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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of 
Representatives: 

June 2014: 

Border Security: 

Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Collaborative Mechanisms along the 
Southwest Border: 

GAO-14-494: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-494, a report to Chairman, Committee on Homeland 
Security, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

According to DHS's CBP, Arizona and South Texas represent some of the 
highest-threat areas along the southwest border for illegal entrants 
and smuggling. DHS and CBP coordinate border security with interagency 
partners, including other federal, state, local, and tribal entities. 
DHS established collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to 
integrate CBP operations and improve interagency coordination. 

GAO was asked to review DHS efforts to coordinate resources along the 
southwest border. This report (1) describes how DHS uses collaborative 
mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to coordinate border security 
efforts, and (2) examines the extent to which DHS has established 
performance measures and reporting processes and how, if at all, DHS 
has assessed and monitored the effectiveness of the collaborative 
mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas. GAO analyzed documentation, 
such as campaign plans for the mechanisms; conducted visits to Arizona 
and South Texas; and interviewed CBP components and interagency 
partners selected on the basis of agency type and level of 
participation in the mechanism. Information from these interviews 
cannot be generalized to all components and partners, but provided 
insights into the mechanisms. 

What GAO Found: 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has coordinated border 
security efforts using collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South 
Texas, specifically (1) the Joint Field Command (JFC), which has 
operational control over all U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
resources in Arizona; (2) the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats 
(ACTT), which is a multiagency law enforcement partnership in Arizona; 
and (3) the South Texas Campaign (STC), which integrates CBP resources 
and facilitates coordination with other homeland security partner 
agencies. Through these collaborative mechanisms, DHS and CBP have 
coordinated border security efforts in (1) information sharing, (2) 
resource targeting and prioritization, and (3) leveraging of assets. 
For example, to coordinate information sharing, the JFC maintains an 
operations coordination center and clearinghouse for intelligence 
information. Through the ACTT, interagency partners work jointly to 
target individuals and criminal organizations involved in illegal 
cross-border activity. The STC leverages assets of CBP components and 
interagency partners by shifting resources to high-threat regions and 
conducting joint operations. 

DHS and CBP have established performance measures and reporting 
processes for the JFC and ACTT in Arizona and the STC in South Texas; 
however, opportunities exist to strengthen these collaborative 
mechanisms by assessing results across the efforts and establishing 
written agreements. Each collaborative mechanism reports on its 
results to DHS or CBP leadership through a variety of means, such as 
accomplishment reports and after-action reports. However, CBP has not 
assessed the JFC and STC mechanisms to evaluate results across the 
mechanisms. JFC and STC components GAO interviewed identified 
challenges with managing resources and sharing best practices across 
the mechanisms. For example, officials from all five JFC components 
GAO interviewed highlighted resource management challenges, such as 
inefficiencies in staff conducting dual reporting on operations to CBP 
leadership. Best practices for interagency collaboration call for 
federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts to create the means 
to monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas 
for improvement. An assessment of the JFC and STC could provide CBP 
with information to better address challenges the mechanisms have 
faced. In addition, DHS has not established written agreements with 
partners in the ACTT and STC Unified Command-—the entity within STC 
used for coordinating activities among federal and state agencies—-
consistent with best practices for sustaining effective collaboration. 
Officials from 11 of 12 partner agencies GAO interviewed reported 
coordination challenges related to the ACTT and STC Unified Command, 
such as limited resource commitments by participating agencies and 
lack of common objectives. For example, a partner with the ACTT noted 
that there have been operations in which partners did not follow 
through with the resources they had committed during the planning 
stages. Establishing written agreements could help DHS address 
coordination challenges, such as limited resource commitments and lack 
of common objectives. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that CBP assess the JFC and STC, and that DHS, among 
other things, establish written agreements with ACTT and the STC 
Unified Command partners. DHS concurred with the recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-494]. For more 
information, contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or 
gamblerr@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DHS Uses Collaborative Mechanisms to Share Information, Target 
Resources, and Leverage Assets: 

DHS Has Established Performance Measures and Reporting Processes for 
the JFC, ACTT, and STC, but Could Strengthen These Collaborative 
Mechanisms: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: List of Partners in the Alliance to Combat Transnational 
Threats and South Texas Campaign Unified Command: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Summary of Collaborative Mechanisms in Arizona and South 
Texas: 

Table 2: Summary of Objectives and Performance Measures Reported by 
the Collaborative Mechanisms: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Geographic Areas of Responsibility of the Joint Field 
Command (JFC), Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT), and 
South Texas Campaign (STC) along the Southwest Border: 

Abbreviations: 

ACTT: Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats: 

ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives: 

CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOI: Department of the Interior: 

ERO: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Enforcement and Removal 
Operations: 

HSI: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security 
Investigations: 

ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

JFC: Joint Field Command: 

JOD: Joint Operations Directorate: 

MOU: memorandum of understanding: 

OA: Office of Administration: 

OAM: Office of Air and Marine: 

OFO: Office of Field Operations: 

POE: port of entry: 

STC: South Texas Campaign: 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 27, 2014: 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The United States shares over 1,900 miles of border with Mexico, with 
Arizona and South Texas sharing 387 and 697 miles of that border 
respectively.[Footnote 1] The border with Mexico and these two states 
includes different types of terrain that represent a significant 
challenge to border security efforts. For example, in Arizona, the 
border is characterized by desert and rugged mountains, while in South 
Texas, the border is divided by the Rio Grande. Threats along the 
southwest border include illegal entrants and the smuggling of drugs, 
firearms, and currency by criminal networks. According to U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP), corridors in Arizona and South Texas 
represent some of the highest-threat areas along the southwest border 
for illegal entrants and smuggling. 

Securing U.S. borders is the responsibility of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), in collaboration with other federal, state, 
local, and tribal entities. CBP, a component within DHS that is the 
lead agency for border security, is responsible, among other things, 
for preventing terrorists and their weapons of terrorism from entering 
the United States and for interdicting persons and contraband crossing 
the border illegally. Within CBP, the Office of Field Operations (OFO) 
is responsible for securing the border at ports of entry (POE). 
[Footnote 2] The U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) is the CBP 
component charged with ensuring security along border areas between 
the POEs. Additionally, CBP's Office of Air and Marine (OAM) provides 
air and maritime support to secure the national border between the 
POEs, within maritime operating areas, and within the nation's 
interior. DHS and CBP and its components coordinate their border 
security efforts with various federal, state, local, and tribal 
entities. 

DHS has established collaborative mechanisms throughout the southwest 
region that are designed to help integrate CBP operations and improve 
interagency coordination.[Footnote 3] In September 2013, we reported 
that DHS has established collaborative mechanisms with both 
similarities and differences in how they are structured, which 
missions or threats they focus on, and which agencies participate in 
them, among other things.[Footnote 4] In Arizona, CBP realigned its 
resources in February 2011 through the Joint Field Command (JFC), 
wherein the operations of all CBP components in Arizona--OFO, Border 
Patrol, and OAM--report to a single commander. CBP also coordinates 
with interagency partners in Arizona through the Alliance to Combat 
Transnational Threats (ACTT), which is a multiagency forum initiated 
in September 2009 to integrate intelligence and operations among 
homeland security partners, including DHS's U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Arizona Department of Public Safety, 
among others. In South Texas, CBP instituted the South Texas Campaign 
(STC) in February 2012 to help integrate the activities of CBP 
components to accomplish specified objectives, such as targeting 
criminal networks, and to facilitate coordination with homeland 
security partners, such as ICE and the Drug Enforcement Administration. 

You asked us to review how DHS is coordinating resources along the 
southwest border to achieve an integrated law enforcement response to 
border security threats. This report addresses the following two 
questions: 

* How does DHS use collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas 
to coordinate border security efforts? 

* To what extent has DHS established performance measures and 
reporting processes and how, if at all, does DHS assess and monitor 
the effectiveness of the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South 
Texas? 

To address these objectives, we visited the JFC and the ACTT in 
Arizona and the STC in South Texas and conducted interviews with 
officials in CBP headquarters. In Arizona, we visited JFC and ACTT 
headquarters in Tucson and observed the JFC's Joint Intelligence and 
Operations Center and an ACTT leadership meeting. We also conducted 
interviews with JFC and ACTT headquarters officials. In South Texas, 
we visited STC headquarters in Laredo, where we observed operations at 
Border Patrol checkpoints and POEs as well as the South Texas Border 
Intelligence Center, and conducted interviews with STC headquarters 
officials. During our site visits to Arizona and South Texas, we also 
met with officials from OFO, Border Patrol, and OAM. Additionally, we 
conducted semistructured interviews via telephone with officials from 
5 CBP component offices from the 21 CBP component locations in Arizona 
and 5 CBP component offices from the 43 CBP component locations in the 
South Texas region.[Footnote 5] We also conducted semistructured 
interviews via telephone with officials from 6 ACTT partner agencies 
from the 66 ACTT partner agencies in Arizona and 6 STC Unified Command 
partner agencies from the 33 STC Unified Command partner agencies in 
South Texas.[Footnote 6] We selected component offices to interview 
based on type of component, the level of threat as defined by the 
number of CBP apprehensions of illegal entrants, and geographic 
location. We selected interagency partners to interview based on type 
of governmental unit and level of participation in the mechanisms. 
While we cannot generalize information obtained from these interviews 
to all CBP component offices and interagency partners in Arizona and 
South Texas, information from these interviews provided us with 
insights into how CBP has coordinated border security efforts. 

To describe how DHS uses collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South 
Texas to coordinate border security efforts, we reviewed documents 
from 2009 through 2014 obtained from JFC, ACTT, and STC officials, 
such as charter documents, establishment memos, and organizational 
charts, to identify the structure and roles and responsibilities for 
each mechanism.[Footnote 7] We also reviewed campaign and operational 
plans, as well as performance reports, to determine coordination 
efforts of the mechanisms. To examine the extent to which DHS has 
established performance measures and reporting processes and how, if 
at all, DHS has assessed and monitored the effectiveness of the 
collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas, we analyzed 
campaign plans, after-action reports, and accomplishment reports from 
2011 through 2014 obtained from the collaborative mechanisms to 
determine what measures are in place to track outcomes and assess 
progress.[Footnote 8] We also conducted interviews with officials from 
Border Patrol, OFO, and OAM headquarters to determine the extent to 
which CBP and its components are assessing the benefits and challenges 
of the JFC, ACTT, and STC. We compared the mechanisms' structures and 
operations with best practices to enhance and sustain interagency 
collaboration and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government.[Footnote 9] Appendix I presents more details about our 
objectives, scope, and methodology. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

CBP's three components--OFO, Border Patrol, and OAM--maintain a field 
structure across the United States and its territories consisting of 
20 OFO field offices, 20 Border Patrol sectors, and 3 OAM regions. 
Within this field structure, each component also manages individual 
locations; OFO field offices provide oversight of POEs, Border Patrol 
sectors oversee stations, and OAM regions oversee branches. For 
example, OAM's Southwest Border Region provides oversight of 
individual air and marine branches across the southwest border, 
including locations in both Arizona and South Texas. 

