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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

June 2014: 

Maritime Security: 

Ongoing U.S. Counterpiracy Efforts Would Benefit From Agency 
Assessments: 

GAO-14-422: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-422, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Piracy and maritime crime continues to threaten ships off the Horn of 
Africa's east coast and in the Gulf of Guinea off Africa's west coast, 
putting seafarers in harm's way and costing governments and industry 
billions of dollars in ransom, insurance, and protective measures. The
types and causes of piracy and maritime crime, as well as the African 
states' ability to address the problem in the two regions, differ. To 
help U.S. agencies coordinate efforts, the NSCS developed an 
interagency plan in 2008 to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute piracy off 
the Horn of Africa in collaboration with industry and international 
partners. GAO was asked to evaluate U.S. counterpiracy activities. 

This report: (1) assesses how piracy off the Horn of Africa has 
changed since our 2010 review, and describes U.S. efforts to assess 
its counterpiracy actions, given any changing conditions; and (2)
identifies trends in piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea 
and U.S. efforts to address them, and evaluates the extent to which 
the United States has assessed its counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf 
of Guinea. GAO reviewed plans, activities, and data from 2007 through
2013 and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, international 
partners, and industry, selected as a nongeneralizable sample for 
their involvement in counterpiracy activities. 

What GAO Found: 

Piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa's east coast near Somalia have 
declined sharply since 2010, but U.S. agencies have not assessed their 
counterpiracy efforts as GAO recommended in 2010. Since 2010, the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports piracy incidents declined 
from 219 to 15 in 2013. Similarly, from 2010 to 2013 hostages taken by 
pirates declined from 1,016 to 34. Also, a World Bank report stated 
that total ransoms declined by 2012. Officials participating in 
counterpiracy activities from the Departments of Defense and State, 
among others, as well as shipping industry officials and international
partners, attribute the decline to a combination of prevention, 
disruption, and prosecution activities. However, officials cautioned 
that this progress is tenuous, and discontinuing these efforts could 
allow piracy to resurge. Despite changing conditions, U.S. agencies 
have not systematically assessed the costs and benefits of their 
counterpiracy efforts. Agency officials stated that their decisions
and actions are guided by discussions rather than formal assessments. 
GAO has previously noted that assessments of risk and effectiveness in 
an interagency environment can strengthen strategies and resource 
usage. As such, GAO's prior recommendations remain valid and could 
help U.S. agencies identify the most cost effective mix of efforts and 
prioritize activities as they respond to changing conditions and 
fiscal pressures while avoiding a resurgence in piracy. 

Off the west coast of Africa, piracy and maritime crime has been a 
persistent problem in the Gulf of Guinea, as shown in the figure 
below. Although the United States has interagency and international 
efforts underway with African states to strengthen maritime security, 
it has not assessed its efforts or the need for a collective plan to 
address the evolving problem in the region. The U.S. role in 
addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has focused on prevention, 
disruption, and prosecution, through training and assistance to 
African coastal states. However, according to U.S. agencies working in 
the region, the National Security Council Staff (NSCS) has not 
directed them to collectively assess their efforts to address piracy 
and maritime crime. An assessment of agencies' Gulf of Guinea efforts 
could strengthen their approach by informing the appropriate mix of
activities to achieve the most effective use of limited resources, as 
well as help determine if additional actions are needed. 

Figure: Reported Incidents of Piracy and Maritime Crime, 2008 through 
2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Number of incidents: 

Year: 2008; 
Horn of Africa: 110; 
Gulf of Guinea: 55. 

Year: 2009; 
Horn of Africa: 214; 
Gulf of Guinea: 40. 

Year: 2010; 
Horn of Africa: 219; 
Gulf of Guinea: 29. 

Year: 2011; 
Horn of Africa: 235; 
Gulf of Guinea: 38. 

Year: 2012; 
Horn of Africa: 75; 
Gulf of Guinea: 52. 

Year: 2013; 
Horn of Africa: 15; 
Gulf of Guinea: 43. 

Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data. GAO-14-422. 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the NSCS, with the Secretaries of Defense and State,
collaborate with the involved agencies to assess their efforts and to 
determine whether additional actions are needed to guide efforts in 
the Gulf of Guinea. The NSCS did not concur or non-concur with GAO's 
recommendations but provided an update on its planning activities. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-422]. For more 
information, contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or 
CaldwellS@gao.gov or Chris P. Currie at (404) 679-1875 or 
CurrieC@gao.gov. 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Various Efforts Have Reduced Piracy off the Horn of Africa Since 2010, 
but the United States Has Not Updated its Action Plan: 

U.S. Efforts Aim to Address Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf 
of Guinea, But an Assessment Would Help Inform Efforts and Determine 
the Need for Additional Actions: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Attempted and Successful Pirate Attacks off the Horn of 
Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea, 2010 through 2013: 

Appendix III: Interagency Progress in Implementing the Lines of Action 
in the National Security Council's 2008 Countering Piracy off the Horn 
of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan: 

Appendix IV: Department of Defense Counterpiracy Costs, 2010 through 
2013: 

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Piracy and Maritime Crime Characteristics in the Horn of 
Africa and Gulf of Guinea: 

Table 2: Update on Recommendation Implementation since September 2010: 

Table 3: Interagency Progress in Implementing the Lines of Action in 
the National Security Council's (NSC) 2008 Action Plan: 

Table 4: Department of Defense Counterpiracy Costs Incurred from 
Calendar Years 2010-2013 (dollars in millions): 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Attempted and Successful Piracy Incidents off the Horn of 
Africa, 2010 through 2013 10: 

Figure 2: Attempted and Successful Piracy and Maritime Crime Incidents 
in the Gulf of Guinea, 2010 through: 

2013 11: 

Figure 3: Piracy Incidents Reported off the Horn of Africa, 2008 
through 2013: 

Figure 4: Hostages Taken In Horn of Africa Piracy Incidents, 2008 
through 2013: 

Figure 5: Estimated Total and Average Ransoms Paid in Piracy Incidents 
off the Horn of Africa, 2007 through 2012: 

Figure 6: U.S. Naval Vessel Steaming Days in Horn of Africa Task 
Forces, 2010 through 2013: 

Figure 7: Incidents of Piracy and Maritime Crime in the Gulf of 
Guinea, 2007 through 2013: 

Figure 8: Types of Piracy and Maritime Crime Incidents in the Gulf of 
Guinea, 2010 through 2013: 

Figure 9: Attempted and Successful Pirate Attacks off the Horn of 
Africa, 2010 through 2013: 

Figure 10: Attempted and Successful Pirate Attacks in the Gulf of 
Guinea, 2010 through 2013: 

Abbreviations: 

AMLEP: African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership: 

BMP: Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based 
Piracy: 

CPCC: Counter-Piracy Coordination Center: 

CTF: Combined Task Force: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

DOT: Department of Transportation: 

ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States: 

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States: 

EU: European Union: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

G8: Group of Eight: 

IMB: International Maritime Bureau: 

INL: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement: 

IRTC: Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor: 

MOTR: Maritime Operational Threat Response: 

MSCHOA: Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa: 

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 

NSC: National Security Council: 

NSCS: National Security Council Staff: 

ONI: U.S. Office of Naval intelligence: 

UN: United Nations: 

UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

June 19, 2014: 

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John Garamendi: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Rick Larsen: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Frank A. LoBiondo: 
House of Representatives: 

Piracy and maritime crime, including armed robbery, kidnapping, and 
hijackings, continues to threaten ships in the waters off the Horn of 
Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea, putting seafarers in harm's way and 
costing businesses and governments billions of dollars in ransoms, 
insurance, and protective measures. U.S. efforts to combat piracy and 
maritime crime involve multiple agencies from the Departments of 
Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), State (State), 
Transportation (DOT), and the Treasury (Treasury) and are coordinated 
with international and industry partners. While maritime piracy is not 
a new threat, pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa started reaching 
unprecedented levels in 2008. At the same time, the persistence of 
attacks in West Africa's Gulf of Guinea--including the kidnapping of 
two Americans from a vessel in October 2013--have evolved with pirates 
venturing farther from shore and using more violent tactics.[Footnote 
1] According to DOD and State officials, piracy off the Horn of Africa 
stems from an ungoverned Somalia and has generally focused on 
hijacking ships transiting through open waters, while piracy in the 
Gulf of Guinea has generally focused on armed robbery of ships in 
territorial waters of sovereign states and has displayed less regard 
for the health and safety of its victims. 

In September 2010, we issued a report examining U.S. efforts to 
address piracy off the Horn of Africa and found that the U.S. 
government had taken steps to implement the National Security 
Council's (NSC) Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership 
and Action Plan (Action Plan) by, for example, working with partners 
to conduct naval patrols, update ship security plans, and provide 
judicial capacity building to African states.[Footnote 2] However, we 
found that many agencies could benefit from greater specificity in 
assigning roles and responsibilities, and from identifying the costs, 
benefits, and measures of effectiveness of their counterpiracy 
efforts, among other things.[Footnote 3] We recommended that the NSC 
collaborate with the agencies to reassess and update its Action Plan; 
identify metrics; assess the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of 
U.S. counterpiracy activities; and clarify agency roles and 
responsibilities. In March 2011, we testified that piracy off the Horn 
of Africa continued to be a problem as pirates shifted tactics, and we 
reiterated our recommendations on actions the government could 
undertake to improve U.S. efforts.[Footnote 4] As of June 2014, these 
recommendations have not been implemented and are discussed later in 
this report. 

As piracy and maritime crime continues to evolve off both African 
coasts and the U.S. government faces fiscal pressures, you asked that 
we examine whether opportunities exist to leverage the cooperative 
efforts and strategies used to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa 
in addressing the problem of piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of 
Guinea. Specifically, this report: 

* assesses how piracy off the Horn of Africa in the East has changed 
since our 2010 report and describes U.S. efforts to assess 
counterpiracy actions, given any changing conditions; and: 

* identifies trends in piracy and maritime crime in West Africa's Gulf 
of Guinea and U.S. efforts to address them, and evaluates the extent 
to which the United States has assessed its counterpiracy efforts in 
the Gulf of Guinea. 

To assess how piracy off the Horn of Africa has changed since 2010, we 
analyzed data from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the 
U.S. Office of Naval intelligence (ONI) on reported piracy incidents, 
hostages taken, and ransom paid off the Horn of Africa from 2008 
through 2013.[Footnote 5] We discussed data collection methods, 
processes for data entry, and the steps taken to ensure reasonable 
accuracy of the data with both IMB and ONI. We determined the data to 
be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. In addition, 
we met with DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, DOT, and Treasury officials; 
international partners; and representatives from insurance, shipping, 
and private security industry associations to discuss their 
involvement in counterpiracy activities such as developing best 
practices for protecting ships from pirate attack, working with the 
international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, and 
participating in naval patrols off the Horn of Africa.[Footnote 6] We 
met with officials from shipping industry associations that represent 
owners and operators from over 80 percent of the world's merchant 
fleet and describe themselves as providing a unified industry voice in 
the creation of industry policy and strategy; insurance industry 
associations whose members cover approximately 90 percent of the 
world's ocean-going tonnage; and a private security industry 
association that has over 180 members across 35 countries. While the 
statements of these industry officials cannot be generalized to the 
entire industries they represent, their perspectives provide valuable 
insight since each is actively involved in international collaborative 
efforts to combat piracy. To determine the extent to which the United 
States has assessed its counterpiracy actions as outlined in the 2008 
Action Plan for countering piracy off the Horn of Africa, we reviewed 
the 2008 Action Plan, the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime 
Security, the 2007 Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other 
Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, relevant U.S. policies and laws, and 
United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions. We also reviewed 
program documents such as briefings and meeting summaries and 
interviewed officials from DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, DOT, and the 
Treasury, as well as components including U.S. Naval Forces Central 
Command, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), to discuss implementation of the Action Plan and the status of 
implementing recommendations from our September 2010 report to improve 
the plan.[Footnote 7] We selected these departments and agencies 
because the Action Plan states they shall contribute to, coordinate, 
and undertake initiatives in accordance with the plan and they are 
members of the Counter-Piracy Steering Group established to oversee 
the implementation of the plan. 

