This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-14-597 
entitled 'Supplemental Security Income: Wages Reported for Recipients 
Show Indications of Possible SSN Misuse' which was released on July 
16, 2014. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

July 2014: 

Supplemental Security Income: 

Wages Reported for Recipients Show Indications of Possible SSN Misuse: 

GAO-14-597: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-597, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In fiscal year 2012, SSA estimated it paid over $53.4 billion to SSI 
recipients, of which 8.1 percent, or $4.3 billion, SSA estimated to 
have been improper payments. The SSI program pays benefits to the 
aged, blind or disabled adults and children with limited income and 
resources. 

GAO was asked to analyze potentially improper SSA disability payments. 
This report identifies potential SSI overpayments and indicators of 
possible SSN misuse. SSA provided GAO with a onetime file extract of 
SSI recipients as of December 2010 and the matching income from both 
the quarterly wage and unemployment insurance components of the NDNH 
database that included fiscal year 2010. GAO compared the SSI benefit 
and NDNH wage data to identify potential overpayments. GAO randomly 
selected five individuals for case-file review. These cases cannot be 
projected to the overpayment population but provide illustrative 
examples of possible SSN misuse. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO's analysis of wages reported in the National Directory of New 
Hires (NDNH) initially showed that the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) made $19 million in potential overpayments to 10,187 recipients 
through its Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program in fiscal year 
2010. Using a different methodology that includes additional causes of 
overpayments not considered in GAO's analysis, SSA estimated it made 
$3.3 billion in SSI overpayments in fiscal year 2010. The majority (70 
percent) of the estimated overpayment amount GAO identified showed 
indications of possible Social Security number (SSN) misuse, such as 
employers reporting wages for recipients in multiple locations during 
the same quarter. For example, GAO determined that wages for 2,399 SSI 
recipients were reported solely by employers outside the recipient's 
state of residence. As the figure below shows, one individual in 
California had wages reported from 11 different employers in seven 
other states during the same quarter of calendar year 2010. This 
suggests that multiple individuals may be using the SSI recipient's 
SSN and name for work. The exact number of individuals who received 
overpayments and the exact amount of overpayments made to those 
individuals cannot be determined without detailed case investigations 
by SSA. GAO analyzed five recipient cases and provided the results to 
SSA. 

Figure: Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Recipient with Reported 
Wages in Seven Different States: 

Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

Recipient state: California. 
States where wages were received: 
Alabama; 
Florida; 
Indiana; 
Illinois; 
Mississippi; 
Pennsylvania; 
Washington. 

Source: GAO analysis of National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) and 
Social Security Administration (SSA) information. GAO-14-597. 

[End of figure] 

GAO analyzed employers with wages for SSI recipients from outside the 
recipient's state and found nine employers who reported wages for 15 
or more SSI recipients during the same quarter who lived in different 
states from the employer's location. For example, a plant located in 
one state reported wages for 22 SSI recipients who lived in six other 
states, indicating possible SSN misuse. SSA has previously reported 
that privacy and disclosure issues have limited its ability to 
routinely share information with the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), which is responsible for enforcing employer compliance with 
immigration laws through its work-site enforcement strategy. Reviewing 
SSI wages at a summary level can provide information on certain 
employers that have high incidences of inaccurate wage reports. The 
ability to share information regarding potential unauthorized 
employment could enhance SSA's ability to address SSN misuse and help 
DHS better target its work-site enforcement efforts. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Acting Commissioner of Social Security work 
with the Secretary of Homeland Security to identify the data useful to 
DHS's work-site enforcement strategy and seek legislative authority to 
obtain such information, as appropriate. DHS agreed with GAO's 
recommendation and SSA agreed to the intent of the recommendation, but 
did not agree to seek legislative authority. GAO still believes this 
recommendation is valid as discussed in the report to help the federal 
government better utilize the complementary sources of data available 
at SSA. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-597]. For more 
information, contact Seto J. Bagdoyan at (202) 512-6722 or 
BagdoyanS@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Potential Overpayments to SSI Recipients in Fiscal Year 2010 Show 
Indications of Possible SSN Misuse: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Social Security Administration: 

GAO Comments 30: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Overpayment Estimate of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
Recipients with Indications of Possible Social Security Number (SSN) 
Misuse in Fiscal Year 2010: 

Figure 2: Supplemental Security Income Recipient with Reported Wages 
in Seven Different States: 

Figure 3: Employer with Reported Wages for Supplemental Security 
Income Recipients in Distant States: 

Abbreviations: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DI: Disability Insurance: 

EIN: Employer Identification Number: 

HSI: Homeland Security Investigations: 

NDNH: National Directory of New Hires: 

OIG: Office of the Inspector General: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

SSA: Social Security Administration: 

SSI: Supplemental Security Income: 

SSN: Social Security number: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

July 16, 2014: 

Congressional Requesters: 

The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, which is administered 
by the Social Security Administration (SSA), provides cash assistance 
to financially needy individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled. The 
SSI program is currently 1 of the 13 programs designated by the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) as being "high-error" programs for 
improper payments.[Footnote 1] In this regard, during fiscal year 
2012, SSA estimated it paid over $53.4 billion to SSI recipients, of 
which 8.1 percent, or $4.3 billion, SSA estimated to have been 
improper payments (overpayments and underpayments).[Footnote 2] 
Furthermore, SSA attributed 59 percent of SSI improper payments in 
fiscal year 2012 to verification and administration errors--such as 
the detection of unreported financial accounts and wages--among other 
things. Individuals are not eligible for SSI payments for any period 
during which they have income or resources that exceed the allowable 
amounts established under the Social Security Act, which also requires 
SSA to verify information on income and resources to ensure that 
payments are correct and are only provided to eligible individuals. 
[Footnote 3] The accuracy of earnings information is important since 
earnings affect a recipient's SSI eligibility and payment amount. 

Our prior work has found that weaknesses in SSA's process for 
reviewing recipients' work activity have hindered the agency's ability 
to identify and review recipient income, which affects eligibility for 
disability benefits.[Footnote 4] This report is the third in a series 
that responds to your request to examine employment-related databases 
and analyze potentially improper SSA disability payments. Accordingly, 
this report compares SSA data with income reported in the National 
Directory of New Hires (NDNH) to identify potential SSI overpayments 
and indicators of possible Social Security number (SSN) misuse. 
[Footnote 5] The exact number of individuals who received SSI 
overpayments and the exact amount of overpayments made to those 
individuals cannot be determined without detailed case investigations 
by SSA. Hence, we refer to "potential overpayments" throughout this 
report. 

