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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives: 

September 2014: 

Afghanistan Equipment Drawdown: 

Progress Made, but Improved Controls in Decision Making Could Reduce 
Risk of Unnecessary Expenditures: 

GAO-14-768: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-768, a report to the Committee on Armed Services, 
House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

DOD anticipates that the drawdown from Afghanistan will be more 
difficult than that from Iraq due to logistical challenges and the 
costs of transporting equipment out of landlocked Afghanistan. As of 
summer 2013, the Army and Marine Corps had substantial amounts of 
equipment in Afghanistan. The efficiency and effectiveness of 
equipment disposition decision making can directly affect the total 
cost of the drawdown. 

GAO was asked to review DOD's efforts to execute the drawdown in a 
cost-effective and efficient manner. GAO examined: (1) the status of 
DOD's efforts to draw down equipment from Afghanistan and (2) the 
extent to which DOD has taken steps to create efficiencies and 
consider costs concerning the return of equipment from Afghanistan. To 
evaluate these efforts, GAO reviewed documents and data containing 
approximately 10,000 disposition decisions made over a 12-month 
period, in addition to interviewing DOD officials in the United States 
and Afghanistan. 

What GAO Found: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has made some progress in its drawdown 
of equipment from Afghanistan, but ongoing uncertainties about the 
future force in Afghanistan could affect progress of the drawdown. 
Specifically, from October 2012 to October 2013, DOD returned from 
Afghanistan or destroyed 14,664 vehicles, an average of 1,128 vehicles 
per month. Future progress toward drawdown goals will depend on 
equipment turn-in rates, which, in turn, depend on having more 
information about the post-2014 force level and mission. In addition, 
over the course of the last 8 months of the above period, the number 
of vehicles turned in by units for the drawdown averaged 55 percent of 
what had been forecast. This is because some vehicles that had been 
forecast for turn-in were instead redistributed to other units in 
Afghanistan. A senior DOD official stated that units have retained 
equipment because of uncertainty regarding future operational needs in 
Afghanistan. Once the post-2014 force level and mission are announced, 
these vehicle turn-in rates may increase. 

DOD has taken some steps to improve efficiencies and manage costs in 
its Afghanistan drawdown processes. For example, U.S. Central Command 
amended its drawdown instruction to allow for aggregation of equipment 
at U.S. ports. According to DOD officials, this will allow for 
shipment of equipment via rail, resulting in potential savings when 
compared with trucking costs. However, due to ineffective internal 
controls, the Army and Marine Corps may be incurring unnecessary costs 
by returning equipment that potentially exceeds service needs or is 
not economical to return and repair. Specifically, GAO found the 
following: 

* In a 12-month period, the Army and Marine Corps returned more than 
1,000 potentially unneeded vehicles, thereby incurring estimated 
transportation costs of up to $107,400 per vehicle, depending on the 
type of vehicle. DOD guidance indicates that equipment exceeding 
certain service-approved quantities should not be retained unless 
economic or contingency reasons support its retention. However, 
neither the Army nor the Marine Corps documented and reviewed 
justifications for returning items exceeding these approved 
quantities. Federal internal control standards state that 
documentation and review should be part of an organization's 
management to provide reasonable assurance that operations are 
effective and efficient. 

* The Army and Marine Corps may have returned vehicles that were 
uneconomical to return and repair because they did not consider 
transportation costs in making equipment-disposition decisions. DOD 
guidance states that all costs associated with materiel management, 
including transportation costs, shall be considered in making best-
value decisions throughout the DOD supply chain. When all costs are 
not included in the decision-making process, there is risk of allowing 
the return and repair of uneconomical-to-return-and-repair equipment. 

This is a public version of a For Official Use Only (FOUO) report GAO 
issued previously, which omits FOUO information and data such as the 
schedule of drawdown efforts, numbers of vehicles returned, overall 
drawdown goals, and some cost information that DOD deemed FOUO. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD ensure that the Army and Marine Corps document 
and review justifications for the return of potentially unneeded items 
and that transportation costs and other relevant costs be included in 
disposition decision making. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-768]. For more 
information, contact Cary Russell at (202) 512-5431 or 
russellc@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Some Drawdown Progress Has Been Made, but Key Uncertainties Could 
Affect Future Progress: 

Steps Have Been Taken to Reduce Transportation Costs, but Improved 
Controls Could Mitigate Risk of Unnecessary Expenditures: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Facilities That Process Returning Equipment: 

Appendix III: Equipment Return Routes: 

Appendix IV: Transfer of Equipment in the Afghanistan Drawdown: 

Appendix V: Destruction of Equipment in the Afghanistan Drawdown: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Costs and Transit Times for Different Afghanistan Equipment 
Return Routes: 

Table 2: Cost Comparison of Item Destruction and Item Transportation: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Afghanistan Equipment Reduction Disposition Framework: 

Figure 2: Transportation Routes for Equipment Leaving Afghanistan: 

Figure 3: Number of Vehicles Processed at Afghanistan Redistribution 
Property Assistance Teams (RPAT) Yards: 

Figure 4: Capacity of Yards as Percentage of Total Redistribution 
Property Assistance Teams (RPAT) Capacity in Afghanistan, March 2013: 

Figure 5: Return of Vehicles by Mode, April 2012-September 2013: 

Figure 6: Forecast Army and Marine Corps Equipment Disposition, Summer 
2013: 

Abbreviations: 

CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command: 

DLA: Defense Logistics Agency: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FOUO: For Official Use Only: 

M/M: Multimodal: 

NDN: Northern Distribution Network: 

PAKGLOC: Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication: 

RPAT: Redistribution Property Assistance Team: 

TRANSCOM: U.S. Transportation Command: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 30, 2014: 

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

Early in 2013, the President announced that the United States planned 
to end participation in combat operations in Afghanistan on December 
31, 2014. As the Department of Defense (DOD) proceeds with troop 
reductions, it will also make decisions on the disposition of large 
stocks of equipment that were shipped to Afghanistan in support of 
military operations. Generally, DOD distinguishes between non-rolling 
stock, much of which can be containerized for transport, and rolling 
stock, or vehicles. DOD officials told us that vehicles are a reliable 
indicator of drawdown progress. According to these officials, vehicles 
also represent the most challenging equipment to move out of 
Afghanistan. In October 2013, DOD estimated that there were thousands 
of vehicles remaining in Afghanistan. According to DOD officials, some 
vehicles will remain in Afghanistan for use by the post-December 2014 
force, but military service guidance indicates that equipment is not 
to be left behind or abandoned. 

DOD anticipates that the drawdown from Afghanistan will be more 
complex than was the Iraq effort, which a senior DOD official 
described as one of the most complex logistical operations in U.S. 
military history. Logistical infrastructure and seaports in 
neighboring Kuwait facilitated the equipment drawdown from Iraq. 
Conversely, from landlocked Afghanistan it takes weeks to drive to the 
nearest seaport, and there is no staging area where equipment can be 
stored to await processing and transportation. 

DOD officials have three basic disposition options for drawing down 
equipment in Afghanistan: (1) returning it to DOD inventories outside 
of Afghanistan; (2) transferring it to another U.S. government agency 
or the government of another country; or (3) destroying it in 
Afghanistan.[Footnote 1] There are extraordinary challenges and costs 
to returning equipment that has accumulated in a landlocked country 
after more than 10 years of combat operations. The efficiency of the 
drawdown process and the effectiveness of decision making on equipment 
disposition can directly increase or decrease the costs of drawdown in 
Afghanistan. 

This is our second report on DOD's efforts to draw down equipment in 
Afghanistan. In December 2012, we reviewed DOD's Afghanistan drawdown 
planning efforts and reported that the return of equipment items from 
Afghanistan was only supported by informal cost-benefit analyses, and 
that none of the military services was able to provide us with 
documentation of these informal cost-benefit analyses.[Footnote 2] We 
therefore recommended that, as part of drawdown planning efforts, the 
military services and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) conduct and 
document analyses to compare the costs of returning excess major end 
items against the benefits of returning them. We further recommended 
the use of these cost-benefit analyses as a key factor in decision 
making concerning the return of excess major end items. DOD concurred 
with these recommendations and has taken some actions to implement 
them.[Footnote 3] 

For this review, you asked us to examine whether DOD's efforts to 
execute the drawdown were done in a cost-effective and efficient 
manner. We examined: (1) the status of DOD's efforts to draw down 
equipment from Afghanistan; and (2) the extent to which DOD has taken 
steps to create efficiencies and consider costs concerning the return 
of equipment from Afghanistan. 

