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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee 
on Armed Services, House of Representatives: 

May 2014: 

Army Networks: 

Select Programs Are Utilizing Competition to Varying Degrees: 

GAO-14-460: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-460, a report to the Subcommittee on Tactical Air 
and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

For nearly 20 years, the Army has had limited success in developing an 
information network—-sensors, software, and radios—-to give soldiers 
the exact information they need, when they need it, in any 
environment. The Army has declared its tactical network as its top 
modernization priority and estimated the modernization may cost up to 
$3 billion per year into the foreseeable future. The Army's current 
modernization approach is intended to leverage solutions developed by 
private industry. 

Given the costs and importance of the network, GAO was asked to 
examine aspects of the Army's effort to acquire network capabilities. 
This is the third report in response to the Subcommittee's requests.
In this report, GAO examines the Army's progress in implementing 
competitive strategies for tactical networking systems. GAO selected a 
non-generalizable sample of 9 of these 25 systems that the Army 
indicated are critical for ensuring soldiers are able to send and 
receive mission-critical information between units, and that cover the 
breadth of warfighter operations. GAO reviewed acquisition strategies 
for evidence that the Army was seeking competition. 

What GAO Found: 

The Army is incorporating competition in various ways for most of the 
nine tactical networking acquisition programs GAO examined. To achieve 
the best return on the government's investment, federal agencies are 
generally required to award contracts competitively. As the Army has 
decreased the amount of in-house system development it is doing for 
tactical networking equipment, it is using various tools to involve 
private industry to meet its needs. One such tool is the agile 
capabilities life cycle process whereby the Army determines the 
capabilities it needs and gaps in those capabilities, and uses market 
research and semi-annual evaluations, among other means, to involve 
industry. According to the Army, this agile process provides 
opportunities for enhancing competition. The Army acquisition strategy 
for eight of the nine systems discusses plans for competition and 
market research. An acquisition strategy is not required for the 
Soldier Radio Waveform Appliqué system because it is not a formal 
acquisition program; however, the Army conducted market research and 
is seeking competition. GAO grouped the nine systems into three 
categories based on similarities in the competition strategy. 
Specifically, 

* In two of the nine systems GAO examined—Mid-tier Networking 
Vehicular Radio and Soldier Radio Waveform Appliqué—the Army is 
beginning new programs and structuring the acquisition approaches to 
competitively procure non-developmental capabilities directly from 
industry. The Army competitively awarded a procurement contract for 
its Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio, providing units for risk 
reduction and requirements verification. In April 2014 the Army 
competitively awarded contracts to four vendors to buy the Soldier 
Radio Waveform Appliqué. 

* Five of the nine systems GAO studied have been under development for 
many years. Three of those—-the Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Station 
radio; the Rifleman Radio; and the Manpack Radio—-were part of the 
Joint Tactical Radio System, which was previously competed and which 
the Army has restructured. The Army had been developing software-
defined radios to interoperate with existing radios. The Army is now 
seeking non-developmental solutions through competition to provide the 
needed capability. For the other two systems, the Joint Battle Command–
Platform and Nett Warrior, the Army reports that it plans to use full 
and open competition for individual subcomponents. In both cases, the 
Army conducted market research to identify vendors or seek feedback on 
requirements. 

* The Army deemed competition impractical for the two remaining 
systems in GAO's review, the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 
Increment 2 and Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 3. 
The Army considered acquisition strategies for more competition in the 
development and procurement of these systems but determined that only 
the incumbent contractor could satisfy the requirements without 
unacceptable delays. Nevertheless, the Army continues using market 
research to identify interested contractors and has awarded several 
competitive contracts for subcomponents under these two systems. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD provided 
technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated, 
as appropriate. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-460]. For more 
information, contact Belva M. Martin at (202) 512-4841 or 
martinb@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Army Utilizing Competition in Various Ways Across Nine Tactical 
Networking Systems: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Supplemental Information for Nine Army Networking Systems: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Description of Selected Army Tactical Networking Systems: 

Table 2: Status of Army Systems' Acquisition Strategies: 

Abbreviations: 

ACAT: Acquisition Category: 

AMF: Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station: 

BFT: Blue Force Tracking: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FAR: Federal Acquisition Regulation: 

FCBC2: Force XXI, Battle Command, Brigade and Below: 

FFP: Firm Fixed Price: 

GMR: Ground Mobile Radio: 

HMS: Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit: 

IDIQ: Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity: 

JBC-P: Joint Battle Command-Platform: 

JCR: Joint Capabilities Release: 

JTRS: Joint Tactical Radio System: 

MDA: Milestone Decision Authority: 

MNVR: Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio: 

NIE: Network Integration Evaluation: 

RFP: Request for Proposal: 

SALT: Small Airborne Link 16 Terminal: 

SANR: Small Airborne Networking Radio: 

SRW: Soldier Radio Waveform: 

WIN-T: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 29, 2014: 

The Honorable Michael R. Turner: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

In 2011, the Army began a major undertaking to modernize its tactical 
network--an effort that may cost about $3 billion per year into the 
foreseeable future--to improve communication and other capabilities 
and to provide needed information to soldiers and commanders on the 
battlefield. The Army has declared the network its number one 
modernization priority. For nearly 20 years, the Army has had limited 
success in developing its information network of sensors, software, 
and radios to give soldiers and commanders exact information when they 
need it, in any environment, and thus improve situational awareness 
and decision making in combat. Under its current network modernization 
strategy, the Army is implementing a new agile process, intended to 
leverage industry technology solutions with less system development by 
the Army to field new and improved capabilities as they become 
available. 

Due to the network's cost and importance, the ambitious nature of the 
current network modernization strategy, and the department's history 
with system acquisitions over the past decade, you asked us to examine 
elements of the new process the Army is using to acquire network 
capabilities. We have issued two products on these efforts. In our 
first report, we addressed issues related to the Army's agile process. 
[Footnote 1] In our second report,[Footnote 2] we examined the Army's 
Network Integration Evaluations (NIE), a key enabler of the agile 
process.[Footnote 3] 

In this third report, we examined the progress the Army has made in 
implementing competitive contracting strategies for tactical 
networking systems to allow soldiers to move mission-critical 
information between units.[Footnote 4] 

To conduct this work, we reviewed Federal Acquisition Regulations 
(FAR) and Department of Defense (DOD) policies to identify 
documentation and procedures as a guide to assess the Army's use of 
competitive contracting strategies. We looked for evidence that the 
Army had utilized some of the principles of competition in its 
acquisition strategies, but did not assess compliance with policy and 
federal acquisition regulations, for a non-generalizable sample of 9 
of the 25 tactical networking systems by determining if DOD had 
developed the documentation. These systems are the Mid-Tier Networking 
Vehicular Radio, Soldier Radio Waveform--Appliqué, Rifleman Radio, 
Manpack, Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station, Joint Battle Command--
Platform, the Nett Warrior, Warfighter Information Network--Tactical 
Increment 2, and Warfighter Information Network--Tactical Increment 3. 
We selected these 9 systems because the Army has indicated they are 
critical systems for ensuring soldiers are able to send and receive 
mission-critical information between units and they cover the breadth 
of warfighter operations. Because this is a non-generalizable sample, 
we are not projecting our findings across the universe of tactical 
networking systems. We reviewed Army market research reports, requests 
for information, acquisition strategies, contract award information, 
and briefings to senior Army officials. We independently researched 
accessibility of acquisition announcements on federal procurement 
opportunity web sites. We also interviewed key program officials to 
discuss both their consideration of competition in contracting 
strategies and their plan for engaging industry. A detailed 
description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2013 to May 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Over the last decade, the Army focused most of its decisions to field 
network improvements on supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan--
an effort that was both expensive and time consuming. The Army did not 
synchronize the development and fielding efforts for these network 
improvements and the funding and timelines for the associated 
acquisition activities were rarely, if ever, aligned. The Army's 
efforts to develop networking capabilities fell far short of their 
objectives, resulting in what the Army believes was a loosely 
coordinated set of disparate sensors, applications, and services. The 
Army fielded capabilities in a piecemeal fashion and the user in the 
field was largely responsible for integrating them with existing 
technology. In other words, the Army had neither an overarching 
framework outlining its desired tactical networking capabilities nor a 
strategy for acquiring them. 

