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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

September 2014: 

Air Traffic Control System: 

Selected Stakeholders' Perspectives on Operations, Modernization, and 
Structure: 

GAO-14-770: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-770, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

aviation stakeholders have debated whether FAA should be the entity in 
the United States that operates and modernizes the ATC system. During 
this period, GAO reported on challenges FAA has faced in operating and 
modernizing the ATC system. FAA reorganized several times in attempts 
to improve its performance and implement an initiative to modernize 
the ATC system, known as NextGen. Recent budgetary pressures have 
rekindled industry debate about FAA's efficiency in operating and 
modernizing the ATC system. 

GAO was asked to gather U.S. aviation industry stakeholder views on 
the operation and modernization of the current ATC system. This report 
provides perspectives from a wide range of stakeholders on: 

(1) the performance of the ATC system and the NextGen modernization 
initiative and any challenges FAA may face in managing these 
activities and; 

(2) potential changes that could improve the performance of the ATC 
system, including the NextGen modernization initiative. 

Based on GAO's knowledge and recommendations from interviewees, GAO 
interviewed a non-probability, non-generalizable sample of 76 U.S. 
aviation industry stakeholders—-including airlines, airports, labor 
unions, manufacturers, and general aviation—-using a semi-structured 
format with closed and open-ended questions. GAO also discussed the 
perspectives with current FAA officials. The Department of 
Transportation provided technical comments on a draft of this product. 

What GAO Found: 

The 76 aviation industry stakeholders with whom GAO spoke were 
generally positive regarding the Federal Aviation Administration's 
(FAA) operation of the current air traffic control (ATC) system but 
identified challenges about transitioning to the Next Generation Air 
Traffic Control System (NextGen). Specifically, the majority of 
stakeholders rated FAA as moderately to very capable of operating an 
efficient ATC system, but the majority also rated FAA as only 
marginally to moderately capable of implementing NextGen, FAA's 
initiative to modernize the system. Almost all (75) of the 
stakeholders identified challenges that they believe FAA faces, 
particularly in implementing the NextGen initiatives. These challenges 
included difficulty in (1) convincing reluctant aircraft owners to 
invest in the aircraft technology necessary to benefit from NextGen 
(46 stakeholders) and (2) mitigating the effects of an uncertain 
fiscal environment (43 stakeholders). FAA officials acknowledged and 
generally agreed with these challenges. 

Sixty four stakeholders suggested a range of changes they believe 
could improve the efficiency of ATC operations and NextGen's 
implementation. The change stakeholders suggested most often was to 
modify how FAA's ATC operations and NextGen programs are funded, 
including the need to ensure that FAA has a predictable and long-term 
funding source. Other suggested changes were to improve human capital 
activities, such as air traffic controllers' training, and improve 
coordination with industry stakeholders. GAO has reported on these 
issues in the past, and in some cases, made recommendations, with 
which FAA concurred but has not yet implemented. GAO also asked 
stakeholders whether separating ATC services from FAA, such as the 
privatization of the ATC service provider, was an option; 27 of the 
stakeholders believed it was an option; another 26 believed it was an 
option, but had significant reservations about such a change. Support 
for this option was mixed among categories of stakeholders (see table 
below). Stakeholders identified several issues that would need to be 
taken into account before making any changes to the provision of ATC 
services, including lessons learned from other countries, funding 
sources for such a system, and the extent of Congress's role in 
overseeing a separate ATC system. 

Industry category (number of stakeholders in category):	Airlines (17); 
Yes: 9; 
Maybe[A]: 5; 
No: 1; 
No opinion: 2; 
No answer given: 0. 

Industry category (number of stakeholders in category):	Airports (7); 
Yes: 1; 
Maybe[A]: 3; 
No: 2; 
No opinion: 1; 
No answer given: 0. 

Industry category (number of stakeholders in category):	Aviation 
experts and other relevant organizations (18); 
Yes: 10; 
Maybe[A]: 6; 
No: 2; 
No opinion: 0; 
No answer given: 0. 

Industry category (number of stakeholders in category):	General 
aviation (4); 
Yes: 1; 
Maybe[A]: 1; 
No: 1; 
No opinion: 0; 
No answer given: 1. 

Industry category (number of stakeholders in category):	Labor unions 
and professional associations (8); 
Yes: 1; 
Maybe[A]: 3; 
No: 2; 
No opinion: 2; 
No answer given: 0. 

Industry category (number of stakeholders in category):	Manufacturers 
and service providers (16); 
Yes: 4; 
Maybe[A]: 5; 
No: 3; 
No opinion: 4; 
No answer given: 0. 

Industry category (number of stakeholders in category):	Other 
stakeholders[B] (6); 
Yes: 1; 
Maybe[A]: 3; 
No: 1; 
No opinion: 0; 
No answer given: 1. 

Industry category (number of stakeholders in category):	Total; 
Yes: 27; 
Maybe[A]: 26; 
No: 12; 
No opinion: 9; 
No answer given: 2. 

Source: GAO Analysis. GAO-14-770. 

[A] Maybe represents stakeholders who qualified their “Yes” responses 
with significant reservations. 

[B] Included in this other category are three industry categories with 
fewer than four stakeholders—Research & Development Organizations, 
Other Federal Agencies, and Passenger and Safety Groups. 

[End of table] 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-770]. For more 
information, contact Gerald Dillingham, Ph.D., at (202) 512-2834 or 
dillinghamg@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Industry Stakeholders Were Generally Positive Regarding the 
Performance of the Current ATC System but Cited Challenges to 
Transitioning to a Modernized System: 

Industry Stakeholders Suggested Changes That Could Improve ATC System 
Performance and Modernization and Identified Issues to Be Considered 
If ATC Operations Were Separated from FAA: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: List of the 76 Aviation Industry Stakeholders GAO 
Interviewed: 

Appendix III: Responses to GAO's Closed-Ended Question on Safety: 

Appendix IV: List of Challenges FAA Faces in Improving the Efficiency 
of the Air Traffic Control (ATC) System and Implementing NextGen, as 
Raised by the 76 Aviation Industry Stakeholders GAO Interviewed: 

Appendix V: List of Changes to FAA to Improve the Efficiency of the 
Air Traffic Control (ATC) System or the Implementation of NextGen, or 
Both, as Cited by the 76 Aviation Industry Stakeholders GAO 
Interviewed: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Stakeholder Responses to GAO's Questions on Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) System's Efficiency and NextGen Implementation: 

Table 2: Stakeholder Responses to GAO Question on Separating Air 
Traffic Control (ATC) Services from Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) by Industry Category: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Current 
Organizational Structure: 

Figure 2: Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Fiscal Year 2013 
Congressional Appropriations by Account: 

Figure 3: Improvements to Phases of Flight Expected under NextGen: 

Figure 4: Procedures Using Conventional Equipment and Performance 
Based Navigation (PBN) Technologies: 

Figure 5: Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Radio Range (VOR) 
Station: 

Abbreviations: 

ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast: 

ANSP: air navigation service provider: 

ATC: air traffic control: 

ATO: Air Traffic Organization: 

CEO: chief executive officer: 

COO: chief operating officer: 

CANSO: Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation: 

EUROCONTROL: European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation: 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 

IFR: instrument flight rules: 

NAC: NextGen Advisory Committee: 

NAS: National Airspace System: 

NAV Lean: Navigation Lean: 

NextGen: Next Generation Air Transportation System: 

OAPM: Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex: 

PBN: Performance Based Navigation: 

PMO: Program Management Office: 

RNAV: Area Navigation: 

RNP: Required Navigation Performance: 

VOR: Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Radio Range: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 12, 2014: 

The Honorable Bill Shuster,
Chairman: 
The Honorable Nick J. Rahall, II: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Frank A. LoBiondo: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Rick Larsen: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Aviation: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) handles over 50,000 flights a 
day and more than 700 million passengers each year and is generally 
considered not only the busiest and most complex air traffic control 
system in the world but also the safest. Key aviation stakeholders--
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), airlines, airports, 
aircraft manufacturers, and the National Transportation Safety Board--
work together to ensure these results. However, over the past two 
decades, U.S. aviation stakeholders have debated whether the FAA 
should be the entity in the United States that operates and modernizes 
the air traffic control (ATC) system. Since its inception in 1958, FAA 
has overseen the entire NAS, owning and operating the ATC system and 
regulating industry safety, aircraft, and operations. In 1995, 
Congress considered reforming FAA in response to government and 
industry frustration with the agency's slow pace in modernizing the 
ATC system and concerns about constrained spending for aviation due to 
efforts to reduce the budget deficit. Similar conditions exist today: 
the recent constrained fiscal environment has forced federal agencies--
including FAA--to cut their spending through budget sequestration and 
employee furloughs. At the same time, the current ATC system continues 
to use aging technologies and infrastructure--such as analog 
communications and ground-based radar--and FAA continues to face 
challenges modernizing the ATC system through its Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen) initiative. These conditions have 
rekindled industry debate about whether (1) organizational changes 
need to be made within FAA and (2) alternative NAS structures--such as 
making FAA an independent agency or commercializing ATC services--
could provide ATC services, as well as modernize the ATC system, more 
efficiently.

You requested that we gather U.S. aviation industry views on FAA's ATC 
system operations and modernization. This report examines the 
perspectives of a wide range of aviation stakeholders on: 

* the performance of the current ATC system and its modernization 
through the NextGen initiative, and any challenges FAA may face in 
managing these activities, and: 

* potential changes, if any, that could improve the performance of the 
ATC system, including FAA's modernization initiative.

To perform this work, we interviewed a non-probability sample of 76 
aviation industry stakeholders from a cross-section of the industry. 
We selected stakeholders based on our knowledge of the industry and 
recommendations from interviewees. We wanted to obtain perspectives 
from individuals and organizations with direct experience, as users, 
or knowledge, through research or study, of the current ATC system, 
modernization efforts, and FAA's management of the system. As such, we 
limited our review to U.S.-based companies and airlines and sought the 
views of individuals and organizations with a stake in the performance 
of the NAS. The selected stakeholders represented the following 
industry sectors: airlines, airports, aviation experts and other 
relevant organizations, general aviation, labor unions and 
professional associations, manufacturers and service providers, other 
federal government agencies--the Department of Defense and National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, passenger and safety groups, and 
research and development organizations.

To obtain stakeholder perspectives, we used a semi-structured 
interview format with both closed-and open-ended questions. The intent 
of our open-ended questions was to engage the stakeholders in a 
conversation about the issues they considered most important and 
relevant. To determine the common themes that we are reporting on, we 
conducted a content analysis of each of the interviewees' responses. 
The numbers reported for our open-ended questions represent those 
stakeholders who, during our interviews, raised a challenge or issue 
to consider or suggested a change. It does not mean that the remaining 
stakeholders agreed or disagreed with that challenge, change, or 
issue. In our discussion of stakeholder views obtained through our 
open-ended questions, we aggregated their responses and reported on 
stakeholders perspectives in general. The results of our review are 
not generalizable to the industry as a whole.