As stated in CBP's Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan, providing 
security along the northern, southern, and coastal borders requires 
effective coordination and integration of all of CBP's operational 
components, along with the guidance and assistance of essential CBP 
mission support personnel. One of CBP's objectives is to establish and 
maintain effective control of air, land, and maritime borders through 
the use of the appropriate mix of infrastructure, technology, and 
personnel. To that end, CBP's strategic plan states that gaining and 
maintaining effective control of the nation's border requires useful 
intelligence and strong partnerships with federal, state, local, 
tribal, and foreign governments. The JFC, ACTT, and STC are intended 
to help CBP achieve these objectives, according to CBP documents. For 
example, the 2011 memo establishing the JFC states that the JFC's 
responsibility will be to ensure full strategic integration of all CBP 
assets where feasible and possible in order to maximize operational 
effectiveness and efficiencies. The ACTT's charter states that the 
ACTT is to be an effort to maximize the cooperation and coordination 
of interagency law enforcement efforts in Arizona. Moreover, the STC's 
establishment memo notes the STC Commander is to serve as the CBP 
integrator in South Texas, increasing CBP's operational effects 
through partnerships with stakeholders and communities of interest in 
South Texas. Figure 1 shows the geographic area that the JFC, ACTT, 
and STC cover within the southwestern United States. 

Figure 1: Geographic Areas of Responsibility of the Joint Field 
Command (JFC), Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT), and 
South Texas Campaign (STC) along the Southwest Border: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Illustrated on the map: 

Joint Field Command (JFC) and Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats 
(ACTT): State of Arizona
JFC and ACTT headquarters: Tucson, Arizona; 
South Texas Campaign (STC)[A]: South Texas; 
STC headquarters: Laredo, Texas. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
information, Mapinfo (map). GAO-14-494. 

[A] The STC added the New Orleans Border Patrol sector to the STC in 
2013. The New Orleans sector oversees stations in Alabama, Louisiana, 
and Mississippi. 

[End of figure] 

The three mechanisms have varying structures that aim to integrate CBP 
operations and improve interagency coordination, as described below. 

* JFC: The JFC is an entity, under the direction of a commander, with 
operational control over CBP's resources in Arizona, including OFO, 
Border Patrol, and OAM resources. Intended to maximize operational 
effectiveness and efficiencies, the JFC exercises the authority to 
reallocate staffing and resources among CBP components in Arizona. 
While the JFC Commander maintains operational control of resources in 
Arizona, each component's headquarters has authority over 
administrative decisions for the component, such as providing funding, 
equipment, and training. The JFC has a dedicated budget of 
approximately $5 million in fiscal year 2014 that primarily covers 
personnel costs. 

* ACTT: The ACTT is a multiagency law enforcement partnership in 
Arizona designed to address smuggling of aliens, drugs, and bulk cash; 
exportation of weapons; and hostage taking, among other illegal 
activities. While it is a DHS initiative, the ACTT concept was 
implemented by CBP and other federal, state, and local agencies. 
According to the ACTT Chief of Staff, the ACTT is not under the 
authority of the JFC; however, the JFC approves CBP-level 
participation in ACTT operations. The JFC utilizes the ACTT to 
prioritize tactical targets and coordinate operations with homeland 
security partners. The ACTT is composed of more than 60 partners 
representing federal, state, local, military, and tribal 
organizations.[Footnote 10] Arizona's ACTT is headed by a 13-member 
Unified Command, including three JFC component heads, which provides 
strategic direction to the ACTT as well as guidance for partner 
interaction. The ACTT does not have a dedicated budget, although CBP 
components and interagency partners provide funds for administrative, 
personnel, and operational costs. See appendix II for a full list of 
ACTT participants. 

* STC: The STC is an entity that realigned CBP resources, as well as a 
mechanism for fostering interagency partnerships. As a hybrid of the 
mechanisms that DHS has in place in Arizona, the STC is intended to 
enhance coordination both within CBP, as well as with external 
partners in South Texas. Like the JFC, the STC is managed by a 
commander; however, the STC Commander exercises less control over the 
day-to-day operations of CBP components, instead assuming operational 
control as it specifically relates to the STC mission and objectives, 
such as conducting targeted operations to disrupt and degrade 
transnational criminal organizations. As with the JFC, each 
component's headquarters has authority over administrative decisions, 
such as providing funding, equipment, and training. The STC Commander 
coordinates with a Unified Command composed of approximately 30 
partners representing federal, state, and military organizations (see 
app. II for a full list of STC Unified Command participants). While 
the STC does not have a dedicated budget, the STC has received 
discretionary funds from the CBP Commissioner's Office, as well as 
funds from the components, such as resources from Border Patrol 
targeted for border security efforts in the Rio Grande Valley area. 

Table 1 provides additional information on each mechanism, including 
the staffing, participants, and purpose. 

Table 1: Summary of Collaborative Mechanisms in Arizona and South 
Texas: 

Mechanism: Joint Field Command-Arizona; 
Staffing: 27 permanent staff members and 35 personnel on temporary 
detail; 
Participants: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) components, 
including the Office of Field Operations (OFO) Tucson Field Office, 
Office of Border Patrol Tucson and Yuma Sectors, the Office of Air and 
Marine (OAM) Tucson and Yuma Air Branches and National Air Security 
Operations Center - Sierra Vista, and the Office of Intelligence and 
Investigative Liaison; 
Purpose: Integrate organizational responsiveness, resource allocation, 
and decision-making capabilities across Arizona. 

Mechanism: Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT)-Arizona; 
Staffing: 3 permanent staff members and 19 personnel on temporary 
detail; 
Participants: CBP; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); 
U.S. Attorney's Office; Bureau of Land Management; U.S. Forest Service; 
National Park Service; Transportation Security Administration; Arizona 
Department of Public Safety; Cochise County; Tucson Police Department; 
Tohono O'odham Nation; U.S. Army; and other federal, state, local, and 
tribal partners; 
Purpose: Leverage the capabilities and resources of partners against 
individuals and criminal organizations involved in illegal cross-
border activity. 

Mechanism: South Texas Campaign (STC)-South Texas; 
Staffing: 13 personnel on either permanent or temporary status; 
Participants: STC; CBP components, including OFO Laredo and Houston 
Field Offices; Border Patrol Del Rio, Laredo, Rio Grande Valley, and 
New Orleans Sectors; and OAM Del Rio Air Branch, Laredo Air Branch, 
McAllen Air and Marine Branch, and Houston Air and Marine Branch; 
STC Unified Command; CBP, ICE, Drug Enforcement Administration, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other federal and state partners; 
Purpose: Integrate intelligence, leverage communities of interest, 
pursue enhanced coordination with the government of Mexico, and 
conduct targeted operations to disrupt and degrade transnational 
criminal organizations. 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP information. GAO-14-494. 

[End of table] 

CBP oversees the JFC and the STC through the Joint Operations 
Directorate (JOD). The JOD was created by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security in February 2011 and is part of the Office of the CBP 
Commissioner. The JOD's purpose is to help ensure that CBP-wide 
missions are being carried out and that CBP maintains a nation-wide 
focus. Headed by an Executive Director, the JOD is intended to address 
CBP joint operations coordination, incident management, strategic 
planning, deliberate planning, and operational doctrine and policy. 
The JOD is also responsible for defining metrics to determine 
effectiveness and link CBP strategies to the budget cycle. The JOD is 
staffed by personnel from CBP components and funding is provided 
through the Office of the Commissioner. The JOD serves as a liaison 
for the JFC to Border Patrol, OFO, and OAM headquarters, and the CBP 
Commissioner for staffing, operations, and other requirements and, 
according to the JOD Executive Director, plans to serve as a liaison 
for the STC in the future as well.[Footnote 11] 

DHS Uses Collaborative Mechanisms to Share Information, Target 
Resources, and Leverage Assets: 

DHS has taken a number of actions to coordinate border security 
efforts both within CBP and externally with interagency partners using 
collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas in three primary 
areas: (1) information sharing, (2) resource targeting and 
prioritization, and (3) leveraging of assets. Coordination efforts 
have involved sharing of information across geographic areas and 
organizations, strategic placement of resources to address threats, 
and the implementation of joint operations, among others. 

Information sharing. DHS and CBP have coordinated information sharing 
among CBP components and participating agencies in the JFC, ACTT, and 
STC through the development and implementation of various programs or 
initiatives within these collaborative mechanisms. For example, in 
Arizona the JFC maintains the Joint Intelligence and Operations 
Center, which is an operations coordination center and clearinghouse 
for intelligence information. The Joint Intelligence and Operations 
Center is staffed by an integrated team of Border Patrol, OFO, and OAM 
officers and agents that use data, video, and communications systems 
to coordinate statewide operations. For example, the center monitors 
real-time air traffic in Arizona and moves air assets where needed in 
support of ground operations. In addition, the Joint Intelligence and 
Operations Center disseminates strategic intelligence to all Arizona 
field components for immediate action, such as information on targets 
in Arizona. Among other things, the ACTT initiated focus area meetings 
in each of five geographic areas of Arizona to allow interagency 
partners to collaborate and share information related to their 
specific regions, such as tactics used by drug and alien smugglers, 
including types of vehicles and common routes.[Footnote 12] In 
addition, the ACTT provides intelligence briefings and support to the 
partners in all of the focus areas. Information sharing in South Texas 
is facilitated by the South Texas Border Intelligence Center, which 
the STC created to share intelligence at a centralized location. The 
South Texas Border Intelligence Center was established to facilitate 
the sharing and fusion of law enforcement information and intelligence 
among Border Patrol, OFO, OAM, and interagency partners, such as the 
Drug Enforcement Administration and the Texas Department of Public 
Safety. Among other things, the STC has facilitated information 
sharing between OFO and Border Patrol through OFO sharing knowledge 
regarding technology used at ports that Border Patrol is leveraging to 
conduct electronic scans of a larger number of vehicles moving through 
checkpoints. 