For our prior work, SSA provided us with a one-time file extract 
containing SSI recipients as of December 2010 and the matching income 
information from both the quarterly wage and unemployment insurance 
components of the NDNH database that included fiscal year 
2010.[Footnote 6] Since this extract is the most-recent NDNH data 
available to us, our analysis of SSI beneficiaries with income in the 
NDNH is limited to fiscal year 2010. To determine the subset of 
recipients who received potential overpayments during fiscal year 
2010, we identified individuals who received SSI benefits in fiscal 
year 2010 and who also had records in the NDNH indicating the receipt 
of wages or unemployment insurance in the corresponding quarter of 
fiscal year 2010. For each individual, we compared the amount of all 
income in the NDNH to the maximum allowable income as specified by SSA 
and compared this amount to the monthly SSI benefit amounts in SSA's 
files to determine the total amount of overpayment. Through comparison 
of these benefit amounts and income, we were able to identify 
potential SSI overpayments. 

In addition to our overall analysis, we randomly selected five 
individuals for additional review of detailed SSI case-file 
information from a population of individuals who were reported as 
receiving wages from four or more states other than the state of 
residence on their SSA record during the same quarter.[Footnote 7] 
Because we selected a small number of individuals for further 
analysis, the result of these five cases cannot be projected to the 
entire population of individuals. To develop the five cases, we 
reviewed relevant SSA case-file documents and interviewed SSI program 
officials. 

To determine the reliability of the SSA disability records and NDNH 
data, we reviewed documentation related to these databases and 
interviewed officials responsible for compiling and maintaining 
relevant SSI and NDNH data. In addition, we performed electronic 
testing to determine the validity of specific data elements in the 
databases that we used to perform our work. We also reviewed detailed 
SSA case files for the nongeneralizable selection of five individuals 
selected for additional analysis to corroborate the NDNH and SSA data. 
On the basis of our discussions with agency officials, our review of 
related documentation, and our own testing, we concluded that the data 
elements used for this report were sufficiently reliable for our 
purposes. See appendix I for more information on our objective, scope, 
and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 to July 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. 

Background: 

The SSI program pays benefits to the aged, blind or disabled adults, 
and children who have limited income and resources. To determine 
whether an SSI applicant is financially eligible, SSA is to perform an 
initial determination at the time of application, and to conduct 
periodic reviews to determine whether the recipient remains eligible. 
SSI recipients are required to report events that may affect their 
financial eligibility for benefits, including changes in income, 
resources, marital status, and living arrangements. SSI generally 
reduces the monthly benefit by $1 for every $2 of monthly earnings 
after the first $85.[Footnote 8] 

SSA matches computerized data from other federal and state agencies to 
help verify that the recipients' case information is correct. SSA 
accesses the NDNH by means of routine file matches to verify 
eligibility and payment amounts under the SSI program.[Footnote 9] 
During SSA's income-verification process, SSA systems generate an 
alert when a match between the SSA record and the verified quarterly 
wage file shows there are significant overreported or underreported 
wages. SSA uses established criteria, such as tolerances, to generate 
the alerts and post them to the recipient's record for future review 
and development by field-office staff to determine whether the 
discrepancies affect SSI benefits.[Footnote 10] 

The NDNH database, administered by the Department of Health and Human 
Services, contains employment data on newly hired employees (form W-
4), quarterly wage data on individual employees, and unemployment 
insurance data. In order to verify the accuracy of data in the NDNH, 
the department transmits the NDNH data to SSA to verify the accuracy 
of the SSN and its related name against information in the SSA 
database. When the NDNH receives notification that the SSN is 
verified, the system then adds the data to the NDNH database. If the 
SSN is not verified it is either rejected or posted to separate files 
within the NDNH.[Footnote 11] 

GAO and the SSA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) have previously 
identified patterns of errors and irregularities in wage reporting, 
including SSN misuse. For example, in January 2001 the SSA OIG 
reported that employers in the agriculture industry submit thousands 
of wage items for which the employee's name or SSN does not match SSA 
records.[Footnote 12] In April 2005, the SSA OIG also identified the 
top 100 employers in each of the service, restaurant, and agriculture 
industries that contribute the most reporting irregularities.[Footnote 
13] Several of the employers and industry associations that spoke with 
the SSA OIG for its April 2005 report stated that unauthorized 
noncitizens contribute to SSN misuse. In 2005, we reported that 
employers in certain industry categories are more likely than others 
to submit reports with invalid worker identity information. Some 
employers exhibit a pattern of errors year after year, such as using 
one SSN for more than one worker in multiple tax years.[Footnote 14] 

According to SSA, SSN misuse can cause errors in wage reporting when 
earnings for one individual are incorrectly reported to the record of 
another person having a similar surname. An individual, such as an 
unauthorized noncitizen obtaining work in the United States, can also 
deliberately use the name and SSN of another individual, which 
contributes to SSN misuse. When an individual assumes another person's 
identity to work in the United States using the number holder's actual 
SSN and name to do so, wages reported for that individual will be 
posted to the true number holder's account. According to SSA policy, 
if earnings are identified that do not belong to the number holder, 
the individual may submit a signed statement "disclaiming" the wages 
as his or her own and have the earnings removed from his or her Master 
Earnings File.[Footnote 15] 

Potential Overpayments to SSI Recipients in Fiscal Year 2010 Show 
Indications of Possible SSN Misuse: 

According to SSA, in 2010, the SSI program made a total of $44.6 
billion in payments to 8.9 million recipients. Our analysis of wages 
reported in the NDNH initially showed that SSA made $19 million in 
potential SSI overpayments to 10,187 SSI recipients in fiscal year 
2010, but approximately 70 percent of the total overpayment amount 
showed indications of possible SSN misuse, such as individuals with 
wages reported from employers in multiple states during the same 
quarter, so we were unable to determine whether the recipients 
actually received SSI overpayments.[Footnote 16] We also found 
employers with high incidences of inaccurate wage reports and 
identified information that could be shared with the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) to help address possible SSN misuse. 

Analysis of 2010 Data Identified Potential Overpayments and Possible 
SSN Misuse: 

Based on comparisons of SSI beneficiary records with quarterly wage 
and unemployment records included in the NDNH, we initially estimated 
that SSA made $19 million in potential SSI overpayments to 10,187 SSI 
recipients in fiscal year 2010. Using a different methodology that 
includes additional causes of overpayments not considered in GAO's 
analysis, SSA estimated to have made $3.3 billion in SSI overpayments 
in fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 17] SSA also considers other causes of 
overpayments such as pensions; resources such as real estate, bank 
accounts, cash, stocks, and bonds; and living arrangements. The 10,187 
recipients we identified received a monthly SSI payment when, based on 
our analysis, they were potentially not entitled to any benefits. All 
of these individuals appeared to receive income in fiscal year 2010 
above the maximum SSI program threshold--$1,433 per month--while also 
receiving SSI payments. However, as discussed below, we found 
indications of some possible SSN misuse and were therefore unable to 
determine the extent to which SSI overpayments were due to income 
earned by the recipient and reported in the NDNH. 

