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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

July 2014: 

Littoral Combat Ship: 

Additional Testing and Improved Weight Management Needed Prior to 
Further Investments: 

GAO-14-749: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-749, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

LCS represents an innovative approach to Navy acquisitions and 
operations, consisting of a ship—-called a seaframe-—and 
reconfigurable mission packages. These packages provide combat 
capability to perform three primary missions: surface warfare; mine 
countermeasures; and anti-submarine warfare. The Navy plans to buy no 
more than 32 seaframes in two variants from two shipyards, and 64 
mission packages, with an estimated acquisition cost of over $25 
billion in 2010 dollars. GAO was mandated to examine elements related 
to the LCS program. This report examines (1) knowledge that the Navy 
has gained since GAO issued a report on the LCS program in July 2013 
and (2) outstanding acquisition risks with the LCS program. GAO 
analyzed key documents, including test and weight reports, and 
interviewed Navy officials responsible for the LCS deployment and 
program officials. This report is a public version of a sensitive but 
unclassified report issued in April 2014. 

What GAO Found: 

Since July 2013, the Navy has continued to demonstrate and test 
various facets of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) systems and capability, 
but important questions remain about how LCS will operate and what 
capabilities it will provide the Navy. The first operational 
deployment of an LCS to Singapore gave the Navy an opportunity to 
examine key LCS concepts operationally. The deployment was limited to 
only one of the two variants carrying one of three mission packages. 
In addition, mechanical problems prevented the ship from spending as 
much time operationally as planned. As a result, some key concepts 
could not be tested. The Navy has completed some additional testing on 
the seaframes and mission packages, which has enabled the Navy to 
characterize performance of some systems, but performance has not yet 
been demonstrated in an operational environment. 

Outstanding weight management and concurrency risks related to buying 
ships while key concepts and performance are still being tested 
continue to complicate LCS acquisitions. Initial LCS seaframes face 
capability limitations resulting from weight growth during 
construction. This weight growth has resulted in the first two ships 
not meeting performance requirements for sprint speed and/or 
endurance, as well as potentially complicating existing plans to make 
additional changes to each seaframe design. Several seaframes now do 
not have the required amount of service life allowance-—margin to 
accommodate future changes without removing weight over the ship's 
lifetime-—but Navy officials said they have a plan to recover the 
service life allowance on the Independence class variant. 

Table: Status of Recent Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Service Life 
Allowances: 

Freedom Variant: 

Ship: LCS 1; 
Currently meets service life allowance requirements?[A] No-—24 tons 
less than requirement. 

Ship: LCS 3; 
Currently meets service life allowance requirements?[A] Yes—-exceeds 
requirement by 106 tons. 

Ship: LCS 5[B]; 
Currently meets service life allowance requirements?[A] Yes-—exceeds 
requirement by 17 tons. 

Independence Variant: 

Ship: LCS 2; 
Currently meets service life allowance requirements?[A] No—-67 tons 
less than requirement. 

Ship: LCS 4; 
Currently meets service life allowance requirements?[A] No—-34 tons 
less than requirement. 

Ship: LCS 6[B]; 
Currently meets service life allowance requirements?[A] No—-19 tons 
less than requirement. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy data. GAO 14-749. 

[A] LCS has a service life allowance requirement of 50 metric tons. 
Numbers are rounded. 

[B] LCS 1-LCS 4 have been delivered and therefore builder's margin 
remaining has become part of the service life allowance. LCS 5 and LCS 
6 are still in construction and could gain available service life 
allowances if weight reserved for design and construction variations 
are not used. 

[End of table] 

The Navy has not received accurate or complete weight reports from the 
seaframe prime contractors, and the Navy's lengthy review process has 
hindered a timely resolution of the Navy's concerns. Additionally, a 
number of significant test events, including rough water, shock and 
total ship survivability trials, will not be completed in time to 
inform upcoming acquisition decisions—including future contract 
decisions. Finally, the Navy's recent decision to accelerate low rate 
initial production of mission packages above the quantity necessary 
for operational testing limits the flexibility that the program will 
have to adjust to any problems that may arise during operational 
testing. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Navy (1) demonstrate certain capabilities for 
both LCS seaframe variants before the Navy is approved for future 
contract awards and (2) ensure a timely review of contractor seaframe 
weight reports and take actions to make contractors more responsive to 
comments on the reports' content. DOD agreed with the weight report 
recommendation and partially agreed with the other, noting that it 
intends to complete as much testing as possible-—but not all-—before 
releasing the request for proposals for future contracts. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-749]. For more 
information, contact Michele Mackin at (202) 512-4841 or 
mackinm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Initial Deployment and Further Testing Yielded Additional Learning 
about LCS Systems and Capabilities, but Gaps in Knowledge Remain: 

Outstanding Weight Management and Concurrency Risks Continue to 
Complicate LCS Acquisition: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Selected Navy Comments on Recent LCS Weight Reports: 

Appendix III: 2014 National Defense Authorization Act Navy Reporting 
Requirements: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Status of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframes: 

Table 2: Planned Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Increments: 

Table 3: Questions about Littoral Combat Ship Operations and Lessons 
Learned from Initial Deployment of USS Freedom: 

Table 4: Problems with USS Freedom Equipment That Have Since Been 
Replaced on Later Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS): 

Table 5: 7th Fleet Observations on Initial Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
Deployment: 

Table 6: Recently Completed Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Test Events: 

Table 7: Weight Analysis of Littoral Combat Ship Seaframes, January 
2014: 

Table 8: Navy Recommended Service Life Allowances by Ship Type as 
Compared to Littoral Combat Ship Requirements: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Two Variants of Littoral Combat Ships: 

Figure 2: Areas of Responsibility of the Navy's 5th and 7th Fleets and 
Approximate Location of Singapore Deployment of Littoral Combat Ship 
USS Freedom: 

Figure 3: Current Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Weight 
Estimates, by Increment: 

Figure 4: Timing of Key Littoral Combat Ship Test Events and 
Demonstrations Versus Planned Issuance of Request for Proposals and 
Seaframe Contract Awards: 

Abbreviations: 

ASW: Anti-Submarine Warfare: 

COTF: Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force: 

DAB: Defense Acquisition Board: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOT&E: Director, Operational Test and Evaluation: 

ESWBS: Expanded Ship Work Breakdown Structure: 

INSURV: Board of Inspection and Survey: 

JROC: Joint Requirements Oversight Council: 

LCS: Littoral Combat Ship: 

LCSRON: Littoral Combat Ship Squadron 1: 

MCM: Mine Countermeasures: 

NAVSEA: Naval Sea Systems Command: 

NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act: 

OPNAV: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations: 

RFP: Request for Proposal: 

RMMV: Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle: 

RMS: Remote Minehunting System: 

SUW: Surface Warfare: 

TEMP: Test and Evaluation Master Plan: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

July 30, 2014: 

Congressional Committees: 

The Department of the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a program 
framed by an innovative approach to shipbuilding acquisition and naval 
operations. Unlike other Navy surface combatants, which generally have 
fixed mission systems, LCS is intended to be reconfigurable to perform 
three different primary missions: mine countermeasures, surface 
warfare, and anti-submarine warfare. The LCS consists of two distinct 
parts--the ship itself (called a seaframe because of its ability to 
carry interchangeable payloads similar to an aircraft's airframe) and 
the interchangeable package of sensors, weapons and aircraft that it 
carries and deploys, called a mission package. The mission package 
provides the majority of the ship's combat capability. Two shipyards 
are currently building an equal number of two different versions of 
the LCS seaframe. According to current plans, the LCS will represent a 
large portion of the Navy's future surface combatant fleet, and the 
Navy plans to spend over $25 billion in 2010 dollars to acquire up to 
32 LCS seaframes and 64 mission packages--a reduction of at least 20 
seaframes based on the direction of the Secretary of Defense in 
February 2014.[Footnote 1] 

In July 2013, we highlighted a number of risks related to the LCS 
program, including cost growth, schedule delays, and problems related 
to delivering intended capabilities; and questioned the soundness of 
the Navy's business case of continuing to buy seaframes and modules 
given the unknowns related to the program's key warfighting and 
support concepts.[Footnote 2] Since that report was issued, the Navy 
has completed its first operational deployment of an LCS--USS Freedom--
with a surface warfare mission package, to Singapore. Given the recent 
deployment and the issues that we and others have raised about the 
Navy's acquisition of the LCS, the House's and Senate's committee 
reports for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2014 mandated that we examine a number of elements related to the 
program.[Footnote 3] In light of the Navy's current plan to contract 
for additional ships in 2016 and its ongoing mission package 
purchases, this report examines: (1) knowledge that the Navy has 
gained as a result of the initial deployment of USS Freedom (LCS 1) to 
Singapore and ongoing testing of the LCS seaframes and mission 
packages and (2) outstanding risks with the LCS acquisition 
program.[Footnote 4] This report is a public version of a sensitive 
but unclassified report issued in April 2014. DOD deemed some of the 
information in the corresponding report as sensitive but unclassified 
information, which must be protected from public disclosure. 
Therefore, this report omits certain sensitive information, but the 
content of both reports is largely the same. 

To evaluate the knowledge the Navy has gained since we issued our July 
2013 report, we analyzed Navy and Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation (DOT&E) reports on recent mission package testing and the 
approved LCS Test and Evaluation Master Plan, and discussed testing 
with LCS program office and DOT&E officials. We also analyzed 
documentation and data pertaining to the deployment of USS Freedom to 
Singapore. We traveled to Singapore to meet with Navy officials 
responsible for the LCS deployment, toured the ship, and interviewed 
the commanding officer and crew members. We also traveled to Japan and 
spoke with officials from the Navy's 7th Fleet who were responsible 
for operational tasking of USS Freedom while it was in the 7th Fleet 
theater.[Footnote 5] To assess outstanding risks with the ongoing LCS 
acquisition program, we examined Navy and shipyard documentation on 
seaframe and mission package weight management and discussed ongoing 
design studies that are under way that will likely have an effect on 
seaframe weight with Navy program office and technical experts. We 
also assessed the remaining test events identified in Navy 
documentation against the planned program schedule. We spoke to 
subject matter experts in naval architecture with backgrounds in 
designing U.S. Navy ships, and visited both LCS shipyards. A more 
detailed description of our scope and methodology is presented in 
appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2013 to July 2014 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

The LCS consists of two separate acquisition programs: one for the 
seaframe and one for the mission packages, which, when integrated with 
the seaframe and supplemented with aviation support, provide the 
ship's mission capability. In order to demonstrate LCS mission 
capability both seaframe variants will be evaluated through 
developmental and operational testing. Developmental testing is 
intended to assist in identifying system performance, capabilities, 
limitations, and safety issues to help reduce design and programmatic 
risks. Operational testing is intended to assess a weapon system's 
capability in a realistic environment when maintained and operated by 
warfighters, subjected to routine wear-and-tear, and employed in 
combat conditions. 

Seaframe: 

The Navy is procuring two different seaframe designs from shipbuilding 
teams led by Lockheed Martin--which builds its ships at Marinette 
Marine in Marinette, Wisconsin--and Austal USA in Mobile, Alabama. 
[Footnote 6] This report refers to the Lockheed Martin ships as the 
Freedom variant and the Austal USA ships as the Independence variant. 
The two designs reflect different contractor solutions to meet the 
same set of performance requirements. The most notable difference is 
that the Lockheed Martin Freedom variant (LCS 1 and other odd-numbered 
seaframes, 3 through 23) is a monohull design with a steel hull and 
aluminum superstructure, while the Austal USA Independence variant 
(LCS 2 and other even-numbered seaframes, 4 through 24) is an aluminum 
trimaran.[Footnote 7] Figure 1 shows the first two LCS seaframes. 

Figure 1: Two Variants of Littoral Combat Ships: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

Freedom variant: 

Source: Lockheed Martin (image). GAO-14-749. 

Independence variant: 

Source: General Dynamics (image). GAO-14-749. 

[End of figure] 

The Navy currently has contracted for 24 seaframes. Twenty seaframes 
are covered under block buy contracts that anticipate funding 
construction of seaframes through 2015, with deliveries under those 
contracts continuing until 2019.[Footnote 8] The Navy then plans to 
award additional contracts in 2016 to continue seaframe acquisition 
beyond the first two block buy contracts. In late February 2014, the 
Secretary of Defense announced that as part of its fiscal year 2015 
budget proposal the Navy would not contract for more than 32 ships, 
instead of 52 ships as planned.[Footnote 9] Our analysis is based on 
the approved acquisition strategy for the program at the time of this 
report. 

See table 1 for the current status of seaframe construction. 

Table 1: Status of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframes: 

Seaframe number: 1-4; 
Status as of February 2014: Navy has accepted delivery. 

