Correctional services: $1.5 billion: 23%; 
Other cost centers (cost centers each representing under 5% of 
obligations)[B]: $3 billion: 46%. 

Source: GAO analysis of BOP data. GAO-14-821. 

Notes: The budget data for all cost centers include all staff 
salaries, operational supplies, contract services, equipment, and 
other items related to that department. BOP organizes its 
cost centers based on location within the organization; thus, there 
are cost centers at the institution level, regional level, national 
training level, national program level, Central Office level, and 
contract confinement level. Institution-level cost centers--which 
represent the majority of BOP obligations--are further broken down by 
security level (e.g., high, medium, low, etc.). For the purposes of 
our review, we combined the various institution security-level 
cost centers into common cost centers for all institutions. This 
allows us to present data on, for example, correctional services, BOP 
medical care, and so forth, for all institutions BOP-wide. 

According to BOP, it considers some funds obligated within the "Other 
cost centers" category to be part of the larger cost centers displayed 
in figure 1. Including BOP's estimates of these funds in the totals of 
the larger cost centers listed above would change totals approximately 
as follows: 

* Correctional services: An additional $100 million if special 
projects, urinalysis surveillance, clothing allowances, and other 
items were included. 

* Medical services (both BOP and non-BOP): An additional $47 million 
if referral labs, dialysis, emergency airlift, and other items were 
included. 

* Food service: An additional $10 million if farm and special projects 
were included. 

* Private operated secure facilities: An additional $11 million if BOP 
privatization staff salaries were included. 

* Recategorizing these obligations would subsequently reduce the Other 
cost centers category to approximately $2.8 billion, or 42% of totals 
for fiscal year 2013. 

In addition, according to BOP, staff at institutions--regardless of 
the cost center functions that they primarily serve--are trained as 
correctional officers and thus may be called upon to assist in 
correctional services or other functions whenever necessary. 

[A] The BOP medical care cost center also contains approximately $103 
million in funds transferred to pay salaries and other costs 
associated with Public Health Services staff. According to BOP, these 
are medical professionals employed by the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) who provide medical services to BOP institutions. 
While these Public Health Services staff are technically paid by HHS, 
BOP transfers the necessary funds to HHS to pay for their services. 

[B] The "other cost centers" category contains a number of cost 
centers that together account for 46 percent of BOP's total costs, as 
shown above; however, individually, each cost center included 
in the "other" category accounts for 5 percent or less of BOP's total 
costs. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 2 provides further information on the key cost centers 
represented above. 

Figure 2: Descriptions of Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Largest Cost 
Centers: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated data] 

Correctional services: 

Costs necessary to ensure institutional security. The majority of the 
costs are related to salaries and benefits for correctional officers. 
Additional minor operating costs are incurred in this cost center 
for security-related items such as gloves, utility belts, flashlights, 
detail pouches, handcuffs/restraints, batons, etc. 

BOP medical care: 

Costs incurred for all medical services provided inside of BOP 
facilities, such as salaries and benefits for medical staff (including 
Public Health Services staff), pharmaceuticals, contract staff, and 
hospital services in instances where outside providers visit a BOP 
institution to provide services. Additional costs for medical 
equipment and supplies are incurred in this cost center. 

Non-BOP medical care: 

Costs incurred whenever inmates are sent outside of an institution to 
a local health care provider (e.g., hospital or treatment clinic) to 
receive services that BOP cannot provide in-house at that location. 
Such costs include hospital services, outside services provided under 
contractual arrangements, overtime paid to correctional officers 
necessary to accompany inmates on outside visits, and the use of 
contract guard services (for low-security inmates) to monitor inmates 
during hospital stays, based on correctional services policies and 
procedures. 

Privately operated secure contract facilities: 

Privately operated secure contract facilities are secure institutions 
operated by private corporations. BOP has contracts in place with 14 
private facilities across the nation. The majority of BOP inmates in 
private facilities are sentenced criminal aliens who may be deported 
upon completion of their sentences. 

Food services: 

Costs of food provided to BOP inmates, as well as salaries and 
benefits for food service workers and food preparation equipment. 

Other: 

Contains a number of cost centers that incur costs at the institution 
level, such as Facilities Maintenance and Equipment, Purchased 
Utilities, Drug Treatment, Psychology Services, Religious 
Services, Unit Management, Inmate Services, Safety, Institution 
Administration (Human Resource Management, Financial Management, Local 
Computer Services, Executive Staff), Education, Recreation, and local 
staff training. It also contains cost centers that incur costs at the 
regional and national levels, such as Information Systems and various 
administrative expenses, as well as other contract confinement costs, 
such as residential reentry centers and contract state and local 
facilities/jails. 

Source: BOP. GAO-14-821. 

[End of figure] 

Within its cost centers, the majority of costs across the bureau are 
payment of staff salaries and benefits. Detailed data on these 
expenses are tracked using budget object and subobject 
classifications. These budget classifications are used consistently 
across all cost centers and represent items or services actually 
purchased by BOP. 

Figure 3 shows the budget object classifications that accounted for 
BOP's total fiscal year 2013 obligations. 

Figure 3: Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Fiscal Year 2013 Obligation Levels 
by Object Classification: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Personnel compensation and benefits[A]: 59%: $3.9 billion; 
Other contractual services[B]: 26%: $1.7 billion; 
Supplies and materials[C]: 9%: $609 million; 
Rent, communications, and utilities: 5%: $296 million; 
Other[D]: 2%: $112 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of Bureau of Prisons data. GAO-14-821. 

Notes: Totals do not add up to 100 percent because of rounding. 

Included in these obligations are approximately $103 million in funds 
transferred to pay salaries and other costs associated with Public 
Health Services staff. According to BOP, these are medical 
professionals employed by the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) who provide medical services to BOP institutions as needed. 
While these Public Health Services staff are technically paid by HHS, 
BOP transfers the necessary funds to HHS to pay for their services. 

[A] Personnel compensation and personnel benefits are actually two 
separate object classifications, but were combined for the purposes of 
this figure. 

[B] "Other contractual services" covers obligations for contractual 
services for advisory and assistance services (including contract 
staff), purchases of goods and services from government accounts; 
operation and maintenance of facilities and equipment; payments for 
medical care, research and development contracts; subsistence and 
support of persons; and other services not otherwise classified. 

[C] "Supplies and materials" covers obligations for commodities 
whether acquired by formal contract or other form of purchase that 
are: ordinarily consumed or expended within 1 year after they are put 
into use, converted in the process of construction or manufacture, or 
used to form a minor part of equipment or fixed property. Examples 
include food, pharmaceuticals, clothing, and office supplies. 

[D] Other object classifications include equipment, travel and 
transportation of persons, and other items. 

[End of figure] 

As figure 3 shows, personnel compensation and benefits (retirement 
contributions, health insurance benefits, etc.) account for 
approximately 59 percent of BOP's overall obligations. Moreover, BOP's 
personnel costs are actually higher than 59 percent because 
compensation for other staff employed on a contractual basis is 
included in the "other contractual services" object class. This object 
class consists of privately operated prison expenses, outside medical 
services, and other items--as well as contract staff--and accounts for 
nearly 26 percent of fiscal year 2013 obligations. See appendix IV for 
more detailed data on object and subobject class obligations from 
fiscal years 2009 through 2013. 

BOP Has Identified and Implemented Various Cost Savings Efforts: 

BOP's Director, in an April 2014 statement before Congress, 
highlighted BOP's commitment to stewardship of financial resources by 
seeking cost avoidance and greater efficiencies throughout 
the bureau.[Footnote 29] In accordance with this focus, BOP has 
embarked on a number of initiatives in recent years that have resulted 
in actual or projected cost savings. Key initiatives for which BOP has 
estimated cost savings over the last 3 fiscal years are listed in 
table 1. 

Table 1: Examples of Cost-Savings Initiatives Adopted by the Bureau of 
Prisons (BOP): 

Cost savings initiative: Renegotiated medical contracts; 
Description: BOP's institutions attempt to contract with medical 
service providers to set a fee structure for necessary services that 
BOP cannot provide in-house. These contracts typically establish a 
rate of payment for services at a certain premium over a benchmark, 
such as standard Medicare rates. Savings are generated by trying to 
reduce premiums paid over the Medicare rate for many BOP medical 
services contracts; 
Estimated cost savings[A]: BOP reports that from April 2013 through 
April 2014, it has saved nearly $33 million through renegotiated 
contracts. 

Cost savings initiative: Industries, Education, and Vocational 
Training efficiency efforts; 
Description: Industries, Education, and Vocational Training Division 
recorded cost-saving items (most of which are related to Federal 
Prison Industry operations) completed during fiscal year 2013. These 
items represent cost savings efforts identified through the use of 
Lean Six Sigma methodologies, such as changes to warehouse lighting or 
materials processing.[B] BOP reports that it recently developed a 
process to validate the actual cost savings achieved through these 
efforts, and plans to validate cost savings for fiscal year 2014 
efforts; 
Estimated cost savings[A]: BOP reports estimated savings of about $14 
million in nonappropriated funds (i.e., the costs of operating Federal 
Prison Industry programs) during fiscal year 2013. 

Cost savings initiative: Administrative efficiencies; 
Description: During fiscal year 2013, BOP conducted a reorganization 
of its regional offices and administrative operations, which resulted 
in a reduction of 60 positions; 
Estimated cost savings[A]: BOP reports salary savings of approximately 
$7.2 million in fiscal year 2013, with additional operational savings. 

Cost savings initiative: National Paving Project; 
Description: Minimum security inmates from one BOP institution have 
performed road-paving services at 30 BOP institutions over the last 2 
1/2 years, in lieu of hiring contractors to perform such work; 
Estimated cost savings[A]: BOP estimates that this project has saved a 
minimum of about $2 million versus the cost of employing a contractor, 
and officials believe that actual savings have been higher when taking 
into account factors such as markup and overhead associated with the 
use of a contractor. 

Cost savings initiative: Information technology savings; 
Description: BOP is involved with a Department of Justice (DOJ)-level 
working group to identify areas for savings by combining the 
purchasing power of DOJ components. For example, BOP is using DOJ's 
enterprise license agreements for Microsoft, Oracle, and Adobe 
products; 
Estimated cost savings[A]: BOP reports that through use of another DOJ 
component's delivery order contract, it has saved about $2.4 million 
in purchase and maintenance agreements. BOP does not track cost 
savings through the aforementioned enterprise license agreements. 

Cost savings initiative: Food digester; 
Description: A machine that converts food waste into gray water, which 
is disposed of through the institution's sewer system, rather than at 
a landfill, saving BOP on landfill costs. BOP currently has 94 units 
in place at various institutions, with another 10 awaiting 
installation; 
Estimated cost savings[A]: According to data provided by BOP, we 
calculate that these units may save approximately $1.8 million 
annually across BOP. 

Cost savings initiative: Telemedicine; 
Description: Use of videoconferencing to provide clinical and 
consultative services in psychiatry and dermatology. This enables BOP 
to have a physician on contract at any location to perform these 
services, rather than contracting to bring in specialists for on-site 
consultations[C]. BOP also contracts with a company to provide remote 
interpretations of inmate X-rays, rather than paying for the service 
on-site. This approach has been in place since 2004; 
Estimated cost savings[A]: BOP estimates that it saved approximately 
$448,000 in calendar year 2013 through videoconferencing for 
dermatology services. It also states that it can make more cost-
effective decisions on medications and reduce referral and treatment 
times for inmates. BOP estimates that in fiscal year 2012 (the last 
year for which data are available), it was able to avoid approximately 
$387,000 in costs at 86 institutions through this "teleradiology" 
approach. 

Source: GAO analysis of BOP information. GAO-14-821. 

[A] All cost estimates were provided by BOP. We assessed the 
reliability of these estimates and found them sufficiently reliable to 
present as estimated savings. 

[B] Federal Prison Industries is a federal government corporation 
overseen by BOP that, among other things, employs and provides job 
skills training to a number of federal inmates, and produces goods 
and services for sale to the federal government. Lean Six Sigma is a 
data-driven approach to process improvement based on the idea of 
eliminating defects and errors that contribute to losses of time, 
money, opportunities, or business. 

[C] BOP states that it has a total of 14 psychiatrists (filling 
20 allotted positions) providing virtual psychiatric services to 
inmates at 90 BOP institutions. The dermatologist participating in this 
program conducted 501 consultations with clinicians at 50 institutions 
during calendar year 2013. 

[End of table] 

These efforts reflect a focus on the part of both BOP management and 
staff to identify and implement cost savings initiatives, on both a 
large and a small scale. BOP-developed estimates of savings from these 
efforts total about $61 million, which is just under 1 percent of 
total obligations for fiscal year 2013. BOP officials stated that 
since such a large component of BOP's costs is related to paying 
salaries and benefits necessary to manage its inmate population, their 
ability to recognize cost savings beyond those efforts presented here 
is fairly limited. 

In addition, BOP is in varying stages of taking additional actions 
such as converting inmate case files from paper to electronic records 
that may reduce costs--for which it has not determined or provided 
savings estimates--that can be found in appendix V. According to BOP 
officials, they may undertake such initiatives in order to operate 
more efficiently, and these initiatives may also result in immediate 
cost savings. However, the officials said that they do not always 
develop cost savings estimates for initiatives whose primary purpose 
is to improve efficiency, rather than achieve cost savings. 

BOP Has Designed Internal Processes to Identify Opportunities for 
Additional Cost Efficiencies, but Could Improve the Monitoring of 
Corrective Actions: 

BOP Has Designed Mechanisms to Identify Opportunities for Cost 
Efficiencies: 

BOP has various mechanisms to identify opportunities for cost 
efficiencies, including the following: 

* Strategic Plan. BOP's Strategic Plan helps guide its efforts in 
fulfilling its mission and achieving strategic goals. As one strategic 
goal, BOP states that it will manage its operations and resources in 
an effective manner that encourages innovation, and that it 
"continually strives toward improvements in its effective use of 
resources and its efficient delivery of services."[Footnote 30] 
Further, BOP has developed a strategic objective focused on cost 
efficiency and innovation, stating that it will continue to focus on 
reducing costs using efficient and cost-effective methods to perform 
tasks. According to the Strategic Plan, it will accomplish this 
through, in part, "continued emphasis on financial planning, analyzing 
workload and staffing requirements, using consolidated and shared 
services, increasing the use of technology, and refining the processes 
of the BOP." In support of this strategic objective, BOP requires that 
institutions and regions submit to Central Office established local 
best practices or cost savings measures that can be shared and 
replicated at other institutions. 

* Cost Efficiencies and Innovations Catalog. This product is a 
compendium of institution-level efficiency efforts and innovations 
that serves as a reference for other institutions. The catalog is a 
result of efforts to identify cost efficiencies as stated in BOP's 
Strategic Plan. To compile this catalog, BOP's Central Office 
surveys institutions twice a year regarding new or ongoing efforts 
that they consider to be local best practices in achieving cost 
efficiencies. After compiling the catalog, BOP distributes it bureau-
wide, including to program managers at all institutions. Some examples 
of cost-efficiency efforts identified and shared throughout BOP via 
this catalog include efforts in recycling material and food waste, 
water and energy conservation, use of video conferencing, and inmate 
training and education. Institutional officials we spoke with reported 
that they were aware of and reviewed this catalog. BOP institution- 
level staff estimated that the catalog issued in March 2013 
contained items saving tens of millions of dollars in expenses. 
[Footnote 31] 

* Best practices internal site. In April 2007, BOP implemented an 
internal information-sharing site designed to facilitate bureau-wide 
communication of efforts that have resulted in cost efficiencies to 
bureau staff or inmates. This reference tool includes links to cost 
reduction initiatives, energy conservation efforts, and other items 
that have been reviewed and vetted by subject matter experts as having 
demonstrated their value to BOP. The website includes institution-led 
efforts such as battery-recycling operations and improved efficiencies 
to water-heating systems. 

* General staff/program area meetings. Officials at BOP's Central 
Office, regional offices, and selected institutions with whom we spoke 
all cited frequent communication between and among program officials 
and executive staff regarding items such as general operations, budget 
and cost levels, staffing levels and use of overtime, health care 
topics, and other items. These officials frequently cited the 
quarterly executive staff meeting, which includes assistant 
directors from Central Office and the six regional directors, as a key 
meeting for these discussions. At these meetings, among other things, 
officials present and discuss position papers that lay out information 
on initiatives that may have the potential for cost savings. For 
instance, at one meeting, the participants discussed a paper 
describing ongoing efforts to convert BOP's Inmate Case Files from a 
paper-based system to an electronic system, ultimately saving staff 
resources. 

* Internal control. Internal control is an integral component of an 
organization's management that is to provide reasonable assurance that 
objectives are achieved, including the efficiency of operations. We 
focused our review on BOP's internal control objective related to 
achieving operational efficiencies. Given this, we reviewed the 
elements of BOP's internal control system that specifically provide 
BOP with opportunities to identify cost efficiencies, and found that 
BOP's internal control processes align with Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government. Table 2 provides examples and 
descriptions of BOP's specific internal control processes, organized 
by internal control standard, that allow it to identify opportunities 
for cost efficiencies. We did not independently test BOP's internal 
controls to determine whether they mitigate all possible risks and are 
operating as intended. 

Table 2: Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Internal Control Processes That 
Provide Opportunities to Identify Cost Efficiencies by Internal 
Control Standard: 

Internal control standard: Environment; 
Management and employees should establish and maintain an environment 
throughout the organization that sets a positive and supportive 
attitude toward internal control and conscientious management. It 
provides discipline and structure as well as the climate which 
influences the quality of internal control; 
BOP process: 
* Central Office oversight; 
BOP's use in identifying opportunities for cost efficiencies: BOP 
Central Office's Program Review Division oversees compliance with the 
Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular A-123 and conducts 
the internal review of administrative and operational functions 
bureau- wide[A]. As noted above, BOP's Strategic Plan also includes a 
strategic goal to continually strive toward improvements in effective 
use of resources and efficient delivery of services. As noted above, 
BOP's Director has stated BOP's commitment to stewardship of financial 
resources. For instance, in BOP's fiscal year 2015 Budget Request, the 
Director stated that the agency will continue to seek cost avoidance 
and find efficiencies throughout the agency. 

Internal control standard: Risk assessment; 
Internal control should provide for an assessment of the risks the 
agency faces from both external and internal sources; 
BOP process: 
* Control Evaluation Template; 
* Management Assessment; 
BOP's use in identifying opportunities for cost efficiencies: The 
Control Evaluation Template is a documented list of controls, and the 
risk each control is intended to mitigate, in compliance with OMB 
Circular A-123. For example, one identified risk is an error in 
payment. BOP's Management Assessment process includes documenting 
risks within BOP's major program areas (e.g. Food Services). Assessing 
risk informs the development of internal control and, consequently, 
guides the internal control review process. For instance, one 
identified risk is the probability of not conducting inventory 
properly, which could affect the accuracy of data used when 
formulating and submitting a budget. For each risk assessment tool, 
BOP assesses the magnitude and likelihood of each risk. 

Internal control standard: Control activities; Control activities help 
ensure that management's directives are carried out. The control 
activities should be effective and efficient in accomplishing the 
agency's control objectives, including achieving efficiencies; 
BOP process: 
* Control Evaluation Template; 
* Program statements (policy); 
* Program review guidelines (Internal control testing plan); 
BOP's use in identifying opportunities for cost efficiencies: The 
Control Evaluation Template documents internal controls, designed to 
mitigate identified risks. The template also includes control testing 
results, in compliance with OMB Circular A-123. For example, certain 
BOP management review and approval chains are designed to mitigate 
the risk of improper payment. Program statements are internal policy 
documents that outline program requirements, including key internal 
control activities. For instance, program statements note that staff 
are to monitor the performance of and payments to contractors. Program 
review guidelines serve as a guide to conducting internal reviews of 
program areas' operations and administrative activities, to ensure 
that key internal controls are strong and operated effectively (i.e., 
internal control testing). Program reviews document the results of 
this internal review process. For example, the guideline directs the 
reviewer to assess whether and how well staff conduct inventory and 
the program review documents the results of that assessment. 

Internal control standard: 
Information and communication; Information should be recorded and 
communicated to management and others within the entity who need it 
and in a form and within a time frame that enables them to carry out 
their internal control and other responsibilities; 
BOP process: Program review results; Quarterly program review 
summaries; 
BOP's use in identifying opportunities for cost efficiencies: BOP 
documents and shares internal review results with the organization 
that is reviewed, which are generally institutions. Quarterly program 
review summaries compile numerous internal review results and 
highlight frequent internal control deficiencies and other significant 
findings. BOP distributes these summaries bureau-wide. For example, if 
a significant finding related to an inventory process is identified at 
one institution, the summary would cite the issue anonymously for 
other institutions' awareness. As noted above, BOP also has two 
efforts--the Cost Efficiencies and Innovations Catalog and the best 
practices intranet site--to communicate efficiency and cost-saving 
efforts. 

Internal control standard: Monitoring; Internal control monitoring 
should assess the quality of performance over time and ensure that the 
findings of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved; 
BOP process: Corrective action plan; 
BOP's use in identifying opportunities for cost efficiencies: 
Within BOP, the subject of an internal review is responsible for 
devising and completing a corrective action plan to resolve any 
internal control deficiency or other finding. For example, if an 
institution did not conduct a quarterly inventory of property in a 
certain program area, the institution is responsible for mitigating 
the risk of inaccurate agency records. 
BOP's Program Review Division monitors whether corrective action has 
been taken by the specific organization or program that is reviewed. A 
follow-up internal review eventually verifies whether the corrective 
action is adequate. The frequency with which a subsequent review 
occurs depends on the likelihood of risk as determined during the 
Management Assessment process. For example, BOP conducts internal 
reviews of certain institutions' operations, at a frequency 
ranging from once a year to once every 3 years. 

Source: GAO analysis of BOP information. GAO-14-821. 

[A] Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-123, Management's 
Responsibility for Internal Control, defines management's 
responsibility for internal control in federal agencies. The circular 
states that federal employees must ensure that resources are used 
efficiently and effectively to achieve desired objectives. Internal 
controls are the tools (organization, policies, and procedures) to 
help managers achieve results, including operational efficiency. 

[End of table] 

BOP's Internal Control System Helps Identify Opportunities to Achieve 
Efficiencies, but Lacks a Mechanism to Consistently Monitor Bureau-
wide Corrective Actions: 

We found that BOP's internal control system is designed to identify 
additional opportunities for cost efficiencies, but BOP did not 
provide specifics or documentation on a mechanism to consistently 
monitor bureau-wide corrective actions. Program reviews--which 
document the results of the Program Review Division's (PRD) internal 
reviews of programs and operations at each BOP institution-- 
collectively cited repeated frequent control deficiencies and 
significant findings over multiple time periods that present 
inefficiencies or could increase costs.[Footnote 32] However, for 
these repeated issues, BOP did not provide specifics or documentation 
for how its corrective actions were always monitored consistently to 
ensure that the actions addressed the issues bureau-wide.[Footnote 33] 
Specifically, we reviewed BOP's quarterly program review summaries--
which compile each quarter's internal review results and highlight 
frequent deficiencies and significant findings--for the years 2009- 
2013 to identify significant findings as well as the most frequent 
internal control deficiencies reported with respect to opportunities 
to achieve cost efficiencies in the highest-cost areas identified 
above. According to our review of these 20 quarterly summaries, 
frequent deficiencies or significant findings were repeatedly reported 
in three high-cost areas--time and attendance (14 of 20 quarters), 
food services (8 of 20 quarters), and RRC contract administration (6 
of 20 quarters). 

BOP has processes to identify and share information about these 
frequent and significant deficiencies. In particular, PRD disseminates 
its quarterly program review summaries to all BOP institutions and the 
other Central Office divisions to make them aware of these 
deficiencies. For instance, we found that officials from the Central 
Office Divisions with oversight over the repeated frequent 
deficiencies and significant findings that we analyzed--the Human 
Resource Management Division (HRMD), Health Services Division (HSD), 
and Reentry Services Division (RSD)--were aware of them. 

Moreover, one of the divisions, HRMD, formulated a corrective action 
plan and has systematically taken steps to address and monitor 
progress toward resolving reported deficiencies and findings related 
to time and attendance that were identified at multiple institutions 
across multiple time periods. For instance, BOP's program reviews 
identified control issues related to time and attendance in 14 of the 
20 quarters from 2009 through 2013, such as inaccurate time and 
attendance records and the lack of appropriate documentation to 
support payment. These reported issues could lead to payment errors, 
such as incorrectly compensating staff for overtime. HRMD officials 
reported that, as a result of these issues, they implemented policy 
changes, such as developing mandatory training and requiring that each 
human resource office audit a representative sample of its time and 
attendance files annually. Further, BOP is currently transitioning to 
a web-based time and attendance reporting system, which includes 
information technology controls. Such information technology controls 
establish segregation of duties (e.g., the staff approving reported 
work hours is supervisory and different from the staff reporting the 
hours worked) and the retention of electronic records in compliance 
with rules and regulations, which officials report could help address 
the deficiencies. To consistently monitor progress toward resolving 
these issues bureau-wide, BOP's Central Office has conducted a number 
of audits of time and attendance records and reports that error rates 
in record accuracy have declined from about 5 percent in 2010 to less 
than 2 percent in 2014. 

The other two Central Office divisions with oversight over the 
repeated frequent deficiencies and significant findings that we 
analyzed--HSD and RSD--have taken actions at the national level to 
attempt to address some of the deficiencies. However, they did not 
provide specifics or documentation for how the divisions would monitor 
progress toward correcting them. With respect to HSD, BOP's internal 
reviews identified findings related to the administration and 
management of resources in its Food Services Program (constituting 
$408 million, or 6 percent, of BOP's obligations in fiscal year 2013) 
in 8 of the 20 quarters from 2009 through 2013, such as incomplete 
inventories; not properly reporting lost, damaged, or stolen property; 
or failures to adjust inventory records referenced when formulating 
and submitting an institution's budget. At the national level, BOP is 
providing training on the use of the Food Services Program's 
information system that includes a quarterly inventory control 
function, and has formed support teams to provide assistance to 
institutions identified as having deficient programs. For the staff 
performing inventory control at the local level (e.g., warehouse 
staff), the division is requesting that they attend national training 
or a similar training program. However, HSD did not provide specifics 
or documentation for establishing a mechanism that would allow it to 
monitor whether the actions taken have produced needed improvements 
within Food Services comprehensively across institutions. 

With respect to RSD, BOP's internal review identified findings related 
to RRC contract oversight and monitoring (RRC contracts constituting 
$296 million, or 4 percent, of BOP's obligations in fiscal year 2013) 
in 6 of 20 quarters from 2009 through 2013, such as monitoring reports 
not being completed on a timely basis and inaccurate payments being 
made to contractors. These reported issues could result in failing to 
address contractor performance or overpayments. In July 2013, 
Residential Reentry Management (RRM) offices nationwide were 
consolidated under the direct management of the Residential Reentry 
Management Branch (RRMB). Previously, the RRM field offices were 
under the operational control of the six BOP regional offices. 
According to BOP, this reorganization has allowed BOP to implement and 
monitor consistent practices throughout the Residential Reentry 
offices. BOP also reported that, as a result of these findings, 
management teams within the Residential Reentry Management Branch 
provide guidance to individual field offices that require corrective 
actions. Additionally, they have scheduled a national-level training 
session in September 2014 to address repeated frequent deficiencies, 
share best practices in contract monitoring, and promote consistency 
and effective oversight of RRCs. Similar to Food Services, however, RSD 
did not provide specifics or documentation for establishing a 
mechanism that would allow it to monitor whether the actions taken 
have produced needed improvements with the Residential Reentry Program 
comprehensively across RRC contracts. 

Internal control standards state that monitoring of internal controls 
should include policies and procedures for ensuring that the findings 
of audits and other reviews are promptly resolved. In particular, 
managers are to promptly evaluate findings from audits and other 
reviews, including those showing deficiencies and recommendations 
reported by auditors who evaluate agencies' operations; determine 
proper actions in response to findings and recommendations from audits 
and reviews; and complete, within established time frames, all actions 
that correct or otherwise resolve the matters brought to management's 
attention. According to the standards, the resolution is completed 
only after action that corrects identified deficiencies, produces 
improvements, or demonstrates the findings and recommendations do not 
warrant management action.[Footnote 34] 

For deficiencies and other findings associated with a particular 
institution, BOP has a mechanism to monitor corrective actions at the 
individual institution to help ensure that the deficiencies and 
findings do not reoccur at that specific location. Specifically, 
according to BOP, the responsible official of the entity reviewed 
(most often the warden of the institution) is responsible for 
developing and implementing the corrective action, and PRD monitors 
that specific institution's progress in implementing the corrective 
action. However, with respect to frequent deficiencies and significant 
findings across a number of institutions repeatedly reported over 
time, BOP did not provide specifics or documentation for establishing 
a mechanism to consistently monitor bureau-wide corrective actions to 
determine whether they are achieving desired results and helping to 
prevent similar deficiencies from occurring at different institutions 
over time. We found that in at least one instance in which 
deficiencies were repeatedly found across a number of institutions--
HRMD's process for resolving deficiencies associated with time and 
attendance--a Central Office division did successfully take 
steps to consistently monitor the deficiencies bureau-wide. 
Specifically, for the repeated frequent deficiencies 
and significant findings associated with time and attendance, we found 
that HRMD's process for implementing and monitoring its corrective 
actions has resulted in fewer errors and stronger internal controls 
related to record retention and segregation of duties, which could 
reduce the risk of erroneous payments, thereby providing BOP with 
greater assurance that it is operating more efficiently with regard to 
its staff costs across its many institutions. 

However, despite the repeated nature and recency of findings within 
the Food Services and Residential Reentry Programs, the relevant 
Central Office divisions did not provide specifics or documentation 
for how they have monitored their corrective actions to assess their 
progress toward addressing these findings across BOP institutions. 
As a result, BOP does not have reasonable assurance that actions taken 
are preventing certain frequent and significant findings from 
reoccurring at other institutions, thus hindering BOP's ability to 
achieve cost efficiencies in these two high-cost areas--accounting for 
spending of $408 million and $296.1 million in fiscal year 2013, 
respectively. By establishing a mechanism for relevant Central Office 
divisions to consistently monitor bureau-wide corrective actions and 
assess their progress in the presence of repeated frequent 
deficiencies or significant findings reported across multiple 
institutions, BOP could be better assured that it is resolving 
such deficiencies promptly and, ultimately, operating more efficiently. 
Further, although repeated frequent deficiencies and significant 
findings related to operational effectiveness and compliance-related 
issues were outside the scope of our review, such a mechanism would 
also better position BOP to resolve repeated deficiencies and 
significant findings in these areas. 