As shown in figure 1 below, more than 40 percent of our identified 
population of 10,187 SSI recipients (4,228 SSI recipients) and about 
70 percent of our original overpayment estimate ($13.2 million) showed 
indications of possible SSN misuse. 

Figure 1: Overpayment Estimate of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
Recipients with Indications of Possible Social Security Number (SSN) 
Misuse in Fiscal Year 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart and sub-chart] 

$19 million in potential Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
overpayments: 
Potential Social Security number (SSN) misuse population: $13.2 
million. 

Of that $13.2 million: 
2,399 individuals with wages reported solely by employers located 
outside the recipients' state of residence: $9.8 million; 
582 individuals with in- and out-of-state wages: $2.1 million; 
1,247 individuals with in-state wages reported by multiple employers 
for the same quarter: $1.3 million; 
Total: 4,228 individuals. 

Source: GAO analysis of National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) and 
Social Security Administration (SSA) information. GAO-14-597. 

Note: The exact number of individuals with possible SSN misuse cannot 
be determined without a detailed case investigation by SSA. 

[End of figure] 

During our analysis, we identified instances in which SSI recipients 
were reported as having received wages by employers from different 
states than what was reported as their state of residence on their SSA 
record. We conducted additional analysis of our potential overpayment 
population to determine the extent to which such out-of-state wages 
occurred. We determined that for our potential overpayment population 
of 10,187 recipients, wages for 2,399 SSI recipients were reported 
solely by employers located outside the recipient's state of 
residence. Of those 2,399 individuals, 21 were reported as receiving 
wages by employers from four or more different states than what was 
reported as their state of residence on their SSA records during the 
same quarter. We randomly selected 5 recipients from this group of 21 
for additional review of detailed SSI case-file information. 

Our case-file reviews for these five recipients are nongeneralizable 
(i.e., cannot be projected to the entire population of individuals) 
but identify possible instances of SSN misuse. For each of the five 
cases, wages reported in the NDNH triggered alerts to SSI caseworkers 
for follow-up. However, all five of the recipients had evidence in 
their case files of wages being disclaimed. Under SSA's procedures for 
disclaiming wages, recipients can provide SSA with a signed statement 
attesting that the wages being reported for their SSN were not earned 
by them. One of the recipients disclaimed wages as far back as 2004, 
and has repeatedly disclaimed wages every year from 2009 to 2012. Once 
a recipient disclaims wages, the SSI caseworker then is to take an 
additional step to remove the disclaimed earnings from the Master 
Earnings File. According to SSA, the agency had already referred four 
of the five recipients to SSA's OIG for further investigation. SSA OIG 
stated that it reviewed the four cases, but the cases were 
subsequently closed due to insufficient details that hindered its 
ability to make a determination as to which individual was possibly 
misusing the SSN. 

The five cases we reviewed also indicated possible SSN misuse. For 
example, as shown in figure 2 below, one individual living in 
California had wages reported in the NDNH from 11 different employers 
in seven other states that were many miles away during the same 
quarter of calendar year 2010. This suggests that multiple individuals 
may have been using the SSI recipient's SSN and name for work 
purposes. We recognize there are instances when individuals could work 
for multiple employers simultaneously. However, it is questionable 
that one person could work for multiple employers simultaneously in 
different regions of the country during the same quarter. 

Figure 2: Supplemental Security Income Recipient with Reported Wages 
in Seven Different States: 

Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

Eleven employers in seven distant states reported wages in the same 
quarter for one California Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
recipient: 

One individual had reported wages from different employers in seven 
different states, which suggests that multiple individuals are using 
the Social Security number (SSN) and name for work. 

Recipient state: California. 
States where wages were received: 
Alabama (1); 
Florida (2); 
Indiana(1); 
Illinois(1); 
Mississippi(2); 
Pennsylvania(1); 
Washington (3). 

Source: GAO analysis of National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) and 
Social Security Administration (SSA) information. GAO-14-597. 

[End of figure] 

Of the 10,187 individuals we identified as having received potential 
SSI overpayments, we also identified another 582 SSI recipients with 
wages reported from employers both outside and within their home state 
during the same quarter. Wages reported for the remaining portion of 
our overpayment population were solely from employers inside their 
state. However, this subset of recipients also showed indications of 
possible misuse. A total of 1,247 in-state recipients had multiple 
employers report wages during the same quarter. For example, we 
identified one individual who, according to SSA's records, lives in a 
border town in south Texas, but had wages reported in the NDNH from 
four different employers during the same quarter of calendar year 2010 
located hundreds of miles away in the Dallas/Fort Worth and Houston, 
Texas, areas. 

We recognize that it is possible for individuals that live near a 
state border to work in the neighboring state or for individuals to 
change their employer within a 3-month quarter for which wages are 
reported.[Footnote 18] However, without a detailed case-file review 
that includes contacting the recipient to determine if reported wages 
should be disclaimed, it is impossible to determine whether the wages 
reported by employers in other states that are many miles away are 
attributable to a single SSI recipient or to other individuals 
misusing the recipient's SSN. 

Certain Employers Had High Incidence of Questionable Wage Reporting: 

After determining the extent to which individuals had wages reported 
from outside their state, we analyzed the employers that reported 
those wages. As another sign of possible SSN misuse, our analysis 
identified nine employers who reported wages for 15 or more SSI 
recipients during the same quarter that, according to SSA's records, 
lived in different states from the employer's location. For example, 
as shown in figure 3 below, one meat plant with a single Indiana 
location reported wages for 22 SSI recipients whose SSA records 
indicated that they lived in other states that were many miles away: 
namely California, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Texas. According to SSA's records, none of the SSI recipients we 
detected in the wages reported by this employer actually lived in 
Indiana. This suggests that the Indiana plant workers may have been 
improperly using the SSNs of SSI recipients living in other states, or 
that the SSI recipients were actively working in other states while 
claiming SSI. 

Figure 3: Employer with Reported Wages for Supplemental Security 
Income Recipients in Distant States: 

Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

One employer located in Indiana reported wages for 22 different 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients that lived in distant 
states. 

None of the SSI recipient Social Security numbers (SSN) we detected in 
the reported wages for this employer actually lived in Indiana, 
according to the Social Security Administration's (SSA) records. 

Employer state: Indiana; 
Recipient states: 
California (1); 
Louisiana (1); 
Massachusetts (1); 
New York (1); 
Pennsylvania (1); 
Texas (17). 

Source: GAO analysis of National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) and 
Social Security Administration (SSA) information. GAO-14-597. 