This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we 
issued. DOD deemed some of the information in the prior report as For 
Official Use Only (FOUO), which must be protected from public 
disclosure. Therefore, this report omits FOUO information and data 
such as the schedule of drawdown efforts, numbers of vehicles 
returned, overall drawdown goals, and some cost information about 
DOD's efforts to draw down its equipment in Afghanistan. Although the 
information provided in this report is more limited in scope, it 
addresses the same questions as the sensitive report. Also, the 
overall methodology used for both reports is the same. 

To conduct this work, we interviewed and obtained documentation from 
cognizant officials from CENTCOM, the combatant command responsible 
for operations in Afghanistan, as well as from the military services. 
To examine the status of DOD's efforts to reduce equipment in 
Afghanistan, we identified drawdown goals and key sources of 
documentation. Specifically, we identified and analyzed the processes 
and facilities that support CENTCOM in the execution of the drawdown 
and examined guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, CENTCOM, U.S. Transportation Command 
(TRANSCOM), military departments and services, and the Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA). We then examined the metrics used by drawdown 
decision makers, reviewed Afghanistan drawdown statistics, and 
compared these statistics with DOD's drawdown goals. 

To analyze the steps DOD has taken to create efficiencies and consider 
costs concerning the return of equipment from Afghanistan, we obtained 
and analyzed standard operating procedures and other guidance used to 
return equipment from Afghanistan and interviewed officials familiar 
with the transportation of equipment out of Afghanistan. To determine 
the extent to which the services have taken steps in their disposition 
decision-making process to consider costs related to the return of 
equipment, we reviewed equipment-management guidance and interviewed 
service equipment managers. We focused our review on vehicles because 
of the costs associated with transporting them, the number of vehicles 
that are candidates for disposition, and the ability to track vehicles 
by identification number. We also focused our review on theater-
provided equipment that will be repaired.[Footnote 4] In addition, we 
focused our review to include only the Army and the Marine Corps since 
these services have owned the preponderance of equipment in 
Afghanistan. We surveyed the organizations responsible for maintaining 
the approved acquisition objective, inventory, and disposition-
decision databases in order to determine the reliability of the data 
we analyzed.[Footnote 5] From these efforts, we determined that the 
data were sufficiently reliable for determining how many vehicles were 
returned that exceeded approved acquisition objectives. A more-
detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is included in 
appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2013 to September 
2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Drawdown Rates for Personnel Differ from Those for Equipment: 

One of the DOD lessons learned from Iraq is to begin drawdown 
operations early because of their complexity. To that end, the Marine 
Corps began equipment drawdown operations for Afghanistan in August 
2011, and the Army began in January 2012--both starting well before 
the January 2013 announcement that combat operations would end in 
December 2014.[Footnote 6] According to DOD officials, one reason 
these early actions to reduce equipment were warranted is that it 
takes longer to draw down equipment from Afghanistan than it does to 
reduce personnel levels. 

Decision Framework for the Drawdown of Equipment: 

CENTCOM is the command responsible for drawdown operations in 
Afghanistan. However, the military services determine disposition for 
their equipment that is to be drawn down in Afghanistan, and TRANSCOM 
arranges transportation for the items that the services decide to 
return from Afghanistan. Figure 1 illustrates the equipment-
disposition framework used to draw down Army and Marine Corps 
equipment from Afghanistan. 

Figure 1: Afghanistan Equipment Reduction Disposition Framework: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

1. Unit prepares to leave Afghanistan and identifies equipment for 
drawdown. 

2. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and service officials determine 
whether this equipment is still needed in Afghanistan or in region. If 
unneeded, disposition is requested from service. 

3. Service equipment managers in United States decide whether the 
equipment will ultimately be returned, transferred, or destroyed. 

If returned: 

4. Equipment is prepared for shipment at Redistribution Property 
Assistance Team (RPAT) yards in Afghanistan; 
5. Return. 

If transferred: 

4. DOD coordinates with the Department of State and other agencies for 
the transfer of equipment; 
5. Transfer. 

If destroyed: 

4. Equipment is turned in to Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
Disposition Services for demilitarization; 
5. Destroy. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD guidance and data. GAO-14-768. 

[End of figure] 

Officials in the Army and the Marine Corps manage their respective 
services' equipment throughout the equipment's life cycle. Once 
CENTCOM officials determine that a piece of equipment is no longer 
needed in Afghanistan (see figure 1, box 2), a request for disposition 
is sent to equipment managers in the United States, who decide whether 
to divest or retain the item.[Footnote 7] If an item is retained it 
will be returned from Afghanistan. If an item is divested it will be 
transferred or destroyed. These three general options are described as 
follows. 

Return: This is the shipment of equipment to a repair 
facility.[Footnote 8] Service officials forecast that the majority of 
equipment is likely to be returned from Afghanistan to service 
inventories. Equipment that is to be returned is delivered to one of 
the seven service-operated Redistribution Property Assistance Team 
(RPAT) yards or similar facilities situated throughout Afghanistan, 
where each piece is inspected and readied for transport. (See appendix 
II and III.) 

Transfer: This is the redistribution of equipment to either another 
U.S. agency or the government of another country.[Footnote 9] DOD has 
described this as a limited option due to the limited ability of the 
Afghanistan government to absorb and maintain large amounts of 
equipment. (See appendix IV.) 

Destroy: This is the demilitarization of equipment at Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) Disposition Service disposition sites. The 
material may then be sold as scrap. If a serviceable item is to be 
destroyed, DOD requires certification that the item has been vetted 
through a service process and that all avenues for 
reutilization/transfer have been exhausted, or that a cost-benefit 
analysis was conducted and destruction found to be the most cost-
effective option. (See appendix V.) 

Factors Guiding Services' Equipment Disposition Decision Making: 

There are a number of factors to be considered in the equipment 
disposition decision-making process. In determining whether to return, 
transfer, or destroy an item, equipment managers consider whether an 
item is still needed by their service; whether a replacement item 
could or should be purchased at a lower cost; and the potential cost 
and benefit to be derived from repairing or refurbishing the item. 
Managers' decisions may also be guided by service-wide decisions laid 
out in strategies specific to a particular equipment type, such as the 
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle.[Footnote 10] Equipment 
managers stated that these strategies and other factors result in 
published lists of equipment that are marked either for divesture 
(that is, transfer or destruction) or for retention in the service 
inventory. 

The services have processes for their disposition decision making. For 
example, when determining whether an item is required, Army and Marine 
Corps equipment managers are to compare the number of these items 
currently in each service's existing inventory against the approved 
acquisition objective for each item, which is the quantity of an item 
authorized for meeting peacetime and wartime requirements.[Footnote 
11] In addition, service officials are to determine whether an item is 
economical to repair. Army equipment managers are guided by Army 
Regulation 750-1, Army Materiel Maintenance Policy, and related 
technical bulletins, which establish the process of determining the 
maximum amount of money--termed the "maintenance expenditure limit"--
that should be spent for the repair of an item.[Footnote 12] A 
maintenance expenditure limit is the total acceptable onetime cost to 
repair an item and restore it to fully serviceable condition. If the 
repair cost is below this limit, the repair is authorized. If it is 
above this limit, the guidance requires a waiver in order for the item 
to be repaired. A waiver to make an uneconomical repair can be 
approved when an urgent operational or training need exists that 
justifies repair. Ordinarily, however, an item whose repair costs 
exceed the maintenance expenditure limit would be divested. Similarly, 
Marine Corps equipment managers are guided by Marine Corps Order 
4790.19, Depot Maintenance Policy, which calls for comparing the cost 
of repair against the cost of procuring the item.[Footnote 13] Unlike 
the Army guidance, which establishes a maintenance expenditure limit 
for a specific item, the Marine Corps order indicates that if the 
repair equals or exceeds 65 percent of the standard unit price or 
replacement cost for any piece of equipment, the equipment is not 
economical to repair. Marine Corps officials stated that these 
uneconomical-to-repair items should, ordinarily, be divested. 