In an effort to establish a requirements framework for acquiring its 
networking capabilities, the Army, in December 2011, finalized the 
Network-enabled Mission Command Initial Capabilities Document, a 
central document that describes the essential network capabilities 
required by the Army, as well as scores of capability gaps. These 
capabilities support an Army mission-command capability defined by a 
network of command posts, aerial and ground platforms, manned and 
unmanned sensors, and dismounted soldiers linked by an integrated 
suite of mission command systems. A robust transport layer capable of 
delivering voice, data, imagery, and video to the tactical edge (i.e., 
the forward battle lines) connects these systems. 

The Army also developed a network strategy that changes the way it 
develops, evaluates, tests, and delivers networked capability to its 
operating forces, using an approach called capability set management. 
A capability set is a suite of network components, associated 
equipment, and software that provides an integrated network 
capability.[Footnote 5] With this approach, the Army plans to buy only 
what is currently available, feasible, and needed for units preparing 
to deploy, instead of developing an ultimate capability and buying 
enough to cover the entire force. Every year, the Army plans to 
integrate another capability set that reflects changes or advances in 
technology since the previous set. To support this approach, the Army 
has implemented the agile capabilities life-cycle process, which uses 
the identified capability gaps to solicit solutions from industry and 
government and then evaluate those solutions during the NIEs in 
consideration for later fielding to combat units. This process is 
quite different from the past Army methods in which the Army assumed 
beginning-to-end control of the design, development, test, and 
procurement of networking systems. Army officials expect the agile 
process and associated network integration evaluations to provide 
opportunities for greater industry involvement by allowing vendors to 
both propose solutions to address capability gaps and showcase their 
systems in a realistic environment. This allows the Army to identify 
and evaluate systems without the need for large investments in 
development programs and without having to enter into procurement 
contracts. 

Competition in contracting is a critical tool for achieving the best 
return on investment for taxpayers and can help save the taxpayer 
money, improve contractor performance, and promote accountability for 
results. Past GAO work has found that the federal government can 
realize significant cost savings when awarding contracts 
competitively. DOD also acknowledges specific benefits from 
competition, such as direct cost savings; improved product/service 
quality; enhanced solutions and industrial base; fairness and 
openness; prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse; and increased 
likelihood of efficiencies and innovation. Federal acquisition 
regulations require, with limited exceptions, that contracting 
officers shall promote and provide for full and open competition in 
soliciting offers and awarding government contracts.[Footnote 6] 

Federal acquisition regulations also require that agencies conduct 
market research, which DOD recognizes as a key to effective 
competition. According to the Defense Acquisition University, market 
research involves collecting and analyzing information about 
capabilities within the market to satisfy agency needs. It is a 
continuous process for gathering data on product characteristics, 
suppliers' capabilities, and the business practices/trends that 
surround them--plus the analysis of that data to make smart 
acquisition decisions. Market research can vary across acquisitions 
given that the nature of the research depends on such factors as 
urgency, dollar value, complexity, and past experience. One such 
market research method allows for government to communicate its needs 
to industry and identify commercial items that could be used to 
satisfy those needs. The FAR outlines specific techniques for 
conducting market research. These could include, but are not limited 
to, consulting with government and industry subject-matter experts, 
publishing requests for information, or conducting interchange 
meetings with potential offerors, and hosting pre-solicitation 
conferences for potential offerors, which the Army has called industry 
days. 

Congress passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, 
which outlines several congressionally-directed defense acquisition 
reforms related to competition.[Footnote 7] Subsequently, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics issued 
an update to DOD acquisition policy, which provides direction and 
guidance on how program management will create and sustain a 
competitive environment at both the prime and subcontract level 
throughout the program's life cycle.[Footnote 8] DOD policy requires 
programs to outline their market research in their acquisition 
strategies, which is the business and technical management framework 
for planning, directing, contracting for, and managing a program. 
Market research, in general, is a process for gathering data on, among 
other things, product characteristics, suppliers' capabilities, and 
the business practices and trends that surround them-plus the analysis 
of that data to make smart acquisition decisions. 

Army Utilizing Competition in Various Ways Across Nine Tactical 
Networking Systems: 

The Army is incorporating competition in various ways for most of the 
nine tactical networking acquisition programs we examined. As the Army 
decreases the amount of in-house system development it is doing for 
tactical networking equipment, it is using various tools to involve 
industry in seeking items that the Army does not pay to develop to 
meet its needs. One such tool is the agile capabilities life cycle 
process and the associated semi-annual Network Integration Evaluations 
(NIEs), which serve as market research to identify potential solutions 
to meet capability gaps. This process relies heavily on industry for 
success, thus providing opportunities for enhancing competition when 
procuring new tactical networking capabilities. The Army has also 
reached out to industry to identify small businesses with the skills, 
experience, knowledge, and capabilities required to manage, maintain, 
operate, sustain, and support several tactical networking systems. Two 
of the Army networking systems are new programs that are building 
their acquisition approaches around competition and leveraging 
contracting mechanisms that Army officials believe will enhance 
competition. Five other networking systems have modified their 
acquisition approaches in ways that would incorporate greater levels 
of competition. This includes reaching out to industry to provide 
potential solutions, and competing the procurement of individual 
components. The two remaining systems have incorporated competition at 
some point in their past development efforts, but the Army has 
determined that expanding competition at this stage is not feasible or 
cost effective. In these cases, the Army continues to engage with 
industry to identify potential vendors for future components of these 
systems. 

Table 1 contains a list of the nine systems in our review and provides 
a brief description of each. Appendix II contains more detailed 
information about the nine systems in our review. 

Table 1: Description of Selected Army Tactical Networking Systems: 

Tactical networking system: Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR); 
Description: The Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio will be a 
multichannel vehicular radio that will provide networking capability 
to connect unmanned sensors to decision makers on the move, which 
could significantly reduce decision-making time. MNVR will also 
provide an Internet-like mobile ad-hoc networking capability and will 
be interoperable with current force radios through simultaneous and 
secure voice, data, and video communications. 

Tactical networking system: Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW) Appliqué; 
Description: The SRW Appliqué Radio System is a single channel, 
vehicular mounted, software-defined radio for use by brigade combat 
teams. It provides a bridge for SRW radios to interface with units 
equipped with legacy systems, such as the Single Channel Ground and 
Airborne Radio System radios. SRW-Appliqué runs the soldier radio 
waveform and acts as a conduit for transmitting voice and data between 
the dismounted soldier, his unit, and higher headquarters. 

Tactical networking system: Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station (AMF); 
Description: AMF products are software programmable, multi-band, multi-
mode mobile networking radios, providing simultaneous voice, data and 
video communications for Army aviation platforms. 