[End of figure] 

SSA Could Better Share Information to Help Address SSN Misuse: 

According to an August 2013 SSA OIG report, SSA staff stated that some 
employers hire unauthorized workers because they know SSA has no legal 
authority to levy fines and penalties, and they are not concerned 
about potential Internal Revenue Service sanctions.[Footnote 19] DHS 
is responsible for granting aliens permission to work in the United 
States, and for enforcing compliance of employers with immigration 
laws. Under the law, employers who employ individuals who they know 
are not authorized to work in the United States may face civil fines, 
or in some cases, criminal penalties. The U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), has a three-
pronged approach to address work-site enforcement: enforcement 
(criminal arrests of employers); compliance (employment-eligibility 
verification inspections, civil fines, and suspension and debarment); 
and outreach (education and training). According to HSI officials, HSI 
prioritizes its work-site enforcement investigations by focusing on 
the most-egregious violators, such as employers that knowingly hire 
unauthorized workers, utilize unauthorized workers as a business 
model, mistreat or exploit their workers, aid in the smuggling of 
their alien workforce into the United States, or create false identity 
documents or facilitate document fraud. HSI officials further stated 
that the agency continues to prioritize the protection of our nation's 
critical infrastructures and key resource sectors and industries by 
ensuring that unauthorized workers do not have access to sensitive 
facilities or information. As part of the effort to target 
unauthorized employment, a law was established allowing SSA to share 
data with DHS on noncitizens who have earnings recorded under a 
nonwork SSN.[Footnote 20] Under certain circumstances, SSA may assign 
nonwork SSNs to noncitizens who are in the United States but are not 
authorized to work. Individuals earning wages under a nonwork SSN 
represent potential noncitizens who are working without DHS 
authorization. Furthermore, DHS officials stated that if the data on 
possible SSN misuse we identified could be routinely shared with them, 
similar to sharing the nonwork SSN data, it may assist them in their 
enforcement efforts. For example, they stated that the data on 
possible SSN misuse we identified may add to the depth of DHS 
investigations by identifying indicators of potentially egregious 
employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers, and support DHS's 
work-site enforcement strategy efforts. Specifically, rather than 
identifying work discrepancies on a case-by-case basis, DHS officials 
agreed that our summary analysis may provide useful information on 
certain employers that have a high incidence of reporting inaccurate 
wages, indicating possible SSN misuse. 

Although SSA is able to identify possible SSN misuse for SSI 
recipients when alert notices are generated and wages are ultimately 
disclaimed by the recipient, SSA has previously reported that privacy 
and disclosure issues have limited its ability to combat SSN misuse. 
[Footnote 21] For instance, according to SSA, data-sharing 
restrictions limit its ability to routinely share information with DHS 
regarding employers who file large numbers of wage statements with 
inaccurate SSNs.[Footnote 22] In 2001, SSA OIG recommended that SSA 
reevaluate its application of existing laws or seek legislative 
authority to remove barriers that would allow the agency to share 
information regarding chronic problem employers who submit duplicate 
or unassigned SSNs with DHS. At the time, SSA disagreed with the 
recommendation, stating that it continued to provide appropriate 
disclosure guidance within its existing authority. In addition, SSA 
stated in its response to the SSA OIG's 2001 report that there was no 
need for the agency to reevaluate its disclosure policies or to seek 
legislation in this area because SSA's existing regulations authorized 
it to disclose information for law-enforcement purposes, including 
requests for investigation or prosecution purposes. 

Similarly, in February 2005 we recommended that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security take steps to determine how DHS can best use SSA-
supplied data on potential illegal work activity and specific 
industries associated most frequently with such activity to support 
its work-site enforcement efforts.[Footnote 23] In its response to our 
2005 report, DHS had stated that it was taking the necessary steps to 
determine the best use of SSA-provided listings of persons with 
earnings who lack work authorization. In February 2006 we further 
concluded that coordination between DHS and SSA to leverage usable and 
useful data is essential to ensure that limited DHS work-site 
enforcement resources are targeted effectively.[Footnote 24] In 2005, 
SSA OIG reiterated its support for the 2001 recommendation to seek 
legislative authority that would allow SSA to share information 
regarding employers who had the most reporting irregularities, such as 
invalid, unassigned, and duplicate SSNs. In 2013, SSA OIG identified 
employers who report wages with significant errors in the employee 
name and SSN and also recommended that SSA continue working with DHS 
to develop a coordinated strategy to reduce SSN misuse.[Footnote 25] 
In its written response to the August 2013 SSA OIG report, SSA agreed 
with this recommendation and stated it would continue to promote 
methods for employers to verify employee names and SSNs that would 
result in fewer wage-reporting irregularities. For example, DHS's E-
Verify is a free, largely voluntary, Internet-based system that allows 
employers to verify the employment eligibility of newly-hired 
employees with the SSA database and DHS immigration databases. 
Currently, DHS estimates that 9 percent of employers utilize E-Verify 
with approximately 1,600 additional employers enrolling every week. 

Both Congress and the executive branch have recognized the need for 
improved collaboration across the federal government. In addition, in 
our past work, we have concluded that collaboration is critical for 
achieving meaningful results in efforts involving multiple federal 
agencies.[Footnote 26] Following key practices for effective 
collaboration can help agencies address a range of challenges, such as 
information sharing and communication. One of these key practices is 
directly relevant to SSA's efforts to collaborate with DHS: 
establishing compatible policies, procedures, and other means to 
enhance information sharing and communication across agency 
boundaries. We previously identified tools that can facilitate such 
collaboration between agencies, such as shared databases and web 
portals. Establishing a negotiated data-sharing arrangement could be 
beneficial for effective collaboration between SSA and DHS. 

As previously mentioned, a component of DHS's work-site enforcement 
strategy includes focusing on employers who knowingly hire 
unauthorized workers. Our analysis provides important newly identified 
summary information on employers that file high numbers of inaccurate 
wage reports with valid and assigned SSNs that appear to be misused. 
Such information could be used by DHS to target unauthorized 
employment in support of its work-site enforcement efforts. In 
addition to providing specific data in response to requests from law 
enforcement for particular investigations, routine data-sharing 
capabilities that include employers who have high incidences of 
inaccurate wage reports may augment DHS's existing work-site 
enforcement strategies by identifying potential unauthorized 
employment. 