Transportation costs are another factor that Army and Marine Corps 
equipment managers should generally consider when making equipment 
disposition decisions. Specifically, Army guidance includes 
transportation costs in the determination of whether it is economical 
to repair an item that is located overseas. Marine Corps guidance also 
indicates that equipment managers should consider the cost to return 
an item when making disposition decisions. Specifically, a Marine 
Corps order regarding equipment return indicates that an item normally 
should not be returned when the cost to return the item exceeds the 
cost to procure it new.[Footnote 14] In either case, the return of 
large and heavy equipment items can be expensive due to the 
transportation costs of moving an item out of landlocked Afghanistan 
(see table 1). Moving a tactical vehicle back to the United States, 
for example, can range in cost from $0.73 per pound to more than $3.30 
per pound.[Footnote 15] According to DLA Disposition Service 
officials, destruction of the same type of vehicle costs between $0.28 
and $0.31 per pound.[Footnote 16] 

Table 1: Costs and Transit Times for Different Afghanistan Equipment 
Return Routes: 

Route: Jordan; 
Average transit time: 61 days; 
Mode: Air/sea; 
Range of transportation costs per vehicle[A]: $17,400-$107,400. 

Route: Azerbaijan; 
Average transit time: 87 days; 
Mode: Air/sea; 
Range of transportation costs per vehicle[A]: $16,100-$93,400. 

Route: United Arab Emirates; 
Average transit time: 60 days; 
Mode: Air/sea; 
Range of transportation costs per vehicle[A]: $13,700-$83,500. 

Route: Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC); 
Average transit time: 65 days; 
Mode: Ground/sea; 
Range of transportation costs per vehicle[A]: $5,700-$23,800. 

Route: Northern Distribution Network (NDN)-Russia; 
Average transit time: 71 days; 
Mode: Ground/sea; 
Range of transportation costs per vehicle[A]: $5,700-$23,800. 

Source: GAO analysis of TRANSCOM data. GAO 14-768. 

Notes: Data are from fiscal year 2013. 

[A] The cost per vehicle is based on data furnished by U.S. 
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) for the estimated cost of returning 
a heavy and a light vehicle from Kandahar Air Force Base, Afghanistan. 
Lowest cost reflects transport of a trailer. Highest cost reflects 
transport of a heavy (18.5-ton) tactical vehicle on the same route. 

[End of table] 

Transportation Routes: 

To gain as much efficiency as possible in a drawdown, the military 
seeks a synchronized transportation process that links the drawdown of 
personnel, equipment, and materiel. A well-synchronized process can 
expedite movement out of Afghanistan and avoid backlogs at facilities 
and along transportation networks. Synchronization is characterized by 
timely and predictable airflow and seaflow, and by the ability to 
adjust transportation schedules. CENTCOM has issued instructions that 
guide units as they arrange for equipment to leave Afghanistan through 
a variety of air and surface routes (see figure 2). 

Figure 2: Transportation Routes for Equipment Leaving Afghanistan: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Northern Distribution Network (NDN): 
Afghanistan to: 
* Baku to Poti to Constanta to Germersheim; 
* Klaipeda; 
* Riga; 
* Tallinn. 

Multimodal (M/M): 
Afghanistan to: 
* Baku; 
* Dubai; 
* Jordan; 
* Kuwait; 
* Oman; 
* Qatar. 

Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 
Afghanistan to: 
* Karachi. 

Source: GAO analysis of TRANSCOM data. GAO-14-768. 

Note: This illustration of return transportation route lines is 
notional. The lines do not indicate the exact routes taken or 
countries transited. DOD also takes advantage of return flights out of 
Afghanistan as they become available; however these routes are not 
shown above. 

[End of figure] 

On the ground, equipment moves through Pakistan, using the Pakistan 
Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC) or through European and 
central Asian countries, as part of the Northern Distribution Network 
(NDN), to seaports from which it can be loaded onto ships for onward 
movement overseas.[Footnote 17] As we have previously reported, 
however, geopolitical complexities in the region make the use of these 
ground routes challenging for equipment return.[Footnote 18] There are 
also airlift and multimodal airlift (air and sea) options that fly 
equipment from Afghanistan to ports in the region, from which the 
equipment can be transported onward via ship. According to DOD, 
although airlift and multimodal airlift are the more expensive 
transportation options, they have to date been the most reliable in 
the equipment drawdown due to limitations associated with the ground 
routes (see appendix III). 

Some Drawdown Progress Has Been Made, but Key Uncertainties Could 
Affect Future Progress: 

DOD has made some progress in its drawdown of equipment from 
Afghanistan, but ongoing uncertainties about the future force in 
Afghanistan could affect future progress of the drawdown. 
Specifically, from October 2012 to October 2013, DOD returned from 
Afghanistan or destroyed 14,664 vehicles, or an average of 1,128 
vehicles per month. Future progress toward drawdown goals will depend 
on equipment turn-in rates which, in turn, depend on having more 
information about the post-2014 force level and mission. However, 
DOD's future force levels and mission requirements beyond 2014 have 
not yet been announced.[Footnote 19] Moreover, from March 2013 to 
October 2013, the number of vehicles turned in by units for the 
drawdown averaged 55 percent of what had been forecasted. This is 
because some vehicles that had been forecast for turn-in were instead 
redistributed to other units in Afghanistan. A senior DOD official 
stated that units have retained equipment because of uncertainty 
regarding future operational needs in Afghanistan. Once the post-2014 
force level and mission are announced, these vehicle turn-in rates may 
increase. 

Equipment Drawdown Has Progressed as DOD's Drawdown Goals Have Changed 
over Time: 

From October 2012 to October 2013, DOD returned from Afghanistan or 
destroyed 14,664 vehicles, or an average of 1,128 vehicles per month. 
[Footnote 20] DOD officials reported that, as of October 2013, 
thousands of vehicles remained in Afghanistan. In March 2012, command 
officials in Afghanistan established monthly goals for reducing 
equipment in country. To meet their goals, DOD established capacities 
at DLA Disposition Services sites, at RPAT yards, and on 
transportation routes. For the purposes of this report, the term 
capacity refers to the infrastructure, resources, and personnel in 
place to return or destroy a specific number of vehicles or 
containers, or both, in a month. For example, in Afghanistan, DLA 
Disposition Services initially established a destruction capacity of 
450 vehicles per month. 

The Army unit responsible for RPAT facilities in Afghanistan initially 
established a monthly processing capacity, and TRANSCOM also initially 
established a monthly capacity to move vehicles out of the 
country.[Footnote 21] Although DLA and TRANSCOM officials told us that 
they are postured to surge beyond current capacities if necessary, 
there has not been any reason to do so because the amount of equipment 
turned in has not required them to rely on surge capacity: 

TRANSCOM officials also told us that building the capacity of the 
routes requires time and a steady increase in the amount of equipment 
required to be moved, since frequent use incentivizes contractors to 
maintain en-route infrastructure. In June 2013, DOD transitioned from 
its monthly reduction goals to new classified goals based on 
operational milestones.[Footnote 22] DOD officials may further adjust 
these classified drawdown goals as the post-December 2014 mission and 
size of the enduring force are clarified, and as a result the 
reduction of vehicles may accelerate. 

Future Drawdown Progress Will Depend on Post-2014 Force Information 
and Turn-in Rates: 

Uncertainties about the future force in Afghanistan could affect the 
progress of the drawdown. Because the United States has not yet 
announced its post-2014 force level and mission in Afghanistan, the 
future equipment needs are still uncertain. A high-level Army official 
has stated that the goal is to draw down all equipment not needed by 
the enduring force from Afghanistan by October 2014.[Footnote 23] 
However, with the bilateral security agreement pending, the mission 
and size of the enduring force has not yet been finalized, and the 
date by which all equipment must be drawn down could change. DOD will 
need this information to determine the amounts and types of equipment 
that will remain in Afghanistan for the enduring presence and 
consequently the amount and types of vehicles that will be drawn down. 