Resource targeting and prioritization. DHS and CBP, through the JFC, 
ACTT, and STC, have established strategies or mechanisms to target and 
prioritize resources among participating components and interagency 
partners. For example, in Arizona the JFC created an air integration 
strategy and a coordinated process of prioritizing and managing air 
assets through the establishment of an oversight mechanism known as 
the Air Council. The Air Council sets strategic goals and objectives 
for the management of all aviation assets in Arizona and meets weekly 
to set the aviation support air schedule, coordinating with military 
and other air partners to ensure that geographic areas are prioritized 
and covered appropriately without the overlap of air assets. In 
addition, the JFC monitors and analyzes real-time operational data to 
help target enforcement efforts against transnational criminal 
organizations. The ACTT is to act as a "force multiplier," as 
interagency partners can leverage one another's resources and 
capabilities to target individuals and criminal organizations involved 
in illegal cross-border activity. Specifically, partners identify 
targets based on geographic vulnerabilities and emerging threat 
information, among other things. The ACTT targets are identified 
through established focus area meetings and communications between 
ACTT partner agencies, among other things. In South Texas, the STC 
jointly selects and prioritizes targets based on intelligence by 
collaborating with interagency partners through the Unified Command. 
The STC also established Joint Targeting Teams, which are focused on 
Unified Command approved targets, which present the highest threats to 
the area. In addition, the STC formalized an OFO operation that is 
designed to target transnational criminal organization leaders, 
members, associates, and family members to cancel their nonimmigrant 
visas, or place those that have legal permanent resident status in 
removal proceedings. 

Leveraging of assets. DHS and CBP, through the JFC, ACTT, and STC, 
have leveraged assets of CBP components and interagency partners 
through resource sharing or joint operations. In Arizona, the JFC 
established the Canine Council, which integrates OFO and Border Patrol 
canine resources. In particular, OFO and Border Patrol representatives 
are to meet on a regular basis to discuss how canines might be used to 
address threats specific to their geographic areas. For example, 
Border Patrol canine assets are used at Arizona POEs to cover over 200 
shifts per month. The ACTT has leveraged interagency partners' assets 
by conducting a number of joint operations with interagency partners, 
including an operation that involved the deployment of increased 
resources from Border Patrol, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and 
local law enforcement agencies at a Border Patrol checkpoint and 
surrounding highways in the western part of Arizona. The operation was 
designed to disrupt transnational criminal organization activity along 
the Interstate 10 highway in Arizona. The ACTT also has provided 
partner agencies with access to resources, such as OAM air support and 
planning assistance for operations. The STC leverages component and 
interagency partners' assets in South Texas. For example, the STC 
shifted Border Patrol assets from Laredo to the Rio Grande Valley in 
order to augment existing Border Patrol resources and address the 
current threat environment in the Rio Grande Valley area. Further, the 
STC conducted joint operations such as an operation that involved 
assets from multiple Border Patrol stations, OAM, the Department of 
Defense, the government of Mexico, and the U.S. Attorney's Office. The 
purpose of the operation was to strategically place resources at and 
between POEs in South Texas in order to increase border security. 

DHS Has Established Performance Measures and Reporting Processes for 
the JFC, ACTT, and STC, but Could Strengthen These Collaborative 
Mechanisms: 

DHS and CBP Have Performance Measures and Reporting Processes in Place 
for Collaborative Mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas: 

DHS and CBP have established processes, including objectives and 
performance measures, to report on the results of the JFC, ACTT, and 
STC, and these reporting processes vary across the mechanisms. For 
example, the STC develops and reports on specific quantitative 
performance measures for operations, while the JFC and the ACTT use 
and report on a mix of quantitative and qualitative measures to assess 
their activities. Some of the quantitative performance measures 
developed by the JFC, ACTT, and STC are existing metrics used by CBP 
and its components to assess and report on progress of their specific 
border security activities. For example, the ACTT reports on seizures 
of narcotics and currency as performance measures to assess efforts to 
disrupt, degrade, and dismantle criminal organizations operating in 
Arizona. CBP established these measures to assess and report on border 
security efforts. Further, the STC reports on apprehensions of illegal 
entrants as a performance measure to assess the success of various 
operations. This measure was established by Border Patrol to assess 
and report on its enforcement efforts between POEs. The objectives and 
performance measures reported by each collaborative mechanism are 
summarized in table 2. 

Table 2: Summary of Objectives and Performance Measures Reported by 
the Collaborative Mechanisms: 

Mechanism: Joint Field Command (JFC)-Arizona; 
Objectives: The JFC is focused on all U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) objectives in Arizona, specifically: 
* manage the border; 
* expedite lawful trade and travel; 
* manage risk; 
* integrate missions; 
Performance measures: The JFC has performance measures in place across 
areas such as conducting targeted actions to mitigate risk posed by 
transnational criminal organizations and implementing innovative 
solutions to promote border security. The performance measures are a 
mix of quantitative and qualitative measures and include reducing 
illicit cross-border activity, developing and implementing new 
strategies to combat border security threats, and improving air and 
ground coordination. 

Mechanism: Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT)-Arizona; 
Objectives: 
* Identify, prioritize and execute actions against common threats and 
targets in each focus area; 
* Conduct sustained and unified actions against prioritized threats in 
each focus area; 
* Enhance the level of collaboration, principally in the areas of 
interagency participation, transparency, and information sharing; 
* Leverage intelligence, investigations, and interdiction to disrupt 
threats in Arizona; 
* Enhance situational awareness in order to more effectively detect, 
identify, classify, and track threats; 
* Enhance the ability to respond to and resolve identified threats; 
Performance measures: The ACTT maintains performance measures across 
the mechanism's four objectives. Performance measures are both 
quantitative and qualitative, including initial increases in 
narcotics, currency, and weapons seizures; increased arrests and 
prosecutions of criminal organizations' personnel; increased citizen 
calls reporting activity; and changes in concealment methods at ports 
of entry. 

Mechanism: South Texas Campaign (STC)-South Texas; 
Objectives: 
* Integrate intelligence, analysis, and targeting throughout the South 
Texas region; 
* Engage communities of interest in order to degrade transnational 
criminal organizations' ability to operate throughout the region's 
communities; 
* Engage, sustain, and enhance bi-national efforts with the government 
of Mexico in order to degrade the critical capabilities of 
transnational criminal organizations within the region and the 
adjoining states of Mexico; 
* Incorporate a flexible, mobile, and unified South Texas region 
workforce to address emerging threats; 
* Disrupt and degrade transnational criminal organizations' ability to 
use established air, land, and sea routes of egress and ingress; 
Performance measures: The STC develops specific goals, objectives, 
metrics, and performance indicators for each operation. The metrics 
and performance indicators are designed to allow operational planners 
to categorize, evaluate, predict, and improve STC operations. Metrics 
and performance indicators vary based on the operation and can include 
increases in apprehensions; decreases in the number of illegal entries; 
changes in the recidivism rate; and changes in tactics, techniques, 
and procedures of transnational criminal organization in the area. The 
STC is to reevaluate the metrics and performance indicators on a 
regular basis to ensure that they are aligned with operational 
strategies. 

Source: GAO analysis of CBP information. GAO-14-494. 

[End of table] 

The type and frequency of reporting varies by each collaborative 
mechanism. Each collaborative mechanism reports on its results to its 
leaders, or DHS or CBP leadership, through a variety of means, such as 
accomplishment reports and after-action reports, as discussed below. 

* JFC. The JFC reports on its results through quarterly progress 
reports, an initial accomplishment report, and operational after-
action reports. First, the JFC develops quarterly progress reports, 
which are to be reviewed by JFC leadership. The quarterly progress 
reports began in fiscal year 2014 and provide information on new 
threats, high-traffic areas, and available resources. JFC leadership 
reviews the reports to assess progress made toward the JFC's 
objectives and to determine whether changes are needed to JFC 
priorities based on changes to threats or border security activities 
identified in the report, according to JFC officials. Second, the JFC 
developed a report providing information on its initial 
accomplishments from its establishment in 2011 through 2013. This 
report provided information on JFC accomplishments in the areas of 
integrated operations and planning, sharing of information and skills 
among components, joint intelligence gathering, military coordination, 
and integrated resources. Finally, the JFC is to prepare after-action 
reports for each operation. These after-action reports provide 
information on the operation's mission, use of resources, and 
operational results. For example, in an operation from October 2012 
through July 2013, the JFC reported the following statistics from 
sustained outbound inspections: approximately $5.3 million in seized 
currency and 881 arrests.[Footnote 13] The JFC uses these after-action 
reports to debrief operations and to provide comments and 
recommendations for future operations. JFC and component leadership 
also discuss results of operations during biweekly teleconferences, 
according to JFC documents. 

* ACTT. The ACTT reports information on its results through annual 
accomplishment reports; periodic, ad hoc reports; and after-action 
reports. For example, the ACTT produces annual accomplishment reports 
to report its results. In these accomplishment reports, the ACTT 
reports information on operations, tactics employed, intelligence, 
trends, and partner activities. The ACTT also reports on its results 
to DHS, CBP, and ICE leadership on an ad hoc basis upon request. For 
example, CBP has periodically requested ACTT progress reports on such 
things as the number of joint operations completed and their results, 
in connection with its year-end accomplishment reporting. In addition, 
the ACTT is to prepare after-action reports for each of its 
operations. These after-action reports contain information intended to 
help ACTT leadership determine whether the ACTT should engage in 
additional phases of an operation. For example, a joint operation of 
Border Patrol and ICE, under the auspices of the ACTT, during November 
2013, reported 34 arrests, 381 pounds of marijuana seized, and 1 
recovered stolen vehicle. 

* STC. The STC reports on its results through annual, weekly, and 
after-action reports. Specifically, the STC reports on its results 
through an annual accountability report provided to CBP headquarters. 
These annual accountability reports provide information on the STC's 
progress toward meeting operational and administrative milestones, 
accomplishments related to each of the STC's five objectives, and best 
practices across the South Texas region. Reported accomplishments in 
the fiscal year 2013 accomplishment report include intelligence 
sharing among interagency partners to identify targets and the 
completion of several joint operations. The report also includes 
performance measures for several operations, such as the number of 
arrests and seizures of drugs and currency. Across the South Texas 
region, the STC reported the disruption and degradation of the 
capabilities of transnational criminal organizations through the 
arrest of 231 approved targets. Beginning in fiscal year 2014, the STC 
also prepares weekly status reports for Unified Command members and 
CBP headquarters, which include information on coordination efforts 
with other agencies as well as updates on operations. Additionally, 
the STC prepares an after-action report for each operation. For 
example, in an operation from June through September 2013, under the 
auspices of the STC, the Rio Grande Valley sector reported making 
2,756 apprehensions of illegal entrants and seizing approximately 
4,585 kilograms of marijuana. During the same operation, the Laredo 
sector reported making 223 apprehensions of illegal entrants and 
seizing 4,085 kilograms of marijuana. According to STC officials, they 
use after-action reports to confirm whether the operation achieved the 
anticipated results and to determine if new strategies are necessary 
for future operations. The STC uses information in after-action 
reports to brief the STC Unified Command at quarterly meetings and 
provide ad hoc updates to the CBP Commissioner. 