Conclusions: 

Wages reported by employers in the NDNH for SSI recipients can be used 
to identify recipient employment activity as well as the possible 
misuse of SSNs. Our analysis shows that reviewing these discrepancies 
between income reported by SSI recipients and income reported by 
employers at a summary level can provide important information on 
certain employers that have a high incidence of reporting inaccurate 
wages for SSI recipients, indicating possible SSN misuse. This 
employer-level information could be useful to DHS as part of its work-
site enforcement strategy, which includes focusing on employers who 
knowingly hire unauthorized workers. However, due to privacy and 
disclosure laws, SSA is limited in its ability to share this employer-
level information with DHS. This leaves the federal government unable 
to "connect the dots" using data it already has at its disposal. 
Hence, additional actions could facilitate the sharing of this 
information. Obtaining legislative authority to enable the sharing of 
information regarding potential unauthorized employment, including 
about employers who file high numbers of wage statements with 
potentially misused SSNs, could enhance SSA's ability to address SSN 
misuse and help DHS better target its work-site enforcement efforts. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To help strengthen SSA's efforts to monitor the SSI program, and pay 
accurate SSI benefits, as well as to enhance DHS's investigative 
efforts on behalf of its work-site enforcement strategy, we recommend 
that the Acting Commissioner of Social Security work with the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to identify the specific data useful to 
DHS's work-site enforcement strategy, including the new summary 
information that we identified on employers who file high numbers of 
wage reports with potentially misused SSNs, along with the 
corresponding privacy and disclosure restrictions, and seek 
legislative authority to allow the Secretary to obtain such 
information, as appropriate. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of our report to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and the Acting Commissioner of Social Security for comment. 
We adjusted the initial language of the recommendation based on a 
request from SSA officials to allow the flexibility to coordinate with 
DHS and identify specific data that would be useful to DHS's work-site 
enforcement strategy prior to seeking any new legislative authority. 
We received written comments from both DHS and SSA, which are 
reproduced in appendix II and III. SSA and DHS also provided technical 
comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. 

In its written comments, DHS said that it concurred with the 
recommendation and that HSI will work with SSA to identify information 
that may be useful to DHS's work-site enforcement efforts and 
establish a formal point of contact for doing so, although DHS did not 
provide a time frame for implementing the recommendation. In its 
written comments, SSA said it agreed with the intent of the 
recommendation but will not pursue any legislative authority that may 
be required to share data not already allowed under current law 
because it does not want to be a conduit for sharing data between 
other agencies. GAO still believes that appropriate legislative 
authority should be pursued as necessary to allow DHS and SSA to more-
effectively share information, and better "connect the dots" with the 
data they already have at their disposal. Since SSI program data 
converges with complementary data from the Department of Health and 
Human Services and the Department of the Treasury, these data would be 
useful in supporting DHS's work-site enforcement efforts. We continue 
to believe action is needed in response to our recommendation because, 
with neither SSA nor DHS pursuing potentially needed data-access 
authority, the information on potential SSN misuse and on employers 
with a high incidence of questionable wage reporting identified by GAO 
will remain unutilized. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 
committees, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, the Secretary 
of Homeland Security, and other interested parties. In addition, the 
report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-6722 or BagdoyanS@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. 

Signed by: 

Seto J. Bagdoyan: 
Acting Director, Audits: 
Forensic Audits and Investigative Service: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Tom Coburn, M.D.
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Claire McCaskill: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Financial and Contracting Oversight: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology: 

Both Congress and the executive branch have recognized the need for 
improved collaboration across the federal government. In our past 
work, we concluded that collaboration is critical when meaningful 
results that the federal government seeks to achieve required the 
coordinated efforts of more than one federal agency.[Footnote 27] This 
report examines potential Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
overpayments by comparing Social Security Administration (SSA) data 
with income reported in the National Directory of New Hires (NDNH) 
database and identifies indicators of possible Social Security number 
(SSN) misuse. 

For our prior work on SSA's programs, SSA had provided us with a file 
containing SSI recipients as of December 2010 and the matching income 
information from both the quarterly wage and unemployment insurance 
component of the NDNH database that included fiscal year 2010. 
[Footnote 28] SSA also provided us an updated extract of SSI 
recipients as of September 2013, which separated the state and federal 
portion of the SSI benefit payment. We utilized the income reported in 
the NDNH and the federal portion of the SSI benefit payment to 
determine the extent that individuals potentially received SSI 
overpayments in fiscal year 2010. Since the file containing SSI 
recipients and the corresponding NDNH data provided by SSA is the most-
recent NDNH data available to us, our analysis of SSI beneficiaries 
with income in the NDNH is limited to fiscal year 2010. 

To determine the subset of recipients who received overpayments during 
fiscal year 2010, we identified individuals who received SSI benefits 
in fiscal year 2010, and who also had records in the NDNH indicating 
the receipt of wages or unemployment insurance in the corresponding 
quarter of fiscal year 2010. For each individual, we used the monthly 
SSI benefit amounts in SSA's files and the amount of all income in the 
NDNH to determine the total amount of overpayment. Through comparison 
of these benefit amounts and income, we were able to identify 
potential SSI overpayments. Our analysis of the potential overpayments 
is limited to income data from the NDNH and SSI payments from SSA. The 
exact number of individuals who received SSI overpayments and the 
exact amount of overpayments made to those individuals cannot be 
determined without detailed case investigations by SSA. Thus, we refer 
to "potential overpayments" throughout this report. 

We also reviewed detailed SSI case files for a nongeneralizable 
selection of five individuals to illustrate potential cases of SSN 
misuse in overall overpayment population. We randomly selected a 
sample of five individuals from our population who were reported as 
receiving wages from four or more different states other than the 
state of residence that was reported on their SSA record. In order to 
be included in our sample, individuals had to have wages reported from 
four or more separate states during the same quarter. Because we 
selected a small number of individuals for further analysis, the 
results of these five cases cannot be projected to the entire 
population of individuals who received SSI overpayments. To develop 
the cases, we reviewed relevant SSA case-file documents and 
interviewed SSI program officials. 

Of our population of SSI recipients that we identified who were 
reported as receiving wages from a different state than the state of 
residence that was reported on their SSA record during the same 
quarter, we analyzed the Employer Identification Number (EIN) for 
their employers and found nine employers who had 15 or more SSI 
recipients who lived out of state working for that employer in the 2nd 
quarter of 2010. To avoid the possibility that an employer might have 
locations in multiple states, we researched each of the nine EINs in 
LexisNexis to determine the number of states in which the employer had 
locations. Of the nine EINs, four were not found in LexisNexis, and 
four had locations in multiple states. The remaining one had locations 
in only one state. We selected this employer as an example of an 
employer who reported wages for SSI recipients in distant states 
during the same quarter. 

To determine the reliability of the SSA disability records and NDNH 
data, we reviewed documentation related to these databases and 
interviewed officials responsible for compiling and maintaining 
relevant SSI and NDNH data. In addition, we performed electronic 
testing to determine the validity of specific data elements in the 
databases that we used to perform our work. We also reviewed detailed 
SSA case files for the nongeneralizable selection of five individuals 
selected for additional analysis to corroborate SSA data. On the basis 
of our discussions with agency officials, our review of related 
documentation, and our own testing, we concluded that the data 
elements used for this report were sufficiently reliable for our 
purposes. 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2013 to July 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. 