Authorities within BOP's Control to Reduce Costs Are Limited; Options 
outside of BOP's Authority Could Have a Larger Impact on Costs: 

BOP's Current Authority to Reduce Inmate Sentences Results in Limited 
Cost Savings Relative to Its Overall Budget: 

BOP has certain discretionary authorities that can affect the period 
for which an inmate is incarcerated or remains in BOP custody. We have 
previously reported on these in detail, and found that inmate 
eligibility for certain programs and lack of capacity affect BOP's use 
of them.[Footnote 35] Among these discretionary authorities are 
those that permit BOP to: 

* determine the eligibility of a foreign national offender for 
transfer to the offender's home country to serve out his or her 
sentence;[Footnote 36] 

* reduce the length of the inmate's sentence, based on inmate "good 
conduct time (GCT);"[Footnote 37] 

* determine the eligibility of an offender for participation in a 
substance abuse program (which may result in a sentence reduction of 
up to 1 year);[Footnote 38] and: 

* transfer an inmate out of prison to serve the remainder of his or 
her sentence in a residential reentry center or in home detention.
[Footnote 39] 

Table 3 describes key statutory provisions in which BOP has a role in 
reducing a federal prisoner's period of incarceration in a BOP 
institution. 

Table 3: Key Statutory Provisions Available to the Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP) to Reduce a Federal Prisoner's Period of Incarceration or Time 
in BOP Custody: 

Discretionary flexibilities: International Prisoner Transfer Program 
(IPTP), 18 U.S.C. § 4102; 
Description: The Department of Justice (DOJ) is authorized to transfer 
offenders under a sentence of imprisonment, on parole, or on probation 
to the foreign countries of which they are citizens or nationals, 
provided that there is a current treaty between the United States and 
the other country that provides for such transfer, that the offender 
has voluntarily requested the treaty transfer, and that the home 
country agrees to the transfer. BOP determines whether an inmate meets 
specific minimum eligibility requirements; if these are met, BOP 
forwards the request to DOJ's Office of Enforcement Operations. DOJ is 
responsible for determining whether an inmate is approved or denied 
for treaty transfer. 

Discretionary flexibilities: Reduction in Sentence through 
Compassionate Release, 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g), 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); 
Description: Upon motion of the Director of BOP, the court may reduce 
a term of imprisonment after considering certain factors if it finds 
that either (1) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant 
such a reduction; or (2) the inmate is at least 70 years of age, has 
served at least 30 years in prison for the offense or offenses for 
which the inmate is imprisoned, and a determination has been made by 
the Director of BOP that the inmate is not a danger to the safety of 
any person or the community; and that such a reduction is consistent 
with applicable policy statements issued by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission (USSC). 

Discretionary flexibilities: Good conduct time (GCT); 18 U.S.C. § 
3624(b); 
Description: BOP is authorized to award credit toward the service of 
an inmate's sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days per 
year of sentence served if the inmate has displayed exemplary 
compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations. To be 
eligible, the inmate must be serving a sentence of more than 
1 year other than a term of imprisonment for life. 

Discretionary flexibilities: Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program 
(RDAP), 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e); 
Description: BOP is required to provide substance abuse treatment for 
each inmate it determines has a treatable condition of substance 
abuse. BOP must, subject to the availability of appropriations, 
provide residential substance abuse treatment (and make arrangements 
for appropriate aftercare) for all eligible inmates, with priority 
provided based on proximity to release date. Through RDAP, BOP may 
reduce the sentence of an inmate convicted of a nonviolent offense who 
successfully completes the treatment program for a period of up to 1 
year. 

Discretionary flexibilities: Residential Reentry Program; 18 U.S.C. § 
3624(c); 
Description: The Director of BOP must, to the extent practicable, 
ensure that an inmate spends a portion of the final months of that 
inmate's term (not to exceed 12 months), under conditions that will 
afford the inmate a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare 
for reentry into the community. This may include a prisoner being 
placed in a residential reentry center (RRC, or halfway house).[A] As 
of April 2014, BOP supervised the operations of 200 RRCs nationwide; 
RRCs are operated by private contractors that have contracts with 
BOP.[B] 

Source: GAO analysis of federal statutes and BOP information. GAO-14-
821. 

[A] Home detention is an option for a limited number of offenders, and 
BOP requires that specific criteria be met, both with regard to the 
offender's eligibility and with having an acceptable home environment 
for home detention. By statute, an eligible offender may be placed in 
home detention for the shorter of 10 percent of the term of 
imprisonment or 6 months. 

[B] BOP reported that it also has 49 intergovernmental agreements for 
"work release," which it includes under its count of RRCs (for a total 
of 249); of these agreements, 40 are with state and local governments, 
and 9 are with the U.S. Marshals Service. 

[End of table] 

Of these authorities, two--IPTP and Compassionate Release--are 
programs that can result in a direct reduction of BOP's population and 
thus cost savings. The number of inmates released through these 
two programs annually is small, however, as are the estimated savings. 
For example, the estimated 2013 cost savings from these programs were 
about $2.6 million and $651,000, respectively, or about 0.04 and 
about 0.01 percent of BOP's total fiscal year 2013 appropriations of 
$6.44 billion. 

* IPTP. As of June 28, 2014, BOP had about 54,000 foreign nationals in 
its custody. However, eligibility criteria constrain the number who 
can be transferred. Specifically, inmates must voluntarily request a 
transfer to their home countries to serve out the remainder of their 
sentences, the United States must have a treaty with the home country 
permitting repatriation, eligibility for transfer must be confirmed by 
BOP, the transfer request must be approved by DOJ's Office of 
Enforcement Operations, and the home country must agree to receive 
the prisoner. Further, while the United States has treaties with 94 
foreign countries to permit IPTP transfers, the DOJ Inspector General 
(IG) reported that, as of 2010, about 22 percent of the foreign 
nationals in BOP come from countries with which there is no transfer 
agreement. In addition, as of late June 2014, almost 37,400 (17.3 
percent) of all BOP inmates were Mexican nationals (or about 70 
percent of all BOP foreign nationals). However, since 2001, Mexico has 
restricted eligibility for transfer from the United States, 
according to a 2011 DOJ IG report.[Footnote 40] 

In fiscal year 2013, DOJ approved 245 transfers out of BOP 
custody, representing less than 0.5 percent of BOP's foreign national 
population. Through these transfers, BOP estimates that it avoided 
costs of approximately $2.6 million in fiscal year 2013, or about 0.04 
percent of BOP's fiscal year 2013 $6.44 billion appropriation.
[Footnote 41] 

* Compassionate Release. We have previously reported on BOP's 
discretionary authority to request compassionate release for certain 
offenders--termed "reduction in sentence" by BOP--and found that BOP 
used this authority infrequently because of, among other things, BOP's 
eligibility criteria.[Footnote 42] Specifically, compassionate release 
of an inmate historically has been limited by BOP to terminally ill 
patients with an incurable disease and short life expectancy or to 
those who are elderly with a profoundly debilitating medical 
condition. In April 2013, the DOJ IG reported that the existing BOP 
compassionate release program had been poorly managed and implemented 
inconsistently, likely resulting in eligible inmates not being 
considered for release and in terminally ill inmates dying before 
their requests were decided.[Footnote 43] No cost savings estimate 
could be provided for earlier releases because, according to the IG 
report, BOP did not maintain cost data associated with the custody of 
inmates eligible for consideration under the program, and BOP had not 
conducted any analysis of cost savings achieved by releasing such 
inmates. 

DOJ issued a revised program statement with less restrictive criteria 
for compassionate release in August 2013. The revisions included 
making terminally ill inmates with a life expectancy of up to 18 
months eligible for consideration instead of maintaining the previous 
12-month limit.[Footnote 44] 

According to BOP data, total releases under compassionate release 
increased from 29 inmates in calendar year 2011 to 39 in calendar year 
2012, and to 61 in calendar year 2013 (including 11 released under the 
expanded criteria). An additional 2 had been released as of July 2014 
under expanded nonmedical criteria. However, as a percentage of BOP's 
population and costs, the number of affected inmates and savings 
remains small given the numerous factors involved in determining 
eligibility. Inmates released under compassionate release in calendar 
year 2013 represented about 0.03 percent of the total BOP inmate 
population, and estimated savings from the releases amounted to about 
$651,000, or about 0.01 percent of BOP's fiscal year 2013 $6.44 
billion appropriation.[Footnote 45] 

Funding and eligibility constraints also limit BOP's use of RDAP and 
RRCs to affect costs related to the number of inmates in BOP custody. 
Some cost savings can result from inmates being able to reduce their 
sentences as a result of successfully completing the RDAP program; 
however, both RDAP and RRCs are types of rehabilitation programs 
intended to reduce recidivism rather than serving as cost-saving 
mechanisms.[Footnote 46] Moreover, as RDAP and RRC are programs that 
require professional staff and resources, increasing the number of 
offender participants in either would require additional funding that 
could offset potential cost savings.[Footnote 47] 

* RDAP. We have previously reported that, according to BOP, delays 
resulting from system-wide demand for this treatment program have 
prevented timely inmate entry into RDAP and thereby reduced the number 
of eligible inmates receiving the maximum allowable sentence 
reduction. This is because by the time some inmates complete RDAP, 
they have fewer months remaining on their sentences than the maximum 
allowable reduction of 12 months.[Footnote 48] According to BOP, the 
average participant reduced his or her sentence by about 10 months in 
fiscal year 2013. 

As we have also previously concluded, increasing RDAP participation 
would cost more than the potential savings from reducing sentences by 
relatively small amounts. For example, if every eligible RDAP 
participant who completed the program in fiscal year 2011 had received 
his or her maximum sentence reduction, BOP would have been responsible 
for 15,729 fewer months of inmate incarceration, yielding an estimated 
cost savings of about $13.2 million. However, the fiscal year 2012 
request for an additional $15 million to permit more offenders to 
enter RDAP "on time" and thereby to increase their allowable sentence 
reductions would not have been enough to achieve the full 12-month 
potential reduction, meaning that expanding RDAP would have cost at 
least $1.8 million more than it would have saved. Similarly, according 
to DOJ, BOP received an increase of $15 million in RDAP funding in 
fiscal year 2014 and this funding will, by fiscal year 2016, increase 
the average sentence reduction for RDAP participants from 10 months in 
fiscal year 2013 to an estimated 11.5 months.[Footnote 49] BOP 
reported that reaching the full potential 12-month sentence reduction 
for all participants in fiscal year 2013 would have resulted in about 
$11 million in cost avoidance savings, but it did not provide a 
calculation of the cost of providing additional spaces and staff 
to permit the full sentence reduction for all participants. 

These cost savings estimates do not take into account potential long- 
term savings to society from reducing substance abuse and recidivism 
among released inmates. While RDAP may contribute to achieving such 
savings, expanding it above current levels requires an up-front cost 
that exceeds its potential cost savings for BOP in the short term. 

* RRCs. According to BOP, RRCs, or halfway houses, provide programs 
that are intended to help inmates rebuild their ties to the community 
and to thereby reduce the likelihood that they will recidivate. Run by 
private contractors, RRCs provide programs that help offenders find 
employment, and coordinate the provision of services to address 
substance abuse, medical, and mental health care with appropriate 
community providers. We have previously found that the use of RRCs is 
constrained by both eligibility criteria and funding.[Footnote 50] For 
example, inmates with detainers (other crimes for which they were 
charged but were not yet sentenced), with sentences of 6 months 
or less, or who are in civil commitment status are all ineligible for 
RRC placement.[Footnote 51] In addition, BOP officials stated that 
objections from local communities to halfway houses in residential 
neighborhoods have hindered expanding the RRC program, even when funds 
were available. 

We have previously found that not all inmates are eligible to be sent 
to an RRC prior to their release from prison, and that for those who 
are eligible, some spend only a portion of the full 12 months' 
allowable time in an RRC because of a lack of bed space and because of 
eligibility criteria.[Footnote 52] According to BOP, an increase in 
the number of offenders getting the full 12 months' allowable time 
would necessitate additional bed space, which would require both 
additional funding and additional RRC contracts. For example, in 
fiscal year 2013, BOP reported that it had 9,455 RRC beds available 
nationwide, but would have required about 30,000 beds to provide the 
maximum allowable 12 months in RRCs to all participants, or an 
addition of more than 20,500 beds above its current capacity. As noted 
above, and as we have previously reported, BOP officials explained 
that such an expansion could be challenged by local zoning 
restrictions and the unwillingness of many communities to accept 
nearby RRCs. Moreover, if such an expansion were to take place, BOP 
would need additional funding to pay for the new RRC bed space. For 
fiscal year 2013, BOP reports that the average daily cost per offender 
in an RRC was about $73, or $26,645 per year. This means that an 
increase of the more than 20,500 beds that would be required to 
achieve the allowable 12 months for all participants (at current 
program levels) would cost about $546 million annually.[Footnote 53] 
Expanding RRCs might help reduce recidivism but would require a 
substantial funding increase, equal to almost 8 percent of BOP's 
entire $6.9 billion fiscal year 2015 budget request. 

Potential Actions outside of BOP's Authority Could Reduce Prison 
Populations and Costs, and Experts Say There Are Advantages and 
Disadvantages to These Options: 

We examined cost-saving options that are outside BOP's authority and 
that are widely discussed among criminal justice policy experts, the 
USSC, and DOJ, such as instructing federal prosecutors to decline 
to charge certain defendants in certain drug cases in such a manner as 
to trigger mandatory minimum prison sentences, reducing the lengths of 
sentences specified by federal guidelines for drug offenders, or 
applying the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 
retroactively in order to provide sentences for cocaine base ("crack") 
offenders that are less disparate from those applied for possession of 
powder cocaine.[Footnote 54] Toward this end, we reviewed selected 
reports and analyses from entities chosen for their expertise in 
criminal justice issues, and had discussions with officials from DOJ, 
BOP, and the USSC. See appendix VI for more information on the 
entities we selected. Through this review, we identified eight options 
outside BOP's authority that could reduce the size of the inmate 
population. These involve potential legislative actions by Congress, 
executive orders by the President, policy changes implemented by the 
Attorney General, or changes in sentencing guidelines that could be 
promulgated by the USSC.[Footnote 55] For each of these options, we 
asked the USSC to calculate the estimated impact on the size of BOP's 
population and the potential savings that could result from 
implementation of each.[Footnote 56] See appendix VII for the USSC 
analyses of these options. For the purposes of our analysis, we 
determined that the USSC is an authoritative source for conducting 
such analysis; it has conducted similar analyses in recent years and 
published one on its website on July 25, 2014.[Footnote 57] For each 
option, the time frame (number of years) over which the option would 
take effect may vary, as well as the number and type of offenders who 
would be eligible for a changed sentence under the option. In general, 
the majority of the impact of most options was estimated by the USSC 
to occur within 5 or 6 years of implementation. However, the options 
are not all directly comparable; some would have a greater impact more 
quickly than would others, depending on the option and the number of 
potentially eligible offenders. For options that apply only 
prospectively (that is, only to future offenders)--such as the 
Attorney General's August 2013 memorandum to U.S. Attorneys--the 
potential impact is typically less than for options that would apply 
to larger numbers of currently incarcerated offenders. 

On the basis of analyses the USSC conducted of the potential results 
from implementing each of the eight options, which provided estimates 
of bed year savings, we then calculated the potential cost savings. 
[Footnote 58] Implementation of the options could range from about 
$8.7 million to almost $4.1 billion, with the potential savings 
varying based on the option implemented and the duration of the 
option. Cost savings or cost avoidance savings were calculated using 
BOP's fiscal year 2014 estimated average annual marginal cost of 
approximately $11,000. Marginal costs covers such things as security, 
food, medical care, clothing, unit management, education, records, and 
maintenance associated with additional inmates entering existing BOP 
facilities. BOP officials stated that calculating cost savings using 
marginal cost was more appropriate than using per capita costs because 
BOP is about 36 percent overcrowded system-wide, and therefore BOP 
would have to reduce its existing population by that percentage (equal 
to about 78,000 offenders in July 2014) to eliminate overcrowding 
system-wide. Until that number is reached, BOP officials stated, they 
would not be closing existing prisons and therefore would expect 
savings only in marginal costs versus average per capita costs to be 
realized. However, the use of marginal cost in calculating savings 
does not take into account the possibility that reductions in BOP 
population could permit BOP to reduce the numbers of offenders 
sufficiently to reduce staff, close some existing facilities, or avoid 
opening additional ones that would otherwise have been required. If 
the options achieved population reductions resulting in reductions in 
fixed costs, such as reducing staff or closing existing prisons, 
calculating cost savings using average annual per capita costs-- 
$29,291 in fiscal year 2013, according to BOP--would be appropriate. 
Three of the options could result in an estimated 78,000 or more 
offenders being eligible for release or eligible for sentence 
reductions over five years, which could greatly reduce or eliminate 
current overcrowding based on BOP's estimate within the same 5 years. 
[Footnote 59] Given the size of these potential reductions in sentence 
lengths and the number of eligible offenders, we calculated per capita 
cost savings for three of these options, based on the USSC estimates 
for saved bed years. We did not calculate per capita savings for a 
fourth option--changing the way that BOP calculates the amount of 
"good conduct" time that offenders earn for each year served--because 
although the number of eligible inmates would be almost 180,000, the 
reduction in sentence for each inmate would be small in contrast to 
the other three options and would occur over 30 or more years. 
Therefore, this option may be less likely to allow BOP to reduce 
staffing levels or close facilities.[Footnote 60] 

It is important to emphasize cost savings is one of many 
considerations. In particular, these options may have additional 
effects, such as on public safety. The expert entities we contacted 
identified potential advantages and disadvantages they believe 
could result from the implementation of each option, such as making 
sentences more commensurate with the crime or releasing inmates who 
may reoffend. 

We are not taking a position on any of these options. We present the 
information we obtained from the USSC and the expert entities to 
inform policymakers as they weigh whether and how to address costs at 
BOP. Specifically, in table 4, we summarize each option we presented 
to the USSC, expert entities, and the four states selected because of 
their experience with criminal justice sentencing initiatives. For 
each option, we show the USSC estimate of the number of BOP offenders 
who would likely be eligible for release or for a reduced sentence 
(leading to release) as a result of implementation. The table also 
shows the USSC estimates, if available, of the bed year savings that 
would result from implementation of each option, and our calculation 
of the cost savings that would result.[Footnote 61] In addition, we 
summarize the comments from the responding states and the expert 
entities with regard to potential advantages and disadvantages that 
could result from implementing these options. 

Table 4: Options for Changes to Sentencing Processes, Number of 
Eligible Inmates, Estimated Cost of Options, and Assessment of 
Potential Advantages and Disadvantages by Expert Entities and Four 
States with Sentencing Change Experience: 

Option 1: Reduce the length of mandatory minimum sentences for 
incarcerated drug offenders[A]: 

Description: 
Implementing this option would reduce the sentences of certain current 
incarcerated drug offenders convicted of an offense carrying a 
mandatory minimum sentence--for example, from 20 years to 10 years, 10 
years to 5 years, and 5 years to 2 years--and would release 
incarcerated offenders if they had already completed their 
recalculated sentence (i.e., if the time served exceeded the new 
sentence length). Offenders with time remaining on their sentences 
would remain in prison until they met the new (shorter) sentence 
length requirement that applies to their cases. Implementing 
this option would mean an average reduction in sentence for eligible 
offenders of 57 months (44.2 percent). 

Estimated number of inmates eligible for release or sentence 
reduction: This is estimated to be 78,102 inmates. Of these, 68,620 
(88 percent) would be eligible for release during the first 5 years 
after implementation, and 9,482 in the sixth year and after. 

Estimated bed year reduction and cost savings: It is estimated that 
370,985 bed years would be saved, or $4.1 billion.[B] Savings would 
roughly match the released numbers--about 88 percent ($3.6 billion) in 
savings would occur in the first 5 years after implementation. Given 
the size of these potential reductions in offenders and required bed 
space, per capita savings could occur, which means savings could be as 
much as $10.231 billion over the first 5 years and an additional 
$1.395 billion in the sixth year after, or a total of $11.626 
billion[C]. 

Expert-identified potential advantages: 
* This could make sentences more proportionate to the crime committed; 
* This could significantly reduce Bureau of Prisons (BOP) population, 
thereby reducing overcrowding and improving prison safety for 
prisoners and staff, as well as reducing wait lists for anti-
recidivism programs. 

Expert-identified potential disadvantages: 
* Released offenders may recidivate, which could increase crime. The 
financial and societal costs of increased crime could eclipse cost 
savings; 
* This could reduce prosecutorial leverage to get plea bargains in 
exchange for evidence against those in higher positions in a criminal 
organization; 
* This could shorten sentences too much below original intent or 
shorter sentences may be too lenient. 

[A] The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 
3207, established the basic framework of statutory penalties currently 
applicable to federal drug-trafficking offenses. The act specified 
statutory penalty ranges for manufacturing, distributing, or 
dispensing the drug, or possessing the drug with intent to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense the drug. For each of several 
drug types, the act specified separate statutory ranges for such 
offenses involving various quantities of the drug. See 21 U.S.C. § 841. 

[B] In developing its analysis, the USSC made a number of assumptions, 
including that Congress would authorize the courts (or the President 
using clemency powers) to reduce the sentences of offenders 
incarcerated on or after a specific date in a manner consistent with 
the Guidelines Manual and bound only by any mandatory minimum 
penalties that might apply in current law or as modified through the 
policy option. The bed year fiscal year 2014 average marginal cost of 
$11,000 was not adjusted for future inflation. 

[C] Estimated per capita savings were calculated using BOP fiscal year 
2014 average per capita costs of about $31,338. BOP's fiscal year 2014 
enacted Salaries and Expenses appropriation of $6.769 billion was 
divided by the July 24, 2014 population of about 216,000. Future year 
savings were not adjusted for inflation. 

Option 2: Retroactively apply the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 
reductions in drug mandatory minimum penalties to offenders 
currently incarcerated for crack cocaine-related offenses. 

Description: 
This option would retroactively apply to eligible incarcerated 
offenders the reductions in mandatory minimum penalties for crack 
cocaine-related offenses that are provisions of the Fair Sentencing 
Act (FSA) of 2010, which did not apply to offenders already sentenced 
under the original penalty guidelines.[A] The USSC amended the 
sentencing guidelines to implement these revisions effective November 
1, 2011, and also voted to apply that amendment retroactively to those 
already sentenced under the guidelines that incorporated the original 
penalty structure. However, because Congress did not make the 
statutory changes to the mandatory minimum penalties retroactive, some 
offenders were unable to receive the full or, in some cases, any 
benefit from the commission's action. This option would have the 
effect of applying the new, lesser mandatory minimum penalties 
retroactively to currently incarcerated offenders. 

Estimated number of inmates eligible for release or sentence 
reduction: An estimated 8,468 inmates would be eligible; 6685 (79 
percent) would be eligible for release over a period of 5 years 
following implementation.[B]. 

Estimated bed year reduction and cost savings: It is estimated that 
37,400 bed years would be saved, or about $411 million. Of the total, 
about $325 million would be saved over first 5 years; and about 
another $86 million in the sixth year and after[C]. 

Expert-identified potential advantages: 
* This could enhance fairness in federal sentencing by making the 
sentence more commensurate with the crime. By applying 
the same sentences for the same crime retroactively, it could increase 
prison safety by reducing potential inmate conflict; 
* This could reduce BOP population, thereby reducing overcrowding and 
improving prison safety; it could allow BOP to shift fund to other 
priorities; 
* This could release offenders deemed to be at low risk for 
reoffending and at high likelihood for successful reentry; it could 
increase the likelihood of successful reentry and therefore save money. 

Expert-identified potential disadvantages: 
* Released offenders may recidivate, which could increase crime; 
* Reductions in sentence length after conviction and sentencing could 
reduce prosecutors' ability to negotiate a plea bargain in future 
cases. 

[A] The mandatory minimums revised by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, had been enacted in the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, which included 
the federal criminal law distinction between "cocaine base" and other 
forms of cocaine. The thresholds triggering the 10-year penalty--5 
kilograms of powder cocaine and 50 grams of cocaine base--created a 
100-to-1 quantity ratio. The identical ratio was reflected in the 5-
year mandatory minimum thresholds as well: 500 grams of powder cocaine 
and five grams of cocaine base both triggered the 5-year penalty. 
Among other things, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 increased the 
quantities of crack cocaine that trigger the 5-and 10-year statutory 
mandatory minimum penalties--from 5 grams to 28 grams for 5-year 
mandatory minimums and from 50 to 280 grams for 10-year mandatory 
minimums--and eliminated the 5-year mandatory minimum for simple 
possession of crack cocaine. 

[B] USSC data permitted calculation of bed year savings based 
on 8,468 cases. 

[C] In developing its analysis, the USSC made a number of assumptions, 
including that Congress would authorize the courts by statute to 
reduce the sentences of offenders in accordance with the Guidelines 
Manual in effect on a specific date and bound only by the mandatory 
minimum penalties as amended by the FSA. The bed year fiscal year 2014 
average marginal cost of $11,000 was not adjusted for future inflation. 

Option 3: Avoid charging future low-level nonviolent drug offenders 
with a charge that results in a mandatory sentence. 

Description: 
This option has been implemented as part of the August 2013 direction 
issued by the Attorney General instructing prosecutors in cases 
involving the applicability of drug law mandatory minimum sentences 
based on drug type and quantity to decline to charge the quantity 
necessary to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence if the defendant 
meets particular criteria[A]. 

Estimated number of inmates eligible for release or sentence 
reduction: The Attorney General's August 2013 direction applies only 
to future offenders (i.e., it is not retroactive). The USSC estimates 
that it would be applicable to about 620 offenders annually each year 
for each of the next 5 years (or a total of about 3,100 offenders). 

Estimated bed year reduction and cost savings: This would result in an 
estimated savings of 788 bed years over 5 years, or about $8.7 
million[B]. 

Expert-identified potential advantages: 
* This could help restore proportionality in federal drug sentences by 
ensuring that sentence length is more commensurate with offense 
severity. It also could serve to more often appropriately defer to 
local and state prosecution in many cases; 
* It could help reduce BOP overcrowding and thereby reduce costs; 
* It could allow for more judicial or prosecutorial discretion or 
alternative treatment opportunities; 
* It could allow more use of community punishments and treatment, 
which are more likely to reduce recidivism than the same programs in 
prison. 

Expert-identified potential disadvantages: 
* Released offenders may recidivate, which could increase crime; 
* This could reduce prosecutorial leverage to get plea bargains in 
exchange for evidence against those higher up in a criminal 
organization; 
* A change in policy could be quickly reversed by a different 
administration or by Congress; 
* This could provide increased discretion to prosecutors, which could 
make it difficult to ensure consistency in application. 

[A] According to the USSC, this option is comparable to making certain 
changes in application of the safety valve. 

[B] Bed year fiscal year 2014 average marginal cost of $11,000 was not 
adjusted for future inflation. USSC estimates for this option are 
based on the USSC's understanding of the implementation of the 
criteria established by DOJ in this policy; however, ultimate savings 
will depend on how DOJ personnel interpret and apply these criteria in 
practice. 

Option 4: Amend USSC sentencing guidelines for future drug offenders, 
reducing them two levels below current guidelines[A]. 

Description: 
This option would reduce the potential sentences for all future drug 
offenders by two levels below current guidelines, resulting in a 
roughly 18 percent reduction of sentence length below current 
lengths[B]. 

Estimated number of inmates eligible for release or sentence 
reduction; An estimated 87,285 inmates would be eligible, based on 
17,457 annually for each of the next 5 years. 

Estimated bed year reduction and cost savings: Approximately 17,990 
bed years would be saved over 5 years, or $198million. Given the size 
of these potential reductions in offenders' sentences and required bed 
space, per capita savings could occur; which means savings could be as 
much as $564 million over the first 5 years[C]. 

Expert-identified potential advantages: 
* This could significantly reduce average sentences, reducing BOP 
overcrowding and costs; 
* It could make sentences more proportionate to the crime; 
* It could result in sentences that are individualized to the risks 
and needs of the particular offender. 

Expert-identified potential disadvantages: 
* Released offenders may recidivate, which could increase crime; 
* Overall reduction of guideline length does not address the specific 
offender risks and needs. Unilateral reduction in sentences could be a 
relatively blunt approach to reducing sentences for all types of drug 
offenders; 
* This may not address issues raised by statutory mandatory minimum 
sentences or differentiate among crimes committed by offenders 
receiving a reduced sentence. 

[A] This option was approved by a vote of the USSC on April 10, 2014, 
and transmitted to Congress on April 30, 2014; the proposed amendment 
will go into effect on November 1, 2014, unless Congress acts to 
modify or disapprove the amendment to the sentencing guidelines. 

[B] According to the USSC, if this option was implemented, and if the 
courts were to grant the full reduction possible in each case, the 
projected new average sentence for the eligible offenders would 
be 51 months versus a current average of 62 months, or a reduction of 
about 18 percent. 

[C] Per capita savings were calculated using BOP fiscal year 2014 
average per capita costs. BOP's fiscal year 2014 enacted Salaries and 
Expenses appropriation of $6.769 billion was divided by the July 24, 
2014, population of about 216,000. Future-year savings were not 
adjusted for inflation. 

Option 5: Apply the amendments to sentencing guidelines in option 4 
also to incarcerated drug offenders--that is, to both new 
drug offenders and retroactively to incarcerated drug offenders[A]. 

Description: 
Under this option, the provisions of option 4 would apply both to new 
drug offenders and also retroactively to incarcerated drug 
offenders. This would reduce the sentences for all future and currently 
incarcerated drug offenders by two levels below current USSC 
guidelines, resulting in a roughly 19 percent reduction below current 
lengths[B]. 

Estimated number of inmates eligible for release or sentence 
reduction: An estimated 132,635 inmates would be eligible for 
sentence reductions (87,285 from option 4 and 45,350 from applying 
option 4 retroactively). 

Estimated bed year reduction and cost savings: This is estimated to 
save 81,303 bed years over the first 5 years, saving about $894.3 
million. (17,990 bed years from future cost avoidance and 63,313 bed 
years saved from retroactively applying the reduction in sentence 
lengths). For retroactivity over a period of 6 or more years, an 
estimated additional 16,426 bed years would be saved, producing an 
additional $181 million in savings.[C] (Future-year cost avoidance 
savings beyond the first 5 years were not calculated). Given the size 
of these potential reductions in offenders and required bed space, per 
capita savings could occur; which means savings could be as much as 
$2.548 billion over the first 5 years, and an additional $515 
million in the sixth year and after. This would mean a total savings 
of about $3.1 billion[D]. 

Expert-identified potential advantages[E]: 
* This could reduce BOP population, thereby reducing overcrowding and 
improving prison safety; it would increase the ability to shift 
(saved) funds to other priorities such as rehabilitation programs; 
* It could enhance fairness and proportionality in sentencing by 
ensuring that those in BOP custody for the same crime have similar 
sentences; 
* It could reduce BOP population and therefore save money. 

Expert-identified potential disadvantages: 
* Released offenders may recidivate, which could increase crime; 
* This could reduce prosecutorial leverage to get plea bargains in 
exchange for evidence against those higher up in a criminal 
organization; 
* It could base release decisions solely upon guideline length 
reduction without a separate and current risk/needs assessment and 
without taking into consideration offender behavior and programming 
while incarcerated, which may result in increased recidivism[F]. 