Seaframe number: 5-12; 
Status as of February 2014: Under construction at the two shipyards. 

Seaframe number: 13-20; 
Status as of February 2014: Under contract with the two shipyards; 
congressional funding has been received. 

Seaframe number: 21-24; 
Status as of February 2014: Under contract but not yet congressionally 
funded. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. GAO-14-794. 

[End of table] 

As we previously reported, the Navy is investigating potentially 
significant design changes to the ships while production is under way. 
[Footnote 10] Some of these initiatives include: 

* Changes to improve habitability: Part of the LCS concept is to 
reduce the number of crew on the ship by relying extensively on shore-
based support for the ship's administrative personnel and maintenance 
needs. Prior to the deployment of LCS 1 to Singapore, the Navy added 
20 extra beds--called berths--to the ship to accommodate extra people, 
and has also made a similar change to LCS 2 and subsequent ships. 
However, the Navy did not add equivalent amounts of crew storage 
space, additional water and sanitation systems, and food storage, and 
while the Navy officials stated that the ships still meet 
requirements, the Navy is investigating changes to better meet Navy 
standards. The Navy and the shipyards are now evaluating how to make 
these changes to both variant designs, but the effects have been 
described by the program office as pervasive throughout much of the 
ship. 

* Changes to increase commonality: many of the systems on the two 
seaframe variants are not common; commonality can enhance efficient 
maintenance, training, manning, and logistics. The Navy is 
investigating making changes to improve commonality between the two 
variants, including selecting a common combat management system--an 
architecture that uses computers to integrate sensors (such as a 
radar) with shipboard weapon systems--for both seaframes. 

* Changes to improve safety: the Independence variant was designed 
without bridge wings, which are enclosed areas that extend out to the 
sides of the ship from the bridge to provide enhanced visibility and 
safety for the crew for maneuvers like docking the ship. The Navy has 
added bridge wings to LCS 2, and now plans to add bridge wings to all 
the ships of this variant. 

Ship Weight: 

As part of the decision to make any design changes to a ship, the 
designer needs to consider the effect that the changes might have on 
ship weight. Weight is a critical aspect of a ship design, and is 
measured in several ways: 

* Light ship condition: The ship is complete and ready for service, 
repair parts are held onboard, and liquids in machinery are at 
operating levels. Light ship condition does not include items of 
variable load, such as officers and crew; ammunition; aircraft and 
vehicles that are fully fueled with repair parts available; full 
supply of provisions and stores; and full tanks for potable water, 
lube oil, and fuel. For LCS, the light ship condition does not include 
installation of a mission package. 

* Full load condition: Light ship condition plus variable loads. For 
LCS, full load condition includes an installed mission package and is 
the condition against which performance requirements are assessed. 

* Naval architectural limit: The maximum weight that a ship can 
displace while still meeting its stability and survivability 
requirements. For LCS, naval architectural limits are unique to each 
seaframe variant. 

To ensure that ships meet required capabilities, the Navy and its 
shipbuilders typically engage in intensive estimating, weighing, and 
reporting processes throughout construction to identify and monitor a 
ship's weight and stability. As part of these processes, shipbuilders 
actively estimate and track certain information, including the 
following: 

* Builder's margin, which consists of weight and vertical center of 
gravity allowances included in a weight estimate to cover slight 
variations of component weight and centers of gravity that take place 
throughout the design and construction of a ship.[Footnote 11] 

* Service life allowances, which refer to weight and vertical center 
of gravity budgets included in a ship's design to accommodate changes 
due to ship alterations and unplanned growth during the ship's 
operational lifetime, which tend to increase displacement and affect 
stability. 

Weights are definitively determined as part of a ship's inclining 
experiment, which involves moving known weights around the ship and 
measuring how they change the ship's equilibrium. This allows for the 
Navy to determine a ship's displacement and the height and 
longitudinal position of its center of gravity. For most ships, 
inclining experiments take place immediately prior to delivery and 
after significant post-delivery maintenance periods, when necessary. 

Mission Packages: 

The LCS mission package designs are based on standard shipping 
containers that are outfitted with a variety of unmanned systems, 
sensors, and weapons that can be loaded onto and off of the seaframe. 
Mission packages are also accompanied by an aviation detachment, 
consisting of an MH-60 helicopter and its flight and support crew, as 
well as vertical take-off unmanned aerial vehicles. These packages are 
intended to give the Navy flexibility to change equipment in the field 
to meet different mission needs and incorporate new technology to 
address emerging threats. The Navy plans on fielding one anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) increment and four mine countermeasures (MCM) 
and surface warfare (SUW) increments.[Footnote 12] The Navy will 
upgrade all mission packages to the same configuration as additional 
increments are fielded. The Navy plans to buy a total of 64 mission 
packages--though this quantity could change if the number of seaframes 
acquired is reduced. See table 2 for a brief discussion of the mission 
packages.[Footnote 13] 

Table 2: Planned Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Increments: 

Mission package: Surface warfare; 24 packages planned; 

Increment: 1; 
Key systems: MK 46 30-millimeter gun system. 

Increment: 2; 
Key systems: Maritime security module (2 teams and associated 
equipment). 

Increment: 3; 
Key systems: 
Vertical take-off unmanned aerial vehicle; 
Surface-to-surface missile. 

Increment: 4; 
Key systems: Surface-to-surface missile upgrade (if needed). 

Mission package: Mine countermeasures; 24 packages planned; 

Increment: 1; 
Key systems: 
Airborne laser mine detection system; 
Airborne mine neutralization system; 
AN/AQS-20a sonar; 
Remote multi-mission vehicle. 

Increment: 2; 
Key systems: 
Vertical take-off unmanned aerial vehicle; 
Coastal battlefield reconnaissance and analysis system. 

Increment: 3; 
Key systems: Unmanned surface vehicle with unmanned influence surface 
sweep system. 

Increment: 4; 
Key systems: Surface mine countermeasure unmanned undersea vehicle 
(Knifefish). 

Mission package: Anti-submarine warfare; 16 packages planned; 
Increment: 2[A]; 
Key systems: 
Multi-function towed array; 
Variable depth sonar; 
Light weight tow torpedo countermeasure; 
Vertical take-off unmanned aerial vehicle. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. GAO-14-794. 

Notes: Each mission package is also accompanied by an MH-60 helicopter 
which carries additional systems and equipment. Mission package 
increments are cumulative, so an increment 4 mission package includes 
all systems from increment 1-3, with the exception of the SUW package 
increment 4 surface-to-surface missile, which will replace the 
increment 3 missile if necessary. 

[A] The initial ASW increment was delivered in 2008, but the Navy 
canceled the increment after analysis showed the module did not 
contribute significantly to ASW capabilities. The newly configured ASW 
mission package is currently planned to be the only ASW increment. 

[End of table] 

Initial LCS Deployment: 

To obtain operational experience with LCS, the Navy last year deployed 
USS Freedom carrying an increment 2 SUW mission package. The ship 
departed San Diego, California, for operations in the Western Pacific 
under the command of the Navy's 7th Fleet in early March 2013. The 
ship was deployed for approximately 10 months, returning to the United 
States in late December 2013. The 7th Fleet area of responsibility 
poses unique challenges to the Navy given the vast distances it 
covers. While on this deployment, USS Freedom participated in an 
international exhibition as well as several multilateral naval 
exercises with regional navies, including Singapore; Malaysia; Brunei; 
and Indonesia. The ship also conducted some real-world operations as 
directed by the 7th Fleet, such as participating in humanitarian 
assistance disaster relief to the Philippines following a major 
typhoon. See figure 2 for a map showing the location of the Singapore 
deployment and the Navy fleet areas of responsibility in the Indo-
Pacific region. 

Figure 2: Areas of Responsibility of the Navy's 5th and 7th Fleets and 
Approximate Location of Singapore Deployment of Littoral Combat Ship 
USS Freedom: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation (data); MapResources (map). 
GAO-14-749. 

[End of figure] 

Initial Deployment and Further Testing Yielded Additional Learning 
about LCS Systems and Capabilities, but Gaps in Knowledge Remain: 

Since July 2013, the Navy has made progress demonstrating and testing 
various facets of LCS systems and capability but significant gaps 
remain in the Navy's knowledge of how the LCS will operate and what 
capabilities it will provide the Navy. The deployment to Singapore 
provided the Navy with an opportunity to examine key LCS concepts 
operationally, including: the ship's smaller manning profile, 
rotational crewing, and use of off-ship maintenance and support. The 
deployment was limited because only one of the two variants carrying 
one mission package was deployed, and mechanical problems prevented 
USS Freedom from spending as much time as planned underway--that is, 
at sea unanchored and not at port. As a result, some key concepts 
could not be demonstrated. While the deployment provided useful 
insight for the Navy, it was never intended to be a substitute for 
formal testing and evaluation activities. The Navy has also completed 
additional developmental testing on the seaframes and mission 
packages, which has enabled the Navy to characterize performance of 
some systems, but many capabilities have not been demonstrated in an 
operational environment. 

Singapore Deployment Provided Useful Knowledge about LCS Operations, 
but Significant Unknowns Persist Regarding LCS Concepts and Use: 

Navy officials have stated that they were able to learn some valuable 
lessons from the deployment of USS Freedom to Singapore, and the Navy 
has taken several steps to analyze post-deployment lessons learned. 
According to the Navy, the deployment demonstrated the LCS's ability 
to participate in cooperative exercises and helped carry out the 
Navy's forward presence mission in Asia, thereby freeing up more 
costly multi-mission warships to carry out other high-priority Navy 
duties. Navy officials also said USS Freedom demonstrated how a LCS 
can fill the need for a smaller U.S. ship that can dock in more 
foreign ports than larger U.S. vessels, which they believe will be a 
valuable tool for engaging with certain countries that might otherwise 
be hard to access. Further, USS Freedom's SUW mission package crew was 
able to conduct some launch and recovery operations with Rigid Hull 
Inflatable Boats and to participate in boarding exercises, which 
provided lessons about the operations of these boats as well as the 
systems on USS Freedom needed to launch and recover them. These 
operations, although undoubtedly useful for the Navy, were never 
intended as formal testing and evaluation activities--or to replace 
them. Therefore, key unknowns remain regarding how the Navy will 
eventually be able to use the LCS and how well the ship meets its 
performance requirements. 

Initial Deployment Provided Insight, but Key Concepts Remain Untested 
or Not Validated: 

USS Freedom's deployment to Singapore represented an opportunity for 
the Navy to gain insight into the feasibility of the LCS's unique 
operational concepts. However, some of the fundamental concepts on 
which the program is premised--such as the maintenance and manning 
concepts--were demonstrated in a limited manner because the deployment 
involved only one ship of the Freedom variant and this ship is not 
representative of other ships of that variant. In other cases, certain 
concepts have not yet been demonstrated. Therefore, some of the 
lessons learned from the deployment cannot be extrapolated to the 
entire LCS class or all of the ships planned for the Freedom variant. 
[Footnote 14] Until additional deployments have been conducted--in 
conjunction with operational test events--the Navy will have 
insufficient data to evaluate the feasibility of these concepts on 
both variants. Table 3 identifies the key concepts that underpin the 
program and the degree to which the Navy was able to evaluate them on 
this deployment.[Footnote 15] Questions remaining regarding LCS's 
underlying concepts will, in turn, have implications for the 
practicality of certain requirements and key differences between the 
two variants--issues that have the potential to affect future 
acquisition decisions. 

Table 3: Questions about Littoral Combat Ship Operations and Lessons 
Learned from Initial Deployment of USS Freedom: 

Key concept: Two distinct seaframe variants operating in the same 
manner; 
Lessons learned from Singapore deployment: The Navy was able to obtain 
some data about performance and strengths and limitations of the USS 
Freedom seaframe; 
Questions remaining: Some major equipment has been changed on 
subsequent Freedom class ships, rendering USS Freedom different in 
several regards from later ships. Learning about these systems and how 
they performed on USS Freedom cannot predict how replacement systems 
might perform on subsequent ships; 
An Independence class seaframe has not yet deployed, and Navy 
officials, including those in 7th Fleet and elsewhere, told us that 
the Independence variant will have different advantages and 
disadvantages than the Freedom variant that will need to be identified 
through deployments. The Independence variant has completed test 
events and operations off the U.S. coast with contractor-based 
maintenance support, but this is not the same as an overseas 
deployment in which the ship must be supported remotely in a foreign 
country; 
Navy officials told us that they notionally plan for a deployment of 
an Independence variant before 2017, so this deployment may not occur 
until after the Navy awards additional seaframe contracts--currently 
planned for 2016. 