Limitations to Using NDNH Data: 

The timing and nature of NDNH income data we received present 
limitations to the data's capacity to identify overpayments in 
accordance with SSA's program rules. First, the quarterly amounts on 
the NDNH represent 3 months of income; however, SSA calculates 
overpayments based on monthly earnings amounts. To facilitate our 
analysis, we calculated monthly income for each month in a quarter by 
dividing the quarterly NDNH amount by three. For example, if the NDNH 
reported quarterly income of $3,000 in the first quarter of 2010, we 
calculated the monthly income to be $1,000 for January, February, and 
March of 2010. This monthly computed income amount could differ from 
the actual monthly income. For instance, using the previous example, 
the actual monthly income in January 2010 could be $3,000, and actual 
income in February or March could be $0. In addition, because we were 
limited to SSI beneficiaries with income in the NDNH for fiscal year 
2010, our analysis may understate the extent of individuals receiving 
potential overpayments due to possible SSN misuse. 

SSI Overpayments: 

Our analysis of the NDNH match file identified individuals who 
received SSI payments in fiscal year 2010 and had computed monthly 
income that exceeded the corresponding monthly threshold for the 
program.[Footnote 29] To calculate the potential SSI overpayments for 
each month, we compared the income to the maximum benefit amounts as 
specified by SSA by subtracting the total countable income from the 
2010 monthly SSI benefit rate of $674. SSI has program rules for the 
exclusion of a certain amount of income in considering whether the 
monthly SSI benefit rate should be reduced.[Footnote 30] As such, we 
took these exclusions into consideration to capture the amount of 
exclusion used and the remaining exclusion amount. Specifically, we 
calculated countable unearned income, countable earned income, and the 
total countable income. Since this population included individuals 
with indications of expenses incurred or income set aside that are 
typically excluded from countable income when calculating the SSI 
benefit amount,[Footnote 31] individuals with these types of expenses 
were also excluded from our overall population. About 0.25 percent of 
the SSI recipients in our population had any indication of exclusions 
to income present. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

June 30, 2014: 

Seto J. Bagdoyan: 
Acting Director, Forensic Audits and Investigative Service: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO 14-597, "Supplemental Security Income: Wages 
Reported for Recipients Show Indications of Possible SSN Misuse" 

Dear Mr. Begdoyan: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) work in conducting its 
review and issuing this report. 

The Department is pleased to note GAO's recognition of DHS' efforts to 
protect our nation against unauthorized workers; in particular the 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security 
Investigation's (HSI's) three-pronged approach to address work-site 
enforcement through: 

* enforcement (criminal arrests of employers); 

* compliance (employment-eligibility verification inspections, civil 
fines and suspension and debarment); and; 

* outreach (education and training). 

DHS will continue to collaborate with the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) to determine what SSA information can be used to 
improve work-site enforcement, as appropriate. 

The draft report contained one recommendation, with which the 
Department concurs. Specifically, GAO recommended that the Acting 
Commissioner of Social Security work with the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to: 

Recommendation 1: Identify the specific data useful to DHS's work-site 
enforcement strategy, including the new summary information that we 
identified on employers who file high numbers of wage reports with 
potentially misused SSNs, along with the corresponding privacy and 
disclosure restrictions, and seek legislative authority to allow the 
Secretary to obtain such information, as appropriate. 

Response: Concur. The ICE HSI, will work with the SSA to identify 
information, allowable for distribution under law that may be useful 
to DHS's worksite enforcement efforts. HSI will establish a point of 
contact to reach out to SSA to more formally continue the dialogue 
between the two agencies. Estimated Completion Date: To Be Determined. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this 
draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under 
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker, CIA, CFE: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Social Security Administration: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at 
the end of this appendix. 

Page numbers in the draft report may differ from those in this report. 

Social Security: 
Office of the Commissioner: 
Social Security Administration: 
Baltimore, MD 21235-0001: 

July 3, 2014: 

Mr. Seto Bagdoyan: 
Acting Director, Forensic Audits: 
and Investigative Service: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Bagdoyan: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report, 
"Supplemental Security Income: Wages Reported for Recipients Show 
Indications of Possible SSN Misuse" (GAO-14-597). We have enclosed our 
response to the audit report contents. 

If you have any questions, please contact me at (410) 966-9014. Your 
staff may contact Gary S. Hatcher, our Senior Advisor for Records 
Management and Audit Liaison Staff, at (410) 965-0680. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Katherine Thornton: 
Deputy Chief of Staff: 

Comments On The Government Accountability Office Draft Report: 

"Supplemental Security Income: Wages Reported For Recipients Show 
Indications Of Possible SSN Misuse" GAO-14-597: 

General Comments: 

We take seriously our responsibility to protect the integrity of the 
Social Security number (SSN). We are pleased the report confirms that 
our field employees take this responsibility seriously, as they took 
appropriate action to disclaim wages and even referred cases of 
concern to our Office of the Inspector General's Office of 
Investigations. 

We believe the statement on GAO's highlight page (second sentence), 
"Using a different methodology that includes additional causes of 
overpayments not considered in GAO's analysis, SSA estimated it made 
$3.3 billion in SS1 overpayments in fiscal year 2010." is misleading 
to the reader and adds no value to what GAO found based on GAO's 
methodology. Additionally, GAO makes no reference to the source of the 
estimates GAO states SSA estimated. Therefore, we suggest GAO remove 
this sentence from the report. [See comment 1] 

Potential SSN Misuse: 

GAO assumes, based on the results of its limited, non-generalizable 
sample, that receiving earnings outside a worker's state of residence 
or from multiple employers is an indication of SSN misuse. GAO 
acknowledges, but then seems to dismiss, that there may be valid 
reasons for these earnings. It is not only workers residing near state 
borders, or workers for companies with multiple locations, who are 
likely to have earnings reported in other States. Individuals who work 
for large corporations that contract with out-of-state payroll 
providers may have earnings reported from another State. For example, 
we pay our employees who work in Baltimore, Maryland through the 
Department of the Interior, located in Denver, Colorado, rather than 
by a Maryland office of the Social Security Administration. 
Additionally, it is common for individuals to have multiple earnings 
reports. In fact, each year we process multiple earnings reports for 
tens of millions of individuals. In short, without a more thorough 
analysis, or even a more detailed description of the methodology from 
which to replicate GAO's review, we cannot determine the validity of 
GAO's conclusion that such earnings indicate potential SSN misuse is 
valid. [See comment 2] 

Unauthorized Employment: 

Based on previous unrelated audits rather than any analysis of the 
cases reviewed, GAO assumes that instances of "potential SSN misuse" 
are the result of work performed by noncitizens without work 
authorization. GAO does not consider any alternatives, such as 
identity theft perpetrated by family members with access to the 
worker's personally identifiable information. We cannot, based on the 
limitations of GAO's methodology, draw the same conclusion that 
"potential SSN misuse" directly correlates to unauthorized work. [See 
comment 3] 