These post-2014 uncertainties may affect the rate that vehicles are 
turned in by units in Afghanistan, affecting the progress of DOD's 
drawdown. The current vehicle drawdown pace has been limited by lower-
than-forecast quantities being turned in by units for drawdown. From 
March 2013 to October 2013, the number of vehicles turned in by units 
for the drawdown averaged 55 percent of what had been forecasted. In 
some instances, vehicles that had been forecast for reduction were 
redistributed to other units in Afghanistan instead of turned in for 
destruction or return. Commanders in Afghanistan must ensure that they 
have the equipment necessary to accomplish their mission and sometimes 
have found it necessary to retain equipment rather than release it. A 
senior DOD official stated that in some cases units have retained 
equipment because of uncertainty related to future operational needs 
in Afghanistan. Consequently, the flow of vehicles to be destroyed at 
DLA sites or returned via RPAT yards and transportation routes has 
been limited. These turn-in rates may increase once the post-2014 
force level and mission are announced. 

Steps Have Been Taken to Reduce Transportation Costs, but Improved 
Controls Could Mitigate Risk of Unnecessary Expenditures: 

DOD has taken some steps to improve efficiencies and manage costs in 
its Afghanistan drawdown processes. For example, CENTCOM amended its 
drawdown instruction to allow for aggregation of equipment at U.S. 
ports. According to DOD officials, this will allow for shipment of 
equipment via rail, resulting in potential savings when compared with 
trucking costs. However, as a result of ineffective internal controls, 
the Army and Marine Corps may be incurring unnecessary costs by 
returning equipment that potentially exceeds service needs or that is 
not economical to return and repair. DOD guidance on supply chain 
materiel management indicates that equipment exceeding certain service-
approved quantities should not be retained unless economic or 
contingency reasons support its retention. We found that in a 12-month 
period the Army and Marine Corps returned more than 1,000 vehicles 
that exceeded their service-approved quantities, thereby incurring 
possible transportation costs of up to $107,400 per vehicle, depending 
on the type of vehicle, for equipment that might no longer be needed. 
Neither the Army nor the Marine Corps documented and reviewed 
justifications for returning these potentially unneeded items, 
although federal internal control standards state that documentation 
and review should be part of an organization's management to provide 
reasonable assurance that operations are effective and efficient. 
[Footnote 24] 

DOD guidance also states that all costs associated with materiel 
management, including transportation costs, shall be considered in 
making best-value decisions throughout the DOD supply chain. While the 
services considered repair costs, they did not consider transportation 
costs in determining whether vehicles were economical to return and 
repair. Consequently, it is unclear how many vehicles the services may 
have returned that were uneconomical to return and repair. Without 
adequate internal controls to ensure that DOD is returning only 
equipment that is needed and is considering transportation costs in 
these decisions, the services are at risk for incurring unnecessary 
drawdown expenditures.[Footnote 25] 

DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Improve Efficiencies and Manage 
Transportation Costs: 

DOD has taken some steps to improve efficiencies and manage costs in 
its drawdown processes, although DOD officials have stated that cost 
savings or efficiencies gained as a result of these changes have yet 
to be fully realized. In May 2013, CENTCOM amended its drawdown 
instruction to provide TRANSCOM with earlier notice of the amount and 
types of equipment requiring transportation. 

Combatant commanders are responsible for redeployment planning, and 
must consider synchronization--that is, linking the redeployment of 
personnel, equipment, and materiel in a timely manner. To move 
equipment out of the country as quickly and cost-effectively as 
possible, TRANSCOM needs advance knowledge about the amount of 
equipment to be moved. Acquiring this information is complicated by 
the fact that, while personnel movements out of Afghanistan can be 
known 180 days in advance, DOD officials have told us that 
transportation requirements for equipment are more difficult to 
identify as early because the equipment may still be needed in 
country. Prior to May 2013, it was difficult to obtain advance 
knowledge about the amount of equipment to be moved because TRANSCOM 
officials were notified that equipment was available for movement only 
when it arrived at an RPAT yard. To create more efficient 
transportation scheduling, in May 2013 CENTCOM amended its drawdown 
instruction to require notifying transportation officials almost 90 
days before equipment is turned in, and to require subsequent 
confirmation of transportation needs 30 days before the arrival of 
equipment at the RPAT yard. 

Another step taken by CENTCOM was the amending of its drawdown 
instruction in May 2013 to allow for the aggregation of equipment at 
U.S. ports. According to TRANSCOM officials, this change may yield 
savings because aggregating equipment at U.S. ports will allow for the 
subsequent shipment of the equipment to final destinations via rail, 
resulting in savings of up to 45 percent over trucking the equipment 
to depots. For example, the cost to move three Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected vehicles from an East Coast port to a West Coast depot by 
truck exceeds $20,300, while moving the same cargo by rail costs 
$11,700. According to TRANSCOM analysis, rail transport is four times 
more fuel efficient than truck transport and historically has resulted 
in savings of between 20 and 60 percent for shipments of large volumes 
of cargo. TRANSCOM officials expect that cost savings will accrue 
based on these changes to the guidance. In addition, TRANSCOM has 
reduced costs by more than doubling the number of vehicles returned 
through the PAKGLOC and less expensive air routes since June 2013. 
TRANSCOM estimates that this increased use of the PAKGLOC and less 
expensive air routes has resulted in a potential cost avoidance of 
about $55 million. 

Army and Marine Corps Lack Effective Controls for Returning Vehicles 
from Afghanistan: 

Ineffective internal controls over the equipment disposition decision 
process allowed the Army and Marine Corps to return equipment from 
Afghanistan that may have been unneeded. The DOD instruction providing 
supply chain materiel-management policy states that all costs 
associated with materiel management shall be considered in making best-
value decisions throughout the DOD supply chain. According to this 
guidance, best-value decisions include the consideration of both cost 
and noncost factors. The guidance further indicates that equipment 
exceeding approved acquisition objectives should not be retained 
unless economic or contingency reasons support its retention. 
[Footnote 26] The approved acquisition objective is defined as the 
quantity of an item authorized for peacetime and wartime requirements 
to equip and sustain U.S. and allied forces according to DOD policies 
and plans.[Footnote 27] Consequently, any item in the inventory that 
exceeds its approved acquisition objective is potentially unneeded. 

However, our analysis indicates that both the Army and Marine Corps 
have returned potentially unneeded vehicles from Afghanistan. Between 
mid-March 2012 and mid-March 2013, the Army and Marine Corps, 
combined, returned approximately 9,000 vehicles.[Footnote 28] Of 
these, 1,034 exceeded approved acquisition objectives and were not 
supported by documented justifications to retain these potentially 
unneeded items in service inventories. We estimate that the 
transportation costs alone associated with the return of these items 
ranged from $5.9 million to $111.1 million. This range of 
transportation costs represents smaller, lighter vehicles transported 
through the least expensive routes at the low end ($5.9 million), and 
larger, heavier vehicles transported through the most expensive routes 
at the high end ($111.1 million).[Footnote 29] 

According to Army and Marine Corps officials, items exceeding approved 
acquisition objectives may have been returned for a variety of 
reasons. For example, officials told us that an item may be returned 
because it is the newest model of a certain type of equipment, or 
because there may be an increased requirement for an item in the 
future. However, we could find no documentation that justified the 
return of these items. According to federal internal control 
standards, documentation and review should be part of an 
organization's management to provide reasonable assurance that 
operations are effective and efficient.[Footnote 30] By returning 
equipment above approved acquisition objectives without documenting 
and reviewing the justifications for doing so, the services are at 
risk for spending funds unnecessarily to retain items that may not be 
needed. 

Army and Marine Corps Did Not Have Effective Controls to Ensure 
Transportation Costs Were Considered in Disposition Decision Making: 

Ineffective internal controls over the equipment disposition decision 
process allowed the return of equipment from Afghanistan without 
consideration of transportation costs, which may have made the 
equipment uneconomical to return and repair. DOD guidance on supply 
chain materiel management states that all costs associated with 
materiel management, including transportation, shall be considered in 
making best-value decisions throughout the DOD supply chain.[Footnote 
31] We found, however, that although the services considered repair 
costs, they did not consider transportation costs--which range up to 
$107,400 per vehicle depending on the type of vehicle--when deciding 
to return vehicles for repair. By returning equipment without 
considering the transportation costs, the services are at risk of 
spending funds unnecessarily to transport and repair items that 
otherwise might not be economical to retain. 