[A] Applying the sentencing guidelines in option 4 retroactively to 
eligible incarcerated offenders was approved by a vote of 
the USSC on July 18, 2014; the decision amended a policy statement 
related to the proposed amendment to the sentencing guidelines. As 
such, it corresponds to the April 30 USSC decision and does not require 
separate congressional action. Unless Congress acts to modify or 
disapprove the corresponding April 30 amendment, beginning November 1, 
2014, eligible offenders can ask courts to reduce their sentences. 
Offenders whose requests are granted by the courts may not be released 
earlier than November 1, 2015. The Attorney General announced after 
the USSC vote that at his direction, BOP will begin notifying federal 
inmates of the opportunity to apply for a reduction in sentence 
immediately. BOP subsequently notified inmates about the USSC 
amendment. 

[B] According to the USSC, retroactive application of option 4 would 
result in an average sentence for those eligible of 108 months, a 
reduction of 25 months from the current average of 133 months (18.8 
percent less). The USSC also noted that sentences will be reduced 
retroactively only after consideration by a judge in each case. 

[C] According to the USSC, 80 percent of the sentence reductions, and 
hence cost avoidance savings, would occur within the first 5 years of 
implementation. Fiscal year 2014 average marginal costs of $11,000 are 
not adjusted for future inflation. The remainder of the savings would 
occur over nearly 25 years, because of the length of the sentences of 
some of those potentially eligible. 

[D] Per capita savings were calculated using BOP fiscal year 2014 
average per capita costs. BOP's fiscal year 2014 enacted Salaries and 
Expenses appropriation of $6.769 billion was divided by the July 24, 
2014, population of about 216,000. Future-year savings were not 
adjusted for inflation. 

[E] Expert entities were asked to comment on this option before it was 
approved. The approved version delays implementation by 1 year (to 
November 2015). Since this did not affect the substance of the 
proposed change, we report the experts' comments as stated to us. 

[F] The USSC notes that sentences will be reduced retroactively only 
after consideration by a judge in each case. The option reviewed by 
expert entities did not have this requirement as it was approved by 
the USSC after the list of options had been sent to the expert 
entities for review and comment. 

Option 6: Increase good time credits for good conduct time (GCT). 

Description: 
BOP has discretionary authority to award credit toward the service of 
an inmate's sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days per 
year of sentence served if the inmate has displayed exemplary 
compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations. As applied by 
BOP, this actually results in 47 days earned per year of sentence 
imposed because inmates do not earn GCT credit for years they do not 
ultimately serve because of being released early.[A] Under this 
option, the GCT credit would be awarded to current offenders using a 
formula that would result in 54 days' credit per year of sentence, 
rather than the current BOP interpretation that limits the GCT credit 
to 47 days per sentence year. This would result in eligible inmates 
serving 85 percent of their sentence, rather than the higher 87 
percent average resulting from BOP's current interpretation of 18 
U.S.C. § 3624(b). 

Estimated number of inmates eligible for release or sentence 
reduction: Approximately 179,265 inmates would be eligible. 

Estimated bed year reduction and cost savings: This would save 34,359 
bed years, saving $378 million, of which $246 million (65 percent) 
would occur during the first 5 years after implementation. The 
remaining $132 million would be saved in the sixth year and after. 
(According to a DOJ 2012 analysis of this potential change in 
calculating the GCT credit, it would take more than 30 years for all 
eligible inmates to be affected, given the length of some sentences.). 

Expert-identified potential advantages[B]: 
* This could reduce BOP population/overcrowding, which has positive 
consequences, such as decreasing wait lists for recidivism programs, 
increasing safety, or freeing up resources for other priorities; 
* It could incentivize participation in programming aimed at reducing 
recidivism, promoting successful reentry; 
* It could save money over the long term through reduced recidivism. 

Expert-identified potential disadvantages: 
* It could require additional slots or spaces for inmates to 
participate in qualifying programming, thereby requiring more funding; 
* It could undermine "truth in sentencing," which was the goal of 
mandatory sentences and public confidence in the criminal justice 
system; 
* Released offenders may recidivate despite participation in 
programming, thus increasing crime. For instance, inmates could 
"game the system" to get admitted to antirecidivism programs in order 
to get a reduced sentence. 

[A] See GAO-12-320 for further discussion of these issues. 

[B] Expert entities were asked to comment on both good conduct time 
credits and credited time that might be earned through participation 
in anti-recidivism programs, including substance abuse programs. 
However, because such programs incur costs, rather than producing cost 
savings, and participation rates could not be specified, we asked the 
USSC to estimate the potential savings from a change in the way that 
GCT is credited by BOP for current federal inmates. 

Option 7: Make the current "safety valve" available to any drug 
offender with no offenses that receive 3 points under the criminal 
history point system[A]. 

Description: 
Under this option, the current statutory requirements for eligibility 
for "safety valve" relief in drug cases involving a mandatory minimum 
penalty would be expanded to cover incarcerated offenders with any 
number of criminal history points under USSC guidelines, provided that 
the offender does not have a conviction for which the sentence imposed 
was a 3-point offense under USSC sentencing guidelines. The courts 
would be authorized to resentence all federal offenders convicted 
of a drug offense in a manner consistent with the revised statute[B]. 

Estimated number of inmates eligible for release or sentence 
reduction: Approximately 11,949 inmates would be eligible (applies 
only retroactively). Of these, 10,259 (86 percent) would be released 
within the first 5 years following implementation. 

Estimated bed year reduction and cost savings: This would save15,889 
bed years, saving $175 million.[C] Of this, about $150.5 million (86 
percent) would be saved within the first 5 years following 
implementation. 

Expert-identified potential advantages: 
* It could reduce BOP population/overcrowding, which has positive 
consequences, such as decreasing wait lists for recidivism programs, 
increasing safety, or freeing up resources for other priorities; 
* It could increases judicial discretion, resulting in less severe and 
more proportionate and fair sentences; 
* It could help reduce BOP overcrowding and thereby reduce costs. 

Expert-identified potential disadvantages: 
* Released offenders may recidivate, which could increase crime; 
* It could reduce prosecutorial leverage to get plea bargains in 
exchange for evidence against those higher up in a criminal 
organization; 
* It may not address issues raised by statutory mandatory minimum 
sentences or differentiate among crimes committed by offenders 
receiving a reduced sentence. For example, point systems are 
inflexible; change must recognize that three 1-point offenses are not 
the same as one 3-point offense. 

[A] The safety valve was created by the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, which 
directed that certain defendants sentenced for certain drug offenses 
who meet specified criteria would not be subject to mandatory minimum 
penalties. Accordingly, only defendants sentenced after the guideline 
amendment's November 1, 1987, effective date who satisfy the safety 
valve requirements would be eligible for the reduced term of 
imprisonment. 

[B] USSC guidelines are used to determine prison sentences based 
primarily on two factors: (1) the conduct associated with the offense 
(the offense conduct, which produces the offense level) and (2) the 
defendant's criminal history (the criminal history category). In 
general, criminal history points are calculated by adding 3 points for 
each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding 1 year and 1 month; 
adding 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least 60 
days but not more than 13 months; adding 1 point for each prior 
sentence of less than 60 days, and so forth. This option would make 
more drug offenders eligible for sentencing by judges who would not 
be required to solely follow mandatory sentencing guidelines. 

[C] The bed year fiscal year 2014 average annual marginal cost of 
$11,000 is not adjusted for future inflation. 

Option 8: Expand the safety valve as described in option 7 to include 
both nonviolent drug offenders and any nonviolent offenders provided 
that they do not have a 3-point offense. 

Description: 
Under this option, the current statutory requirements for eligibility 
for "safety valve" relief in drug cases involving a mandatory minimum 
penalty would be expanded to cover both drug offenders and other 
nonviolent (nondrug) offenders. No offender could have a conviction 
for which the sentence imposed was a 3-point offense under USSC 
sentencing guidelines. The courts would be authorized to resentence 
all federal offenders convicted of a nonviolent offense in a manner 
consistent with the revised statute. 

Estimated number of inmates eligible for release or sentence 
reduction: Approximately 38,930 inmates would be eligible. 

Estimated bed year reduction and cost savings: This could save 40,552 
bed years, saving about $446 million. Of this, about $397 million (89 
percent) would be saved in the first 5 years following implementation. 
The remaining $49 million would be saved in the sixth year and after.

Expert-identified potential advantages: 
* This could reduce BOP population/overcrowding and would thus have 
positive consequences, such as decreasing wait lists for recidivism 
programs, increasing safety, or freeing up resources for other 
priorities; 
* It could result in sentences that are less severe and fairer, 
reducing prison overcrowding and improving prison safety; 
cost savings could permit shifting funds to other priorities, such as 
rehabilitation programs; 
* It could allow more judicial discretion (judges can render sentences 
focused upon the individual offender), thereby potentially increasing 
the likelihood of a successful outcome while simultaneously reducing 
the prison population. 

Expert-Identified Potential Disadvantages: 
* It could reduce prosecutorial leverage to get plea bargains in 
exchange for evidence against those higher up in a criminal 
organization; 
* It could lead to disparities in sentencing across multiple 
jurisdictions, which sentencing guidelines were intended to address; 
* It could shorten sentences too much below original intent. 

Sources: USSC analysis, GAO analysis of USSC and BOP data, and GAO 
analysis of expert responses. GAO-14-821. 

[End of table] 

As the Attorney General has noted, without action to reduce the 
current size of BOP's population, and projected future growth, BOP 
will continue to require an ever greater share of DOJ's budget, having 
increased from about 14 percent of that budget in 1980 to nearly 25 
percent in the fiscal year 2015 request. As table 4 shows, a number 
of options outside of BOP's current authority exist by which the 
sentence lengths of prospective and incarcerated offenders could be 
reduced (producing bed year savings), as well as the number of 
offenders to be incarcerated, such as under the Attorney General's 
August 2013 Smart on Crime direction (option 3). Hence, BOP's costs 
could be reduced, but the range of potential savings from these 
options is great. As illustrated in table 4, actual savings are 
greater for options that apply to current offenders compared with 
those that apply only prospectively. For example, retroactively 
reducing drug sentences by about 44 percent (option 1) would have the 
greatest estimated cost savings: $4.1 billion using marginal cost 
savings, or $11.626 billion if per capita savings were to occur. Other 
options would have a lesser impact, such as avoiding charging future 
low-level, nonviolent drug offenders with charges that result in 
mandatory minimum sentences, which could be a savings of $8.7 million 
in marginal costs over 5 years (option 3). However, as discussed 
earlier, cost savings is one of many considerations in weighing which, 
if any, option could be adopted. Equally important is consideration of 
the advantages and disadvantages associated with each option. 

Conclusions: 

According to BOP officials, BOP's biggest challenges are managing the 
continually increasing federal inmate population while providing for 
inmates' care and safety, as well as the safety of BOP staff and 
surrounding communities, within budgeted levels. BOP has made 
improvements in its effective use of resources a strategic goal. 
Toward that end, BOP has implemented mechanisms that allow it to 
identify opportunities for cost savings, such as an internal website 
through which BOP staff can view cost efficiency efforts being 
implemented across BOP, and undertaken cost-savings efforts, such as 
in energy conservation. However, establishing a mechanism for 
relevant Central Office divisions to consistently monitor bureau-wide 
corrective actions and assess their progress in the presence of 
repeated frequent or significant findings could help BOP better ensure 
that it is resolving such deficiencies promptly and, ultimately, 
operating more efficiently. 

BOP's inmate population is its primary cost driver; however, BOP's 
ability to reduce its population, and thus its costs, are limited. 
Potential changes outside of BOP's authority could substantially 
reduce both BOP's population and its costs. Expert entities and states 
from which we obtained views reported that there are potential trade-
offs to implementing these options. Some expert entities observed that 
release of offenders poses the risk of recidivism and that reductions 
in sentence length could reduce prosecutors' leverage in extracting 
information from low-level criminals that is used to prosecute higher-
level ones. At the same time, other expert entities reported potential 
advantages to these options, such as making sentence lengths more 
commensurate with the crime committed. These experts' analyses of the 
possible savings and the potential advantages and disadvantages, 
beyond cost savings, of these options may be useful for policymakers 
to consider as they weigh whether and how to address BOP's population 
and, ultimately, its costs. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To enable BOP to promptly address repeated frequent deficiencies and 
other significant findings it identifies through its program reviews 
in areas of high cost across multiple institutions, we recommend that 
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons establish a mechanism for 
relevant Central Office divisions to consistently monitor bureau-wide 
corrective actions. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from DOJ. In an email 
received September 17, 2014, the DOJ liaison stated that DOJ concurred 
with our recommendation. The Department did not provide official 
written comments to include in our report, but did provide written 
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The U.S. 
Sentencing Commission also provided written technical comments, which 
we incorporated as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to selected congressional 
committees, the Attorney General, the Director of BOP, and other 
interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge 
on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any further questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report 
are listed in appendix VIII. 

Signed by: 

David C. Maurer: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Tom Coburn, M.D. 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John Cornyn: 
Ranking Member: 

Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Oversight, Federal Rights and Agency Action: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Michael S. Lee: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte: 
Chairman: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and 
Investigations: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Jason Chaffetz: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

We addressed the following questions as part of this review:

1) What are the major costs for Bureau of Prisons (BOP) operations, 
and what actions has BOP taken to implement cost savings? 

2) To what extent does BOP have mechanisms to identify opportunities 
for cost efficiencies and to take corrective actions that may improve 
cost efficiency? 

3) What potential changes, both within and outside of BOP's authority, 
could lead to cost reductions or improved efficiencies in BOP 
operations, and what might be the potential impact of these changes?

To address the first question, we obtained historical obligation data 
from BOP's Financial Management Information System for fiscal years 
2009-2013--a 5-year time frame to provide us with an adequate 
understanding of trends in BOP obligation levels--to identify the 
major costs incurred by BOP for its Salaries and Expenses account, 
which generally represents 98 percent of BOP's budget.[Footnote 62] We 
have assessed the reliability of these data and determined them to be 
reliable for the purposes of this report. This assessment included 
performing checks on the data received and interviewing officials 
responsible for compiling and maintaining these data. We also 
collected data (e.g., cost savings estimates prepared by BOP) and 
documentation, such as memos and concept papers approved by executive 
staff from fiscal years 2009 through 2013; through review of these 
data and documents and interviews with relevant agency officials, we 
determined that these data are also reliable for the purposes of this 
report. In addition, we interviewed Central Office-, regional-, and 
institutional-level officials to identify to the extent possible all 
existing cost efficiency and savings initiatives adopted by BOP and 
their impact on its overall budget. 

To address the second question, we reviewed the processes and tools at 
BOP during the same time period (fiscal years 2009-2013) that 
identify, implement, and promote cost-efficiency and savings 
initiatives throughout its institutions, such as executive staff 
meetings and a catalog compiling cost-savings initiatives. With 
respect to identifying additional opportunities to realize cost 
efficiencies or reduce costs, using our financial analysis as context, 
we analyzed elements of BOP's internal control system related to the 
control objective of achieving operational efficiencies and interviewed 
relevant officials to assess whether BOP has a management structure 
and processes to routinely assess its administrative and 
operational activities for possible corrective action. Specifically, 
we reviewed BOP's mechanisms and processes leading to its internal 
review of operational and administrative functions, including its 
process for taking corrective action, related to high-cost areas and 
compared these characteristics with those called for in Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government.[Footnote 63] 

To address the third question, on potential policy changes both within 
and outside BOP's authority that could lead to BOP cost savings, we 
collected analysis and documentation from the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), BOP, the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC), and entities 
selected for their expertise in criminal justice issues, and, in 
particular, potential changes to federal sentencing policies.[Footnote 
64] We identified these expert entities through several means, 
including (1) asking officials at both the USSC and the Urban 
Institute who have previously worked on analyses and reports relevant 
to prison population data and criminal justice to identify entities 
they considered as expert in the field of sentencing reform and 
criminal justice, (2) conducting a literature search to identify 
publications issued by some of the entities on sentencing reform or 
corrections, and (3) identifying entities with known expertise and 
authoritativeness (e.g., the ABA) in the criminal justice field 
through literature searches. These entities may not be representative 
of the universe of expert entities in the criminal justice field and 
therefore may not represent all views on this topic; however, their 
views provide insights. We obtained data from calendar year 2011 
through July 2014 from BOP on the impact on BOP's population and costs 
resulting from changes implemented by BOP to broaden the criteria for 
compassionate release of offenders, as well as analyses from the USSC 
on the estimated impact of the memorandum accompanying the Attorney 
General's August 2013 DOJ Smart on Crime initiative that instructed 
prosecutors to decline to charge certain defendants in certain 
types of drug cases in such a manner as to trigger mandatory minimum 
sentences. For data on efforts taken under BOP's authority, we 
assessed the reliability by reviewing documentation and interviewing 
knowledgeable officials; we determined the data to be sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. For data on the impact of 
policy changes outside BOP's authority, we obtained analyses from the 
USSC. According to our audit objectives, we determined based on its 
expertise that the evidence obtained from the USSC provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions. 

We reviewed sentencing reform options identified by the expert 
entities, as well as analyses of these options from these entities. We 
identified these entities on the basis of their demonstrated expertise 
as well as to ensure that a wide range of views on the advantages or 
disadvantages of potential changes to existing sentencing guidelines 
was covered. GAO is not taking a position on any of these options, but 
presents information on estimated cost savings and experts' views of 
advantages and disadvantages for such options to inform policymakers 
as they weigh whether and how to address rising costs at BOP. 

On the basis of the options we identified, we compiled a list of seven 
sentencing guideline and related changes that were being widely 
considered and discussed among expert entities at the time we began 
our review and during the course of the review. We also included one 
change resulting from a memorandum issued by the Attorney General in 
August 2013 to U.S. Attorneys instructing them to decline to charge 
certain defendants in certain types of drug cases in such a manner as 
to trigger mandatory minimum sentences. These selected options were 
based on our assessment of proposals put forward by several sources, 
including the Attorney General, expert entities, states with 
experience with criminal justice reform, and advocacy entities with a 
range of views on criminal justice reform. See appendix II for the 
letter sent to expert entities asking for their assessment of options, 
which provides a list of the proposals that were used to develop the 
selected options. During the course of our review, two of these 
options were approved by the USSC, with the amendment to the 
sentencing guidelines forwarded to Congress. This amendment will 
become effective on November 1, 2014, unless Congress acts to modify 
or disapprove the amendment. The two options approved are closely 
related--the first, approved by the USSC on April 10, 2014, reduces 
the sentences for future (federal) drug offenders, such that there 
would be an approximately 18 percent reduction in the average length 
of such sentences compared with sentences under current guidelines. 
The second was approved on July 18, 2014, by USSC, and applies the 
reduction retroactively--that is, to currently incarcerated drug 
offenders.[Footnote 65] After the USSC July 18 vote to make the drug 
sentence reductions retroactive (if eligibility criteria are met), the 
Attorney General issued a statement that, at his direction, BOP will 
begin notifying federal inmates of the opportunity to apply for a 
reduction in sentence immediately. Unless Congress modifies or 
disapproves the amendment to the sentencing guidelines submitted by 
the USSC, beginning November 1, 2014, eligible offenders can ask 
courts to reduce their sentences. Offenders whose requests are granted 
by the courts can be released no earlier than November 1, 2015, under 
the USSC provision. For the purposes of this report, we refer to these 
two changes by the USSC, and the Attorney General's August 2013 
directive to U.S. Attorneys, and to the other options collectively as 
eight options. 

For each of these eight options, we asked the USSC to estimate the 
impact on the size of the BOP inmate population. The USSC calculates 
such impact in bed years; 1 bed year is defined by the USSC as 12 
months of prison time (e.g., one offender in prison for 1 year, or 
three offenders in prison for 4 months each, and so forth). Using the 
USSC bed years' savings estimates, we then calculated cost savings or 
cost avoidance that could result from implementing a given option. 
[Footnote 66] The USSC analyses of these eight options are 
reproduced in appendix VII. 

In addition, we asked the 14 expert entities to comment on the options 
with regard to their view of the advantages or disadvantages of 
implementation of the eight options. We also identified 4 states 
(Texas, Louisiana, Ohio, and North Carolina) that have had at least 1 
year's experience in implementing state-level sentencing and criminal 
justice changes similar to the ones being discussed for federal 
offenders, and asked them to comment on the potential options 
for change.[Footnote 67] We selected Louisiana, Ohio, and North 
Carolina also because they are participants in the joint DOJ-Pew 
Charitable Trust Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI), which funds 
implementation of changes to state sentencing and criminal justice 
policies intended to reduce prison populations and recidivism, and 
these states were also the largest in terms of annual spending on 
corrections among the JRI states with at least 1 year's experience in 
implementing JRI-related initiatives.[Footnote 68] We selected Texas 
because, as of 2012, it had both the largest state prison population 
in the United States and was cited by the Urban Institute as an early 
leader in criminal justice reform initiatives that DOJ used as a model 
for the Justice Reinvestment Initiative program. We received responses 
from 17 of the 18 entities (the 14 expert entities and 4 states) to 
which we sent the letter.[Footnote 69] 

We conducted this performance audit from July 2013 to September 2014 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our: 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Letter Sent to Select States and Expert Entities: 

March 24, 2014: 

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), the investigative arm 
of the U.S. Congress, is carrying out a research engagement (GAO job 
#441173) on ways in which the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) can 
achieve cost efficiencies. As part of this work, we will be listing 
select options that would require action by entities other than BOP-- 
such as changes enacted by Congress and the President that could 
affect the size of the BOP prison population, or changes in sentencing 
guidelines that could be promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
(USSC) and possibly also applied retroactively. 

These options include proposals identified by a number of experts or 
included in pending legislation that would likely help reduce costs at 
BOP. We are writing you to ask for your comments or observations on 
these select options. 

These options are based on an assessment of varying proposals put 
forward by several sources: 

* Proposals and guidance from the U.S. Attorney General on sentencing 
reform, including changes to charging procedures ordered in August 
2013 as part of the DOJ Smart on Crime Initiative to avoid 
incarceration of low-level, non-violent drug offenders. 

* Potential cost-saving changes or concepts identified by expert 
entities, including the USSC; the Pew Charitable Trusts; the Urban 
Institute; the Heritage Foundation; the Vera Institute of Justice; the 
Council of State Governments/Justice Center; and the American Bar 
Association, some of which are also included in pending legislation. 

* The experiences of various states in recent years with criminal 
justice reform, often intended to reduce prison populations and 
recidivism, including Texas and 17 states involved in the DOJ Justice 
Reinvestment Initiative (JRI) and as reported on in the January 2014 
joint DOJ-Urban Institute report, Justice Reinvestment Initiative 
State Assessment Report.[Footnote 70] 

* Comments and analyses by several expert/advocacy entities with a 
range of views on criminal justice reform including the National 
Association of Assistant United States Attorneys; the National 
Association of Former United States Attorneys; the Brennan Center for 
Justice at New York University School of Law; Families Against 
Mandatory Minimums; and Right on Crime: A project of the Texas Public 
Policy Foundation in cooperation with Justice Fellowship. 

Based on common policy themes assessed or reported by the 
aforementioned sources, the options listed below are grouped into 
three broad categories (in most cases, there are several related 
proposals or concepts that have been put forth by various expert 
entities or experts): 

1) Sentencing Reform--Proposals to Reduce Length of Mandatory 
Sentences; 

2) Enhancement of "Good Conduct Time" reduction-in-sentence through 
good behavior by inmates and/or through participation in programs 
intended to reduce recidivism, enhance post-release employment 
chances, and/or reduce substance abuse; and: 

3) Proposals to expand the safety valve for offenders. A "safety 
valve" is a statutory exception to mandatory minimum sentencing laws 
that authorizes a judge to sentence a person below a mandatory minimum 
term if certain conditions are met. The current federal sentencing 
guidelines provide for a reduced sentence for persons whomeet the 
current federal safety valve criteria (which apply only to drug 
trafficking cases) even in cases where a mandatory minimum penalty 
would not otherwise apply. 

Instructions: 

For each option, we would like to ask you to briefly identify any 
potential "advantage" or "disadvantage", based on your organization's 
expertise or, for states, based on your experience in implementing 
some version of them (we recognize these vary considerably in detail). 
For example, an "advantage" for most of these proposals is sometimes 
stated to be to reduce overcrowding of prisons, or to reduce the 
waiting list for anti-recidivism educational or substance abuse 
programs. Alternatively, a "disadvantage" for some of these, as 
identified by some experts, is that a certain percentage of those 
released may commit crimes again and that, therefore, early release 
(v. serving the full sentence) may put someone back into society who 
may become a recidivist earlier than would otherwise have occurred. 

GAO will generally present only the aggregate results of the responses 
to these questions in our report to Congress. Although in some cases 
individual responses may be discussed, the report will not include any 
information that could be used to identify individual respondents. 
Identifying information will not be released outside of GAO, unless 
compelled by law or pursuant to a Congressional request. See 31 U.S.C. 
§716. 

Please start by saving the document as a Microsoft Word file to a hard 
drive before completing it, as your comments will otherwise not be 
saved. There are comment boxes below each of the options. Please type 
your responses in the space provided, which will expand automatically 
to accommodate your comments. 

Group 1: Proposals to Reduce Length of Mandatory Sentences: 

Option A: Reduce the length of mandatory minimum sentences for drug-
related offenses - for example, reduce the mandatory minimum sentences 
in drug trafficking cases from 20 years to 10 years; 10 years to 5 
years; and 5 years to 2 years. 

Your Comments; 
Advantage: 
Disadvantage: 
Additional: 

Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough Information to 
Comment. 

Option B: Make the amendments to drug mandatory minimum penalties of 
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactive to those offenders 
currently incarcerated for crack cocaine-related offenses. 

Your Comments: 
Advantage: 
Disadvantage: 
Additional: 

Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough Information to 
Comment.

Option C: Avoid charging low-level non-violent drug offenders with a 
charge which results in a mandatory sentence. 

Your Comments: 
Advantage: 
Disadvantage: 
Additional: 

Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough Information to 
Comment. 

Option D: Amend sentencing guidelines for all drug offenders--for 
example, reduce such sentences by a given percentage below current 
lengths (e.g., by 20 percent; by 10 percent). 

Your Comments: 
Advantage: 
Disadvantage: 
Additional: 

Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough Information to 
Comment. 

Option E: Apply the amendments to sentencing guidelines in Option D to 
both new drug offenders and retroactively to incarcerated drug 
offenders. 

Your Comments: 
Advantage: 
Disadvantage: 
Additional: 

Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough Information to 
Comment. 

Group 2: Proposals to Reduce Sentence Time Based on Good Conduct 
and/or Participation in Anti-Recidivism and Substance Abuse Programs: 

Option F: Increase good time credits for good conduct and/or 
participation in anti-recidivism programs, including substance abuse 
programs. 

Your Comments: 
Advantage: 
Disadvantage: 
Additional: 

Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough Information to 
Comment. 

Group 3: Proposals to Expand the Safety Valve for Drug and/or Other 
Offenders: 

Overview: The "safety valve" was created by the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which directed that lower-level 
defendants sentenced for certain drug offenses who meet specified 
criteria will not be subject to mandatory minimum penalties. 
Accordingly, only defendants sentenced after the guideline amendment's 
November 1, 1995 effective date who satisfy the safety valve 
requirements are eligible for the reduced term of imprisonment. 

Select Options: 

Option G: Expand the current "safety valve" for drug offenders to make 
it available to offenders with more than one prior minor offense up to 
a certain limit (for instance, up to three criminal history points.) 
[Footnote 71] 

Your Comments: 
Advantage: 
Disadvantage: 
Additional: 

Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough Information to 
Comment. 

Option H: Expand the safety valve as described in Option G to include 
both drug offenders and other non-violent offenders (this would not 
apply to any sex offenders). 

Your Comments: 
Advantage: 
Disadvantage: 
Additional: 

Please check box if Not Applicable or Not Enough Information to 
Comment. 

Additional Comments or Suggested Options: 

Finally, in the box below, please make any other comments or 
suggestions you may have, especially with regard to whether there are 
any other options for making cost effective changes to criminal 
justice rules or processes that you wish to bring to our attention. 

Additional Comments or Observations: Other Options to Consider: 

This completes the requested assessment of potential options we are 
considering. Thank you for your time in providing your input 
on these options with regard to the federal criminal justice system. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Data on the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Largest 
Cost Centers: 

Table 5 presents annual obligations data for fiscal years 2009 through 
2013 for BOP's 20 largest cost centers during fiscal year 2013. 

Table 5: Annual Obligations for Each of the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) 
20 Largest Cost Centers, Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013: 

Cost center: Correctional Services; 
2009: $1,349,084,739; 
2010: $1,429,586,006; 
2011: $1,469,511,315; 
2012: $1,495,434,551; 
2013: $1,513,151,472. 

Cost center: Privately Operated Secure Contract Facilities; 
2009: $486,680,887; 
2010: $544,310,237; 
2011: $556,674,258; 
2012: $625,636,747; 
2013: $624,456,406. 

Cost center: BOP Medical Care[A]; 
2009: $493,979,657; 
2010: $518,183,641; 
2011: $545,304,468; 
2012: $565,568,091; 
2013: $595,492,696. 

Cost center: Non-BOP Medical Care; 
2009: $319,585,026; 
2010: $351,572,156; 
2011: $362,448,629; 
2012: $385,865,248; 
2013: $419,927,987. 

Cost center: Food Service; 
2009: $354,285,520; 
2010: $366,808,966; 
2011: $386,830,370; 
2012: $403,446,856; 
2013: $408,021,963. 

Cost center: Unit Management; 
2009: $287,515,668; 
2010: $296,250,747; 
2011: $300,984,838; 
2012: $304,402,809; 
2013: $305,156,264. 

Cost center: Contract Residential Reentry Centers; 
2009: $244,444,527; 
2010: $259,937,098; 
2011: $271,605,677; 
2012: $280,878,201; 
2013: $296,123,954. 

Cost center: Construction and Mechanical Services; 
2009: $246,547,837; 
2010: $258,751,128; 
2011: $270,133,073; 
2012: $283,939,306; 
2013: $283,682,155. 

Cost center: Purchased Utilities; 
2009: $231,373,396; 
2010: $238,163,022; 
2011: $239,485,407; 
2012: $285,387,855; 
2013: $250,421,579. 

Cost center: Uncontrollables-Administrative; 
2009: $120,313,499; 
2010: $138,476,463; 
2011: $167,144,272; 
2012: $177,159,116; 
2013: $177,549,624. 

Cost center: Education; 
2009: $108,573,667; 
2010: $115,174,065; 
2011: $120,343,124; 
2012: $125,397,895; 
2013: $125,822,670. 

Cost center: Chief Executive Officer; 
2009: $103,826,162; 
2010: $108,540,721; 
2011: $109,648,711; 
2012: $108,185,902; 
2013: $110,346,853. 

Cost center: Financial Management; 
2009: $97,038,156; 
2010: $101,538,642; 
2011: $103,963,681; 
2012: $103,675,217; 
2013: $107,468,147. 