According to a senior JOD official, the JOD is working with components 
to standardize reporting processes among the JFC, STC, and ACTT. 
According to the official, the JOD envisions obtaining regular (e.g., 
biweekly) reports from each mechanism regarding progress made toward 
achieving its annual objectives. The intent of these reports, once 
implemented, will be to help ensure that CBP's collaboration with 
other agencies is carrying out CBP's mission. 

Assessment of Collaborative Mechanisms, Written Agreements, and a 
Monitoring Mechanism Could Strengthen Integration and Coordination 
Efforts along the Southwest Border: 

Opportunities exist to strengthen collaborative mechanisms by 
conducting an assessment of results across the mechanisms and 
establishing written agreements and a strategic-level mechanism to 
monitor coordination efforts. Specifically, DHS has not assessed the 
JFC and STC mechanisms to determine their relative benefits and 
challenges. Moreover, DHS has not established written agreements or a 
monitoring mechanism that could help facilitate and strengthen 
coordination with interagency partners in the ACTT and the STC Unified 
Command. 

DHS Could Benefit from an Assessment of the JFC and STC Mechanisms: 

CBP has not assessed the JFC and STC to evaluate results across the 
mechanisms to identify any possible areas for improvement. Our 
analysis of CBP documentation on the JFC and STC as well as our 
interviews with headquarters and field officials identified two 
primary challenges experienced by the JFC and STC: (1) resource 
management challenges and (2) limited sharing of best practices across 
mechanisms. An assessment of the JFC and STC mechanisms could provide 
CBP with information to help better address these challenges. 

Resource management challenges. JFC and STC component officials 
reported to us resource management challenges that, while different in 
nature, could be evaluated through an assessment of these mechanisms. 
The Fiscal Year 2013 JFC Campaign Plan states that the JFC mission is 
to integrate organizational responsiveness, resource allocation, and 
decision-making capabilities to improve efficiencies and 
effectiveness; however, our interviews with officials from all five 
JFC components highlighted resource management challenges with the 
JFC. For example, the JFC Chief of Staff stated that Border Patrol 
canine teams have been successfully used at POEs in Arizona for a 
number of years and that Border Patrol station and OFO port leadership 
jointly determine canine requirements and priorities and address any 
gaps in coverage and operational needs with their combined canine 
assets. In addition, the JFC Chief of Staff stated that Border Patrol 
and OFO canines are routinely used at POEs and can be interchanged 
between CBP components in many environments. The Chief of Staff noted 
that the deployment of Border Patrol canine teams to POEs serves as a 
force multiplier. However, some officials we interviewed provided 
different perspectives on the use of canines. For example, three JFC 
component officials in Arizona we interviewed cited challenges, from 
their perspective, in how the JFC has used Border Patrol and OFO 
canine resources. For example, these officials in Arizona told us that 
the JFC has attempted to integrate the canine resources of Border 
Patrol and OFO by reassigning canines from Border Patrol stations to 
POEs; however, they stated that, in their view, the reassignment of 
canines can contribute to inefficiencies because, among other things, 
Border Patrol canines are not used to working in the POE environment. 
CBP headquarters officials from both OFO and Border Patrol stated that 
canines are not easily interchanged between CBP components. 
Specifically, according to OFO officials, Border Patrol canines have 
less frequent contact with passengers, do not receive training on 
searching pedestrians, and can be more aggressive than OFO canines, 
which are used to working closely with passengers entering and leaving 
the United States. According to a Border Patrol headquarters official, 
in his view, the JFC has shifted canines from higher-threat areas 
along the border to a lower-threat POE, despite the fact that the port 
is not an area priority and receives a nominal amount of traffic. 

Moreover, CBP component officials stated that dual reporting on JFC 
activities can contribute to inefficiencies in the use of resources 
and could result in duplication of effort. In its initial 
accomplishment report, the JFC notes as a success the consolidation of 
reporting through the Joint Intelligence and Operations Center to 
provide CBP field and headquarters' leadership with a single source 
for all Arizona operational reporting. However, our interviews with 
officials from all five CBP components identified challenges in the 
reporting of information from the field to headquarters units. For 
example, according to JFC officials, all JFC components--OFO, Border 
Patrol, and OAM--are required to report operational matters, such as 
significant incidents involving the use of weapons, through the Joint 
Intelligence and Operations Center to the CBP Commissioner's office. 
However, according to CBP component officials, the heads of OFO, 
Border Patrol, and OAM have identified a need to receive the same 
information on these operational matters. Thus, OFO, Border Patrol, 
and OAM officials in Arizona typically report information to both the 
JFC and their own chains of command in their own components, resulting 
in dual reporting. In addition, CBP component officials in Arizona 
stated that it can be challenging reporting port-related information 
to the JFC because JFC staff members may not have knowledge of port 
operations. For example, a senior OFO official stated that the JFC has 
directed a significant amount of follow-up questions to a POE on the 
data it reported because Border Patrol agents handle the JFC reporting 
process, and these Border Patrol agents do not have familiarity with 
port operations, which can create a burden for the components. 

In addition, officials we interviewed stated that the STC has 
experienced resource challenges related to limited funding and 
personnel. The STC has no permanent staff and depends on a rotation of 
personnel from CBP components (e.g., Border Patrol, OFO, OAM) through 
the STC, as additional positions were not created to support the STC. 
Four of five CBP component officials we interviewed stated that 
limited resources are an overall challenge of the STC, and three of 
these component officials noted that detailing personnel to the STC 
can create staffing challenges. An official from one Border Patrol 
station in South Texas stated that the STC is pulling top resources 
from the station and that this creates challenges with backfilling the 
positions at the station and training the new staff. OFO officials 
also told us that POEs in South Texas have limited personnel to 
conduct port operations, making it difficult for POEs to provide 
personnel resources to the STC. In January 2013, the STC completed a 
staffing forecast, projecting ongoing staffing and resource needs that 
discusses the STC's dependence on components to provide staff and 
resources to support the STC. The staffing forecast noted that this 
practice is not sustainable. According to senior STC headquarters 
officials, CBP headquarters has not taken any action on the STC's 
staffing forecast because of staff turnover. An assessment of the JFC 
and STC could help CBP better understand areas for possible 
improvement related to resource management, such as the resources 
needed to implement these mechanisms and how to use the mechanisms' 
resources efficiently. 

Limited sharing of best practices across mechanisms. Opportunities 
also exist for CBP components to share best practices across Arizona 
and South Texas. The CBP Commissioner's fiscal year 2014 operational 
priorities state that CBP should take the best practices of existing 
innovative and successful initiatives and apply them agency-wide. 
Further, both the STC Campaign Plan and the JFC Commander's intent 
state that the mechanisms should capture and replicate best practices 
to better fulfill their missions and improve strategies; however, CBP 
has not assessed the potential application of best practices across 
these mechanisms. The JFC has shared some of its practices with the 
STC, such as sending officials to the STC to help establish standard 
operating procedures and sharing various initiatives, such as a visa 
revocation program. The STC has compiled a list of 40 administrative 
and operational best practices throughout the South Texas region for 
the potential application of the practices region-wide. The STC has 
implemented two of the identified best practices, an OAM fuel-saving 
program that provides bulk fuel prices for marine vessels and a 
physical training regimen to improve the daily duty performance of 
employees, and as of April 2014, according to STC officials, was also 
in the process of implementing an auto parts concession program. 
[Footnote 14] However, this list of best practices compiled by the STC 
has not been shared with other CBP collaborative mechanisms, as CBP 
has not assessed the extent to which best practices could be 
identified and shared among the mechanisms. 

JFC and STC officials identified opportunities for the sharing of best 
practices across the various mechanisms. For example, an official at 
one STC component we interviewed noted that the STC should encourage 
additional sharing of best practices and that components should seek 
them out for continued growth. However, a senior STC official was 
unaware of efforts to apply STC best practices outside of the South 
Texas region. CBP headquarters officials stated that the STC planners 
used some informal lessons learned from the JFC when planning the STC 
and noted that the STC benefited from the JFC having been established 
first. Sharing of practices, however, has not been ongoing. JFC 
officials stated that some JFC practices, such as the coordinated 
process of prioritizing and managing air assets, should serve as best 
practices for potential replication in other parts of the country, but 
that CBP has not made a systematic effort to share these practices, 
although the JFC has shared some practices on an ad hoc basis. An 
assessment of the JFC and STC mechanisms could help provide CBP with 
insights on areas for possible improvement and best practices that 
could be shared among the mechanisms. 

In addition to resource management challenges and limited sharing of 
best practices across the mechanisms, CBP officials we interviewed 
identified concerns regarding the structure and operations of the JFC. 
Specifically, senior Border Patrol officials in Arizona told us that, 
in their view, the JFC has added an unnecessary layer to CBP 
operations in the state and that it was unclear to them what added 
capabilities the mechanism was providing. Border Patrol headquarters 
officials stated that, in their view, CBP should evaluate the JFC to 
determine whether changes are needed to the way the mechanism is 
structured and operated. These officials suggested that changes could 
be made to the JFC, such as letting POEs maintain responsibility for 
their daily operations and focusing more on targeted enforcement 
instead of focusing primarily on the allocation and control of CBP 
resources. 

JFC officials noted that the establishment of the JFC was a major 
realignment of CBP operations in Arizona as well as a cultural change 
for personnel in the field. The officials noted that field-level 
resistance to the JFC is not unexpected given the massive undertaking 
of the realignment, and that the components are now recognizing the 
benefits of the JFC. However, an assessment of the JFC and STC could 
help position CBP to evaluate the effects of these mechanisms, best 
practices that could be shared among the mechanisms, and any areas for 
possible improvement, such as management of resources. Senior JOD 
officials stated that the JOD could help to ensure that JFC and STC 
local operational objectives are in line with nationwide objectives 
and make sure that the objectives are being met for more consistent 
nationwide monitoring. These officials stated that since the JOD is a 
new organization that is developing and being shaped by CBP, it has 
not assessed CBP's collaborative mechanisms, including reviewing the 
potential sharing of best practices. These officials stated that CBP 
at the agency level needs to decide which mechanisms are working and 
to fund them based on an informed analysis. However, no entity within 
CBP has been directed to complete an assessment. 