Potential Improper Payments in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
Program: 

In general, GAO should clarify the confusing description of the 
matched Supplemental Security Record and National Directory of New 
Hires (NDNH) data. For example, the report notes that GAO received a 
file of December 2010 SSI recipients and "matching" income information 
from the NDNH, which would seem to indicate that GAO used income from 
the 4th quarter of 2010. However, the report refers to all of fiscal 
year 2010 as the analysis period, and states that "...individuals 
appeared to receive income in fiscal year 2010 above the maximum SSI 
program threshold—-$1,433 per month-—while also receiving SSI 
payments" [italics added]. [See comment 4] 

In addition, the limitations of its methodology for comparing SSI 
payments to NDNH data call into question GAO's estimate that we made 
$19 million in potential SSI overpayments. Income determinations under 
the SSI program can be complex, and GAO's abridged income calculations 
do not account for these complexities. [See comment 5] For example, 
GAO's methodology does not account for: 

* Periods of SSI ineligibility, 

* Retrospective Monthly Accounting, 

* Other income exclusions (e.g. Student Earned Income Exclusions); or: 

* Delays in applying work incentives or reporting employment or income 
to SSA. 

Recommendation: 

To help strengthen SSA's efforts to monitor the SSI program, and pay 
accurate SSI benefits, as well as to enhance DHS's investigative 
efforts on behalf of its work-site enforcement strategy, we recommend 
that the Acting Commissioner of Social Security work with the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to identify the specific data useful to 
DHS's work-site enforcement strategy, including the new summary 
information that we identified on employers who file high numbers of 
wage reports with potentially misused SSNs, along with the 
corresponding privacy and disclosure restrictions, and seek 
legislative authority to allow the Secretary to obtain such 
information, as appropriate. 

Response: 

We agree with the intent of the recommendation: that enhanced work-
site enforcement tools would be helpful to the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). Such enforcement tools would deter potential SSN 
misuse, stop businesses from knowingly hiring undocumented workers, 
and provide DHS with point-of-hire employment data that includes 
information about new hires and their employers. We remain committed 
to continuing our long-standing, close working relationship with DHS, 
including support of the E-Verify program and DHS's efforts to expand 
its usefulness as a key enforcement tool against unauthorized 
employment. As part of our ongoing inter-agency working discussions to 
improve E-Verify, we will reach out to DHS to determine whether there 
is information in our records and under our control that DHS would 
need to target its work-site enforcement efforts. However, as 
discussed in detail below, we will not seek legislative authority to 
share data in our records that is not ours to share; as such sharing 
may not improve our payment accuracy. 

In its recommendation, GAO proposes that sharing information with DHS 
to enhance its work-site enforcement strategy would also help us 
monitor and improve the accuracy of SSI payments. Given our concerns 
with GAO's methodology, we do not believe the evidence supports the 
conclusion that sharing data with DHS would improve SSI payment 
accuracy. As GAO notes in its report, the results of its five-case 
sample are not generalizable, and there are many reasons why an 
individual may have work reported by multiple employers in multiple 
states. 

In addition, the data that GAO suggests we share with DHS is not ours 
to share. The NDNH database belongs to the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS). Earnings information in our records and in the 
NDNH, such as Employer Identification Numbers, are considered tax 
information and are subject to rigid protection against disclosure 
under the Internal Revenue Code. Pursuant to statute, we are 
authorized to access and use this data for our own program purposes. 
However, given that we do not believe sharing this data with DHS will 
enhance our payment accuracy, we see no reason to seek legislative 
authority to act as a conduit for information between DHS and agencies 
that may maintain data of use to DHS in its work-site enforcement 
efforts. Accordingly, we defer to DHS to work directly with agencies, 
such as HHS and the Department of Treasury, to obtain access, if 
appropriate, to the information under those agencies' control. 

Technical Comments: 

Page 4, footnote 3. {See comment 6] 

Comment: Footnote 3 should read "42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq." 

Page 6, Background, first paragraph, last sentence: 

We suggest adding a footnote for the statement, "SSI generally reduces 
the monthly benefit by $1 for every $2 of monthly earnings after the 
first $85." Our suggested footnote language is, "The first $65 (up to 
a maximum of $85 if the individual has no income other than earnings) 
of any monthly earned income plus one-half of remaining earnings are 
excluded for SSI benefit computation purposes." [See comment 7] 

GAO Comments: 

The following are GAO's comments on the Social Security 
Administration's (SSA) letter dated July 3, 2014. 

1. In the report, we added a reference to SSA's Fiscal Year 2011 
Performance and Accountability Report as the source of the estimate. 
Including SSA's own estimate of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
overpayments shows that overpayments are a recognized issue with the 
program. 

2. As mentioned in the report, we recognize that it is possible for 
individuals that live near a state border to work in the neighboring 
state or for individuals to change their employer within a 3-month 
quarter for which wages are reported. However, without a detailed case-
file review that includes contacting the recipient to determine if 
reported wages should be disclaimed, it is impossible to determine 
whether the wages reported by employers in other states that are many 
miles away are attributable to a single SSI recipient or to other 
individuals misusing the recipient's Social Security number (SSN). Our 
report describes a case where an SSI recipient that lives in 
California had wages reported by 11 different employers in seven 
different states, none of which bordered California, for the same 3-
month period. We believe this is an indication of potential SSN misuse. 

3. As mentioned in our report, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) stated that the data on possible SSN misuse we identified may 
add to the depth of DHS investigations by identifying indicators of 
potentially egregious employers who knowingly hire unauthorized 
workers. 

4. We revised the report to clarify GAO had National Directory of New 
Hires (NDNH) data that included fiscal year 2010. 

5. As mentioned in the report, we state that the exact number of 
individuals who received SSI overpayments and the exact amount of 
overpayments made to those individuals cannot be determined without 
detailed case investigations by SSA. Thus, we refer to "potential 
overpayments" throughout this report. In addition, the report states 
that approximately 70 percent of the total overpayment amount showed 
indications of possible SSN misuse, such as individuals with wages 
reported from employers in multiple states during the same quarter, so 
we were unable to determine whether the recipients actually received 
SSI overpayments. Additional limitations to our methodology are 
described in detail in appendix I. 

6. We revised the footnote to address SSA's specific comment. 

7. We added the footnote to address SSA's specific comment. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] High-error programs are those programs that (1) measured and 
reported errors above the threshold determined by OMB and contributed 
to the majority of improper payments; (2) have not reported an 
improper payment dollar amount, but have in the past reported errors 
above the threshold; or (3) have not yet reported an overall program 
improper payment dollar amount, but the aggregate of the measured 
program's component errors are above the threshold. The fiscal year 
2010 threshold was $750 million in improper payments. 