Cost center: Management and Administrative Support; 
2009: $90,888,006; 
2010: $96,183,777; 
2011: $99,626,401; 
2012: $101,044,832; 
2013: $103,648,380. 

Cost center: Inmate Services; 
2009: $63,743,317; 
2010: $79,161,534; 
2011: $72,535,791; 
2012: $86,344,508; 
2013: $85,059,211. 

Cost center: Leisure Time Activities; 
2009: $65,441,546; 
2010: $70,407,608; 
2011: $73,291,323; 
2012: $74,274,020; 
2013: $76,032,065. 

Cost center: Drug Abuse Program; 
2009: $58,528,233; 
2010: $64,109,527; 
2011: $66,826,055; 
2012: $69,733,453; 
2013: $75,883,387. 

Cost center: Psychology Services; 
2009: $44,748,555; 
2010: $47,206,056; 
2011: $49,624,556; 
2012: $51,534,118; 
2013: $52,438,931. 

Cost center: Power Plant; 
2009: $45,741,334; 
2010: $48,326,306; 
2011: $49,020,235; 
2012: $49,020,897; 
2013: $50,507,908. 

Cost center: Employee Services Department; 
2009: $39,935,664;  
2010: $41,446,038; 
2011: $43,837,987; 
2012: $44,717,642; 
2013: $44,002,882. 

Source: GAO analysis of BOP data. GAO-14-821. 

Notes: All program areas above represent obligations incurred at the 
institutional level, except for the following: 

Privately Operated Secure Contract Facilities (Contract Confinement 
Cost Centers, nationwide): 

Contract Residential Reentry Centers (Contract Confinement Cost 
Centers, nationwide). 

Uncontrollables-Administrative (National Programs). This cost center 
represents items that are tracked and funded out of the Central Office 
on behalf of the institutions, such as DOJ phone services, National 
Finance Center payroll processing, mail services, transit subsidies, 
and other items. 

[A] BOP Medical care includes costs of salaries and other costs 
associated with Public Health Services staff. According to BOP, these 
are medical professionals employed by the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) who provide medical services to BOP institutions. 
While these Public Health Services staff are technically paid by HHS, 
BOP transfers the necessary funds over to HHS to pay for their 
services. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Data on the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Largest 
Subobject Class Expenses: 

Table 6 presents annual obligations data for fiscal years 2009 through 
2013 for BOP's 20 largest subobject classes in fiscal year 2013. 
Compensation for full-time permanent staff has consistently been the 
greatest area of expense; personnel compensation and benefits account 
for most of the subobject classes listed below. 

Table 6: Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Obligations by Its 20 Largest 
Subobject Classes, Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013: 

Object: Personnel Compensation and Benefits[A]: 

Subobject class: Full Time-Permanent Appointment; 
2009: $1,843,183,744; 
2010: $1,935,330,619; 
2011: $1,982,819,749; 
2012: $1,984,097,551; 
2013: $2,012,540,824. 

Subobject class: Federal Employees' Retirement System Retirement, Law 
Enforcement Officers, and Firefighters; 
2009: $493,494,905; 
2010: $521,660,581; 
2011: $553,491,039; 
2012: $569,164,019; 
2013: $542,789,373. 

Subobject class: Federal Employees Health Benefits Act; 
2009: $213,563,268; 
2010: $232,974,957; 
2011: $258,500,221; 
2012: $272,741,587; 
2013: $269,165,149. 

Subobject class: Wage Board-Permanent Appointment; 
2009: $222,097,563; 
2010: $232,822,515; 
2011: $239,808,681; 
2012: $242,571,507; 
2013: $245,682,761. 

Subobject class: Federal Insurance Contributions Act; 
2009: $133,085,312; 
2010: $140,256,606; 
2011: $142,415,468; 
2012: $143,237,577; 
2013: $136,549,567. 

Subobject class: Overtime, Other than Wage Board; 
2009: $86,672,551; 
2010: $85,966,848; 
2011: $78,938,623; 
2012: $89,297,894; 
2013: $90,438,851. 

Subobject class: Contribution Accrual[B]; 
2009: $1,197; 
2010: $4,181; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: $72,455,016. 

Subobject class: Thrift Savings Plan Matching Government Contribution; 
2009: $65,858,897; 
2010: $71,003,306; 
2011: $73,361,984; 
2012: $73,567,039; 
2013: $69,859,878. 

Subobject class: Employee Compensation (Injury or Death); 
2009: $50,387,420; 
2010: $54,276,066; 
2011: $59,573,568; 
2012: $60,616,186; 
2013: $63,622,470. 

Subobject class: Holiday Pay; 
2009: $36,006,208; 
2010: $36,497,469; 
2011: $35,959,582; 
2012: $36,253,718; 
2013: $39,779,485. 

Object: Other contractual services: 

Subobject class: Contract Services[C]; 
2009: $640,758,937; 
2010: $751,876,304; 
2011: $781,896,029; 
2012: $861,571,108; 
2013: $936,791,945. 

Subobject class: Housing of Prisoners, Temporary Housing for Federally 
Assisted Witnesses[D]; 
2009: $309,231,120; 
2010: $290,455,682; 
2011: $307,978,195; 
2012: $282,334,113; 
2013: $250,236,250. 

Subobject class: Medical Hospital Services; 
2009: $187,987,798; 
2010: $190,474,836; 
2011: $180,663,439; 
2012: $196,405,226; 
2013: $195,153,846. 

Subobject class: Other Services[E]; 
2009: $125,846,279; 
2010: $133,993,847; 
2011: $154,818,892; 
2012: $154,593,414; 
2013: $153,185,222. 

Object: Supplies and materials: 

Subobject class: Supplies/Purchase Card[F]; 
2009: $290,468,851; 
2010: $303,532,259; 
2011: $321,588,084; 
2012: $334,613,110; 
2013: $346,619,862. 

Subobject class: Food; 
2009: $92,074,252; 
2010: $90,759,178; 
2011: $101,156,094; 
2012: $104,630,698; 
2013: $108,460,308. 

Subobject class: Pharmaceutical, Other; 
2009: $62,758,400; 
2010: $62,558,146; 
2011: $63,259,284; 
2012: $71,464,265; 
2013: $75,396,816. 

Subobject class: Other Materials and Supplies[G]; 
2009: $35,919,356; 
2010: $48,650,402; 
2011: $34,869,912; 
2012: $44,093,428; 
2013: $42,889,721. 

Object: Rent, communications, and utilities: 

Subobject class: Electricity; 
2009: $99,700,242; 
2010: $103,055,828; 
2011: $106,759,993; 
2012: $103,184,518; 
2013: $105,136,797. 

Subobject class: Water; 
2009: $32,981,285; 
2010: $34,776,915; 
2011: $37,104,912; 
2012: $38,153,278; 
2013: $41,942,871. 

[End of table] 

Notes: The obligations above do not include funds to pay salaries and 
other costs associated with Public Health Services staff. According to 
BOP, these are medical professionals employed by the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) who provide medical services to BOP 
institutions. BOP tracks these obligations only by object 
classification and does not break them down by subobject class. For 
fiscal year 2013, the object class obligations were approximately as 
follows: Personnel Compensation, $71 million; Personnel Benefits, 
$31 million; Transportation of Things, $437,000; Travel and 
Transportation of Persons, $133,000; Other Contractual Services 
$100,000. 

[A] Items under the Personnel Compensation and Personnel Benefits 
object classifications are combined in this table. 

[B] Contribution Accrual--month-end accrual of DOJ contributions 
chargeable to other subobject classes, such as Federal Employees 
Health Benefits Act and Federal Insurance Contributions Act 
contributions. The accrual is reversed in the following month. 

[C] Contract Services--contractual charges for consultants and other 
contractors, such as doctors, dentists, teachers, chaplains, legal 
advisors, architects, engineers, surveyors, appraisers, inmate 
commissary clerks, etc. 

[D] Housing of Prisoners, Temporary Housing for Federally Assisted 
Witnesses--charges for the housing of federal prisoners under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Marshals Service who are being held 
in nonfederal jail facilities. Charges for housing and moving expenses 
for witnesses under the Emergency Witness Assistance Program. 
Includes, but is not limited to, prisoners being held in state/local 
facilities, unsentenced prisoners, detained witnesses, the expense of 
1 month's deposit on a rental property, moving expenses, truck 
rentals, etc., if such expenses are more cost-effective than 
hotel/motel stays; it may also include dependents and other family 
members, as appropriate. 

[E] Other Services--charges for services not otherwise classified. 
Includes premiums for surety bonds, money order fees, registration and 
license fees, charges for sanitation and towel service, charges for 
General Services Administration information centers and water cooler 
services. 

[F] Supplies/Purchase Card --purchases made with the government-issued 
credit card (nontravel) for supplies not to exceed $3,000. BOP 
officials noted that some contracting officers can use the cards to 
make payments of up to $30,000. 

[G] Other Materials and Supplies--charges for materials and supplies 
not otherwise classified. 

Source: GAO analysis of BOP data. GAO-14-821. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Additional Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Efforts to 
Achieve Cost Savings and Efficiencies: 

In addition to efforts discussed earlier, BOP also reports pursuing 
the following initiatives that could provide current and future cost 
savings, shown in Table 7. 

Table 7: Additional Cost-Savings Efforts Under Way or Being Pursued by 
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP): 

Cost savings initiative: Electronic Inmate Central File project; 
Description: This is an ongoing effort in BOP to convert inmate paper 
records to electronic files. In 2010, BOP estimated that the logistics 
of moving, managing, and accounting for inmate paper files required 
approximately 1.2 million staff hours annually. BOP began this 
project to modernize bureau operations and repurpose the time spent 
managing these paper files back to focusing on the custody and care of 
inmates. BOP is currently testing an approach to integrate its data 
with that from the U.S. Marshals Service that it plans to complete by 
the end of August 2014. If successful, BOP officials state that they 
would then transfer documents from shared directories into the 
electronic files, which would be complete by the end of September 2014. 

Cost savings initiative: Program and administrative reductions; 
Description: BOP's fiscal year 2015 Congressional Budget Justification 
contains $157 million in program offsets through program and 
administrative reductions, which BOP officials reported will not be 
identified until 2015 funds are appropriated. According to BOP, these 
funds are necessary to pay for increases in costs, including pay 
raises, retirement contributions, and General Services Administration 
rent, among other things. 

Cost savings initiative: Medical Claims Adjudication; 
Description: A contractor reviews the accuracy of payments for medical 
services provided through contractual agreements with health care 
providers, currently in place at 25 BOP facilities. BOP does not 
routinely track cost savings of these adjudications as they are 
considered more of an operational efficiency effort; however, 
officials stated that when this effort began at Federal Medical Center 
Butner, about $1.3 million in savings was originally identified. As 
this effort has grown in scope, according to BOP officials, cost 
savings are difficult to quantify as service providers become more 
focused on accurate billings. 

Cost savings initiative: Medical Contracting Initiatives for 
Residential Reentry Center (RRC) Inmates; 
Description: BOP is examining the feasibility of regional contracting 
options at specific locations for medical, dental, and mental health 
services for inmates at RRCs. Specifically, BOP acquisition staff are 
formulating a procurement strategy and engaged in informal discussions 
with vendors to identify an approach that will reduce medical costs 
while assisting RRC inmates' transition into their community. At this 
point, BOP has not established any time frames for this acquisition of 
services. In addition, BOP is hiring three Health Service Specialists 
to conduct medical bill adjudication for these services. 

Cost savings initiative: Mail order pharmacy; 
Description: BOP is pursuing a Mail Order Pharmacy program to 
consolidate prescription drugs into one main inventory and buy the 
least expensive generic medications, as well as automate 
prescriptions, pending funding. However, this program has been on hold 
as BOP is working to identify potential new sites for this inventory, 
and funding for building renovation has been unavailable. 

Cost savings initiative: National contracts for medical resources; 
Description: Through representation on the interagency Strategic 
Sourcing Leadership Council, BOP is pursuing use of a Department of 
Defense prime vendor contract to purchase medical and surgical 
supplies.[A] 

Cost savings initiative: Measuring cost effectiveness of health 
services; 
Description: BOP's Health Services Division has tentatively identified 
nine metrics related to evaluating efficiency of health care services 
to report to its National Governing Board. These metrics will provide 
data on top diagnostic codes, top procedural codes, rate of rejected 
medical claims, drug expenditures, catastrophic care costs, outside 
medical trips, hospital readmission rates (catastrophic), annual 
health care expenditures, and average annual percentage growth in 
health care expenditures. BOP reports that all nine cannot be gathered 
in a systematic way, so the Health Services Division is researching 
alternative or proxy measures, with no current projected 
implementation date. 

Cost savings initiative: Purchase of garbage trucks; 
Description: Over the last 3 years, BOP has purchased and provided 26 
new garbage trucks, and estimates that about one-third of all 
institutions haul away garbage on their own, rather than paying 
contractors. 

Source: GAO analysis of BOP information. GAO-14-821. 

[A] The Strategic Sourcing Leadership Council was formed to lead 
governmental efforts in increasing the use of government-wide 
management and sourcing of goods and services in order to save money 
in contracting. This council is chaired by the Administrator for 
Federal Procurement Policy and contains representatives from a number 
of federal agencies. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Expert Entities Providing Input on Prison Population 
Reduction Options: 

The expert sources that provided us with analysis or information on 
sentencing issues are listed n table 8. 

Table 8: Expert Entities That GAO Consulted in Reviewing Selected 
Policy Options: 

Organization: American Bar Association; 
Description: A professional organization with nearly 400,000 voluntary 
members that supports the legal profession with resources for legal 
professionals while working to improve the administration of justice, 
accredit law schools, establish model ethical codes, and more. 

Organization: Association of State Correctional Administrators; 
Description: An organization consisting of state and Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP) officials focused on improving correctional practices. Among 
other things, the Association of State Correctional Administrators 
works to identify and promulgate correctional practices that are 
likely to reduce the number of offenders returning to prison after 
release. 

Organization: Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School 
of Law; 
Description: A nonpartisan law and policy institute that provides 
legal strategy and empirical research for legal and policy efforts in 
areas including mass incarceration. 

Organization: Council of State Governments/Justice Center; 
Description: A region-based forum that fosters the exchange of 
insights and ideas to help state officials shape public policy. The 
Council of State Governments' Justice Center is a national 
nonprofit organization that provides evidence-based strategies and 
advice to policymakers at the local, state, and federal government 
levels with the goal of increasing public safety--including work on 
reentry issues and reducing spending on corrections. 

Organization: Families Against Mandatory Minimums; 
Description: A nonprofit organization that advocates for federal and 
state prison sentencing reforms. 

Organization: Fraternal Order of Police; 
Description: With over 325,000 sworn law enforcement officers as 
members, this organization works to improve the working conditions of 
law enforcement officers and the safety of communities through 
education, information, community involvement, and employee 
representation. 

Organization: Heritage Foundation; 
Description: An independent, tax-exempt research and education 
institution that studies and advises policymakers on a variety of 
issues, such as federal spending and criminal law. 

Organization: National Association of Assistant U.S. Attorneys; 
Description: Formed to protect, promote, and advance the mission of 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys; their membership contains experts in a 
number of fields such as gang and narcotics prosecutions, among other 
things. 

Organization: National Association of Former U.S. Attorneys; 
Description: Established to promote the litigating authority and 
independence of the office of the U.S. Attorney, the association 
provides education and continuing professional relationships for 
former U.S. Attorneys. 

Organization: Pew Charitable Trusts; 
Description: An independent, nonprofit research and public policy 
organization focused on issues such as family financial security and 
various legal issues, among other things. 

Organization: "Right on Crime," a project of the Texas Public Policy 
Foundation in cooperation with Justice Fellowship; 
Description: The Texas Public Policy Foundation is a nonprofit, 
independent research institute focused on issues of personal 
responsibility and free enterprise. Right on Crime is an initiative 
focused on conservative ideas for criminal justice and prison 
reform in Texas and the nation. 

Organization: The Sentencing Project; 
Description: Conducts research and advocates for criminal sentencing 
reform. 

Organization: Urban Institute; 
Description: An organization that gathers data, conducts research, 
evaluates programs, offers technical assistance overseas, and educates 
the public on social and economic issues to foster public policy 
developments in areas such as justice, health care, and housing. 

Organization: Vera Institute of Justice; 
Description: An independent, nonpartisan organization that conducts 
data and policy analysis to provide assistance to government agencies 
on issues such as relations between police and immigrant communities 
and policy options to safely reduce prison and jail populations, among 
other things. 

Source: GAO analysis of information from each entity listed above. 
GAO-14-821. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Analyses of Options Provided by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission (USSC): 

This appendix reproduces the methodology and analyses prepared by the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC) in developing estimates of the 
impact on the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inmate population of 
eight options for cost saving that are outside BOP's authority and 
that are widely discussed among criminal justice policy experts and 
entities. GAO identified these eight options based on our assessment 
of proposals put forward by several sources, including the Attorney 
General, expert entities, states with experience with criminal justice 
reform, and advocacy entities with a range of views on criminal 
justice reform. GAO is not taking a position on any of these options, 
but presents information on them to inform policymakers as they weigh 
whether and how to address rising costs at BOP. The USSC estimates on 
the inmate population are reported in the full report. 

For options 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, the USSC prepared a written analysis 
describing its estimate of the impact of changes specified by the 
option. For options 3 and 4, the USSC provided tables showing 
estimated impact. A description of the option analyzed by the USSC and 
further information relevant to specific analyses are included with 
each analysis or table below. 

1. USSC analysis of option 1: Reduce the length of mandatory minimum 
sentences for incarcerated drug offenders. 

Under this option, the sentences of certain incarcerated drug 
offenders convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum 
sentence would be reduced by an average of about 44 percent—for 
example, from 10 years to 5 years and from 5 years to 2 years. 
Incarcerated offenders who have completed their recalculated 
sentence (i.e., if the time served exceeded the new sentence length) 
would be released. 

Letter: 

United States Sentencing Commission: 
One Columbus Circle, N.E. 
Suite 2-500, South Lobby: 
Washington, D.C. 20002-8002: 
(202) 502-4500: 
Fax (202) 502-4699: 

April 11, 2014: 

Jonathan R. Tumin: 
Senior Analyst: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G St., NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Tumin: 

The Government Accountability Office has asked the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission to assist it in connection with its engagement (number 
441173). We understand that through this engagement the GAO is 
examining ways in which the operating costs of the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons (BoP) can be reduced. As we have previously discussed with you 
and your colleagues, the Commission has agreed to analyze on GAO's 
behalf several policy options which could reduce the overall size of 
the prison population that the BoP administers. Specifically, our 
analyses of these policy options will consider the effect on the 
federal prison population if the policies were implemented in such a 
way that the options would apply to inmates currently incarcerated in 
the BoP system. 

In this memorandum, we provide to you another of these estimates. Here 
we provide our estimate of the impact on the federal prison population 
if the current statutory mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses 
of 5, 10 and 20 years were reduced to 2, 5, and 10 years, 
respectively, and the courts were authorized to resentence all federal 
offenders convicted of an drug offense carrying one of these mandatory 
minimum penalties under a sentencing framework that incorporated the 
new minimum penalties. 

As we discuss more fully below, we estimate that 78,106 offenders who 
are incarcerated and would still be in prison as of October 1, 2014 
would be eligible for a sentence reduction. The average reduction in 
sentence for these offenders would be 57 months (44.2 percent). 
The estimated total savings to the BoP from such a policy change 
applied retroactively would be 370,985 bed years. 

I. The Policy Option We Considered: 

One of the policy options that we have agreed to examine on behalf of 
the GAO is the impact of a policy change in current law whereby the 
current statutory mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses of 5, 
10 and 20 years were reduced to 2, 5, and 10 years, respectively (the 
"Policy Option").[Footnote 1] As part of our analysis, we have assumed 
that the courts would be authorized (most likely by statute)[Footnote 
2] to resentence all federal offenders convicted of a drug offense 
carrying one of these mandatory minimum penalties under a sentencing 
framework that incorporated the new minimum penalties. 

II. What We Found: 

Applying the Policy Option to offenders in the custody of the BoP, we 
estimate that there are 78,106 offenders who would be incarcerated on 
October 1,2014 who would be eligible for a reduction in their current 
sentence if the Policy Option were to be retroactively applied. If the 
courts were to grant each of these offenders the full reduction in 
their sentence we estimate that the total savings to the BoP would be 
370,985 bed years.[Footnote 3] 

Table 1 provides information on some of the demographic characteristic 
of the offenders eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to the 
Policy Option. Table 2 provides an estimate of the number of offenders 
who would be released each year if the Policy Option was applied 
retroactively compared to the number of offenders who will be released 
each year pursuant to their current sentence. As can be seen on this 
table, if the Policy Option were fully retroactive on October 1,2014, 
more than 24,600 offenders would be eligible for immediate release. 
Within the first year of the effective date of the Policy Option, 
another 8,221 offenders would be eligible for release above the number 
who will be released under their current sentence. Table 3 provides 
information on selected sentencing guideline characteristics and the 
criminal history category of these offenders. 

For the 78,102 offenders who would be eligible to receive a sentence 
reduction under the Policy Option, the current average sentence is 129 
months. If the courts (or the President) were to grant the full 
reduction possible in each case, the projected new average sentence 
for these offenders would be 72 months, a reduction of 57 months (or 
44.2 percent). Based on this reduction, the estimated total savings to 
the BoP from the retroactive application of the Policy Option would be 
37,400 bed years. This savings would not be realized in any single 
year but is the cumulative savings realized over several years. 

III. How We Conducted This Analysis: 

A. Methodology: 

The methodology for this analysis is based on the Commission's Prison 
Impact Model, which has been in use in some form since the guidelines 
were first developed. This model is used to estimate the impact of 
proposed statutory and guideline amendments on newly sentenced 
offenders and to project the future impact those amendments will have 
on bed space in the BoP. For this analysis, those offenders who appear 
to be eligible to receive a reduced sentence were hypothetically 
"resentenced" with the computer program as if the proposed policy 
change had been in effect in the year in which they were sentenced. A 
new release date for each offender also was calculated in order to 
determine when the offender would be eligible for release if 
he or she were provided the full reduction in sentence provided by the 
proposed policy change. 

B. The Offender Population We Studied: 

The Bureau of Prisons provided the Commission with a datafile of 
inmates who were in the custody of the BoP on Jan 25,2014. That file 
contained approximately 189,000 offenders. Approximately 184,000 of 
these offenders were sentenced between fiscal year 1992 and fiscal 
2013.[Footnote 4] USSC staff was able to match 171,765 of these 
offenders to Commission records. Of these, 138,894 were estimated to 
remain incarcerated on October 1, 2014. 

In order to approximate the group of offenders who will be sentenced 
in fiscal year 2014, the Commission used the FY2013 datafile and moved 
all sentence dates forward by one year. Staff then determined which of 
these offenders would be incarcerated on October 1,2014. This process 
added another 40,178 offenders into the analysis. Between the two 
groups, the Commission's analysis included data on 179,072 offenders. 

C. Our Assumptions: 

In performing our analysis, we have been required to make some 
assumptions (set forth below) concerning the decisions that Congress 
and the courts (or the President) would make in determining whether, 
and to what extent, to reduce the sentences of offenders eligible to 
receive a modification of sentence pursuant to the Policy Option 
discussed above. These assumptions may not hold in every case. 

1. Procedural assumptions: 

Specifically, we have assumed that Congress would authorize the courts 
(or the President would issue an order) to reduce the sentences of 
offenders incarcerated on or after a specific date (discussed below) 
in a manner consistent with the Guidelines Manual and bound only by 
any mandatory minimum penalties that might apply in current law or as 
modified through the Policy Option being discussed. We also assumed 
that the Commission would make no further changes to the Guidelines 
Manual in light of the Policy Option, so that the provisions of the 
2013 Guidelines Manual would apply in these cases. Finally, we assumed 
that the effective date of any such Policy Option would be October 
1,2014. Therefore, only offenders incarcerated as of that date would 
be eligible to seek a reduction in sentence pursuant to the Policy 
Option discussed in the memorandum. 

2. Substantive assumptions: 

The policy we analyzed would have the effect of lowering the current 
statutory mandatory minimum penalties in drug cases from 5, 10, and 20 
years to 2,5, and 10 years respectively. In fiscal year 2010, 
approximately 66 percent of all drug offenders were convicted of an 
offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty.[Footnote 5] Of those, 
approximately 46 percent remain subject to the penalty at the time of 
sentencing.[Footnote 6] Some offenders receive relief from the effect 
of any such penalty by providing substantial assistance to the 
government in the investigation or prosecution of another offender. 
[Footnote 7] Others receive relief from such a penalty through the 
statutory "safety valve" provision which authorizes courts to sentence 
drug offenders without regard to any mandatory minimum penalty 
provided the offender meets several criteria designed to identify 
lowlevel, non-violent offenders with little or no prior criminal 
history.[Footnote 8] Some offenders are eligible for both provisions. 

In our analysis, we provide a full reduction for all offenders who 
remained subject to a mandatory minimum penalty at the time of 
sentencing. That is, we reduce sentences by 60 percent for all 
offenders convicted of a 5-year mandatory minimum who remained subject 
to that mandatory minimum at sentencing. Similarly, we reduce 
sentences by 50 percent for all offenders convicted of a 10-year or a 
20-year mandatory minimum penalty and who remained subject to that 
penalty at sentencing. 

Drug offenders who receive relief from a mandatory minimum penalty by 
providing substantial assistance to the government have sentences that 
are, in general, 46 percent below the applicable guideline minimum 
sentence,[Footnote 9] which often is the mandatory minimum 
penalty. [Footnote 10] Drug offenders who receive relief from a 
mandatory minimum penaltythrough the statutory safety valve provision 
have sentences that are, in general, 39 percent below the applicable 
guideline minimum sentence.[Footnote 11] The extent of these 
reductions fluctuates somewhat each year. Because these offenders 
benefited from substantial reductions in their sentence at the time of 
the original sentence, we have assumed that any benefit to them from 
the Policy Option would not be as great as it would be for those 
offenders who remained subject to a mandatory minimum penalty at 
sentencing. Therefore, for this analysis, we made additional 
assumptions for these offenders, as follows: 

* offenders who were convicted of a drug offense carrying a 5-year 
mandatory minimum penalty, but who were not subject to any mandatory 
penalty at sentencing due to relief through substantial assistance or 
the safety valve would receive a further reduction of 30 percent 
under the Policy Option (i.e., 50% of the 60% reduction that offenders 
received if they remained subject to that mandatory minimum penalty at 
sentencing); 

* offenders who were convicted of a drug offense carrying a 10-year or 
20-year mandatory minimum penalty, but who were not subject to any 
mandatory penalty at sentencing due to relief through substantial 
assistance or the safety valve would receive a further reduction 
of 25 percent under the Policy Option (i.e., 50% of the 50% reduction 
that offenders received if they remained subject to either of those 
mandatory minimum penalties at sentencing). 

This analysis does not assume any change in sentence for offenders who 
were not convicted of a drug offense carrying a mandatory minimum 
penalty. It is possible, of course, that Congress (of the President) 
might authorize a reduction in sentence for drug offenders currently 
incarcerated but who were not convicted of an offense carrying a 
mandatory minimum penalty. Any such reduction would likely be tied to 
a change in the Guidelines Manual that incorporated the Policy Option. 
We are unable to model any change to the sentencing guidelines from a 
statutory enactment of the Policy Option, and so have excluded from 
this analysis any consideration of a change in sentence for drug 
offenders who were not convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory 
minimum penalty. 

Additional assumptions we have made for this analysis are that the 
sentence for each offender would be reduced based on the maximum good 
conduct credit allowed by the Bureau of Prisons, and offenders would 
serve the lesser of the newly calculated sentence or their life 
expectancies. 

If you have any questions about our analysis, please do not hesitate 
to contact the Commission. We continue to work to analyze the other 
policy options that we discussed with you and your colleagues. We will 
provide our analyses of these options as they are completed. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Noah D. Bookbinder: 
Director: 
Office of Legislative and Public Affairs: 

Signed by: 

Glenn R. Schmitt: 
Director: 
Office of Research and Data: 

Footnotes: 

[1] See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (b), 960(b) (2006) (establishing five-, 
ten-, and twenty-year minimum penalties in certain drug cases). 

[2] Another approach would be for the President to reduce the sentence 
for all offenders eligible for such a change using his clemency 
powers. See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 

[3] A "bed year" is the cost to the BoP of incarcerating one inmate 
for one year. For example, one inmate who serves five years of 
imprisonment accounts for five bed years. 

[4] The analysis was limited to data from fiscal year 1992 through 
September 30, 2013 (fiscal years 1992 through 2013) because the 
Commission's data collection efforts prior to fiscal year 1992 were 
not as complete as in later years. For example, the Commission 
did not collect information on the type of drug involved in drug 
offenses prior to fiscal year 1992. 

[5] See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Penalties In The 
Federal Criminal Justice System 154 (2011). 

[6] Id. 

[7] See 18 U.S.c. § 3553(e); USSG §5Kl.1. 

[8] See 18 U.S.c. § 3553(f); USSG §5K3.1. 

[9] See 2013 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, Table 30 
(2014). 

[10] See USSG §5G 1.1 (which provides that the minimum guideline 
sentence may not be lower than any mandatory minimum penalty). 

[11] See 2013 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, Table 30A 
(2014). 

Attachments: 

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Drug Offenders Convicted of a 
Drug Offense Carrying a 5, 10, or 20-Year Mandatory Minimum Penalty 
Eligible for 2, 5, and lO-Year Mandatory Minimums: 

Demographics: 

Race/Ethnicity: 
White: 14,773; 19.0%; 
Black: 27,512; 35.3%; 
Hispanic: 34,096; 43.7%; 
Other: 1,590; 2.0%; 
Total: 77,971; 100.0%. 

Citizenship: 
U.S. Citizen: 57,783; 74.1%; 
Non-Citizen: 20,242; 25.9%; 
Total: 78,025; 100.0%. 

Gender: 
Male: 72,257; 92.5%; 
Female: 5,845; 7.5%; 
Total: 78,102; 100.0%. 

Average Age: 35 (as of October 1, 2014) 

The analysis involves a total of78,106 cases in which the offender was 
identified as eligible to seek a sentence reduction if the drug 
mandatory minimum changes were made retroactive. Cases missing 
information for any specific analysis are excluded from that 
analysis. 

Total percentages may not add to exactly 100% due to rounding. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1992-2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - 
USSCFY13 and projected 2014 Datafile. 

[End of table] 

Table 2: Estimated Projected Year of Release for Drug Offenders 
Potentially Eligible for Mandatory Minimum Sentence Reduction: 

Release Date: immediate: 
If Policy Option Applied Retroactively: 24,601. 

Release Date: within 1 year: 
If Policy Option Applied Retroactively: 12,515; 
Current Sentence: 4,294. 

Release Date: within 2 years: 
If Policy Option Applied Retroactively: 12,191; 
Current Sentence: 9,223. 