CBP and its components have taken some steps to assess the JFC and 
STC; however, these actions have not been completed and do not 
evaluate the effects of these mechanisms, best practices that could be 
shared among the mechanisms, and any areas for possible improvement, 
such as management of resources. First, CBP initiated a review of the 
costs and benefits of the JFC. CBP's Office of Administration (OA) 
began work on the cost-benefit analysis of the JFC in April 2013 in 
response to direction in the explanatory statement accompanying the 
fiscal year 2013 DHS Appropriations Act.[Footnote 15] According to CBP 
officials, a draft cost-benefit analysis was completed in September 
2013 and provided to the CBP Commissioner's office for review; 
however, as of April 2014, the analysis has not been approved by the 
Commissioner and CBP officials could not provide us with a time frame 
for when the analysis would be approved. CBP OA officials stated that 
the draft cost-benefit analysis has no findings or recommendations. 
According to these officials, the draft analysis describes the costs, 
which are primarily personnel related, and discusses the qualitative 
benefits of the JFC related to its stated objectives; however, the 
draft analysis does not address resources needed to maintain the JFC 
going forward, nor does it evaluate the results achieved through the 
JFC. Further, according to OA officials, there is no consensus among 
CBP officials regarding the purpose of the analysis or how it will be 
used. 

In addition to this CBP-wide cost-benefit analysis of the JFC, OFO is 
conducting its own internal assessment of the benefits and challenges 
associated with OFO's involvement in collaborative mechanisms, such as 
the JFC and STC. Senior OFO officials stated that they are conducting 
this assessment to better understand the various collaborative 
mechanism structures as well as to determine how OFO is integrated 
into each mechanism and what resources it is contributing to the 
mechanisms. The officials said that they anticipate presenting the 
final assessment to the OFO Assistant Commissioner by July 2014. 
According to the officials, this assessment by OFO will focus on that 
component's inputs to the JFC and STC, but is not intended to address 
other CBP components' input and benefits from participation in those 
mechanisms. 

Although CBP and OFO have taken steps toward assessing the JFC and 
STC, these assessments are not intended to provide CBP with 
information to evaluate challenges across components participating in 
these mechanisms or determine ways to address those challenges. Best 
practices for interagency collaboration call for federal agencies 
engaged in collaborative efforts to create the means to monitor and 
evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas for 
improvement.[Footnote 16] Further, according to these best practices, 
reporting on these activities can help key decision makers within the 
agencies, as well as clients and stakeholders, to obtain feedback for 
improving both policy and operational effectiveness. Best practices 
also indicate that collaborating agencies should identify the human, 
information, technology, physical, and financial resources needed to 
initiate or sustain their collaborative effort.[Footnote 17] 

In September 2013, we reported that collecting and assessing 
information on existing collaborative mechanisms would enable DHS to 
better monitor these mechanisms.[Footnote 18] In December 2010, we 
also reported that DHS could benefit from an assessment of operations 
along the northern border to identify outstanding challenges and 
develop planned corrective actions.[Footnote 19] Specifically, we 
found that officials in the field were left to resolve coordination 
challenges without adequate headquarters involvement. While CBP's 
current efforts to assess the JFC and STC are limited, or focus on a 
single component, an assessment of the JFC and STC could help CBP 
better determine the effects of these mechanisms, best practices that 
could be shared among the mechanisms, and any areas for possible 
improvement, such as management of resources. CBP's memo to the 
Secretary of Homeland Security establishing the JFC in February 2011 
notes that Arizona will be the site of CBP's first JFC structure, 
suggesting that CBP may seek to establish additional JFC structures in 
other geographic areas. Senior CBP officials explained that CBP may 
look to expand these mechanisms; however, CBP has not finalized the 
cost-benefit analysis and has not made efforts to evaluate the STC. An 
assessment could help inform CBP decision making regarding any future 
uses or changes to the collaborative mechanisms. 

DHS Could Strengthen Coordination by Establishing Written Agreements 
and a Monitoring Mechanism: 

ACTT and STC Unified Command partners reported positive aspects of 
coordination; however, officials from 11 of 12 partner agencies we 
contacted reported coordination challenges.[Footnote 20] Officials we 
interviewed from CBP headquarters and the partner agencies reported 
benefits of coordination, including increased information sharing and 
improved planning for joint operations. For example, CBP headquarters 
officials and partners noted that intelligence sharing among agencies 
has improved because of the establishment of the ACTT and STC Unified 
Command. However, our discussions with officials from ACTT and the STC 
Unified Command partner agencies identified three barriers that they 
most frequently stated hindered effective coordination within their 
mechanisms: (1) limited resource commitments by participating 
agencies, (2) lack of common objectives, and (3) limited outreach to 
interagency partners.[Footnote 21] Written agreements and a strategic-
level monitoring mechanism could better position DHS to address these 
challenges and strengthen coordination among partner agencies 
participating in the ACTT and STC Unified Command. 

Limited resource commitments by participating agencies. Our interviews 
with officials from ACTT and STC Unified Command partner agencies 
identified challenges associated with limited partner resource 
commitments to the collaborative mechanisms. As stated in the ACTT 
charter, the ACTT is intended to engage individual agencies through a 
joint and cooperative effort to maximize resources toward a common 
strategy; however, officials from three of six ACTT partner agencies 
we interviewed cited resource challenges as a barrier to effective 
coordination. For example, a partner with the ACTT noted that 
resources are limited for all partners, and that there have been 
operations in which partners did not follow through with the resources 
they had committed during the planning stages. Specifically, this 
official explained how his agency was responsible for leading an 
overnight operation, which involved the commitment of other ACTT 
partners. However, the official said that other ACTT partners decided 
to cover a portion of the overnight operation, rather than the entire 
operation, without communicating the change in resources to the lead 
agency or the ACTT, a decision that shortened the length of the 
operation. Also, another ACTT partner stated that an operation was 
hampered by lack of resources from an interagency partner. In this 
case, the ACTT partner said that his agency was unable to apprehend a 
group of illegal entrants because it did not have the authority to 
detain or arrest the entrants, and the agency did not have resources 
from an interagency partner with those authorities. The ACTT partner 
stated that it would be helpful to establish a partnership agreement 
regarding the level of resources that agencies can commit to joint 
operations. 

Additionally, according to ACTT officials, the ACTT has experienced 
challenges finding interagency partners to contribute personnel to the 
ACTT staff. Border Patrol, ICE, the Arizona Department of Public 
Safety, and the Arizona National Guard are the four entities that 
provide staff to the ACTT. While the ACTT Charter states that the ACTT 
staff is to be recruited by individual agencies, there is no agreement 
among ACTT partners regarding how many staff will be provided or by 
which partners. Members of the ACTT staff said that, in their view, a 
number of different interagency partners should have the opportunity 
to lead the ACTT to better reflect a whole-of-government effort, in 
which partners participate jointly, as noted in the ACTT Charter; 
however, they stated that no agencies other than CBP and ICE have 
expressed an interest in assuming a leadership role in the ACTT. 

Further, the STC Campaign Plan reflects the intention of the STC 
Unified Command to take a whole-of-government approach, with partner 
agencies contributing resources to enhance operations; however, 
officials from five of six STC Unified Command partners we interviewed 
cited resource challenges as a barrier to effective coordination. For 
example, an STC Unified Command partner stated that it can be 
difficult to address specific targets, such as a "stash house," which 
is a property that a criminal network may use to harbor illegal 
entrants, because of not having a sufficient resource commitment from 
investigative agencies. This partner stated that the success of the 
STC's Unified Command is predicated on a whole-of-government approach 
in which all partner agencies provide ample resources. Another STC 
Unified Command partner stated that agencies may be reluctant to share 
personnel with the STC Unified Command because of pressure within 
these agencies to dedicate resources strictly for internal agency 
initiatives, rather than multiagency efforts. 

Lack of common objectives. Our interviews with officials from ACTT and 
STC Unified Command partner agencies identified lack of common 
objectives as a barrier to coordination, which could result in limited 
sharing of information between interagency partners. Officials from 
three of six ACTT partner agencies and four of six STC Unified Command 
partner agencies cited lack of common objectives as a challenge. 
Specifically, according to officials from some of these partner 
agencies, as CBP is a lead agency of the ACTT and the STC, those 
mechanisms have been more focused on helping CBP achieve its 
interdiction objectives, rather than the missions of the various 
interagency partners. For example, one ACTT partner stated that the 
ACTT has not taken the priorities of investigative agencies into 
account when planning joint operations, which has marginalized these 
agencies. This partner noted that in some instances valuable 
operations have collapsed prior to implementation because ACTT 
partners could not reach consensus regarding whether and how to 
proceed because of the ACTT's focus on interdictions. An STC Unified 
Command partner also noted that, in his view, the STC Unified Command 
has been more focused on interdictions, which has resulted in 
inadequate information sharing between CBP and investigative agencies, 
such as ICE and the Drug Enforcement Administration. In addition, DHS 
and CBP headquarters officials stated that the lack of common 
objectives between CBP and investigative agencies has been an ongoing 
challenge and has resulted in limited information sharing between the 
agencies. 

Limited outreach to interagency partners. Our interviews with 
officials from ACTT and STC Unified Command partner agencies 
identified challenges associated with limited outreach from the 
mechanisms to interagency partners. Specifically, officials from two 
of six ACTT partner agencies cited limited outreach as a barrier to 
coordination. One partner stated that the ACTT has not provided 
partner agencies with a sufficient understanding of how the ACTT is 
different from other multiagency task forces and initiatives in 
Arizona, in his view contributing to less support for the mechanism 
among interagency partners. Another partner noted that the ACTT has 
not communicated its approach to prioritizing resources across the 
focus areas, which has created a lack of alignment between the focus 
areas. Moreover, officials from four of six STC Unified Command 
partner agencies we interviewed noted that STC leadership could 
improve its outreach to federal, state, and local entities in order to 
increase awareness of how the STC Unified Command can serve different 
partners' needs. For example, one partner stated that the STC Unified 
Command has incorporated one of the partner agency's locations in 
South Texas into the STC Unified Command; however, the STC Unified 
Command has not conducted outreach to the agency's other locations in 
the area. Consequently, the official stated that these other locations 
either do not know about the STC Unified Command or are not yet aware 
of the value that the mechanism can provide. This partner noted that 
gaining the support of all area offices is important in helping the 
STC Unified Command to build cases against criminal networks as 
opposed to making individual apprehensions without knowledge of the 
broader threat environment. Senior STC headquarters officials noted 
that the STC Unified Command can do a better job of conducting 
outreach to interagency partners. 