Lessons learned from Singapore deployment: USS Freedom received a 
greater than envisioned level of underway refueling: instead of 
refueling every 13 days as initially estimated, the ship required 
refueling more frequently, although Navy officials said operations 
were not altered due to fuel constraints. A senior officer told us 
that fuel constraints made them less likely to operate the ship at 
higher speeds which require using the gas turbines in addition to the 
ship's diesel engines, since use of the turbines limits fuel economy; 
Questions remaining: 7th Fleet logistics officials told us that this 
demand will be more stressing when there are multiple LCS assets 
operating within the area, although USS Freedom has the smallest fuel 
capacity of any LCS seaframe. Fuel consumption for an Independence 
class seaframe is different than for a Freedom class seaframe, so 
future deployments may show the logistics demand to be different. 

Key concept: Reduced manning; 
Lessons learned from Singapore deployment: The Navy increased the LCS 
core crew size from 40 to 50 and included contractor technical experts 
aboard USS Freedom during the deployment; 
LCS employs a rotational crewing concept, whereby multiple crews are 
assigned to one ship and rotate on and off while the ship remains 
forward deployed. Navy officials told us that rotational crewing is 
supposed to help ameliorate crew fatigue since the crew is on the ship 
for less than the full deployment; 
Questions remaining: Based on our conversations with the crew on the 
second half of the deployment, they were strained to keep up with some 
duties even with the additional people. Crew members reported lower 
than average amounts of sleep than the Navy standard of 8 hours per 
day, although Navy officials told us operational conditions on all 
Navy ships may cause a ship's crew to receive less than 8 hours per 
day. It is unknown what the effect will be if the contractor support 
is removed; 
The crew also reported heavy reliance on the mission package crew to 
conduct seaframe maintenance--which is not their role. The crew 
reported being more strained when the mission package crew was 
conducting their own operations. According to Navy officials, focusing 
the available labor on tasks at hand is consistent with existing fleet 
practice. However, the three mission packages require different crews 
and equipment, and can also require different skill sets, e.g., 
mechanics. It remains to be seen if the manning in each package could 
alter the extent to which the mission package crew will be able to 
support the seaframe crew and reduce strain, or how the crew manages 
if the mission package crew is more heavily tasked with mission 
package operations. 

Key concept: Novel maintenance approach; 
Lessons learned from Singapore deployment: USS Freedom also 
demonstrated a relatively limited range in the theater. This was in 
part driven by the novel maintenance concept requiring the ship to 
return to Singapore after 25 days of operations for a 5-day 
maintenance period that was conducted by contractors flown in from the 
U.S; 
The Navy plans to try a revised concept with a longer interval between 
in-port maintenance for the upcoming 2014 deployment of LCS 3 to 
Singapore. The Navy also plans to add an additional maintenance 
location to increase how far LCS can travel; 
Questions remaining: Future deployments will help determine if 
revisions to the maintenance concept will improve flexibility. Future 
deployments will also illustrate whether different maintenance 
approaches may be needed for the Independence variant. 

Key concept: In-theater mission package swaps; 
Lessons learned from Singapore deployment: USS Freedom deployed with 
an increment 2 SUW package, but did not swap out this package in 
Singapore. The Navy has only executed mission package changes in 
California; 
Questions remaining: As identified in Navy wargames, it is unknown how 
the precise logistics of in-theater mission package swaps will work. 
There is no mission package change planned for the next deployment. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy analyses and post-deployment data. GAO-14-
794. 

[End of table] 

In addition, mechanical problems hampered the Navy's ability to 
operate USS Freedom as planned during the Singapore deployment. Based 
on information provided by LCS program officials responsible for LCS 
fleet introduction, USS Freedom's mechanical failures resulted in 55 
days of mission days lost, which is a significant portion of its 10-
month deployment. Navy officials stated many of these days were 
planned in-port periods.[Footnote 16] The ship could not fully 
participate in at least two planned or requested exercises and some 
operational 7th Fleet presence missions while repairs were conducted. 
According to the LCS program office, several of the more problematic 
pieces of equipment that resulted in significant lost underway days 
are either slated to be replaced on follow-on Freedom class ships or 
have already have been replaced on LCS 3 or LCS 5. Table 4 depicts 
some of the most significant equipment failures and how the Navy 
believes they have been corrected on subsequent seaframes. 

Table 4: Problems with USS Freedom Equipment That Have Since Been 
Replaced on Later Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ships (LCS): 

System: Ship service diesel generators; 
System description: Generators that provide electrical power to the 
ship; 
Mission days lost: 11 days; 
Changes on future LCS seaframs: Design changes have been made to these 
generators on LCS 5 and follow-on ships. 

System: Starboard splitter gear and port combining gear; 
System description: Gears that allow the ship to run on a combination 
of diesel engines and gas turbine engines; 
Mission days lost: 20 days; 
Changes on future LCS seaframs: Changes have been or will be made to 
improve maintainability on LCS 1 and 3. The design will be changed on 
LCS 5 and follow-on ships to further improve maintainability. 

System: Starboard steerable water jet hydraulic power pack; 
System description: Hydraulic system for the water jets; 
Mission days lost: 17 days; 
Changes on future LCS seaframs: For LCS 3, the Navy has identified a 
means of facilitating easier flushing of the system. The Navy has 
funded efforts to redesign this system on LCS 5 and follow-on ships. 

System: Port steerable water jet; 
System description: Provides propulsion and steering for LCS; 
Mission days lost: 7 days; 
Changes on future LCS seaframs: The water jet feedback cables have 
been modified on LCS 5 and follow-on ships. 

System: Total; 
Mission days lost: 55 mission days lost. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. GAO-14-794. 

[End of table] 

Even with the reduced number of operational mission days, the 
Singapore deployment raised questions about the practicality of the 
small crew size. LCS is intended to operate with a crew that is 
smaller than comparable surface combatants. This reduced manning has 
long been a focus of Navy analysis, and the increase to a 50-person 
crew for the deployment was the maximum size allowed by current 
program requirements. This number was augmented by civilian contractor 
technical experts who could assist with troubleshooting and some 
maintenance. However, as shown in table 3, even with these additional 
people the deployment provided indications that the crew strained to 
keep up with duties.[Footnote 17] Further, the ship is currently at 
capacity in terms of the number of crew members it can accommodate. 
Therefore, any increase in crew size would require a significant 
redesign of the seaframes and would necessitate a revision to the 
maximum 50-person manning requirement, which has been validated by the 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Officials from the office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations told us after the deployment that they are 
not considering any further revision to the manning requirements for 
the ship, although some manning studies are under way to assess the 
rank and billet structure for the mission packages and aviation 
detachment. 

Additionally, some of USS Freedom's equipment is unique to that ship, 
unique to the Freedom variant, or unique to LCS class, which we were 
told made some repair efforts cumbersome and slow. For example, crew 
members told us that in some cases they had to track down spare parts 
that were sometimes available only in foreign countries rather than 
being able to find them in Navy inventories. While some of this may be 
a first-of-class issue, replacement of some ship systems with more 
reliable ones or with systems that are more commonly found in the Navy 
inventory may also reduce these burdens on the crew in the future. 
According to the LCS program office, replacing these less reliable 
systems should mean that future deployments of other ships from the 
Freedom class should not incur the same number of failures as USS 
Freedom. However, as DOT&E has observed, no formal operational testing 
has been conducted to verify and quantify these improvements, although 
Navy and DOT&E officials said that they were working together on 
operational test opportunities. Until the Navy completes further 
underway periods and/or testing it will not be able to determine the 
significance of improvements on ship availability. 

Fleet Observations on Deployment Highlight Potential Limitations on 
LCS Usage: 

This first deployment provided limited insight into how the LCS might 
be utilized in the different theaters in which the Navy operates. USS 
Freedom was deployed to Singapore and conducted operations for 7th 
Fleet largely consisting of participation in planned multi-lateral 
exercises. While 7th Fleet officials noted that a benefit of having 
LCS in theater was that the ship could participate in international 
exercises, thereby freeing up other surface combatants for other 
missions, they were still not certain about the ship's potential 
capabilities and attributes, or how they would best utilize an LCS in 
their theater. Until the Navy completes additional testing and 
deployments, it will not have adequate operational data and 
operational experience on which to base assumptions regarding LCS 
utilization. Table 5 discusses some of the observations related to the 
LCS deployment that we discussed with 7th Fleet officials related to 
the LCS deployment. 

Table 5: 7th Fleet Observations on Initial Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
Deployment: 

Fleet Observation: Fleet users expressed uncertainty about LCS's 
potential capabilities and attributes, or how they would best utilize 
an LCS in their theater. Several 7th Fleet officials told us that they 
thought the LCS in general might be better suited to operations in the 
5th Fleet theater (headquartered in Bahrain) than to 7th Fleet due in 
part to the smaller area of responsibility in 5th Fleet that would 
make range less of a consideration; 
Significance: Determining how to best use LCS in different theaters 
could influence the Navy's decision about the total number of 
seaframes and mission modules the Navy requires; 
Considerations: 
The Navy is planning future deployments of LCS to the 7th Fleet; 
The Navy held a wargame in March 2014 to try to understand how well 
LCS supports Navy needs and war plans in various phases of operations 
in a Pacific theater crisis. 

Fleet Observation: Fleet users expressed interest in several 
modifications that they would like to see made to the seaframes and/or 
mission packages to better suit their needs, based on their experience 
with the deployment. These include; 
* A replacement system for an unreliable and poorly performing 
electronic warfare system called WBR-2000 that is currently installed 
on the Freedom variant; 
* An ability to make additional use of the MH-60 helicopter by; 
* being able to carry sonar buoys on the ship for helicopter use 
regardless of whether or not the anti-submarine warfare package is 
onboard; and; 
* Developing an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance-specific 
mission package to augment existing capabilities; 
Significance: According to the 7th Fleet users, these changes would 
make LCS more reflective of their theater-specific needs; 
Considerations: Officials from the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations stated that there were no such changes currently 
envisioned, though they are always open to potential improvements. 

Fleet Observation: Fleet users said LCS fuel constraints contributed 
to a low average transit speed which, coupled with the very long 
distances ships have to travel within the 7th Fleet theater, make it 
hard for LCS to easily or efficiently get around the theater; 
Significance: If limitations of LCS complicate use in operations in 
the 7th Fleet theater, the Navy may need to consider the impact in 
terms of the total number of seaframes and mission packages the Navy 
requires; 
Considerations: 
Future deployments of LCS to the 7th Fleet theater are planned with 
different LCS seaframes, which may yield different observations; 
Section 124 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2014 limits the availability of funds for LCS 25 and 26 until the Navy 
submits to the congressional defense committees, among other things, a 
certification that requires in relevant part that the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)--responsible for validating 
performance requirements--has assessed the adequacy of the current LCS 
capabilities development document to meet the requirements of the 
combatant commands and to address future threats.[A] The JROC could 
approve increases or reductions or make no changes to requirements, 
including top speed, range, and endurance. 

Source: GAO interviews with 7th Fleet officials and analysis of 
relevant documentation. GAO-14-794. 

Note: 

[A] Pub. L. No. 113-66 (2013). 

[End of table] 

Navy Has Made Progress with Recent Testing but Additional Testing 
Needed to Demonstrate LCS Capabilities: 

Since July 2013, the Navy has completed additional testing on the 
seaframes and mission modules and is seeing results but has not yet 
proven performance in an operational environment. Table 6 describes 
these recently completed events and some important considerations 
about the testing. 

Table 6: Recently Completed Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Test Events: 

System: Seaframe; 

Test event: Developmental Testing of LCS Launch, Handling, and 
Recovery Systems on LCS 2 seaframe; 
Date: August 2013; 
Considerations: 
* Testing of the Launch, Handling, and Recovery Systems used to lower 
the mine countermeasures package's minehunting Remote Multi-mission 
Vehicle (RMMV) and other systems out of the back of the ship; 
* The Navy's Commander of Operational Test and Evaluation Force and 
the office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) 
observed this testing and stated that systems showed improved 
functioning over prior tests; 
* This testing also further demonstrated--although with some 
reliability problems--the use of multi-vehicle communication systems, 
a new system that allows the seaframe to control multiple RMMVs 
simultaneously. This testing showed only use of this system 
communicating in single-vehicle mode. 

Test event: Combat System Ship Qualification Testing on USS Fort Worth 
(LCS 3); 
Date: Late 2012; 
Considerations: 
* The Navy obtained initial test results and analysis from this 
testing in April 2013 and is still evaluating the results; 
* LCS 3 was the first LCS to complete this testing, which represents 
an opportunity to verify and validate combat and weapon systems 
performance for new ships. LCS 1 and LCS 2 have not yet formally 
completed this testing.[A] USS Coronado (LCS 4) is expected to conduct 
this testing in 2014. 