Release Date: within 3 years: 
If Policy Option Applied Retroactively: 8,546; 
Current Sentence: 10,166. 

Release Date: within 4 years: 
If Policy Option Applied Retroactively: 6,404; 
Current Sentence: 9,256. 

Release Date: within 5 years: 
If Policy Option Applied Retroactively: 4,363; 
Current Sentence: 7,852. 

Release Date: within 6 years+: 
If Policy Option Applied Retroactively: 9,482; 
Current Sentence: 37,311. 

Of the 78,106 offenders who appear to be eligible for relief if the 
Policy Option was applied Retroactively, Commission records contained 
sufficient information to perform this analysis for 78,102 offenders. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1992 - 2012 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - 
USSCFY13 and projected. 

[End of table] 

Table 3: Guideline Sentencing Characteristics and Criminal History of 
Drug Offenders Potentially Eligible for Mandatory Minimum Sentence 
Reduction: 

Characteristics: 

Average Base Offense Level: 32. 

Weapon Specific Offense Characteristic: 14,729; 18.9%; 
Firearms Mandatory Minimum Applied: 7,433; 9.5%; 
Safety Valve §5C1.2: 14,042; 18.1%; 
Aggravating Role §3B1.1: 11,549; 14.8%; 
Mitigating Role §3B1.2: 6,675; 8.6%; 
Obstruction Adjustment §3Cl.l: 3,660; 4.7%; 
Career Offender Status §4B1.1: 10,982; 14.1% 

Criminal History Category: I: 28,925; 37.0%; 
Criminal History Category: II: 9,652; 12.4%; 
Criminal History Category: III: 12,995; 16.6%; 
Criminal History Category: IV: 6,853; 8.8%; 
Criminal History Category: V: 4,079; 5.2%; 
Criminal History Category: VI: 15,602; 20.0%; 
Criminal History Category: Total: 78,106; 100%. 

The analysis involves a total of78, 1 06 cases in which the offender 
was identified as eligible to seek a sentence reduction if the drug 
mandatory minimum changes were made retroactive. Cases missing 
information for any specific analysis are excluded from that analysis. 

The average base offense level was excluded from this analysis due to 
missing guideline relevant statutory information from the new sentence. 

Total percentages may not add to exactly 100% due to rounding. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1992 - 2012 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - 
USSCFY13 and projected 2014 Datafile. 

[End of table] 

2. USSC Analysis of Option 2: Retroactively apply the Fair Sentencing 
Act of 2010 reductions in drug mandatory minimum penalties to 
offenders currently incarcerated for crack cocaine—related offenses. 

This option would retroactively apply to eligible incarcerated 
offenders the reductions in mandatory minimum penalties for crack 
cocaine—related offenses that are provisions of the Fair 
Sentencing Act (FSA) of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, 
which did not apply to offenders already sentenced under the original 
penalty guidelines. 

United States Sentencing Commission: 
One Columbus Circle, N.E. 
Suite 2-500, South Lobby: 
Washington, D.C. 20002-8002: 
(202) 502-4500: 
Fax (202) 502-4699: 

February 20, 2014: 

Jonathan R. Tumin: 
Senior Analyst: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G St., NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Tumin: 

The Government Accountability Office has asked the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission to assist it in connection with its engagement (number 
441173). We understand that through this engagement the GAO is 
examining ways in which the operating costs of the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons (BoP) can be reduced. As we have previously discussed with you 
and your colleagues, the Commission has agreed to provide to the GAO 
the results of our analyses of several policy options which could 
reduce the overall size of the prison population that the BoP 
administers. Specifically, our analyses of these policy options will 
consider the effect on the federal prison population if the policies 
were implemented in such a way that the options would apply to inmates 
currently incarcerated in the BoP system. 

In this memorandum, we provide to you the first of these estimates. 
Here we provide our estimate of the impact on the federal prison 
population if the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 
[Footnote 1] (the "FSA") were authorized to apply to persons currently 
incarcerated and sentenced before the enactment of that law. As we 
discuss more fully below, we estimate that 8,829 offenders who were 
incarcerated on January 1, 2014 would be eligible for a sentence 
reduction if the FSA were applied retroactively beginning on that 
date. If the courts were to reduce the sentence of each eligible 
offender in accordance with the FSA and the current Guidelines Manual, 
the average reduction in sentence for these offenders would be 53 
months (28.8 percent). The estimated total savings to the BoP would be 
37,400 bed years. 

I. Statutory Changes in the FSA and the Conforming Guideline Amendment: 

A. Statutory Changes in the FSA: 

The FSA changed the quantities of crack cocaine that trigger the five- 
and ten-year statutory mandatory minimum penalties. As a consequence, 
first-time trafficking offenses involving less than 28 grams of crack 
cocaine are subject to a statutory penalty range of zero to 20 years 
of imprisonment. First-time trafficking offenses involving between 28 
and 280 grams of crack cocaine are subject to a statutory penalty 
range of five to 40 years of imprisonment.[Footnote 2] A first-time 
trafficking offense involving 280 or more grams of crack cocaine is 
subject to a statutory penalty range of 10 years to life 
imprisonment.[Footnote 3] The FSA did not make any of the statutory 
changes retroactive. Therefore, offenders sentenced before the 
effective date of the FSA[Footnote 4] continue to be subject to the 
mandatory minimum penalties in effect on the date of sentencing. 
[Footnote 5] 

B. Temporary and Permanent Amendments to the Guidelines Manual in 
Response to the FSA: 

On October 15, 2010, the Commission promUlgated a temporary, emergency 
amendment to the guidelines that implemented the emergency directive 
in section 8 of the FSA.[Footnote 6] On April 6, 2011, the Commission 
re-promulgated the temporary amendment as a permanent multipart 
amendment, which became effective on November 1,2011.[Footnote 7] (In 
this memorandum, the several modifications to the drug guidelines 
promulgated in response to the FSA are referred to collectively as the 
"FSA Guideline Amendment.") 

Part A of the FSA Guideline Amendment modified the base offense level 
for various quantities of crack cocaine assigned by the Drug Quantity 
Table.[Footnote 8] Part B of the FSA Guideline Amendment added both 
new mitigating and aggravating provisions to USSG §2D 1.1 for offenses 
involving drugs, regardless of drug type. Part C of the FSA Guideline 
Amendment eliminated a provision in the guidelines under which an 
offender who possessed more than 5 grams of crack cocaine was 
sentenced under the drug trafficking guideline. 

C. Retroactive Application of the FSA Guideline Amendment: 

The Commission voted to authorize courts to retroactively apply Parts 
A and C of the FSA Guideline Amendment to offenders currently 
incarcerated.[Footnote 9] Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), 
courts were then authorized to reduce the sentences of those offenders 
consistent with the amended sentencing guidelines. To date, the courts 
have reduced the sentences of more than 7,500 offenders pursuant to 
retroactive application of the FSA Guideline Amendment.[Footnote 10] 
In more than 5,000 other cases, the courts have denied relief to 
offenders seeking a reduction in sentence under the FSA Guideline 
Amendment. The courts found that the offender was not eligible for any 
sentence reduction in more than 3,700 of those cases. For example, in 
1,458 cases, the court found that the offender was ineligible because 
the applicable mandatory minimum penalty controlled the sentence and 
prevented the court from reducing the sentence. 

In more than 1,045 other cases, the offender was found ineligible 
because the Career Offender guideline (USSG §4B1.1), and not the drug 
trafficking guideline (USSG §2D 1.1), determined the guideline range 
at sentencing. As discussed above, the mandatory minimum penalties 
applicable to offenders sentenced prior to the FSA were unchanged by 
the act. The Career Offender guideline is linked to statutory maximum 
penalties which, in drug cases, are also linked to statutory mandatory 
minimum penalties. Because neither the FSA nor the FSA Guideline 
Amendments had the effect of lowering the Career Offender guideline, 
the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) allowing courts to reduce the 
sentences of incarcerated offenders when their sentencing guideline is 
lowered do not apply to offenders whose guideline range is determined 
under that provision. 

Finally, in some additional cases, the offender received only a 
partial reduction in sentence under the FSA Guideline Amendment. This 
was because a mandatory minimum penalty prevented the court from 
lowering the sentence to a point within the amended guideline range. 

II. Retroactive Application of the FSA: 

One of the policy options that we have agreed to examine on behalf of 
the GAO is the impact of applying the provisions of the FSA 
retroactively to offenders in the custody of the BoP. We estimate that 
there are 8,829 offenders incarcerated on January 1, 2014 who would be 
eligible for a reduction in their current sentence if the FSA were to 
be retroactively applied. If the courts were to grant each of these 
offenders the full reduction in their sentence in accord with the 
Guideline Manual, we estimate that the total savings to the BoP would 
be 37,400 bed years.[Footnote 11] 

Table GAO-1 provides an estimate of the number of offenders who would 
be released each year if the FSA were fully retroactive compared to 
the number of offenders who will be released each year pursuant to 
their current sentence. As can be seen on this table, if the FSA were 
fully retroactive on January 1,2014, more than 3,000 offenders would 
be released in 2014 in addition to those who would be released if the 
current sentences of these offenders remains unchanged. 

Of the 8,829 offenders who appear eligible for retroactive application 
of the FSA, Commission records contained sufficient information to 
perform an analysis of the amount of reduction in sentence for 8,468 
offenders. For those 8,468 offenders, the current average sentence is 
184 months. If the courts were to grant the full reduction possible in 
each case in accordance with the Guidelines Manual, the projected new 
average sentence for these offenders would be 131 months, a reduction 
of 53 months (or 28.8 percent). Based on this reduction, the estimated 
total savings to the BoP from the retroactive application of the FSA 
would be 37,400 bed years. This savings would not be realized in any 
single year but is the cumulative savings realized over several years. 

III. How We Conducted This Analysis: 

A. Methodology: 

The methodology for this analysis is based on the Commission's Prison 
Impact Model, which has been in use in some form since the guidelines 
were first developed. This model is used to estimate the impact of 
proposed statutory and guideline amendments on newly sentenced 
offenders and to project the future impact those amendments will have 
on bed space in the BoP. For this analysis, those offenders who appear 
to be eligible to receive a reduced sentence were hypothetically 
"resentenced" with the computer program as if the proposed policy 
change had been in effect in the year in which they were sentenced. A 
new release date for each offender also was calculated in order to 
determine when the offender would be eligible for release if 
he or she were provided the full reduction in sentence provided by the 
proposed policy change. 

B. Our Assumptions: 

In performing our analysis, we have been required to make some 
assumptions (set forth below) concerning the decisions that Congress 
and the courts would make in determining whether, and to what extent, 
to reduce the sentences of offenders eligible to receive a 
modification of sentence pursuant to the FSA if it were retroactively 
applied. These assumptions may not hold in every case. 

Specifically, we have assumed that Congress would authorize the courts 
by statute to reduce the sentences of offenders in accordance with the 
Guidelines Manual in effect on a specific date and bound only by the 
mandatory minimum penalties as they were amended by the FSA. We also 
assumed that the Commission would make no further changes to the 
Guidelines Manual regarding crack cocaine offenses in response to 
Congress' action, so that the provisions of the 2012 Guidelines Manual 
would apply in these cases.[Footnote 12] Finally, we assumed that the 
effective date of any such statutory change would be no earlier than 
January 1, 2014. 

Additional assumptions we have made for this analysis are as follows: 

(1) offenders sentenced within the applicable guideline range when 
they were first sentenced would be sentenced at the same point in the 
range under the Guidelines Manual in effect on January 1, 2014; 

(2) offenders sentenced outside the applicable guideline range when 
they were first sentenced would be sentenced to a new position outside 
the guideline range under the Guidelines Manual in effect on January 
1, 2014 that is the same proportional distance above or below the 
amended guideline range as their original sentence was from the 
guideline range in effect at the original sentencing; 

(3) offenders for whom the new estimated sentence is below the 
applicable mandatory minimum (all cases in this analysis have five 
grams triggering a five-year mandatory minimum or 50 grams triggering 
a 10-year mandatory minimum), and where no safety valve or substantial 
assistance reduction was applied when the offender was originally 
sentenced, would be sentenced at the new applicable mandatory minimum; 

(4) offenders classified as Career Offenders would be sentenced 
pursuant to the Career Offender provision of the guidelines in 
accordance with the statutory maximums as amended by the FSA; 

(5) the "mitigating role cap" on the base offense level of the 
guidelines would be applied, if appropriate, based upon the new base 
offense level; 

(6) offenders originally receiving relief from a mandatory minimum 
penalty by operation of the safety valve provision would continue to 
receive relief but, if the applicable statutory minimum is at least 
five years, the offense level determined after applying Chapters Two 
(Offense Conduct) and Three (Adjustments) of the guidelines would not 
be less than level 17 (pursuant to USSG §5C I.2(b)); 

(7) for offenders with an original combined offense level (after 
application of Chapters Two and Three) of level 16 or greater but 
having a new combined offense level below level 16, the applicable 
reduction for Acceptance of Responsibility would be reduced from three 
levels to two levels in accordance with that guideline provision; 

(8) the sentence for each offender would be reduced based on the 
maximum good conduct credit allowed by the Bureau of Prisons; and; 

(9) offenders would serve the lesser of the newly calculated sentence 
or their life expectancies. 

C. Limitation as to Application of New Mitigating Provisions of the 
FSA: 

As discussed above, Part B of the FSA Guideline Amendment added both 
new mitigating and aggravating provisions to USSG §2D 1.1 for offenses 
involving drugs, regardless of drug type. The Commission did not vote 
to allow those provisions to be applied retroactively. We are unable 
to assess the extent to which the courts might apply these new 
mitigating provisions were the FSA to be applied retroactively as 
those provisions involve the consideration of facts that are not 
readily available in the sentencing documents provided to the 
Commission in all cases. To the extent that the courts might consider 
these provisions in resentencing offenders when applying the FSA 
retroactively, the sentences for some offenders could be reduced below 
the point determined in our estimate, which would accelerate the 
release of those offenders from incarceration. 

D. The Offender Population We Studied: 

In conducting this analysis, the Commission requested and received a 
datafile from the BoP which identified a total of 135,536 offenders in 
the BoP's custody at that time who the BoP estimated would still be 
incarcerated on January 1,2014 (the proposed retroactivity date we 
used for this analysis.). These offenders were those sentenced between 
FYI992 and FY2012 and whose BoP record could be matched with USSC 
records.[Footnote 13] Of those, 19,154 offenders were identified as 1) 
having been sentenced under the drug trafficking guideline,[Footnote 
14] 2) having crack cocaine as one of the drug types involved in the 
offense, and 3) having sufficient information for analysis by the 
Commission's prison and sentencing impact model. 

The Commission's retroactivity analysis determined that of these 
19,154 offenders, 10,325 would not experience a change in their 
sentence if the FSA were fully retroactive. These offenders were 
excluded from the analysis. The majority of the offenders (n = 9,741) 
were excluded because they would not experience the proposed statutory 
change - either because no statutory mandatory minimum penalty applied 
in their cases or the offender already was sentenced below the FSA 
mandatory minimum thresholds.[Footnote 15] Another 362 offenders were 
sentenced under the Career Offender provision and, despite a change to 
their drug statutory minimum penalty, their guideline range under the 
Career Offender provision did not change. In another 191 cases, the 
current sentence is greater than both the guideline minimum and the 
FSA statutory minimum, therefore no change in their sentence would 
result. A small number of offenders (n=30) were excluded because their 
guideline range was determined under the Armed Career Criminal 
provision, which would be unaffected by the retroactive application 
of the FSA. Lastly, one offender had a base offense level of38, the top 
of the Drug Quantity Table, and the quantity of drugs involved in that 
case continued to place the offender at that level, so therefore no 
change in his or her guideline range would occur. 

After these offenders were excluded, there remained 8,829 offenders 
who were projected to be incarcerated on January 1,2014 and who 
appeared eligible to seek a reduced sentence if the provisions of the 
FSA were to be made retroactive as described above. 

If you have any questions about our analysis please do not hesitate to 
contact the Commission. We continue to work to analyze the other 
policy options that we discussed with you and your colleagues. We will 
provide our analyses of these options as they are completed. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Noah D. Bookbinder: 
Director: 
Office of Legislative and Public Affairs: 

Signed by: 

Glenn R. Schmitt: 
Director: 
Office of Research and Data: 

Footnotes: 

[1] Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) [hereinafter FSA]. 

[2] The new five year mandatory minimum threshold quantity of28 grams 
corresponds to approximately one ounce, which has been considered to 
be a threshold quantity for purposes of classifying the function of 
certain federal crack cocaine offenders. See United States Sentencing 
Commission, Report To The Congress: Cocaine And Federal Sentencing 
Policy 18 (MAY 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Commission Report]. 

[3] Because it now takes approximately 18 times more powder cocaine 
than crack cocaine to trigger the same statutory mandatory minimum 
penalties, some may refer to this penalty structure as an "18-to-l 
drug quantity ratio." 

[4] The FSA was enacted into law on August 3,2010. 

[5] See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012) 
(FSA's lower mandatory minimum penalties applied to offenders 
sentenced on and after August 3, 2010). 

[6] USSG, 2011 Supp. to App. C, Amendment 748 (effective Nov. 1,2010). 

[7] USSG, 2011 Supp. to App. C, Amendment 750 (effective Nov. 1,2011). 

[8] Offenses involving 28 grams of crack cocaine were assigned a base 
offense level of 26, and offenses involving 280 grams of crack cocaine 
were assigned a base offense level of 32. This approach is consistent 
with how the guidelines incorporate the statutory mandatory minimum 
penalties for all other drug offenses. 

The base offense level for some quantities of crack cocaine 
in the Drug Quantity Table did not change as a result of the FSA 
Guideline Amendment. Also, offenses involving quantities of less than 
500 mg of crack cocaine were unaffected by the amendment and remained 
assigned to BOL 12. 

[9] USSG, 2011 Supp. to App. C, Amendment 759 (effective Nov. 1,2011). 

[10] See generally USSG, Preliminary Crack Retroactivity Data Report, 
Fair Sentencing Act (January 2014) (available at hyperlink, 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistic
s/FSAAmendment/index.cfm)]. 

[11] A "bed year' is the cost to the BoP of incarcerating one inmate 
for one year. For example, one inmate who serves five years of 
imprisonment accounts for five bed years. 

[12] While the 2012 Guidelines Manual was used for this analysis, the 
provisions of the 2013 Guidelines Manual that pertain to offenses 
under USSG §2D 1.1 are unchanged. 

[13] The analysis was limited to data from fiscal year 1992 through 
September 30, 2010 (fiscal years 1992 through 2010) because the 
Commission did not collect information on the type of drug involved 
in drug offenses prior to fiscal year 1992. 

[14] For some of these offenders, the guideline range that applied at 
sentencing was derived from either the Career Offender (USSG §4B 1.1) 
or Armed Career Criminal (USSG §4B 1.4) provision. However, for the 
purpose of this analysis these offenders are considered to have been 
sentenced under the drug trafficking guideline as the court is 
required to calculate a guideline range for them under USSG §2D 1.1 as 
well. 

[15] Because many of the offenders currently incarcerated in the BoP 
for crack offenses were sentenced after August 3, 2010, the mandatory 
minimum penalty provisions applied by the courts in most of those 
cases were the lower penalties provided by the FSA. Some courts did 
continue to apply the pre-FSA minimum penalties to offenders sentenced 
after August 3,2010 but who committed their crime prior to that date. 
However, the Supreme Court's opinion in Dorsey clarified that this 
practice was in error. 

Attachment: 

Table GAO-l: Estimated Projected Year of Release for Crack Cocaine 
Offenders Potentially Eligible for FSA Retroactivity: 

Release Date: within 1 year: 
If FSA Retroactivity Granted: 3,695; 
Current Sentence: 682. 

Release Date: within 2 years: 
If FSA Retroactivity Granted: 999; 
Current Sentence: 847. 

Release Date: within 3 years: 
If FSA Retroactivity Granted: 806; 
Current Sentence: 951. 

Release Date: within 4 years: 
If FSA Retroactivity Granted: 682; 
Current Sentence: 996. 

Release Date: within 5 years: 
If FSA Retroactivity Granted: 503; 
Current Sentence: 958. 

Release Date: within 6 years +: 
If FSA Retroactivity Granted: 1,783; 
Current Sentence: 4,034. 

Of the 8,829 offenders who appear to be eligible for relief if the 
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were retroactive, Commission records 
contained sufficient information to perform this analysis for 
8,468 offenders. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1992 - 2012 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - 
USSCFYI2. 

[End of table] 

3. USSC Table with Data for Impact of Option 3: Instruct US Attorneys 
to decline to charge certain defendants in certain types of drug cases 
in such a manner as to trigger mandatory minimum sentences. 

This option has been implemented as part of the August 2013 direction 
issued by the Attorney General instructing prosecutors in cases 
involving the applicability of drug law mandatory minimum sentences 
based on drug type and quantity to decline to charge the quantity 
necessary to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence if the defendant 
meets particular criteria. 

For option 3, the USSC provided a table composed of 6 sub-tables that 
show the USSC's analysis of the estimated impact of the changes 
discussed in option 3. According to the USSC, the total number of 
offenders estimated to be affected annually by option 3 can be found 
in line 1, column 2, of the first table (i.e., 620). For the first 5 
years' estimated impact, we multiplied 620 by 5. According to the 
USSC, the bed years saved over the first 5 years of implementation can 
be found by adding the numbers shown in the first line of the third 
table, which total 788. 

Comparison of Prison Impact Analysis – Safety Valve Expansion with 
Statutory Trumps, FY2012 Cases: 

Table: Change in Sentences Imposed: 

2 pts: 
Total Cases[A]: 841; 
Number Affected[B]: 620; 
Percent Affected: 73.7%; 
Current Average Sentence for Affected Cases: 46; 
New Average Sentence for Affected Cases: 37; 
Number of Months Change: -9; 
Percent Change: -19.6%; 

2-3 pts: 
Total Cases[A]: 2,242; 
Number Affected[B]: 1,636; 
Percent Affected: 73.0%; 
Current Average Sentence for Affected Cases: 49; 
New Average Sentence for Affected Cases: 40; 
Number of Months Change: -9; 
Percent Change: -18.4%. 

[End of table] 

Table: Change in Incarceration Levels: 

Change in total years of incarceration for offenders sentenced 
in one fiscal year[C]: 

2 pts: 
1st Year: -51; 
2nd Year: -46; 
3rd Year: -64; 
4th Year: -47; 
5th Year: -64; 
10th Year: -6; 
15th Year: -1; 
Total[D]: -372. 

2-3 pts: 
1st Year: -115; 
2nd Year: -119; 
3rd Year: -167; 
4th Year: -142; 
5th Year: -181; 
10th Year: -34; 
15th Year: -3; 
Total[D]: -1,065. 

[End of table] 

Table: Change in Total BOP Population in Future Years[E]: 

2 pts: 
1st Year After Effective Date: -51; 
2nd Year After Effective Date: -97; 
3rd Year After Effective Date: -161; 
4th Year After Effective Date: -208; 
5th Year After Effective Date: -271. 

2-3 pts: 
1st Year After Effective Date: -115; 
2nd Year After Effective Date: -234; 
3rd Year After Effective Date: -401; 
4th Year After Effective Date: -543; 
5th Year After Effective Date: -724. 

[A] Total Cases are those with a particular sentencing factor being 
analyzed. 

[B] Affected Cases are those in which the sentence is estimated to 
change as a result of the sentencing factor being analyzed. Not all 
cases will change as a result of the application of the sentencing 
factor being analyzed. 

[C] This table represents the number of prison beds saved each year by 
a cohort of offenders sentenced in a single year. 

[D] This is the total number of prison beds that will be saved when 
all offenders who were sentenced in the same year are ultimately 
released from prison. 

[E] This is the annual number of prison beds saved as ongoing cohorts 
of offenders enter the Bureau of Prisons who have been sentenced under 
the changed guideline. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission Prison and Sentencing Impact 
Assessment Model, FY2012 datafile. 

[End of table] 

4. USSC Table with Data for Impact of Option 4: Amend USSC sentencing 
guidelines for future drug offenders, reducing them two levels below 
current guidelines. 

This option reduces the potential sentences for all future drug 
offenders by two levels below current guidelines. This option reduces 
the potential sentences for all future drug offenders by two levels 
below current guidelines, resulting in a roughly 18 percent reduction 
of sentence length below current lengths. This sentence reduction was 
approved as an amendment to sentencing guidelines by the USSC and 
forwarded to Congress on April 30, 2014 and will apply to future 
eligible drug offenders effective November 1, 2014, unless modified or 
disapproved by act of Congress. The USSC provided a table composed of 
2 subtables that address the application of potential sentence 
reductions for all future drug offenders. According to the USSC, the 
number of offenders estimated to be affected annually by the option 
(17,457) can befound in line 1 of the first table. 

However, the USSC amended a policy statement related to this proposed 
amendment to the sentencing guidelines that would apply the sentencing 
guidelines in this option retroactively to eligible incarcerated 
offenders as well as to all future drug offenders (see Option 5). The 
USSC approved the application of option 4 retroactively in July 2014. 
As such, it corresponds to the April 30, 2014 USSC decision (option 4) 
and does not require separate congressional action. Unless Congress 
acts to modify or disapprove the corresponding April 30 amendment, 
beginning November 1, 2014, eligibleoffenders can ask courts to reduce 
their sentences. Offenders whose requests are granted by the courts 
may not be released earlier than November 1, 2015. 

Table 5: Estimated Effect on Sentencing and Incarceration of 
Decreasing the Drug Quantity Table by Two Levels FY2012 Cases: 

Change in Sentences Imposed: 

Total Cases[A]: 24,968; 
Number Affected[B]: 17,457; 
Percent Affected: 69.9%; 
Current Average Sentence for Affected Cases: 62; 
New Average Sentence for Affected Cases: 51; 
Number of Months Change: -11; 
Percent Change: -17.7%. 

Change in Sentences Served: 
Change in years of incarceration served for offenders sentenced 
in a single fiscal year[C]: 

1st Year: -894; 
2nd Year: -1,083; 
3rd Year: -1,667; 
4th Year: -1,2817; 
5th Year: -1,625; 
10th Year: -634; 
15th Year: -256; 
Total[D]: -13,938. 

Change in total BOP Population in Future Years[E]: 

1st Year After Effective Date: -894; 
2nd Year After Effective Date: -1,977; 
3rd Year After Effective Date: -3,644; 
4th Year After Effective Date: -4,925; 
5th Year After Effective Date: -6,550. 

[A] Total Cases are those with a particular sentencing factor being 
analyzed. 

[B] Affected Cases are those in which the sentence is estimated to 
change as a result of the sentencing factor being analyzed. Not all 
cases will change as a result of the application of the sentencing 
factor being analyzed. 

[C] This table represents the number of prison beds saved each year by 
a cohort of offenders sentenced in a single year. 

[D] This is the total number of prison beds that will be saved when 
all offenders who were sentenced in the same year are ultimately 
released from prison. 

[E] This is the annual number of prison beds saved as ongoing cohorts 
of offenders enter the Bureau of Prisons who have been sentenced under 
the changed guideline. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission Prison and Sentencing Impact 
Assessment Model, FY2012 datafile. 

[End of table] 

5. USSC Analysis of Option 5: Apply the amendments to sentencing 
guidelines in option 4 also to incarcerated drug offenders—-that is, 
to both new drug offenders and retroactively to incarcerated drug 
offenders. 

Under this option, the provisions of option 4 apply to both new drug 
offenders and also retroactively to eligible incarcerated drug 
offenders. It reduces the sentences for all future and currently 
incarcerated drug offenders by two levels below current USSC 
guidelines, resulting in a roughly 19 percent reduction below current 
lengths. It was approved by the USSC in July 2014 as an amendment 
to option 4; as such, it corresponds to the April 2014 USSC decision 
and does not require separate congressional action. Unless Congress 
acts to modify or disapprove the corresponding April 30 amendment, 
beginning November 1, 2014, eligible incarcerated offenders can ask 
courts to reduce their sentences. Incarcerated offenders whose 
requests are granted by the courts may not be released earlier than 
November 1, 2015. 

This analysis (which also includes information relevant to option 4, 
to which it is closely related) was posted to the USSC website on July 
25, 2014. [hyperlink, http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-
publications/retroactivity-analyses-and-data-reports/retroactivity-
analyses-and-data-reports]. 

Letter: 

United States Sentencing Commission: 
One Columbus Circle, NE: 
Suite 2-500, South Lobby: 
Washington, Dc 20002-8002: 
(202) 502-4500: 
Fax (202) 502-4699: 

Memorandum: 

To: 
Chair Saris: 
Commissioners: 
Kenneth Cohen: 

July 25, 2014: 

From: Office of Research and Data: 

Subject: Summary of Key Data Regarding Retroactive Application of the 
2014 Drug Guidelines Amendment: 

1. Introduction: 

On April 30,2014, the United States Sentencing Commission submitted to 
Congress an amendment to the federal sentencing guidelines that would 
revise the guidelines applicable to drug trafficking offenses by 
changing how the base offense levels in the drug quantity tables in 
sections 2D 1.1 and 2D 1.11 of the Guidelines Manual[Footnote 1] 
incorporate the statutory mandatory minimum penalties for drug 
trafficking offenses (Amendment 782).[Footnote 2] Specifically, the 
amendment would reduce by two levels the offense levels assigned to 
the quantities that trigger the statutory mandatory minimum penalties, 
resulting in corresponding guideline ranges that include the mandatory 
minimum penalties, and make conforming changes to section 2D2.11. On 
July 18, the Commission voted to give retroactive effect to Amendment 
782 beginning on the effective date of the amendment, which will be 
November 1, 2014, unless Congress acts to modify or disapprove the 
amendment. 

As part of the Commission's decision to retroactively apply Amendment 
782, it required that no offender may be released pursuant to the 
retroactive application of the amendment until November 1, 2015 or 
later. This memorandum provides information concerning the effect of 
this limitation. 

II. Further Analyses Of The Impact Of Retroactive Application Of The 
2014 Drug Guidelines Amendment: 

A. Summary of Data on the Eligible Offenders: 

ORD previously estimated that 51,141 offenders sentenced between 
October 1, 1991 and October 31, 2014,[Footnote 3] would be eligible to 
seek a reduction in their current sentence if the Commission were to 
make the 2014 drug guidelines amendment retroactive.[Footnote 4] 
Of this group, there are 46,376 offenders who would not be released 
under their current sentence until on or after November 1,2015, and so 
could benefit from the Commission's decision to retroactively apply 
Amendment 782. 

The current average sentence for the 46,376 offenders who could 
benefit under retroactive application of the amendment is 133 months. 
Applying the amendment retroactively to these offenders the new 
average sentence would be 108 months. This is a difference of 25 
months, which represents an 18.8 percent reduction in the sentence. 
The number of bed years saved by this reduction is 79,740 bed years, 
which would be realized by the Bureau of Prisons over a period of 
years, of course. 