[2] Total federally administered payments represent estimated program 
outlays and may vary from actual outlays. SSI statistical precision is 
at a 95 percent confidence level. Confidence intervals for fiscal year 
2012 are ±0.53 percent for underpayments and ±1.78 percent for 
overpayments. 

[3] 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. 

[4] Our earlier work focused on SSA's Disability Insurance (DI) 
program, which is the nation's largest cash-assistance program for 
workers with disabilities. See GAO, Disability Insurance: Work 
Activity Indicates Certain Social Security Disability Insurance 
Payments Were Potentially Improper, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-635] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 
2013) and Disability Insurance: SSA Can Improve Efforts to Detect, 
Prevent, and Recover Overpayments, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-724] (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 
2011). 

[5] The Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Child 
Support Enforcement's NDNH contains quarterly state wage information, 
which is more recent than the annual wage information that SSA obtains 
through its current Internal Revenue Service data match. SSA currently 
uses the NDNH to periodically monitor the earnings of SSI recipients. 
According to SSA Office of the Inspector General (OIG), SSN misuse is 
described as one person using another's name and SSN for work purposes. 

[6] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-724] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-635]. 

[7] Individuals had to have wages reported from four or more separate 
states during the same quarter. "Four or more states" was utilized as 
a criterion because it is unlikely that an individual could work 
simultaneously in four or more states in one quarter, although it is 
possible for individuals that live near a state border to work in the 
neighboring state. 

[8] According to SSA, the first $65 (up to a maximum of $85 if the 
individual has no income other than earnings) of any monthly earned 
income plus one-half of remaining earnings are excluded for SSI 
benefit computation purposes. 

[9] SSA matches the SSI data against the NDNH database, looking for 
significant wage discrepancies between reported income by SSI 
recipients and income reported by employers. 

[10] An alert is generated when the wage amount for a quarter exceeds 
the Supplemental Security Record wage amount for that quarter by more 
than the "tolerance." The tolerance for a recipient's wage is $250 for 
a quarter. An alert will not be generated for self-employment income 
because it is reported annually, not quarterly. 

[11] Some states' quarterly wage records include only a partial set of 
letters, or no letters, in the employees' names. When these states 
send their records to the NDNH, the system checks the SSN to determine 
whether it is within the range of SSNs that have been issued to date 
by SSA. Records with SSNs outside the issued range are rejected. If 
the SSN is within the range, the system attempts verification. If the 
SSN/name combination is not verified, the system accepts the record 
and stores it in the quarterly wage Non-Verifiable or Unverified files. 

[12] Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General, 
Obstacles to Reducing Social Security Number Misuse in the Agriculture 
Industry, A-08-99-41004 (Jan. 22, 2001). 

[13] Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General, 
Social Security Number Misuse in the Service, Restaurant, and 
Agriculture Industries, A-08-05-25023 (Apr. 29, 2005). 

[14] See GAO, Social Security: Better Coordination among Federal 
Agencies Could Reduce Unidentified Earnings Reports, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-154] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 4, 
2005). 

[15] The Master Earnings File is the main source of SSA's earnings 
data. SSA uses earnings information received from the Internal Revenue 
Service, including quarterly earnings records, and annual income-tax 
forms to calculate benefit amounts, and stores this earnings 
information as the Master Earnings File. 

[16] Due to indications of potential SSN misuse, we refer to our SSI 
overpayment population as "potential" overpayments. It is important to 
note that it is not possible to determine from data analysis alone the 
extent to which SSA made improper benefit payments to these 
individuals since a detailed evaluation of all the facts and 
circumstances must be conducted for each recipient. This evaluation 
would include contacting the recipient and the employer to gather 
information. 

[17] Figure obtained from Social Security Administration, Fiscal Year 
2011 Performance and Accountability Report. 

[18] Individuals may also work for large corporations that contract 
with out-of-state payroll providers and have earnings reported from 
another state. 

[19] Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General, 
Employers Who Report Wages with Significant Errors in the Employee 
Name and Social Security Number, A-08-12-13036 (Aug. 9, 2013). 

[20] 8 U.S.C. § 1360(c). 

[21] Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General, 
Employers Who Report Wages with Significant Errors in the Employee 
Name and Social Security Number. 

[22] Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General, 
Obstacles to Reducing Social Security Number Misuse in the Agriculture 
Industry. 

[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-154]. 

[24] See GAO, Social Security Numbers: Coordinated Approach to SSN 
Data Could Help Reduce Unauthorized Work, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-458T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 
2006). 

[25] Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General, 
Social Security Number Misuse in the Service, Restaurant, and 
Agriculture Industries, A-08-05-25023; and Employers Who Report Wages 
with Significant Errors in the Employee Name and Social Security 
Number. 

[26] See GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for 
Implementing Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 
2012). 

[27] See GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for 
Implementing Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 
2012). 

[28] Our earlier work focused on SSA's Disability Insurance (DI) 
program, which is the nation's largest cash-assistance program for 
workers with disabilities. See GAO, Disability Insurance: Work 
Activity Indicates Certain Social Security Disability Insurance 
Payments Were Potentially Improper, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-635] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 
2013) and Disability Insurance: SSA Can Improve Efforts to Detect, 
Prevent, and Recover Overpayments, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-724] (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 
2011). 

[29] The maximum SSI monthly earnings threshold for calendar year 2010 
was $1,433. 

[30] The SSI federal monthly benefit rate for fiscal year 2010 was 
$674. This standard amount is then reduced by any countable income. 
The reduction for unemployment and pension income, which is considered 
unearned income, is dollar for dollar after a $20 general income 
exclusion. The reduction for quarterly wage income, which is 
considered earned income, is $1 for every $2 after an $85 exclusion 
($20 general exclusion + $65 earnings exclusion). 

[31] SSA allows recipients to deduct out-of-pocket costs for 
Impairment Related Work Expenses from the amount of earnings used to 
figure the SSI benefit. Impairment Related Work Expenses may be 
nonreimbursed expenses related to the disability and needed in order 
to work. Earned income used to meet Blind Work Expenses is not counted 
in the SSI eligibility and payment amount decision. Blind Work 
Expenses may be expenses needed to earn income, and do not have to be 
related to the individual's blindness. A Plan to Achieve Self Support 
is an SSI provision to help individuals with disabilities return to 
work. Plan to Achieve Self Support lets a disabled individual set 
aside money and things he or she owns to pay for items or services 
needed to achieve a specific work goal. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the 
performance and accountability of the federal government for the 
American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates 
federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, 
and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, 
and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is 
reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and 
reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's website [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, 
testimony, and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] and select 
"E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO's actual cost of 
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black 
and white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO's 
website, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

Connect with GAO: 

Connect with GAO on facebook, flickr, twitter, and YouTube.
Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 
Website: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]; 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov; 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470. 

Congressional Relations: 

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

[End of document]