To identify trends in piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, 
we analyzed IMB and ONI data on piracy incidents--hijackings, 
boardings, attempts, ships fired upon, and kidnappings--reported from 
2007 through 2013. As with the Horn of Africa data, we discussed the 
accuracy and reliability of the data with IMB and ONI officials and 
determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
this report.[Footnote 8] To evaluate U.S. efforts to address piracy 
and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, we reviewed program 
briefings and meeting summaries and interviewed officials from the 
previously described U.S. agencies, international military partners, 
and partners from the insurance, shipping, and private security 
industries. The agencies, international partners, and industry 
associations we interviewed were those that we identified as 
contributors to ongoing counterpiracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea 
or those representing or insuring vessel owners and operators in the 
region. While the statements of the industry officials cannot be 
generalized to the entire industries they represent, their 
perspectives provide valuable insight since each is actively involved 
in international collaborative efforts to combat piracy. We compared 
agency efforts and their coordination against recommended practices in 
the National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan and the Strategy to Combat 
Transnational Organized Crime which are used to guide the efforts and, 
in general, call for risk-based assessments. A full description of our 
objectives, scope, and methodology can be found in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Piracy Is a Recognized Global Issue: 

Under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy consists of 
any of several acts, including any illegal act of violence or 
detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by 
the crew or the passengers of a private ship and directed against 
another ship, aircraft, persons, or property onboard another ship on 
the high seas, or against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a 
place outside the jurisdiction of any state.[Footnote 9] According to 
both conventions, all states have the duty to cooperate to the fullest 
extent possible in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any 
other place outside the jurisdiction of any state and are authorized 
to seize pirate ships or a ship under the control of pirates and 
arrest the persons and seize the property onboard on the high seas or 
in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state.[Footnote 10] 
When crimes that would constitute piracy are committed in the 
territorial waters of a coastal state, they are generally referred to 
as maritime crime. For the purposes of this report, we describe the 
criminal conduct in the Gulf of Guinea as piracy and maritime crime in 
order to include piracy on the high seas (i.e., outside the 
jurisdiction of any one sovereign state), as well as hijacking, armed 
robbery, kidnapping, and attempts at these crimes within the 
territorial waters of a state. 

Piracy and maritime crime off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of 
Guinea affect countries around the globe. In 2013, over 42,000 vessels 
transited the waters off the Horn of Africa, which include some of the 
world's busiest shipping lanes. Within these waters, pirates target 
merchant vessels, fishing ships, and dhows.[Footnote 11] Since 2008, 
the UN has adopted a number of United Nations Security Council 
resolutions related to countering piracy off the Horn of Africa. 
[Footnote 12] Similarly, in 2011 and 2012, recognizing the Gulf of 
Guinea's critical shipping and global energy resources, the UN adopted 
resolutions that expressed deep concern about the threat that piracy 
and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea pose to international 
navigation, security, and the economic development of states in the 
region.[Footnote 13] 

Piracy off the Horn of Africa Generally Differs from That in the Gulf 
of Guinea: 

The types of crime, vessel traffic, and coastal states' jurisdictional 
responses to address the piracy problem off the Horn of Africa and in 
the Gulf of Guinea generally differ, as does the U.S. response. DOD 
and State officials described the following as key differences: 

* Types of crime: Piracy off the Horn of Africa is generally 
characterized by ransom-seeking, in which pirates attack ships for 
their crew, cargo, or the ship itself, which are often held hostage 
for months or years to obtain millions of dollars in ransom. In the 
Gulf of Guinea, piracy is generally characterized either as armed 
robbery--such as petroleum tanker hijackings to steal a ship's oil--or 
targeted kidnappings for ransom near or within the Niger Delta, 
according to DOD officials. Additionally, unlike the hostage-taking 
and high-dollar ransoms off the Horn of Africa that can result in 
months or years that a vessel and its crew are held, the kidnappings 
off the Niger Delta are for days or weeks, for thousands of dollars in 
ransom, and do not necessarily involve the hijacking of a vessel. In 
general, pirates hijack tankers and their crew only for the time it 
takes to offload the oil.[Footnote 14] 

* Vessel traffic: The nature of how vessels travel through the regions 
also differs. Sea traffic off the Horn of Africa is characterized by 
large, high-speed cargo vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden 
and Indian Ocean. Piracy in this region generally involves pirates 
pursuing and boarding moving vessels. In contrast, in the Gulf of 
Guinea, commercial vessels generally are smaller and operate closer to 
shore, slowing down to make port calls and stopping at off-shore 
facilities in territorial waters or in the exclusive economic zones of 
coastal states. The slow speeds and stationary positions make these 
vessels vulnerable to piracy and maritime crime. 

* Jurisdiction and response: U.S. efforts to combat piracy off the 
Horn of Africa and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea evolved in 
response to the particular characteristics of piracy and maritime 
crime in each region and the extent to which the United States has 
jurisdiction and coastal states have the capability to respond. For 
example, the UN authorized international militaries and organizations 
to enter Somali territorial waters and economic zones to conduct 
counterpiracy operations and patrols as though they were international 
waters. The transitional and new Somali governments have relied on the 
assistance of international militaries since they are building 
maritime security capacities. Conversely, in the Gulf of Guinea, 
maritime security in territorial waters is under the authority of the 
respective recognized national governments in the region.[Footnote 15] 

Figures 1 and 2 show the number of attempted and successful pirate 
attacks off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea respectively 
from 2010 through 2013. 

Figure 1: Attempted and Successful Piracy Incidents off the Horn of 
Africa, 2010 through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: Interactive graphic] 

Click on the icon to show that year's attacks, click on the icon to 
hide that year. For a noninteractive version see appendix II. 

Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data (data); 
MapInfo (map). GAO-14-422. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 2: Attempted and Successful Piracy and Maritime Crime Incidents 
in the Gulf of Guinea, 2010 through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: Interactive graphic] 

Click on the icon to show that year's attacks, click on the icon to 
hide that year. For a noninteractive version see appendix II. 

Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data (data); 
MapInfo (map). GAO-14-422. 

Note: IMB data is based on self-reporting directly to IMB by vessels 
and companies operating in the area. According to ONI data--which is 
aggregated from multiple data sources, (e.g., open source data such as 
media reports, IMB information, and all-source intelligence) and 
corroborated with other U.S. agencies and information--the actual 
number of incidents in the Gulf of Guinea is greater than what is 
reported to IMB. According to ONI and IMB officials, reasons for the 
variation between the two sets of data, include differences in 
categorization of incidents, validation of sources, under reporting, 
and differences in geographic scope. IMB data is presented in figure 
2. A discussion of the data used in this report can be found in 
appendix I. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to the types of crimes, vessel traffic, and jurisdiction, 
other characteristics such as the reporting of incidents by vessel 
owners and operators and the ability of pirates to use land based safe 
havens for operations, among others, create differences between piracy 
off the Horn of Africa and piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of 
Guinea. These differences are summarized in table 1. 

Table 1: Piracy and Maritime Crime Characteristics in the Horn of 
Africa and Gulf of Guinea: 

Piracy characteristic: Location of incidents; 
Horn of Africa: International waters; 
Gulf of Guinea: Territorial and international waters. 

Piracy characteristic: States with jurisdiction; 
Horn of Africa: All states have jurisdiction within Somali coastal 
waters and in international waters; 
Gulf of Guinea: Gulf of Guinea coastal states have jurisdiction within 
0-12 nautical miles and all states have jurisdiction in international 
waters. 

Piracy characteristic: Quality of incident reporting[A]; 
Horn of Africa: Good reporting of incidents; 
Gulf of Guinea: Underreporting of incidents. 

Piracy characteristic: Nature of ship traffic; 
Horn of Africa: Transit the area at higher speeds and can avoid Somali 
coast; 
Gulf of Guinea: Make port calls to coastal states and are often slow 
moving or stationary. 

Piracy characteristic: Pirate actors; 
Horn of Africa: Homogeneous actors (predominantly from five Somali 
clans); 
Gulf of Guinea: Diverse set of actors (former militants, criminals, 
transnational criminal organizations). 

Piracy characteristic: Type of piracy business model; 
Horn of Africa: Hijacking vessels and crews; 
Gulf of Guinea: Mixed--hijacking, robbery, cargo theft, kidnapping for 
ransom. 

Piracy characteristic: Violence to crews/hostages; 
Horn of Africa: Infrequent isolated incidents; 
Gulf of Guinea: Frequent incidents of violence throughout the event. 

Piracy characteristic: Vessels targeted; 
Horn of Africa: Targets of opportunity, in particular ships that are 
"low and slow"; 
Gulf of Guinea: Intelligence-driven targets (i.e., pirates targeting 
vessels known to be carrying specific cargo such as oil) and some 
targets of opportunity. 

Piracy characteristic: Pirate response to armed security teams; 
Horn of Africa: Pirates avoid engaging armed security teams; 
Gulf of Guinea: Pirates willing to engage armed security teams. 

Piracy characteristic: Presence of safe havens; 
Horn of Africa: Safe havens off Somali coast serve as bases for 
operations; 
Gulf of Guinea: Limited safe havens to serve as bases for operations. 

Piracy characteristic: Type of naval security forces in the region; 
Horn of Africa: International security forces provide naval patrols; 
Gulf of Guinea: Gulf of Guinea coastal states provide limited naval 
patrols. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD, State, and UN information. | GAO-14-422: 

[A] According to DOD officials, the quality of incident reporting is 
their assessment based on the number of incidents they are aware of 
compared to the number that is reported. 

[End of table] 

The Response to Piracy off the Horn of Africa Involves Combined 
Efforts from U.S. and International Partners: 

Since 2008, the international community has taken steps to respond to 
piracy off the Horn of Africa, including patrols by the United States, 
NATO, the European Union (EU), and others in waters near Somalia; the 
establishment of international naval task forces with specific 
mandates to conduct counterpiracy operations; and the formation of a 
voluntary multilateral Contact Group to coordinate international 
counterpiracy efforts such as the development of industry practices 
and coordination of international law enforcement efforts. Recognizing 
that vibrant maritime commerce underpins global economic security and 
is a vital national security issue, the United States has also 
developed policies and plans to collaborate with its international 
partners and to mobilize a U.S. interagency response. In December 
2008, the NSC published the Action Plan, which discusses countering 
piracy emanating from Somalia. The Action Plan directed the Secretary 
of State and Secretary of Defense to establish a high-level 
interagency task force--the Counter-Piracy Steering Group--to 
coordinate, implement, and monitor the actions contained in the plan. 
In addition, the NSC directed that DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, DOT, the 
Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
undertake coordinated initiatives in accordance with the plan, subject 
to available resources.[Footnote 16] 

Various Efforts Have Reduced Piracy off the Horn of Africa Since 2010, 
but the United States Has Not Updated its Action Plan: 

Piracy Incidents Off of the Horn of Africa Have Declined Since 2010: 

Piracy activity off of the Horn of Africa has declined as indicated by 
the number of incidents reported, the number of hostages taken, and 
the amount of money paid in ransoms in 2013 as compared with recent 
years. In September 2010, we reported that successful and attempted 
piracy attacks off the Horn of Africa had risen from 30 in 2007 to 218 
in 2009.[Footnote 17] Our analysis of data provided by the IMB, which 
collects reported incidents from ship owners and operators, shows that 
the number of piracy incidents continued to rise to 235 in 2011, but 
declined thereafter to 15 total incidents in 2013, as shown in figure 
3.[Footnote 18] 

Figure 3: Piracy Incidents Reported off the Horn of Africa, 2008 
through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Year: 2008; 
Boarded: 2; 
Hijacked: 42; 
Attempted: 27; 
Fired Upon: 39; 
Total: 110. 

Year: 2009; 
Boarded: 1; 
Hijacked: 46; 
Attempted: 55; 
Fired Upon: 112; 
Total: 214. 

Year: 2010; 
Boarded: 16; 
Hijacked: 49; 
Attempted: 54; 
Fired Upon: 100; 
Total: 219. 

Year: 2011; 
Boarded: 20; 
Hijacked: 27; 
Attempted: 81; 
Fired Upon: 107; 
Total: 235. 

Year: 2012; 
Boarded: 2; 
Hijacked: 14; 
Attempted: 38; 
Fired Upon: 21; 
Total: 75. 

Year: 2013; 
Boarded: 0; 
Hijacked: 2; 
Attempted: 5; 
Fired Upon: 8; 
Total: 15. 

Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data. GAO-14-422. 

[End of figure] 

At the same time, the number of hostages taken during pirate attacks 
rose from 815 in 2008 to 1,016 in 2010, but declined to 34 in 2013, as 
shown in figure 4. 

Figure 4: Hostages Taken In Horn of Africa Piracy Incidents, 2008 
through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Year: 2008; 
Hostages taken: 815. 

Year: 2009; 
Hostages taken: 857. 

Year: 2010; 
Hostages taken: 1,016. 

Year: 2011; 
Hostages taken: 464. 

Year: 2012; 
Hostages taken: 233. 

Year: 2013; 
Hostages taken: 34. 

Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data. GAO-14-422. 

Note: Hostages taken include victims abducted from dhows, fishing 
ships, and merchant vessels. However, no hostages were taken from 
merchant vessels in 2013. 

[End of figure] 

As the number of hostages taken during piracy incidents rose, the 
amount of ransom money collected by pirates also increased. According 
to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Bank, low estimates 
of the total dollar amount of ransoms paid to free hostages rose from 
$2.4 million in 2007 to $151.1 million in 2011 but declined to $36.4 
million in 2012.[Footnote 19] While ransoms paid were an estimated 
average of $1.2 million in 2007, the estimated average amount rose to 
$4 million in 2012, as shown in figure 5. According to State 
Department officials, at of the end of 2013, there were at least 49 
hostages from 11 countries held by Somali pirates. 