We also interviewed the following FAA senior management officials on 
their perspectives and reactions to our preliminary results on 
stakeholder perspectives: Administrator; Deputy Administrator/Chief 
NextGen Officer; Assistant Administrator for NextGen; Associate 
Administrator for Aviation Safety; Chief Operating Officer (COO) of 
the Air Traffic Organization (ATO); and the Assistant Administrator 
for Policy, International Affairs, and Environment. Finally, we 
reviewed GAO reports that were related to stakeholder-identified 
themes, including collaboration with stakeholders, delivery of NextGen 
capabilities, and Performance Based Navigation procedures, and FAA 
leadership in overseeing NextGen implementation. Appendix I describes 
our objectives, scope, and methodology in greater detail. See also 
appendix II for the complete list of stakeholders we interviewed.

In addition, you asked us to obtain stakeholders' perspectives on the 
safety of the NAS. Nearly all of the stakeholders we interviewed 
agreed that the NAS is extremely or very safe. (See appendix III for 
stakeholders' ratings of the safety of the NAS.) For this reason, we 
focused this report on the stakeholders' perspectives on ATC 
operations and NextGen modernization and changes that could improve 
FAA's efforts in these areas.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2013 to September 
2014, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Background: 

FAA's primary mission is to provide the safest, most efficient 
aerospace system in the world. FAA oversees operating and maintaining 
this system, known as the NAS, as well as the safety of aircraft and 
operators. FAA operates and maintains the NAS through the following: 

* a workforce of technicians, air traffic controllers, and other staff 
who work in airport towers, terminal areas, en-route centers, oceanic 
air traffic control centers, and other facilities, and: 

* the ATC and other supporting systems and infrastructure, including 
ground-based surveillance radar facilities, communication equipment, 
automation systems, and the facilities that house and support these 
systems.

Various offices within FAA are responsible for the air traffic control 
system and its modernization through the NextGen initiative. The ATO, 
headed by the COO, is responsible for the day-to-day operations and 
maintenance of the air traffic control system. The NextGen Office, 
ATO, and Office of Aviation Safety are involved with various aspects 
of NextGen's management and implementation. The Office of Airports is 
responsible for all programs related to airport safety and 
inspections, standards for airport design, construction, and 
operation. In this role, the Office of Airports supports the 
implementation of NextGen. These offices report to the Deputy 
Administrator, who also has the designation Chief NextGen Officer (see 
figure 1).

Figure 1: Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Current 
Organizational Structure: 

[Refer to PDF for image: organizational structure] 

Top level: 
FAA Administrator[A]; 
* Deputy Administrator/Chief NextGen Officer[A]; 
* Audit and Evaluation.

Second level, reporting to FAA Administrator: 
* Air Traffic Organization (ATO)[A]; 
* Aviation Safety[A]; 
* Human Resource Management; 
* Civil Rights; 
* Communications; 
* Government and Industry Affairs; 
* Security and Hazardous Materials Safety; 
* Commercial Space Transportation; 
* Finance and Management; 
* Policy, International Affairs and Environment; 
* Airports[A]; 
* NextGen[A]; 
* Chief Counsel. 

[A] Offices with responsibilities for key NextGen-related activities. 

Sources: FAA and GAO. GAO-14-770. 

[End of figure]

FAA receives funds annually through congressional appropriations into 
four accounts: 

* The operations account funds, among other things, the operation and 
maintenance of the air traffic control system.

* The facilities and equipment account funds technological 
improvements to the air traffic control system, including NextGen.

* The research, engineering, and development account funds research on 
issues related to aviation safety and NextGen systems.

* The Airport Improvement Program account provides grants for airport 
planning and development.

See figure 2 for percentage of fiscal year 2013 congressional 
appropriations by account.

Figure 2: Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Fiscal Year 2013 
Congressional Appropriations by Account: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Operations: 60% ($9.15 billion); 
Airport improvement program: 22% ($3.34 billion); 
Facilities and equipment: 17% ($2.61 billion); 
Research, engineering, and development: 1% ($0.16 billion). 

Sources: FAA Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2015 and U.S. Department of 
Transportation. GA0-14-770. 

[End of figure] 

Congress appropriates funding from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, 
which receives revenues from a series of excise taxes paid by users of 
the national airspace system, as well as from general revenues. The 
Trust Fund provides nearly all of the funding for FAA's capital 
investments in the airport and airway system. Revenue sources for the 
trust fund include passenger ticket taxes, segment taxes, air cargo 
taxes, and taxes paid by both commercial and general aviation 
aircraft. The trust fund also provides a substantial portion of 
funding for operations--for example 80 percent of FAA's $15.9-billion 
funding in fiscal year 2014. The remaining amount was appropriated 
from general revenues.

The U.S. Air Traffic Control System versus International Air Traffic 
Control Systems: 

Whereas FAA operates, maintains, and regulates the air traffic control 
system in the United States, in countries such as the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Canada, their air navigation service providers (ANSP) are 
commercialized and handle the day-to-day operations of the air traffic 
control systems, while the governments regulate these activities. 
These ANSPs employ the workforce, maintain the infrastructure, and 
undertake modernization efforts. International ANSPs vary in the 
extent of government ownership and commercialization, with some as 
state-owned corporations, some as public-private partnerships, and 
some as private corporations.[Footnote 1]

According to two recent international analyses comparing ANSPs from 
different countries on a range of performance measures including 
productivity, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness, FAA operates one of 
the most efficient ATC systems. According to a 2012 comparison of air 
traffic management performance between FAA and the combined 37 ANSPs 
of Europe,[Footnote 2] the United States had a similar arrival 
punctuality rate with Europe for a similar amount of continental 
airspace. Another international comparison, completed in 2013, of 
performance data from FAA and 22 global ANSPs showed similar results, 
with FAA ranking second in productivity.[Footnote 3],[Footnote 4] 
However, it is difficult to compare performance, as air spaces are 
different. For example, FAA's ATC system controls about 60 percent 
more flights than Europe,[Footnote 5] its airspace is nearly twice as 
dense as that of the European ANSPs, and it has 23 percent fewer air 
traffic controllers. In addition, Europe has to coordinate among 37 
ANSPs, while the United States has one.

Air Traffic Control Modernization: 

Although FAA is recognized for safety and relative efficiency, its 
attempts to modernize the ATC system have been less successful. We 
have chronicled the difficulties FAA has faced completing what it 
envisioned initially in 1981 as a 10-year program to upgrade and 
replace NAS facilities and equipment.[Footnote 6] For example, in 
August 1995, we found substantial cost and schedule overruns.[Footnote 
7] To address these difficulties, in the past, Congress gave FAA 
acquisition and human capital flexibilities to improve the agency's 
management of the modernization program. Specifically, in 1995, 
Congress directed FAA to implement new acquisition and personnel 
management systems and exempted the agency from certain federal 
acquisition and personnel laws and rules.[Footnote 8] In June 2005, we 
found that FAA had largely implemented these flexibilities.[Footnote 9]

However, modernization difficulties persisted, and Congress directed 
FAA in 2003 to conceptualize and plan NextGen.[Footnote 10] NextGen 
was envisioned at that time as a major redesign of the air 
transportation system to increase efficiency, enhance safety, and 
reduce flight delays. NextGen is planned to incorporate precision 
satellite navigation and surveillance; digital, networked 
communications; an integrated weather system; and more. This complex 
undertaking requires acquiring new integrated air traffic control 
systems; developing new flight procedures, standards, and regulations; 
and creating and maintaining new supporting infrastructure. This 
transformation is designed to dramatically change the roles and 
responsibilities of both air traffic controllers and pilots and change 
the way they interface with their systems. The involvement of airlines 
and other aviation stakeholders is also critical, since full 
implementation of NextGen will necessitate airlines and others to 
invest in new avionics and other technologies to take advantage of 
NextGen technologies. See figure 3 for the expected benefits from 
NextGen implementation as depicted through improvements to the phases 
of flight.

Figure 3: Improvements to Phases of Flight Expected under NextGen: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Flight planning: 

Integrated flight planning: 
Allows immediate access to weather information through one data source. 

Push back/Taxi/Takeoff: 

Enhanced surface traffic operations: 
Data communications expedite clearances and reduce communication 
errors. 

Surface traffic management: 
Automation optimizes taxi routing by reducing taxi times and enhancing 
safety. 

Streamlined departure management: 
Allows multiple departure paths from each runway, thereby increasing 
departure capacity. 

Domestic/oceanic cruise: 

Efficient cruise: 
Standards for reduced separation between aircraft and consideration of 
weather conditions allow aircraft to fly most optimal path. 

Descent/Final approach/Landing: 

Streamlined arrival management: 
Equipped aircraft fly precise paths at reduced power from descent 
point to final approach. Time, fuel, emissions and holding are reduced. 

Enhanced surface traffic management: 
Detailed taxi route information sent via data communications to pilots 
prior to approach. Pilot and controller workload reduced and safety 
improved. 

Source: GAO analysis of FAA information. GA0-14-770. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, to address stakeholder and congressional concerns over 
NextGen management practices and the pace of modernization efforts 
over the last decade, FAA has reorganized several times. These changes 
included: 

* In 2003, FAA hired a COO and in 2004 created the ATO to transform 
the air traffic control system into a more performance-based 
organization and improve the modernization effort.

* In 2011, FAA moved the office responsible for coordinating NextGen 
activities--the NextGen Office--out of the ATO and made it report 
directly to the Deputy Administrator to increase NextGen's visibility 
within and outside of the agency and create a direct line of authority 
for NextGen.

* In 2012, FAA created the Program Management Office (PMO), within the 
ATO, to improve the oversight of ATO's acquisition and implementation 
efforts, including those for NextGen.

* At the direction of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, 
FAA created the Chief NextGen Officer position, currently held by the 
Deputy FAA Administrator, who reports directly to the FAA 
Administrator.[Footnote 11]

However, challenges continue to persist, as we found in April 2013, 
August 2013, and February 2014.[Footnote 12] Specifically, we found 
that while FAA had made some progress in implementing the NextGen 
modernization program, FAA continued to experience challenges, 
including in the following areas: 

* Human capital activities: Improving and sustaining NextGen 
leadership and preparing FAA's workforce.

* Program management: Prioritizing projects to achieve some near-and 
mid-term benefits and managing NextGen interdependencies.

* Coordination with industry stakeholders: Gaining greater involvement 
from industry stakeholders in FAA's initiatives and equipping aircraft 
with NextGen technologies.