Tactical networking system: Rifleman Radio; 
Description: The Rifleman Radio is a single-channel handheld 
networking radio with a global positioning system receiver that uses 
the soldier radio waveform and allows leaders and soldiers to form ad-
hoc communications networks in order to exchange voice, video, and 
data during all aspects of military operations. 

Tactical networking system: Manpack; 
Description: The Manpack radio is a two-channel radio with military 
global positioning system that is capable of operating at various 
transmission frequencies, which allows Soldiers to participate in 
voice and data communications networks as well as transmit position 
location information. 

Tactical networking system: Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P); 
Description: The JBC-P provides joint forces command and control and 
situational awareness capability at the platform level and enables 
mission accomplishment across the entire spectrum of joint military 
operations. JBC-P provides continuous near real-time identification of 
friendly locations to populate the joint common operating picture. JBC-
P provides tactical chat with chat room capability resulting in 
enhanced collaboration for commanders; mission command applications 
for planning and execution; a graphical interface with improved 
display of maps and images; enhanced situational awareness between 
mobile platforms, tactical operation centers, and dismounted soldiers 
equipped with Nett Warrior; and ruggedized equipment. 

Tactical networking system: Nett Warrior; 
Description: The Nett Warrior is an integrated dismounted leader 
situational awareness system for use during combat operations. It 
allows for faster and more accurate decisions in the tactical fight. 

Tactical networking system: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 
(WIN-T) Increment 2; 
Description: WIN-T, which is developing multiple increments of 
capability, employs a combination of terrestrial, airborne, and 
satellite-based transport options to connect all users. WIN-T 
Increment 2 provides commercial and military band satellite 
communications to Division, Brigade, Battalion and Company units while 
also providing on-the-move capability and a mobile infrastructure. It 
further provides satellite communications and supports limited 
collaboration and mission planning. 

Tactical networking system: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 
(WIN-T) Increment 3; 
Description: WIN-T Increment 3 develops the network operations 
software to enable seamless integration of tactical network functions, 
and enhanced waveforms for increased throughput capability. These 
enhancements will be provided as technical insertions to previous WIN-
T Increments. 

Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

[End of table] 

Eight of the nine systems we reviewed have either completed an 
acquisition strategy or have one in draft, and all include language 
that pertain to market research and competition as required by DOD 
policy. The Army has not developed an acquisition strategy for SRW-
Appliqué because it does not meet the requirements of a formal 
acquisition program. Rather, the Army has developed a plan to deliver 
a radio waveform capability to satisfy a directed requirement, has 
used market research, and is seeking competition for this system, as 
discussed below. Table 2 presents the status of the acquisition 
strategy for the nine systems. 

Table 2: Status of Army Systems' Acquisition Strategies: 

System: Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio; 
Status of acquisition strategy: Completed. 

System: Soldier Radio Waveform Appliqué[A]; 
Status of acquisition strategy: Not planned. 

System: Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station; 
Status of acquisition strategy: In draft. 

System: Rifleman Radio[B]; 
Status of acquisition strategy: Completed. 

System: Manpack[B]; 
Status of acquisition strategy: Completed. 

System: Joint Battle Command-Platform; 
Status of acquisition strategy: Completed. 

System: Nett Warrior; 
Status of acquisition strategy: Completed. 

System: Wideband Information Network-Tactical Increment 2; 
Status of acquisition strategy: Completed. 

System: Wideband Information Network-Tactical Increment 3; 
Status of acquisition strategy: Completed. 

Source: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

[A] According to Army officials, they created an acquisition plan in 
lieu of an acquisition strategy because Soldier Radio Waveform 
Appliqué is not a formal acquisition program. Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement requires officials to prepare 
written acquisition plans for acquisitions for development when the 
total cost of all contracts for the acquisition program is estimated 
at $10 million or more and for acquisitions for production or services 
when the total cost of all contracts for the acquisition program is 
estimated at $50 million or more for all years or $25 million or more 
for any fiscal year. The Army has used competitive procedures and 
market research, as discussed below. 

[B] The Rifleman Radio and Manpack Radio are both included within the 
Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) acquisition strategy. 

[End of table] 

Army Initiating Two New Systems Predicated on Competition and Off-the-
shelf Acquisitions: 

In two of the cases we examined, the Army is beginning new programs, 
structuring the acquisition strategies to focus on competition, and 
procuring directly from industry. One of these systems, the Mid-Tier 
Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR), will provide a subset of 
functionality the Army intended to get from the Joint Tactical Radio 
System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radio (GMR), which was canceled in 2011. 
The other system, SRW Appliqué, augments the capabilities of existing 
radios and allows them to communicate with newer, software-defined 
radios. 

Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio: 

The MNVR represents a subset of functionality that was demonstrated in 
the JTRS Ground Mobile Radio (GMR) program. The Army has a directed 
requirement to procure MNVR to provide secure communications. 
Accordingly, on September 24, 2013, following full and open 
competition, the Army awarded an MNVR production contract. The Army 
used the initial delivery order from this contract to procure a 
limited number of radio systems to conduct risk reduction and 
requirements verification. The acquisition strategy contains summary 
information regarding plans for competition and market research and 
states that follow-on production contracts are expected to use a full-
and-open competition strategy. 

SRW Appliqué: 

Two vendors sent SRW Appliqué radios through the Army's Network 
Integration Evaluation in 2011, which the Army has described as a 
mechanism for market research. In March 2012, the Army finalized 
market research to identify sources for the production and delivery of 
approximately 5,000 radios to satisfy a directed requirement for a 
soldier radio waveform capability.[Footnote 9] The associated 
indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts were competitively 
awarded in April 2014 to four vendors.[Footnote 10] Additionally, in 
2013, the Army also purchased SRW Appliqué radios off the General 
Services Administration schedule for demonstration at a Network 
Integration Evaluation in May 2014 and operational testing at a 
Network Integration Evaluation in November 2014.[Footnote 11] 

Army Modifying Approaches to Create Opportunities for Competition for 
Five Legacy Networking Systems: 

AMF, Rifleman Radio, and Manpack were all part of the restructured 
JTRS program, which utilized competition early on to develop software-
defined radios that would interoperate with existing radios and 
increase communications and networking capabilities. Before the Army 
began restructuring the JTRS program in 2011, it encountered a number 
of technical challenges that resulted in cost growth and schedule 
delays. Consequently, the Army is now reaching out to industry for 
proposed solutions. The Army has also adjusted its approach for the 
Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) and Nett Warrior programs and 
assumed the role of integrator. In this capacity, the Army is 
purchasing individual components from industry and integrating them 
together to build the systems. According to the Army, all of the 
contract orders for both systems over fiscal years 2012 and 2013 were 
awarded using full and open competition. 

Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station: 

Initially, Army officials believed there was only one source that 
could produce a particular AMF variant, but they later used market 
research to identify a second potential source that was interested in 
competing for that system. The acquisition strategy for that variant 
now states that full and open competition and best value procedures 
will be used when awarding contracts, with an emphasis on modified non-
developmental solutions. To continue efforts to identify potential 
sources to fulfill this requirement, the Army has also posted pre-
solicitations for industry comment and hosted interested vendors at 
industry days to discuss draft Requests for Proposals (RFP) and answer 
any non competition-sensitive question about the pending solicitation. 