Establishing ACTT-and STC Unified Command-specific agreements with 
interagency partners could help better position DHS to address these 
challenges. While there are broader agreements in place between some 
federal agencies relating to agency authorities, protocols, and 
responsibilities along the southwest border, ACTT-and STC Unified 
Command-specific partnership agreements have not been developed or 
implemented. Best practices for interagency collaboration call for the 
development of written agreements to document collaboration.[Footnote 
22] These practices indicate that as agencies bring diverse cultures 
to the collaborative effort, it is important to address these 
differences to enable a cohesive working relationship and to create 
the mutual trust required to enhance and sustain the collaborative 
effort. Written agreements, in part, provide a legal framework to 
improve partnerships, facilitate information exchange, define tasks to 
be accomplished by each entity, and establish written assurances of 
each entity's commitments. 

Accordingly, we have previously recommended that collaborations would 
benefit from a formal written agreement. For example, in April 2013, 
we recommended that DHS examine the potential benefits of written 
agreements between Border Patrol and tribes to address border security 
coordination issues.[Footnote 23] We concluded that written agreements 
could help DHS and tribal governments come together as partners to 
establish complementary goals and strategies for achieving shared 
results in securing the border on tribal lands. Moreover, in March 
2006, in response to a GAO recommendation, DHS, the U.S. Department of 
the Interior (DOI), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) related to border security 
efforts on federal lands.[Footnote 24] The agreement defines the 
resource commitments of each agency related to areas such as 
operations and training, outlines common goals, and specifies outreach 
activities designed to enhance communication among the parties. In 
November 2010 we found that DHS, DOI, and USDA could better implement 
some provisions of the agreement; however, we concluded that 
information sharing among the parties increased since establishment of 
the MOU.[Footnote 25] 

Officials from CBP noted that ACTT-and STC Unified Command-specific 
partnership agreements do not exist because there is a tendency to 
depend on informal relationships among partner agencies and there may 
be some concern about making a written commitment, which would hold 
agencies accountable for multiagency efforts in addition to their 
internal agency initiatives. However, written agreements could serve 
as a guiding document or overarching statement of principles for ACTT 
and STC Unified Command participants, including specifying the types 
and levels of participation and resources by agencies, delineating 
common objectives, and defining outreach activities to enhance 
awareness across agencies. For example, the ACTT Chief of Staff stated 
that the ACTT is facing coordination challenges, such as lack of 
common objectives, and noted that a partnership agreement could help 
document partner resource commitments and achieve higher-level buy-in 
to ACTT objectives and missions. According to this official, 
establishment of such a written agreement would need to be initiated 
at a higher level, such as by DHS, since many partners are components 
within larger organizations. Senior Border Patrol officials in South 
Texas stated that the STC Unified Command would also benefit from an 
overarching written agreement, or agreements, with partner agencies, 
which could serve as a road map among the agencies and could help 
delineate resource commitments. 

In addition, establishing a monitoring mechanism could help better 
position DHS to address challenges and strengthen coordination among 
DHS components and components from other federal, state, and local 
agencies that participate in the ACTT and STC Unified Command. There 
is no DHS headquarters-level monitoring mechanism for coordination 
among DHS components participating in the ACTT and the STC Unified 
Command, or the external coordination efforts of the ACTT or the STC 
Unified Command. However, such a mechanism could help DHS, at a 
strategic level, to monitor the implementation of any written 
agreements to address the coordination challenges we identified, 
particularly related to agencies' resource commitments to the ACTT and 
STC Unified Command and establishment of common objectives. For 
example, as previously discussed, officials from ACTT and STC Unified 
Command partner agencies we interviewed identified challenges 
associated with limited partner resource commitments to the 
collaborative mechanisms. Written agreements could help document 
partner resource commitments to the ACTT and STC Unified Command, and 
a DHS-level monitoring mechanism could help the department monitor 
implementation of resource commitments identified in the written 
agreements. Moreover, as previously discussed, officials from some 
ACTT and STC Unified Command partner agencies we interviewed cited 
challenges related to lack of common objectives. As the ACTT and STC 
Unified Command are led by DHS component agencies, a DHS strategic-
level monitoring mechanism could help support and review the 
establishment of common objectives among partner agencies and help 
better ensure that those common objectives are appropriately balanced 
among the missions of interagency partners. 

Officials from both the ACTT and STC have also said that a DHS-level 
monitoring mechanism could strengthen these collaborative mechanisms. 
For example, ACTT staff members noted that DHS is not involved with 
the ACTT and stated that more DHS headquarters involvement is needed 
to monitor the whole-of-government effort and to create a unified 
strategy. The ACTT Chief of Staff suggested that increased DHS 
engagement at the strategic level could improve coordination among DHS 
component partners, help better integrate ACTT partners, and serve as 
an example for other partners to increase their participation. 
Moreover, senior STC headquarters officials stated that operations in 
the field are evolving more quickly than operations at the 
headquarters level, and the success of collaborative mechanisms is 
predicated on headquarters-level monitoring. Further, the Executive 
Director of the JOD stated that a DHS-level mechanism to monitor the 
ACTT and STC Unified Command would help in ensuring that these 
mechanisms are operating in a strategic manner. 

In addition, an assessment of DHS's collaborative mechanisms by the 
Homeland Security Advisory Council found that DHS's collaborative 
mechanisms would benefit from strategic-level monitoring at the 
headquarters level.[Footnote 26] Specifically, this assessment found 
that headquarters-level support could help to set and monitor specific 
objectives for the mechanisms and improve outreach to interagency 
partners, among other things. Further, in documentation establishing 
another border security collaborative mechanism, DHS identified the 
importance of a DHS headquarters leadership entity or monitoring 
mechanism. For example, the charter establishing DHS's ACTT in New 
Mexico and West Texas stated that a leadership group at the DHS 
headquarters level would be beneficial in providing guidance to 
collaborative mechanisms, and should be composed of senior officials 
from each DHS component. 

In September 2013, we reported that DHS's limited visibility over the 
universe of collaborative field mechanisms operating under its purview 
reduced its ability to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of 
these mechanisms to enhance cross-departmental management and 
integrated operations.[Footnote 27] Specifically, DHS senior officials 
stated at the time that the components, not the department, are 
responsible for the mechanisms' oversight because the department is 
more focused on strategic rather than operational-level management 
activities. In addition, a DHS senior policy official during our 
review indicated that a monitoring mechanism at the DHS headquarters 
level would be beneficial if it functions in a strategic manner, 
rather than managing the operations of collaborative mechanisms. 
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government indicates 
that controls should generally be designed to ensure that ongoing 
monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations and assesses the 
quality of performance over time.[Footnote 28] Such monitoring should 
be performed continually and ingrained in the agency's operations. 
Further, best practices for interagency collaboration state that 
federal agencies can enhance and sustain collaborative efforts by, in 
part, developing mechanisms to monitor and evaluate their results to 
identify areas for improvement.[Footnote 29] These practices indicate 
that monitoring can be achieved through various means, such as 
establishing a leadership council to oversee coordination efforts or 
conducting regular progress reviews. 

DHS could benefit from strategic-level monitoring of the ACTT and the 
STC Unified Command, as the department is accountable for the 
resources that support these mechanisms and ensuring that components, 
such as CBP and ICE, are integrated. In addition, DHS is better 
positioned than the components to increase collaboration and resolve 
potential issues with other departments participating in collaborative 
mechanisms, such as the Department of Justice. Specifically, a DHS-
level monitoring mechanism could help address the coordination 
challenge that the ACTT and the STC Unified Command are facing related 
to lack of common objectives across agencies. A department-level 
monitoring mechanism could also help better position DHS to ensure 
that DHS agencies participating in the ACTT and the STC Unified 
Command are following provisions established in any written 
agreements, including resource commitments. 

Conclusions: 

Security threats along the southwest border highlight the importance 
of integrated operations and interagency coordination with respect to 
DHS's border security efforts. DHS has established collaborative 
mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to help better integrate CBP 
components and facilitate coordination with federal, state, local, 
tribal, and military homeland security partners. These mechanisms have 
coordinated CBP and interagency partner efforts through areas such as 
information sharing, resource targeting and prioritization, and 
leveraging of assets. 

DHS and CBP have established processes to report on the results of the 
JFC, ACTT, and STC. Although these reporting processes are in place, 
opportunities exist for CBP to more thoroughly address integration and 
coordination challenges. For example, CBP has not completed an 
assessment of the benefits and challenges of the JFC and STC. An 
assessment looking across the JFC and STC could help CBP evaluate the 
effects of these mechanisms, best practices that could be shared among 
the mechanisms, and any areas for possible improvement, such as 
management of resources. Moreover, while interagency partners report 
benefits of participation in these collaborative mechanisms, 
participants we interviewed identified barriers to effective 
coordination, including limited partner resource commitments and lack 
of common objectives. Written agreements specific to ACTT and STC 
Unified Command participation could provide a mechanism to help 
resolve coordination issues, such as resource commitments. Further, 
DHS does not have a headquarters-level monitoring mechanism to oversee 
the interagency coordination efforts of the ACTT or STC Unified 
Command. A monitoring mechanism could help address ACTT and STC 
Unified Command coordination challenges related to lack of common 
objectives, resolve potential issues among interagency partners, and 
help ensure that partner agencies are following parameters established 
in partnership agreements, including resource commitments. 
Establishing written agreements and a monitoring mechanism could be 
helpful in minimizing ongoing coordination issues related to the ACTT 
and the STC Unified Command and help DHS to develop more effective 
collaborative field mechanisms. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To strengthen coordination within the JFC and STC, we recommend that 
the Commissioner of CBP complete an assessment of the JFC and STC, 
including evaluating the effects of these mechanisms, best practices 
that could be shared among the mechanisms, and any areas for possible 
improvement, such as management of resources. 

To strengthen coordination among partner agencies participating in the 
ACTT and the STC Unified Command, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security take the following two actions: 

1. establish written agreements with interagency partners 
participating in the ACTT and the STC Unified Command, and: 

2. establish a strategic-level mechanism to monitor the interagency 
coordination efforts of the ACTT and the STC Unified Command. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense, 
Homeland Security, the Interior, and Justice for review and comment. 
The Departments of Defense, the Interior, and Justice did not provide 
comments on our draft report. DHS provided written comments, which are 
summarized below and reproduced in full in appendix III, and technical 
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS concurred with the 
three recommendations in the report and described actions underway or 
planned to address them. 