Figure 5: Estimated Total and Average Ransoms Paid in Piracy Incidents 
off the Horn of Africa, 2007 through 2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Year: 2007; 
Low estimate of total ransom paid: $2.4 million; 
High estimate of total ransom paid: $7.1 million; 
Average ransom paid: $1.2 million. 

Year: 2008; 
Low estimate of total ransom paid: $20.2 million; 
High estimate of total ransom paid: $32.7 million; 
Average ransom paid: $1.4 million. 

Year: 2009; 
Low estimate of total ransom paid: $57.2 million; 
High estimate of total ransom paid: $84.4 million; 
Average ransom paid: $2.2 million. 

Year: 2010; 
Low estimate of total ransom paid: $69.7 million; 
High estimate of total ransom paid: $89.9 million; 
Average ransom paid: $3.7 million. 

Year: 2011; 
Low estimate of total ransom paid: $151.1 million; 
High estimate of total ransom paid: $155.7 million; 
Average ransom paid: $5 million. 

Year: 2012; 
Low estimate of total ransom paid: $36.4 million; 
High estimate of total ransom paid: $40.4 million; 
Average ransom paid: $4 million. 

Source: World Bank 2013. GAO-14-422. 

[End of figure] 

Officials Attribute the Decline in Horn of Africa Piracy to a 
Combination of Efforts to Prevent, Disrupt, and Prosecute: 

The Action Plan establishes the U.S. role in countering piracy as a 
collaborative one, seeking to involve all countries and shipping-
industry partners with an interest in maritime security. DOD, DHS, 
DOJ, State, DOT, and the Treasury, in collaboration with their 
international and industry partners, have implemented steps in the 
Horn of Africa across the three lines of action established in the 
Action Plan, which are to: (1) prevent piracy attacks by reducing the 
vulnerability of the maritime domain, (2) disrupt acts of piracy in 
ways consistent with international law and the rights and 
responsibilities of coastal and flag states, and (3) ensure that those 
who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their actions by 
facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates.[Footnote 20] 

U.S. Efforts to Prevent Acts of Piracy: 

U.S. agencies, in collaboration with their international and industry 
partners have taken several steps to deter pirates and reduce the 
vulnerability of ships transiting off the Horn of Africa. DOD and 
State officials and representatives from each of eight shipping 
industry associations we met with emphasized that these prevention 
efforts work together and described the following as examples of key 
prevention efforts. 

* Working with Industry: U.S. agencies have worked with industry 
partners to develop guidance and requirements for implementing 
counterpiracy efforts. For example, the Coast Guard issued Maritime 
Security (MARSEC) Directives that provide guidance to owners and 
operators of U.S. vessels on how to respond to emerging security 
threats.[Footnote 21] These directives include practices that help to 
prevent pirate attacks and require that vessels operating in high risk 
waters update their vessel security plans to include security 
protocols for terrorism, piracy, and armed robbery against ships in 
high risk waters. Among other things, these plans cover the need for 
enhanced deterrence, surveillance and detection equipment; crew 
responses if a potential attack is detected or is underway; and 
coordination with counterpiracy organizations that could be of 
assistance. The practices are mandated for U.S. flag vessels operating 
in high risk waters and are also recommended for foreign flag vessels 
in the Coast Guard's Port Security Advisories and in the International 
Maritime Organization's (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee circulars. 
[Footnote 22] 

Additionally, the Coast Guard and DOT's Maritime Administration 
(MARAD) co-chaired Working Group 3 of the Contact Group on Piracy off 
the Coast of Somalia which focused on industry awareness. Through this 
working group, practices were developed and enhanced through the Best 
Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy 
(BMP), developed by the working group's maritime industry 
representatives to deter, prevent, and deny incidents of piracy off 
the Horn of Africa. The BMP was introduced in 2008 as a joint industry 
strategy and has been updated based on lessons learned from 
investigated piracy incidents throughout the region. Version 4 of the 
BMP was issued in August 2011 and recommends 14 specific actions 
shipping companies can take to mitigate pirate activity while 
transiting high risk waters off the Horn of Africa. Examples of these 
ship protection measures include providing additional lookouts during 
watch periods, enhancing the ship's physical barrier, and establishing 
a safe point or secure citadel on the ship to ensure the safety of the 
crew and vessel during a pirate boarding. Use of the BMP is not 
mandatory; rather, officials from each of the eight shipping industry 
associations we interviewed describe the BMP as a tool kit of 
practices the ship's master can tailor to the situation and risks that 
the ship faces. Officials from an insurance industry association we 
met with stated that its members encourage and consider the 
implementation of the practices when pricing products based on steps 
that vessel owners have taken to mitigate risks. 

Of the various implemented practices, officials from the six U.S. 
agencies engaged in counterpiracy activities and the eight shipping 
industry associations we interviewed describe the use of privately 
contracted armed security personnel on ships as a key factor in 
reducing the number of piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa. 
However, each of the eight shipping industry associations we 
interviewed stated that they do not want armed security teams to 
become a standard long term practice, primarily because of the hazards 
involved with the use of force and weapons aboard ships as well as the 
expense, with an average cost of about $5,000 per day for a four 
person security team. These officials added that, in comparison, 
requiring crew to continuously lookout for suspicious activity is a 
relatively low-cost measure when compared to deploying armed security 
personnel with a vessel -the burden of which could be too costly for 
smaller shipping companies. As security costs become a concern and the 
threat of piracy declines, DOD, EU, and NATO officials expressed 
concern that some in the shipping industry may seek to reduce the size 
and qualifications of the security teams as well as the hours they are 
deployed to protect the ship. 

* Strategic communication: According to officials from DOD's AFRICOM, 
strategic communication from Somali radio stations is also an 
effective method of preventing piracy. These officials stated that the 
United States and its international partners have supported a 
partnership with Somali radio stations to bring awareness to the 
Somali public about the dangers of piracy and acts of abuse that 
hostages may endure. 

U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Acts of Piracy: 

U.S. efforts to disrupt acts of piracy involve working with 
international partners to position resources to interdict pirates at 
sea and prevent the financing of pirates on land. The following were 
described by DOD, State, Treasury, EU, and NATO as examples of U.S. 
efforts that are intended to prevent acts of piracy. 

* Maritime coalition operations: DOD, State, industry, EU, and NATO 
officials cited the presence of international navies in the region as 
a key factor in interdicting and disrupting pirate activity. Three 
multinational maritime coalition operations--the Combined Task Force 
(CTF) 151, EU Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR) Operation Atalanta, and NATO's 
Operation Ocean Shield[Footnote 23]--along with independent 
deployments from countries outside of NATO and the EU such as China, 
India, Japan, and South Korea have worked to protect the waters off 
the Horn of Africa and the Internationally Recommended Transit 
Corridor (IRTC).[Footnote 24] U.S. involvement in these activities is 
primarily through participation in CTF 151 and NATO's Operation Ocean 
Shield. DOD and State officials stated that these operations are 
effective in establishing a protective force in a region that is 
growing its own capabilities and has allowed the United States to 
build new partnerships with navies from around the world. 

* U.S. presence: According to Navy officials, while as of 2013 the 
United States no longer regularly dedicates naval vessels to CTF 151, 
the U.S. presence plays an important role in fostering the 
participation of other countries in the task force. Additionally, the 
Navy may task ships from other missions, such as counternarcotics or 
counterterrorism, into the task force on a given day or for short 
periods to respond in an emergency if they are the closest or most 
appropriate--consistent with the overarching goal of preserving safety 
of life at sea. The Unites States has regularly provided, from 2010 
through 2014, at least one ship in support of NATO's Operation Ocean 
Shield counterpiracy mission. As incidents of piracy have declined off 
the Horn of Africa, the number of steaming days has also declined, as 
shown in figure 6. 

Figure 6: U.S. Naval Vessel Steaming Days in Horn of Africa Task 
Forces, 2010 through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Steaming days: 

Year: 2010; 
NATO Combined Task Force (CTF) 508: 344; 
Combined Maritime Forces CTF 151: 683. 

Year: 2011; 
NATO Combined Task Force (CTF) 508: 355; 
Combined Maritime Forces CTF 151: 771. 

Year: 2012; 
NATO Combined Task Force (CTF) 508: 313; 
Combined Maritime Forces CTF 151: 245. 

Year: 2013; 
NATO Combined Task Force (CTF) 508: 282; 
Combined Maritime Forces CTF 151: 51. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data. GAO-14-422. 

Note: Steaming days are the days in which a naval vessel is actively 
patrolling the waters. 

[End of figure] 

* Disrupting pirate financing: To help disrupt pirate revenue, the 
U.S. Treasury is authorized to block financial transactions of known 
pirate actors through the application of Executive Order 13536 when 
there is a nexus to U.S. interests.[Footnote 25] Under this authority, 
Treasury may impose sanctions on individuals providing funds to known 
pirate actors and can block the transaction if it involves a U.S. 
financial institution. Officials from an insurance industry 
association we met with stated that ship owners can carry insurance 
policies that reimburse companies for ransom paid as a result of 
pirate attacks. According to Treasury officials, members of the U.S. 
and international shipping industry initially expressed concerns that 
the ransom paid and reimbursed by their policies could be prohibited 
by the executive order. Treasury officials also stated that the order 
has specific application, is applied on a case-by-case basis, and, as 
of March 2014, had not been formally applied in response to a 
potential ransom payment. 

U.S. Efforts to Facilitate Prosecutions of Suspected Pirates: 

The Action Plan aims to ensure that those who commit acts of piracy 
are held accountable for their actions by facilitating the prosecution 
of suspected pirates, and in appropriate cases prosecuting pirates in 
the United States. Officials from DOD, State, and DOJ described 
several examples of how the United States plays a role in making sure 
pirates are brought to justice. 

* Building law enforcement capabilities: The United States helps 
expand law enforcement capabilities within the region through two key 
efforts. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service conducts 
investigations and has developed a manual that provides 
recommendations to law enforcement agencies investigating acts of 
piracy at sea. Last, the United States has contributed to a piracy 
database administered by INTERPOL that allows law enforcement agencies 
to access evidence connected to piracy incidents, although U.S. 
investigations are primarily focused on piracy incidents with a nexus 
to U.S. interests.[Footnote 26] 

* Judicial capacity building: U.S. agencies have also provided piracy-
related judicial capacity-building assistance to countries in the 
region, such as Kenya and the Seychelles, for law enforcement and 
prosecutions. These activities have included establishing regional 
courts and building prisons in Somalia. Additionally, DOD, DOJ, and 
State have worked with international partners to ensure that pirates 
are tried and held accountable for their crimes by facilitating 
prosecution agreements. As of November 2013, among 22 nations, 1,130 
Somali pirates had been detained for trial, were on trial, or had been 
convicted. 

* U.S. prosecutions: The United States has jurisdiction to prosecute 
anyone who commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of 
nations on the high seas and is later brought to or found in the 
United States.[Footnote 27] U.S. government prosecutions have resulted 
in the conviction of at least 28 Somali pirates since 2010. In 2010, 
five men from Somalia were convicted of piracy and related offenses by 
a federal jury in what, according to DOJ officials, is believed to be 
the first piracy trial conviction in the United States since 1820 and 
is seen as the first in a series of government prosecutions aimed at 
slowing the spread of piracy off of Africa. In February 2013, a 
federal jury found five Somalis guilty of engaging in piracy and other 
offenses in connection with the attack on the Navy ship the USS 
Ashland. Additionally, in November 2013, a Somali pirate involved in 
the shooting of four Americans aboard a yacht off the coast of Somalia 
during a failed kidnapping attempt was sentenced to 21 life sentences 
for his role in their deaths.[Footnote 28] Also, DOD, State, and DOJ 
officials stated that these prosecutions send a message that piracy 
carries serious consequences and may serve as a deterrent to others 
involved in piracy. However, DOJ and State officials told us that, 
especially in cases where the hijacked vessel or crew has little or no 
connection to the United States, a more appropriate role for the 
United States would be to provide technical assistance to other 
countries in prosecuting pirates. 

Appendix III provides a summary of the three lines of action and 
specific activities in the Action Plan. DOD, State, U.S. Coast Guard, 
DOJ, DOT, and the Treasury attribute the decline in piracy attacks to 
the collective implementation of these actions. Officials from these 
agencies noted that the efforts of governments and the industry 
practices work together to reduce vulnerabilities and prevent attacks. 
DOD, State, EU, and NATO naval officials as well as officials from the 
eight shipping industry associations we interviewed cautioned that 
discontinuing counterpiracy efforts could provide opportunities for 
piracy to resurge off the Horn of Africa. They stated that piracy off 
the Horn of Africa is a crime of opportunity driven by economic 
conditions in Somalia that have not been addressed. They noted that 
the practices in place have reduced the likelihood of a successful 
pirate attack by increasing the risk but the capability and motivation 
of pirates have not changed. 