The most common drug types involved in these cases are methamphetamine 
(28.8%), powder cocaine (27.8%), crack cocaine (19.3%), marijuana 
(11.6%), heroin (7.6%), and other drugs (5.0%). Attached to this 
memorandum is a summary of selected offender characteristics 
about these offenders as well as information about their criminal 
history. 

B. Summary of Data on the Projected Release Dates of the Eligible 
Offenders: 

We estimate that on November 1,2015 there would be 7,953 offenders 
eligible for immediate release. Another 8,550 offenders would be 
released during the year that begins on November 1, 2015 and ends on 
October 31,2016. That is, a total of 16,503 offenders will be released 
during the first year in which offenders may be released pursuant to 
retroactive application of the amendment. If the Commission had not 
authorized the amendment to be applied retroactively, we estimate that 
7,609 offenders would still have been released during that year, as 
their current terms of incarceration expired. Attached to this 
memorandum is a table that provides additional information concerning 
the release years of these offenders and the districts in which they 
were sentenced. 

Table: Selected Characteristics of Eligible Offenders Retroactive 
Application of Amendment 782 With Release On or After November 1, 2015 
(FY1992 through FY2015): 

Race/Ethnicity: 
White: 10,734; 23.2%; 
Black: 14,427; 31.2%; 
Hispanic: 19,958; 43.1%%; 
Other: 1,171; 2.5%; 
Total: 46,290; 100.0%. 

Citizenship: 
U.S. Citizen: 34,928; 75.4%; 
Non-Citizen: 11,411; 24.6%; 
Total: 46,339; 100.0%. 

Gender: 
Male: 42,759; 92.2%; 
Female: 3,615; 7.8%; 
Total: 46,374; 100.0%. 

Criminal History Category: I: 17,580; 37.9%; 
Criminal History Category: II: 6,320; 13.6%; 
Criminal History Category: III: 9,232; 19.9%; 
Criminal History Category: IV: 5,473; 11.8%; 
Criminal History Category: V: 3,417; 7.4%; 
Criminal History Category: VI: 4,354; 9.4%; 
Total: 46,376; 100.0%. 

Projected Year of Release: November 1, 2015; 
Retroactive[A]: 7,953. 

Projected Year of Release: within 1 year; 
Retroactive[A]: 8,550; 
If Not Retroactive: 7,609. 

Projected Year of Release: within 2 years; 
Retroactive[A]: 6,938; 
If Not Retroactive: 7,461. 

Projected Year of Release: within 3 years; 
Retroactive[A]: 5,473; 
If Not Retroactive: 6,207. 

Projected Year of Release: within 4 years; 
Retroactive[A]: 4,177; 
If Not Retroactive: 5,291. 

Projected Year of Release: within 5 years; 
Retroactive[A]: 2,909; 
If Not Retroactive: 3,923. 

Projected Year of Release: more than 5 years; 
Retroactive[A]: 9,350; 
If Not Retroactive: 14,859. 

Projected Year of Release: Total: 
Retroactive[A]: 45,350; 
If Not Retroactive: 45,350. 

The analysis involves a total of 46,376 cases, however, cases missing 
information for any specific analysis are excluded from that analysis. 
Total percentages may not add to exactly 100% due to rounding. 

[A] A total of 16,503 offenders are estimated 10 be eligible for 
release during the first year in which offenders may be released WIder 
retroactive application of the amendment. This is 8,894 more than 
will be released upon expiration of their current sentence. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1992 - 2005 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - 
USSCFY13. 

[End of table] 

Table: Possible Release Timing for Retroactive Eligible Offenders by 
District (FY1992 through FY2015): 

Total: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 7,953; 17.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 8,550; 18.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 6,938; 15.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 5,473; 12.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 4,377; 9.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 2,909; 6.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 9,350; 20.6%; 
Total: 45,350. 

Circuit: D.C Circuit: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 25; 12.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 37; 18.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 38; 19.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 27; 13.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 12; 6.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 8; 4.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 50; 265.4%; 
Total: 197. 

District: District of Columbia: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 25; 12.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 37; 18.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 38; 19.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 27; 13.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 12; 6.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 8; 4.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 50; 265.4%; 
Total: 197. 

Circuit: 

First Circuit: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 231; 10.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 41;2 19.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 387; 18.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 342; 16.0%; 
Eligible for Release342 16.0 in Year Four: 256; 12.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 147; 6.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 364; 17.0%; 
Total: 2,139. 

District: Maine: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 30; 18.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 45; 27.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 31; 18.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 22; 13.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 19; 11.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 7; 4.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 12; 7.2%; 
Total: 166. 

District: Massachusetts: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 27; 14.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 37; 20.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 33; 18.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 19; 10.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 16; 8.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 9; 5.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 40; 22.1%; 
Total: 181. 

District: New Hampshire: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 11; 17.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 21; 33.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 14; 22.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 5; 8.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 1; 1.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 3; 4.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 7; 11.3%; 
Total: 62. 

District: Puerto Rico: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 149; 9.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 295; 17.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 290; 17.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 280; 17.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 214; 13.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 122; 7.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 294; 17.9%; 
Total: 1,644. 

District: Rhode Island: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 14; 16.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 14; 16.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 19; 22.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 16; 18.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 6; 7.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 6; 7.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 11; 2.8%; 
Total: 86. 

Circuit: Second Circuit: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 344; 17.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 380; 19.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 328; 16.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 264; 13.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 196; 9.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 118; 5.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 371; 18.5%; 
Total: 2,001. 

District: Connecticut: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 45; 16.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 67; 24.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 51; 18.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 31; 11.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 32; 11.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 18; 6.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 26; 9.6%; 
Total: 270. 

District: New York: Eastern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 51; 17.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 49; 16.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 66; 22.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 43; 14.7%;
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 21; 7.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 14; 4.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 49 16.7%; 
Total: 293. 

District: New York: Northern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 48; 17.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 58; 21.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 53; 19.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 39; 14.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 29; 10.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 10; 3.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 31; 11.6%; 
Total: 268. 

District: New York: Southern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 136; 18.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 132; 17.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 104; 13.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 101; 13.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 65; 8.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 48; 6.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 171; 22.6%; 
Total: 757. 

District: New York: Western: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 55; 16.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 52; 15.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 43; 12.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 43; 12.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 37; 11.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 22; 6.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 85; 25.2%; 
Total: 337. 

District: Vermont: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 9; 11.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 22; 28.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 11; 14.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 7; 9.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 12; 15.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 6; 7.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 9; 11.8%; 
Total: 76. 

Circuit: Third Circuit: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 207; 15.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 267; 20.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 198; 15.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 160; 12.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 120; 9.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 74; 5.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 284; 21.7%; 
Total: 1,310. 

District: Delaware: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 9; 22.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 9; 22.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 8; 20.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 2; 5.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 1; 2.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 0; 0.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 11; 27.5%; 
Total: 40. 

District: New Jersey: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 54; 17.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 82; 26.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 58; 18.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 38; 12.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 26; 8.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 16; 5.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 41; 13.0%; 
Total: 315. 

District: Pennsylvania: Eastern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 55; 11.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 73; 15.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 64; 13.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 64; 13.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 46; 9.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 33; 7.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 135; 28.7%; 
Total: 470. 

District: Pennsylvania: Middle: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 65; 23.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 59; 21.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 64; 14.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 36; 12.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 31; 11.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 7; 2.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 43; 15.3%; 
Total: 281. 

District: Pennsylvania: Western: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 19; 11.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 38; 22.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 22; 13.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 15; 8.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 12; 7.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 15; 8.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 49; 28.7%; 
Total: 171. 

District: Virgin Islands: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 8; 15.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 6; 18.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 5; 15.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 5; 15.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 4; 12.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 3; 9.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 5; 15.2%; 
Total: 33. 

Circuit: Fourth Circuit: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 1,028; 17.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 954; 15.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 812; 13.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 683; 11.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 559; 9.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 454; 7.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 1,545; 25.6%; 
Total: 6,035. 

District: Maryland: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 85; 15.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 102; 18.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 102; 18.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 80; 14.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 49; 8.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 37; 6.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 102; 18.3%; 
Total: 557. 

District: North Carolina: Eastern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 140; 12.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 147; 13.2%;
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 143; 12.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 122; 10.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 112; 10.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 111; 10.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 340; 30.5%; 
Total: 1,115. 

District: North Carolina: Middle: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 86; 20.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 89; 20.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 50; 11.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 44; 10.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 36; 8.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 29; 6.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 93; 21.8%; 
Total: 427. 

District: North Carolina: Western: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 150; 23.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 118; 18.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 82; 12.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 60; 9.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 63; 9.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 40; 6.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 137; 21.1%; 
Total: 650. 

District: South Carolina: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 133; 14.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 117; 12.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 116; 12.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 118; 12.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 109; 11.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 85; 9.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 264; 28.0%; 
Total: 942. 

District: Virginia: Eastern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 170; 14.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 127; 11.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 145; 12.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 121; 10.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 98; 8.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 85; 7.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 396; 34.7%; 
Total: 1,142. 

District: Virginia: Western: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 134; 20.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 100; 15.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 83; 12.9%;
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 73; 11.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 49; 7.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 44; 6.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 160; 24.9%; 
Total: 643. 

District: West Virginia: Northern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 88; 26.4%;  
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 87; 26.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 51; 15.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 37; 11.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 29; 8.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 13; 3.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 28; 8.4%; 
Total: 333. 

District: West Virginia: Southern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 32; 18.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 67; 29.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 40; 17.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 28; 12.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 14; 6.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 10; 4.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 25; 11.1%; 
Total: 226. 

Circuit: Fifth Circuit: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 1,853; 18.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 2,023; 20.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 1,562; 15.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 1,180; 11.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 901; 8.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 608; 6.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 2,013; 19.9%; 
Total: 10,140. 

District: Louisiana: Eastern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 46; 14.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 56; 18.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 46; 14.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 38; 12.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 31; 10.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 28; 9.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 66; 21.2%; 
Total: 311. 

District: Louisiana: Middle: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 22; 19.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 24; 21.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 20; 17.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 12; 10.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 8; 7.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 6; 5.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 22; 19.3%; 
Total: 114. 

District: Louisiana: Western: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 57; 21.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 35; 13.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 49; 18.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 29, 10.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 19. 7.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 14; 5.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 64; 24.0%; 
Total: 267. 

District: Mississippi: Northern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 34; 21.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 33; 20.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 23; 14.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 22; 13.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 14; 8.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 7; 4.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 26; 16.4%; 
Total: 159. 

District: Mississippi: Southern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 46; 13.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 52; 15.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 52; 15.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 44; 13.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 24; 7.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 24; 7.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 92; 27.5%; 
Total: 334. 

District: Texas: Eastern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 210; 14.8 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 29; 14.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 203; 14.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 183; 12.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 142; 10.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 101; 7.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 367; 25.9%; 
Total: 1,415. 

District: Texas: Northern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 220; 16.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 179; 13.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 183; 13.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 150; 11.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 124; 9.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 109; 8.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 403; 29.5%; 
Total: 1,368. 

District: Texas: Southern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 559; 19.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 680; 23.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 462; 16.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 334; 11.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 255; 8.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 145; 5.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 432; 15.1%; 
Total: 2,867. 

District: Texas: Western:
Eligible for Immediate Release: 659; 19.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 755; 22.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 524; 15.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 368; 11.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 284; 8.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 174; 5.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 541; 16.4%; 
Total: 3,305. 

Circuit: Sixth Circuit: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 739; 17.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 913; 22.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 709; 17.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 514; 12.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 362; 8.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 265; 6.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 637; 15.4%; 
Total: 4,139. 

District: Kentucky: Eastern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 92; 16.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 123; 22.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 116; 21.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 64; 11.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 48; 8.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 30; 5.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 73; 13.4%; 
Total: 4,139. 

District: Kentucky: Western: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 49; 19.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 61; 24.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 37; 15.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 34; 13.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 23; 9.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 12; 4.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 30; 12.2%; 
Total: 246. 

District: Michigan: Eastern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 73; 19.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 77; 20.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 52; 13.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 57; 15.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 32; 8.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 16; 4.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 72; 19.0 %; 
Total: 379. 

District: Michigan: Western: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 55; 15.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 61; 17.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 48; 13.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 39; 11.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 27; 7.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 30; 8.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 87; 25.1%; 
Total: 347. 

District: Ohio: Northern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 95; 18.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 131; 25.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 90; 17.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 63; 12.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 45; 8.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 29; 5.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 59; 11.5%; 
Total: 512. 

District: Ohio: Southern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 87; 20.3 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 101; 23.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 76; 17.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 57; 13.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 36; 8.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 27; 6.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 45; 10.5%; 
Total: 429. 

District: Tennessee: Eastern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 179; 16.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 231; 20.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 203; 18.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 131; 11.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 104; 9.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 88; 8.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 168; 15.2 %; 
Total: 1,104. 

District: Tennessee: Middle: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 32; 21.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 30; 19.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 21; 13.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 23; 15.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 17; 11.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 6; 4.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 22; 14.6%; 
Total: 151. 

District: Tennessee: Western: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 77; 18.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 98; 23.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 66; 15.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 46; 10.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 30; 7.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 27; 6.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 81; 19.1%; 
Total: 425. 

Circuit: Seventh Circuit: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 455; 16.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 437; 16.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 389; 14.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 292; 10.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 252; 9.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 210; 7.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 689; 25.3%; 
Total: 2,734. 

District: Illinois: Central: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 79; 19.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 51; 12.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 38; 9.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 32; 7.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 30; 7.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 29; 7.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 148; 36.4%; 
Total: 407. 

District: Illinois: Northern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 123; 18.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 93; 13.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 101; 14.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 75; 11.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 59; 8.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 55; 8.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 171; 25.3%; 
Total: 677. 

District: Illinois: Southern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 51; 10.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 63; 13.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 48; 10.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 58; 12.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 77; 16.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 58; 12.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 127; 26.3%; 
Total: 482. 

District: Indiana: Northern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 56; 17.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 73; 22.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 68; 20.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 28; 8.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 21; 6.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 20; 6.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 63; 19.1%; 
Total: 329. 

District: Indiana: Southern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 63; 14.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 53; 12.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 72; 16.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 56; 13.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 35; 8.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 23; 5.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 126; 29.4%; 
Total: 428. 

District: Wisconsin: Eastern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 45; 17.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 76; 30.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 48; 19.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 30; 11.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 10; 4.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 16; 6.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 27; 10.7%; 
Total: 252. 

District: Wisconsin: Western: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 38; 25.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 28; 18.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 14; 9.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 13; 8.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 20; 13.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 9; 6.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 27; 18.1%; 
Total: 149. 

Circuit: Eighth Circuit: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 742; 17.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 739; 17.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 628; 14.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 501; 11.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 401; 9.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 285; 6.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 933; 22.1%; 
Total: 4,229. 

District: Arkansas: Eastern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 51; 15.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 75; 22.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 45; 13.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 45; 13.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 42; 12.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 21; 6.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 51; 15.5%; 
Total: 330. 

District: Arkansas: Western: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 45; 17.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 44; 17.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 47; 18.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 42; 16.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 21; 8.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 19; 7.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 41 15.8%; 
Total: 259. 

District: Iowa: Northern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 123; 9.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 80; 12.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 74; 11.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 65; 10.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 80; 12.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 47; 7.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 152; 24.5%; 
Total: 621. 

District: Iowa: Southern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 82; 15.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 85; 15.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 78; 14.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 63; 11.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 41; 7.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 38; 7.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 158; 29.0%; 
Total: 545. 

District: Minnesota: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 75; 24.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 55; 17.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 38; 12.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 36; 11.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 23; 7.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 22; 7.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 61; 19.6%; 
Total: 311. 

District: Missouri: Eastern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 130; 23.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 123; 22.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 96; 17.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 53; 9.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 42; 7.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 24; 4.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 88; 15.8%; 
Total: 556. 

District: Missouri: Western: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 89; 16.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 88; 16.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 86; 15.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 70; 12.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 47; 8.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 43; 7.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 120; 22.1%; 
Total: 543. 

District: Nebraska: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 91; 12.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 127; 17.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 113; 15.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 93; 12.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 73; 10.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 47; 6.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 176; 24.4%; 
Total: 720. 

District: North Dakota: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 30; 14.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 38; 18.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 32; 15.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 21; 10.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 17; 8.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 12; 5.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 61; 28.9%; 
Total: 211. 

District: South Dakota: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 26; 19.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 24; 18.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 18; 13.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 13; 9.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 15; 11.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 12; 9.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 25; 18.8%; 
Total: 133. 

Circuit: Ninth Circuit: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 889; 17.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 1,153; 22.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 873; 16.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 667; 12.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 465; 9.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 273; 5.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 849; 16.4%; 
Total: 5,169. 

District: Alaska: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 36; 19.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 34; 18.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 27; 14.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 24; 13.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 19; 10.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 11; 6.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 30; 16.6%; 
Total: 181. 

District: Arizona: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 172; 25.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 223; 32.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 111; 16.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 59; 8.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 33; 4.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 14; 2.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 69; 10.1%; 
Total: 681. 

District: California: Central: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 114; 15.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 134; 18.5%;
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 103; 14.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 88; 12.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 72; 9.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 44; 6.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 169; 23.3%; 
Total: 724. 

District: California: Eastern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 92; 13.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 132; 19.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 124; 18.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 98; 14.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 82; 12.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 44; 6.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 114; 16.6%; 
Total: 686. 

District: California: Northern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 58; 20.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 52; 18.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 49; 17.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 37; 12.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 28; 9.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 20; 6.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 45; 16.6%; 
Total: 289. 

District: California: Southern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 77; 11.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 176; 25.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 135; 19.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 128; 18.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 68; 9.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 33; 4.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 69; 10.1%; 
Total: 686. 

District: Guam: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 6; 16.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 9; 24.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 5; 13.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 5; 13.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 1; 2.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 1; 2.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 10; 27.0%; 
Total: 37. 

District: Hawaii: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 55; 19.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 54; 19.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 37; 13.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 29; 10.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 28; 10.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 15; 5.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 61; 21.9%; 
Total: 279. 

District: Idaho: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 48; 16.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 60; 20.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 43; 14.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 37; 12.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 23; 8.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 10; 3.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 68; 23.5%; 
Total: 289. 

District: Montana: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 49; 13.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 65; 17.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 60; 19.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 50; 13.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 34; 9.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 19; 5.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 95; 25.5%; 
Total: 372. 

District: Nevada: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 55; 18.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 56; 19.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 59; 20.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 36; 12.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 17; 5.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 18; 6.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 50; 17.2%; 
Total: 291. 

District: Northern Mariana Islands: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 0; 0.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 3; 50.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 0; 0.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 0; 0.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 2; 33.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 1; 16.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 0; 0.0%; 
Total: 6. 

District: Oregon: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 40; 18.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 50; 23.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 43; 20.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 28; 13.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 13; 6.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 14; 6.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 24; 11.3%; 
Total: 212. 

District: Washington: Eastern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 39; 19.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 41; 20.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 35; 17.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 23; 11.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 24; 11.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 17; 8.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 25; 12.3%; 
Total: 204. 

District: Washington: Western: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 48; 20.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 64; 27.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 42; 18.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 25; 10.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 21; 9.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 12; 5.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 20; 8.6%; 
Total: 232. 

Circuit: Tenth Circuit: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 419; 18.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 428; 18.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 322; 14.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 263; 11.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 186; 8.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 151; 6.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 492; 21.8%; 
Total: 2,261. 

District: Colorado: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 37; 14.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 48; 19.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 46; 18.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 33; 13.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 18; 7.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 17; 6.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 54; 21.3%; 
Total: 253. 

District: Kansas: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 84; 13.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 104; 17.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 81; 13.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 76; 12.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 64; 10.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 46; 7.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 158; 25.8%; 
Total: 613. 

District: New Mexico: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 89; 23.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 92; 24.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 61; 16.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 39; 10.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 21; 5.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 23; 6.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 57; 14.9%; 
Total: 382. 

District: Oklahoma: Eastern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 21; 19.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 20; 18.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 8; 7.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 14; 12.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 14; 12.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 5; 4.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 27; 24.8%; 
Total: 109. 

District: Oklahoma: Northern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 24; 16.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 31; 21.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 21; 14.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 22; 15.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 9; 6.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 9; 6.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 28; 19.4%; 
Total: 144. 

District: Oklahoma: Western: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 51; 22.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 40; 17.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 29; 12.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 23; 10.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 15; 6.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 16; 7.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 55; 24.0%; 
Total: 229. 

District: Utah: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 72; 23.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 64; 20.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 53; 17.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 39; 12.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 23; 7.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 16; 5.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 42; 13.6%; 
Total: 309. 

District: Wyoming: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 41; 18.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 29; 13.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 23; 10.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 17; 7.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 22; 9.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 19; 8.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 71; 32.0%; 
Total: 222. 

Circuit: Eleventh Circuit: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 1,021; 20.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 807; 16.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 692; 13.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 580; 11.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 467; 9.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 316; 6.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 1,123; 22.4%; 
Total: 5,006. 

District: Alabama: Middle: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 45; 26.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 17; 9.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 29; 17.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 21; 12.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 18; 10.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 5; 2.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 36; 21.1%; 
Total: 171. 

District: Alabama: Northern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 78; 26.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 40; 13.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 34; 11.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 33; 11.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 31; 10.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 17; 5.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 57; 19.7%; 
Total: 290. 

District: Alabama: Southern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 80; 23.3 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 70; 20.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 49; 14.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 29; 8.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 31; 9.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 25; 7.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 60; 17.4%; 
Total: 344. 

District: Florida: Middle: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 235; 17.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 207; 15.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 196; 14.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 155; 11.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 128; 9.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 115; 8.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 298; 22.3%; 
Total: 1,334. 

District: Florida: Northern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 97; 21.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 48; 10.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 43; 9.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 45; 10.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 37; 8.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 28; 6.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 153; 33.9%; 
Total: 451. 

District: Florida: Southern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 249; 19.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 234; 18.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 198; 15.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 152; 11.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 115; 9.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 69; 5.4%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 266; 20.7%; 
Total: 1,283. 

District: Georgia: Middle: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 31; 13.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 57; 24.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 45; 19.1%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 37; 15.7%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 21; 8.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 9; 3.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 36; 15.3%; 
Total: 236. 

District: Georgia: Northern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 100; 19.3%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 61; 11.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 49; 9.5%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 67; 13.0%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 55; 10.6%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 32; 6.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 153; 29.6%; 
Total: 517. 

District: Georgia: Southern: 
Eligible for Immediate Release: 106; 27.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year One[A]: 73; 19.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Two: 49; 12.9%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Three: 41; 10.8%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Four: 31; 8.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Year Five: 16; 4.2%; 
Eligible for Release in Six or more years: 64; 16.8%; 
Total: 380.

[A] For example. in the District Of Columbia, 62 offenders are 
eligible for release between November 1, 2015 and October 31, 2016. 

Of the 46,376 offenders identified as eligible for relief under the 
amendment, Commission records contained sufficient information to 
perform this analysis for 45,350 offenders. 

Estimated release dates were determined using the Commission's prison 
and sentencing impact model which applies proposed guideline changes 
to affected offenders and re-sentencing these offenders in a 
proportional manner. Under to model, affected offenders: 1) receive a 
new official level; 2) have a new sentencing range determined (using 
the ranges from the Sentencing Tables; 3) are resentenced to the same 
relative position within (or outside) the original guideline trumps 
when applicable. 

Other assumptions incorporated in the model include: 

1) offenders earn the maximum allowable good-time (currently 54 days 
per year served for imposed sentences greater than one year but not 
life imprisonment); 2) offenders serve the lessor of A) the sentence 
imposed less the maximum allowable good conduct time, or B) their 
estimated remaining life expectancy, based upon an actuary table 
incorporating age, race, and sex. 

Source: U.S Sentencing mission, 1992-2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - USSCFY 
93. 

[End of table] 

Footnotes: 

[1] U.S. Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §2D 1.1 (Unlawful 
Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting or Trafficking (Including 
Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses); Attempt or 
Conspiracy) (2013) (hereinafter USSG); USSG §2D 1.11 (Unlawfully 
Distributing, Importing, Exporting or Possessing a Listed Chemical; 
Attempt or Conspiracy). 

[2] References in this memorandum to the "2014 drug guidelines 
amendment," "the amendment," or any similar references mean the 
amendment the Commission submitted to Congress on April 30, 2014, that 
would modify the drug quantity tables in USSG §§2Dl.1 and 2Dl.l1. 

[3] The analysis was limited to data from fiscal year 1992 and later 
because the Commission's data collection efforts prior to fiscal year 
1992 were not as complete as in later years. 

[4] Memorandum from the Office of Research and Data and the Office of 
General Counsel to Chair Saris, Commissioners, and Kenneth Cohen (May 
27,2014), available at [hyperlink, http://www.ussc.gov]. 

6. USSC Analysis of Option 6: Increase good time credits for good 
conduct time (GCT). 

Under this option, a credit for GCT would be awarded to current 
offenders using a formula that would result in 54 days' credit per 
year of sentence, rather than the current BOP interpretation that 
limits the GCT credit to 47 days per served sentence year. This would 
result in eligible inmates serving 85 percent of their sentence, 
rather than the higher 87 percent average resulting from BOP's current 
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). 

Letter: 

United States Sentencing Commission: 
One Columbus Circle, N.E. 
Suite 2-500, South Lobby: 
Washington, D.C. 20002-8002: 
(202) 502-4500: 
Fax (202) 502-4699: 

June 12, 2014: 

Jonathan R. Tumin: 
Senior Analyst: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G St., NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Tumin: 

The Government Accountability Office has asked the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission to assist it in connection with its engagement (number 
441173). We understand that through this engagement the GAO is 
examining ways in which the operating costs of the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons (BoP) can be reduced. As we have previously discussed with you 
and your colleagues, the Commission has agreed to analyze on GAO's 
behalf several policy options which could reduce the overall size of 
the prison population that the BoP administers. Specifically, our 
analyses of these policy options will consider the effect on the 
federal prison population if the policies were implemented in such a 
way that the options would apply to inmates currently incarcerated in 
the BoP system. 

In this memorandum, we provide to you another of these estimates. Here 
we provide our estimate of the impact on the federal prison population 
if the current method of determining "good time credit" were to be 
changed so that offenders could earn up to 54 days per year for good 
conduct and the BoP would be authorized to apply that expanded credit 
to all offenders currently incarcerated. 

As we discuss more fully below, we estimate that 179,265 offenders who 
are incarcerated and would still be in prison on October 1,2014 would 
be eligible to receive additional good conduct credit under such a 
policy change. The average increase in good conduct credit for these 
offenders would be 2.3 months (2.2%). The estimated total savings to 
the BoP from such a policy change applied retroactively would be 
34,359 bed years. 

I. The Policy Option We Considered: 

Under current law,[Footnote 1] a prisoner who is serving a term of 
imprison of more than one year may receive credit to the service of a 
sentence if they behave satisfactorily while incarcerated. Section 3 
624(b) of title 18 provides: 

A prisoner may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner's 
sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each 
year of the prisoner's term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of 
the first year of the term ... Credit for the last year or portion of 
a year of the term of imprisonment shall be prorated and credited 
within the last six weeks of the sentence.[Footnote 2] 

The goal of this provision is, in essence, that offenders serve at 
least 85 percent of the sentence imposed. The BoP currently uses a 
formula to determine good conduct credit that results in a maximum of 
47 days of credit being given for each year of incarceration served. 
The difference between the BoP approach and the 54 days described in 
the statute occurs because of the BoP's interpretation of when the 
good conduct credit is accrued (following the service of each year) 
and how the credit is to be applied to the partial year remaining at 
the end of an offender's sentence. 

An alternate method of calculating the good conduct credit could be to 
simply award 54 days of credit for each year of sentence imposed at 
the beginning of the sentence. Although the BoP's current 
interpretation of the statute has been upheld by the Supreme Court,
[Footnote 3] the Department of Justice has proposed to Congress that 
it amend the governing statute so as to allow the BoP to award up to 
54 days per year.[Footnote 4] 

You have asked us to consider a change to the statute whereby the 
calculation of the good conduct credit is changed to authorize 54 days 
per year to be awarded (the "Policy Option"). 

II. What We Found: 

Applying the Policy Option to offenders in the custody of the BoP, we 
estimate that there are 179,265 offenders who would be incarcerated on 
October 1,2014 who would be eligible for a reduction in the time they 
have left to serve on the sentence imposed if the Policy Option were 
to be retroactively applied. If the BoP were to grant each of these 
offenders the full good time credit of the Policy Option we estimate 
that the total savings to the BoP would be 34,359 bed years.[Footnote 
5] 

Table 1 provides information on some of the demographic characteristic 
of the offenders eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to the 
Policy Option. Table 2 provides an estimate of the number of offenders 
who would be released each year if the Policy Option was applied 
retroactively compared to the number of offenders who will be released 
each year pursuant to their current sentence. As can be seen on this 
table, if the Policy Option were fully retroactive on October 1, 2014, 
there would be 819 offenders eligible for immediate release. Within 
the first year of the effective date of the Policy Option, another 
25,918 offenders would be eligible for release. In total, the number 
of offenders eligible for release under the Policy Option in the first 
year is 2,878 more than the number who will be released under their 
current sentence. Table 3 provides information on selected sentencing 
guideline characteristics and the criminal history category of these 
offenders. 

For the 179,265 offenders who would be eligible to receive additional 
good conduct credit under the Policy Option, the current average time 
served is 103.3 months. If the BoP were to award the maximum good time 
credit under the Policy Option, the projected average time served 
would be 101.0 months, a reduction of 2.3 months (or 2.2%). Based on 
this reduction, the estimated total savings to the BoP from the 
retroactive application of the Policy Option would be 34,359 bed 
years. This savings would not be realized in any single year but is 
the cumulative savings realized over several years. 

III. How We Conducted This Analysis: 

A. Methodology: 

The methodology for this analysis is based on the Commission's Prison 
Impact Model, which has been in use in some form since the guidelines 
were first developed. This model is used to estimate the impact of 
proposed statutory and guideline amendments on newly sentenced 
offenders and to project the future impact those amendments will have 
on bed space in the BoP. For this analysis, those offenders who appear 
to be eligible to receive a reduced sentence were hypothetically 
"resentenced" with the computer program as if the proposed policy 
change had been in effect in the year in which they were sentenced. A 
new release date for each offender also was calculated in order to 
determine when the offender would be eligible for release if he or she 
were provided the full reduction in sentence provided by the proposed 
policy change. 

B. The Offender Population We Studied: 

The Bureau of Prisons provided the Commission with a datafile of 
inmates who were in the custody of the BoP on Jan 25,2014. That file 
contained approximately 189,000 offenders. Approximately 184,000 of 
these offenders were sentenced between fiscal year 1992 and fiscal 
2013.[Footnote 6] USSC staff was able to match 171,765 of these 
offenders to Commission records. Of these, 138,894 were estimated to 
remain incarcerated on October 1, 2014. 

In order to approximate the group of offenders who will be sentenced 
in fiscal year 2014, the Commission used the FY2013 datafile and moved 
all sentence dates forward by one year. Staff then determined which of 
these offenders would be incarcerated on October 1, 2014. This process 
added another 40,178 offenders into the analysis. Between the two 
groups, the Commission's analysis included data on 179,072 offenders. 