* Transitioning to NextGen: Balancing the needs of the current ATC 
system and NextGen and consolidating and realigning FAA's facilities.

In these reports, we made six recommendations to FAA regarding the 
improvement of budget planning, performance-based navigation 
implementation, and stakeholder coordination and communication. DOT 
concurred with these recommendations, but as of August 2014, had not 
yet implemented them.

Industry Stakeholders Were Generally Positive Regarding the 
Performance of the Current ATC System but Cited Challenges to 
Transitioning to a Modernized System: 

Stakeholders Said that the United States' Current ATC System is 
Efficient, whereas NextGen Has Experienced Difficulties: 

Stakeholders' views on FAA's capability to operate an efficient ATC 
system generally align with the two international analyses described 
previously. Almost three-quarters (53) of the 72 stakeholders who 
provided a rating rated FAA as moderately to very able to operate an 
efficient ATC system. Four stakeholders did not rate FAA on this 
issue. (See table 1 for the stakeholders' ratings.) In addition, 
during our interviews, over three times as many of the stakeholders 
specifically mentioned that the ATC system is generally efficient (37) 
than those who said the system is not (12). Fourteen stakeholders 
specifically said that FAA operates the most efficient system in the 
world. Notwithstanding this generally positive assessment, 
stakeholders raised areas where FAA could improve. For example, 29 
stakeholders indicated that FAA does not handle irregular air traffic 
operations very well, such as those caused by inclement weather.

Stakeholders' views regarding NextGen implementation also reflect our 
past findings on FAA's difficulties in implementing the initiative. 
Eighty percent (56) of the 70 stakeholders who provided a rating rated 
FAA as marginally to moderately able to implement NextGen. Six 
stakeholders did not rate FAA. (See table 1.) In addition, during our 
interviews, more than three times as many of the stakeholders (43) 
said that FAA's overall implementation of NextGen was not going well 
than those who said it was going well (13), and 30 specifically 
mentioned that FAA was not doing well managing technology programs in 
general and NextGen acquisitions and contracts in particular.

Table 1: Stakeholder Responses to GAO's Questions on Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) System's Efficiency and NextGen Implementation: 

Number of stakeholder responses: 

How would you characterize the level of capability Federal Aviation 
Administration has shown in: 

Capability rating: Extremely; 
Operating an efficient ATC system? 8; 
Implementing NextGen? 1.

Capability rating: Between Very to Extremely[A]; 
Operating an efficient ATC system? 3; 
Implementing NextGen? 0.

Capability rating: Very; 
Operating an efficient ATC system? 19; 
Implementing NextGen? 6.

Capability rating: Between Moderately to Very[A]; 
Operating an efficient ATC system? 7; 
Implementing NextGen? 2.

Capability rating: Moderately; 
Operating an efficient ATC system? 27; 
Implementing NextGen? 26.

Capability rating: Between Marginally to Moderately[A]; 
Operating an efficient ATC system? 3; 
Implementing NextGen? 8.

Capability rating: Marginally; 
Operating an efficient ATC system? 2; 
Implementing NextGen? 22.

Capability rating: Between Not at All to Marginally[A]; 
Operating an efficient ATC system? 0; 
Implementing NextGen? 3.

Capability rating: Not at all; 
Operating an efficient ATC system? 3; 
Implementing NextGen? 2.

Capability rating: No rating given; 
Operating an efficient ATC system? 4; 
Implementing NextGen? 6.

Capability rating: Total; 
Operating an efficient ATC system? 76; 
Implementing NextGen? 76.

Source: GAO Analysis. GAO-14-770. 

[A] This rating was not given to the stakeholders as a choice; however, 
the stakeholders' answers fell between these categories. 

[End of table] 

In our interviews with FAA senior management, officials acknowledged 
that stakeholders' complaints about NextGen were not new. They also 
said that the agency is taking steps to improve implementation, that 
NextGen is now on track and that the agency is starting to focus more 
on using these technologies to improve flight efficiencies and reduce 
flight time and fuel use, steps and a focus that should result in 
stakeholders realizing tangible benefits in the future.

Stakeholders Identified Challenges Related to Overcoming NextGen 
Implementation Difficulties: 

Almost all (75) of the 76 stakeholders identified challenges that they 
stated FAA faces in improving ATC operations and overcoming 
difficulties in implementing NextGen. (See appendix IV for a list and 
description of the challenges for FAA that stakeholders identified 
during our interviews.) The six challenges stakeholders noted most 
often are discussed below. These challenges are long-standing, as we 
have issued reports on them as far back as the 1980s, and more 
recently in the past few years.

Ensuring Aircraft Are Equipped to Take Advantage of NextGen: 

Side bar: 

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B): 

ADS-B, a key NextGen program, is a technology that enables aircraft to 
continually broadcast flight data--such as position, air speed, and 
altitude, among other types of information--to air traffic controllers 
and other aircraft: 
* ADS-B Out is the ability to transmit ADS-B signals; 
* ADS-B In is the ability to receive ADS-B signals from the ground and 
other aircraft, process those signals, and display traffic and weather 
information to flight crews. 

The Federal Aviation Administration required that airplanes be 
equipped with ADS-B Out by January 1, 2020. On the other hand, 
aircraft operators are not required to install ADS-B In, but may 
choose to do so, as is the case for most NextGen equipment. 

Source: GAO. GAO-14-770. 

[End of side bar] 

Consistent with what we have found in the past, stakeholders and FAA 
officials told us that ensuring that aircraft are equipped with 
avionics to take advantage of NextGen technologies is a challenge. 
Full implementation of NextGen will necessitate that system users make 
significant investment in new technologies. FAA estimated in 2013 
that, of the estimated $18.1-billion overall implementation cost that 
is to be shared between airlines and FAA, airlines would need to 
invest $6.6 billion on avionics to realize the full potential benefits 
from NextGen capabilities.[Footnote 13] Forty-six of the stakeholders 
we interviewed raised this issue as a challenge for FAA, such as in 
convincing users to equip their aircraft with avionics to take 
advantage of NextGen technologies. Stakeholders explained that users 
have been reluctant to equip their aircraft due to the expense and 
uncertainty over FAA's ability to meet timelines for deploying NextGen 
technologies. In April 2013, we found that airlines and other 
stakeholders had expressed skepticism about the progress FAA had made 
to date in implementing NextGen technologies, skepticism that, in 
turn, had affected their confidence about whether benefits would 
justify these investments.[Footnote 14] While some stakeholders agreed 
that equipping aircraft is necessary for successful and continuous 
modernization, they differed in who bore responsibility for paying for 
equipage—users or FAA. In August 2013,[Footnote 15] we noted that the 
2012 FAA Modernization and Reform Act[Footnote 16] required FAA to 
report on options to encourage equipping aircraft with NextGen 
technologies and the costs and benefits of each option. FAA officials 
we interviewed said that they have completed the installation of the 
ground infrastructure for Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
(ADS-B) Out and that aviation system users, in turn, must equip their 
aircraft with ADS-B Out avionics by the FAA's 2020 equipage deadline. 

Mitigating the Effects of an Uncertain Fiscal Environment: 

Both the aviation stakeholders and FAA officials we interviewed regard 
budget uncertainty as a challenge for FAA. Forty-three stakeholders 
raised budget uncertainty as a difficulty for FAA's ability to 
continue operation of an efficient ATC system and/or implementation of 
NextGen. One factor stakeholders raised as contributing to budget 
uncertainties is the annual appropriations process. In all but 3 of 
the last 30 years, Congress has passed “continuing resolutions” to 
provide funding for agencies to continue operating until agreement is 
reached on final appropriations.[Footnote 17] Further, according to 
the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, prior to the 
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, FAA had operated under 22 
extensions, that provided short-term funding for the agency since the 
expiration of the 2007 Aviation Authorization legislation. According 
to some stakeholders, the stops and starts associated with continuing 
resolutions make it difficult for FAA to carry out long-term planning 
and strategic development of future technologies and innovation. 
[Footnote 18] We found in September 2009 and March 2013 that 
continuing resolutions can create budget uncertainty for agencies 
about both when they will receive their final appropriation and what 
level of funding will ultimately be available.[Footnote 19] We further 
found that operating under continuing resolutions can also complicate 
agency operations and cause inefficiencies, such as leading to 
repetitive work, limiting agencies' decision-making options, and 
making trade-offs more difficult. On the other hand, attempting to 
mitigate the effects of an unpredictable funding stream is not a new 
challenge for FAA, or for many other federal agencies that have had to 
operate in times of an uncertain fiscal environment.[Footnote 20] 

Stakeholders also indicated that the current budgetary conditions—the 
fiscal year 2013 budget sequestration[Footnote 21] (the across-the-
board cancellation of budgetary resources) along with the associated 
employee furloughs and the October 2013 government shutdown—have made 
FAA's funding less predictable. In turn, this can make it difficult 
for FAA to run a 24/7 operation and maintain the ATC system as part of 
the transition to NextGen. In March 2014, we detailed the effects of 
the fiscal year 2013 budget sequestration on federal agencies, 
including FAA, such as reducing or delaying some public services and 
disrupting some operations.[Footnote 22] We found that the DOT took 
actions to minimize the effects of sequestration on FAA operations by 
beginning to plan for it during the summer of 2012, focusing on 
ensuring the safety of the traveling public, according to DOT 
officials.[Footnote 23] DOT halted these actions when it was provided 
with statutory authority to make a one-time transfer of $253 million 
between budget accounts to address these issues. As a result of this 
transfer, FAA minimized the number of planned furlough days and 
restored ATC services and other aviation activities; however, these 
efforts did not prevent delays from occurring in major metropolitan 
areas—including New York, Chicago, and Southern California—according 
to FAA, because fewer controllers were available to manage air traffic. 

FAA senior management generally agreed with the stakeholders' 
perspective that unpredictable budgets make planning and managing the 
ATC system and NextGen programs difficult and result in delays and 
inefficiencies. The senior managers did not offer specific solutions; 
however, they indicated that if FAA received more funding that was 
available across fiscal years, rather than just for one fiscal year at a
time,[Footnote 24] and had a greater ability to move funds between 
accounts, FAA would be able to improve its operations and NextGen 
implementation. 

Improving Human Capital Activities to Meet Future NextGen and 
Operational Requirements: 

Consistent with what we have found in the past, the stakeholders and 
FAA senior management agree that improving human capital activities is 
a challenge for FAA. Forty-two stakeholders identified human capital 
activities as a challenge for FAA in improving the efficiency of the 
ATC systems and/or implementing NextGen. Among the human capital 
challenges the stakeholders identified were matching workforce skills 
with FAA needs for hiring and staffing, insufficient training, and 
planning for upcoming retirements. FAA senior management also raised 
human capital challenges during our discussions with them. For 
example, one senior official acknowledged that providing required 
training is an element of delivering the full capability of NextGen 
and is a challenge but that FAA was working to address this challenge. 