The U.S. Action Plan Has Not Been Updated as We Recommended in 2010: 

The Action Plan was published in December 2008 when piracy off the 
Horn of Africa was on the rise but has not been updated, as we 
recommended in 2010, to reflect changing dynamics in piracy, such as 
industry's use of armed security teams or the sharp decline in piracy 
incidents, or to implement recommendations we previously made to 
include elements of a strategic approach. The Action Plan was 
developed to identify and implement measures to suppress pirate 
activity off the Horn of Africa. Its intent was to respond to the 
growing threat and be mutually supportive of longer-term initiatives 
aimed at establishing governance, rule of law, security, and economic 
development in Somalia. In September 2010, we reviewed the Action 
Plan, which implements the National Strategy for Maritime Security 
[Footnote 29] and the Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other 
Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea[Footnote 30] as applied to piracy off 
the Horn of Africa. At that time, we found that the Action Plan had 
not been revised to reflect adapted piracy tactics and did not 
designate which agencies should lead or carry out most activities. 
[Footnote 31] Additionally, we found that the National Security 
Council Staff (NSCS) did not fully include characteristics of a 
strategic approach in the Action Plan, such as measures to evaluate 
the effectiveness of U.S. resources applied to counterpiracy, the 
identification of roles and responsibilities, or the cost of U.S. 
activities relative to the benefits they achieved.[Footnote 32] 

As a result, in September 2010 we recommended that the NSCS, in 
collaboration with the Secretaries of Defense, State, Homeland 
Security, Transportation, and the Treasury, as well as the Attorney 
General: (1) reassess and revise the Action Plan to better address 
evolving conditions off the Horn of Africa and their effect on 
priorities and plans; (2) identify measures of effectiveness to use in 
evaluating U.S. counterpiracy efforts; (3) direct the Counter-Piracy 
Steering Group to identify the costs of U.S. counterpiracy efforts 
including operational, support, and personnel costs; and assess the 
benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities; and (4) 
clarify agency roles and responsibilities and develop joint guidance, 
information-sharing mechanisms, and other means to operate across 
agency boundaries for implementing key efforts such as strategic 
communication, disrupting pirate revenue, and facilitating 
prosecution.[Footnote 33] Since we issued our report in 2010, 
conditions have continued to change off the Horn of Africa in many 
ways since the Action Plan was developed in 2008. However, as of June 
2014 the NSCS had not fully implemented the four recommendations from 
our September 2010 report as summarized in table 2. 

Table 2: Update on Recommendation Implementation since September 2010: 

2010 Recommendation: Reassess and revise the Action Plan to better 
address evolving conditions off the Horn of Africa and their effect on 
priorities and plans; 
Update since 2010: Action Plan not updated. In September 2010, we 
recommended that the NSCS update the Action Plan because piracy was 
increasing and pirate tactics were changing. Since that time, 
conditions have continued to evolve off the Horn of Africa. Industry 
has made frequent use of embarked armed security teams. An 
internationally-recognized Somali federal government was established 
in August 2012 and responsibility for strategic communication was 
transferred to it. Piracy declined sharply in 2012 and 2013. EU NAVFOR 
and NATO counterpiracy operations off the Horn of Africa are set to 
expire by the end of 2016. State officials recognize that an updated 
Action Plan is needed and have provided input to the NSCS, but as of 
March 2014 they had not received guidance from the NSCS regarding any 
changes to counterpiracy plans or efforts. In commenting on a draft of 
this report, an NSCS official stated that a global action plan is 
being developed, with a separate annex focusing on the Horn of Africa 
and was expected to be issued in the summer of 2014. 

2010 Recommendation: Identify measures of effectiveness to use in 
evaluating U.S. counterpiracy efforts; 
Update since 2010: Measures not established to assess counter piracy 
efforts. In September 2010, we recommended that the NSCS include 
measures of effectiveness in the Action Plan to provide direction for 
counterpiracy activities and information that could be used in 
strategic and resource-based decisions. During the course of this 
review, State officials told us the key measures are the number of 
hostages and ships hijacked, but they have not established formal 
measures and their decisions are generally guided by discussions 
rather than formal assessments. However, this information does not 
provide insight into which efforts are having the greatest effect in 
suppressing piracy. 

2010 Recommendation: Direct the Counter-Piracy Steering Group to 
identify the costs of U.S. counterpiracy efforts including 
operational, support, and personnel costs; and assess the benefits, 
and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities; 
Update since 2010: U.S. counterpiracy costs and benefits not fully 
tracked. In September 2010, we reported that the United States is not 
collecting information to determine the most cost-effective mix of 
counterpiracy activities. During the course of this review, we 
obtained information from agencies identifying some costs related to 
their counterpiracy efforts. For example, the costs of counterpiracy 
efforts incurred by DOD peaked in 2011 at approximately $275 million 
but have declined to approximately $70 million in 2013.[A] State 
tracks funds used to operate its counterpiracy and maritime security 
functions, as well as foreign assistance provided to African 
countries. However, most agencies do not systematically track the 
costs of counterpiracy efforts or activities because these efforts and 
activities typically fall under a broader maritime security category. 
Further, the Counter-Piracy Steering Group has not identified the 
benefits of the various counterpiracy activities relative to their 
costs and resources. 

2010 Recommendation: Clarify agency roles and responsibilities and 
develop joint guidance, information-sharing mechanisms, and other 
means to operate across agency boundaries for implementing key efforts 
such as strategic communication, disrupting pirate revenue, and 
facilitating prosecution; 
Update since 2010: Agency roles and responsibilities defined for some 
tasks. In September 2010, we reported that agencies had made less 
progress in implementing action items in the Action Plan that involved 
multiple agencies than those that were the responsibility of one 
specific agency. Since that time, U.S. agencies have defined roles and 
responsibilities for applying the Maritime Operational Threat Response 
(MOTR) process to piracy incidents involving U.S. interests.[B] DOJ 
officials stated that the NSCS has also identified roles and 
responsibilities for transporting pirate suspects for prosecution. 
However, the NSCS has not established roles and responsibilities 
across all activities outlined in the Action Plan. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, Treasury, and NSCS 
information. GAO-14-422. 

[A] The costs include naval and air patrols, as well as contracted 
linguists. 

[B] The MOTR is a separate presidentially approved Plan to achieve a 
coordinated U.S. Government response to threats against the United 
States and its interests in the maritime domain. The MOTR Plan 
contains operational coordination requirements to ensure quick and 
decisive action to counter maritime threats. 

[End of table] 

* In commenting on a draft of this report, an NSCS official stated 
that the Action Plan is being updated through a global action plan, 
with a separate annex focusing on the Horn of Africa, but did not 
indicate whether the plan would include all of the elements in our 
recommendations. We continue to believe our recommendations have merit 
and should be implemented. While conditions affecting piracy have 
continued to evolve in the Horn of Africa since 2010, the 2008 Action 
Plan continues to guide U.S. efforts. Officials from each of the six 
agencies engaged in counterpiracy activities noted that current 
efforts are suppressing piracy off the Horn of Africa, but the results 
are tenuous and piracy could resurge without addressing its root 
causes. The Action Plan was developed at a time when U.S. policy 
focused on addressing problems in the absence of a functioning 
government in Somalia and without involving a U.S. presence in the 
country. With U.S. agencies and industry both having limited resources 
available for counterpiracy activities, we continue to believe that 
implementing our recommendations would be of value in understanding 
the costs and benefits and measuring the effectiveness of U.S. 
counterpiracy efforts. DOD, Coast Guard, DOJ, and State officials, as 
well as shipping industry officials, noted that the suppression of 
piracy has been based on a combination of government and industry 
counterpiracy activities, particularly the use of armed security teams 
on private vessels and the presence of naval patrols. However, U.S. 
agencies do not assess how industry practices and government resources 
could potentially offset each other's roles and associated 
costs.[Footnote 34] As we concluded in September 2010, in an 
environment where government resource decisions directly affect costs 
incurred by the shipping industry and international partners, 
balancing risk reduction and benefits with costs should be emphasized. 

U.S. Efforts Aim to Address Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf 
of Guinea, But an Assessment Would Help Inform Efforts and Determine 
the Need for Additional Actions: 

Piracy and Maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea Is an Ongoing Problem, 
although Recent Incidents May Indicate Evolving Tactics and 
Capabilities: 

Piracy and maritime crime, primarily armed robbery at sea, oil theft, 
and kidnapping, is a persistent problem that continues to contribute 
to instability in the Gulf of Guinea. According to ONI data, incidents 
of piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea rose from nearly 60 
in 2010 to over 100 in 2011, and totaled more than 110 in 2013, as 
shown in figure 7. According to this data, incidents in 2013 included 
11 vessel hijackings and 32 kidnappings. According to officials from 
AFRICOM, ONI, State, and the IMO, this recent rise in piracy and 
maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea is part of a long-standing, 
persistent problem in the region. For example, according to DOD 
officials, the Gulf of Guinea was the most active region in the world 
for piracy in 2007, prior to the rise in pirate activity off the Horn 
of Africa. According to the IMB, the number of vessel-reported 
incidents in the Gulf of Guinea from 2007 through 2009 is similar to 
that of 2011 through 2013.[Footnote 35] IMO officials added that, 
while the reported incidents indicate an ongoing, persistent problem, 
the number and frequency of incidents do not yet rise to the epidemic 
proportions that were seen off the Horn of Africa. 

Figure 7: Incidents of Piracy and Maritime Crime in the Gulf of 
Guinea, 2007 through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph] 

Year: 2007; 
International Maritime Bureau self-reported incidents: 44. 

Year: 2008; 
International Maritime Bureau self-reported incidents: 55. 

Year: 2009; 
International Maritime Bureau self-reported incidents: 40. 

Year: 2010; 
International Maritime Bureau self-reported incidents: 29; 
Office of Naval Intelligence recorded incidents: 56. 

Year: 2011; 
International Maritime Bureau self-reported incidents: 38; 
Office of Naval Intelligence recorded incidents: 104. 

Year: 2012; 
International Maritime Bureau self-reported incidents: 52; 
Office of Naval Intelligence recorded incidents: 89. 

Year: 2013; 
International Maritime Bureau self-reported incidents: 43; 
Office of Naval Intelligence recorded incidents: 112. 

Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau and Office of 
Naval Intelligence data. GAO-14-422. 

Notes: ONI data is aggregated from multiple data sources, (e.g., open 
source data such as media reports, IMB information, and all-source 
intelligence) and corroborated with other U.S. agencies and 
information. However, according to ONI officials, similar ONI data 
prior to 2010 is not available. IMB data is based on self-reporting by 
vessels and companies operating in the area made directly to IMB. 
According to DOD, State, industry, and IMB officials, there are 
several reasons for the variation between the two sets of data, 
including differences in categorization of incidents, validation of 
sources, under reporting, and differences in geographic scope. A 
discussion of the data used in this report can be found in appendix I. 

[End of figure] 

According to the U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime 
and information from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, as 
well as the UN Security Council, piracy and maritime crime pose a 
threat to regional commerce and stability in the Gulf of Guinea. For 
example, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
while Nigeria has the second largest amount of proven crude oil 
reserves in Africa, as of December 2013, exploration activity there 
was at its lowest levels in a decade as a result of rising security 
problems related to oil theft, onshore pipeline sabotage, and piracy 
and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as other investment 
and government uncertainties. 

Moreover, incident data since 2010 shows that piracy is moving farther 
off shore, prompting concerns that these trends may continue. 
According to officials from AFRICOM, ONI, and State, and according to 
IMB data as shown in figure 2 of this report, Gulf of Guinea piracy 
and maritime crime prior to 2011 have generally occurred in the 
coastal areas near Lagos or off the Niger Delta. However, recent 
attacks have taken place farther away from the waters off Nigeria, 
demonstrating a broader reach of pirates, as well as increasing the 
number of coastal states involved. For example, since 2011, several 
tanker hijackings were reported farther west than previously observed, 
off Togo and Cote d'Ivoire, according to ONI officials. Further, a 
July 2013 tanker hijacking off the coast of Gabon, and a similar 
incident off Angola in January 2014 represent, as of March 2014, the 
southernmost occurrences in which vessels were hijacked and sailed to 
Nigeria to offload the stolen oil cargo. According to AFRICOM 
officials, the ability to conduct such hijackings, which involve 
difficult maneuvering of large vessels across swaths of open water 
while conducting oil bunkering operations, illustrates that these 
maritime criminals may be increasingly capable of complex and long-
range operations.[Footnote 36] 

The types of piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea fluctuate 
from theft of petroleum products and other cargo to include a greater 
proportion of kidnappings for ransom. According to ONI and AFRICOM 
officials, while the total number of incidents has remained relatively 
constant since 2011, they have observed a recent increase in the 
proportion of kidnappings. Specifically, incidents of kidnapping 
increased from 14 incidents (or 16 percent of attacks) in 2012, to 32 
incidents (or 29 percent of attacks in 2013), as shown in figure 8. 
[Footnote 37] Further, combined with the higher levels of violence 
seen in the Gulf of Guinea as compared to the Horn of Africa, MARAD, 
State, and all eight of the shipping industry association officials we 
interviewed expressed that the increasing prevalence of kidnappings is 
a cause for concern. 