The Army has established procedures to determine whether an item is 
economical to return and repair. To ensure economic and operational 
effectiveness, Army officials use a preset maintenance expenditure 
limit to decide whether an item is economical to repair. For items 
located overseas, the Army specifies that transportation and handling 
costs be included in determining whether an item is economical to 
repair.[Footnote 32] When making the decision to return and repair 
items from Afghanistan, however, Army officials considered repair 
costs but omitted transportation costs as a factor for consideration, 
though it is unclear why these costs were omitted. It is unclear how 
Army officials could determine whether the return and repair of 
equipment was economical without including the transportation costs as 
a decision-making factor. It is also unclear how many items returned 
by the Army from Afghanistan would have been identified as 
uneconomical to return and repair if transportation costs had been 
included in disposition decision making. 

Similarly, Marine Corps guidance establishes monetary limits to 
determine whether an item is economical to repair and whether it is 
economical to return. The Marine Corps uses a threshold of 65 percent 
of the procurement cost when determining whether an item is economical 
to repair.[Footnote 33] Concerning transportation, guidance indicates 
that an item should not normally be returned to the depot when the 
cost to transport the item exceeds the cost to procure it new. 
[Footnote 34] Marine Corps officials told us that equipment managers 
used repair assessment information from Afghanistan to make 
disposition decisions, but that they did not consider transportation 
costs in their disposition decision making, though it is unclear why 
these costs were not considered. By not including all costs in their 
decision-making process, the services are at risk of allowing the 
return and repair of uneconomical-to-return-and-repair equipment. 

Conclusions: 

DOD officials have taken some positive steps to reduce costs and 
create efficiencies in the drawdown of equipment from Afghanistan. The 
services have established processes and have guidance that, if applied 
to decisions about the disposition of equipment in Afghanistan, can 
inform decision making about such equipment and ensure that decisions 
are well-reasoned, reviewable, and made on the basis of best value. 
However, by returning items without documentation and review of 
justifications and by not including all costs in the decision-making 
process, the Army and the Marine Corps are at risk of making 
unnecessary expenditures. As the equipment drawdown accelerates, 
potentially unneeded and uneconomical-to-return-and-repair items will 
compete with other equipment for transportation assets. With improved 
internal controls, the Afghanistan drawdown operations could be made 
more efficient and cost-effective. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To reduce the risk of unnecessary expenditure of resources, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 
Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to take the following two 
actions: 

1. ensure that justifications for returning items that exceed their 
approved acquisition objectives are documented and receive management 
review; and: 

2. ensure that transportation and all other relevant costs are 
included in disposition decision making. 

Agency Comments: 

In written comments on the earlier FOUO version of this report, DOD 
concurred with both of the recommendations and stated that it will be 
taking steps to further improve service disposition decision-making 
processes. DOD also provided technical clarifications, which we 
incorporated, as appropriate. DOD's written comments are reprinted in 
appendix VI. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; and 
the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The report is also available at no 
charge on GAO's website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix VII. 

Signed by: 

Cary Russell: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To conduct this work, we interviewed and obtained documentation from 
cognizant officials from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the combatant 
command responsible for operations in Afghanistan, as well as from the 
military services. To examine the status of the Department of 
Defense's (DOD) efforts to reduce equipment in Afghanistan, we 
identified drawdown goals and key sources of documentation. 
Specifically, we identified and analyzed the processes and facilities 
that support CENTCOM in the execution of the drawdown and examined 
guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, CENTCOM, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), military 
departments and services, and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). We 
then examined the metrics used by drawdown decision makers, reviewed 
Afghanistan drawdown statistics, and compared these statistics with 
DOD's drawdown goals. 

To analyze the steps DOD has taken to create efficiencies and consider 
costs concerning the return of equipment from Afghanistan, we obtained 
and analyzed standard operating procedures and other guidance used to 
return equipment from Afghanistan and interviewed officials familiar 
with the transportation of equipment out of Afghanistan. To determine 
the extent to which the services have taken steps in their disposition 
decision-making process to consider costs related to the return of 
equipment, we reviewed equipment-management guidance and interviewed 
service equipment managers. We focused our review on vehicles because 
of the costs associated with transporting them, the number of vehicles 
that are candidates for disposition, and the ability to track vehicles 
by identification number. We also focused our review on theater-
provided equipment or nonunit equipment that will be repaired. 
[Footnote 35] In addition, we focused our review to include only the 
Army and the Marine Corps since these services have owned the 
preponderance of equipment in Afghanistan. We examined the factors and 
data used by decision makers who issued disposition instructions, and 
analyzed the results of those decisions. Specifically, we examined 
service inventories and approved acquisition objectives--the amount of 
equipment needed by the services for peacetime and wartime 
requirements--used by equipment managers to make disposition 
decisions. To determine the service-approved acquisition objective for 
any specific item, we relied on the databases used by service 
officials to manage the relevant equipment. These data, along with the 
disposition decision and inventory data, were used to determine how 
many vehicles were returned that exceeded approved acquisition 
objectives. Specifically, to determine whether an item that exceeded 
its approved acquisition objective was returned from mid-March 2012 to 
mid-March 2013, we conducted one analysis for the Army and one for the 
Marine Corps. For the Army, its equipment-management officials 
determined which types of rolling stock exceeded service-approved 
acquisition objectives. We then took a list of these types of rolling 
stock that the Army personnel had identified and compared this list to 
data that the Army provided that contained the service's disposition 
decisions regarding rolling stock or vehicles in Afghanistan from mid-
March 2012 to mid-March 2013. For the Marine Corps analysis, equipment-
management officials provided us with approved acquisition data and 
inventory data from fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013. We then 
compared the inventory to the approved acquisition objective for both 
years to identify the types of vehicles that exceeded the approved 
acquisition objective. We took this list of the types of vehicles and 
then compared it to data that the Marine Corps provided that contained 
the service's disposition decisions regarding rolling stock or 
vehicles in Afghanistan from mid-March 2012 to mid-March 2013. 

To determine the results of each service's equipment disposition 
decisions, we obtained and reviewed data containing approximately 
10,000 disposition decisions made by the Army and Marine Corps over a 
12-month period. Of these decisions, roughly 87 percent resulted in 
the return of vehicles to the United States (the remaining 13 percent 
resulted in either the return of the vehicles to a site outside of the 
United States or the transfer or destruction of vehicles in country). 
Because our second objective is related to the return of equipment, we 
focused our analysis on these approximately 9,000 vehicle-return 
decisions. Moreover, we chose the 12-month period spanning mid-March 
2012 to mid-March 2013 because by that time each service had several 
months' experience in drawing down its equipment. 

We also examined the transportation costs of returning these vehicles. 
To estimate the costs of returning equipment, we used the rates 
TRANSCOM charges the military services for representative types of 
equipment. We surveyed the organizations responsible for maintaining 
the databases in order to determine the reliability of the data. From 
these efforts, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable 
for determining how many vehicles were returned that exceeded approved 
acquisition objectives. To obtain additional information for our 
review, we contacted or interviewed officials from the: 

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics; 

* Joint Staff; 

* CENTCOM; 

* U.S. Forces-Afghanistan; 

* TRANSCOM; 

* Surface Deployment and Distribution Command; 

* Headquarters, Department of the Army; 

* U.S. Army Materiel Command; 

* U.S. Army Sustainment Command; 

* U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command; 

* U.S. Marine Corps/Installations and Logistics; 

* U.S. Marine Corps Logistics Command; 

* U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command; 

* Headquarters, U.S. Navy; 

* Headquarters, U.S. Air Force/Equipment Management Branch; and 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Disposition Services: 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2013 to September 
2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Facilities That Process Returning Equipment: 

Background: 

The Army has stated that equipment will not be abandoned in 
Afghanistan. To assist units in processing equipment for return and 
arranging proper disposition, the Army's 401st Army Field Support 
Brigade operates seven RPAT facilities. Army officials told us that 
each site has at least 20 acres and is equipped to prepare equipment 
to meet international and U.S. customs standards. RPAT yards process 
equipment that is excess to needs in theater and also handle equipment 
that is battle-damaged or declared as a battle loss. As seen below in 
figure 4, the Bagram and Khandahar yards account for more than 60 
percent of the in-country RPAT capacity. 