Rifleman Radio: 

Both DOD and Congress have pressed for additional competition for the 
Rifleman Radio. In the Conference Report of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, the conferees noted strong 
agreement with the direction provided by certain DOD and Army 
documents regarding the conduct of full and open competition within 
the JTRS program, which included the Rifleman Radio. The Army modified 
the acquisition strategy to reflect the push for added competition, 
which entailed developing a competition strategy, conducting market 
research, releasing draft solicitations, and holding industry days. 
Consequently, the full-rate production decision was delayed from May 
2012 to the second quarter of fiscal year 2017. The Army is currently 
receiving low-rate initial production units. Army planning documents 
indicate plans for full and open competition and IDIQ contracts for 
the subsequent full-rate production units. Further, the Army 
anticipates releasing the RFP by June 2014 and awarding contracts by 
March 2015. The Army has also posted requests for information to seek 
industry feedback on documentation required for potential future 
solicitations as well as hosted industry days for added market 
research. 

Manpack: 

As with Rifleman Radio, the DOD and the Congress have encouraged 
increased competition for the Manpack, which was also part of the JTRS 
system. The Army is currently receiving low-rate initial production 
units. However, the full-rate decision has slipped to the fourth 
quarter of fiscal year 2017. According to the Army, this resulted from 
congressional direction for full and open competition of the full-rate 
production units, which involve several activities noted above. In 
addition, delayed approval of the acquisition strategy postponed the 
RFP, which is expected to occur by September 2014.[Footnote 12] The 
Army has reached out to industry to identify sources for sustainment 
of Manpack radios, solicited feedback on documentation required for 
future solicitations, and hosted industry days. 

Joint Battle Command-Platform: 

The JBC-P is largely a software development effort that will utilize 
existing hardware from a predecessor system. However, it will also 
incorporate new hardware such as a new tablet computer and a beacon 
device for situational awareness data. Wherever possible, the Army 
plans to use existing, competitively awarded Army contracts to procure 
new hardware. The Army contracted with the Software Engineering 
Institute to assess the capabilities of several software development 
organizations, ultimately selecting the Software Engineering 
Directorate at Redstone Arsenal to develop JBC-P software.[Footnote 
13] According to Army officials, any necessary software that is beyond 
the directorate's capabilities will be competed to industry. Army 
officials told us they also have plans to compete the blue-force 
tracker 2 component, which is the Army's latest system for tracking 
the location of friendly forces. During fiscal years 2012 and 2013, 
the Army made 15 contract awards, 13 of which were awarded using full 
and open competition and the remaining 2 were awarded using full and 
open competition after exclusion of sources.[Footnote 14] Army 
officials told us some vendors were automatically excluded from 
competition because they failed to meet certain criteria, such as 
security classification. These contract awards covered a variety of 
items, including miscellaneous communications equipment, cables, 
system configuration services, and other information technology 
equipment and services. The Army also conducted market research to 
identify a second source for armored and Stryker brigade combat team 
installation kits, which, according to Army officials, saved $900,000 
per brigade. 

Nett Warrior: 

The Nett Warrior acquisition strategy describes the program's planned 
approach for engaging in market research, including Internet-based 
searches, manufacturer site visits, and requests for information via 
the Federal Business Opportunities website--federal agencies' primary 
tool for soliciting potential offers. Major Nett Warrior components 
include the Rifleman Radio and the end user device, which is a 
smartphone-like device. According to documents provided by the Army, 
the program has already competed the procurement of end user devices. 
Army documents show that the Army has made a number of other purchases 
such as cases, secure digital memory cards, and styluses 
competitively. The Army is acquiring radios from a current vendor for 
the Nett Warrior program as government-furnished equipment but plans 
to purchase other hardware and software-related items competitively. 

Army Deemed Competition Impractical for WIN-T Increments 2 and 3: 

The Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) connects soldiers 
in theater with higher levels of command via line-of-sight and 
satellite-based communications. For WIN-T Increments 2 and 3, the Army 
has determined that competition for the overall system is impractical, 
although aspects of competition are still being used on the programs. 
When the WIN-T program was in system development, the Army contracted 
with two separate companies to develop competing designs for the 
system. In August 2004, the Army combined the two designs in order to 
develop a system with attributes from both and proceeded with a single 
contractor after the two contractors teamed to establish a single 
architecture for WIN-T that leveraged each contractor's proposed 
architecture to provide the Army with what it believed was a superior 
technical solution for WIN-T. An updated acquisition strategy for WIN-
T includes language that describes plans for both market research and 
competition. 

Pursuant to a DOD acquisition decision memorandum, the Army conducted 
a business case analysis to provide a recommendation with the least 
development and procurement cost and greatest benefit to the Army for 
the follow-on production of WIN-T Increment 2. Based on the analysis, 
the Army concluded that a sole source contract with competition at the 
subcontract level was most appropriate. The Army's market research led 
it to conclude that only one contractor, the incumbent, is capable of 
providing the WIN-T capability. Federal acquisition regulations permit 
contracting without providing for full and open competition for DOD in 
cases where only one responsible source or a limited number of 
sources, and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency 
requirements.[Footnote 15] Furthermore, based on market research, 
government technical experts determined that there are no new 
technologies being developed that can meet WIN-T Increment 3 
requirements. However, the Army is awarding contracts for numerous 
items that support WIN-T, many of which are awarded competitively. 

Agency Comments: 

We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided a draft 
of this report to DOD for their review and comment. DOD provided 
written comments, which are reproduced in Appendix III. These comments 
provided updated and clarifying information on a few of the systems in 
our review. We incorporated these and other technical comments in the 
report, as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and 
other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at 
no charge on GAO's website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact Belva Martin at (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Belva M. Martin: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objective was to examine the Army's progress in implementing 
competitive contracting strategies for its network-related systems, in 
particular for its radio capabilities. To address this objective, we 
selected nine of the Army's 25 tactical networking systems as a non-
generalizable sample for review. These systems are the Mid-Tier 
Networking Vehicular Radio, Soldier Radio Waveform--Appliqué, Rifleman 
Radio, Manpack, Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station, Joint Battle 
Command--Platform, the Nett Warrior, Warfighter Information Network--
Tactical Increment 2, and Warfighter Information Network--Tactical 
Increment 3. We chose these systems for a variety of reasons. These 
systems exist on either the tactical network's transport or 
applications level and the Army has indicated they are critical 
systems for ensuring soldiers are able to move mission-critical 
information between units. They are also a subset of the systems that 
constituted over $3.6 billion in Army spending in fiscal year 2014 and 
several of them may also be included in capability set 14.[Footnote 
16] These nine programs also cover the breadth of operations from the 
warfighter at the tactical edge to the brigade command post. 

We reviewed Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and Department of 
Defense (DOD) policies to identify documentation and procedures as a 
guide to assess the Army's use of competitive contracting strategies. 
We reviewed program acquisition strategies to determine how the 
programs plan to use market research and competition. While we did not 
attempt to assess compliance with policy and federal acquisition 
regulations for any of these programs, we did identify examples in 
acquisition strategies where the Army has utilized or intends to 
utilize competition. We reviewed Army market research reports, 
requests for information, acquisition strategies, contract award 
information, and briefings to senior Army officials. We reviewed 
acquisition decision memoranda to identify key programmatic decisions 
that affect contracting strategies. We reviewed defense acquisition 
training materials designed to enhance competition in defense 
programs. We interviewed Army acquisition personnel and discussed both 
their consideration of competition in contracting strategies and their 
plan for engaging industry. We independently researched accessibility 
of acquisition announcements on federal procurement opportunity web 
sites. We reviewed market research strategies for identifying the 
contractors with the ability to provide networking solutions and 
alternative courses of actions the Army considered for meeting 
networking requirements. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2013 to May 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions, based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Supplemental Information for Nine Army Networking Systems: 

Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio: 

The Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR) will host the 
Department of Defense's (DOD) Joint Tactical Radio System[Footnote 17] 
(JTRS) Wideband Networking and Soldier Radio waveforms to connect 
unmanned sensors to decision makers on the move, which is expected to 
significantly reduce the decision-making time. MNVR will also provide 
a mobile Internet-like ad-hoc networking capability and will be 
interoperable with current soldier radios though simultaneous and 
secure voice, data, and video communications. MNVR will support Battle 
Command, sensor-to-shooter, sustainment and survivability applications 
in a full range of military operations on vehicular platforms. The 
program includes specific requirements to support the U.S. Army, 
Brigade Combat Teams, and the warfighter. 