We have also reported on FAA's workforce training and staffing issues 
in the past. For example, in August 2013 we found that FAA had been 
working to address long-standing challenges associated with involving 
its air traffic controller and technician workforce in developing and 
implementing NextGen systems, steps that are critical to the 
successful implementation of NextGen. In addition, we found that 
during the NextGen transition, FAA would need a sufficient number of 
skilled controllers who are able to increasingly rely on automation, 
technicians who are able to properly maintain and certify both 
existing and NextGen systems, and a sufficient acquisitions workforce 
to successfully acquire NextGen systems and equipment.[Footnote 25] 

Implementing New Navigation Procedures: 

Stakeholders identified challenges in implementing new navigation 
procedures, and we have found similar challenges in previous work. A 
large percentage of the current U.S. air carrier fleet is equipped to 
fly using Performance Based Navigation (PBN) procedures, which are 
precise routes that use the Global Positioning System or glide descent 
paths (see fig. 4). While 21 stakeholders said the development and 
implementation of PBN-related procedures was improving or working 
well, almost twice as many, or 41, of the stakeholders said that this 
process was not working well or moving too slowly. Even when 
stakeholders said that there have been some things working well, such 
as successes like the Greener Skies Over Seattle initiative-—a 
satellite-based navigation arrival procedure intended to save aviation 
system users more than two million gallons of fuel a year and 
significantly reduce aircraft exhaust and emissions—-they pointed to 
other areas where implementation is taking too long. In April 2013, we 
found that FAA continues to face challenges in implementing PBN 
procedures and in explaining to stakeholders the benefits that accrue 
from their use. Specifically, FAA is not fully leveraging its ability 
to streamline the development of PBN procedures and the use of third 
parties to develop, test, and maintain these flight procedures. 
[Footnote 26] 

Senior FAA officials emphasized that their Optimization of Airspace 
and Procedures in the Metroplex (OAPM) initiative[Footnote 27] is 
yielding good results and pointed to the successful use of PBN 
procedures not only in Seattle but also in the areas around Houston, 
[Footnote 28] North Texas, Washington, D.C., and Denver. Officials 
also said that implementing PBN is one of their top priorities and is 
part of an effort to deliver near term-benefits and capabilities to 
system users by 2016. Officials explained that they are working on 
PBN, through several metroplex-based initiatives, and all parts of the 
country will not see PBN benefits at the same time. 

Side bar: 

Performance Based Navigation (PBN): 

PBN procedures use satellite-based guidance to route aircraft and 
improve approaches at airports. There are two main types of PBN 
procedures, Area Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Performance 
(RNP), which vary in the level of precision guidance they can provide. 

Over the longer term, PBN procedures are intended to offer airlines 
more time-and cost-efficient approaches to airports. In the near term, 
during the transition period to full implementation of NextGen 
technologies, benefits include fuel savings and increased efficiency, 
particularly in congested airspace. 

As the Federal Aviation Administration's primary effort to implement 
new PBN procedures, the Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the 
Metroplex initiative focuses on priority metroplexes with airport 
operations that have a large effect on the overall efficiency of the 
National Airspace System. 

FAA updated its plans and, as of June 2014, there are 10 metroplexes, 
of which the Houston metroplex project has been implemented with one 
more metroplex scheduled for implementation by the end of 2014. 

Source: GAO. GAO-14-770. 

[End of side bar] 

Figure 4: Procedures Using Conventional Equipment and Performance 
Based Navigation (PBN) Technologies: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Procedures: 
Conventional procedures; 
Area Navigation (RNAV) (Increased airspace efficiency); 
Required Performance Navigation (RNP) (Highly optimized use of 
airspace) ("Curved paths"). 

For each procedure, the illustration depicts the following: 
* Ground based navigation aid such as radar; 
* Waypoint: a predetermined geographical point that is most often used 
to indicate a change in direction, speed, or altitude along the 
desired path; 
* Destination airport; 
* Flight path boundary. 

Sources: FAA and GAO. GA0-14-770. 

[End of figure] 

Articulating What NextGen Is and Delivering Benefits in the Near Term: 

Consistent with what we have found in previous work, stakeholders told 
us that FAA needs to deliver benefits of NextGen in the near term. To 
convince aviation system users to make investments in NextGen 
equipment, FAA must continue to deliver systems, procedures, and 
capabilities that demonstrate near-term benefits and returns on users' 
investments.[Footnote 29] Forty stakeholders identified as a challenge 
FAA's inability to articulate to the industry what NextGen is and what 
near-term benefits NextGen is going to provide to users. Similarly, in 
April 2013,[Footnote 30] we noted the need for FAA to demonstrate to 
stakeholders NextGen benefits over the next few years. For example, we 
found that FAA had made some progress in key operational improvement 
areas, such as upgrading airborne traffic management to enhance the 
flow of aircraft in congested airspace,[Footnote 31] revising 
standards to enhance airport capacity,[Footnote 32] and focusing FAA's 
PBN efforts at priority OAPM sites[Footnote 33] with airport 
operations that have a large effect on the overall efficiency of the 
NAS. However, we also found that in pursuing these near-term benefits, 
FAA had to make trade-offs in selecting sites and did not fully 
integrate implementation of its operational improvement efforts at 
airports. We concluded that because of the interdependency of the 
improvements, their limited integration could also limit benefits in 
the near term. Accordingly, we recommended, among other things, that 
FAA should proactively identify new PBN procedures for the NAS, based 
on NextGen goals and targets, and evaluate external requests so that 
FAA can select appropriate solutions and implement guidelines for 
ensuring timely inclusion of operational improvements at metroplexes 
such as OAPMs. DOT concurred with these recommendations and is working 
to address them.

FAA senior managers said they were aware of stakeholders' desire for 
near-term benefits and told us that they either have taken or plan to 
take the following steps to address stakeholders' concerns.

* FAA plans to emphasize "high priorities" for users based on 
recommendations of two FAA advisory committees--the NextGen Advisory 
Committee (NAC) and the RTCA (once called the Radio Technical 
Commission for Aeronautics).[Footnote 34] The high priorities are new 
multiple runway operational procedures at 7 airports by fiscal year 
2015, PBN procedures at 9 metroplexes and an additional two 
metroplexes by October 2014, surface surveillance at 44 airports by 
fiscal year 2017, and data communications to provide tower clearance 
delivery at 57 airports by fiscal year 2016.

* FAA has identified seven NextGen and NextGen-related programs that 
will be able to deliver near-term benefits and capabilities by 2016, 
with no additional requirements for users to equip their aircraft 
until the January 1, 2020, FAA-required deadline for aircraft to be 
equipped with ADS-B Out technology.[Footnote 35]

* The FAA Administrator has begun holding quarterly briefings on 
NextGen progress and benefits with airline chief executive officers 
(CEO); however, senior management noted that the diverse range of 
interests within the industry, and even between CEOs and operations 
staff within the same company, can make the communication of NextGen 
progress and benefits challenging.

* According to FAA's Assistant Administrator for NextGen, in October 
2014 FAA will release a road map outlining the official timeline of 
the implementation of its NextGen modernization project that will 
guide FAA through 2025.

Maintaining the ATC Infrastructure through the Transition to NextGen 
while Consolidating or Closing Aging Facilities: 

Stakeholders and FAA officials agree that a challenge for FAA is to 
maintain the ATC infrastructure through the transition to NextGen 
while also consolidating or closing aging facilities. Because NextGen 
represents a transition from existing ATC systems and facilities to 
new systems, it necessitates changes to or consolidation of existing 
facilities. Thirty-seven of 76 stakeholders mentioned that 
consolidating or closing older air traffic control facilities and the 
need to maintain older "legacy" systems was a challenge. Stakeholders 
noted congressional interest in preserving ATC facilities and the 
associated jobs in their districts as a cause for making it more 
difficult for FAA to close facilities. FAA officials acknowledged that 
reducing the "footprint" of the air traffic control infrastructure has 
been difficult but added that they are working on their first set of 
facility consolidation recommendations, as required by law, and will 
have those recommendations ready by the end of 2014.[Footnote 36] In 
August 2013,[Footnote 37] we found that if aging systems and 
associated facilities were not retired, FAA would miss potential 
opportunities to reduce its overall maintenance costs at a time when 
resources needed to maintain both systems and facilities may become 
scarcer and recommended that FAA develop a strategy for implementing 
the FAA's Air Traffic Organization's (ATO) plans. FAA concurred with 
this recommendation and is working to develop such a strategy by 
September 2014. An example of a facility FAA plans to close--a very 
high frequency omnidirectional radio range (VOR) station--is shown in 
figure 5.[Footnote 38]

Figure 5: Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Radio Range (VOR) 
Station: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: FAA. GA0-14-770. 

[End of figure] 

Industry Stakeholders Suggested Changes That Could Improve ATC System 
Performance and Modernization and Identified Issues to Be Considered 
If ATC Operations Were Separated from FAA: 

Stakeholders Suggested Changes to Improve Performance of ATC 
Operations and Modernization of the ATC: 

Overall, while stakeholders generally thought the current ATC system 
was operating at least moderately efficiently under FAA's leadership, 
when asked what potential changes, if any, to FAA could improve the 
performance of ATC operations and NextGen implementation, 64 of the 76 
stakeholders we interviewed suggested changes. The six most often 
suggested changes are discussed below. (See appendix V for a list and 
examples of the changes to FAA that the stakeholders suggested during 
our interviews with them.) Some of these changes address the six 
challenges raised by stakeholders previously mentioned, while the rest 
address other challenges stakeholders identified.

Change how FAA Is Funded. The change suggested by the most 
stakeholders (36 of the 64 stakeholders who suggested a change) was to 
modify how FAA's ATC operations and NextGen programs are funded. As 
discussed earlier, budget uncertainty was raised by stakeholders as a 
challenge for FAA's ATC operations, NextGen modernization, or both. 
While 36 stakeholders said a change to the funding process or source 
of funding was needed, most focused on the outcome they would like to 
see, namely a more stable or predictable funding stream. Fewer 
stakeholders (11) offered specific suggestions on how to achieve this 
outcome. For example, one stakeholder suggested providing FAA with a 
top-line budget number and then allowing FAA to determine how to 
allocate resources based on its priorities. FAA officials suggested 
changes to the agency's funding mechanism that could improve FAA's 
ability to operate the ATC system and implement NextGen, including 
allowing FAA the flexibility to use funds for their highest priority 
areas, increasing the fees for registering aircraft, and authorizing 
FAA to use multi-year funds.