With regard to the first recommendation, that CBP complete an 
assessment of the JFC and STC, DHS concurred and stated that CBP's 
Joint Operations Directorate will develop a plan to conduct an 
assessment of the JFC and STC, including the criteria to be evaluated, 
a timeline for the assessment, and courses of action to conduct the 
assessment. DHS stated that, based on the plan, the CBP Commissioner 
will designate an entity to conduct the assessment. With regard to the 
second recommendation, that DHS establish written agreements with 
interagency partners participating in the ACTT and the STC Unified 
Command, DHS concurred and stated that the department will establish a 
process to develop MOUs for coordination mechanisms along the southern 
border, including the ACTT and STC Unified Command. DHS noted that it 
has already taken initial steps in addressing this recommendation, 
such as creating a strategic framework to guide development of a 
campaign plan for the southern border. DHS stated that, once 
completed, this plan will, among other things, include approaches for 
improved information sharing and inform related efforts, including the 
development of MOUs with federal, state, local, and international 
governments. With regard to the third recommendation, that DHS 
establish a strategic-level mechanism to monitor the interagency 
coordination efforts of the ACTT and the STC Unified Command, DHS 
concurred and stated that the DHS Office of Operations Coordination 
and Planning, in coordination with other components, will establish a 
strategic-level mechanism to monitor the interagency coordination 
efforts of the ACTT and STC Unified Command. DHS noted that it has 
initiated steps toward addressing this recommendation, such as 
creating the strategic framework to guide development of a campaign 
plan for the southern border. DHS stated that this plan, once 
completed, will promote further development of mechanisms for enhanced 
strategic-level monitoring and interagency coordination. If fully 
implemented, these and other actions noted in DHS's written comments 
should help address the intent of the recommendations. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested 
parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO 
website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Rebecca Gambler: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report (1) describes how the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) uses collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to 
coordinate border security efforts, and (2) examines the extent to 
which DHS has established performance measures and reporting processes 
and how, if at all, DHS has assessed and monitored the effectiveness 
of the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas. 

To address these objectives we visited the Joint Field Command (JFC) 
and the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) in Arizona and 
the South Texas Campaign (STC) in South Texas and conducted interviews 
with officials in U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
headquarters. In Arizona, we visited JFC and ACTT headquarters in 
Tucson and observed the JFC's Joint Intelligence and Operations Center 
and an ACTT leadership meeting. We also conducted interviews with JFC 
and ACTT headquarters officials. In South Texas, we visited STC 
headquarters in Laredo, where we observed operations at Border Patrol 
checkpoints and ports of entry (POE) as well as the South Texas Border 
Intelligence Center, and conducted interviews with STC headquarters 
officials. During our site visits to Arizona and South Texas, we also 
met with officials from the Office of Field Operations (OFO), Border 
Patrol, and the Office of Air and Marine (OAM). Additionally, we 
conducted semistructured interviews via telephone with CBP component 
officials in Arizona and South Texas. We selected nonprobability 
samples of 5 CBP component locations from the 21 CBP component 
locations in Arizona and 5 CBP component locations from the 43 CBP 
component locations in the South Texas region. Concerning the JFC, we 
conducted interviews with officials from the Yuma and Casa Grande 
Border Patrol stations, the Nogales and San Luis POEs, and the Tucson 
Air Branch. Regarding the STC, we conducted interviews with officials 
from the McAllen and Laredo South Border Patrol stations, the 
Brownsville and Eagle Pass POEs, and the McAllen Air Branch. We 
selected these JFC and STC component locations based on (1) the type 
of component (Border Patrol station, OFO POE, or OAM air branch), (2) 
the level of threat as defined by the number of CBP apprehensions of 
illegal entrants, and (3) geographic location. 

Further, we conducted semistructured interviews via telephone with 
officials from interagency partners participating in the ACTT and the 
STC Unified Command. We selected nonprobability samples of 6 ACTT 
partners from the 66 ACTT partners in Arizona and 6 STC Unified 
Command partners from the 33 STC Unified Command partners in South 
Texas. With respect to the ACTT, we interviewed officials from the 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), National Park Service, 
Arizona National Guard, Arizona Department of Public Safety, Sierra 
Vista Police Department, and Tohono O'odham Police Department. 
Regarding the STC Unified Command, we interviewed officials from the 
CBP Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol station; CBP Laredo Field Office; 
Drug Enforcement Administration (Houston); ICE (San Antonio); Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (San Antonio); and the 
U.S. Assistant Attorney's Office (Laredo). We selected these agencies 
based on a range of factors, including (1) type of governmental unit 
(federal, state/county, local, tribal, or military), and (2) the level 
of participation in the mechanism as defined by leadership role. While 
we cannot generalize information obtained from these interviews to all 
CBP component offices and intergovernmental partners in Arizona and 
South Texas, we selected these locations and partners to provide 
examples of the way CBP has integrated and coordinated border security 
efforts. We used the results of semistructured interviews with CBP 
component offices in the field and interagency partners to identify 
the primary areas of integration and coordination of the collaborative 
mechanisms. 

To describe how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) uses 
collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to coordinate 
border security efforts, we reviewed program documentation and 
interviewed officials from CBP. Specifically, we reviewed documents 
obtained from JFC, ACTT, and STC officials covering the time frame 
2009 through 2014, such as charter documents, establishment memos, and 
organizational charts, to identify the structure and roles and 
responsibilities for each mechanism. We also reviewed campaign and 
operational plans, as well as performance reports, to determine 
coordination efforts of the mechanisms. Further, we interviewed CBP 
headquarters officials, including officials from the Office of 
Administration (OA) and the Joint Operations Directorate (JOD), 
regarding DHS's coordination efforts in Arizona and South Texas. 

To examine the extent to which DHS has established performance 
measures and reporting processes and how, if at all, DHS has assessed 
and monitored the effectiveness of the collaborative mechanisms in 
Arizona and South Texas, we analyzed campaign plans, after-action 
reports, and accomplishment reports from 2011 through 2014 obtained 
from the collaborative mechanisms to determine what measures are in 
place to track program results and outcomes. In addition, we conducted 
interviews with officials from Border Patrol, OFO, and OAM 
headquarters to determine the extent to which CBP and its components 
are assessing the benefits and challenges of the JFC, ACTT, and STC. 
We used our interviews with CBP's JOD and OA to determine the extent 
to which CBP is evaluating the JFC and STC mechanisms to identify 
challenges and potential best practices for replication. Additionally, 
we reviewed partnership agreements in place among interagency partners 
in Arizona and South Texas, as well as a previous DHS assessment of 
collaborative mechanisms in the field.[Footnote 30] We evaluated CBP's 
integration and coordination efforts against best practices for 
implementing interagency collaboration.[Footnote 31] We also compared 
CBP's monitoring efforts against criteria in the Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government.[Footnote 32] 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: List of Partners in the Alliance to Combat Transnational 
Threats and South Texas Campaign Unified Command: 

Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats: 

U.S. Border Patrol Tucson and Yuma Sectors: 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Field Operations: 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security 
Investigations (HSI): 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Enforcement and Removal 
Operations (ERO): 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA): 
U.S. Attorney's Office: 
U.S. Department of the Interior: 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF): 
U.S. Department of Agriculture: 
Bureau of Land Management: 
U.S. Forest Service: 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service: 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS): 
U.S. Marshals Service: 
U.S. Secret Service: 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA): 
U.S. Department of State: 
National Park Service: 
Arizona Department of Public Safety: 
Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas: 
Tucson Counter Narcotics Alliance: 
State of Arizona Attorney General: 
Pima County Attorney: 
Santa Cruz County Attorney: 
Maricopa County Attorney: 
Yuma County Attorney: 
Pinal County Attorney: 
Cochise County Attorney: 
Pima County Sheriff: 
Santa Cruz County Sheriff: 
Maricopa County Sheriff: 
Yuma County Sheriff: 
Pinal County Sheriff: 
Cochise County Sheriff: 
Graham County Sheriff: 
Gila River Police Department: 
Tohono O'odham Police Department: 
Ak-Chin Indian Community Police Department: 
Phoenix Police Department: 
Tucson Police Department: 
Nogales Police Department: 
Patagonia Police Department: 
Sahuartia Police Department: 
South Tucson Police Department: 
Marana Police Department: 
Oro Valley Police Department: 
Casa Grande Police Department: 
Eloy Police Department: 
Maricopa Police Department: 
San Luis Police Department: 
Yuma Police Department: 
Wellton Police Department: 
Benson Police Department: 
Bisbee Police Department: 
Douglas Police Department: 
Huachuca City Police Department: 
Safford Police Department: 
Sierra Vista Police Department: 
Tombstone Marshal's Office: 
Willcox Police Department: 
Thatcher Police Department: 
Arizona National Guard: 
Arizona Joint Counter Narco-Terrorism Task Force: 
Luke Air Force Base: 
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Fort Huachuca: 

South Texas Campaign Unified Command: 

Laredo Border Patrol Sector Chief Patrol Agent: 
Del Rio Border Patrol Sector Chief Patrol Agent: 
Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol Sector Chief Patrol Agent: 
New Orleans Border Patrol Sector Chief Patrol Agent: 
Laredo Field Office Director of Field Operations: 
Houston Field Office Director of Field Operations: 
Southwest Region Director: 
San Antonio Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent in Charge: 
Houston DEA Special Agent in Charge: 
San Antonio HSI Special Agent in Charge: 
Houston HSI Special Agent in Charge: 
Southern District of Texas U.S. Marshal: 
Laredo DEA Assistant Special Agent in Charge: 
San Antonio DEA Assistant Special Agent in Charge: 
McAllen DEA Assistant Special Agent in Charge: 
Dallas DEA Assistant Special Agent in Charge: 
San Antonio ATF Resident Agent in Charge: 
Houston ATF Special Agent in Charge: 
Corpus Christi U.S. Coast Guard Captain: 
Joint Task Force North Lieutenant Colonel: 
U.S. Army North Colonel: 
San Antonio USCIS District Director: 
San Antonio USCIS Records Manager: 
San Antonio ERO Field Office Director: 
Houston ERO Field Office Director: 
Laredo Assistant U.S. Attorney: 
CBP Internal Affairs Special Agent in Charge: 
CBP Assistant Chief Counsel: 
CBP Attaché Mexico City: 
TSA Field Security Director: 
Texas Department of Public Safety Regional Director: 
South Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Director: 
Houston High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Director: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

June 9, 2014: 

Rebecca Gambler: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Re: Draft Report GAO 14-494, "Border Security: Opportunities Exist to 
Strengthen Collaborative Mechanisms along the Southwest Border" 

Dear Ms. Gambler: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) work in conducting its 
review and issuing this report. 