Test event: LCS 2 rough water trials; 
Date: January-February 2014; 
Considerations: 
* These trials allow the Navy to capture data with instrumentation on 
how the seaframes react to heavy sea conditions, which can be used to 
verify and validate computer model predictions that help inform 
expectations about service life and how stress can result in fatigue 
areas of the ship's structure. Results are not yet available; 
* The Navy has not yet conducted rough water trials for the; 
* Freedom variant; 
testing was initiated in 2011 for LCS 1 but was suspended when a hull 
crack was identified. Rough water trials for the Freedom variant are 
now planned to occur with LCS 1 in 2015. 

System: Mission packages; 

Test event: Developmental testing of the mine countermeasures package 
RMMV and the Remote Minehunting System (RMS)[B]; 
Date: February-June 2013; 
Considerations: 
* Testing demonstrated marked improvements in the reliability of the 
RMMV and RMS which has been a problem for several years, measured by 
the extent to which the system could perform its mission without 
failures that prevent the successful completion of a mission; 
* We reported in July 2013 that the contractor had improved 
reliability from 7.9 hours between operational failures to 45 hours, 
as compared with the Navy's 75-hour requirement. According to a recent 
test report, RMS; 
* demonstrated operating with hours between such failures exceeding 
both the Navy's requirement and the contractor's goal of 129 hours; 
* Several factors limit the significance of the testing: 
- Testing was conducted using an older configuration of the RMMV than 
will be used for operational testing which is, according to DOT&E, 
incompatible with the LCS and will never be used operationally. DOT&E 
stated that using a non-representative RMMV in developmental testing 
limits the utility of the data obtained; 
- DOT&E found that the definition of mean time between operational 
mission failures erroneously added the time that the crew would be 
spending conducting post-mission analysis of data obtained from RMS 
operations to the time that the vehicle was actually operating. DOT&E 
stated this artificially inflates the reliability rate by a factor of 
at least two. Officials from the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations stated that there are two definitions of this parameter, 
one definition intended for the purpose of system's engineering and 
reliability growth and the other intended for the purpose of 
operational test and evaluation; 
- We noted that while Navy sailors were used to support testing, it 
did not involve an RMMV integrated with the LCS, but instead the RMMV 
was operated from a pier. Further testing will be required to 
replicate these results in a more operationally relevant environment. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy test reports. GAO-14-794. 

[A] Navy program officials told us they have conducted testing that is 
at least as rigorous as Combat System Ship Qualification Trials during 
the developmental testing phase. DOT&E officials disagree, emphasizing 
that operational effectiveness and suitability can be assessed only 
through operational testing. 

[B] The RMS consists of an RMMV, which operates as a semi-submersible 
to tow an AN/AQS-20A sonar that is used to detect, classify, locate, 
and identify minelike objects. 

[End of table] 

Outstanding Weight Management and Concurrency Risks Continue to 
Complicate LCS Acquisition: 

Although the Navy has gained knowledge related to LCS capabilities and 
concepts since our July 2013 report, there continue to be significant 
acquisition risks to the program. Key among these is managing the 
weight of the ships. Initial LCS seaframes face limitations resulting 
from weight growth during construction of the first several ships. 
This weight growth has required the Navy to make compromises on 
performance of LCS 1 and LCS 2 and may complicate existing plans to 
make additional changes to each seaframe design. While weight growth 
is not uncommon over the life of a ship and the Navy builds a weight 
allowance into ships to account for this growth, LCS has significantly 
lower available margin compared to other ship classes. Compounding 
these issues, the Navy has not received complete or accurate weight 
reports from the LCS seaframe prime contractors--and the Navy's 
lengthy review process has hindered a timely resolution. Additionally, 
as we have previously reported, the Navy has considerable testing to 
complete before the program demonstrates operational capability. 
Further, the Navy has continued with the acquisition without the 
knowledge that would be gained from additional testing. For example, 
since our last report, the Navy has granted the mission modules 
program approval to accelerate the mission package production rate 
before completing key test activities to demonstrate their performance. 

Seaframe Weight Growth Affects Performance and Design Changes, with 
Navy Oversight Challenged by Inadequate Contractor Weight Reports: 

Weight growth occurred on the first four LCS seaframes, which affected 
the capabilities of both Freedom and Independence variant seaframes. 
This situation has led the Navy to accept lower than minimum 
requirements on two delivered seaframes (LCS 1 and 2) in endurance and 
sprint speeds, respectively. Further, weight growth has caused three 
delivered LCS seaframes (LCS 1, 2, and 4) to not achieve the required 
service life allowance for weight. Weight management in shipbuilding 
programs, including the LCS, is critical to ensuring that performance 
requirements associated with survivability, sea keeping (meaning the 
ability to withstand rough sea conditions), and the ability to 
accommodate upgrades during ship service lives, are met. For LCS 
seaframes, specific performance requirements that are sensitive to 
weight include the following: 

* 3,500-nautical-mile range (endurance) when operated at a speed of 14 
knots,[Footnote 18] 

* 40-knot sprint speed, 

* 20-foot navigational draft (the greatest depth, in feet, of the 
keel), 

* 50-metric-ton service life allowance for weight, and: 

* 0.15-meter service life allowance for stability.[Footnote 19] 

In the LCS program, weight management and reporting processes also 
rely on accurate mission package weight data. The Navy provides 
mission package weight estimates to the shipbuilders to include in 
their full load condition estimates. 

Table 7 identifies the Navy's current weight estimates for each of the 
first six LCS seaframes under full load conditions, along with current 
service life allowance projections for each ship as compared to the 
required 50 metric tons. As is depicted, there are several seaframes 
that do not have the required amount of service life remaining due to 
weight growth. 

Table 7: Weight Analysis of Littoral Combat Ship Seaframes, January 
2014: 

Estimates in metric tons. 

Freedom variant: 

Ship: LCS 1; 
Naval architectural limit: 3,400.0; 
Full load condition: 3,374.2; 
Required service life allowance (weight): 50.0; 
Available service life allowance (weight): 25.8; 
Builder's margin: N/A; 
GAO observations: Ship does not meet service life allowance 
requirements. 

Ship: LCS 3; 
Naval architectural limit: 3,550.0; 
Full load condition: 3,394.3; 
Required service life allowance (weight): 50.0; 
Available service life allowance (weight): 155.7; 
Builder's margin: N/A; 
GAO observations: Ship meets service life allowance requirements. 

Ship: LCS 5; 
Naval architectural limit: 3,550.0; 
Full load condition: 3,482.7; 
Required service life allowance (weight): 50.0; 
Available service life allowance (weight): 67.3; 
Builder's margin: 30.4; 
GAO observations: Ship meets service life allowance requirements and 
has builder's margin available. 

Independence variant: 

Ship: LCS 2; 
Naval architectural limit: 3,188.0; 
Full load condition: 3,204.5; 
Required service life allowance (weight): 50.0; 
Available service life allowance (weight): -16.5; 
Builder's margin: N/A; 
GAO observations: Ship exceeds its naval architectural limit and does 
not meet service life allowance requirements, but according to Navy 
officials, margin in fuel weight could compensate. 

Ship: LCS 4; 
Naval architectural limit: 3,188.0; 
Full load condition: 3,171.5; 
Required service life allowance (weight): 50.0; 
Available service life allowance (weight): 16.5; 
Builder's margin: N/A; 
GAO observations: Ship does not meet service life allowance 
requirements, but according to Navy officials, margin in fuel weight 
could compensate. 

Ship: LCS 6; 
Naval architectural limit: 3,188.0; 
Full load condition: 3,156.7; 
Required service life allowance (weight): 50.0; 
Available service life allowance (weight): 31.3; 
Builder's margin: 29.2; 
GAO observations: Ship does not meet service life allowance 
requirements, but according to Navy officials, available builder's 
margin could provide an offset and margin in fuel weight could 
compensate. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. GAO-14-794. 

Notes: 

LCS 1-LCS 4 have been delivered and therefore builder's margin 
remaining has become part of the service life allowance. LCS 5 and 6 
are under construction. 

Contractor officials responsible for construction of the LCS seaframes 
told us that weight growth on at least some of the seaframes was due 
in part to design changes made by the Navy during construction. 

[End of table] 

LCS 2 faces the most significant weight challenges of any of the first 
six seaframes, but Navy officials stated they have a strategy to 
mitigate the issue while still meeting requirements. According to Navy 
estimates, LCS 2 is so heavy in the full load condition that it 
exceeds its naval architectural limit--an outcome that provides no 
service life allowance for weight and restricts the ship's ability to 
execute its required missions. Subject matter experts in naval 
architecture who we interviewed stated that operating a ship in excess 
of its naval architectural limit can make it prone to failure in 
certain weather or damage conditions, and the ship can also see a 
decreased service life due to structural fatigue. Navy officials 
stated that they will limit fuel loads on LCS 2, as necessary, to 
ensure the naval architectural limit is not exceeded. In addition, the 
Navy is developing design modifications for Independence variant 
seaframes to reduce fuel capacity--estimated to total over 100 metric 
tons--in order to restore service life allowances. Although this 
reduction will reduce the endurance of these ships, the Navy reports 
that this variant has excess fuel capacity--as demonstrated during LCS 
2 calm water trials in June 2013--and will still meet LCS range at 
transit speed requirements after the fuel reduction. 

Further, as table 7 shows, three of the other LCS seaframes--LCS 1, 
LCS 4, and LCS 6--also do not currently meet their service life 
allowance requirements for weight when configured in normal, full load 
conditions. For example, LCS 1 and LCS 4 have near or less than 50 
percent of the required 50 metric ton service life allowances for 
weight (25.8 and 16.5 tons, respectively), and the Navy projects LCS 6 
will enter service with less than 63 percent (31.3 metric tons) of its 
required 50 metric ton service life allowance for weight. At present, 
LCS 6 has over 29 metric tons of builder's margin available, which if 
still available at delivery could offset that particular ship's 
estimated service life allowance deficit for weight. 

Weight growth contributed to LCS 1 and LCS 2 not achieving some 
requirements related to endurance and sprint speed respectively, when 
operated in normal, full load conditions. For instance, although LCS 1 
meets its sprint speed requirement of 40 knots, excess weight growth 
to date in part prevents that ship from achieving the 3,500 nautical 
miles at 14 knots endurance requirement. Alternatively, LCS 2 can only 
sprint at 39.5 knots under full loads, but is predicted to exceed the 
endurance requirement by over 800 nautical miles, albeit at potential 
risk to its naval architectural limit, as discussed above.[Footnote 20] 

LCS Has Low Weight Growth Margins Compared to Other Ship Classes: 

Complicating the weight growth on early LCS seaframes is the fact that 
LCS requirements for service life allowances already fall short of the 
growth margins called for under Navy and industry recommended 
practice.[Footnote 21] Table 8 outlines recommended service life 
allowances for different ship types as compared to LCS requirements. 

Table 8: Navy Recommended Service Life Allowances by Ship Type as 
Compared to Littoral Combat Ship Requirements: 

Ship types: Surface combatants; 
Weight (percentage): 10.0; 
Vertical center of gravity (meters)[A]: 0.30. 

Ship types: Aircraft carriers; 
Weight (percentage): 7.5; 
Vertical center of gravity (meters)[A]: 0.76. 

Ship types: Amphibious warfare ships (large decks); 
Weight (percentage): 7.5; 
Vertical center of gravity (meters)[A]: 0.76. 

Ship types: Amphibious warfare ships (other); 
Weight (percentage): 5.0; 
Vertical center of gravity (meters)[A]: 0.30. 

Ship types: Auxiliary ships; 
Weight (percentage): 5.0; 
Vertical center of gravity (meters)[A]: 0.15. 

Ship types: Special ships and craft; 
Weight (percentage): 5.0; 
Vertical center of gravity (meters)[A]: 0.15. 

Ship types: LCS requirements; 
Weight (percentage): 1.4 to 1.6[B]; 
Vertical center of gravity (meters)[A]: 0.15. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy and industry documentation. GAO-14-749. 

Notes: Service life allowances are measured against the full load 
condition at the time of ship delivery. 

[A] Vertical center of gravity is the height of the ship's vertical 
center of gravity measured from the bottom of the keel. 

[B] We calculated the percentage range by dividing the LCS service 
life allowance requirement for weight (50 metric tons) by the 
estimated full load condition displacements for LCS 5 and LCS 6 
(3,482.7 and 3,156.7 metric tons, respectively). We used LCS 5 and LCS 
6 because the Navy views these as the first production representative 
ships. 