Figure 4: Capacity of Yards as Percentage of Total Redistribution 
Property Assistance Teams (RPAT) Capacity in Afghanistan, March 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Bagram: 38%; 
Kandahar: 25%; 
Other sites: 37%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. GAO-14-768. 

[End of figure] 

Overview: 

Army Redistribution Property Assistance Teams (RPAT) operate 
facilities in Afghanistan to process equipment, including vehicles and 
non-rolling stock, for return to the United States. Units leaving 
Afghanistan bring equipment that is no longer needed in Afghanistan to 
an RPAT yard to be processed for return. After turn-in, it can take on 
average 29 days for non-rolling stock and 60 days for vehicles to be 
processed for shipment. As a result, there is about a 2-month delay 
from turn-in to the final processing of vehicles. Because all nonunit 
equipment must go through RPAT yard processing before shipment, 
efficient RPAT operations are critical for the transport of equipment 
out of Afghanistan. Further, to meet future drawdown demand, it is 
likely that RPAT processing throughput will have to increase from 
existing levels (see figure 3). 

Figure 3: Number of Vehicles Processed at Afghanistan Redistribution 
Property Assistance Teams (RPAT) Yards: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Vehicles processed: 

2012: 
March: 472; 
April: 586; 
May: 706; 
June: 774; 
July: 737; 
August: 237; 
September: 327; 
October: 405; 
November: 304; 
December: 236. 

2013: 
January: 320; 
February: 468; 
March: 1,097; 
April: 1,036; 
May: 655; 
June: 431; 
July: 792; 
August: 646; 
September: 845; 
October: 966. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. GAO-14-768. 

[End of figure] 

Potential Future Challenges: 

RPAT processing capacity may become a limiting factor for the 
Afghanistan drawdown. Army officials stated that RPAT facilities in 
Afghanistan have the capacity to process more than 1,000 vehicles per 
month. However, they have tested the upper limits of this capacity in 
only 3 months of a 20-month period (see fig. 3). Officials further 
stated that they have not reached their capacities due to the limited 
rate of equipment turn-in. Going forward, we note that simultaneous 
unit moves, base closures, and other events may result in turn-in 
levels that exceed the capacity of the facilities. Moreover, RPAT 
capacity is also a function of space availability and the efficiency 
with which equipment can be moved out of a yard. This efficiency 
depends on the ability of units to forecast what equipment will be 
turned in as well as the ability of the transportation system to move 
the equipment. From March 2012 to October 2013, average transportation 
wait times were 44 days for vehicles and 19 days for containers. In 
the future, RPAT output could be limited by the scheduling of 
transportation assets and the availability of lines of communication. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Equipment Return Routes: 

Background: 

In the drawdown from Iraq, the majority of equipment was processed and 
returned through a nearby port in Kuwait. Due to the landlocked 
geography of Afghanistan and the challenging political environment in 
Central Asia, TRANSCOM must rely on multiple routes and modes of 
transportation for the return of equipment from Afghanistan. 

Multimodal Routes (Air/Surface): 
* Jordan; 
* Azerbaijan; 
* United Arab Emirates; 
* Oman. 

Surface Routes (Ground/Sea): 
* Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC); 
* Northern Distribution Network (NDN). 

Overview: 

U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has established 18 surface, 
airlift, and multimodal airlift routes for the return of equipment 
from Afghanistan. The Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication 
(PAKGLOC), terminating at the port of Karachi, is the least expensive 
route out of Afghanistan. To the north, the Northern Distribution 
Network (NDN) broadly comprises three land routes terminating at 
several seaports: one through Central Asia into the South Caucasus; 
one through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia that ends in the Baltic 
states; and one through Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Russia 
that also ends in the Baltic states. These routes have limitations 
concerning the kinds of equipment that can be transported through 
them, and availability is subject to geopolitical complexities. For 
example, the PAKGLOC remained closed for 8 months from 2011 to 2012 
and did not become operational until March 2013. Only about 4 percent 
of equipment return shipments flow through the NDN, but the NDN routes 
proved critical for inbound cargo during the PAKGLOC closure (see 
figure 5). Airlift and multimodal movement (air and sea) reduce the 
amount of time needed to return equipment, but are substantially more 
expensive. 

Figure 5: Return of Vehicles by Mode, April 2012-September 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Vehicles returned: 

2012: 

April: 
Multimodal: 331; 
Airlift: 363; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 0; 
May: 
Multimodal: 400; 
Airlift: 362; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 0; 
June: 
Multimodal: 486; 
Airlift: 356; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 0; 
July: 
Multimodal: 357; 
Airlift: 282; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 0; 
August: 
Multimodal: 448; 
Airlift: 359; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 0; 
September: 
Multimodal: 218; 
Airlift: 378; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 0; 
October: 
Multimodal: 256; 
Airlift: 255; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 0; 
November: 
Multimodal: 761; 
Airlift: 392; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 0; 
December: 
Multimodal: 521; 
Airlift: 464; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 0. 

2013: 

January: 
Multimodal: 335; 
Airlift: 579; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 0; 
February: 
Multimodal: 366; 
Airlift: 3323; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 0; 
March: 
Multimodal: 847; 
Airlift: 335; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 0; 
April: 
Multimodal: 565; 
Airlift: 290; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 159; 
May: 
Multimodal: 383; 
Airlift: 330; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 293; 
June: 
Multimodal: 165; 
Airlift: 305; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 284; 
July: 
Multimodal: 302; 
Airlift: 220; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 445; 
August: 
Multimodal: 757; 
Airlift: 196; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 193; 
September: 
Multimodal: 310; 
Airlift: 187; 
Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC): 174. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. GAO-14-768. 

[End of figure] 

Potential Future Challenges: 

Route limitations will affect cost and time required for equipment 
reduction. Transportation officials told us that when demands for 
return of equipment increase in late 2013 and early 2014, it is 
unlikely that the PAKGLOC will be able to fully support the demand. 
Officials stated that equipment return may continue for some time 
after December 2014 due to the volume of equipment remaining and the 
limited availability of assets and capabilities to move it. Officials 
also anticipate that the physical limits of transportation routes such 
as aerial port capacities could present a constraint in the drawdown. 
TRANSCOM officials cautioned that, in the future, it is possible that 
the volume of equipment to be returned could exceed the capacity of 
the system. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Transfer of Equipment in the Afghanistan Drawdown: 

Background: 

There are two types of transfers of equipment in the Afghanistan 
drawdown: those associated with a base closure and those independent 
of a base closure. 

Subject to limitations, equipment in Afghanistan may be transferred 
within DOD and to other federal agencies, U.S. states, foreign 
countries, and other recipients. 

For transfers to Afghanistan through the Foreign Excess Personal 
Property program, DOD has issued guidance establishing who can approve 
the transfer of certain equipment by cost threshold. Transfers are 
coordinated with the U.S. Embassy team. 

Transfer of equipment may also be possible under other authorities, 
such as the Foreign Military Sales and Excess Defense Articles 
programs, as well as specific statutes related to equipment in 
Afghanistan. 

Overview: 

Equipment in Afghanistan that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
determines to be no longer needed in the region and that the services 
and Department of Defense (DOD) want to divest is either destroyed or 
transferred to another U.S. agency, to U.S. states, to Afghanistan, to 
another country, or to certain organizations. A number of factors are 
used to determine whether equipment used in Afghanistan will be 
transferred, including whether the equipment is in good condition; the 
needs of the receiving organization or government; the ability of the 
recipient to sustain the equipment; and the need to maintain critical 
timelines for base closures and transfer actions. According to Army 
and Marine Corps forecasts, the amount of equipment in Afghanistan 
that will be divested (transferred or destroyed) is limited, and the 
majority will be returned (see fig. 6). The ability to transfer 
equipment minimizes the need for in-country destruction and could also 
avoid transportation charges when equipment is not returned to the 
United States. In fiscal year 2012, the Army estimated that transfers 
of excess equipment in Afghanistan resulted in the avoidance of at 
least $1.2 billion in return transportation costs. 