Figure 8: Types of Piracy and Maritime Crime Incidents in the Gulf of 
Guinea, 2010 through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Year: 2010; 
Vessel hijacked: 1; 
Boarding: 26; 
Fired upon/attempted boarding: 12; 
Kidnapping: 17. 

Year: 2011; 
Vessel hijacked: 19; 
Boarding: 41; 
Fired upon/attempted boarding: 26; 
Kidnapping: 18. 

Year: 2012; 
Vessel hijacked: 14; 
Boarding: 31; 
Fired upon/attempted boarding: 30; 
Kidnapping: 14. 

Year: 2013; 
Vessel hijacked: 11; 
Boarding: 26; 
Fired upon/attempted boarding: 43; 
Kidnapping: 32. 

Source: GAO analysis of Office of Naval Intelligence data. GAO-14-422. 

[End of figure] 

The United States Has Ongoing Efforts to Strengthen Maritime Security 
in the Gulf of Guinea: 

According to AFRICOM officials, the objective of building partner 
capacity in the Gulf of Guinea, including strengthening maritime 
security, has long been part of U.S. military and diplomatic efforts 
in the region, even though the United States and international 
partners do not generally conduct naval patrols such as those 
conducted off the Horn of Africa.[Footnote 38] For example, AFRICOM 
has conducted training and other efforts to strengthen regional 
security, including combating piracy and maritime crime, since its 
creation in 2008. According to AFRICOM, State, and U.S. Coast Guard 
Officials, while U.S. efforts in the Gulf of Guinea are informed by 
the region's specific geopolitical context, they also include efforts 
aimed to improve the prevention, disruption, and prosecution of piracy 
and maritime crime. 

U.S. Efforts to Prevent Acts of Piracy and Maritime Crime: 

According to State and DOD officials, providing a permanent U.S. or 
international interdiction presence in the region is impractical 
because foreign nations do not have the authority to conduct military 
operations in another sovereign nation's territory and the need for 
limited naval resources to address other strategic priorities. 
However, as in the Horn of Africa, a variety of U.S. efforts are 
underway to help prevent acts of piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf 
of Guinea, including in the following areas: 

* Coordination of international activities and assistance: According 
to DOD and State officials, facilitating collaboration and avoiding 
duplication is important to U.S. and international partners. To help 
achieve this, and in recognition of increasing concern in the region, 
an ad hoc Group of Eight (G8) group called the G8++ Friends of the 
Gulf of Guinea was established to conduct high-level coordination and 
discussion of international assistance efforts.[Footnote 39] Further, 
State and AFRICOM officials said that as part of their planning 
process, AFRICOM holds planning conferences to solicit input from 
international partners, coordinate activities, and leverage resources. 
All U.S. officials we spoke with agreed that while the establishment 
of the Contact Group for the Horn of Africa was helpful in the absence 
of a functioning Somali government, in the case of the Gulf of Guinea, 
solutions must emerge from the region itself, and the role of the 
international community is to support and promote African-led 
initiatives. For example, the U.S., through DOD and State, has 
supported and facilitated the efforts of the two relevant African 
economic communities--the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS)--to develop and lead efforts to prevent and suppress piracy. 
For example, according to AFRICOM and State officials, AFRICOM and 
respective U.S. embassies supported the recent development of a code 
of conduct concerning the prevention of piracy, armed robbery, and 
other maritime crime, which was signed in June 2013 by leaders of the 
Gulf of Guinea coastal states. 

* Security advisories for U.S. vessels and ship protection measures: 
MARAD provides security advisories to alert U.S. vessel operators 
transiting all over the world, and in August 2008, MARAD issued a 
maritime advisory warning of piracy and criminal activity against oil 
industry and other vessels by Niger Delta militants in Nigerian 
territorial waters. Additionally, in August 2010, MARAD warned that 
vessels operating near oil platforms in Nigerian waters were at high 
risk of armed attacks and hostage taking, and advised vessels to act 
in accordance with Coast Guard directives on security plans and risk 
assessments. Further, in March 2012, shipping industry organizations 
in coordination with NATO issued interim guidelines for protection 
against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea as a companion to their August 
2011 BMP version 4 for the Horn of Africa region. Most recently, in 
July 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard directed U.S. vessels to revise their 
ship security plans and protective measures in response to continued 
attacks and lessons learned from investigations of recent incidents, 
including hijacking tankers for oil theft, acts of robbery, and 
kidnapping for ransom of vessel masters and officers from offshore oil 
exploration support vessels. 

U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Acts of Piracy and Maritime Crime: 

Unlike off the coast of Somalia, where agreements authorize 
international forces, including the United States, to disrupt pirate 
attacks in territorial waters and dismantle pirate bases ashore, every 
Gulf of Guinea country possesses the sovereign rights to control its 
maritime and land borders. Accordingly, the U.S. role and the majority 
of its efforts pertain to training, security assistance, and 
coordination, including the following activities: 

* Bilateral equipment and training assistance to navies and coast 
guards: According to IMO, DOD, and State officials, the development of 
regional countries' naval capabilities is critical to successfully 
fighting piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea. Further, DOD 
officials told us that regional navies have either nascent or 
insufficient national maritime forces to independently combat the 
crime that occurs off their coasts, let alone that which may occur 
farther out to sea. To increase capabilities for regional maritime 
forces, State, in coordination with DOD, provides bilateral assistance 
and training to countries in the region. This includes approximately 
$8.5 million since 2010 in equipment and related training (e.g., 
vessels, engines, and maintenance training and parts) provided to 
countries in the greater Gulf of Guinea region to help build their 
maritime forces, according to State officials.[Footnote 40] 
Additionally, according to State budget documents, since 2010, State 
has used its Africa Maritime Security Initiative to provide regional 
maritime security training and support through the DOD's Africa 
Partnership Station and requested $2 million for this effort in fiscal 
years 2013 and 2014.[Footnote 41] 

* Training exercises to strengthen regional response capabilities: In 
addition to equipment and training to build countries' maritime 
forces, AFRICOM and its naval component, U.S. Naval Forces - Africa 
provide multilateral training to improve regional maritime security 
operations capability, such as navy-to-navy exercises focused on 
maritime interdiction operations and response. For example, the annual 
Obangame Express exercise is a multi-country, multi-fleet exercise 
that implements various scenarios over several days. Begun as a proof 
of concept in 2010 with limited countries and vessels involved, the 
objectives of Obangame Express conducted in February 2013, according 
to AFRICOM, were focused on information sharing and interoperability 
among 10 Gulf of Guinea countries, the ECCAS Combined Maritime Center, 
ECOWAS, as well as the United States and 4 international partners. The 
exercises involve combating and responding to various scenarios 
including oil bunkering, trafficking illegal cargo, illegal fishing, 
and piracy, and AFRICOM officials stated that future exercises already 
have commitments of expanded international and regional participation. 

U.S. Efforts to Support Prosecution of Suspected Pirates and Maritime 
Criminals: 

According to the Action Plan, facilitating the prosecution and 
detention of pirates off the Horn of Africa is a central element of 
U.S. efforts to combat piracy in the region. However, as previously 
noted, the majority of Gulf of Guinea maritime crimes occur within the 
territorial waters of one or more country and as a result are under 
their legal jurisdiction. As such, the U.S. role in prosecuting 
suspected criminals, like its role in prevention and disruption of 
attacks, is one of support and capacity building, such as the 
following efforts: 

* Maritime law enforcement training and prosecution: According to DOD, 
State, and U.S. Coast Guard officials, much of the training the United 
States provides to maritime law enforcement in the Gulf of Guinea is 
similar to that provided in the Horn of Africa, and is used to combat 
a variety of crimes, such as narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, 
human trafficking, and illegal fishing, as well as piracy. For 
instance, in West Africa, AFRICOM and the Coast Guard provide training 
including visit, board, search, and seizure skills and mentorship 
through the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) 
program, which aims to strengthen countries' abilities to enforce 
their maritime laws. AMLEP targets illicit trafficking in drugs, arms, 
and humans, as well as counterpiracy issues and illegal fishing, and 
the program has resulted in the successful seizure and prosecution of 
illegal fisherman by African law enforcement officers in African 
waters, according to AFRICOM officials. 

* Judicial capacity building: State's Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) has conducted a series of regional 
maritime criminal justice seminars. Specifically, INL and the Africa 
Center for Strategic Studies have hosted a series of Trans-Atlantic 
Maritime Criminal Justice Workshops, which provide an opportunity for 
regional law enforcement agencies to learn about maritime crime and 
related gaps in their judicial systems. This series of conferences 
included a June 2013 session for ECOWAS countries in Ghana, with the 
other conferences held in February 2013 in Cape Verde and February 
2014 in Benin. Additionally, according to State officials, in 2013 the 
agency began discussions with the G8++ Friends of Gulf of Guinea to 
develop possible future U.S. programs to strengthen regional 
countries' capacity to investigate and prosecute cases of armed 
robbery at sea and piracy.[Footnote 42] 

The United States Has Not Assessed Piracy and Maritime Crime in the 
Gulf of Guinea: 

According to DOD and State officials, U.S. efforts to combat piracy 
and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea are guided by the same over-
arching U.S. policies and security goals as the efforts to combat 
piracy off of the Horn of Africa. These policies include the 2007 
Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of 
Violence at Sea, the 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized 
Crime, the 2012 Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, the 2012 National 
Strategy for Maritime Security, and the 2013 National Maritime Domain 
Awareness Plan. For example, the Strategy to Combat Transnational 
Organized Crime outlines East and West African maritime security as 
regional priorities, specifically noting incidents of Somali piracy 
and oil theft and kidnapping of oil workers in the Gulf of Guinea. DOD 
and State officials emphasized that U.S. efforts are then developed in 
consideration of the particular contexts of each region. In the case 
of Somalia, the surge and intensity of the rising piracy problem, the 
specific nature of the crime, and the absence of a functioning 
government presented a crisis that warranted collective international 
action, as well as a U.S. plan to guide its contribution to this 
response. Alternatively, State, DOD, and Coast Guard officials we 
spoke with explained that because the context of maritime crime in the 
Gulf of Guinea, and thereby the U.S. efforts there, encompass a 
broader set of geopolitical issues and maritime crimes, creating a 
piracy-focused plan similar to the Action Plan in the Horn of Africa 
may not be appropriate. 

While there is not a whole-of-government plan to guide maritime 
security efforts in the Gulf of Guinea, DOD, State, Coast Guard, and 
others continue to expand and coordinate their maritime security 
activities there, which range from individual boarding team trainings 
to broad judicial sector reform. DOD and State officials told us that 
as the United States and international partners look to expand efforts 
in the Gulf of Guinea, coordinating activities to achieve the most 
effective mix and efficient use of resources is increasingly 
important. For example, officials from U.S. Naval Forces - Africa 
stated that occasional duplication of training activities can happen, 
particularly as international partners increase their attention to the 
region. However, according to officials from the U.S. government 
agencies working in the region, the NSCS has not directed them to 
conduct a collective assessment of efforts to combat piracy and 
maritime crime that weighs the U.S. security interests, goals, and 
resources in the region against the various types of agency and 
international activities underway. Moreover, while individual agencies 
have conducted analysis regarding the incidents of piracy and maritime 
crime such as armed robbery and kidnapping in the region, there has 
not been a coordinated interagency appraisal of how the variety of 
existing and planned activities address U.S. policy objectives in the 
context of such a broad set of maritime crimes, from illegal fishing 
and oil theft, to arms trafficking and kidnapping of U.S. citizens 
from offshore supply vessels. 

The National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan cites the importance of 
understanding new and emerging maritime challenges in the maritime 
domain, the development of solutions to address those challenges, and 
continuous reassessment using risk management principles. Further, the 
Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime outlines a specific 
set of U.S. priority actions to combat transnational criminal threats 
such as piracy and maritime crime, one of which is to increase 
research, data collection, and analysis to assess the scope and impact 
of such crime and the most effective means to combat it. 

Individual agencies may include some assessment information into their 
planning and evaluation processes but this information is specific to 
agencies and programs rather than the overall U.S. effort. For 
example, according to AFRICOM officials, it uses available information 
to assess the operating environment, such as demographic surveys, to 
develop indicators to help measure program effectiveness, or it may 
conduct an assessment of a partner country's naval capabilities to 
inform program design. However, the chief of the AFRICOM assessments 
directorate said this assessment process is relatively new for the 
command, and there are no known interagency efforts to leverage this 
information into a broader assessment of U.S. maritime security or 
counterpiracy efforts. Additionally, according to State officials from 
the Political-Military Affairs Bureau, while individual programs such 
as State's foreign military financing or other security assistance 
activities may conduct evaluations of their programs, it is not part 
of a broader assessment of State's regional maritime security 
activities. 