Improve Human Capital Activities. Twenty-four of the 64 stakeholders 
who suggested a change suggested human capital improvements. 
Stakeholder suggestions included updating the air traffic controller's 
handbook, improving the training air traffic controllers receive on 
new technologies, and streamlining the hiring process. For example, 
stakeholders said changes were needed to streamline FAA's air traffic 
controller-training programs and to ensure the best applicants are 
hired, especially as many current controllers begin to retire. In June 
2008, we reported on FAA's efforts to hire and train new controllers, 
in light of the expected departure, mostly due to retirements, of much 
of the current air traffic controller workforce of over 15,000 
controllers between 2008 and 2017. We also found FAA needed to ensure 
that technician-and controller-training programs were designed to 
prepare FAA's workforce to use NextGen technologies.[Footnote 39] 
Regarding updating the air traffic controller's handbook, a senior FAA 
official said that stakeholders do not appreciate what changing the 
handbook involves, such as running safety scenarios and testing new 
procedures to ensure any changes do not adversely affect safety. More 
broadly, another senior FAA official said that shifting to NextGen 
would require a cultural change in how air traffic controllers are 
trained to respond to traffic.

Improve Internal Collaboration. Twenty-four of the 64 stakeholders who 
suggested a change suggested FAA needs to improve internal 
collaboration within the organization. Stakeholders said different 
offices within FAA do not communicate well with one another and that 
this situation has resulted in difficulties and delays in the roll out 
of NextGen technologies and procedures. Stakeholder suggestions 
included improving how FAA's lines of business work together to 
implement NextGen. In August 2013, we found that FAA is making 
progress in ensuring communication on NextGen issues across lines of 
business, for example, through the NextGen Management Board and 
biweekly program review meetings. In the same report, we also 
discussed how designating one leader, such as the Deputy 
Administrator's responsibility over NextGen, can improve interagency 
collaboration and speed decision-making.[Footnote 40] While external 
stakeholders raised internal collaboration as an area in need of 
improvement, FAA senior management said that there are good working 
relationships between the lines of business responsible for ATC 
operations and NextGen implementation, especially between the 
Assistant Administrator of NextGen, the COO of the ATO, and the 
Associate Administrator of Aviation Safety. 

Streamline Processes. Twenty-three of the 64 stakeholders suggesting a 
change suggested that FAA needs to streamline some of its processes. 
Stakeholder suggestions included streamlining the development and 
implementation of flight navigation procedures, the certification of 
new aircraft equipment, and the acquisition of new technology. For 
example, to streamline its process for certifying new technology, one 
stakeholder said that FAA should use an approach that recognizes that 
once a type of equipment, such as an antenna, is found to be safe, 
every piece of that equipment produced does not have to be personally 
inspected by FAA. FAA officials said that they are making progress 
streamlining both the certification of new technology and development 
of new procedures; however, FAA must ensure that new procedures and 
technology are evaluated for potential safety and environmental 
concerns and that community outreach occurs. In April 2013, we found 
that FAA's processes and requirements, while keeping the U.S. airspace 
safe, are also complex and lengthy.[Footnote 41] This includes the 
processes for developing PBN and other new flight navigation 
procedures. In the April 2013 report, we also found that FAA had 
efforts under way to address some of these issues, such as the 
Navigation Lean (NAV Lean) initiative, which is focused on 
streamlining the implementation and amendment processes for all flight 
procedures, but it will be several years before the impact is known. 
In June 2014, the Department of Transportation Inspector General's 
office found that aviation stakeholders are unlikely to see the full 
benefits of the NAV Lean initiative, namely a reduction in the time it 
takes to implement new procedures, until September 2015 or later. 
[Footnote 42] In October 2010 and October 2013, we found 
inefficiencies in the certification and approvals process and 
variations in FAA's interpretation of certification standards, and 
recommended improvements FAA could make to evaluate and track 
certification and approval processes.[Footnote 43] In October 2013, we 
also found that while FAA had developed milestones and deployed a 
tracking system to monitor each certification-related initiative, FAA 
had not identified overall performance metrics for these efforts to 
determine whether they would achieve their intended effects. 
Ultimately, we concluded that having efficient and consistent 
certification processes will allow FAA to better use its resources as 
its workload increases with the implementation of NextGen.[Footnote 44]

Improve Coordination with Industry Stakeholders. Stakeholders 
acknowledged the improvements FAA has made in involving stakeholders 
in the planning and implementation of NextGen initiatives, especially 
through the NextGen Advisory Committee. However, 23 of the 64 
stakeholders who suggested a change suggested FAA should do more to 
encourage participation and communication with industry stakeholders. 
For example, one stakeholder said that while FAA has improved its 
collaboration with industry stakeholders, particularly by including a 
wider range of stakeholders, FAA needs to ensure that stakeholders are 
involved early in the planning process for NextGen initiatives. FAA 
officials said that ensuring the appropriate stakeholders are involved 
in an effort is a challenge, but noted that FAA has on-going efforts 
to ensure the right stakeholders are involved to avoid some of the 
earlier difficulties rolling out NextGen programs. Similarly, in April 
2013, we found that FAA is making progress in systematically involving 
industry stakeholders, air traffic controllers, and other key subject 
matter experts in its initiatives, such as the OAPM initiative. 
However, we have also recommended areas for improvement, such as 
developing and implementing guidelines for ensuring timely inclusion 
of appropriate stakeholders, including airport representatives, in the 
planning and implementation of NextGen improvement efforts.[Footnote 
45] DOT concurred with these recommended areas for improvement and is 
taking steps to implement the recommendations.

Increase Accountability. Twenty-one of the 64 stakeholders who 
suggested a change suggested FAA needs to increase accountability. 
Stakeholder suggestions included that FAA should hold its employees 
and management accountable for how well they accomplish program and 
plan goals and for how funds are spent. For example, one stakeholder 
suggested an annual operating plan could help hold FAA accountable to 
its performance goals. The need for more accountability at FAA, 
specifically regarding the implementation of NextGen, cuts across 
several areas we have previously reported on. In February 2014, we 
found that complex organizational transformations, such as NextGen, 
require substantial leadership commitment over a sustained period and 
that leaders must be empowered to make critical decisions and held 
accountable for results.[Footnote 46] In April 2013, we also found 
that to address accountability issues, FAA has taken steps, such as 
designating the Deputy Administrator as the Chief NextGen Officer with 
responsibility for all NextGen activities. In the same report, we also 
discussed that the use of performance measures would allow 
stakeholders to hold FAA accountable for results.[Footnote 47]

While Most Stakeholders Agreed That Separating ATC Operations from FAA 
Was an Option to Consider, They Identified Several Issues That Would 
Need to be Taken into Account: 

In light of the ongoing discussion within the aviation industry on new 
approaches for operating and modernizing the ATC system, we also asked 
stakeholders about changing the provision of ATC services to improve 
ATC efficiency and NextGen implementation. These potential changes 
include moving the provision of ATC services out of FAA into a 
separate unit or organization and commercializing ATC services as has 
been done in Canada. Seventy percent of the stakeholders (53 of 76) 
agreed that separating ATC operations out from FAA was an option, but 
half of these stakeholders (26) voiced serious reservations or 
indicated such a change was unlikely to occur. Stakeholders also cited 
potential benefits of separating air traffic control operations from 
FAA, including a more predictable funding source; potentially reduced 
political involvement in ATC operational decisions; faster and less 
costly modernization of the ATC system; and more efficient day-to-day 
operations. The remaining stakeholders we interviewed were split 
between the opinion that a separate ATC system was not a good idea 
(12) and either not providing an opinion on this question or not 
answering it (11). See table 2 below for stakeholder responses. 
Stakeholders also raised several issues that would need to be taken 
into account before making changes to the provision of ATC services.

Further, no stakeholder category was unanimous in either supporting or 
rejecting the option to change provision of ATC services. Airlines 
were generally more supportive of separating the ATC system from FAA 
than labor unions and professional associations. General aviation 
stakeholders were open to the idea but had reservations about the 
funding scheme. See table 2 for stakeholder responses to this question 
by industry category. In addition, FAA officials said that they were 
not opposed to privatization or commercialization of the ATC system, 
but they would rather focus on what services FAA should provide and 
what is the best way to pay for these services.

Table 2: Stakeholder Responses to GAO Question on Separating Air 
Traffic Control (ATC) Services from Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) by Industry Category: 

Do you think that separating the functions of the safety regulator and 
ATC service provider into separate units or organizations is an option 
for the United States? 

Industry category[A]: Airlines; 
Number of stakeholders in category: 17; 
Yes: 9; 
Maybe[B]: 5; 
No: 1; 
No opinion: 2; 
No answer given: 0.

Industry category[A]: Airports; 
Number of stakeholders in category: 7; 
Yes: 1; 
Maybe[B]: 3; 
No: 2; 
No opinion: 1; 
No answer given: 0.

Industry category[A]: Aviation experts and other relevant 
organizations; 
Number of stakeholders in category: 18; 
Yes: 10; 
Maybe[B]: 6; 
No: 2; 
No opinion: 0; 
No answer given: 0.

Industry category[A]: General aviation; 
Number of stakeholders in category: 4; 
Yes: 1; 
Maybe[B]: 1; 
No: 1; 
No opinion: 0; 
No answer given: 1.

Industry category[A]: Labor unions and professional associations; 
Number of stakeholders in category: 8; 
Yes: 1; 
Maybe[B]: 3; 
No: 2; 
No opinion: 2; 
No answer given: 0.

Industry category[A]: Manufacturers and service providers; 
Number of stakeholders in category: 16; 
Yes: 4; 
Maybe[B]: 5; 
No: 3; 
No opinion: 4; 
No answer given: 0.

Industry category[A]: Other; 
Number of stakeholders in category: 6; 
Yes: 1; 
Maybe[B]: 3; 
No: 1; 
No opinion: 0; 
No answer given: 1.

Industry category[A]: Total; 
Number of stakeholders in category: 76; 
Yes: 27; 
Maybe[B]: 26; 
No: 12; 
No opinion: 9; 
No answer given: 2. 

Source: GAO Analysis. GAO-14-770. 

[A] We included industry categories with at least 4 interviewed 
stakeholders or stakeholder organizations. As a result, 3 industry 
categories--Research and Development Organizations, Other Federal 
Agencies, and Passenger and Safety Groups--are combined into the Other 
category.

[B] This answer was not given as a choice. However, because a large 
number of stakeholders qualified their "Yes" responses with 
significant reservations, we added it as a category in this table. 

[End of table] 

Few stakeholders suggested a specific alternative structure for the 
provision of ATC services, although some listed potential 
characteristics of an alternative structure, such as user fees, public-
private partnership, and a board of directors composed of system 
users. One example of a specific alternative structure suggested by a 
stakeholder was a Consumer Service Corporation with no shareholders, 
so as to avoid vested interests. Others suggested models similar to 
NAV CANADA, a non-profit trust with a board of representatives made up 
of industry and government, financed with user fees, and regulated by 
government.