Background: 

The MNVR represents a subset of functionality that was successfully 
demonstrated in the JTRS Ground Mobile Radio (GMR) program. The Army 
reported that lessons learned from recent operational experiences have 
shown that a significant capability gap exists at the company level in 
Brigade Combat Teams in the inability of legacy tactical radios to 
seamlessly pass real-time information throughout the range of military 
operations. To address this capability gap, the Army initiated its GMR 
program; however, due to poor performance and rising costs, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
directed the Army to establish a new program that manages the 
evaluations, testing, and delivery of non developmental item products 
to meet the reduced set of capabilities to be fielded to operational 
units in fiscal year 2014. This program is the Mid-Tier Networking 
Vehicular Radio that will host the JTRS networking waveforms. The MNVR 
program achieved a Material Development Decision in September 2013 and 
the program awarded a MNVR radio production contract. The initial 
Increment 1 Delivery Order[Footnote 18] procures a limited number of 
MNVR radio systems to begin risk reduction developmental testing and 
requirements verification testing. The acquisition has two components, 
(1) the manufacture, testing, and delivery of the radio and associated 
hardware (B-kit) and (2) the manufacture and testing of the adaption 
kit (A-kit) that mounts the B-kit to the intended platforms. Three 
delivery orders are planned for the B-kit: 

* Delivery order 1--Provides procurement of a limited number of MNVR 
systems to undergo Government verification testing, and limited user 
test. Provides assets to support the development of vehicle 
installation kits by platform integrators and to meet various 
certification requirements. 

* Delivery order 2--Successful limited user test results will inform a 
Milestone C decision and support an initial operational test and 
evaluation. 

* Delivery order 3--Successful initial operational test and evaluation 
results will inform a full-rate production decision to procure assets 
to field systems to Capability Sets 17 and 18. 

Program Status: 

Acquisition category: Non-Major Defense Acquisition Program ACAT ID, 
Special Interest.[Footnote 19] 

Acquisition phase: Production: 

Procurement award: September 2013: 

Contractor: Harris Corporation: 

Contract type: Hardware--indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity 
(IDIQ) with firm-fixed-price (FFP): 

Total program: $1,304.5 million: 

Research and development: $109.1 million: 

Procurement: $1,195.4 million: 

Quantity: Estimated procurement of 10,293 radios: 

Next major program event: MNVR will participate in NIE 14.2 in May 
2014 as a risk reduction exercise. A limited user test is scheduled 
for the first quarter of fiscal year 2015. 

Competition History and Plans: 

In February 2012, the Army revalidated the need for a mid-tier 
wideband networking radio for brigade combat teams to fill the gap 
created by the cancellation of the Ground Mobile Radio. The Army 
conducted a cost/benefit analysis for three options and concluded that 
a new MNVR procurement was the best solution. The Army posted a pre-
solicitation notice and later posted the request for proposals. On 
August 27, 2012, the Under Secretary of the Army determined that full 
and open competition would be used to make a single award for a firm 
fixed price, IDIQ contract for a MNVR.[Footnote 20] According to the 
Army, such a contract instrument would not obligate the Army to 
procure large quantities of units. Rather, it would allow the Army to 
purchase only what is needed in the near-term through delivery orders. 
It also provides the Army the opportunity to infuse technology as it 
becomes available into future delivery orders. On September 24, 2013, 
following full and open competition, the Army awarded a MNVR 
production contract to Harris Corporation valued at up to $140 
million. The Army included a clause in the contract that makes Harris 
responsible for all government and contractor costs related to follow-
on verification testing, to include the costs of any associated 
retesting required by failures. The contract has a 3 to 5 year 
ordering period. The Army expects that after 3 to 5 years, 
advancements in operating system software, power amplifiers, digital 
processing, as well as advancements in waveform capabilities will 
evolve to the point that defense stakeholders will consider revising 
the governing requirements document and will coordinate to determine 
the need for an updated requirement and a new procurement. If 
stakeholders determine the need for a new procurement, MNVR will 
pursue industry competition with a full and open solicitation. 

SRW Appliqué: 

The Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW) Appliqué Radio System is a single 
channel, vehicular mounted, software-defined radio for use by brigade 
combat teams. It is essentially a data transmission module that can be 
mounted into certain vehicle configurations of current Single Channel 
Ground and Airborne Radio System radios that have no capability to 
send or receive data. SRW-Appliqué runs the JTRS soldier radio 
waveform and acts as a conduit for transmitting voice and data between 
the dismounted soldier, the soldier's unit, and higher headquarters. 
SRW-Appliqué is intended to interact seamlessly with the Rifleman 
Radio, which is carried by platoon, squad-level, and team-level 
soldiers, and which also runs the SRW. The Army plans to integrate the 
SRW-Appliqué radios with multiple vehicle platforms for fielding 
flexibility. 

Background: 

In May 2011, the Army issued a directed requirement for a soldier 
radio waveform capability. Two vendors offered systems that the Army 
ultimately evaluated at a Network Integration Evaluation in October 
and November 2011. The operational need for SRW-Appliqué was confirmed 
by the systems' participation at this event. 

Program Status: 

Acquisition category: NA-Commodity Buy: 

Acquisition phase: Procurement: 

Procurement contract award: April 2014: 

Contractor: Contracting team of Exelis, General Dynamics, Harris 
Corporation, and Thales: 

Total program: Estimated $800 million to $900 million: 

Quantity: Estimated procurement of 5,000 radios: 

Next major program event: Source selection and contract award. 

Competition History and Plans: 

Using full and open competition, the Army plans to award multiple 
multi-year indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts with a 
firm-fixed-price for SRW-Appliqué radios. In March 2012, the Army 
finalized market research results and concluded that only five of the 
10 interested vendors were capable of providing the requisite SRW 
radio system. In June 2012, the Army posted a presolicitation 
notifying industry of plans to publish a request for proposal, which 
it did in October 2012. The Army is considering the use of on ramps 
and off ramps in the contract so new vendors can be added or 
underperforming vendors can be removed.[Footnote 21] The government-
owned SRW will be made available to contractors for integration onto 
their existing hardware solutions. 

Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station: 

AMF products are software programmable, multi-band, multi-mode mobile 
networking radios, providing simultaneous voice, data and video 
communications for Army aviation platforms. The radios will operate in 
networks supporting the Common Operational Picture, situational 
awareness, and interoperability of Mission Command Systems. The AMF 
program will procure two non-developmental radios to meet user needs. 
One radio, Small Airborne Link 16 Terminal (SALT), will possess Link 
16 and SRW capability. The second, Small Airborne Networking Radio 
(SANR), will provide networking and legacy waveform capability. SALT 
will provide one channel dedicated to a Link 16 capability and a 
second software-defined radio channel that can host SRW. SANR will 
provide a two-channel software-defined radio that provides 
interoperability with the Army's Mid-tier Networking Waveform 
capability that will be widely deployed to ground forces. The radio 
will be installed on AH-64E Apache, UH-60M/L Black Hawk, CH-47F 
Chinook, and OH-58F Kiowa Warrior helicopters in addition to the MQ-1C 
Gray Eagle unmanned aircraft system. 