C. Our Assumptions: 

In performing our analysis, we have been required to make some 
assumptions (set forth below) concerning the decisions that Congress 
and the courts would make in determining whether, and to what extent, 
to reduce the sentences of offenders eligible to receive a 
modification of sentence pursuant to the Policy Option discussed 
above. These assumptions may not hold in every case. 

1. Procedural assumptions: 

Specifically, we have assumed that Congress would amend the provisions 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) in such a way that the BoP would award a 
maximum of good conduct credit of 54 days per year of sentence 
imposed. We have also assumed that Congress would authorize the 
statutory change to be applied retroactively to offenders incarcerated 
in the BoP. 

2. Substantive assumptions: 

We have assumed that the sentence for each offender would be reduced 
based on the maximum good conduct credit allowed under the Policy 
Option. This assumption may not hold for every offender, as some 
offenders lose a portion or all of their earned good conduct credit as 
a sanction for unacceptable behavior. As a result, our estimate of the 
impact of the Policy Options may be overbroad, but not to an extent we 
can determine. We have also assumed that offenders would serve the 
lesser of the newly calculated sentence or their life expectancies. 

If you have any questions about this analysis, or any of our prior 
analyses that we have provided to the GAO, please do not hesitate to 
contact the Commission. This analysis completes the list of analyses 
we have agreed to provide to you. We hope that the information the 
Commission has provided has been useful to the GAO in its work. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Noah D. Bookbinder: 
Director: 
Office of Legislative and Public Affairs: 

Signed by: 

Glenn R. Schmitt: 
Director: 
Office of Research and Data: 

Footnotes: 

[1] 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). 

[2] Jd. 

[3] Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. _ (2010). 

[4] Lanny Brewer, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Remarks at the National District Attorneys 
Association Summer Conference (July 23, 2012) available at [hyperlink, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminallpr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-
120723.html]. 

[5] A "bed year" is the cost to the BoP of incarcerating one inmate 
for one year. For example, one inmate who serves five years of 
imprisonment accounts for five bed years. 

[6] The analysis was limited to data from fiscal year 1992 through 
September 30, 2013 (fiscal years 1992 through 2013) because the 
Commission's data collection efforts prior to fiscal year 1992 were 
not as complete as in later years. For example, the Commission did not 
collect information on the type of drug involved in drug offenses 
prior to fiscal year 1992. 

Attachments: 

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Eligible Offenders (FY1992 
through FY2014): 

Demographics: 

Race/Ethnicity: 
White: 47,363; 26.5%; 
Black: 58,531; 32.7%; 
Hispanic: 67,051; 37.5%; 
Other: 6,045; 3.4%; 
Total: 178,990; 100.0%. 

Citizenship: 
U.S. Citizen: 133,096; 74.3%; 
Non-Citizen: 46,073; 25.7%; 
Total: 179,169; 100.0%. 

Gender: 
Male: 166,582; 92.9%; 
Female: 12,675; 7.1%; 
Total: 179,257; 100.0%. 

Average Age: 
39 (as of November 1, 2014); 
36 (at sentencing). 

The analysis involves a total of 179,265 cases, however, cases missing 
information for any specific analysis are excluded from that analysis. 

Total percentages may not add to exactly 100% due to rounding. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1992 - 2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - 
USSCFY13. 

[End of table] 

Table 2: Projected Year of Release for Retroactive Eligible Offenders 
(FY1992 through FY2014): 

Release Date: Immediate Release; 
If Option Not Retroactive: 819. 

Release Date: within 1 year; 
If Option Not Retroactive: 25,918; 
If Option Retroactive: 23,859. 

Release Date: within 2 years; 
If Option Not Retroactive: 31,111; 
If Option Retroactive: 30,901. 

Release Date: within 3 years; 
If Option Not Retroactive: 24,980; 
If Option Retroactive: 24,972. 

Release Date: within 4 years; 
If Option Not Retroactive: 19,287; 
If Option Retroactive: 19,395. 

Release Date: within 5 years; 
If Option Not Retroactive: 14,841; 
If Option Retroactive: 15,063. 

Release Date: within 6 years +; 
If Option Not Retroactive: 62,309; 
If Option Retroactive: 65,075. 

Of the 179,265 offenders who appear to be eligible to benefit under 
the Policy Option, Commission records contained sufficient information 
to perform this analysis for 179,265 offenders. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1992 - 2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - 
USSCFYI3. 

[End of table] 

Table 3: Guideline Sentencing Characteristics, Criminal History, and 
Position Relative to the Guideline Range of Eligible Offenders (FY1992 
through FY2014): 

Characteristics: 

Average Base Offense Level: 

Weapon Specific Offense Characteristic: 23,888; 13.3%; 
Firearms Mandatory Minimum Applied: 21,962; 12.3%; 
Safety Valve §5C1.2: 15,970; 16.3%; 
Aggravating Role §3Bl.l: 17,959; 10.0%; 
Mitigating Role §3B1.2: 8,705; 4.9%; 
Obstruction Adjustment §3C1.1: 8,416; 4.7%; 
Career Offender Status §4B1.1: 19,532; 10.9%. 

Criminal History Category: I: 58,109; 32.4%; 
Criminal History Category: II: 19,809; 11.1%; 
Criminal History Category: III: 28,548; 15.9%; 
Criminal History Category: IV: 19,857; 11.1%; 
Criminal History Category: V: 13,790; 7.7%; 
Criminal History Category: VI: 39,152; 21.8%; 
Criminal History Category: Total: 179,265; 100%. 

Sentence Relative to the Guideline Range: 

Within Range: 97,940; 54.7%; 
Above Range: 5,615; 3.1%; 
Substantial Assistance §5K1.1: 25,871; 14.5%; 
Otherwise Below Range: 49,478; 27.7%; 
Total: 178,904; 100%. 

The analysis involves a total of 179,265 cases, however, cases missing 
information for any specific analysis are excluded from that analysis. 

Total percentages may not add to exactly 100% due to rounding. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1992 - 2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - 
USSCFYI3. 

[End of table] 

7. USSC Analysis of Option 7: Make the current “safety valve” 
available to any drug offender with no offenses that receive 3 points 
under the criminal history point system. 

Federal law generally requires a sentencing judge to impose a minimum 
sentence of imprisonment following conviction for any number of 
federal offenses; however, there are two statutorily provided 
exceptions. One of these exceptions, commonly referred to as the 
safety valve, was created by the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, and is 
available for certain types of defendants for certain offenses that 
carry minimum sentences. Under this option, the current statutory 
requirements for eligibility for "safety valve" relief in drug cases 
involving a mandatory minimum penalty would be expanded to cover 
incarcerated offenders with any number of criminal history points—-
which are assigned based on a defendant's criminal record-—under USSC 
guidelines, provided that the offender does not have a conviction for 
which the sentence imposed was a 3-point offense under USSC sentencing 
guidelines. Under USSC sentencing guidelines, three criminal history 
points are assigned if an offender has been previously sentenced or is 
being sentenced to a prison term of 13 months or more. 

Letter: 

United States Sentencing Commission: 
One Columbus Circle, N.E. 
Suite 2-500, South Lobby: 
Washington, D.C. 20002-8002: 
(202) 502-4500: 
Fax (202) 502-4699: 

April 24, 2014: 

Jonathan R. Tumin: 
Senior Analyst: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G St., NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Tumin: 

The Government Accountability Office has asked the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission to assist it in connection with its engagement (number 
441173). We understand that through this engagement the GAO is 
examining ways in which the operating costs of the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons (BoP) can be reduced. As we have previously discussed 
with you and your colleagues, the Commission has agreed to analyze on 
GAO's behalf several policy options which could reduce the overall 
size of the prison population that the BoP administers. Specifically, 
our analyses of these policy options will consider the effect on the 
federal prison population if the policies were implemented in such a 
way that the options would apply to inmates currently incarcerated in 
the BoP system. 

In this memorandum, we provide to you another of these estimates. Here 
we provide our estimate of the impact on the federal prison population 
if the current statutory requirements for eligibility for "safety 
valve" relief in drug cases involving a mandatory minimum penalty 
[Footnote 1] were to be expanded. Specifically, you have asked us to 
consider a change to current law whereby offenders with any criminal 
history not involving a conviction for which the sentence imposed 
exceeded 13 months would be eligible for such relief and the courts 
would be authorized to resentence all federal offenders convicted of a 
drug offense in a manner consistent with the revised statute. 

As we discuss more fully below, we estimate that 11,949 offenders who 
are incarcerated and would still be in prison as of October 1, 2014 
would be eligible for a sentence reduction. The average reduction in 
sentence for these offenders would be 18 months (19.1 percent). The 
estimated total savings to the BoP from such a policy change applied 
retroactively would be 15,889 bed years. 

I. The Policy Option We Considered: 

One of the policy options that we have agreed to examine on behalf of 
the GAO is the impact of a policy change in current law whereby the 
current statutory requirements for eligibility for "safety valve" 
relief from the application of mandatory minimum penalties in drug 
cases would be expanded. That provision currently requires courts to 
sentence offenders who have been convicted of a drug offense carrying 
a mandatory minimum penalty without regard for that penalty when all 
of several criteria are met.[Footnote 2] One of those criteria 
involves the criminal history score[Footnote 3] of the offender. 
Currently, offenders are eligible for safety valve relief only if they 
have been assessed no more than one criminal history point under the 
sentencing guidelines.[Footnote 4] You have asked us to consider a 
change to the statute whereby offenders would be eligible for safety 
valve relief regardless of their criminal history score provided that 
none of their criminal history involves a conviction for which the 
sentence imposed exceeded one year and one month,[Footnote 5] and 
further provided they meet the remaining safety valve criteria (the 
"Policy Option"). 

II. What We Found: 

Applying the Policy Option to offenders in the custody of the BoP, we 
estimate that there are 11,949 offenders who would be incarcerated on 
October 1, 2014 who would be eligible for a reduction in their current 
sentence if the Policy Option were to be retroactively applied. If the 
courts were to grant each of these offenders the full reduction in 
their sentence we estimate that the total savings to the BoP would be 
15,889 bed years.[Footnote 6] 

Table 1 provides information on some of the demographic characteristic 
of the offenders eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to the 
Policy Option. Table 2 provides an estimate of the number of offenders 
who would be released each year if the Policy Option was applied 
retroactively compared to the number of offenders who will be released 
each year pursuant to their current sentence. As can be seen on this 
table, if the Policy Option were fully retroactive on October 1,2014, 
more than 1,123 offenders would be eligible for immediate release. 
Within the first year of the effective date of the Policy Option, 
another 865 offenders would be eligible for release above the number 
who will be released under their current sentence. Table 3 provides 
information on selected sentencing guideline characteristics and the 
criminal history category of these offenders. 

For the 11,949 offenders who would be eligible to receive a sentence 
reduction under the Policy Option, the current average sentence is 94 
months. If the courts were to grant the full reduction possible in 
each case, the projected new average sentence for these offenders 
would be 76 months, a reduction of 18 months (or 19.1 percent). Based 
on this reduction, the estimated total savings to the BoP from the 
retroactive application of the Policy Option would be 15,889 bed 
years. This savings would not be realized in any single year but is 
the cumulative savings realized over several years. 

III. How We Conducted This Analysis: 

A. Methodology: 

The methodology for this analysis is based on the Commission's Prison 
Impact Model, which has been in use in some form since the guidelines 
were first developed. This model is used to estimate the impact of 
proposed statutory and guideline amendments on newly sentenced 
offenders and to project the future impact those amendments will have 
on bed space in the BoP. For this analysis, those offenders who appear 
to be eligible to receive a reduced sentence were hypothetically 
"resentenced" with the computer program as if the proposed policy 
change had been in effect in the year in which they were sentenced. A 
new release date for each offender also was calculated in order to 
determine when the offender would be eligible for release if he or she 
were provided the full reduction in sentence provided by the proposed 
policy change. 

B. The Offender Population We Studied: 

The Bureau of Prisons provided the Commission with a datafile of 
inmates who were in the custody of the BoP on Jan 25,2014. That file 
contained approximately 189,000 offenders. Approximately 184,000 of 
these offenders were sentenced between fiscal year 1992 and fiscal 
2013.[Footnote 7] USSC staff was able to match 171,765 of these 
offenders to Commission records. Of these, 138,894 were estimated to 
remain incarcerated on October 1, 2014. 

In order to approximate the group of offenders who will be sentenced 
in fiscal year 2014, the Commission used the FY2013 datafile and moved 
all sentence dates forward by one year. Staff then determined which of 
these offenders would be incarcerated on October 1, 2014. This 
process added another 40,178 offenders into the analysis. Between the 
two groups, the Commission's analysis included data on 179,072 
offenders. 

C. Our Assumptions: 

In performing our analysis, we have been required to make some 
assumptions (set forth below) concerning the decisions that Congress 
and the courts would make in determining whether, and to what extent, 
to reduce the sentences of offenders eligible to receive a 
modification of sentence pursuant to the Policy Option discussed 
above. These assumptions may not hold in every case. 

1. Procedural assumptions: 

Specifically, we have assumed that Congress would amend the provisions 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) to the effect that "the defendant does not 
have a criminal history score, as determined under the sentencing 
guidelines, that includes points added for any conviction for which 
the sentence imposed exceeded one year and one month." We have further 
assumed that the Commission would amend USSG §5C1.3 to conform it to 
the provisions of the amended statutory safety valve provision 
[Footnote 8] but make no further changes to the Guidelines 
Manual, so that the remaining provisions of the 2013 Guidelines Manual 
would apply in these cases. Further, we have assumed that Congress 
would authorize the statutory change to be applied retroactively to 
offenders incarcerated in the BoP and that the Commission would amend 
USSG §lB1.10 to authorize courts to apply the amendment to USSG §5C1.3 
retroactively to those offenders on some specific date.[Footnote 9] We 
also assumed that the courts would resentence offenders in a manner 
that is consistent with the amended Guidelines Manual.[Footnote 10] 
Finally, we assumed that the effective date of any such Policy Option 
would be October 1,2014. Therefore, only offenders incarcerated as of 
that date would be eligible to seek a reduction in sentence pursuant 
to the Policy Option discussed in this memorandum. 

2. Substantive assumptions: 

In fiscal year 2010 approximately 66 percent of all drug offenders 
were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty. 
[Footnote 11] Of those approximately 46 percent remain subject to the 
penalty at the time of sentencing.[Footnote 12] Some offenders receive 
relief from the effect of any such penalty by providing substantial 
assistance to the government in the investigation or prosecution of 
another offender.[Footnote 13] Others receive relief from such a 
penalty through the statutory "safety valve" provision.[Footnote 14] 
Some offenders are eligible for both provisions. 

Under the sentencing guidelines, drug offenders who meet the 
requirements of the statutory safety valve provision, which is 
incorporated into the guidelines at USSG SCI.3, are entitled to a two- 
level reduction in offense level.[Footnote 15] This provision applies 
regardless of whether the offender was convicted of an offense 
carrying a mandatory minimum penalty. That is, for offenders who are 
convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty, 
eligibility for the safety valve provides two benefits: 1) statutory 
relief from application of the mandatory minimum penalty, and 2) a 
two-level reduction in the offense level calculated under the 
sentencing guidelines. For drug offenders who were not convicted of an 
offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty, eligibility for 
safety valve relief also results in the two-level reduction in offense 
level. For the analysis described in this memorandum, we have assumed 
that this structure would be unchanged, so that all drug offenders 
could benefit from the Policy Option if they meet the revised safety 
valve criteria and regardless of whether a mandatory minimum penalty 
had ever applied in the case. 

Additional assumptions we have made for this analysis are that the 
sentence for each offender would be reduced based on the maximum good 
conduct credit allowed by the Bureau of Prisons, and offenders 
would serve the lesser of the newly calculated sentence or their life 
expectancies. 

If you have any questions about our analysis, please do not hesitate 
to contact the Commission. We continue to work to analyze the other 
policy options that we discussed with you and your colleagues. We will 
provide our analyses of these options as they are completed. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Noah D. Bookbinder: 
Director: 
Office of Legislative and Public Affairs: 

Signed by: 

Glenn R. Schmitt: 
Director: 
Office of Research and Data: 

Footnotes: 

[1] 18 U.S.c. § 3553(f); see also USSG §5C1.2. 

[2] Id. 

[3] See USSG ChA, Pt.A, for a discussion on how the criminal history 
score is determined. 

[4] Criminal history points are assessed by the court at the time of 
sentencing. Id. 

[5] Offenders convicted of an offense for which the sentence imposed 
exceeded one year and one month are assessed three points under the 
sentencing guidelines. See USSG §4A 1.1 (a). Therefore, this Policy 
Option would expand safety valve relief to any offender who did not 
have any conviction that was assigned three points under the criminal 
history provisions of the guidelines. 

[6] A "bed year" is the cost to the BoP of incarcerating one inmate 
for one year. For example, one inmate who serves five years of 
imprisonment accounts for five bed years. 

[7] The analysis was limited to data from fiscal year 1992 through 
September 30, 2013 (fiscal years 1992 through 2013) because the 
Commission's data collection efforts prior to fiscal year 1992 
were not as complete as in later years. For example, the Commission 
did not collect information on the type of drug involved in drug 
offenses prior to fiscal year 1992. 

[8] See 28 U.S.C. § 994(0), which requires the Commission to 
periodically review and revise the sentencing guidelines. 

[9] See 28 U.S.C. § 994(u), which requires that when the Commission 
"reduces the term of imprisonment recommended in the guidelines 
applicable to a particular offense or category of offenses, it shall 
specify in what circumstances and by what amount the sentences of 
prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for the offense may be 
reduced." The Commission does this through amendments to USSG § 1 B 
1.1 0, which lists all of the amendments to the Guidelines Manual that 
may be retroactively applied. 

[10] See 18 U.S.c. 3582(c)(2), which authorizes the courts to 
resentence an incarcerated offender in light of the Commission's 
decision under 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(0) and (u) to retroactively apply 
an amendment to the Guidelines Manual if the sentencing range that 
applied at the time the offender was sentenced would be lower under 
the amended guideline. 

[11] See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Penalties In 
The Federal Criminal Justice System 154 (2011). 

[12] Id. 

[13] See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); USSG §5Kl.l. 

[14] See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); USSG §5K3.1. 

[15] USSG §2Dl.l(b)(16). 

Attachments: 

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Drug Offenders Potentially 
Eligible for Retroactive Expanded Safety Valve (No 3-Point Events): 

Demographics: 

Race/Ethnicity:
White: 3,496; 29.3%; 
Black: 3,463; 29.0%; 
Hispanic: 4,667; 39.1%; 
Other: 309; 2.6%;
Total: 11,935; 100%. 

Citizenship: 
U.S. Citizen: 9,639; 80.7%; 
Non-Citizen: 2,308; 19.3%; 
Total: 11,947; 100%. 

Gender: 
Male: 10,458; 87.5%; 
Female: 1,490; 12.5%; 
Total: 11,948; 100%. 

Average Age 33. 

The analysis involves a total of 11,949 cases in which the offender 
was identified as eligible to seek a sentence reduction if the drug 
mandatory minimum changes were made retroactive. Cases missing 
information for any specific analysis are excluded from that analysis. 

Total percentages may not add to exactly 100% due to rounding. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1992 - 2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - 
USSCFYI3 and projected 2014 Datafile. 

[End of table] 

Table 2: Estimated Projected Year of Release for Drug Offenders 
Potentially Eligible for Retroactive Expansion of Safety Valve (No 3-
Point Events): 

Release Date: immediate; 
If Policy Option Applied Retroactively: 1,123; 

Release Date: within 1 year; 
If Policy Option Applied Retroactively: 2,108; 
Current Sentence: 1,243. 

Release Date: within 2 years; 
If Policy Option Applied Retroactively: 2,520; 
Current Sentence: 2,242. 

Release Date: within 3 years; 
If Policy Option Applied Retroactively: 2,118; 
Current Sentence: 2,009. 

Release Date: within 4 years; 
If Policy Option Applied Retroactively: 1,446; 
Current Sentence: 1,888. 

Release Date: within 5 years; 
If Policy Option Applied Retroactively: 912; 
Current Sentence: 1,327. 

Release Date: within 6 years +; 
If Policy Option Applied Retroactively: 1,690; 
Current Sentence: 3,208. 

Of the 11,949 offenders who appear to be eligible for relief if the 
Policy Option was applied retroactively, Commission records contained 
sufficient information to perform this analysis for 11 ,917 offenders. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1992 - 2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - 
USSCFYI3 and projected 2014 Datafile. 

[End of table] 

Table 3: Guideline Sentencing Characteristic and Criminal History of 
Drug Offenders Potentially Eligible for Retroactive Expanded Safety 
Valve (No 3-Point Events): 

Characteristics: 

Average Base Offense Level: 30. 

Weapon Specific Offense Characteristic: 0; 0%; 
Firearms Mandatory Minimum Applied: 0; 0%; 
Safety Valve §5C1.2: 0; 0%; 
Aggravating Role §3B1.1: 0; 0%; 
Mitigating Role §3B1.2: 1,339; 11.2%; 
Obstruction Adjustment §3C1.l: 0; 0%; 
Career Offender Status §4B1.1: 0; 0%; 

Criminal History Category: I: 0; 0%; 
Criminal History Category: II: 4,658; 39.0%; 
Criminal History Category: III: 4,936; 41.3%; 
Criminal History Category: IV: 1,452; 12.2%; 
Criminal History Category: V: 599; 5.0%; 
Criminal History Category: VI: 304; 2.5%; 
Criminal History Category: Total: 11,949; 100%. 

The analysis involves a total of 11,949 cases in which the offender 
was identified as eligible to seek a sentence reduction if the 
expanded safety valve changes were made retroactive. Cases missing 
information for any specific analysis are excluded from that analysis. 

Total percentages may not add to exactly 100% due to rounding. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1992 - 2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - 
USSCFY13 and projected 2014 Datafile. 

[End of table] 

8. USSC Analysis of Option 8: Expand the safety valve as described in 
option 7 to include both non-violent drug offenders and any nonviolent 
offenders provided that they do not have a 3-point offense. 

Under this option, the current statutory requirements for eligibility 
for "safety valve" relief in drug cases involving a mandatory minimum 
penalty would be expanded to cover both drug offenders and other 
non-violent (non-drug) offenders. No offender could have a conviction 
for which the sentence imposed was a 3-point offense under USSC 
sentencing guidelines. 

Letter: 

United States Sentencing Commission: 
One Columbus Circle, N.E. 
Suite 2-500, South Lobby: 
Washington, D.C. 20002-8002: 
(202) 502-4500: 
Fax (202) 502-4699: 

June 11, 2014: 

Jonathan R. Tumin: 
Senior Analyst: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G St., NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Tumin: 

The Government Accountability Office has asked the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission to assist it in connection with its engagement (number 
441173). We understand that through this engagement the GAO is 
examining ways in which the operating costs of the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons (BoP) can be reduced. As we have previously discussed with you 
and your colleagues, the Commission has agreed to analyze on GAO's 
behalf several policy options which could reduce the overall size of 
the prison population that the BoP administers. Specifically, our 
analyses of these policy options will consider the effect on the 
federal prison population if the policies were implemented in such a 
way that the options would apply to inmates currently incarcerated in 
the BoP system. 

In this memorandum, we provide to you another of these estimates. Here 
we provide our estimate of the impact on the federal prison population 
if the current statutory requirements for eligibility for "safety 
valve" relief in drug cases involving a mandatory minimum penalty 
[Footnote 1] were to be expanded to all offenders regardless of the 
type of offense committed, subject to some limitations. Specifically, 
you have asked us to consider a change to current law whereby any non-
violent offender would be eligible for safety valve relief regardless 
of the offender's criminal history, provided that the offender had not 
been convicted of any offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 
13 months, and the courts would be authorized to resentence those 
offenders in a manner consistent with the revised statute. 

As we discuss more fully below, we estimate that 38,930 offenders who 
are incarcerated and would still be in prison as of October 1, 2014 
would be eligible for a sentence reduction under such a policy change. 
The average reduction in sentence for these offenders would be 15 
months (20.5%). The estimated total savings to the BoP from such a 
policy change applied retroactively would be 40,552 bed years. 

1. The Policy Option We Considered: 

One of the policy options that we have agreed to examine on behalf of 
the GAO is the impact of a policy change in current law whereby the 
current statutory requirements for eligibility for "safety 
valve" relief from the application of mandatory minimum penalties in 
drug cases would be expanded. That provision currently requires courts 
to sentence offenders who have been convicted of a drug offense 
carrying a mandatory minimum penalty without regard for that penalty 
when all of several criteria are met.[Footnote 2] One of those criteria 
involves the criminal history score[Footnote 3] of the offender. 
Currently, offenders are eligible for safety valve relief only if they 
have been assessed no more than one criminal history point under the 
sentencing guidelines.[Footnote 4] 

You have asked us to consider a change to the statute whereby the 
safety valve would be available to all offenders, not just those 
committing drug offenses, provided that they offender was not a 
violent offender. You also asked us to consider a further change to 
the statute so that any such non-violent offender would be eligible 
regardless of their criminal history score, provided that none of 
their criminal history involves a conviction for which the sentence 
imposed exceeded one year and one month,[Footnote 5] and further 
provided they meet the remaining safety valve criteria (the "Policy 
Option"). 

II. What We Found: 

Applying the Policy Option to offenders in the custody of the BoP, we 
estimate that there are 38,930 offenders who would be incarcerated on 
October 1,2014 who would be eligible for a reduction in their 
current sentence if the Policy Option were to be retroactively 
applied. If the courts were to grant each of these offenders the full 
reduction in their sentence we estimate that the total savings to the 
BoP would be 40,552 bed years.[Footnote 6] 

Table 1 provides information on some of the demographic characteristic 
of the offenders eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to the 
Policy Option. Table 2 provides an estimate of the number of offenders 
who would be released each year if the Policy Option was applied 
retroactively compared to the number of offenders who will be released 
each year pursuant to their current sentence. As can be seen on this 
table, if the Policy Option were fully retroactive on October 1, 2014, 
more than 5,623 offenders would be eligible for immediate release. 
Within the first year of the effective date of the Policy Option, 
another 12,067 offenders would be eligible for release. In total, the 
number of offenders eligible for release under the Policy Option in 
the first year is 6,321 more than the number who will be released 
under their current sentence. Table 3 provides information on selected 
sentencing guideline characteristics and the criminal history category 
of these offenders. 

For the 38,931 offenders who would be eligible to receive a sentence 
reduction under the Policy Option, the current average sentence is 73 
months. If the courts were to grant the full reduction possible in 
each case, the projected new average sentence for these offenders 
would be 58 months, a reduction of 15 months (or 20.5%). Based on this 
reduction, the estimated total savings to the BoP from the retroactive 
application of the Policy Option would be 40,552 bed years. This 
savings would not be realized in any single year but is the cumulative 
savings realized over several years. 

III. How We Conducted This Analysis: 

A. Methodology: 

The methodology for this analysis is based on the Commission's Prison 
Impact Model, which has been in use in some form since the guidelines 
were first developed. This model is used to estimate the impact of 
proposed statutory and guideline amendments on newly sentenced 
offenders and to project the future impact those amendments will have 
on bed space in the BoP. For this analysis, those offenders who appear 
to be eligible to receive a reduced sentence were hypothetically 
"resentenced" with the computer program as if the proposed policy 
change had been in effect in the year in which they were sentenced. A 
new release date for each offender also was calculated in order to 
determine when the offender would be eligible for release if he or she 
were provided the full reduction in sentence provided by the proposed 
policy change. 

B. The Offender Population We Studied: 

The Bureau of Prisons provided the Commission with a datafile of 
inmates who were in the custody of the BoP on Jan 25,2014. That file 
contained approximately 189,000 offenders. Approximately 184,000 
of these offenders were sentenced between fiscal year 1992 and fiscal 
2013.[Footnote 7] USSC staff was able to match 171,765 of these 
offenders to Commission records. Of these, 138,894 were estimated 
to remain incarcerated on October 1, 2014.

In order to approximate the group of offenders who will be sentenced 
in fiscal year 2014, the Commission used the FY2013 datafile and moved 
all sentence dates forward by one year. Staff then determined which of 
these offenders would be incarcerated on October 1, 2014. This process 
added another 40,178 offenders into the analysis. Between the two 
groups, the Commission's analysis included data on 179,072 offenders. 

C. Our Assumptions: 

In performing our analysis, we have been required to make some 
assumptions (set forth below) concerning the decisions that Congress 
and the courts would make in determining whether, and to what extent, 
to reduce the sentences of offenders eligible to receive a 
modification of sentence pursuant to the Policy Option discussed 
above. These assumptions may not hold in every case. 

1. Procedural assumptions: 

Specifically, we have assumed that Congress would amend the provisions 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) to provide that the subsection would apply at 
sentencing in any case in which the offender was not convicted of a 
violent offense and had not used violence in the commission of the 
offense. We have also assumed that Congress would amend 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(f)(1) to expand eligibility under that section to any federal 
offender to the extent that: "the defendant does not have a criminal 
history score, as determined under the sentencing guidelines, that 
includes points added for any conviction for which the sentence 
imposed exceeded one year and one month." 

We have further assumed that the Commission would amend USSG §5C1.3 to 
conform it to the provisions of the amended statutory safety valve 
provision[Footnote 8] but make no further changes to the Guidelines 
Manual, so that the remaining provisions of the 2013 Guidelines Manual 
would apply in these cases. Further, we have assumed that Congress 
would authorize the statutory change to be applied retroactively to 
offenders incarcerated in the BoP and that the Commission would amend 
USSG §1B1.10 to authorize courts to apply the amendment to USSG §5Cl.3 
retroactively to those offenders on some specific date.[Footnote 9] We 
also assumed that the courts would resentence offenders in a manner 
that is consistent with the amended Guidelines Manual.[Footnote 10] 
Finally, we assumed that the effective date of any such Policy Option 
would be October 1, 2014. Therefore, only offenders incarcerated as of 
that date would be eligible to seek a reduction in sentence pursuant 
to the Policy Option discussed in this memorandum. 

2. Substantive assumptions: 

In fiscal year 2010, approximately 66 percent of all drug offenders 
were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty. 
[Footnote 11] Of those, approximately 46 percent remain subject 
to the penalty at the time of sentencing.[Footnote 12] Some offenders 
receive relief from the effect of any such penalty by providing 
substantial assistance to the government in the investigation or 
prosecution of another offender.[Footnote 13] Others receive relief 
from such a penalty through the statutory "safety valve" 
provision.[Footnote 14] Some offenders are eligible for both 
provisions. 