Both stakeholders and FAA officials said it was important to identify 
what problem or problems separating ATC services out of FAA is 
intended to solve, before proceeding with it as a solution. However, 
if a change were to be made, 65 of the 76 stakeholders suggested 
actions to take or raised issues or concerns to consider. These issues 
and concerns include the following: 

* Funding: Forty of these 65 stakeholders said the source of funding 
for a separate air traffic control system is important to consider. 
Stakeholders suggested different sources of revenue to support a 
separated ATC system including user fees and a fuel tax. Several 
stakeholders suggested the possibility of accessing funds through 
capital markets as an advantage of a separated ATC system. Because the 
expectation of a future revenue stream (through user fees, for 
example) may enable a corporatized or privatized ATC system to access 
private capital markets (to obtain, for example, a bond issuance), a 
potential benefit of such a structure could be more reliable financing 
for multiyear investment projects as well as for operations.

* Lessons Learned: Thirty-eight of these 65 stakeholders suggested 
studying what the separation of air traffic services from FAA would 
look like. Stakeholders suggested looking at how air-navigation 
service providers function in other countries and trying to learn from 
their successes and mistakes. For example, one stakeholder said that 
given the efficiency of the current system, before any changes are 
made, there needs to be an analysis of how privatization would affect 
passengers, airlines, the aviation industry, and what improvements, 
including fewer delays and more capacity, it could offer. In a 2005 
review of selected foreign air navigation service providers (ANSP), we 
also found some lessons learned during commercialization, including 
being prepared to mitigate the financial effects of an industry 
downturn; the importance of involving industry stakeholders in efforts 
to design, acquire, and deploy new technologies; balancing the 
business needs of an ANSP with smaller communities' need for air 
service; and the importance of maintaining appropriate level of staff 
to carry out safety regulation.[Footnote 48]

* Congressional involvement: Twenty-nine of these 65 stakeholders 
suggested that the extent of Congress's role in overseeing a separate 
ATC system must be clarified. For example, stakeholders said 
Congress's oversight responsibilities of a separate ATC system and 
even whether Congress should have oversight of such a system needs to 
be considered.

* Regulatory coordination: Twenty-seven of these 65 stakeholders 
suggested that ensuring coordination between the safety regulator and 
a separate ATC system should be considered. Stakeholders noted, for 
example, that ensuring coordination might be more difficult with a 
separated ATC system than under the current structure.

* Governance: Twenty-five of these 65 stakeholders suggested that 
governance of a separated ATC system, such as including system users 
on an oversight body, needs to be considered. For example, one 
stakeholder asked who would be on a board of directors and how those 
individuals would be chosen.

* Safety: Twenty-four of these 65 stakeholders raised concerns about 
safety under a separate ATC system. Stakeholders were concerned about 
several issues, including the effect of a non-governmental operator's 
profit motive on safety and whether requiring users to pay a fee to 
use air traffic control services may disincentivize use of the system.

* Transition management: Twenty-one of these 65 stakeholders raised 
concerns about how to transition from the current system to a separate 
ATC system. Stakeholder concerns included the length and difficulty of 
such a transition and included questions about what to do with the 
infrastructure and personnel in the current system, and the 
modernization efforts already under way. FAA senior management also 
cited transition management as a potential impediment to moving to a 
different air traffic control structure. Specifically, an FAA official 
said there does not appear to be an understanding by those advocating 
privatization of how to move from a government-operated system to a 
privatized system given the need to operate the NAS at a high level of 
safety and efficiency. FAA officials also raised concerns about the 
length and difficulty of such a transition. For example, one official 
mentioned that such a transition to a new organization would have to 
include cultural and personnel changes and could take many years to 
implement. Another official was concerned that a transition occurring 
now to a privatized system could negatively affect the implementation 
of NextGen. In November 2002, we found that successful change 
management initiatives in large private and public sector 
organizations can often take at least 5 to 7 years.[Footnote 49]

* Access: Nineteen of these 65 stakeholders also raised concerns about 
access to the NAS under a separate ATC system. For example, 
stakeholders were concerned about small communities losing access to 
the ATC system and that the fees charged by a separate ATC system 
might reduce general aviation's access to the ATC system.

Agency Comments: 

We provided DOT with a draft of this report for its review and 
comment. DOT provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 
appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretary of the Department of Transportation, and 
other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no 
charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me on (202) 512-2834 or at dillinghamg@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this 
report are listed in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our work for this report focused on aviation stakeholders' 
perspectives on the performance of the air traffic control (ATC) 
system and efforts to modernize it. This report examines stakeholder 
perspectives on: (1) the performance of the current ATC system and its 
modernization through the NextGen initiative, and any challenges the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) may face in managing these 
activities; and (2) potential changes, if any, that could improve the 
performance of the ATC system, including FAA's modernization 
initiative. We were also asked to obtain stakeholders' perspectives on 
the safety of the National Airspace System (NAS). However, since 
nearly all stakeholders we interviewed agreed that the NAS is 
extremely or very safe, we did not focus on this area in this report.

To obtain aviation stakeholders' perspectives on these issues, we 
interviewed a non-probability sample of 76 aviation stakeholders. We 
created an initial list of stakeholders using internal knowledge of 
the aviation industry. We then added more stakeholders based on 
interviewee responses to our question on whom else they thought we 
should speak with. Specifically, we wanted to obtain perspectives from 
individuals and organizations with direct experience, as users, or 
knowledge, through research or study, of the current ATC system, 
modernization efforts, and FAA's management of the system. As such, we 
limited our review to U.S.-based companies and airlines and sought the 
views of individuals and organizations with a stake in the performance 
of the NAS. We divided stakeholders into the following nine 
categories: airlines, airports, aviation experts and other relevant 
organizations, general aviation, labor unions and professional 
associations, manufacturers and service providers, other federal 
government agencies (Department of Defense and National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA)), passenger and safety groups, and 
research and development organizations. A list of the individuals and 
groups we interviewed is in appendix II. We used a semi-structured 
interview format with both closed-and open-ended questions to obtain 
aviation stakeholder perspectives on the efficiency of the current 
ATC, implementation of NextGen, and changes, if any, that could 
improve the operation of the ATC and implementation of NextGen. Our 
interview format contained four closed-ended questions with either a 
five-level scale or a yes/no response. These closed-ended questions, 
the response categories, and stakeholder responses are either included 
in the body of the report or in appendix III, as appropriate.

The intent of our open-ended questions was to engage the stakeholders 
in a conversation about the issues they considered most important and 
relevant. The results of our review are not generalizable to the 
industry as a whole.

Our discussion of the challenges FAA faces, potential changes to FAA, 
and issues to consider if the ATC system were separated from FAA is 
based on stakeholder responses to our open-ended questions. As such, 
the numbers we reported with these items represent those stakeholders 
that raised a challenge or issue to consider or suggested a change 
during our interview. When we report that 43 stakeholders raised 
budget uncertainty as a challenge, this does not necessarily mean that 
the remaining 33 stakeholders we interviewed disagreed. Rather, it 
means that those stakeholders did not raise it during the course of 
our interview.

We analyzed the responses to these open-ended questions to identify 
the main themes raised by stakeholders. To ensure the accuracy of our 
content analysis, we internally reviewed our coding and reconciled any 
discrepancies. In discussing stakeholder responses to our open-ended 
questions, we aggregated their responses and reported on stakeholders' 
perspectives in general.

Stakeholder responses to the yes-no question: Do you think that 
separating the functions of safety regulator and ATC service provider 
into separate units or organizations is an option for the United 
States?--fell into four general responses, which we describe in this 
report as yes; maybe; no; and no opinion. Respondents who answered 
"yes" to this question said that separating the ATC service provider 
from the safety regulator (FAA) was not only an option, but also a 
good idea. While these respondents still provided issues to consider, 
they said that this option should be considered and were generally 
supportive of it. GAO classified respondents' answers as "Maybe" for 
those who answered that this was an option, but generally said either 
it was not a good idea, it was not feasible in the United States, or 
that they had very strong reservations about such a change.

Respondents who answered "no" generally said that it was a bad idea or 
would simply not work in the United States. Finally, some respondents 
indicated that they had "no opinion," meaning that their organization 
did not have an official position on whether this change was an option 
in the United States.

We reported on stakeholder responses to this closed-ended question--Do 
you think that separating the functions of the safety regulator and 
ATC service provider into separate units or organizations is an option 
for the United States?--by industry category. For the three industry 
categories with fewer than four respondents--other federal government 
agencies, passenger and safety groups, and research and development 
organizations--we combined these into one category and refer to them 
in table 2 as Other stakeholders.

To obtain FAA senior management views on the preliminary results of 
our content analysis of stakeholder perspectives, we conducted semi-
structured interviews with: Administrator; Deputy Administrator/Chief 
NextGen Officer; Assistant Administrator for NextGen; Associate 
Administrator for Aviation Safety; Chief Operating Officer (COO) of 
the Air Traffic Organization (ATO); and Assistant Administrator for 
Policy, International Affairs, and Environment.

We reviewed GAO reports and other sources of aviation information to 
provide context to the challenges raised by the stakeholders and their 
suggested changes to the current structure. We identified reports that 
had discussed the stakeholder-identified themes, including 
collaboration with stakeholders, delivery of NextGen capabilities, and 
Performance-Based Navigation procedures, and FAA leadership in 
overseeing NextGen implementation.

We conducted this performance audit from November 2013 to September 
2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: List of the 76 Aviation Industry Stakeholders GAO 
Interviewed: 

Category: Airlines; 

Subcategory: Associations; 
Stakeholder: 
* Airlines for America (A4A).
* Cargo Airline Association (CAA).
* National Air Carrier Association (NACA).
* Regional Airline Association (RAA).
* Regional Air Cargo Carriers Association (RACCA).

Subcategory: Cargo; 
Stakeholder: 
* FedEx.
* United Parcel Service (UPS).

Subcategory: Passenger; 
Stakeholder: 
* Alaska Airlines.
* American Airlines.
* Delta Air Lines.
* JetBlue Airways.
* Southwest Airlines.
* United Airlines.

Subcategory: Regional passenger; 
Stakeholder: 
* American Eagle Airlines.
* Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation.
* Cape Air.
* Endeavor Air.

Category: Airports; 

Subcategory: Airport operators; 
Stakeholder: 
* Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport.
* Houston Airport System (George Bush Intercontinental Airport, 
William P. Hobby Airport, and Ellington Airport).
* Los Angeles World Airports (Los Angeles International Airport, 
LA/Ontario International Airport, and Van Nuys Airport).
* Metropolitan Airports Commission (Minneapolis-St. Paul International 
Airport).
* Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (John F. Kennedy 
International Airport, Newark Liberty International Airport, LaGuardia 
Airport, Stewart International Airport, and Teterboro Airport).