The Department is pleased to note GAO's recognition of U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) efforts of utilizing a whole of government 
approach to secure geographic corridors. By employing a collaborative 
enforcement approach, leveraging the capabilities and resources of DHS 
agencies in partnership with other federal state, local and tribal 
partners, CBP strives to increase its operational effectiveness to 
better disrupt, dismantle and ultimately defeat transnational threats 
that are exploiting the border region. 

Two leading examples of these efforts illustrated in GAO's report are 
the Joint Field Command (JFC) in Arizona and the South Texas Campaign 
(STC) in South Texas. In addition, CBP led the effort in 2009 to 
launch the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT); a 
collaborative enforcement effort that leverages the capabilities and 
resources of more than 60 federal, state, local, and tribal agencies 
in Arizona and the Government of Mexico to combat individuals and 
criminal organizations posing a threat to communities on both sides of 
the border. 

The draft report contained three recommendations with which the 
Department concurs. Specifically, GAO recommended that the CBP 
Commissioner: 

Recommendation 1: Complete an assessment of the JFC and STC, including 
evaluating the effects of these mechanisms, best practices that could 
be shared among the mechanisms, and any areas for possible 
improvement, such as management resources. 

Response: Concur. As an office within the Office of the Commissioner, 
CBP's Joint Operations Directorate will develop a plan to conduct an 
assessment of the JFC and STC. This plan will be submitted to the 
Commissioner, and will establish the criteria to be evaluated, a 
timeline which identifies an assessment period and other pertinent 
milestones, and courses of action to conduct the assessment. The 
Commissioner will designate the entity responsible for the assessment 
and initiate the assessment period. Estimated Completion Date (ECD): 
To Be Determined (TBD). 

GAO also recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security: 

Recommendation 2: Establish written agreements with interagency 
partners participating in the ACTT and the STC Unified Command. 

Response: Concur. The DHS Office of Policy (PLCY) in coordination with 
the DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS), CBP, and 
other Components, as appropriate, will develop a process by which 
memoranda of understanding (MOUs) will be developed in order to better 
facilitate partnerships in support of Southern Border coordination 
mechanisms, including the ACTT and STC Unified Command. The Department 
has already taken initial steps toward addressing this recommendation, 
beginning with the recent creation of a DHS-wide U.S. Southern Border 
and Approaches Strategic Guidance/Framework, intended to guide 
development of a DHS-wide Southern Border and Approaches Base Campaign 
Plan. Once completed (on or before September 30, 2014), this plan will 
include approaches for improved information sharing, sensor 
integration, and unified command and control structures, as 
appropriate, and inform related efforts and processes including the 
development of MOUs with Federal, state, local, and international
governments. Development of an MOU process will begin within one year 
following completion of the Campaign Plan. ECD: TBD. 

Recommendation 3: Establish a strategic-level mechanism to monitor the 
interagency coordination efforts of the ACTT and the STC Unified 
Command. 

Response: Concur. Various branches within OPS, in coordination with 
PLCY, CBP, and other Components, as appropriate, will establish a 
strategic-level mechanism to monitor the interagency coordination 
efforts of the ACTT and STC Unified Command. The Department has 
already initiated significant steps toward addressing this 
recommendation, beginning with the recent creation of a DHS-wide U.S. 
Southern Border and Approaches Strategic Guidance/Framework to guide 
development of a DHS-wide Southern Border and Approaches Campaign 
Plan. Once completed on or before September 30, 2014, this plan will 
promote further development of mechanisms and new processes for 
enhanced strategic-level monitoring through situational awareness, and 
interagency coordination on a broader level, to include ACTT and STC 
Unified Command operations. Development of these mechanisms will begin 
within one year following completion of the Campaign Plan. ECD: TBD. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this 
draft report. Technical comments were previously provided under 
separate cover. Please feel free to contact me if you have any 
questions. We look forward to working with you in the future. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim H. Crumpacker: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO-OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or GamblerR@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Jeanette Espínola (Assistant 
Director), David Alexander, Molly Callaghan, Frances Cook, Joseph 
Cruz, Anthony Fernandez, Eric Hauswirth, Lauren Membreno, and Jessica 
Orr made key contributions to the report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] South Texas is defined as the region encompassing U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection's Laredo and Houston Office of Field Operations 
Field Offices; Del Rio, Laredo, and Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol 
sectors; and the Del Rio Air Branch, Laredo Air Branch, McAllen Air 
and Marine Branch, and Houston Air and Marine Branch. 

[2] Ports of entry are officially designated places that provide for 
the arrival at, or departure from, the United States. 

[3] For the purposes of this review, collaboration is defined as a 
joint activity by two or more organizations (either within CBP or 
among CBP and interagency partners) that is intended to produce more 
public value than could be produced when the organizations act alone. 
In September 2012, we reported on collaborative mechanisms and the 
subject matter specialists we interviewed defined an interagency 
mechanism for collaboration as any arrangement or application that can 
facilitate collaboration between agencies. See GAO, Managing for 
Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency Collaborative 
Mechanisms, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022] 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012). 

[4] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to 
Enhance Visibility over Collaborative Field Mechanisms, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-734] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 
2013). 

[5] We interviewed JFC component officials from the Yuma and Casa 
Grande Border Patrol Stations, the Nogales and San Luis POEs, and the 
Tucson Air Branch. We interviewed STC component officials from the 
McAllen and Laredo South Border Patrol Stations, the Brownsville and 
Eagle Pass POEs, and the McAllen Air Branch. 

[6] The Unified Command is an entity that the STC uses to coordinate 
with approximately 30 officials from federal, state, and military 
agencies in South Texas. We interviewed the following ACTT 
participants: ICE, National Park Service, Arizona National Guard, 
Arizona Department of Public Safety, Sierra Vista Police Department, 
and the Tohono O'odham Police Department. We interviewed the following 
STC Unified Command participants: CBP Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol 
station; CBP Laredo Field Office; Drug Enforcement Administration 
(Houston); ICE (San Antonio); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (San Antonio); and the U.S. Attorney's Office (Laredo). 

[7] While DHS has established other collaborative mechanisms along the 
southwest border, our review focused specifically on those mechanisms 
in Arizona and South Texas--the JFC, ACTT, and STC--as these areas are 
among the highest-threat areas for illegal entrants and smuggling 
activity along the southwest border. 

[8] We did not evaluate the performance measures; rather we assessed 
the extent to which the collaborative mechanisms have performance 
measures in place. 

[9] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005); [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022]; and 
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 1, 1999). We developed effective practices to enhance and sustain 
interagency collaboration in [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022] by interviewing experts in 
the area of collaboration and gathering information on select areas 
where federal agencies have developed substantial ongoing 
collaborations. These practices are applicable to collaborative 
mechanisms DHS has established along the southwest border in Arizona 
and South Texas, as these mechanisms involve interagency collaboration 
and are intended to help strengthen coordination of border security 
efforts among participating agencies. 

[10] DHS also maintains a separate ACTT in West Texas/New Mexico, 
which is not included in the scope of our review. 

[11] Since the ACTT is a multiagency effort, it is not overseen by CBP. 

[12] CBP defines focus areas as geographic divisions within Arizona 
that share similar threats, vulnerabilities, and transnational 
criminal activity levels. 

[13] Outbound inspections involve the screening of vehicles and 
persons leaving the United States in order to stem the outbound flow 
of currency and fugitives from the country. 

[14] The Auto Parts Concession program establishes on-site, 
independently operated auto parts concession stores to support CBP 
fleet operations. For example, prior to the establishment of 
concessions stores, sectors ordered parts in bulk. This required 
excessive storage space and isolated costs in a single fiscal year. 
Now, parts ordering and payment are conducted online and parts are 
delivered the same or next day to the repair location. The STC reports 
more efficient fleet operation, better accountability of vehicle 
maintenance, and cost savings and avoidance as successes of the 
concession stores. 

[15] Explanatory Statement, Consolidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2013, 159 Cong. Rec. S1287, S1550 (daily ed. Mar. 
11, 2013). 

[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022]. 

[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-734]. 

[19] GAO, Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of 
Interagency Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-97] (Washington, D.C.: 
Dec.17, 2010). 

[20] In this section of the report, we provide the results of 
interviews with ACTT and STC Unified Command partners, including the 
number of partners of each mechanism that identified a specific area 
as a coordination challenge, such as limited resource commitments by 
participating agencies. The other ACTT and STC Unified Command 
partners did not identify these areas as challenges during the 
interviews. 

[21] Similar coordination challenges were raised in an internal DHS 
assessment of the ACTT by the Homeland Security Advisory Council in 
the fall of 2011. Per the request of the former secretary of homeland 
security, the ACTT was assessed by the Homeland Security Advisory 
Council Southwest Border Security Task Force. See Homeland Security 
Advisory Council, Southwest Border Task Force Report: Third Set of 
Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: Fall 2011). 

[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] and 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022]. 

[23] GAO, Border Security: Partnership Agreements and Enhanced 
Oversight Could Strengthen Coordination of Efforts on Indian 
Reservations, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-352] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 5, 2013). 

[24] Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, and 
Department of Agriculture, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding 
Cooperative National Security and Counterterrorism Efforts on Federal 
Lands along the United States' Border (Washington, D.C.: March 2006). 

[25] GAO, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure 
a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-177] (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 18, 2010). 

[26] See Homeland Security Advisory Council, Southwest Border Task 
Force Report: Third Set of Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: Fall 
2011). 

[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-734]. 

[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[29] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[30] Homeland Security Advisory Council, Southwest Border Task Force 
Report: Third Set of Recommendations, (Washington D.C.: Fall 2011). 
Per the request of the former secretary of homeland security, the ACTT 
was assessed by the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) 
Southwest Border Security Task Force as part of a larger study on the 
potential for expanding the corridor security concept throughout the 
southwest border environment. 

[31] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005); GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing 
Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 
2012); and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999). We developed effective practices to 
enhance and sustain interagency collaboration in [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1022] by interviewing experts in 
the area of collaboration and gathering information on select areas 
where federal agencies have developed substantial ongoing 
collaborations. These practices are applicable to collaborative 
mechanisms DHS has established along the southwest border in Arizona 
and South Texas, as these mechanisms involve interagency collaboration 
and are intended to help strengthen coordination of border security 
efforts among participating agencies. 

[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[End of section] 

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