[End of table] 

Because of the LCS's comparatively low service life allowance 
requirements, the Navy's ability to accommodate alterations and growth 
on these ships over their expected 20-year minimum service lives will 
be significantly more constrained than is typical for other surface 
ships. In 2012, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
highlighted the importance of this issue across ship classes, noting 
in an instruction that inadequate service life allowances for weight 
and vertical center of gravity have resulted in expensive corrective 
ship changes or in the inability to modernize ships through 
installation of new weapons systems. 

Low Growth Margins May Complicate Future Changes: 

Navy program officials told us they expect that most future weight--
and capability--growth on LCS would occur within mission packages, not 
seaframes. However, as we previously reported, the Navy is considering 
changes to the seaframe designs that could further increase weight 
estimates.[Footnote 22] As mentioned above, these changes could 
include increases in: (1) habitability to support larger crews than 
initially anticipated; (2) commonality between the seaframe variants 
and with other Navy ships; and (3) changes to improve safety. We 
reported in July 2013 that the Navy had undertaken several technical 
studies on these initiatives. These studies have not yet been 
completed. Navy officials stated that the possible changes are low 
risk and would not affect LCS performance requirements. However, some 
changes, including those related to habitability, are likely to add 
weight. According to the program office, weight considerations occur 
for every change and corresponding trades are required to be made in 
order to approve the change. For example: 

* Early estimates indicate that roughly 10 to 20 metric tons could be 
added due to accommodations for a larger crew, and would require 
pervasive modifications to each seaframe design. If so, these changes 
would heighten weight challenges and resulting service life allowance 
shortfalls. 

* A change was made to LCS 2 in a recent maintenance period to 
increase the size of the rescue boat from 5 meters to 7 meters, which 
will make the boat more stable in heavier seas. This change resulted 
in an approximately 15 metric ton weight increase to LCS 2; it is 
planned for all Independence variant seaframes. According to the 
contractor, by removing weight from other areas of LCS 6 and follow-on 
ships designs, the larger rescue boat will add 1.3 metric tons. 

* Another proposed change would increase commonality and combat 
capability by replacing the Freedom variant's rolling airframe missile 
system with the heavier missile system found on the Independence 
variant. While the specifics of this potential change have not yet 
been determined or approved, Navy technical experts told us that such 
a modification would subsequently increase the Freedom variant's 
weight and could also result in center of gravity changes. 

Weight constraints could make future modifications more costly than 
anticipated. For instance, subject matter experts in naval 
architecture told us that the Navy may find it has to seek lighter 
alternatives to the systems or equipment it wants, which could 
complicate the redesign and construction modification efforts or make 
them more costly--or both. Because the Navy has not yet completed 
technical studies evaluating its possible changes, the weight effects 
remain unknown. According to Navy officials, preliminary studies on 
the habitability changes should be completed this year, and more 
detailed design work will not occur until fiscal year 2015. The Navy 
has established a weight working group with Navy and shipyard 
representatives that program officials said is intended to try and 
identify ways to offset weight growth from some of these design 
changes. 

Additionally, once a ship is delivered and handed over to the fleet, 
fleet operators and maintainers assume responsibility for these weight 
management processes, which continue throughout the ship's service 
life. For ships that are weight constrained--meaning, at or nearing 
their naval architectural limits for displacement--these weight 
management processes are typically more robust and costly. For 
instance, a Navy instruction states that weight must be kept within 
naval architectural limits and provides that for ships that are weight 
constrained, any additional weight must be compensated for by removing 
weight from the ship.[Footnote 23] Inclining experiments must usually 
be completed following maintenance periods to ensure the ship's naval 
architectural limits remain unbreached. As operational assets, LCS 1 
and LCS 2 are--according to Navy reporting--both in a weight 
constrained status.[Footnote 24] 

Mission Package Weights Continue to Evolve, but Growth Margin Is 
Constrained: 

According to Navy officials, the seaframes have low growth margins 
because the mission packages are supposed to be flexible enough to 
accommodate any future upgrades and growth. However, weight challenges 
exist on the mission packages as well, and weight and space 
constraints are limiting the extent to which the Navy can accommodate 
new mission package systems. Similar to the seaframes, the Navy also 
tracks and manages mission package weights. Mission packages 
(regardless of which type) are required to consume no more than 180 
metric tons when installed aboard a seaframe. Of this 180-metric-ton 
allocation, 105 metric tons are allotted to the actual mission package 
equipment, whereas 75 metric tons are reserved for fuel to power that 
equipment. However, LCS requirements documents do not include a 
service life allowance requirement for mission packages, and based on 
current weight estimates, room for future growth on the final 
increments ranges from approximately 14 metric tons for some 
configurations of the MCM mission package to none for the ASW mission 
package. According to Navy officials, future additions to mission 
packages--beyond the systems currently planned for increment 4 
configurations--will be offset by removing existing systems, described 
below, to the extent required to meet the 105 metric ton weight 
limitation. For MCM, Navy officials stated that they cannot include 
all the current increment 4 systems that they are buying in a package 
at one time, so they have recently developed two options with 
different system configurations. Figure 3 highlights current mission 
package weights that are estimated for each increment of mission 
package capability, including the two MCM options but excluding 
potential weight reduction efforts. 

Figure 3: Current Littoral Combat Ship Mission Package Weight 
Estimates, by Increment: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Projected weight (in metric tons): 

Increment 1; 
Mine Countermeasures Mission package, options A[C]: 77.11; 
Mine Countermeasures Mission package, option B[C]: 77.11; 
Mine Countermeasures Mission package, option A+B[B]: 77.11; 
Surface Warfare Mission package: 85.58; 
Weight limit (105 metric tons): 105. 

Increment 2; 
Mine Countermeasures Mission package, options A[C]: 78.4; 
Mine Countermeasures Mission package, option B[C]: 78.4; 
Mine Countermeasures Mission package, option A+B[B]: 78.4; 
Surface Warfare Mission package: 92.23; 
Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission package[A]: 109.36; 
Weight limit (105 metric tons): 105. 

Increment 3; 
Mine Countermeasures Mission package, options A[C]: 97.38; 
Mine Countermeasures Mission package, option B[C]: 97.38; 
Mine Countermeasures Mission package, option A+B[B]: 97.38; 
Surface Warfare Mission package: 101.61; 
Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission package[A]: 109.36; 
Weight limit (105 metric tons): 105. 

Increment 4; 
Mine Countermeasures Mission package, options A[C]: 91.06; 
Mine Countermeasures Mission package, option B[C]: 97.38; 
Mine Countermeasures Mission package, option A+B[B]: 110.04; 
Surface Warfare Mission package: 101.61; 
Anti-Submarine Warfare Mission package[A]: 109.36; 
Weight limit (105 metric tons): 105. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. GAO-14-749. 

[A] The Navy currently plans for only one increment of anti-submarine 
warfare capability, introduced in increment 2. 

[B] The projected weight of the mine countermeasures mission package 
at increment 4 will differ depending on the systems included. Mine 
countermeasures mission package increment 4 Option A+B reflects a 
configuration with the weight for the Surface Mine Countermeasures 
Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (Knifefish), the Unmanned Influence Sweep 
System, and the weight of the other increment 4 systems. This option 
with both systems onboard is not feasible as the two systems cannot be 
included in one mission package together due to space constraints. 
They are depicted to highlight weight challenges. 

[C] The mine countermeasures mission package increment 4 Option A 
reflects the weight for the Surface Mine Countermeasures Unmanned 
Undersea Vehicle (Knifefish) in addition to the other increment 4 
systems, but without the Unmanned Influence Sweep System. The mine 
countermeasures mission package increment 4 Option B reflects the 
weight for the Unmanned Influence Sweep System in addition to the 
other increment 4 systems, but without Knifefish. 

[End of figure] 

At present, the Navy anticipates that the equipment associated with an 
increment 4 SUW package will require slightly less than the 105-metric-
ton allotment. This estimate is contingent on surface-to-surface 
missile systems not yet selected delivering within the assigned weight 
margins. The Navy has identified a weight reduction plan to provide an 
additional 5 metric tons. 

Navy weight estimates for increment 4 of the MCM mission package, 
however, do not reflect all the systems being acquired for that 
package. Space and weight constraints have required the Navy to modify 
how it intends to outfit increment 4 of the MCM mission package. 
Although the Navy plans to acquire all the systems planned for that 
increment, space and weight limitations will not allow LCS seaframes 
to carry all of these systems at one time. According to LCS program 
officials, MCM mission commanders will have either (1) the Unmanned 
Influence Sweep System and the unmanned surface vehicle that tows it, 
or (2) the minehunting Surface Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Undersea 
Vehicle--called Knifefish--available--but not both systems. As a 
result, LCS seaframes outfitted with the increment 4 MCM package may 
have decreased minesweeping or mine detection capability.[Footnote 25] 
These scenarios would preclude LCS from meeting its MCM minesweeping 
performance requirements; Knifefish is a new capability that was 
recently added to the program, and officials from the mission module 
program office stated that it is not a capability currently defined in 
LCS requirements documentation. The Navy has identified some options 
for weight reduction for this package that could bring the combined 
weight with these two systems included together to just under 105 
metric tons, but physical space constraints would still prohibit both 
being carried together. 

Further, ASW mission package equipment is also estimated to exceed its 
105-metric-ton allotment by approximately 4 metric tons. In response, 
the Navy has identified weight reduction options within that package 
that it estimates will shed a combined 10 metric tons of weight. 
Several of these options require redesign of existing systems, which 
could introduce risk. 

Deficiencies in Contractor Reports Have Hindered Navy Oversight of LCS 
Weight Challenges: 

The Navy has faced challenges obtaining accurate and complete weight 
estimates from the contractors. The Navy's primary mechanism for 
tracking seaframe weights are quarterly weight reports, which are 
produced and delivered by each of the LCS prime contractors per 
contract requirements. These reports provide data on the physical 
characteristics of seaframes under construction, including the 
magnitude, location, and distribution of weight within each ship. 
These data are based on estimated and calculated weights derived from 
design drawings, historical data, and vendor-furnished information, 
and are updated with actual component weight information during 
construction by the shipbuilder. Under the terms of their contracts, 
LCS prime contractors are required to prepare and report data within 
weight reports in accordance with Navy and industry recommended 
practices, which include using the Navy's Expanded Ship Work Breakdown 
Structure (ESWBS) classification system to structure and summarize 
data.[Footnote 26] ESWBS facilitates the grouping of materials, 
equipment, and ship components in a consistent reporting format, which 
in turn positions Navy reviewers to audit the contractors' work. At 
their highest level, ESWBS groupings are organized around major 
systems of the ship, such as the hull structure and propulsion plant, 
but ESWBS groupings are broken down to include individual components 
of these respective systems, such as diesel engines. 

An inclining experiment is important as it represents the point where 
weight data transitions from estimated or calculated data into actual 
data. According to Navy officials, when the weight of a ship is 
determined at an inclining experiment, the weight totals should be 
very close to those identified in the preceding weight reports. 
Acceptable deviation is considered to be only 0.5 percent or less, 
according to Navy technical experts. In the LCS program, however, 
inclining experiments for the first two seaframes revealed weight 
growth that the prime contractors had not fully accounted for within 
their weight reports. For example, the LCS 1 inclining experiment that 
followed that ship's initial post-delivery work periods revealed that 
the ship weighed approximately 90 metric tons more than expected. 
However, it was unclear to the prime contractor where this excess 
weight was located or how it was distributed within the ship, though 
Navy program officials told us that they now believe it was due 
largely to additional insulation and paint. In response, Lockheed 
Martin increased its weight estimates for LCS 3 and worked with the 
Navy to evaluate and resolve the 90 metric ton discrepancy. As part of 
these analyses, Lockheed Martin was able to assign much of the weight 
growth to individual ESWBS accounts, and subsequently inclined LCS 3 
to within 1 percent of that ship's revised weight estimate. However, 
full resolution of the 90 metric tons weight discrepancy remains 
incomplete. Weight reports for LCS 5 and follow-on ships identified 
over 23 metric tons of weight that Lockheed Martin and the Navy have 
not yet identified as belonging within specific ESWBS accounts. 
Similar to LCS 1, LCS 2's inclining revealed an approximately 5 
percent deviation from expected weight, and General Dynamics' Bath 
Iron Works and Austal USA have over 13 metric tons of weight, outside 
of the ESWBS accounts, on later Independence variant seaframes. 
Carrying forward excess weight can have impacts on the ships over the 
course of their service lives, and may have impacts on construction of 
follow-on seaframes. In order to remedy persisting deficiencies in the 
weight reports, Navy officials stated that the administrative 
contracting officer--responsible for ensuring that the contractor is 
fulfilling the contract under the specified terms, including price, 
schedule, and quality--could withhold a percentage of progress 
payments. To date, however, Navy officials report that they have not 
pursued such withholds in the LCS program. 