Program guidance for other multi-agency international collaborative 
efforts--such as providing counternarcotics assistance to countries to 
disrupt drug production and trafficking--has also shown that assessing 
agencies' progress in meeting established goals can provide better 
information for decision making. Guidance for these efforts 
demonstrates how incorporating elements of a strategic approach such 
as evaluating performance measures and setting performance targets can 
provide oversight and guide management decisions about the allotment 
of program resources.[Footnote 43] If a multi-agency collaborative 
plan, such as the Action Plan, was developed for the efforts that 
address piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea, including 
elements of a strategic approach could help determine the best use of 
resources to meet its objectives.[Footnote 44] 

An assessment that identifies the various U.S. and international 
efforts underway to strengthen maritime security, examines the 
relationship of these efforts with the nature and scope of the problem 
in the region, and considers the geopolitical environment and other 
regional factors could help strengthen ongoing efforts to combat 
maritime crime, as well as inform the appropriate mix of activities in 
order to use resources most effectively. Further, such an assessment 
could help determine whether additional actions, such as developing an 
action plan or other guidance, is needed to align U.S. interagency 
efforts to better achieve national security goals. In commenting on a 
draft of this report, an NSCS official stated that a global action 
plan is being developed, with a separate annex focusing on the Gulf of 
Guinea, but did not indicate the extent to which the plan was based on 
an assessment of ongoing activities or would include elements of a 
strategic approach. 

Conclusions: 

Since our September 2010 report on piracy off the Horn of Africa, the 
U.S. Government--as part of an international partnership--has 
continued to take steps outlined in the Action Plan to counter piracy. 
In 2013, piracy steeply declined off the Horn of Africa, but the gains 
are tenuous and piracy could easily resurge if the international 
coalition becomes complacent. Whether piracy incidents are rising or 
declining, it is important for the Action Plan to be updated to 
account for current circumstances. In addition, our current work 
indicates that the U.S. Government has not implemented additional 
steps we recommended to identify measures of effectiveness, identify 
costs and benefits, and clarify agency roles and responsibilities. We 
are not making any new recommendations regarding the Action Plan for 
the Horn of Africa, but we continue to believe that our 2010 
recommendations remain relevant to the changing conditions, and acting 
on these recommendations would assist the NSCS--and DOD and State as 
the co-chairs of the Counter-Piracy Steering Group--in better 
assessing, planning, and implementing actions to counter piracy as it 
continues to evolve, and would help ensure that recent progress is 
sustained. 

Meanwhile, piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea has 
escalated and in 2013 surpassed the Horn of Africa in terms of 
incidents. The variety of U.S. efforts by multiple government agencies 
to combat piracy in the region highlights the importance of having 
coordinated activities that combine the most effective mix of 
resources. Without a collective assessment of the scope and nature of 
the problem of piracy and maritime crime, particularly in the Gulf of 
Guinea where no such collective assessment has occurred, the U.S. may 
not be coordinating its efforts in the most effective or cost 
efficient manner. An assessment of the various U.S. and international 
efforts, as well as of the geopolitical environment and other regional 
factors could help determine what additional actions are needed to 
align all of the efforts underway. Furthermore, an assessment of 
whether and to what extent such actions, such as developing an action 
plan that would include elements of a strategic approach, is needed 
can guide decision making to address the evolving threat, coordinate 
resources and efforts, and prioritize maritime security activities in 
the Gulf of Guinea. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help ensure that efforts to counter piracy and maritime crime are 
coordinated and prioritized to effectively address the evolving 
threat, we recommend that the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, in collaboration with the Secretaries of Defense and 
State, work through the Counter-Piracy Steering Group or otherwise 
collaborate with the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Transportation, 
and the Treasury, and the Attorney General to: 

* conduct an assessment of U.S. efforts to address piracy and maritime 
crime in the Gulf of Guinea to inform these efforts and: 

* determine whether additional actions to address counterpiracy and 
maritime security, such as developing an action plan that includes 
elements of a strategic approach, are needed to guide and coordinate 
activities. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, DOT, 
Treasury, and the NSCS for review and comment. DHS, DOJ, DOT, and 
Treasury, did not provide official comments on our draft report and 
DOD and State deferred to the NSCS for comments on the 
recommendations. In an email from the NSCS dated June 12, 2014, the 
NSCS did not concur or non-concur with our recommendations, but 
provided information related to its current counterpiracy efforts. 

Specifically, the NSCS stated that it is coordinating with departments 
and agencies through the interagency process to develop a global 
action plan for countering piracy, with separate annexes focusing on 
the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. The updated plan will 
provide guidance to the federal government focusing on three core 
areas including: prevention of attacks, response to acts of maritime 
crime, and enhancing maritime security and governance. The plan will 
be forthcoming in the summer of 2014 and the Executive Branch will 
continue to evaluate maritime crime around the world and develop or 
refine guidance to account for evolving conditions in specific regions. 

We are encouraged by the steps being taken by the NSCS in providing 
the federal agencies responsible for counterpiracy activities with an 
updated plan, but it is not clear to what extent the plan will include 
previously recommended elements of a strategic approach. The 
description of the plan appears to provide a needed update to the 
Action Plan given the changes in conditions off of the Horn of Africa. 
The updated plan also appears to be responsive to part of our 
recommendation to consider additional actions such as developing a 
similar plan for the Gulf of Guinea. However, the description of the 
plan does not address the extent to which it will include elements 
such as an assessment of costs and benefits, measures of effectiveness 
to evaluate counterpiracy efforts, and defined roles and 
responsibilities for the agencies involved in carrying out 
counterpiracy activities. Further, the description does not address 
the extent to which the updated plan is based on an assessment of 
ongoing counterpiracy activities in the Gulf of Guinea. We will 
monitor the situation and review the updated plan once it is released 
and will continue to monitor the NSCS's progress in planning and 
providing guidance for counterpiracy activities as well as DOD and 
State's progress in implementing the plan as co-chairs of the Counter 
Piracy Steering Group. 

DOD, DHS, and DOJ provided technical comments on a draft of this 
report which have been incorporated as appropriate. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the 
Attorney General; the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, 
State, Transportation, and the Treasury; and other interested parties. 
In addition, the report will be made available at no charge on the GAO 
Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact either Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or 
CaldwellS@gao.gov or Chris P. Currie at (404) 679-1875 or 
CurrieC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 
report. Key contributors to this report are found in Appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Stephen L. Caldwell 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 

Signed by: 

Chris P. Currie: 
Acting Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report assesses how piracy off the Horn of Africa has changed 
since 2010 and describes U.S. efforts to assess its counterpiracy 
actions, given any changing conditions; and identifies trends in 
piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea and U.S. efforts to 
address them and evaluates the extent to which the United States has 
assessed its counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. 

To assess how piracy off the Horn of Africa has changed since 2010, we 
analyzed data from the International Chamber of Commerce's 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the U.S. Office of Naval 
intelligence (ONI) on reported piracy incidents, hostages taken, and 
ransoms paid off the Horn of Africa from 2008 through 2013.[Footnote 
45] We discussed data-collection methods, processes for data entry, 
and the steps taken to ensure the reliability of the data with both 
IMB and ONI officials. We collected information from both IMB and ONI 
on their processes for quality control, data verification, and how 
potential errors are identified and corrected. We also discussed 
variation between IMB and ONI data with officials from ONI and other 
Department of Defense (DOD) organizations, the Department of State 
(State), and IMB, who attributed differences in categorization of 
incidents, validation of sources, and geographic scope to the 
variation.[Footnote 46] Officials stated that while values between ONI 
and IMB data may differ, IMB is a generally accepted data source for 
tracking global piracy incidents and suitably reflects general 
historical trends.[Footnote 47] We determined the data to be 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing the context, 
trends, and scope of pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa in this 
report. In addition, we met with U.S. agency officials, international 
partners, and representatives from insurance, shipping, and private 
security industry associations to discuss their involvement in 
counterpiracy activities such as developing best practices for 
protecting ships from pirate attack, working with the international 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, and participating in 
naval patrols off the Horn of Africa.[Footnote 48] We met with 
officials from shipping industry associations that represent owners 
and operators from over 80 percent of the world's merchant fleet and 
provide a unified industry voice in the creation of industry policy 
and strategy; insurance industry associations whose members cover 
approximately 90 percent of the world's ocean-going tonnage; and a 
private security industry association that has over 180 members across 
35 countries. While the statements of these industry officials cannot 
be generalized to the entire industries they represent, their 
perspectives provide valuable insight since each is actively involved 
in international collaborative efforts to combat piracy. To determine 
the extent to which the U.S. has assessed its counterpiracy actions as 
outlined in the 2008 Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: 
Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan), we reviewed the Action 
Plan, the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, the 2007 
Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of 
Violence at Sea, relevant U.S. policies and laws, and United Nations 
Security Council resolutions. We also reviewed program documents 
including briefings and meeting summaries and interviewed officials 
from DOD, State, and the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), 
Justice (DOJ), Transportation (DOT), and the Treasury, including 
components such as U.S. Naval Forces - Central Command, the U.S. Coast 
Guard, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to discuss 
implementation of the Action Plan and the status of our 2010 
recommendations to improve the plan.[Footnote 49] We selected these 
departments and agencies because the Action Plan states they shall 
contribute to, coordinate, and undertake initiatives in accordance 
with the plan. 

To identify trends in piracy and maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea 
we analyzed IMB data on actual and attempted piracy incidents from 
2007 through 2013, and ONI data from 2010 through 2013. As with the 
IMB and ONI data pertaining to the Horn of Africa, we collected 
information on the quality control, verification, and safeguards from 
error and discussed the reliability of the data with officials from 
IMB, ONI, and State officials involved in maritime security 
initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea and determined the data to be 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Because ONI 
data on the Gulf of Guinea is unavailable prior to 2010 we chose to 
present the IMB data from 2007 through 2013 alongside the ONI data to 
show trends over a broader period. In addition to data, we reviewed 
publicly available reports and documents regarding maritime security 
and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea from the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, the EU, and other multilateral and nongovernmental 
organizations. To evaluate U.S. efforts to address piracy and maritime 
crime in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the extent to which the U.S. 
has assessed the need for a strategic approach for the region, we 
reviewed relevant U.S. and international policies and laws, such as 
the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, 2007 Policy for the 
Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, the 
2008 Action Plan, the 2012 Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
United Nations Security Council resolutions pertaining to the Gulf of 
Guinea. We also compared agency efforts with U.S. policy priorities 
and requirements for conducting assessments outlined in the 2011 
Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime and the 2013 National 
Maritime Domain Awareness Plan, documents that guide U.S. maritime 
security efforts, including in the Gulf of Guinea. 

For both of our objectives, we interviewed officials and, where 
appropriate, obtained documentation related to their activities off 
the Horn of Africa or in the Gulf of Guinea such as fact sheets, 
briefings, and meeting summaries from the following U.S. government 
agencies and offices, international entities, and U.S. and 
international industry and nongovernmental organizations: 

Department of Defense: 

* Office of the General Counsel; Office of the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Policy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Counter-Narcotics and Global Threats; and the Joint Staff 
J5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate: 

* Department of the Navy, as well as the Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service, and the Office of Naval Intelligence: 

* U.S. Africa Command (Germany) and its components U.S. Naval Forces - 
Africa and Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa: 

* U.S. Central Command and its component U.S. Naval Forces - Central 
Command (Bahrain): 

Department of State: 

* Office of the Legal Adviser for: Economic and Business Affairs; and 
Law Enforcement and Intelligence: 

* Bureau of African Affairs: 

* Bureau of Counterterrorism: 

* Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs: 

* Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs: 

* Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: 

* Bureau of International Organization Affairs: 

* Bureau of Political-Military Affairs: 

Department of Homeland Security: 

* U.S. Coast Guard offices, including the National Defense Strategy 
Division, Maritime Security (Counterterrorism) Division, Office of 
International Affairs and Foreign Policy; Office of Commercial Vessel 
Compliance; Office of Budget and Programs; and the Intelligence 
Coordination Center: 

* U.S. Coast Guard representatives at other agencies, including U.S. 
Africa Command (Germany) and Patrol Forces Southwest Asia (Bahrain): 

Department of Justice: 

* National Security Division; the Criminal Division's Narcotic and 
Dangerous Drug Section, International Criminal Investigative Training 
Assistance Program, and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 
Development Assistance Training: 

* Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

Department of Transportation: 

* Office of the General Counsel: 

* Maritime Administration: Office of the Associate Administrator for 
Environment and Compliance and its Office of Security; Office of the 
Chief Counsel; Office of International Activities: 

Department of the Treasury: 

* Office of General Counsel; Office of Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence and its offices of Terrorist Financing and Financial 
Crimes and Foreign Assets Control; Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network: 

International Government and Multilateral Organizations include: 

* International Maritime Organization (United Kingdom): 

* European Union Naval Forces (United Kingdom): 

* Combined Maritime Forces (Bahrain): 

* Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Meeting (observed in Bahrain): 

* North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the NATO Shipping 
Centre (United Kingdom): 

* United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom): 

Industry Partners and Nongovernmental Organizations include: 

* Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO): 

* Center for Strategic and International Studies: 

* Chamber of Shipping of America: 

* International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO): 

* International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO): 

* International Chamber of Shipping: 

* International Group of P&I Clubs: 

* International Maritime Bureau: 

* International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF): 

* Japanese Shipowners' Association: 

* Lloyd's Market Association: 

* Maersk Line, Limited: 

* Oceans Beyond Piracy: 

* Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF): 

* Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House): 

* Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI): 

* Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators Limited 
(SIGTTO): 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Attempted and Successful Pirate Attacks off the Horn of 
Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea, 2010 through 2013: 

Figure 9: Attempted and Successful Pirate Attacks off the Horn of 
Africa, 2010 through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 4 illustrated maps] 

Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data (data); 
MapInfo (map). GAO-14-422. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 10: Attempted and Successful Pirate Attacks in the Gulf of 
Guinea, 2010 through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 4 illustrated maps] 

Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data (data); 
MapInfo (map). GAO-14-422. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Interagency Progress in Implementing the Lines of Action 
in the National Security Council's 2008 Countering Piracy off the Horn 
of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan: 

In September 2010, we assessed the counterpiracy efforts of the United 
States government against the lines of action identified in the 
Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan 
(Action Plan).[Footnote 50] These lines of action continue to guide 
the United States' efforts off the Horn of Africa. Table 3 summarizes 
our assessments from our September 2010 report and also provides 
updated information for each action since that time.[Footnote 51] 

Table 3: Interagency Progress in Implementing the Lines of Action in 
the National Security Council's (NSC) 2008 Action Plan: 

Line of Action 1: Prevent pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability 
of the maritime domain to piracy. 