Background: 

The AMF program was restructured in accordance with Milestone Decision 
Authority direction dated May 2012 and July 2012. The May 2012 
decision memorandum directed the closeout of the AMF system 
development and demonstration contract awarded in March 2008. The July 
2012 decision memorandum approved a non-developmental item acquisition 
approach leveraging previous industry investment in tactical radio 
technology. 

AMF will operate networking waveforms and select waveforms that are 
widely deployed by Joint Forces today, enable interoperability between 
different types of platforms, and transport information through the 
tactical network to joint network member nodes. The Army has 
determined that the need for interoperable systems, including common 
waveforms, software applications, and network operations is critical 
to the mobile tactical network capability. 

Program Status: 

Acquisition category: ACAT ID: 

Acquisition phase: Pre-solicitation for production: 

System development contract award: March 2008: 

Contractor: Lockheed Martin[Footnote 22] 

Contract type: Cost-plus-award-fee: 

Total program: $3,582.7 million: 

Research and development: $1,849.3 million: 

Procurement: $1,733.4 million: 

Quantity: 7,720 radios, which is 15,440 channels: 

Next major program event: SALT production and SANR low-rate initial 
production decisions in first quarter 2016. 

Competition History and Plans: 

The Army developed two AMF variants--the SALT and the SANR. The SALT 
is intended as a 2-channel radio capable of running the Link 16 and 
SRW waveforms. The Army intends to install the 2-channel Link 16 and 
SRW capable AMF SALT radios on all AH-64E aircraft starting with Lot 
6. The SANR is also a 2-channel radio capable of utilizing the Single 
Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System, Soldier Radio, and Wideband 
Networking Waveforms. The radio will be installed on AH-64E Apache 
Block III, UH-60M/L Black Hawk, CH-47F Chinook, and OH-58F Kiowa 
Warrior helicopters, in addition to the MQ-1C Gray Eagle unmanned 
aerial system. 

In March 2008, the Program Office awarded Lockheed Martin Corporation 
a cost-plus-award-fee contract through full and open competition. The 
basic contract was to acquire the complete JTRS Software Defined Radio 
system and subsystems in accordance with the 2006 JTRS Operational 
Requirements Document with the option to add capability packages for 
additional platform requirements. In September 2011, the Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA) directed a program and contract restructure 
in order to meet the requirements. AMF then conducted market research 
on potential non-developmental Item solutions for Army Aviation. 
Market research showed less complex non developmental solutions would 
be available to meet revised user requirements and identified an 
additional vendor who was interested in competing. 

AMF conducted market research for the SALT radio, advising industry of 
the pending acquisition and soliciting inquiries from interested 
parties. AMF received and analyzed market survey data and initially 
determined a competitive approach in support of the planned SALT 
procurement for the PM Apache AH-64E Lot 6, was not feasible. On June 
24, 2013, via Federal Business Opportunities, the government announced 
its intention to solicit on a sole source basis. In response to the 
synopsis, another vendor indicated its interest in the acquisition. 
Based on information presented by the second vendor, the Government 
concluded the SALT contract strategy should be full and open 
competition. The Army posted a revised solicitation notifying industry 
that the award would be competed and posted the draft request for 
proposals on January 17, 2014. On February 3, 2014, under an update to 
the same solicitation, the Army notified interested vendors that it 
would be hosting a pre-solicitation conference at Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, Maryland, in order to address any non-competition sensitive 
questions about the draft request for proposals. The Army anticipated 
issuing the formal request for proposals by March 3, 2014, and 
contracts by September 2014, but this has been delayed due to the lack 
of an approved acquisition strategy. The Army plans to award, via full 
and open competition, a single firm-fixed-price/cost-plus-fixed-fee 
hybrid type contract with a one-year base period and three one-year 
option periods for delivery of low-rate production and full-rate 
production quantities of SALT systems, spares and associated services. 
The program office estimates that the SALT full-rate production 
contract will be awarded in fiscal year 2017. 

According to a September 17, 2013, presolicitation announcement, the 
Army anticipates awarding two firm-fixed-price/cost-plus-fixed-fee 
hybrid type contracts with a one-year base period and four one-year 
option periods for SANR. The Army anticipated issuing a request for 
proposals by December 2, 2013, but the SANR solicitation schedule is 
being reassessed as a result of the budget estimate submissions. The 
Army would later down select to a single contractor to deliver both 
low-rate initial production units and full-rate production units. 

Rifleman Radio: 

The Army's Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) program evolved 
from the JTRS program and provides software-programmable digital 
radios to support the Army's tactical communications requirements. The 
Rifleman Radio is a handheld, networking radio. In addition to 
functioning as a stand-alone, handheld radio, the Army intends the 
AN/PRC-154A variant to be the radio used as part of the Nett Warrior 
program. Both the Secret and unclassified variants of the Rifleman 
Radio are single-channel radios with a commercial global positioning 
system receiver that operate at various transmission frequencies using 
the SRW, which enables the radios to form an ad-hoc data and voice 
communications network with other SRW-capable radios. Army leaders and 
Soldiers use Rifleman Radios to communicate and create networks to 
exchange voice, video, and data using the SRW during all aspects of 
military operations: 

Background: 

The JTRS HMS program meets the radio requirements for Soldiers and 
small platforms (such as missiles and ground sensors). JTRS HMS 
Increment 1 is structured as a single program of record with two 
phases. Phase 1 developed Small Form Fit and a Rifleman Radio for use 
in a sensitive but unclassified environment. Phase 2 is for the 2-
Channel Manpack and small form fit-B for use in a classified 
environment. JTRS HMS will provide new networking capability to the 
individual Soldiers, Marines, Sailors and Airmen and also continue to 
provide legacy radio interoperability. JTRS HMS provides the 
warfighter with a software reprogrammable, networkable multi-mode 
system capable of simultaneous voice, data and video communications. 
The program encompasses specific requirements to support the US Army, 
US Navy, US Marine Corps, US Air Force and the Special Operations 
Command communication needs. 

Program Status: 

Acquisition category: ACAT ID, as part of HMS program: 

Acquisition phase: Production: 

System development contract award: July 2004: 

Contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems Inc. 

Contract type: Cost-Plus-Award-Fee: 

Low-rate production contract: June 2011: 

Contract type: Firm-Fixed-Price: 

Total program (fiscal years 2013-2019): $361.26 million: 

Quantity (fiscal years 2013-2019): 37,849: 

Next major program event: Draft request for proposal third quarter FY 
2014: 

Competition History and Plans: 

The Army continues to receive low rate units from the June 2011 
contract; however, Army officials say that because of the 
Congressional direction for full and open competition, the full rate 
production decision has been delayed to allow for changes in the 
program acquisition strategy. The program is coordinating with DOD 
officials on a competition strategy prior to solicitation for 
procurement. 

The Army plans to award multiple fixed-price contracts to all 
qualified vendors using a two-step sealed bid process. Further, the 
Army plans to award initial delivery orders for qualification testing 
and operational assessment and award full rate production orders based 
on operational assessments and best value. The full-rate production 
review for the Rifleman Radio, which was initially expected to take 
place in May 2012, is now expected to begin in January 2015. 