As part of the terms of the block buy contracts for LCS seaframes, the 
Navy is required to review and comment on weight reports within 60 
days after they are submitted by a prime contractor.[Footnote 27] 
During the past 2 years, the Navy has, in several cases, provided 
detailed comments back to the contractors on weight reports that it 
identified as deficient. Comments back to the prime contractors 
identified fundamental classification and estimating errors and the 
use of outdated weight information, among other reporting 
deficiencies, which the Navy judged as time sensitive and critically 
important to address (see appendix II, which contains excerpts from 
Navy comments on contractor weight reports). The Navy often requested 
LCS prime contractors to modify and resubmit the report within 30 
days--consistent with the terms of the contracts. 

However, the prime contractors have not addressed the Navy's comments 
and resubmitted weight reports, largely because the Navy's review is 
typically taking longer than 60 days. One contractor stated that the 
Navy's review took 6 to 12 months. According to Navy officials, 
reviews of weight reports now take less than 6 months. Nevertheless, 
by the time that the Navy's comments for one particular report are 
submitted to the contractor, the contractor has often already 
submitted the next quarter's weight report. As a result, LCS 
contractors stated to us that they generally do not make revisions to 
the previously submitted reports. Thus, issues raised in the Navy's 
comments are not immediately addressed by the contractors. These 
revisions can affect weight estimates, but cannot be identified until 
a corrected weight report has been submitted. As a result, serious 
issues within weight reports persist that could obscure timely 
identification of negative weight trends within one or both seaframe 
variants. 

Risk of LCS Concurrency Remains--with Mission Package Procurement 
Exceeding Levels Needed for Operational Testing: 

As we previously reported, the Navy's acquisition approach to the LCS 
program involves a significant degree of concurrency; that is, the 
Navy is buying the ships while key concepts and performance are still 
being tested. Since we issued our report in July 2013, the Navy 
received approval from DOT&E for the LCS test and evaluation master 
plan (TEMP), which sets forth the testing that must be completed to 
ensure that the program meets requirements. In order to determine the 
degree to which the information from test events would be available to 
inform the Navy's decision to purchase additional seaframes, we 
compared the Navy's current acquisition strategy--which calls for 
releasing a request for proposals in 2015 in support of a planned 2016 
award of future seaframe contracts--with the program's test schedule 
as outlined in the most recent TEMP. Figure 4 illustrates the test 
events that will be completed before and after these acquisition 
events.[Footnote 28] 

Figure 4: Timing of Key Littoral Combat Ship Test Events and 
Demonstrations Versus Planned Issuance of Request for Proposals and 
Seaframe Contract Awards: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Test events and demonstrations: 

Events planned to be completed before the planned 2015 request for 
proposals issuance: 

Complete all acceptance trials on at least one ship: 
2013: Freedom Variant; 
2014: Independence Variant. 

Complete Combat System Ship Certification Trials on at least one ship: 
2012: Freedom Variant; 
2014: Independence Variant. 

Complete rough water trials on at least one ship: 
2014: Independence Variant. 

Deploy ship overseas: 
2013: Freedom Variant. 

Begin Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) — Surface 
Warfare (SUW) Increment 2: 
2014: Freedom Variant. 

Total ship survivability trials (TSST): 
2014: Freedom Variant. 

Aviation landing system testing: 
2013: Freedom Variant; Independence Variant. 

Fuel economy and performance testing: 
2013: Freedom Variant; Independence Variant. 

Acoustic trials: 
2013: Freedom Variant; Independence Variant. 

Vertical Take-off Unmanned Aerial Vehicle dynamic interface testing: 
2014: Freedom Variant; Independence Variant. 

Events occurring concurrent with or after planned 2015 request for 
proposals issuance: 

Complete rough water trials on at least one ship: 
2015: Freedom Variant. 

TSST: 
2015: Independence Variant. 

IOT&E — Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Increment 1: 
2015: Freedom Variant; Independence Variant. 

IOT&E — MCM Increment 2: 
2015: Freedom Variant. 

IOT&E — SUW Increment 2: 
2015: Independence Variant. 

Events occurring after planned 2016 contract award: 

Underwater shock trials: 
2016: Freedom Variant; Independence Variant. 

Deploy ship overseas: 
2016: Independence Variant[A]. 

IOT&E — MCM Increment 2: 
2016: Independence Variant. 

IOT&E — MCM Increment 3: 
2016: Freedom Variant; Independence Variant. 

IOT&E — MCM Increment 4: 
2017: Independence Variant; 
2018: Freedom Variant. 

IOT&E — Anti-Submarine Warfare Increment 2: 
2016: Freedom Variant; 
2017: Independence Variant. 

Completion of ship self-defense testing[B]: 
2018: Freedom Variant; Independence Variant. 

IOT&E — SUW Increment 3: 
2018: Freedom Variant[C]; 
2019: Independence Variant[C]. 

IOT&E — SUW Increment 4: 
2018: Freedom Variant[C]; 
2019: Independence Variant[C]. 

Source: LCS Test and Evaluation and Master Plan and Navy 
documentation. GAO-14-749. 

[A] According to the Navy, the exact deployment date of the 
Independence variant is classified, but it is notionally planned to 
deploy before 2017. 

[B] This testing includes completion of air warfare testing. 

[C] Schedule depends on availability of replacement missile solution, 
if necessary. 

[End of figure] 

As shown in figure 4, we found that a number of significant test 
events as outlined in the TEMP will not be completed in time to inform 
the development or release of a request for proposals or the award of 
follow-on contract(s), or they will be completed on one variant but 
not both. Many of these test events are part of operational testing. 
Operational testing includes live-fire testing, which provides timely 
assessment of the survivability and lethality of a weapon system. The 
significance of conducting operational testing is reflected by the 
fact that statute requires a program to complete realistic 
survivability tests and initial operational testing before starting 
full rate production.[Footnote 29] The Navy plans to continue buying 
seaframes before completing operational test events that demonstrate 
the capability of the seaframes, that is, equipped with mission 
packages that can meet initial requirements.[Footnote 30] Other tests 
highlighted in the figure include shock and survivability tests, which 
demonstrate that the ship designs can safely absorb and control 
damage. Realistic survivability tests are required by statute before a 
program proceeds beyond low-rate initial production.[Footnote 31] 

Moreover, based on current test plans, DOT&E has concerns about the 
adequacy and nature of some tests, which led to lengthy revisions of 
earlier versions of the TEMP. Due to these concerns, DOT&E issued a 
conditional approval letter stating that the test plan was not 
adequate to support later phases of operational testing, and that the 
out-years of the program are still not well defined. Final performance 
requirements are defined in the program's capabilities development 
document, and last year the Navy developed requirements for increment 
2 SUW and increment 1 MCM to support testing. However, no requirements 
currently exist for the other increments. DOT&E granted the Navy 
approval to move to the operational testing of increment 2 SUW and 
increment 1 MCM as described in the TEMP, which the Navy plans to 
begin in 2014 and 2015, respectively, but DOT&E required the Navy to 
update and resubmit the TEMP to support testing for later increments. 
As such, the above schedule may change with subsequent TEMP 
submissions. 

To help mitigate the concurrency in the LCS program--in particular to 
better align planned contractual actions with obtaining knowledge 
through some of these test events--we recommended in July 2013 that 
the Navy reassess its acquisition strategy. Specifically, we 
recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) limit future seaframe 
acquisitions until it completed a full-rate production review. We also 
recommended that DOD report to Congress on the relative advantages of 
each seaframe variant for each key LCS mission prior to awarding any 
additional seaframe contracts. In its written response, DOD did not 
agree with our recommendations aimed at slowing the pace of seaframe 
procurements. DOD cited the need to buy ships at the planned pace to 
keep pricing low and saw no value in reducing production pending the 
full-rate production decision. DOD agreed that the Navy could, if 
requested by Congress, report on the performance of each seaframe 
variant against current LCS requirements, but did not address the need 
to provide an assessment of the relative costs and advantages and 
disadvantages of the variants against operational and mission needs. 
Such steps remain important to help ensure that the level of 
capability provided by LCS is militarily useful given the warfighter's 
current capability needs and that continued investment in the program 
is warranted. 

Pace of Mission Package Procurement Outpacing Levels Needed for 
Operational Testing: 

The Navy continues to move forward with a strategy that buys mission 
packages before their performance is demonstrated. The Navy held a 
Milestone B review for the mission packages in January 7, 2014, which 
would typically authorize a program to begin system design and 
demonstration efforts and determine the low-rate production quantity, 
which is necessary to--among other things--provide production 
configured or representative articles for operational tests.[Footnote 
32] Based on this review, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development, and Acquisitions authorized the program to 
effectively accelerate mission package production, granting the 
program approval to procure 5 test units and up to 27 production 
mission packages.[Footnote 33] According to DOD guidance, low-rate 
production usually begins at Milestone C, when programs are authorized 
to begin initial production. As we highlighted in our last report, 
continuing into what is essentially full-rate production--as this 32 
mission packages is half of the total planned quantity of mission 
packages for the program--increases the risk that the Navy will be 
purchasing systems that have not been validated to meet requirements 
through testing.[Footnote 34] We also recommended in July 2013 that 
the Navy only buy the minimum quantities of mission module systems 
required to support operational testing. DOD did not agree with this 
recommendation, stating that mission package procurements were at a 
rate necessary to: support (1) developmental and operational testing 
of the two seaframe variants with each mission module increment; (2) 
fleet training needs; and (3) operational LCS ships. In its memorandum 
on the Navy's Remote Minehunting System (RMS) operational assessment 
and Milestone C decision, DOT&E raised similar concerns, stating for 
example that the Navy should strictly limit any production of RMS, 
including the Remote Multi-mission Vehicle (RMMV), until greater 
system maturity and reliability are demonstrated on the version of RMS 
that will be initially fielded. 

We also recommended in July 2013 that the Navy ensure that the program 
baseline submitted for the mission modules' Milestone B establish 
program goals for cost, schedule, and performance for each mission 
module increment. DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, 
but our review of the program baseline found that it does not define 
the thresholds and objectives for performance for each increment of 
the mission modules. Officials from the office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations stated that there is no plan to update the baseline to 
include this performance information since they believe that the LCS 
mission package increments actually represent only one increment of 
capability. Without defined performance thresholds and objectives for 
each mission package increment, decision makers will continue to lack 
information needed to effectively monitor the development of the 
increments, and a baseline against which to measure performance. 

Additional Reporting Should Provide Congress with Key Information to 
Support Decision Making: 

We raised two matters for Congressional consideration in our July 2013 
report. First, to ensure that continued LCS investments are informed 
by adequate knowledge, we suggested that Congress consider restricting 
funding for additional seaframes until the Navy completes ongoing 
technical and design studies related to potential changes in LCS 
requirements, capabilities, and the commonality of systems on the two 
seaframe variants. Second, to ensure timely and complete information 
on the capabilities of each seaframe variant prior to making decisions 
about future LCS procurements, we suggested that Congress consider 
requiring DOD to report on the relative advantages of each variant in 
carrying out the three primary LCS missions. 

In the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014, 
Congress directed the Navy to complete a number of studies that are in 
line with our recommendations to provide additional information on 
some of the risk areas that we identified.[Footnote 35] The 
legislation restricts the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 
2014 funding for construction or advanced procurement for LCS 
seaframes 25 and 26 until the Navy submits the required reports and 
certifications. However, as LCS 25 and LCS 26 are not yet under 
contract, the Navy cannot use fiscal year 2014 money to fund these 
seaframes. As of the end of January 2014, Navy officials told us that 
they had just begun coordinating efforts and collecting data to write 
reports as required in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014. A copy of this 
NDAA requirement can be found in appendix III. 

Conclusions: 

The Navy has made progress since our last report in demonstrating LCS 
capabilities. In particular, completing the initial deployment of an 
LCS with a mission package to an overseas location provided the Navy 
with important real-world lessons learned that are being used to 
refine plans for subsequent deployments. However, these deployments 
are not a substitute for operational testing. Completing further 
developmental and operational test events will continue to provide the 
Navy will valuable data with which it can evaluate the performance of 
systems and make adjustments, as needed. The Navy still has a great 
deal of learning to do about the ships, the integrated capability that 
they are intended to provide when equipped with the mission packages, 
and how the overall LCS concept will be implemented. Not having 
adequate knowledge--such as the results of additional deployments and 
key operational test events--may result in the Navy buying ships that 
are more costly or burdensome to manage over the course of their 
service lives. Events such as rough water trials, shock and total ship 
survivability trials are intended to provide confidence that the ships 
will last their intended lifespan and are survivable, while 
deployments and operational testing of initial mission packages help 
provide confidence that the LCS will meet its performance 
requirements. Moving forward without this information complicates 
potential design changes to seaframes or mission packages. 