Tasks within each Line of Action: Establish and maintain a Contact 
Group; 
Status as of March 2014: We assessed that the United States had made 
substantial progress on this action in 2010 by helping establish the 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, pursuant to UN 
Security Council Resolution 1851. Chaired by the United States in 
2013, the voluntary group of over 80 countries, organizations, and 
industry groups facilitate the discussion and coordination of actions 
among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of 
Somalia. The 2014 chair is the European Union. 

Tasks within each Line of Action: Strengthen and encourage the use of 
the Maritime Security Patrol Area; 
Status as of March 2014: We assessed that the United States had made 
substantial progress in this area in 2010 by working with 
international and industry partners. Since that time, the U.S. has 
continued to strengthen patrols by providing surface and air support. 
The U.S. has also actively encouraged practices such as registering 
with the regional coordination center and traveling in convoys. 
However, the United States has limited influence with ships that are 
not U.S. flagged. 

Tasks within each Line of Action: Updating ships' security plans; 
Status as of March 2014: We assessed that the Coast Guard had made 
substantial progress in this area in 2010 by approving piracy annexes 
to ship security plans for 100 percent of U.S.-flagged vessels 
identified as transiting high-risk waters, including those in the Horn 
of Africa. The Coast Guard has also issued Maritime Security (MARSEC) 
Directives that provide direction to owners and operators of U.S. 
vessels on how to respond to emerging security threats. The industry 
updated the Best Management Practices by releasing BMP4 in August 2011 
to include recommended risk assessments and planning practices. 

Tasks within each Line of Action: Strategic communication; 
Status as of March 2014: The U.S. government made some progress on 
this in 2010 by issuing counterpiracy statements and supporting 
international efforts. Since 2010, the United States began periodic 
anti-piracy radio programming in Somalia in coordination with local 
organizations, NATO, and the United Nations (UN). In November 2013, 
the Somali Government took over the responsibility for strategic 
communication. 

Line of Action 2: Disrupt acts of piracy consistent with international 
law and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states. 

Tasks within each Line of Action: Support a regionally based Counter-
Piracy Coordination Center (CPCC); 
Status as of March 2014: We assessed that this action was not 
applicable in 2010 because there were already reporting and monitoring 
functions being performed by other organizations. While the United 
States has not directly established a regional counterpiracy 
coordination center, the United States provides assistance to other 
centers. For example, the United Kingdom has established the Regional 
Fusion and Law Enforcement Center for Safety and Security at Sea in 
partnership with the Seychelles. State and DOJ have worked with the 
center to improve information sharing and coordination with INTERPOL. 
EU NAVFOR has also established the Maritime Security Centre - Horn of 
Africa (MSCHOA) to provide 24-hour manned monitoring of vessels 
transiting through the Gulf of Aden. While the United States supports 
the mission of these centers, State officials stated that it would be 
duplicative to establish one of its own and have no plans to do so. 

Tasks within each Line of Action: Seize and destroy pirate vessels and 
related equipment and deliver suspected pirates to prosecuting states; 
Status as of March 2014: We assessed that the U.S. government had made 
some progress in this area in 2010. Since that time, the United States 
and international forces have delivered over 1,000 piracy suspects for 
prosecution. The United States and international forces have also 
continued to seize vessels and equipment used for piracy. 

Tasks within each Line of Action: Provide interdiction-capable 
presence; 
Status as of March 2014: The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard had made 
substantial progress on this in 2010 and continue to contribute assets 
(such as ship and air patrols), leadership, and other support to 
coalition forces patrolling off the Horn of Africa. As piracy has 
decreased the United States has contributed fewer Naval patrols, but 
air patrols and other contributions have been more consistent. 

Tasks within each Line of Action: Support shiprider[A] programs and 
other agreements; 
Status as of March 2014: The U.S. government had made some progress on 
this in 2010 and continues to support other bilateral and regional 
arrangements to bolster regional capabilities to counter piracy. These 
include collecting and analyzing incident information, as well as 
facilitating assistance and a coordinated and effective information 
flow among partners. 
DOJ officials stated that U.S. agencies have not established shiprider 
programs and have no plans to do so because the U.N. has designated 
Somalia's territorial waters as international waters for the purpose 
of fighting piracy. Therefore they question the benefits of shiprider 
programs to facilitating prosecutions in this context. 

Tasks within each Line of Action: Disrupt and dismantle pirate bases 
ashore; 
Status as of March 2014: While the U.S. government had taken little or 
no action on this in 2010, the EU has since taken military action 
against pirate bases on the Somali coast. As a result, pirate bases 
have been largely dismantled or moved inland where DOD officials 
reported that they are a less effective threat. 

Tasks within each Line of Action: Disrupt pirate revenue; 
Status as of March 2014: The U.S. government had made some progress on 
this in 2010 as the President signed an executive order blocking 
assets of certain designated individuals, including two pirate 
financiers.[B] However, U.S. efforts to track financial assets or 
transactions are hampered because there are not financial institutions 
in Somalia. 

Line of Action 3: Facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates by 
flag, victim, and coastal states, and, in appropriate cases, the 
United States to ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held 
accountable for their actions. 

Tasks within each Line of Action: Conclude prosecution agreements; 
Status as of March 2014: In 2010, we noted that the U.S. government 
had made some progress in this area. Since that time a prosecution 
agreement with Kenya has become less effective because Kenya's 
judicial system has become saturated with piracy suspects, according 
to State and Justice officials. The United States has a prosecution 
agreement with the Seychelles. 

Tasks within each Line of Action: Support the exercise of jurisdiction 
under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation; 
Status as of March 2014: In 2010, we noted that the U.S. government 
had made some progress in this area. The United States continues to 
exercise jurisdiction under the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation to prosecute 
pirates in the United States. 

Tasks within each Line of Action: Support the use of other applicable 
international conventions and laws; 
Status as of March 2014: Having made some progress in 2010, the United 
States has continued to exercise jurisdiction and prosecute, pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 1651, 11 suspected pirates for attacks on the USS 
Nicholas and USS Ashland, as well as 15 suspected pirates tied to the 
hijacking of the S/V Quest which resulted in the murder of four 
Americans. 

Tasks within each Line of Action: Enhance regional states' capacity to 
prosecute; 
Status as of March 2014: While having made some progress on this in 
2010, U.S. agencies continue to provide assistance to countries in the 
region for law enforcement and judicial capacity building and reform, 
which can include assistance related to maritime law enforcement and 
piracy. For example, the State Department has provided some foreign 
assistance funding to countries such as Kenya and the Seychelles, to 
help improve their judicial infrastructures. The United States also 
supports investigations and prosecutions, such as conducting Naval 
Criminal Investigative Service investigations aboard pirated vessels, 
and having U.S. Navy personnel provide testimony in foreign trials. 

Source: GAO summary of the NSC Countering Piracy off the Horn of 
Africa: Partnership and Action Plan. GAO-14-422. 

[A] Shiprider programs involve embarking law enforcement officials 
from one country onto a ship of another country. The law enforcement 
official (shiprider) would be able to authorize the ship to pursue and 
apprehend a criminal suspect in the territorial waters of that 
official's country. 

[B] Executive Order 13536, issued April 12, 2010, blocks all property 
and property interests within U.S. jurisdiction of persons listed in 
the Annex to the order and provides the authority for the Secretary of 
the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to 
designate additional persons that threaten the peace, security, or 
stability of Somalia, which includes those who support or engage in 
acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia. See 75 Fed. Reg. 19,869 (Apr. 
15, 2014). Property and property interests within U.S. jurisdiction 
include property in the possession or control of any United States 
person in the United States or overseas. United States person is 
defined as "any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, 
entity organized under the laws of the United States or any 
jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or 
any person in the United States." 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Department of Defense Counterpiracy Costs, 2010 through 
2013: 

During the course of our review, the Department of Defense provided 
information on the costs of its counterpiracy efforts as shown in 
table 4. 

Table 4: Department of Defense Counterpiracy Costs Incurred from 
Calendar Years 2010-2013 (dollars in millions): 

Counterpiracy effort: CTF 151 Surface; 
2010: $161.1; 
2011: $184.9; 
2012: $53.5; 
2013: $10.9. 

Counterpiracy effort: CTF 151 Air; 
2010: $17.9; 
2011: $23.9; 
2012: $33.5; 
2013: $16.0. 

Counterpiracy effort: CTF 508 Surface; 
2010: $61.7; 
2011: $63.2; 
2012: $52.7; 
2013: $40.0. 

Counterpiracy effort: Other[A]; 
2010: $2.5; 
2011: $2.5; 
2012: $2.5; 
2013: $2.5. 

Counterpiracy effort: Total; 
2010: $243.2; 
2011: $274.5; 
2012: $142.2; 
2013: $69.4. 

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data. | GAO-14-422: 

[A] The "other" category reflects the costs of contract linguists used 
in counterpiracy operations. Dollar values are fully-burdened costs 
incurred in a specific year. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov. 

Chris P. Currie, (404) 679-1875 or CurrieC@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contacts above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director; 
Suzanne Wren, Assistant Director; Jason Bair; Charles Bausell; 
Jennifer Cheung; Toni Gillich; Eric Hauswirth; Kevin Heinz; Stan 
Kostyla; Landis Lindsey; Tom Lombardi; John Mingus; Jessica Orr; Matt 
Spiers; and Sally Williamson made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Defense Headquarters: DOD Needs to Periodically Review and Improve 
Visibility of Combatant Commands' Resources. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-293]. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 
2013. 

Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage 
Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-335T]. Washington, 
D.C.: February 14, 2013. 

Maritime Security: Progress Made, but Further Actions Needed to Secure 
the Maritime Energy Supply. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-883T]. Washington, D.C.: August 24, 
2011. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Needs a Strategic, 
Risk-Based Approach to Enhance Its Maritime Domain Awareness. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-621]. Washington, D.C.: 
June, 20, 2011. 

Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan Gains 
Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-449T]. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 
2011. 

Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and 
Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off 
the Horn of Africa. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-856]. Washington, D.C.: September 
24, 2010. 

Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency 
Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-794]. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 
2010. 

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of 
Africa Task Force. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504]. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 
2010. 

Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were 
Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-672]. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 
2008. 

Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in 
Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity 
Tankers. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-141]. 
Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] According to State officials, on October 23, 2013, the Captain and 
Chief Engineer on the C-Retriever, an American owned oil-supply 
vessel, were kidnapped in the Gulf of Guinea and released sometime in 
the 3 weeks following the event. 

[2] National Security Council, Countering Piracy off the Horn of 
Africa: Partnership and Action Plan: (Washington D.C. 2008). 

[3] GAO, Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan 
and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy 
off the Horn of Africa, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-856] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 
2010). 

[4] GAO, Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan 
Gains Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-449T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 
2011). 

[5] IMB is a division of the International Chamber of Commerce 
established as a non-profit organization in 1981 to fight against all 
types of maritime crime and malpractice. IMB uses industry knowledge, 
experience, and access to contacts around the world to identify and 
investigate fraud, spot new criminal methods and trends, and highlight 
other threats to trade. ONI is the division of the U.S. Navy that 
provides U.S. military, intelligence, and policy stakeholders with 
maritime intelligence including the analysis, production and 
dissemination of scientific, technical, geopolitical and military 
intelligence information. 