Manpack: 

The HMS program evolved from the JTRS program and provides software-
programmable digital radios to support tactical communications 
requirements. The Manpack radio is a two-channel radio with military 
global positioning system that is capable of operating at various 
transmission frequencies using the SRW, the legacy Single Channel 
Ground and Airborne Radio System waveform, and current military 
satellite communications waveforms allowing Soldiers to participate in 
voice and data communications networks and transmit position location 
information. 

Army commanders use Manpack radios to provide networked communications 
for host vehicles and dismounted Soldiers during all aspects of 
military operations; communicate and create networks to exchange 
voice, video, and data using legacy waveforms or the SRW; and share 
voice and data between two different communications networks. 

Background: 

As we discussed earlier, the histories of the Manpack and Rifleman 
radios were parallel until 2011.[Footnote 23] Low-rate production 
began in June 2011, for 100 Manpack radios. The full-rate production 
decision, initially expected in December 2012, is now expected to be 
in February 2015. However, in October 2012, the Army received approval 
for an additional 3,726 low-rate production Manpack radios. The 
initial production delays caused a delay in initial operational 
capability from March 2013 to August 2013. 

Program Status: 

Acquisition category: ACAT ID, as part of HMS program: 

Acquisition phase: Production: 

System development contract award: July 2004: 

Contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems Inc. 

Contract type: Cost-Plus-Award-Fee: 

Low rate production contract: June 2011: 

Contract type: Firm Fixed Price: 

Total program (fiscal year 2013-2019): $1,900.35 million: 

Quantity (fiscal years 2013-2019): 12,553: 

Next major program event: Draft Request for Proposal fourth quarter 
fiscal year 2014. 

Competition History and Plans: 

Following full and open competition, a single cost-plus-award-fee 
development contract was awarded in July 2004. The Army began low rate 
production in 2011, using a firm-fixed-price contract, and continues 
to receive low-rate units. However, the Army told us that, because of 
the Congressional direction for full and open competition, the full 
rate production decision has been delayed to allow for changes in the 
program acquisition strategy. The program is coordinating with DOD 
officials on a competition strategy prior to solicitation for 
procurement. The Army plans to award multiple fixed-price contracts to 
all qualified vendors using a two-step sealed bid process. Further, 
the Army plans to award initial delivery orders for qualification 
testing and operational assessment and award full-rate production 
orders based on operational assessments and best value. 

Joint Battle Command-Platform: 

The Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) provides joint forces 
command and control (C2) and situational awareness capability at the 
platform level and enables mission accomplishment across the entire 
spectrum of joint military operations. JBC-P serves as the cornerstone 
for Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness and provides continuous 
near real-time identification of friendly locations to populate the 
Joint Common Operating Picture. JBC-P software is designed to run on 
existing Force XXI, Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FCBC2) systems 
as well as new hardware items, thereby reducing the Army's investment 
in new hardware. JBC-P is an upgrade from FCBC2 in that it provides 
enhanced chat room capability, improved mission command applications, 
a more intuitive graphical interface, enhanced blue force situational 
awareness, and ruggedization of hardware. 

Background: 

Force XXI, Battle Command, Brigade and Below began as a program in 
1996 with primary capabilities of Situational Awareness (e.g. friendly 
and enemy position data) and Command and Control messaging (orders, 
free text, overlays, etc.) for combat platforms and tactical vehicles. 
In its early years, FBCB2 relied upon line-of-sight radio 
communications, but later adopted satellite and became commonly 
referred to as Blue Force Tracking, or BFT. In 2006, the Army began a 
software product line called Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) that, 
according to Army officials, provided increased chat and messaging 
capabilities. However, these capabilities were still limited. To 
address these limitations, the Army initiated a follow-on effort 
called JBC-P, which the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved 
in May 2008. JBC-P heavily leverages both the hardware and product 
line software of JCR and FBCB2 to introduce its enhancements to 
operational units. In September 2009, an Acquisition Decision 
Memorandum approved the system's entry into the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development Phase. In July 2012, the Program Executive 
Office, Command and Tactical, as the JBC-P Milestone Decision 
Authority, approved the program for production. During the October 
through November 2013 Network Integration Evaluation 14.1, the Army 
conducted a JBC-P software build 5.1 customer test to demonstrate 
correction of Initial Operational Test and Evaluation deficiencies 
which supported a Full Rate Production decision in December 2013. 

Program Status: 

Acquisition category: ACAT II[Footnote 24] 

Acquisition phase: Production: 

Contract award: Various: 

Contractor: Various: 

Contract type: Various: 

Total program: $1,975.11 million: 

Research and development: $206.4 million: 

Procurement: $1,768.7 million: 

Quantity: 25,086[Footnote 25] 

Next major program event: JBC-P will participate in NIE 14.2 for 
Follow-on Test and Evaluation as well as NIE 15.1 as a System Under 
Evaluation (SUE). 

Competition History and Plans: 

According to the Army, the FBCB2 and BFT hardware systems are known as 
the mounted Family of Computer Systems; DRS Tactical has a 3-year 
contract with 2 option years to provide needed hardware. The JBC-P 
software is being developed in-house at the U.S. Army Aviation and 
Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center's Software 
Engineering Directorate, rather than selecting a contractor. The 
program's strategy is to use existing hardware so that JBC-P will 
largely be a software-intensive effort. The Army also stated they plan 
to recompete periodically for things like computers to get new 
technologies and reduce costs and contends that competition has 
already netted 25-30% satellite savings and other cost savings for the 
network operations center. The program has conducted market research 
to identify potential sources and is engaging industry, both large and 
small. 

Nett Warrior: 

The Nett Warrior is an integrated dismounted leader situational 
awareness system for use during combat operations. According to the 
Army, the system provides unparalleled situational awareness to the 
dismounted leader and allows for faster and more accurate decisions in 
the tactical fight. The Nett Warrior program focuses on the 
development of the situational awareness system, which has the ability 
to graphically display the location of an individual leader's location 
on a digital geo-referenced map image on a smart device. Additional 
Soldier and leader locations also can appear on the smart device 
digital display. Nett Warrior connects through a secure radio to send 
and receive information from one Nett Warrior to another, thus 
connecting the dismounted leader to the network. These radios will 
also connect the equipped leader to higher echelon data and 
information products to assist in decision making and situational 
understanding. Soldier position location information will appear on 
network via interoperability with the Army's JTRS capability. This 
allows the leader to easily see, understand and interact in the method 
that best suits the user and the particular mission, help leaders 
avoid fratricide, and make soldiers more effective and lethal in the 
execution of their combat missions. 

Background: 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics approved the Ground Soldier Ensemble (later renamed Nett 
Warrior) for entry into the Technology Development Phase in February 
2009. The initial low-rate production contract was awarded in 2012 
with a follow-on low-rate buy authorized in July 2013. The Nett 
Warrior is intended to address operational requirements to provide the 
dismounted Leader with improved situational awareness, command and 
control capabilities. It links the dismounted Leader via voice and 
data communications to Soldiers at the tactical edge and to 
headquarters at Platoon and Company levels. 

Program Status: 

Acquisition category: ACAT II: 

Acquisition phase: Production: 

Technology development: February 2009: 

Low rate production contract award: April 2012: 

Contractor: Various: 

Contract type: Various: 

Total program: $ 793.5 million: 

Research and development: $338.1 million: 

Procurement: $455.4million: 

Quantity: 26,680: 

Next major program event: Full-rate production - Second Quarter 2015: 

Competition History and Plans: 

Three Technology Development contracts were awarded in April 2009 to 
General Dynamics C4 Systems of Scottsdale, Arizona; Raytheon Network 
Centric Systems of McKinney, Texas; and Rockwell Collins of Cedar 
Rapids, Iowa. The systems developed under these contracts have 
undergone Developmental Tests and completed a limited user test in 
late 2010. 