Figure 6: Forecast Army and Marine Corps Equipment Disposition, Summer 
2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 pie-charts] 

Army: 
Return: 713,000 items; 73%; 
Transfer/destroy: 266,000 items; 27%. 

Marine Corps: 
Return: 28,500 items; 77%; 
Transfer/destroy: 8,500 items; 23%. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army and Marine Corps data. GAO-14-768. 

Potential Future Challenges: 

Transfer will be a limited option for the reduction of the equipment 
in Afghanistan. According to CENTCOM officials, they have sufficient 
authorities to transfer equipment to Afghanistan, surrounding 
countries, and coalition partners. However, while DOD has been able to 
transfer equipment such as heaters and air conditioners to 
Afghanistan, it faces challenges in transferring more advanced 
equipment due to Afghanistan's limitations in absorbing and 
maintaining these items. Equipment used in Afghanistan can also be 
transferred to U.S. state and local government agencies, but these 
transfers may be limited by agencies' having to arrange and fund the 
transportation of the equipment out of Afghanistan. In addition, Army 
officials said they may transfer some equipment once it has been 
returned to the United States. This transfer would occur after 
transportation costs have been paid through Overseas Contingency 
Operations funds. 

[End of figure] 

Appendix V: Destruction of Equipment in the Afghanistan Drawdown: 

Background: 

The functions of DLA Disposition Services include reutilizing end 
items, selling or donating surplus property, managing disposal of 
hazardous property, and coordinating the precious metals recovery 
program. DLA Central's area of responsibility includes Afghanistan, 
Kuwait, and Iraq, as well as other Gulf States. Within Afghanistan, it 
operates facilities at Bagram, Kandahar, Camp Leatherneck, and Camp 
John Pratt, as well as at several other sites. Protocols are in place 
to prevent the destruction of serviceable items unless specifically 
authorized. 

Afghanistan Vehicle Demilitarization: 
Vehicles demilitarized in fiscal year 2013: 2,215 vehicles. 

Afghanistan Scrap Removal: 
Scrap removed in fiscal year 2013: 380,525,565 pounds. 

Overview: 

If the services choose to divest an item in Afghanistan, it is either 
transferred or destroyed (demilitarized). The Defense Logistics Agency 
(DLA) Disposition Services has established procedures and facilities 
within Afghanistan to demilitarize the equipment. Demilitarization is 
the act of destroying the military offensive or defensive capabilities 
inherent in certain types of equipment or materiel. Demilitarization 
can be effected through mutilation, dumping at sea, scrapping, 
melting, burning, or alteration designed to prevent the further use of 
the equipment and materiel for its originally intended military or 
lethal purpose. Demilitarization applies equally to materiel in 
unserviceable or serviceable condition that has been screened and 
declared excess to Department of Defense (DOD) needs. 

DLA Disposition Services charges the coalition forces on a per pound 
basis for the services necessary to demilitarize an item and is 
currently charging about 28 to 31 cents per pound. The price is 
generally based on defraying the costs of overhead and operations, and 
it also considers that sale of resulting scrap material will yield a 
certain amount of revenue. Because this is a working capital fund 
operation, the military services pay a rate adjusted proportionally 
for the amount of the service they receive. Table 2 compares the price 
of demilitarizing listed items with the cost of transporting the items 
to the Gulf Coast of the United States. 

Table 2: Cost Comparison of Item Destruction and Item Transportation: 

Vehicle type: Tactical vehicle; 
Weight (pounds): 32,500; 
Demilitarization cost per vehicle: $9,100–$10,100; 
Transport cost to United States per vehicle: $23,800–$107,400. 

Vehicle type: Trailer; 
Weight (pounds): 5,850; 
Demilitarization cost per vehicle: $1,600–1,800; 
Transport cost to United States per vehicle: $5,700–17,400. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Transportation Command and Defense 
Logistics Agency Disposition Services data. GAO-14-768. 

[End of table] 

Potential Future Challenges: 

Space could be a limiting factor at DLA Disposition Services 
demilitarization facilities in Afghanistan. A senior DLA Disposition 
Services official said it is conceivable that demand for 
demilitarization or destruction could exceed the capacity of 
facilities. To accommodate demand and flow, DLA Disposition Services 
has created some flexibility by reprogramming personnel from one task 
to another to match demands. A DLA Disposition Services official also 
acknowledged that demilitarization or destruction operations are 
likely to continue well after December 2014, noting that such 
operations in Iraq continued into 2013. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Assistant Secretary of Defense: 
Logistics And Materiel Readiness: 
3500 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3500: 

March 11, 2014: 

Mr. Cary Russell: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Russell: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report, [redacted] "Afghanistan 
Equipment Drawdown: Progress Made but Improved Controls and Decision 
Making Could Reduce Risk of Unnecessary Expenditures," dated February 
6, 2014 [redacted]. Detailed comments on the report recommendations 
are enclosed. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Paul D. Peters: 
Acting: 

Enclosure: As stated. 

GAO Draft Report Dated February 6, 2014: 
[redacted] 

“Afghanistan Equipment Drawdown: Progress Made but Improved Controls 
and Decision Making Could Reduce Risk of Unnecessary Expenditures” 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

To reduce the risk of resources the Government Accountability Office 
recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 
Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to take the following two 
actions: 

Recommendation 1: Ensure that justifications for returning items that 
exceed their approved acquisition objectives are documented and 
receive management review. 

DOD Response: Concur. Although both the Army and the Marine Corps have 
adequate guidance and processes for overall fleet management as it 
relates to drawdown, the Department is taking steps to further improve 
these processes. For instance, the Marine Corps initiated 
organizational steps to better justify, document and review retrograde 
decisions for items that exceed their approved allowances to the 
degree that it provides an auditable record of our deliberate 
inventory decision-making processes. 

Recommendation 2: Ensure that transportation and all other relevant 
costs are included in disposition decision-making. 

DOD Response: Concur. Although the department has adequate guidance to 
include all costs, including transportation, the Department is taking 
steps to improve these processes. For instance, the Marine Corps is 
finalizing a transportation planning decision support model intended 
to facilitate formal documentation of retrograde cost benefit analyses 
and further strengthen our retrograde decision making processes. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cary B. Russell, (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, individuals who made key 
contributions to this report include: Guy LoFaro, Assistant Director; 
Carolynn Cavanaugh; Carole Coffey; Timothy DiNapoli; Charles Johnson; 
Cale Jones; Larry Junek; Anne McDonough-Hughes; Carol Petersen; Terry 
Richardson; Michael Shaughnessy; Amie Steele; Jose Watkins; Cheryl 
Weissman; Amanda Weldon; and Steve Woods. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-218SP]. Washington, D.C.: February 
11, 2013. 

Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations: DOD Decision Makers Need Additional 
Analyses to Determine Costs and Benefits of Returning Excess 
Equipment. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-185R]. 
Washington, D.C.: December 19, 2012. 

Warfighter Support: DOD Has Made Progress, but Supply and Distribution 
Challenges Remain in Afghanistan. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-138]. Washington, D.C.: October 7, 
2011. 

Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, 
Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-774]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 16, 2011. 

Defense Logistics: DOD Needs to Take Additional Actions to Address 
Challenges in Supply Chain Management. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-569]. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 
2011. 

Warfighter Support: Preliminary Observations on DOD's Progress and 
Challenges in Distributing Supplies and Equipment to Afghanistan. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-842T]. Washington, 
D.C.: June 25, 2010. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Facilitate the Efficient 
Drawdown of U.S. Forces and Equipment from Iraq. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-376]. Washington, D.C.: April 19, 
2010. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on DOD Planning for 
the Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-179]. Washington, D.C.: November 2, 
2009. 

Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment, and 
Infrastructure Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and 
Plans. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-380T]. 
Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2009. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD Planning for 
Reposturing of U.S. Forces from Iraq. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-930]. Washington, D.C.: September 
10, 2008. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Transfer to other entities, such as state governments by means of 
donations or sales, may also be possible. 

[2] GAO, Afghanistan Drawdown Preparations: DOD Decision Makers Need 
Additional Analyses to Determine Costs and Benefits of Returning 
Excess Equipment, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-185R] 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2012). For additional information see 
related GAO products listed at the end of this report. 

[3] Both the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Materiel Readiness and the Marine Corps have issued 
guidance requiring cost comparisons to determine whether certain 
equipment should be returned. 

[4] The Army describes theater-provided equipment as equipment that 
has been identified and positioned in Afghanistan to offset deployment 
requirements, fill shortages, fill service operational needs, or to 
fill service component command-validated operational requirements. 

[5] The approved acquisition objective is defined by DOD as the 
quantity of an item authorized for peacetime and wartime requirements 
to equip and sustain U.S. and allied forces according to current DOD 
policies and plans. DOD's definition notes that the quantity shall be 
sufficient to support other U.S. Government Agencies, as applicable. 
See Department of Defense Regulation 4140.1-R, DOD Supply Chain 
Materiel Management Regulation, appendix 1, para. AP1.1.4 (May 23, 
2003). 

[6] Subsequent to the issuance of the FOUO report, the President 
announced specific information pertaining to post-2014 troop levels 
that may affect drawdown planning and execution. However, the 
announcement noted that the post-2014 troop levels were contingent 
upon the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan signing a 
bilateral security agreement and a status of forces agreement with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

[7] For the purposes of this report, equipment managers are either 
item managers (officials who manage the repair of equipment across its 
life cycle) or program managers (officials who manage the acquisition 
and retirement of equipment). 

[8] This review focuses on theater-provided equipment that will be 
repaired. There is also unit-owned equipment in theater that will be 
returned to units' home stations. 

[9] Transfer to other entities, such as state governments by means of 
donations or sales, may also be possible. 

[10] In the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle strategy, the Army 
decided either to divest or to retain certain variants of this vehicle 
based on the long-term needs of the Army. Similarly, the Marine Corps 
identified the quantity and variants of Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected vehicles that would be retained for the post-2014 force. As 
a result, some vehicles will be returned to the United States and some 
will be transferred or destroyed in Afghanistan. 

[11] The Marine Corps publishes this information by equipment model in 
a "Ground Equipment Reset Playbook," which integrates Marine Corps 
equipment-requirements data, equipment-reset strategies and on-hand 
inventories into a single-source document that is used by all levels 
of the organization in support of equipment drawdown. 

[12] See Army Regulation 750-1, Army Materiel Maintenance Policy 
(Sept. 12, 2013); Army Technical Bulletin 43-0002-81, Maintenance 
Expenditure Limits for FSC Group 23 (Dec. 14, 2012). 

[13] See Marine Corps Order 4790.19, Depot Maintenance Policy (Jan. 
18, 2001). 

[14] See Marine Corps Order 4440.31E, Marine Corps Retention and 
Excess Returns Policies for Wholesale and Retail Materiel Assets (June 
23, 1989). For the purposes of this report we refer to uneconomical-to-
return-and-repair items as items that are uneconomical to repair 
either because the sum of transportation and repair costs exceeds 
authorized limits (Army) or because either the transportation or the 
repair costs exceed authorized limits (Marine Corps). 

[15] This range is based on the cost per pound for transporting a 
heavy tactical vehicle through the least expensive (low end of range) 
and most expensive (high end of range) routes. 

[16] Transfer of a vehicle incurs a minimal cost, but officials have 
stated that this option is limited. 

[17] The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) routes combine ship, 
rail, and truck modes, and they are used to transport equipment 
through combinations of countries including Latvia, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Georgia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Russia, and Uzbekistan. The NDN routes all cross the northern border 
of Afghanistan. 

[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-185R]. 

[19] As previously discussed, in May 2014, subsequent to the issuance 
of the FOUO report, the President announced specific information 
pertaining to post-2014 troop levels that may affect drawdown planning 
and execution. However, the announcement noted that the post-2014 
troop levels were contingent upon the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan signing a bilateral security agreement and a 
status of forces agreement with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. With these issues unresolved as of August 2014, 
uncertainties remain concerning the amount of equipment needed to 
support U.S. operations after December 2014. 

[20] The reduction of equipment in Afghanistan has largely been 
conducted by means of destruction at DLA Disposition Services sites or 
return through RPAT yards and the transportation system. Transfer to 
the Afghanistan government has been limited, resulting in only 43 
vehicles drawn down by this method from October 2012 to October 2013. 
Consequently, we did not include these in our analysis. 

[21] Equipment transfers to other countries or other U.S. agencies 
contribute to meeting the equipment-drawdown goals. To date, this 
disposition option has been limited. See appendix IV. 

[22] In June 2013, DOD produced detailed supporting plans that 
included phased operations as well as milestones and objectives for 
equipment reduction. The specific goals are classified; however, DOD 
officials in theater stated that in the period from June 2013 to 
September 2013, DOD's Afghanistan equipment reductions exceeded these 
goals. 

[23] Resetting the Force for the Future: Risks of Sequestration, 
Before the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services 
Committee, 113th Cong. (Oct. 2, 2013) (testimony of Army Lieutenant 
General Raymond Mason, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics). 

[24] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[25] Many of the costs associated with military operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are funded through the Overseas Contingency Operations 
portion of the budget to more accurately reflect the temporary and 
extraordinary requirements of these overseas operations. In May 2013, 
DOD announced that it was seeking $79.4 billion in overseas 
contingency operations funding for fiscal year 2014. 

[26] See Department of Defense Instruction 4140.01, DOD Supply Chain 
Materiel Management Policy (Dec. 14, 2011). 

[27] See Department of Defense Regulation 4140.1-R, DOD Supply Chain 
Materiel Management Regulation, appendix 1, para. AP1.1.4. 

[28] The term "vehicle" refers to rolling stock, such as tactical 
wheeled vehicles; multipurpose or special-purpose military wheeled 
platforms that transport personnel and all classes of supply; and 
powered and unpowered trailer systems. Vehicles can be specially 
designed for the military or can be commercial vehicles modified to 
meet certain military requirements. Vehicles are classified by weight, 
ranging from less than 2.5 tons to greater than 10 tons. See appendix 
I for a description of the methodology supporting this analysis. 

[29] We estimated the transportation costs for these vehicles because 
determining the actual costs would require the review of each 
vehicle's specific mode and route of transportation, as well as the 
weight and dimensions of each vehicle. To estimate the cost we 
multiplied the number of vehicles returned above their approved 
acquisition objective (1,034 vehicles) by the lowest vehicle 
transportation cost ($5,700) and by the highest vehicle transportation 
cost ($107,400) as provided by TRANSCOM. This estimate is based on 
fiscal year 2013 costs. According to a TRANSCOM official, these costs 
have increased for fiscal year 2014. 

[30] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[31] See Department of Defense Instruction 4140.01, DOD Supply Chain 
Materiel Management Policy, encl.4, para.1.c. 

[32] Specifically, Army guidance provides that cost of freight--
including all transportation and handling costs--will be included as 
an element of cost when the equipment is located overseas and no local 
capability to repair exists. See Army Regulation 750-1, Army Materiel 
Maintenance Policy, para. 4-6.f(2)(d); Army Technical Bulletin 43-0002-
81, Maintenance Expenditure Limits for FSC Group 23, para. 4-1.e(1). 

[33] See Marine Corps Order 4790.19, Depot Maintenance Policy, para. 
4.a(2)(g). 

[34] See Marine Corps Order 4440.31E, Marine Corps Retention and 
Excess Returns Policies for Wholesale and Retail Materiel Assets, 
encl. 3, para. 2.b (June 23, 1989). 

[35] The Army describes theater-provided equipment as equipment that 
has been identified and positioned in Afghanistan to offset deployment 
requirements, fill shortages, fill service operational needs, or to 
fill service component command-validated operational requirements. 

[End of section] 

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