As we have concluded in past work, the Navy's continued approach of 
procuring the ships before proving their capabilities through testing 
increases the risks of costly retrofits or reduced performance. In 
addition, the Navy's recent decision to accelerate the acquisition of 
mission packages further limits the flexibility that the program will 
have to adjust to any problems that may arise during operational 
testing. With the Navy's planned fiscal year 2016 contract awards for 
seaframes fast approaching, we believe the recommendations that we 
made in July 2013 are still important steps that the Navy can take to 
reduce risks to the program, but additional steps are also warranted. 

Further, the Navy's ability to manage the ships' weight has been 
constrained, as the contractors' reporting has not been accurate or in 
a format that would be most useful to naval engineers. The Navy could 
improve the expediency with which it reviews and comments on 
contractor weight reports. Tools are available to improve the 
contractor's weight reporting, such as pursuing financial withholds, 
and modifying the LCS contracts to include additional mechanisms to 
ensure better reporting. More accurate and timely reporting will help 
the Navy target the drivers of weight growth and assess the 
feasibility of the additional design changes being considered for both 
seaframe variants. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

1. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics require--before approving the release of the 
request for proposals for future contracts for either seaframe 
variant--that both variants: 

a. Have deployed to a forward overseas location; 

b. Have completed rough water, ship shock, and total ship 
survivability testing; and: 

c. Have completed initial operational test and evaluation of the SUW 
mission package on the Freedom variant and the MCM mission package on 
the Independence variant. 

2. To improve the Navy's ability to effectively oversee weight 
management of the LCS seaframes, we recommend the Secretary of the 
Navy direct the LCS Seaframe Program Manager to: 

a. Take steps to ensure that the Navy completes its reviews and 
submits comments, if any, on the weight reports to the contractors 
within the timeframes dictated by the contract; and: 

b. Consider actions to make the contractor more responsive to the 
Navy's identified accuracy and content problems in the weight reports, 
including pursuing financial withholds or modifying the contract 
language. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In 
its written comments, which are included in appendix IV, DOD partially 
agreed with our recommendations to complete certain testing and 
deployment activities before approving the release of the request for 
proposals for future seaframes. DOD agreed with our recommendations 
related to seaframe weight management. 

DOD officials stated that they have every intention of completing as 
many as possible of the test and demonstration items that we 
identified in our recommendation before releasing the request for 
proposals (RFP) for future seaframe contracts, but disagreed that the 
release of the RFP should hinge on completion of these events. DOD 
officials stated that creating a break in the production of the 
seaframes would increase program costs and have significant industrial 
base considerations. We are not advocating a production break, but we 
do believe it is conceivable that subsequent seaframe unit cost 
increases could be lower than the potential increases in overall 
program costs if testing uncovered the need for costly retrofits, 
redesign, and/or requirements changes that would then have to be made 
to ships in production. We chose to use the release of the RFP as a 
decision point because we believe that drafting an RFP that is based 
on key knowledge of LCS performance serves as an important risk 
mitigation tool for the government. Specifically, if the government 
goes forward with an RFP that is not fully informed by the results of 
the important test activities we identified in our recommendation, any 
changes that might be later identified as necessary would have to be 
reflected in an amended RFP, which could delay the award of contracts 
and potentially cause a production break. The department noted that a 
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review is planned in the fiscal year 
2016 time frame and that the Board will approve the Navy's acquisition 
strategy for LCS before additional seaframe contracts are awarded. DOD 
stated that this review will take into account the progress of testing 
for both seaframes, and that every item we identified in our 
recommendation will be completed prior to the DAB except for the 
completion of the full-scale ship shock trials. We believe it will be 
important that the department makes certain that the DAB review occurs 
at a point when the Navy can be directed to pause and revise its 
acquisition strategy and the RFP for LCS if necessary to ensure it 
reflects the most current knowledge gained from testing and 
deployments. It is possible that continued testing could inform 
changes to the numbers of each variant procured, changes that would 
need to be incorporated into the acquisition strategy before the DAB 
authorizes the Navy to continue to buy more seaframes. 

Further, we continue to believe that the Navy needs to identify a 
means to conduct a full-scale ship shock trial before committing to 
contracts for further seaframes. Because the LCS seaframes are based 
on commercial designs--though heavily modified--we believe these 
trials are important to ensure that the Navy is buying ships that will 
meet its survivability needs. This is especially true with the 
Independence class variant, which is based on a novel hullform for the 
Navy and represents the Navy's first-time use of aluminum for a ship 
of this size. The Navy has itself identified that it lacks sufficient 
data on which to confidently base assumptions of this variant's 
performance in an underwater shock environment, which makes completing 
this test event before DAB review and award of contracts important. 

DOD agreed to take steps as we recommended to improve the weight 
management of the LCS seaframes, and plans to review within 180 days 
the process by which it reviews the contractor weight submissions and 
the methods by which it can ensure that the contractors are responsive 
to Navy accuracy and content concerns. 

We also provided relevant portions of the draft report (in particular, 
the sections on weight management) to the contractors and incorporated 
their technical comments as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees and the Secretaries of Defense and the Navy. In addition, 
the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at 202-512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Michele Mackin: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable James Inhofe: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Pete Visclosky: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To assess the Navy's lessons learned from the deployment of the first 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to Singapore, we analyzed reports from 
various LCS stakeholders, including Navy 7th Fleet Destroyer Squadron 
7 (responsible for LCS during the deployment), and the Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV). We also traveled to the forward-
deployed location in Singapore, and interviewed USS Freedom's 
commanding officer and some of the crew; as well as officials from the 
LCS fleet introduction program office (PMS 505); Destroyer Squadron 7; 
and Commander, Logistics Force Western Pacific. We also traveled to 
Japan to interview 7th Fleet officials involved with LCS logistics; 
policy and planning; warfare requirements; strategy; and operations. 
Furthermore, we conducted interviews with relevant Navy officials, 
such as the OPNAV office that is the resource sponsor for the LCS 
program (N96); LCS seaframe program office (PMS 501); and the LCS and 
Joint High Speed Vessel Council. To assess what knowledge the Navy has 
obtained about LCS since our previous report, we analyzed DOD, Navy 
and contractor documents, including test and evaluation letters of 
observation from the Commander, Operational Testing and Evaluation 
Force (COTF); testing reports from the Director, Operational Testing 
and Evaluation (DOT&E); as well as the Board of Inspection and Survey 
(INSURV) reports. We analyzed documentation from the LCS mission 
module program office (PMS 420), including an LCS contractor test 
report. Furthermore, we interviewed officials from OPNAV; the LCS and 
Joint High Speed Vessel Council; Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA); 
DOT&E; COTF; INSURV; the Naval Surface Warfare Center; the LCS 
seaframe program office; the LCS mission module program office; and 
the Navy Modeling and Simulation Office. Finally, we leveraged 
previous GAO reports on the LCS dating back to 2005. 

To assess additional risks for the LCS program related to weight 
management, we analyzed Navy and contractor documentation including 
weight reports; inclining experiment reports; LCS seaframe contracts; 
the LCS Capabilities Development Document; and seaframe building 
specifications. To understand weight management and reporting 
practices, we analyzed the Society of Allied Weight Engineers 
Recommended Practices and NAVSEA policies on weight management. 
Furthermore, we conducted interviews with Lockheed Martin; Bath Iron 
Works; Marinette Marine; Austal USA; the American Bureau of Shipping; 
and the Navy's Supervisor of Shipbuilding. To evaluate the naval 
architecture limits of the LCS seaframes, we interviewed retired naval 
architects with significant Navy ship design experience, as well as 
American Bureau of Shipping representatives. We also met with 
technical experts from the Naval Systems Engineering Directorate 
(SEA05).We analyzed Navy and contractor documents, including the LCS 
test and evaluation master plan; DOT&E test and evaluation master plan 
approval memo; the LCS mission modules Milestone B documentation; and 
the Navy's acquisition decision memorandum. Furthermore, we conducted 
interviews with officials from DOT&E; COTF; and INSURV. 

We conducted this performance audit from September 2013 to July 2014 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Selected Navy Comments on Recent LCS Weight Reports: 

Classification errors: 

Navy comment: "Main structural elements such as shell, framing and 
decks are calculated by frame… This results in nearly impossible 
review and audit capability. This method does not adhere to Extended 
Ship's Work Breakdown Structure (ESWBS)..."; 
Comment date: May 2012; 
Associated prime contractor: Austal USA; 
Ships affected: LCS 6. 

Navy comment: "Weight report structure and format are problematic. The 
subject quarterly weight report consisted of various disjointed, 
mislabeled, and conflicting files which are difficult to assemble and 
correlate for reporting purposes"; 
Comment date: April 2013; 
Associated prime contractor: Austal USA; 
Ships affected: LCS 6 and follow-on Independence variant seaframes. 

Navy comment: "It appears the computer aided design effort to 
incorporate detail data for Group 1 weights is fraught with ESWBS 
classification errors…It appears Group 1 has been arbitrarily 
classified to the point of a loss of control of the details"; 
Comment date: November 2013; 
Associated prime contractor: Austal USA; 
Ships affected: LCS 6 and LCS 8. 

Estimating errors: 

Navy comment: "The LCS 3 quarterly weight reports overestimated the 
ship by approximately 90 tons. The details of that same database have 
essentially been carried over to the LCS 5 accepted weight estimate 
and subsequent quarterly weight reports…The last two quarterly weight 
reports have not shown any progress toward improving the details (via 
recalculations) and reducing risk..."; 
Comment date: April 2013; 
Associated prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Ships affected: LCS 5 and follow-on Freedom variant seaframes. 

Navy comment: "The LCS 6 and LCS 8 calculated light ship condition 
with remaining margin is projected to be 56 tons lighter than LCS 4 
inclined light ship condition. When the…correction is incorporated 
into the projection, the full load condition for weight exceeds the 
(naval architectural limit) for displacement by…30 tons. Specifically, 
the service life allowance for weight is deficient by 30 tons. This is 
a serious and unprecedented situation that has to be addressed 
quickly"; 
Comment date: November 2013; 
Associated prime contractor: Austal USA; 
Ships affected: LCS 6 and LCS 8. 

Non-submission: 

Navy comment: "Submittal did not include an updated quarterly weight 
report…a no-submittal indicates the projected full load of the ship at 
delivery is currently unknown"; 
Comment date: December 2012; 
Associated prime contractor: Austal USA; 
Ships affected: LCS 6 and follow-on Independence variant seaframes. 

Use of outdated information: 

Navy comment: "Mission package descriptions, weights and centers have 
not been updated in years. The Contractor must update the mine 
countermeasures and surface warfare mission packages with the latest 
values"; 
Comment date: June 2013; 
Associated prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Ships affected: LCS 5 and follow-on Freedom variant seaframes. 

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. GAO-14-794. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: 2014 National Defense Authorization Act Navy Reporting 
Requirements: 

Section 124 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2014 restricts the obligation or expenditure of fiscal year 2014 
funding for construction or advanced procurement for LCS seaframes 25 
and 26 until the Navy submits the required reports and certifications. 
This section reads: 

SEC. 124. Limitation On Availability of Funds For Littoral Combat Ship: 

(a) Limitation--None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by 
this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2014 for 
construction or advanced procurement of materials for the Littoral 
Combat Ships designated as LCS 25 or LCS 26 may be obligated or 
expended until the Secretary of the Navy submits to the congressional 
defense committees each of the following: 

1) The report required by subsection (b)(1). 

2) A coordinated determination by the Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics that successful completion of the test 
evaluation master plan for both seaframes and each mission module will 
demonstrate operational effectiveness and operational suitability. 

3) A certification that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council--: 

a) has reviewed the capabilities of the legacy systems that the 
Littoral Combat Ship is planned to replace and has compared such 
capabilities to the capabilities to be provided by the Littoral Combat 
Ship; 

b) has assessed the adequacy of the current capabilities development 
document for the Littoral Combat Ship to meet the requirements of the 
combatant commands and to address future threats as reflected in the 
latest assessment by the defense intelligence community; and: 

c) has either validated the current capabilities development document 
or directed the Secretary to update the current capabilities 
development document based on the performance of the Littoral Combat 
Ship and mission modules to date. 

4) A report on the expected performance of each seaframe variant and 
mission module against the current or updated capabilities development 
document. 

5) Certification that a capability production document will be 
completed for each mission module before operational testing. 

(b) Report--: 

(1) In General--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Chief of Naval Operations, in coordination with the 
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees a report on the current concept of 
operations and expected survivability attributes of each of the 
Littoral Combat Ship seaframes. 