Subcategory: Associations; 
Stakeholder: 
* Airports Council International--North America (ACI-NA).
* American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE).

Category: Aviation experts and other relevant organizations; 

Stakeholder: 
* Bill Ayer, Chair of the NextGen Advisory Committee (NAC).
* Air Traffic Control Association (ATCA).
* Michael Baiada, President and Chief Executive Officer, ATH Group.
* Gary Church, President, Aviation Management Associates.
* Dr. George Donohue, Systems Engineering and Operations Research, 
George Mason University.
* Michael Dyment, Managing Partner, NEXA Capital Partners, LLC. 
* Amr ElSawy, President and Chief Executive Officer, Noblis Inc. 
* Dr. John Fearnsides, Chief Executive Officer, MJF Strategies, LLC.
* Dr. Mark Hansen, Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of 
California, Berkley; 
* Dr. John Hansman, Aeronautics and Astronautics, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology.
* Metron Aviation.
* Robert Poole, Director of Transportation Policy, Reason Foundation.
* RTCA (formerly known as the Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics).
* Dr. Stephen Van Beek, Vice President, ICF International.

Category: Former FAA officials; 

Stakeholder: 
* J. Randolph Babbitt, Former Administrator (2009-2011).
* Russell Chew, Former Chief Operations Officer, Air Traffic 
Organization (2003-2007).
* Richard Day, Former Senior Vice President of Operations, Air Traffic 
Organization (2008-2010).
* David Grizzle, Former Chief Operations Officer, Air Traffic 
Organization (2011-2013).

Category: General aviation; 

Stakeholder: 
* Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA).
* Helicopter Association International (HAI).
* Air traffic controllers: National Air Transportation Association 
(NATA).
* National Business Aviation Association (NBAA).

Category: Labor unions and professional associations; 

Subcategory: Air traffic controllers; 
Stakeholder: 
* National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA).

Subcategory: FAA managers; 
Stakeholder: 
* FAA Managers Association.

Subcategory: Pilots; 
Stakeholder: 
* Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA).
* Allied Pilots Association (APA).
* Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations (CAPA).
* NetJets Association of Shared Aircraft Pilots (NJASAP).
* Southwest Airlines Pilots' Association (SWAPA).

Subcategory: Support; 
Stakeholder: 
* Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS).

Category: Manufacturers and service providers; 

Subcategory: Aircraft; 
Stakeholder: 
* Beechcraft.
* Boeing.
* Cessna Aircraft Company.
* Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation.

Subcategory: Associations; 
Stakeholder: 
* Aerospace Industries Association (AIA).
* Aircraft Electronics Association (AEA).
* General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA).

Subcategory: Aviation equipment and systems: 

Stakeholder: 
* General Electric (GE) Aviation.
* Harris Corporation.
* Honeywell Aerospace.
* Exelis.
* Mosaic ATM.
* Raytheon.
* Rockwell Collins.
* Thales.
* United Technologies (UTC) Aerospace Systems.

Category: Other federal government agencies; 

Subcategory: Department of Defense (DOD); 
Stakeholder: 
* National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

Category: Passenger and safety groups; 

Subcategory: Flight Safety Foundation. 
Stakeholder: 
* Travelers United (formerly Consumer Travel Alliance).

Category: Research and development organizations; 

Stakeholder: 
* MITRE Center for Advanced Aviation System Development (CAASD).
* Volpe: The National Transportation Systems Center--Air Traffic 
Systems and Operations. 

Source: GAO. GAO-14-770. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Responses to GAO's Closed-Ended Question on Safety: 

How would you characterize the safety of the current National Airspace 
System, including the operations of the Air Traffic Control system: 

Safety rating: Extremely; 
Number of stakeholder responses: 41.

Safety rating: Between very to extremely[A]; 
Number of stakeholder responses: 9.

Safety rating: Very; 
Number of stakeholder responses: 21.

Safety rating: Moderately; 
Number of stakeholder responses: 2.

Safety rating: Marginally; 
Number of stakeholder responses: 0.

Safety rating: Not very; 
Number of stakeholder responses: 0.

Safety rating: No rating given; 
Number of stakeholder responses: 3.

Safety rating: Total; 
Number of stakeholder responses: 76.

Source: GAO Analysis. GAO-14-770. 

[A] This rating was not given to the stakeholders as a choice; however, 
the stakeholders' answers fell between these categories. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: List of Challenges FAA Faces in Improving the Efficiency 
of the Air Traffic Control (ATC) System and Implementing NextGen, as 
Raised by the 76 Aviation Industry Stakeholders GAO Interviewed: 

Challenge for FAA: Ensuring aircraft are equipped to take advantage of 
NextGen; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: 
Due to the expense and uncertainty over FAA's ability to meet timelines 
for deploying NextGen technologies users have been reluctant to equip 
their aircraft; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 46.

Challenge for FAA: Mitigating the effects of an uncertain fiscal 
environment; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: Budget 
uncertainty makes it difficult for FAA to continue operation of an 
efficient ATC system and/or implement NextGen; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 43.

Challenge for FAA: Human capital activities; 
Description and examples 
of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAA does not match workforce skills 
with needs for hiring and staffing, provides insufficient training, and 
has insufficient planning for upcoming retirements; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 42.

Challenge for FAA: Implementing new navigation procedures; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAA's 
development and implementation of PBN-related procedures is not 
working well or is moving too slowly; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 41.

Challenge for FAA: Articulating what NextGen is and delivering benefits 
in the near term; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAA must 
continue to deliver systems, procedures, and capabilities that 
demonstrate near-term benefits and returns on users' investments to 
convince aviation system users to make investments in NextGen 
equipment; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 40.

Challenge for FAA: Maintaining the ATC infrastructure through the 
transition to NextGen while consolidating or closing aging facilities; 

Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAA must 
plan for changes to or consolidation of existing facilities because 
NextGen represents a transition from existing ATC systems and 
facilities to new systems; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 37.

Challenge for FAA: Intra-agency coordination or communication; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAA's 
offices are stove-piped, do not share information with each other well, 
or are not horizontally integrated; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 32.

Challenge for FAA: Risk-averse culture; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAA's 
aversion to risk and focus on safety prevents improvements in 
efficiency and adoption of new technologies and procedures; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 29.

Challenge for FAA: Handling irregular operations; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAA does 
not handle ATC operations well when airspace capacity is affected by 
congestion and disruptions due to, for example, inclement weather and 
power outages; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 29.

Challenge for FAA: Congress; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: Congress 
politicizes FAA's budget and micromanages FAA operations; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 28.

Challenge for FAA: Organizational structure; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAA's 
organizational structure misplaces offices and blurs lines of 
authority and responsibilities; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 24.

Challenge for FAA: Coordination and communication with external 
stakeholders; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAA does 
not communicate, coordinate, or collaborate well with the aviation 
industry; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 21.

Challenge for FAA: Planning; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAA does 
not plan well, such as setting unrealistic deadlines, or its plans 
lack clarity and precision; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 21.

Challenge for FAA: Leadership; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAA's 
leadership and political appointees lack the right professional 
background and experience; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 21.

Challenge for FAA: Surface operations and infrastructure; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAA does 
not operate airport surface operations well to accommodate increased 
air capacity or maintain surface infrastructure well; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 21.

Challenge for FAA: General policies and procedures; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAA's 
policies and procedures are not up-to-date or lack clarity; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 16.

Challenge for FAA: Consistency across the ATC system; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAA 
controllers in different regions and airports are not consistent in 
applying procedures, such as approach and departure procedures; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 15.

Challenge for FAA: Accountability; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: There is 
little accountability in FAA, such as for NextGen delays; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 12.

Challenge for FAA: Certification processes; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAAs' 
process for certifying safety, aircraft, avionics, and personnel takes 
too long, or is inconsistent; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 12.

Challenge for FAA: Performance measures; 
Description and examples of challenge cited by stakeholders: FAA lacks 
adequate performance measures or its measures are output-related, 
instead of outcome-related; 
Number of stakeholders citing challenge: 11.

Source: GAO. GAO-14-770. 

Note: We included challenges that were raised by more than 10 
stakeholders. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: List of Changes to FAA to Improve the Efficiency of the 
Air Traffic Control (ATC) System or the Implementation of NextGen, or 
Both, as Cited by the 76 Aviation Industry Stakeholders GAO 
Interviewed: 

Change to FAA: Change how FAA is funded; 
Examples of suggested changes: FAA needs a more stable or predictable 
funding stream; 
Number of stakeholders suggesting change: 36.

Change to FAA: Improve human capital activities; 
Examples of suggested changes: FAA needs to improve human capital 
activities including updating the air traffic controller handbook, 
improving the training air traffic controllers receive on new 
technologies, and streamlining the hiring process; 
Number of stakeholders suggesting change: 24.

Change to FAA: Improve internal collaboration; 
Examples of suggested changes: FAA needs to improve communication 
within the agency to reduce difficulties and delays in the roll out of 
NextGen technologies and procedures; 
Number of stakeholders suggesting change: 24.

Change to FAA: Streamline processes; 
Examples of suggested changes: FAA needs to streamline the development 
and implementation of flight navigation procedures, the certification 
of new aircraft equipment, and the acquisition of new technology; 
Number of stakeholders suggesting change: 23.

Change to FAA: Improve coordination with industry stakeholders; 
Examples of suggested changes: While FAA has made improvements 
involving stakeholders in the planning and implementation of NextGen 
initiatives, FAA should do more to encourage participation and 
communication with industry stakeholders; 
Number of stakeholders suggesting change: 23.

Change to FAA: Increase accountability; 
Examples of suggested changes: FAA should hold its employees and 
management accountable for how well they accomplish program and plan 
goals and for how funds are spent; 
Number of stakeholders suggesting change: 21.

Change to FAA: Improve leadership at FAA; 
Examples of suggested changes: There needs to be consistent and 
empowered leadership at FAA; 
Number of stakeholders suggesting change: 16.

Change to FAA: Change role and responsibility of NextGen Office; 
Examples of suggested changes: FAA needs to ensure that all NextGen 
activities are overseen by one NextGen office; 
Number of stakeholders suggesting change: 13.

Change to FAA: Create performance measures; 
Examples of suggested changes: FAA needs to create relevant 
performance measures that measure improvements resulting from the 
implementation of NextGen; 
Number of stakeholders suggesting change: 11.

Change to FAA: Deliver capabilities with near-term benefits; 
Examples of suggested changes: FAA needs to focus on delivering NextGen 
capabilities with near-term benefits; 
Number of stakeholders suggesting change: 8.