Under the sentencing guidelines, drug offenders who meet the 
requirements of the statutory safety valve provision, which is 
incorporated into the guidelines at USSG 5Cl.3, are entitled to a two-
level reduction in offense level.[Footnote 15] This provision applies 
regardless of whether the offender was convicted of an offense 
carrying a mandatory minimum penalty. That is, for offenders who are 
convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty, 
eligibility for the safety valve provides two benefits: 1) statutory 
relief from application of the mandatory minimum penalty, and 2) a 
two-level reduction in the offense level calculated under the 
sentencing guidelines. For drug offenders who were not convicted of an 
offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty, eligibility 
for safety valve relief also results in the two-level reduction in 
offense level. 

For the analysis described in this memorandum, we have assumed that 
this structure would be unchanged, but now would be applied in all 
cases (not just drug cases) in which the offender was not convicted of 
a violent offense and had not used violence in connection with the 
offense. As a result, all non-violent offenders could benefit from the 
Policy Option if they meet the revised safety valve criteria and 
regardless of whether a mandatory minimum penalty had ever applied in 
the case. 

We made several assumptions in for the purpose of determining which 
offenders were violent offenders. Specifically, we considered any of 
the following to be a violent offense or an indication that violence 
had been used in connection with the offense: 

the guideline applied in the case was from Part A of Chapter 2 of the 
Guidelines Manual (which involves crimes against the person); 

the guideline applied was USSG §2B2.1 (burglary of a residence); 

the guideline applied was USSG §2B3.1 (robbery); 

the guideline applied was USSG §2B3.2 (extortion by force or threat of 
injury); 

the guideline applied was USSG §2Dl.9 (placing dangerous devices to 
protect drug production); 

the guideline applied was from Subpart 1 of Part E of Chapter 2 
(racketeering); 

the guideline applied was from Subpart 1 of Part G of Chapter 2 
(promoting commercial sex acts or other prohibited sexual conduct); 

the guideline applied was from Subpart 2 of Part G of Chapter 2 and 
the conduct involved the production of child pornography; 

the guideline applied was USSG §2H4.1 (peonage, slave trade); 

the guideline applied was from Part K of Chapter 2 (firearms); 

the guideline applied was from Subparts 1,2,3,5, or 6 of Part M of 
Chapter 2 (treason, sabotage, espionage, and cases involving nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons and materials); 

the guideline applied was USSG §2Nl.1 (tampering with consumer 
products with risk of death); 

the guideline applied was USSG §2P 1.3 (prison riot); 

the guideline applied was USSG §2Q 1.1 (knowing endangerment from 
HAZMATs); 

the guideline applied was USSG §2Q 1.4 (tampering with public water 
system); or; 

the guideline applied was USSG §2X6.1 (use of a minor in a crime of 
violence). 

Additional assumptions we have made for this analysis are that the 
sentence for each offender would be reduced based on the maximum good 
conduct credit allowed by the Bureau of Prisons, and offenders would 
serve the lesser of the newly calculated sentence or their life 
expectancies. 

If you have any questions about our analysis, please do not hesitate 
to contact the Commission. We continue to work to analyze the other 
policy options that we discussed with you and your colleagues. We will 
provide our analyses of these options as they are completed. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Noah D. Bookbinder: 
Director: 
Office of Legislative and Public Affairs: 

Signed by: 

Glenn R. Schmitt: 
Director: 
Office of Research and Data: 

Footnotes: 

[1] 18 U.S.c. § 3553(£); see also USSG §5CI.2. 

[2] Id. 

[3] See USSG ChA, Pt.A, for a discussion on how the criminal history 
score is determined. 

[4] Criminal history points are assessed by the court at the time of 
sentencing. Id. 

[5] Offenders convicted of an offense for which the sentence imposed 
exceeded one year and one month are assessed three points under the 
sentencing guidelines. See USSG §4A 1.1 (a). Therefore, this Policy 
Option would expand safety valve relief to any offender who did not 
have any conviction that was assigned three points under the 
criminal history provisions of the guidelines. 

[6] A "bed year" is the cost to the BoP of incarcerating one inmate for 
one year. For example, one inmate who serves five years of 
imprisonment accounts for five bed years. 

[7] The analysis was limited to data from fiscal year 1992 through 
September 30, 2013 (fiscal years 1992 through 2013) because the 
Commission's data collection efforts prior to fiscal year 1992 were 
not as complete as in later years. For example, the Commission did not 
collect information on the type of drug involved in drug offenses 
prior to fiscal year 1992. 

[8] See 28 U.S.C. § 994(0), which requires the Commission to 
periodically review and revise the sentencing guidelines. 

[9] See 28 U .S.C. § 994(u), which requires that when the Commission 
"reduces the term of imprisonment recommended in the guidelines 
applicable to a particular offense or category of offenses, it shall 
specify in what circumstances and by what amount the sentences of 
prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for the offense may be 
reduced." The Commission does this through amendments to USSG § 1 B 
1.10, which lists all of the amendments to the Guidelines Manual that 
may be retroactively applied. 

[10] See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which authorizes the courts to 
resentence an incarcerated offender in light of the Commission's 
decision under 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(0) and (u) to retroactively apply an 
amendment to the Guidelines Manual if the sentencing range that 
applied at the time the offender was sentenced would be lower 
under the amended guideline. 

[11] See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Penalties In 
The Federal Criminal Justice System 154 (2011). 

[12] Id. 

[13] See 18 U.S.c. § 3553(e); USSG §5Kl.1. 

[14] See 18 U.S.c. § 3553(f); USSG §5K3.1. 

[15] USSG §2Dl.1(b)(16). 

Attachments: 

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Eligible Offenders (FY1992 
through FY2014): 

Demographics: 

Race/Ethnicity: 
White: 13,640; 35.2%; 
Black: 6,540; 16.9%; 
Hispanic: 17,586; 45.4%; 
Other: 997; 2.6%; 
Total: 38,763; 100.0%. 

Citizenship: 
U.S. Citizen: 25,707; 66.1%; 
Non-Citizen: 13,211; 33.9%; 
Total: 38,918; 100.0%. 

Gender: 
Male: 34,574; 88.8%; 
Female: 4,341; 11.2%; 
Total: 38,915; 100.0%. 

Average Age: 
38 (as of November 1, 2014); 
37 (at sentencing). 

The analysis involves a total of38,931 cases, however, cases missing 
information for any specific analysis are excluded from that analysis. 

Total percentages may not add to exactly 100% due to rounding. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1992 - 2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - 
USSCFY13. 

[End of table] 

Table 2: Projected Year of Release for Retroactive Eligible Offenders 
(FY1992 through FY2014): 

Release Date: 
Immediate Release 
If Amendment Retroactive: 5,623. 

Release Date: within 1 year: 
If Amendment Retroactive: 12,067; 
If Amendment Not Retroactive: 11,369. 

Release Date: within 2 years; 
If Amendment Retroactive: 7,113; 
If Amendment Not Retroactive: 7,605. 

Release Date: within 3 years; 
If Amendment Retroactive: 4,724; 
If Amendment Not Retroactive: 5,476. 

Release Date: within 4 years; 
If Amendment Retroactive: 3,168; 
If Amendment Not Retroactive: 4,115. 

Release Date: within 5 years; 
If Amendment Retroactive: 1,975; 
If Amendment Not Retroactive: 2,816. 

Release Date: within 6 years+; 
If Amendment Retroactive: 4,260; 
If Amendment Not Retroactive: 7,549. 

Of the 38,931 offenders who appear to be eligible for relief under the 
amendment, Commission records contained sufficient information to 
perform this analysis for 38,930 offenders. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1992 - 2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - 
USSCFYI3. 

[End of table] 

Table 3: Guideline Sentencing Characteristics, Criminal History, and 
Position Relative to the Guideline Range of Eligible Offenders (FY1992 
through FY2014): 

Characteristics: 

Average Base Offense Level: 

Weapon Specific Offense Characteristic: 0; 0.0%; 
Firearms Mandatory Minimum Applied: 0; 0.0%; 
Safety Valve §5C1.2: 0; 0.0%; 
Aggravating Role §3B1.1: 0; 0.0%; 
Mitigating Role §3B1.2: 2,108; 5.4%; 
Obstruction Adjustment §3Cl.l: 0; 0.0%; 
Career Offender Status §4B1.1: 845; 2.2%. 

Criminal History Category: I: 17,290; 44.4%; 
Criminal History Category: II: 7,895; 20.3%; 
Criminal History Category: III: 8,492; 21.8%; 
Criminal History Category: IV: 2,848; 7.3%; 
Criminal History Category: V: 1,095; 2.8%; 
Criminal History Category: VI: 1,311; 3.4%; 
Criminal History Category: Total: 38,931; 100%. 

Sentence Relative to the Guideline Range: 

Within Range: 20,748; 53.3%; 
Above Range: 823; 2.1%; 
Substantial Assistance §5K1.1: 4,895; 12.6%; 
Otherwise Below Range: 12,438; 32.0%; 
Total: 38,904; 100%. 

The analysis involves a total of 38,931 cases, however, cases missing 
information for any specific analysis are excluded from that analysis. 
Total percentages may not add to exactly 100% due to rounding. 

Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1992 - 2013 Datafiles, USSCFY92 - 
USSCFY13. 

[End table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

David C. Maurer, (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Jill Verret (Assistant 
Director), Pedro Almoguera, Billy Commons, Adam Couvillion, Michele 
Fejfar, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Linda Miller, Michael Tropauer, and 
Jonathan R. Tumin made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] BOP per capita annual cost per prisoner increased from about 
$13,400 in fiscal year 1980 to about $31,338 in fiscal year 2014 in 
nominal terms. However, after adjustment for inflation, BOP spending 
per capita for salaries and expenses in 2014 is about 6.1 percent less 
than in 1980. According to the chain-weighted gross domestic product 
price index, if BOP spending per capita had kept even with inflation 
since 1980, annual cost per prisoner would be about $33,251 for fiscal 
year 2014 (about 6.1 percent higher than $31,338). Annual per capita 
cost per prisoner for fiscal year 2014 was calculated by dividing 
BOP's enacted fiscal year 2014 budget for Salaries and Expenses of 
$6.769 billion by total prisoner population of about 216,000 as of 
July 24, 2014. BOP excludes appropriations for Buildings and 
Facilities from its calculation of per capita costs because these may 
vary substantially year to year. These costs are also excluded from 
our calculation of fiscal year 2014 per capita costs. Prisoner 
population data are from BOP's inmate tracking database, the SENTRY 
Inmate Management System. 

[2] The DOJ Fiscal Year 2015 Performance Budget Congressional 
Submission projects BOP's population to increase by 2,500 (about 1 
percent) for 2015 over the fiscal year 2014 level--which is forecast 
to be the same as the fiscal year 2013 level--and by about 8.5 percent 
by fiscal year 2019 over the July 2014 level. As a result of these 
projected increases, system-wide overcrowding is estimated to increase 
from 36 percent in fiscal year 2013 to 41 percent by fiscal year 2019. 
We have previously reported on these issues in GAO, Bureau of Prisons: 
Growing Inmate Crowding Negatively Affects Inmates, Staff, and 
Infrastructure, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-743] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2012). 

[3] See GAO, Bureau of Prisons: Eligibility and Capacity Impact Use of 
Flexibilities to Reduce Inmates'Time in Prison, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-320] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 
2012). 

[4] Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987. The act was effective for 
convictions on or after November 1, 1987. Prior to the act, federal 
judges generally had broad discretion in sentencing. Most criminal 
statutes provided only broad maximum terms of imprisonment. Federal 
law outlined the maximum sentence, federal judges imposed a sentence 
within a statutory range, and the federal parole official eventually 
determined the actual duration of incarceration. 

[5] 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). We have previously reported on BOP's use of 
these discretionary authorities. See [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-320]. 

[6] Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), a "prisoner who is serving a term of 
imprisonment of more than 1 year other than a term of imprisonment for 
the duration of the prisoner's life, may receive credit toward 
the service of the prisoner's sentence, beyond the time served, of up 
to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner's term of 
imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term, 
subject to determination by the Bureau of Prisons that, during that 
year, the prisoner has displayed exemplary compliance with 
institutional disciplinary regulations." 

[7] The USSC is an independent agency in the judicial branch of 
government. It was created by the Sentencing Reform Act provisions of 
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 
98 Stat. 1976. The sentencing guidelines established by the commission 
are designed to incorporate the purposes of sentencing (i.e., just 
punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation). 

[8] According to the memorandum, a defendant must be someone (1) whose 
relevant conduct does not involve the use of violence, the credible 
threat of violence, the possession of a weapon, the trafficking of 
drugs to or with minors, or the death or serious bodily injury of any 
person; (2) who is not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of 
others within a criminal organization; (3) who does not have 
significant ties to large-scale drug-trafficking organizations, gangs, 
or cartels; and (4) who does not have a significant criminal history. 
The potential impact of this directive on BOP's population is 
discussed later in this report. 

[9] GAO, Bureau of Prisons: Opportunities Exist to Enhance the 
Transparency of Annual Budget Justifications, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-121] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 
2013). 

[10] BOP is appropriated funds through two accounts: Salaries and 
Expenses and Buildings and Facilities. We focused our review on the 
Salaries and Expenses account as it represents almost the entirety of 
BOP's budget. 

[11] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00.21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999). Internal control is an integral 
component of an organization's management that provides reasonable 
assurance that the following objectives are being achieved: 
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial 
reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 

[12] The expert sources from which we requested or obtained analysis 
or information on sentencing issues were: the American Bar Association 
(ABA); the Association of State Correctional Administrators; the 
Brennan Center for Justice; the Council of State Governments/Justice 
Center; Families Against Mandatory Minimums; the Fraternal Order of 
Police; the Heritage Foundation; the National Association of Assistant 
U.S. Attorneys; the National Association of Former U.S. Attorneys; the 
Pew Charitable Trusts; "Right on Crime", a project of the Texas Public 
Policy Foundation in cooperation with the Justice Fellowship; the 
Sentencing Project; the Urban Institute; and the Vera Institute of 
Justice. We identified these expert entities through several means, 
including (1) asking officials at both the USSC and the Urban 
Institute who have previously worked on analyses and reports relevant 
to prison population data and criminal justice to identify entities 
they considered as expert in the field of sentencing reform and 
criminal justice, (2) conducting a literature search to identify 
publications issued by some of the entities on sentencing reform or 
corrections, and (3) identifying entities with known expertise and 
authoritativeness (e.g., the ABA) in the criminal justice field 
through literature searches. 

[13] The USSC calculates the impact of sentencing changes in terms of 
bed year savings; 1 bed year is defined by the USSC as 12 months of 
prison time (e.g., one offender in prison for 1 year, or three 
offenders in prison for 4 months each, and so forth). Using the USSC 
estimates of saved bed years, we calculated savings that would result 
from sentence length reductions or from cost avoidance savings 
resulting from increases below what would otherwise occur if an option 
was not implemented, by multiplying bed years by the annual marginal 
cost for a prisoner. Marginal costs, calculated by BOP, cover such 
things as food, medical care, clothing, and utilities. For fiscal year 
2014, the average annual marginal cost per offender is about $11,000. 
For some options that could affect the sentences of about 78,000 or 
more offenders, equal to the BOP July 2014 level of system-wide 
overcrowding, we also calculated per capita savings, as such sentence 
reductions could allow BOP to reduce its staff or close facilities. 

[14] Texas was identified as a model for criminal justice system 
reforms in a joint January 2014 DOJ-Urban Institute report assessing 
the JRI initiative. See: Urban Institute-Department of Justice Bureau 
of Justice Assistance, Justice Reinvestment Initiative State 
Assessment Report (Washington, D.C.: January 2014). 

[15] Of the 17 entities that acknowledged receipt of our request for 
comments, 3 did not provide substantive comments. Of these 3, 1 
referred us to multiple articles published on criminal justice issues. 

[16] An obligation is a definite commitment that creates a legal 
liability of an agency for the payment of goods or services received. 
An agency incurs an obligation, for example, when it places an order, 
signs a contract, awards a grant, purchases services, or takes other 
actions that require the government to make payments to the public or 
from one government account to another. See GAO, A Glossary of Terms 
Used in the Federal Budget Process, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-734SP] (Washington, D.C.: September 
2005). To report and monitor obligated funds throughout the bureau, 
BOP employs cost center accounting and designates managers for these 
cost centers.According to the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory 
Board, components of an organization must accumulate costs for each 
type of output they produce for various programs. 

[17] Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards 4: Managerial 
Cost Accounting Standards and Concepts. Federal Accounting Standards 
Advisory Board Handbook, Version 12 (June 2013). 

[18] In order to standardize the budgetary information received from 
federal agencies, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) assigns 
object classifications according to the nature of the services or 
articles procured (e.g., Personnel Compensation; Supplies and 
Materials; Rent, Communications, and Utilities; etc.). 

[19] According to BOP officials, privately operated secure contract 
facilities are low security and primarily house non-U.S. citizens 
convicted of crimes while in this country legally or illegally. 
Regarding the RRCs, BOP officials stated that they use an additional 
49 RRCs through intergovernmental agreements for work release 
purposes. Home detention describes all circumstances under which an 
inmate is serving a portion of his or her sentence while residing in 
his or her home. 

[20] National Institute of Corrections, a component of BOP, provides 
training, technical assistance, information services, and policy/ 
program development assistance to federal, state, and local 
corrections agencies. 

[21] Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987. 

[22] Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217, 98 Stat. 1987, 2017. 

[23] 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). 

[24] See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 

[25] See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

[26] Some types of sentences are not counted in calculating criminal 
history points. These are: foreign sentences of imprisonment; 
sentences imposed by tribal courts; summary court martial sentences; 
sentences imposed for expunged, reversed, vacated, or invalidated 
convictions; sentences for certain petty offenses or minor 
misdemeanors. The Sentencing Guidelines list two classes of these 
minor misdemeanor or petty offenses that are not counted for criminal 
history purposes. One class consists of eight types of minor offenses--
such as hunting and fishing violations or juvenile 
truancy--that are not counted regardless of the sentence imposed. 

[27] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 

[28] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). For the safety valve exception, the court is 
to consider at sentencing (1) the defendant's criminal history; (2) 
whether the defendant used violence or credible threats of violence or 
possessed a firearm or other dangerous weapon in connection with the 
offense; (3) whether the offense resulted in death or serious bodily 
injury to any person; (4) whether the defendant was an organizer, 
leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense or was engaged 
in a continuing criminal enterprise; and (5) the defendant has 
truthfully provided to the government all information and evidence the 
defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of 
the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan. 

[29] Statement of Charles E. Samuels, Jr., Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, before the United States House Committee on 
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related 
Agencies, April 10, 2014. 

[30] BOP, BOP Strategic Plan, (Washington, D.C.: February 2014). 

[31] The catalog contains specific dollar amounts for estimated 
savings by institution, but these figures are not verified by BOP's 
Central Office or other officials. 

[32] BOP/PRD also reports frequent deficiencies and significant 
findings associated with operational effectiveness and compliance-
related issues, such as correctional services and food safety. We 
determined these reported issues do not necessarily have a direct 
impact on operational efficiency and therefore were not included in 
the scope of our review. 

[33] A deficiency generally refers to an internal control deficiency 
(e.g., an internal control is missing, needs improvement, or is not 
operated as designed). BOP officials stated that a deficiency is 
considered "frequent" if it arises multiple times, within a quarterly 
time period, in program reviews conducted at multiple institutions. A 
finding is an issue identified during the course of a review. BOP 
officials stated that findings are considered significant if the 
reported issue is associated with a high-cost program activity or an 
invaluable subject area such as quality of care. A deficiency 
generally refers to the ineffectiveness of an internal control 
activity. If the same finding or deficiency is reported across 
multiple reporting periods, it is considered a repeat problem. 

[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[35] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-320]. 

[36] See 18 U.S.C. § 4102. 

[37] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-320] for 
additional details on GCT. As authorized in statute, 18 U.S.C. § 
3624(b), BOP may award "up to 54 days at the end of each year of the 
prisoner's term of imprisonment," or 54 days per year of sentence 
served. As applied by BOP, however, this actually results in 47 days 
earned per year of sentence imposed because inmates do not earn GCT 
credit for years they do not ultimately serve because of being 
released early. Calculation of the amount of time that BOP should 
award based on good conduct was contested in court. In Barber v. 
Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499 (2010), the Supreme Court upheld BOP's 
methodology against a challenge brought by inmate petitioners. 
As a result, BOP officials state that any change in the method of 
calculating GCT credits would require a change to the law. Therefore, 
for our purposes in this report, GCT is both a discretionary 
authority and one that is an option that could produce potential costs 
savings, provided the calculation method is changed. We include GCT in 
the list of discretionary authorities and as one of the sentencing 
guideline change options. 

[38] 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e). 

[39] 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). 

[40] DOJ, Office of the Inspector General: The Department of Justice's 
International Prisoner Transfer Program, I-2012-002 (Washington, D.C.: 
December 2011). The DOJ IG reported that, in addition to eligibility 
criteria constraints on using the program, other factors within BOP 
control also affected its use, such as incorrect determinations of 
inmate eligibility, language barriers hindering inmate understanding 
of the program, or delays in processing applications. The IG estimated 
that, for fiscal years 2005-2010, BOP delays in processing 
applications resulted in about $8 million in additional costs, or 
$1.33 million annually, on average, for each of those 6 years. The IG 
report stated that since 2001, Mexico's "significant restrictions" had 
resulted in few Mexican inmates being accepted for treaty transfer 
consideration. Data on BOP inmates by nationality are from BOP's 
SENTRY data system. The IG made several recommendations for BOP to 
address these findings, including ensuring that all staff involved in 
IPTP determinations are properly trained. BOP concurred with the IG's 
recommendations and stated that actions are under way to address them. 

[41] Estimated cost avoidance based on a fiscal year 2013 marginal 
cost of $10,674 per offender. 

[42] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-320]. 

[43] DOJ, Office of the Inspector General: The Federal Bureau of 
Prisons' Compassionate Release Program, I-2013-006 (Washington, D.C: 
April 2013). The IG made several recommendations for BOP to address 
these findings, including establishing time frames for processing 
requests at each step of the management review process. BOP generally 
concurred with the IG's recommendations and stated that actions are 
under way to address them. 

[44] According to the revised program statement for Compassionate 
Release/Reduction in Sentence, the following were added: criteria 
regarding requests based on medical circumstances, nonmedical 
circumstances for elderly inmates, nonmedical circumstances in which 
there has been the death or incapacitation of the family member 
caregiver of an inmate's child, nonmedical circumstances in which the 
spouse or registered partner of an inmate has become incapacitated, 
and a list of factors that should be considered for all requests. 

[45] Data were provided by BOP for calendar year releases. Cost 
avoidance savings were calculated by multiplying the BOP fiscal year 
2013 marginal cost per offender ($10,674) by the number of releases. 
Costs as a percentage of BOP appropriations were calculated by 
dividing the cost savings by the cited BOP appropriations. 

[46] RDAP participation is limited to prisoners with a verifiable 
substance use disorder within the 12 months prior to their arrest. 
They must also voluntarily apply for participation and be approved by 
BOP for the program. RRCs are run by private contractors and cost more 
than minimum security institutions, and about the same as low-or 
medium-security BOP prisons on an annual basis per offender. We 
reported daily costs per prisoner previously in [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-320] as follows: $70.79 for RRCs, 
$57.55 for minimum security, $69.53 for low security, and $71.91 for 
medium security. 

[47] We did not include in cost savings the potential long-term 
savings that could result from reduced recidivism. 

[48] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-320]. For fiscal 
years 2009-2011, 15,302 RDAP participants completed the program and 
were eligible to receive a sentence reduction. However, of these 
participants, 19 percent received the maximum sentence reduction that 
corresponded to their sentence length. 

[49] BOP did not provide an estimate of the savings from shortening 
the average sentence by 1.5 months. BOP stated that this funding level 
would mean that RDAP was operating at 100 percent of capacity; that 
is, all the available spaces would be taken. 

[50] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-320]. During an 
assessment for RRC placement, BOP policy requires prerelease RRC 
placement decisions be made on an individual basis and conducted 
in a manner consistent with certain statutory criteria. The criteria 
include (1) the resources of the facility contemplated, (2) the nature 
and circumstances of the offense, (3) the history and characteristics 
of the prisoner, (4) any statement by the court that imposed the 
sentence, and (5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the USSC. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). 

[51] A detainer is a document issued by a law enforcement entity, a 
jail, or correctional facility to seek custody of an individual for 
purposes of instituting legal proceedings. 

[52] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-320]. 

[53] This cost estimate is based on BOP RRC fiscal year 2013 average 
RRC cost of $26,645 per offender multiplied by the required 20,500 bed 
spaces. 

[54] Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, included the federal 
criminal law distinction between "cocaine base" and other forms of 
cocaine. The thresholds triggering a 10-year prison penalty--5 
kilograms of powder cocaine and 50 grams of cocaine base--created a 
100-to-1 quantity ratio. 

[55] Of these eight options, two related to the sentencing guidelines 
were approved by the USSC in April and July 2014; a third was directed 
by the Attorney General in August 2013. All three changes occurred 
during the course of this review. The two actions approved by 
the USSC would reduce lengths of prison terms for (1) most future 
federal drug offenders by amending the sentencing guidelines, and (2) 
currently incarcerated federal drug offenders by about 19 percent 
compared with current term lengths by amending a policy statement to 
give retroactive effect to the proposed amendment to the sentencing 
guidelines. However, under 28 U.S.C. § 994(p), Congress may modify or 
disapprove amendments to the sentencing guidelines. (The second action 
corresponds to the first and does not require separate congressional 
action.) The USSC retroactivity change would permit eligible offenders 
to ask courts to reduce their sentences beginning November 1, 2014. 
However, offenders whose requests are granted by the courts would be 
released no earlier than November 1, 2015. According to the USSC, 
sentences will be reduced retroactively only after consideration 
by a judge in each case. The third policy change went into effect in 
August 2013, when the Attorney General issued a memorandum to U.S. 
Attorneys informing prosecutors to decline to charge certain 
defendants in certain types of drug cases in such a manner as to 
trigger mandatory minimum sentences. 

[56] The USSC calculated the potential savings in bed years; 1 bed 
year is defined by the USSC as 12 months' prison time (e.g., one 
offender in prison for 1 year, or three offenders in prison for 4 
months each, and so forth.) 

[57] USSC: Analysis of the Impact of the 2014 Drug Guidelines 
Amendment If Made Retroactive (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2014). See 
this citation at [hyperlink, http://www.ussc.gov]. 

[58] We calculated cost savings that would result from reductions in 
BOP population or from cost avoidance savings resulting from increases 
below what would otherwise occur if an option was not implemented, by 
multiplying USSC estimates of bed years saved by the annual marginal 
cost for a prisoner in BOP. 

[59] DOJ reports that as of February 2014 BOP prisons were 32 percent 
overcrowded but medium-and high-security prisons were more overcrowded 
than low-and minimum-security institutions. Reducing overcrowding and 
costs would depend on which offenders were released, from where, and 
in what number. Note that a reduction in bed years does not 
necessarily translate into an immediate reduction in prison population. 

[60] See option 6. 

[61] We asked the USSC to estimate the number of offenders who would 
be eligible to be released or to have their sentence reduced (leading 
eventually to release), and to estimate the savings that would result 
from implementation of these eight options. Where estimates could be 
made by USSC, the savings were provided in bed years. 

[62] BOP is appropriated funds through two accounts: Salaries and 
Expenses and Buildings and Facilities. We focused our review on the 
Salaries and Expenses account as it represents almost the entirety of 
BOP's budget. 

[63] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00.21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999). Internal control is an integral 
component of an organization's management that provides reasonable 
assurance that the following objectives are being achieved: 
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial 
reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 

[64] The expert entities from which we requested or obtained analysis 
or information on sentencing issues were the American Bar Association 
(ABA); the Association of State Correctional Administrators; the 
Brennan Center for Justice; the Council of State Governments/Justice 
Center; Families Against Mandatory Minimums; the Fraternal Order 
of Police; the Heritage Foundation; the National Association of 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys; the National Association of Former U.S. 
Attorneys; the Pew Charitable Trusts; "Right on Crime," a project of 
the Texas Public Policy Foundation in cooperation with the Justice 
Fellowship; the Sentencing Project; the Urban Institute; and the Vera 
Institute of Justice. 

[65] According to the USSC, the July 18, 2014, action amends a policy 
statement to provide for retroactive effect to the proposed amendment 
to the sentencing guidelines and as such, does not require submission 
to Congress. 

[66] We calculated savings that would result from reductions in BOP 
population or cost avoidance savings resulting from increases below 
what would otherwise occur if an option was not implemented, by 
multiplying bed years saved by the annual marginal cost for a 
prisoner. BOP defines marginal costs as the cost of adding one 
offender for 1 year; these cover food, medical, clothing, and 
utilities. For fiscal year 2014, the average annual marginal cost 
per offender is about $11,000. For some options that could result in 
reduced sentences and earlier releases of about 78,000 or more 
offenders, we also calculated per capita savings, as such population 
reductions that could allow BOP to reduce its staff or close 
facilities. 

[67] As of January 2014, there were 17 states that are or have been 
participants in DOJ's Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI) program. 
Of these 17, only 3--Louisiana, Ohio, and North Carolina--had had at 
least 1 year's experience implementing JRI-related programs. 
Texas is not a JRI participant but is cited as one of the models for 
JRI programs by DOJ. 

[68] DOJ and the Urban Institute: Justice Reinvestment Initiative 
State Assessment Report (January 2014: Washington, D.C.) The DOJ 
Bureau of Justice Assistance funded the JRI, in a public-private 
partnership with the Pew Charitable Trusts, to provide technical 
assistance and financial support for system-wide criminal justice 
reform efforts. Under the JRI model, a bipartisan working group uses 
comprehensive data analyses to identify the drivers of the local 
corrections population and costs and foster support for a set of cost- 
effective policy options addressing those drivers. 

[69] Of the 18 entities to which we sent a request for comments, 17 
acknowledged receipt of our request. Of these 17, 3 did not provide 
substantive comments, leaving 14 that provided comments. Of the 3 that 
did not provide substantive comments, 1 referred us to multiple 
articles published on criminal justice issues. 

[70] DOJ and the Urban Institute: Justice Reinvestment Initiative 
State Assessment Report (January 2014: Washington, D.C.) The Bureau of 
Justice Assistance (BJA) funded the JRI, in a public-private 
partnership with the Pew Charitable Trusts, to provide technical 
assistance and financial support for system-wide criminal justice 
reform efforts. Under the JRI model, a bipartisan working group 
comprising key policymakers uses comprehensive data analyses to 
identify the drivers of the local corrections population and costs and 
foster support for a set of cost-effective policy options addressing 
those drivers. 

[71] USSC guidelines are used to determine prison sentences based 
primarily on two factors: (1) the conduct associated with the offense 
(the offense conduct, which produces the offense level) and (2) the 
defendant's criminal history (the criminal history category). In 
general, criminal history points are calculated by adding 3 points for 
each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month; 
adding 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least 
sixty days but not more than 13 months; adding 1 point for each prior 
sentence of less than sixty days, and so forth. This option would make 
more drug offenders eligible for sentencing by judges who would not be 
required to solely follow mandatory sentencing guidelines. 

[End of section] 

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