[6] Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008), which 
encouraged states and regional organizations fighting piracy and armed 
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to establish an international 
cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact, the Contact 
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia was established on January 
14, 2009, to facilitate the discussion and coordination of actions 
among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of 
Somalia. 

[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-856]. 

[8] IMB data is based on self-reporting directly to IMB by vessels and 
companies operating in the area. According to ONI data--which is 
aggregated from multiple data sources, (e.g., open source data such as 
media reports, IMB information, and all-source intelligence) and 
corroborated with other U.S. agencies and information--the actual 
number of incidents in the Gulf of Guinea is greater than what is 
reported to IMB. According to ONI and IMB officials, reasons for the 
variation between the two sets of data, include differences in 
categorization of incidents, validation of sources, under reporting, 
and differences in geographic scope. 

[9] In general, the degree to which a coastal state may exercise 
sovereignty and jurisdiction over its adjacent waters differs 
depending on its distance from the coast. Within a state's territorial 
sea (also referred to as its territorial waters), which extends not 
more than 12 nautical miles from its coast, is the area for which a 
state exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction. Within a state's 
contiguous zone--the area outside the territorial sea extending not 
further than 24 miles from a state's coast--the state may exercise 
control necessary to prevent infringement of laws and regulations 
within its territory or territorial sea. Further, within a state's 
exclusive economic zone--the area beyond and adjacent to the 
territorial sea, not extending beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
coastal baseline--the state has sovereign rights for the purpose of 
(and authority to exercise jurisdiction related to) exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing any natural resources, but through 
which all states generally enjoy the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight, among others. The "high seas" include all parts of the sea 
beyond national jurisdiction (i.e., beyond any states' exclusive 
economic zones). In this report, the term piracy refers to relevant 
acts committed in international waters--that is, anything beyond 
states' territorial seas--and maritime crime refers to such acts 
committed in a state's territorial sea. 

[10] The conventions further provide that the courts of the state that 
carry out such seizures may decide upon the penalties to be imposed 
and may determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, 
aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in 
good faith. 

[11] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) documents describe the 
term "dhow" as referring to a number of traditionally-constructed 
vessels used as the primary maritime commercial mode of transportation 
throughout the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Gulf, and the 
Indian Ocean. The structure and shape of dhows differentiate them from 
other types of merchant vessels and crew sizes vary between 5 and 30 
individuals who, according to NATO's description, often do not have 
formalized seamanship or fishery training. 

[12] For example, Resolution 1816, adopted in June 2008, authorized 
states to enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of 
repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. Resolution 2125, 
adopted in November 2013, renews the authorities and concerns raised 
in Resolution 1816 and other resolutions concerning piracy and armed 
robbery at sea with the backing of the Federal Government of Somalia 
that was formed in August 2012 following the end of the interim 
mandate of the Transitional Federal Government. Pursuant to Resolution 
2125, international militaries and organizations may continue to 
operate in Somali territorial waters because the new government does 
not have the capability to protect its coastline. 

[13] In October 2011 and in February 2012 the UN adopted Resolutions 
2018 and 2039, respectively, urging Gulf of Guinea states to 
coordinate regionally and nationally, with help from international 
partners, to, among other things, develop and implement national 
maritime security strategies, including a legal framework for the 
prevention, and repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well 
as for the prosecution of persons engaging in those crimes. 

[14] According to DOD officials, as of September 2013, there is no 
linkage between the Gulf of Guinea piracy and violent extremist groups 
such as Boko Haram and oil and tanker theft is generally carried out 
by criminal organizations for financial gain. 

[15] In June 2013, the governments of Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo signed 
the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery 
Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activities In West and Central 
Africa which calls for a regional framework to counter piracy and 
armed robbery at sea, including information-sharing and operational 
coordination mechanisms, among other things. 

[16] A list of U.S. agencies, international partners, and industry 
partners involved in the response to piracy off the Horn of Africa as 
of September 2010 can be found in [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-856] p.11 and 15. 

[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-856]. 

[18] Reported incidents of piracy can vary based on the type of 
activity recorded and may include: (1) ships boarded, (2) ships 
hijacked, (3) attempted boardings of ships and (4) ships fired upon. 

[19] World Bank. 2013. Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial 
Flows from Pirate Activities off the Horn of Africa. A World Bank 
Study. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9963-7. 

[20] The flag state is the country in which the vessel is registered. 
In general, flag states have the authority to enforce their own as 
well as international regulations, such as those relating to security 
standards, with respect to such vessels. 

[21] Port Security Advisory (2-09) (Rev. 3) Maritime Security (MARSEC) 
Directive 104-6 (series), Guidelines for U.S. Vessels Operating in 
High Risk Waters. January 07, 2011. 

[22] As a specialized agency of the UN, IMO is the global standard-
setting authority for the safety, security and environmental 
performance of international shipping. Its main role is to create a 
regulatory framework for the shipping industry that is fair and 
effective, universally adopted and universally implemented. The 
Maritime Safety Committee is a technical body with representatives 
from each of the IMO member states which, among other things, 
considers and submits recommendations and guidelines on safety for 
possible adoption by the IMO Assembly. 

[23] CTF 151 is a multinational naval task force, set up in 2009 with 
a specific mandate to respond to piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden 
and off the eastern coast of Somalia. The EU NAVFOR maintains a 
counterpiracy presence in the region with its Operation Atalanta CTF 
465. NATO maintains its counterpiracy presence in the region with its 
Operation Ocean Shield CTF 508. 

[24] The IRTC is a defined geographic area in which ships are 
protected by transiting in groups at a common speed or in a planned 
convoy accompanied by a military vessel. 

[25] See Exec. Order No. 13,536, Blocking Property of Certain Persons 
Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia, 75 Fed. Reg. 19,869 (Apr. 15, 
2010). 

[26] INTERPOL is an intergovernmental organization made up of 190 
member countries that facilitates international police cooperation. 
Members work together to provide targeted training, expert 
investigative support, relevant data and secure communications 
channels, among other services. 

[27] See 18 U.S.C. § 1651. 

[28] In total, this prosecution resulted in the conviction of three 
pirates and guilty pleas from 11 others, all resulting in sentences of 
at least life imprisonment. 

[29] The National Strategy for Maritime Security was created pursuant 
to National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive HSPD-13 (Dec. 21, 2004) and identified piracy 
as a threat the strategy intended to address. 

[30] The Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts 
of Violence at Sea states that it is the policy of the United States 
to repress piracy through, among other actions, "continuing to lead 
and support international efforts to repress piracy and urge other 
states to take decisive action both individually and through 
international efforts." 

[31] An assessment of progress made in implementing the Action Plan as 
of September 2010 can be found in [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-856], p 19. 

[32] We developed the characteristics of a strategic approach after 
our research examining legislative and executive mandates, including 
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993; general literature 
on strategic planning and performance; and guidance from the Office of 
Management and Budget on the President's Management Agenda, found that 
there were no legislative or executive mandates identifying a uniform 
set of required or desirable characteristics for national strategies. 
Some of these characteristics include 1) a statement of purpose, 
scope, and methodology, 2) problem definition, 3) goals, priorities 
and performance measures, 4) costs and risk management, 5) roles, 
responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms, and 6) integration with 
other strategies. For a more detailed discussion, see Combating 
Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 
Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C: Feb. 3, 
2004). 

[33] Our recommendations were made to the National Security Staff 
which changed its name to the National Security Council Staff pursuant 
to Executive Order 13657, dated February 10, 2014. 

[34] See appendix IV for a description of DOD counterpiracy costs, 
2010 through 2013. 

[35] As shown in figure 7, IMB reports a dip in incidents in the Gulf 
of Guinea in 2010. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and 
the U.S. Energy Information Administration reported that a 
contributing factor to this decline was the 2009 amnesty and 
subsequent ceasefire between the Nigerian government and Niger Delta 
militants who had previously been responsible for attacks on the oil 
industry, to include kidnappings, acts of piracy, and attacks on 
pipelines and other oil facilities. However, according to the Energy 
Information Administration as well as State officials, delayed 
progress in implementing some of the conditions of the amnesty has in 
turn contributed to increased oil theft and other attacks in recent 
years. 

[36] Oil bunkering is the process of offloading oil from one vessel 
onto another vessel. 

[37] In the context of this report and data reported by ONI and IMB, 
kidnappings refer to those that have occurred, or were reported to 
have occurred. According to ONI and AFRICOM officials, such incidents 
would include scenarios in which oil industry personnel or others were 
kidnapped from offshore supply vessels or platforms and held for 
ransom, such as the case of the two U.S. oil industry personnel taken 
from the C-Retriever in October 2013 off the coast of Nigeria. 
However, according to AFRICOM and Naval Forces-Africa officials, 
kidnappings conducted against the oil industry, including those 
perpetrated by Nigerian militants over the last decade, also include 
onshore kidnappings, or kidnappings within the inland waters and river 
ways of the Niger Delta. Onshore or inland kidnappings are generally 
not included in this data, and ONI officials said they take steps to 
validate the data they report However, ONI officials told us that some 
self-reported or other data may unintentionally include such incidents. 

[38] Maritime security activities in the Gulf of Guinea are primarily 
conducted by DOD and State, while others such as U.S. Coast Guard and 
MARAD also play a role. 

[39] Since 1997, the G8 has been a forum for the governments of eight 
of the world's largest national economies--Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 
March 2014 it was announced that Russia would no longer take part in 
the international group; however, it is unknown how this will effect 
G8-related organizations. 

[40] According to State officials, this amount includes completed 
assistance programs with appropriated funding from fiscal years 2010 
through2013; it does not include funding requests for fiscal year 2014 
or activities with 2010 through 2013 funding that have not been fully 
executed. Additionally, State and AFRICOM officials said that their 
relevant Gulf of Guinea regional maritime security efforts, such as 
those provided through Africa Partnership Station, include West Africa 
countries not technically within the Gulf of Guinea. 

[41] Africa Partnership Station, directed by AFRICOM and administered 
through U.S. Naval Forces - Africa, is the platform through which U.S. 
maritime security assistance--including that through State and Coast 
Guard--is provided to Africa. According to Naval Forces-Africa program 
documents, the fundamental purpose is to foster safety and security at 
sea to help promote prosperity and development ashore, and its broad 
areas of effort include combating trafficking in North and West 
Africa, securing energy infrastructure and maritime transportation in 
the Gulf of Guinea, and countering Somalia-based piracy. AFRICOM 
officials stated this effort has grown from an individual U.S. 
training effort to a coordinated, international set of activities. For 
example, according to Naval Forces-Africa, in 2013 all ship 
contributions for Africa Partnership Station activities were from 
partner nations. 

[42] The United States also engages in a variety of judicial sector 
reform and bilateral governance programs intended to strengthen 
national judicial systems in Nigeria and other countries in the 
region, which includes but is not specifically aimed toward maritime 
law enforcement and prosecution capabilities, according to State 
officials. 

[43] GAO, Counternarcotics Assistance: U.S. Agencies Have Allotted 
Billions in Andean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of 
Results, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-824] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2012). 

[44] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-856]. Elements of 
a strategic approach that could benefit such a plan include those 
previously recommended for the Action Plan to combat piracy off the 
Horn of Africa including defined agency roles and responsibilities; 
measurable goals and objectives linked to agency activities; a 
mechanism to assess the collective effectiveness, costs, and benefits 
of U.S. interagency activities; and a process to revise the plan as 
necessary to address evolving conditions, assessments of U.S. efforts, 
and priorities. 

[45] The IMB collects its data on piracy incidents through its Piracy 
Reporting Centre. According to the IMB, the primary functions of the 
center are: to be a single point of contact for ship masters anywhere 
in the world who are under piratical or armed robbery attack; to 
immediately relay information received to local law enforcement 
agencies requesting assistance; and to immediately broadcast the 
information to all vessels in the region in order to increase overall 
domain awareness. 

[46] We reviewed unclassified ONI data that is aggregated from 
multiple information sources (e.g., all-source data such as company-or 
vessel-provided information, media reports, and IMB data, as well as 
other U.S. and international partner entities such as MARAD, NATO, and 
the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organization) and corroborated with 
other U.S. Government entities. IMB data is based on self-reporting of 
actual and attempted incidents by vessels and companies directly to 
IMB's Piracy Reporting Centre. 

[47] IMB officials told us there is the potential for underreporting 
with their data because they rely on ship officials to provide the 
information, and the extent to which individuals are willing to report 
incidents can vary. 

[48] Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008), which 
encouraged states and regional organizations fighting piracy and armed 
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to establish an international 
cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact, the Contact 
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia was established on January 
14, 2009, to facilitate the discussion and coordination of actions 
among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of 
Somalia. 

[49] GAO, Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan 
and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy 
off the Horn of Africa, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-856] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 
2010). 

[50] GAO, Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan 
and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy 
off the Horn of Africa, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-856] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 
2010). 

[51] In our September 2010 report, we assessed the efforts of U.S. 
agencies using three levels of progress: (1) substantial progress, (2) 
some progress, and (3) little or no progress. 

[End of section] 

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