Change to FAA: Change FAA's oversight of industry; 
Examples of suggested changes: FAA needs to reconsider how it oversees 
the industry and/or reduce its layers of oversight; 
Number of stakeholders suggesting change: 6.

Source: GAO. GAO-14-770. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., (202) 512-2834, or dillinghamg@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Catherine Colwell, 
Assistant Director; Amy Abramowitz; Sarah Arnett; William Colwell; 
Kevin Egan; Sam Hinojosa; David Hooper; Stuart Kaufman; Jennifer Kim; 
Josh Ormond; Amy Rosewarne; and Rebecca Rygg made key contributions to 
this report.

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

NextGen: 

FAA Reauthorization Act: Progress and Challenges Implementing Various 
Provisions of the 2012 Act. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-285T]. Washington, D.C.: February 
5, 2014.

National Airspace System: Improved Budgeting Could Help FAA Better 
Determine Future Operations and Maintenance Priorities. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-693]. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 
2013.

NEXTGEN Air Transportation System: FAA Has Made Some Progress in 
Midterm Implementation, but Ongoing Challenges Limit Expected 
Benefits. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-264]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2013.

Next Generation Air Transportation System: FAA Faces Implementation 
Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1011T]. 
Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2012.

Air Traffic Control Modernization: Management Challenges Associated 
with Program Costs and Schedules Could Hinder NextGen Implementation. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-223]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 16, 2012.

Next Generation Air Transportation: Collaborative Efforts with 
European Union Generally Mirror Effective Practices, but Near-term 
Challenges Could Delay Implementation. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-48]. Washington, D.C.: November 3, 
2011.

Next Generation Air Transportation System: FAA Has Made Some Progress 
in Implementation, but Delays Threaten to Impact Costs and Benefits. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-141T]. Washington, 
D.C.: October 5, 2011.

NEXTGEN Air Transportation System: Mechanisms for Collaboration and 
Technology Transfer Could Be Enhanced to More Fully Leverage Partner 
Agency and Industry Resources. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-604]. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 
2011.

Aviation Safety and Certification: 

Aviation Safety: Status of Recommendations to Improve FAA's 
Certification and Approval Processes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-142T]. Washington, D.C.: October 
30, 2013.

Facilities: 

FAA Facilities: Improved Condition Assessment Methods Could Better 
Inform Maintenance Decisions and Capital-Planning Efforts. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-757]. Washington, D.C.: September 
10, 2013.

International Air Navigation Service Providers: 

Air Traffic Control: Characteristics and Performance of Selected 
International Air Navigation Service Providers and Lessons Learned 
from Their Commercialization. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-769]. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 
2005.

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Air Traffic Control: Characteristics and Performance of 
Selected International Air Navigation Service Providers and Lessons 
Learned from Their Commercialization, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-769] (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 
2005).

[2] Comparison of Air Traffic Management-Related Performance: U.S. -
Europe, Final Report. Produced by the European Organisation for the 
Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) Performance Review Commission 
and FAA's Air Traffic Organization, November 2013. © Air Traffic 
Organization System Operations Services (FAA) © European Organisation 
for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL).

[3] Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO), Global Air 
Navigation Services Performance Report 2013: 2008-2012 ANSP 
Performance Results (January 2014). 

[4] Productivity was measured by the number of hours flown under 
instrument flight rules (IFR) per air traffic controller. Canada's NAV 
CANADA was ranked first in 2012 with 1,739 IFR flight hours per 
controller to FAA's 1,729.

[5] This comparison includes only those flights operating under 
instrumental flight rules, a set of rules governing the conduct of 
flight under instrument meteorological conditions, including bad 
weather. 

[6] For example, see GAO, Transportation: DOT Should Terminate Further 
LORAN-C Development and Modernization and Exploit the Potential of the 
NAVSTAR/Global Positioning System, MASAD-81-42 (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 
18, 1981); Transportation: Delays in Critical Air Traffic Control 
Modernization Projects Require Increased FAA Attention to Existing 
Systems, T-IMTEC-91-14 (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 14, 1991); Air Traffic 
Control: FAA's Modernization Efforts - Past, Present, and Future, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-227T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Oct. 30, 2003); and Next Generation Air Transportation System: 
Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the 
National Airspace System, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-25] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 13, 
2006). For a list of our more recent findings on FAA's modernization 
efforts, see Related GAO Products at the end of this report.

[7] For example, see GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Issues 
Related to FAA Reform, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED-95-247] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 
2, 1995).

[8] Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act, Pub. L. 104-50, §§ 347, 348, 109 Stat. 436, 460 (1995).

[9] GAO, National Airspace System: FAA Has Made Progress but Continues 
to Face Challenges in Acquiring Major Air Traffic control Systems, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-331] (Washington, D.C.: 
June 10, 2005).

[10] Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 
108-176, § 709, 117 Stat. 2490, 2582-2585 (2003).

[11] Pub. L. No. 112-95, §204, 126 Stat. 11, 37 (2012). 

[12] GAO, NextGen Air Transportation System: FAA Has Made Some 
Progress in Midterm Implementation, but Ongoing Challenges Limit 
Expected Benefits, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-264] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2013); National Airspace System: Improved 
Budgeting Could Help FAA Better Determine Future Operations and 
Maintenance Priorities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-693] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 
2013); and FAA Reauthorization Act: Progress and Challenges 
Implementing Various Provisions of the 2012 Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-285T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 5, 
2014). In this report, we made five recommendations to FAA regarding 
aspects of performance-based navigation implementation as well as 
coordinating and communicating with appropriate stakeholders. As of 
the writing of this report, all of these recommendations remained open. 

[13] These estimates were in 2011 dollars and reflected total 
expenditures on NextGen midterm improvements from 2007 through 2018. 
These estimates included equipping aircraft with the Required 
Navigation Performance (RNP) package, as well as other NextGen 
technologies. 

[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-264]. 

[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-693]. 

[16] Pub. L. No. 112–95, §§ 211(c), 222, 126 Stat. 46, 54 (2012). 

[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-464T]. 

[18] A “continuing resolution” is an appropriation act that provides 
budget authority for federal agencies, specific activities, or both to 
continue in operation when Congress and the President have not 
completed action on the regular appropriation acts by the beginning of 
the fiscal year. 

[19] GAO, Continuing Resolutions: Uncertainty Limited Management 
Options and Increased Workload in Selected Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-879] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 
2009); and Budget Issues: Effects of Budget Uncertainty from 
Continuing Resolutions on Agency Operations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-464T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 
2013). 

[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-464T], GAO, 2013 
Sequestration: Agencies Reduced Some Services and Investments, While 
Taking Certain Actions to Mitigate Effects, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-244 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 
2014). 

[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-244]. 

[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-244]. 

[23] Planning included determining the number of furlough days for FAA 
air traffic controllers and other employees and identifying federal 
contract air traffic control towers for closure. 

[24] Congress can appropriate funds to federal agencies that are 
available for a specified fiscal year, for multiple fiscal years, or 
that remain available for an indefinite period of time. 

[25] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-693]. 

[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-264], [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-285T].

[27] OAPM is most currently referred to as "Metroplex," according to 
FAA.

[28] On June 18, 2014, FAA announced the successful implementation of 
the airspace redesign project as part of the OAPM initiative in the 
Houston metroplex. FAA expects this redesign to create more efficient 
routes, deliver more on-time flights, and reduce fuel consumption for 
those flying into and out of the Houston metroplex.

[29] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-285T].

[30] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-264]. This report 
specifically mentioned the period of 2013-2018 for demonstrating 
benefits.

[31] We found that through 2018, FAA was focusing on updating its 
Traffic Management Advisor, an airborne arrival-sequencing program 
that assigns times when aircraft destined for the same airport should 
cross certain points in order to reach the destination airport at a 
specific time and in an efficient order.

[32] We found that FAA had recently approved a few revisions to 
existing standards, which should benefit a handful of airports in the 
midterm, but further revisions were required before the envisioned 
efficiency and capacity benefits of midterm NextGen improvements can 
be fully realized.

[33] A metroplex is a major airport or multi-airport airspace. The 
seven prioritized metroplex sites are Atlanta, Charlotte, Chicago, 
Dallas/Fort Worth, New York, Philadelphia, and Southern California.

[34] The need for stakeholder buy-in and investment, combined with the 
interdependencies of NextGen improvements, led FAA in 2009 to request 
that RTCA recommend deliverables to help establish priorities and 
build support for long-term NextGen investments. RTCA's 2009 NextGen 
Midterm Implementation Task Force recommendations focused on key 
improvements that can be implemented with existing technologies and 
capabilities in the "midterm," which is 2013 through 2018. In 2012, at 
the request of FAA, the Integrated Capabilities Work Group of the 
NextGen Advisory Committee (NAC)--a committee comprised of aviation 
stakeholders from the government and industry and the follow-on to 
RTCA's Air Traffic Management Advisory Committee--reaffirmed the RTCA 
task force's recommendations and developed a subset of priority 
operational improvements for major airports and multi-airport airspace 
("metroplexes") that have either the greatest need for improvements or 
offer the greatest potential benefit to the NAS in the midterm. 

[35] The seven are four NextGen programs--ADS-B, Data Communications 
(Data Comm), NAS Voice System (NVS), and System Wide Information 
Management (SWIM)--and three NextGen-related programs--En Route 
Automation Modernization (ERAM), Terminal Automation Modernization and 
Replacement (TAMR), and Terminal Flight Data Manager (TFDM).

[36] FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 
804, 126 Stat. 11, 119 (2012). 

[37] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-693]. 

[38] We found that, according to FAA data, the number of unscheduled 
outages for VORs increased 130 percent between fiscal years 2001 and 
2011, and that 9 out of 10 VORs were beyond their useful service life. 
Because parts for this system can no longer be procured, FAA has to 
reengineer and construct new parts from existing VOR parts, which is a 
time-and resource-intensive process--exceeding $110 million per year.

[39] GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Efforts to Hire, Staff, and 
Train New Air Traffic Controllers Are Generally on Track, but 
Challenges Remain. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-908T] (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 
2008); [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-693].

[40] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-693].

[41] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-264].

[42] DOT Inspector General, FAA Faces Significant Obstacles in 
Advancing the Implementation and Use of Performance-Based Navigation 
Procedures. AV-2014-057. June 17, 2014

[43] GAO, Aviation Safety: Status of Recommendations to Improve FAA's 
Certification and Approval Process, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-142T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct 30, 
2013); Aviation Safety: Certification and Approval Processes Are 
Generally Viewed as Working Well, but Better Evaluative Information 
Needed to Improve Efficiency, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-14] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2010).

[44] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-142T].

[45] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-264].

[46] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-285T].

[47] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-264].

[48] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-769].

[49] GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transportation: 
Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other 
Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-293SP] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 
2002). 

[End of section] 

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