(2) Elements--The report required by paragraph (1) shall set forth the 
following, 

a) A review of the current concept of operations of the Littoral 
Combat Ship and a comparison of such concept of operations with the 
original concept of operations of the Littoral Combat Ship. 

b) An assessment of the ability of the Littoral Combat Ship to carry 
out the core missions of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower of the Navy. 

c) A comparison of the combat capabilities for the three missions 
assigned to the Littoral Combat Ship seaframes (anti-surface warfare, 
mine countermeasures, and anti-submarine warfare) with the combat 
capabilities for each of such missions of the systems the Littoral 
Combat Ship is replacing. 

d) An assessment of expected survivability of the Littoral Combat Ship 
seaframes in the context of the planned employment of the Littoral 
Combat Ship as described in the concept of operations. 

e) The current status of operational testing for the seaframes and the 
mission modules of the Littoral Combat Ship. 

f) An updated test and evaluation master plan for the Littoral Combat 
Ship. 

g) A review of survivability testing, modeling, and simulation 
conducted to date on the two seaframes of the Littoral Combat Ship. 

h) An updated assessment of the endurance of the Littoral Combat Ship 
at sea with respect to maintenance, fuel use, and sustainment of crew 
and mission modules. 

i) An assessment of the adequacy of current ship manning plans for the 
Littoral Combat Ship and an assessment of the impact that increased 
manning has on design changes and the endurance of the Littoral Combat 
Ship. 

j) A list of the casualty reports to date on each Littoral Combat 
Ship, including a description of the impact of such casualties on the 
design or ability of that Littoral Combat Ship to perform assigned 
missions. 

(3) Form--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in 
classified form and unclassified form. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Assistant Secretary of Defense: 
Acquisition: 
3015 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3015: 

March 25, 2014: 

Ms. Michele Mackin: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Mackin: 

This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO Draft Report, 
[redacted] 'Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved 
Weight Management Needed Prior to Further Investments,' dated March 4, 
2014 (GAO Code 121166). 

The Department acknowledges receipt of the draft report. As more fully 
explained in the enclosure, the Department partially concurs with 
recommendation 1 and concurs with recommendation 2. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. For further questions concerning this report, please contact 
Mr. Jack Evans, Deputy Director for Naval Warfare, at 
johnj.evans.civ@mail.mil or 703-614-3170. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Katrina McFarland: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

GAO Draft Report Dated March 4, 2014: 

"Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing And Improved Weight 
Management Needed Prior To Further Investments" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition Technology, and Logistics require--before approving the 
release of the request for proposals for future contracts for either 
seaframe variant-that both variants: 

a. Have deployed to a forward overseas location; 

b. Have completed rough water, ship shock and total ship survivability 
testing, and; 

c. Have completed initial operational test and evaluation of the SUW 
mission package on the Freedom variant and the MCM mission package on 
the Independence variant. 

DoD Response: Partially Concur. The Department has every intention to 
complete as many as possible of the items identified in sub-parts (a), 
(b), and (c) of the GAO recommendation prior to release for the 
Request for Proposals (RFP) for future seaframe contracts, however. 
the Department disagrees that the RFP release should hinge on the
completion of certain testing and operational deployments suggested in 
the GAO report. 

A Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review is planned in the FY 2016 
timeframe to review the program prior to award of the FY 2016 
seaframes contract. The DAB will evaluate all program information, 
including available test data, and inform the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) on
the program's readiness to proceed with further construction of 
seaframes. USD(AT&L) will need to approve the Acquisition Strategy 
(AS) for the next procurement of seaframes in Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 
prior to release of the RFP. Approval of the AS will be informed by 
the status of the progress of testing for both seaframes, including 
the items identified by the GAO. Current plans indicate that the first 
Independence variant ship deployment to a forward overseas location 
prior to award of future contracts tor seaframe variants, however, 
operational considerations could change this planned deployment date 
beyond the control of the acquisition community. The Freedom
variant completed an overseas deployment to a forward location in 
December 2013. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) seaframe program test 
plan includes rough water testing, ship shock testing, and total ship 
survivability testing. Total ship survivability testing of the 
Independence variant and full scale shock trials of both variants will 
not complete prior to RFP release. Likewise. initial operational 
testing of the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) mission package on the 
Independence variant will not be completed prior to the release of the 
RFP. Initial operational testing of the Surface Warfare mission 
package on the Freedom variant is currently planned to be completed
prior to release of the RFP. Rough water testing of both variants will 
be completed as ocean conditions allow. 

LCS serial production is now optimized at both shipyards to deliver 
seaframes at very favorable prices to the Government. If the 
completion ()f all testing recommended by the GAO were to create a 
break in serial production, the increased cost and impact to the
industrial base associated with the production break would be an 
important factor in the decision to proceed. Placing the construction 
program on hold would cause increased program cost even on the last 
ships of the block buy due to increased shipbuilder overhead cost, 
vendor based pricing, and negative impact on shipyard manpower, and
will have significant industrial base implications as well as cross 
program impacts at shipyards. Additionally, a construction hold would 
create a multi-year gap between the first 24 ships and completion of 
the class which would negatively impact the fleet laydown 
requirements, and impact the cost and schedule of the Mission Module
procurements and the sustainability and maintainability of the ships. 
By the time of the DAB review, the first Independence variant ship 
should have deployed to a forward overseas location, total ship 
survivability testing of both variants should have completed,
and initial operational testing of the MCM mission package on the 
Independence variant should have completed. The only GAO-identified 
testing remaining to complete would be the full scale shock trials of 
both variants. The Department will review the test schedule and make 
any adjustments that can reasonably be made to complete as much
testing as possible suggested by GAO prior to release of the RFP and 
the DAB review for the next procurement of seaframes. In any case, 
considerable developmental testing of the seaframes and the mission 
packages will also be completed prior to RFP release and the DAB 
review and will inform both decisions. For reference purposes this
recommendation will be identified as item [redacted]-01. 

Recommendation 2: To improve the Navy's ability to effectively oversee 
weight management of the LCS seaframes, we recommend the Secretary of 
the Navy to direct the LCS Seaframe Program Manager to: 

a. Take steps to ensure that the Navy completes its reviews and 
commenting, if necessary, on the weight reports within the timeframes 
dictated by the contract; 

b. Consider actions to make the contractor more responsive to the 
Navy's accuracy and content problems in the weight reports, including 
pursuing financial withholds of modifying the contract language. 

DoD Response: Concur. The Navy agrees to review within 180 days the 
internal processes for reviewing weight reports for the LCS program 
and to take steps that will ensure the weight report reviews are 
conducted within the contractual timelines. The Navy also agrees to 
review within 180 days the methods available to ensure the contractors 
are more responsive to accuracy and content issues identified by the 
Navy and to implement those methods when deemed necessary. For 
reference purposes this recommendation will be identified as item 
[redacted]-02. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Michele Mackin, 202-512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, the following staff members 
made key contributions to this report: Diana Moldafsky (Assistant 
Director); Greg Campbell; Jenny Chow; Christopher R. Durbin; G. Oliver 
Elliott; Laura Greifner; Kristine Hassinger; Kenneth Patton; C. James 
Madar; Sabrina Streagle; Roxanna Sun; and Hai Tran. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] This estimate does not include $3.6 billion of procurement money 
for mission package "replacement, attrition, and technology refresh." 

[2] GAO, Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral 
Combat Ship Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, 
Use, and Cost, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-530] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2013); and a testimony based on GAO-13-
530]: Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral 
Combat Ship Continue Amid Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, 
Use, and Cost, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-738T] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2013). 

[3] H.R. Rep. No. 113-102, at 28-29 (2013) and S. Rep. No. 113-44, at 
22-23 (2013). 

[4] GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Deployment of USS Freedom Revealed 
Risks in Implementing Operational Concepts and Uncertain Costs, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-447] (Washington, D.C., 
July 8, 2014) focuses on LCS operational support and life-cycle 
sustainment issues. 

[5] The 7th Fleet's area of responsibility encompasses more than 48 
million square miles of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. 

[6] For LCS 2 and LCS 4, General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works was the 
prime contractor for the Austal USA-built ships. General Dynamics and 
Austal USA ended their teaming arrangement in 2010. Austal USA is the 
prime contractor for the 10 other even-numbered seaframes currently 
under contract. 

[7] A trimaran is a ship that has three separate hulls. The Navy is 
now referring to the Independence class variant as a slender 
stabilized monohull design. 

[8] The Navy awarded two block buy contracts for up to 10 ships to 
both shipyards; the Navy authorized construction of one ship at each 
shipyard at the time of contract award, and authorized construction of 
one ship at each shipyard in fiscal year 2011, and two ships at each 
shipyard per year, from fiscal years 2012-2015. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-530] contains additional 
information on the Navy's contracting strategy. 

[9] At this time, the Secretary of Defense also instructed the Navy to 
submit alternate proposals to procure a capable and lethal small 
surface combatant generally consistent with the capabilities of a 
frigate to assist with fiscal year 2016 budget deliberations. 

[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-530]. 

[11] Vertical center of gravity is defined as the vertical distance 
between the ship's center of gravity and the keel. 

[12] The Navy has recently started referring to the mission package 
increments as "phases;" however, we are retaining the term "increment" 
because that is the term in Navy acquisition documentation. 

[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-530] contains 
additional details about the planned mission packages and the 
timeframes for intended operational capability. 

[14] Navy officials told us that LCS 5 and LCS 6 will be the first 
production representative seaframes that have the majority of various 
design changes incorporated. 

[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-447] focuses on 
LCS operational support and life-cycle sustainment issues. 

[16] There is disagreement within the Navy as to how many mission days 
were lost due to mechanical failures. The LCS fleet introduction 
program office provided us with documentation showing that 55 days 
were lost; other Navy offices stated that 28 days were lost, but did 
not provide documentation for how this number was determined. 

[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-447] focuses more 
specifically on the effect of the reduced crew size during the 
deployment. 

[18] In 2009, the Navy received authorization from the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council to reduce LCS's original endurance 
requirement, which was a 4,300-nautical-mile range when operated at a 
speed of 16 knots, to the current endurance requirement. This 
reduction followed a Navy assessment of the two seaframe designs. 

[19] The stability service life allowance is associated with a 
seaframe's vertical center of gravity as measured from its keel. 

[20] LCS 2 contractor officials told us that the calculated speed in 
the full load condition LCS 2 is 36.5 knots. 

[21] Society of Allied Weight Engineers, Recommended Practice Number 
14: Weight Estimating and Margin Manual for Marine Vehicles (Los 
Angeles, Calif.: May 22, 2001). 

[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-530]. 

[23] Naval Sea Systems Command Instruction 9096.3E, Weight and Moment 
Compensation and Limiting Drafts for Naval Surface Ships (Feb. 14, 
2005). 

[24] LCS 3 exceeds the required service life allowance for weight and 
LCS 4 has not yet delivered and is not yet an operational asset, so it 
is not yet included in this reporting. 

[25] Minehunting is the process of using sensors to localize and 
identify individual mines for avoidance or later neutralization. 
Minesweeping uses either acoustic and magnetic emissions to detonate 
mines designed to target a ship's acoustic or magnetic signature 
(called influence mine sweeping) or a physical device to cut the 
tether of moored mines so that they float to the surface, where they 
can be detonated or recovered for intelligence purposes (called 
mechanical minesweeping). While Navy mine warfare officials stated 
that minehunting is the preferred mode of clearing mines since it is 
more precise, minesweeping is sometimes the only option due to time or 
environmental constraints. 

[26] Society of Allied Weight Engineers, Recommended Practice Number 
12: Weight Control Technical Requirements for Surface Ships, Revision 
Issue No. C (Los Angeles, Calif.: May 22, 2002). 

[27] According to Navy program officials, contracts for the first four 
seaframes included a requirement that the Navy complete its review and 
comment on weight reports within 45 days. 

[28] If the Department of Defense and/or the Navy opt to make a change 
to the program's future acquisition strategy, these dates may change. 
As noted above, in February 2014, the Secretary of Defense announced 
that as part of its fiscal year 2015 budget proposal the Navy would 
not contract for more than 32 ships, instead of the 52 as planned. 

[29] 10 U.S.C. §§ 2399, 2366. 

[30] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-530] contains 
additional information about mission package capabilities. 

[31] 10 U.S.C. § 2366. 

[32] Low-Rate Initial Production quantities are generally 10 percent 
of the total production quantity. 

[33] In October 2012, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology changed the status of the LCS 
mission module program from an Acquisition Category (ACAT) ID to an 
ACAT IC, thereby giving the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development, and Acquisitions decision making authority for 
mission module acquisitions, including approval of the Milestone B 
decision. 

[34] If the Navy curtails LCS production at 32 seaframes, the end 
number of mission package quantities could change. 

[35] Pub L. No. 113-66, § 124 (2013). 

[End of section] 

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