In August 2011, the Army held a configuration steering board that 
approved the recommended de-scoping of the system's requirements and 
set the new technical baseline. Based on the configuration steering 
board recommendations, the Army further refined the system to provide 
competitively procured End User Devices (commercial-based smartphone-
like devices) connected to the Rifleman Radio. As a result of the 
steering board changes, the Army did not pursue the original planned 
limited competition among the technology development phase contractors 
for production effort and instead adopted a commercial approach, 
allowing the program to proceed directly to low rate production. 
Additionally, according to Army Officials, the program plans to employ 
competition at the component level through contract actions with short 
durations, even one-time buys, to take advantage of technology 
advancements. For example, the end user devices will likely be 
purchased using competitively awarded indefinite delivery, indefinite 
quantity contract delivery orders. This type of contract allows the 
agency to bring in new contractors without having to go through the 
process of awarding a new competitive contract. 

According to documents provided by the Army, the Nett Warrior program 
executed 24 competitive contract actions over fiscal years 2012 and 
2013 valued at $94.9 million. According to officials, the Army made 
the majority of these purchases through other agencies' contract 
vehicles as purchase orders. The purchases included a variety of 
items, such as smart phones, cases, secure digital memory cards, and 
styluses. The Nett Warrior has also used market research to get 
feedback from industry utilizing the Federal Business Opportunities 
site to post notices intended to obtain industry comments on proposed 
solicitations for subcomponents. In January 2013, the Army posted a 
notice seeking industry feedback on a draft request for proposals that 
would seek to procure networking hubs and power supply. 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 2: 

Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T) is essentially the 
soldiers' Internet, providing a satellite-based tactical 
communications backbone, to which other Army networked systems need to 
connect in order to function. WIN-T employs a combination of 
terrestrial, airborne, and satellite-based transport options, to 
provide robust, redundant connectivity. It enables battle command on 
the move, keeping highly mobile and dispersed forces connected to one 
another and to the Army's global information network. With essential 
voice, video and data services, commanders can make decisions faster 
than ever before and from anywhere on the battlefield information. WIN-
T will be fielded in three increments, all of which are managed by the 
same program office. Increment 1 is fielded, Increment 2 is currently 
fielded, and Increment 3 is currently being restructured. We discuss 
Increment 3 later in this appendix. 

WIN-T Increment 2 provides commercial and military band satellite 
communications to Division, Brigade, Battalion and Company while also 
providing on the move capability and a mobile infrastructure. It 
further provides satellite communications and supports limited 
collaboration and mission planning. Using equipment mounted on combat 
platforms, WIN-T Increment 2 delivers a mobile capability that reduces 
reliance on fixed infrastructure and allows leaders to move on the 
battlefield while retaining situational awareness and mission command 
capabilities. It enables distribution of information via voice, data 
and real-time video from ground-to ground and ground-to-satellite 
communications. 

Background: 

The Army designed the WIN-T as three-tiered communications 
architecture (space, terrestrial and airborne) to serve as the Army's 
high-speed and high-capacity tactical communications network. WIN-T 
was restructured following a March 2007 Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach 
of the critical threshold,[Footnote 26] and will be fielded in the 
following three increments: 

* Increment 1: Networking At-The-Halt enables the exchange of voice, 
video, data and imagery throughout the battlefield using a satellite 
based network. Increment 1 has been fielded. 

* Increment 2: Initial Networking On-The-Move provides command and 
control down to the company level and implements improved network 
security architecture. Increment 2 has been fielded. 

* Increment 3: Develops the network operations software to enable 
seamless integration of tactical network functions and enhanced 
waveforms for increased throughput capability. WIN-T Increment 3 is 
currently being restructured. 

Program Status: 

Acquisition category: ACAT ID: 

Acquisition phase: Procurement: 

Program start: June 2007: 

Low rate production contract award: March 2010: 

Contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc. 

Contract type: FFP IDIQ: 

Total cost: $5,046.2 million: 

Research and development: $296.6 million: 

Procurement: $4,749.6 million: 

Quantities: 2,156: 

Next program action: Full-rate production decision: 

Competition History and Plans: 

The initial milestone B, which is the point at which a system enters 
system development, in 2003 included two competing contractors--
Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics C4 Systems. In August 2004 the 
competing contractors merged into one team with General Dynamics as 
the lead. After the Nunn McCurdy breach in 2007 and program 
restructure, a sole source contracting approach was used based on the 
authority of 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1) that the requirements were available 
from only one or a limited number of responsible sources and no other 
supplies or services would satisfy agency requirements and for follow-
on production since supplies are only available from the original 
source for continued production. A second Follow-on Operational Test 
and Evaluation is scheduled for the October through November 2014 
timeframe at NIE 15.1 to support the full rate production decision 
review, which is expected to occur in 2015. The Government will 
consider requiring the contractor in the proposal to identify items 
which the government will be able to acquire competitively in the 
future, in substantial quantities. 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical Increment 3: 

WIN-T Increment 3 builds on the capabilities of previous WIN-T 
Increments by developing the network operations software 
(NetOps)[Footnote 27] that enables the seamless integration and 
management of tactical networks, and the enhanced waveforms that 
increase throughput and improve network capacity and robustness. Until 
recently, WIN-T Increment 3 had intended to introduce an additional 
line-of-sight link using an airborne platform. However, an Army 
Configuration Steering Board meeting held on November 7, 2013 approved 
the de-scoping of the program to focus on NetOps and completion of the 
waveform development efforts. As a result, WIN-T Increment 3 is 
currently being restructured and upon Defense Acquisition Executive 
approval, a revised program baseline will be created. 

Background: 

Increment 3: Full Networking On-The-Move provides full mobility 
command and control for all Army field commanders. Network reliability 
and robustness is enhanced with the addition of enhanced network 
operations software and enhanced waveforms. 

Program Status: 

Acquisition category: ACAT ID: 

Acquisition phase: Development: 

Program start: June 2007: 

Development contract award: July 2007: 

Contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc. 

Contract type: Cost Plus Award Fee: 

Total cost: $ 3,621.8 million: 

Research and development: $ 1,991.0 million: 

Procurement: $ 1,630.8 million: 

Quantities: 699: 

Next program action: TBD: 

Competition history and plans: 

The initial development contract was the result of a competitively 
awarded contract between two competing contractors--Lockheed Martin 
and General Dynamics C4 Systems. In August 2004 the competing 
contractors merged into one team with General Dynamics as the lead. 
The follow-on development contract will be a sole source to the 
current contractor--General Dynamics C4 Systems. According to Army 
officials, sole source is planned because the contract cannot be 
competitively awarded without unacceptable delays in fulfilling the 
Army's requirements. For the follow-on development contract, the 
contractor plans to conduct sub-tier competition to ensure it is 
getting the best commercial products at fair and reasonable prices. 
The program anticipates a sole source award for low rate production to 
ensure success of the manufacturing demonstrations and initial 
operational tests. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

GAO received DOD's letter on May 21, 2014. 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense: 
Acquisition: 
3015 Defen5e Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3015: 

Ms. Belva M. Martin: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Martin: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GAO-14-460, "Army Networks: Select Programs Are Utilizing 
Competition to Varying Degrees," dated April 24, 2014 (GAO Code 121 
115). The Department acknowledges receipt of the draft report. 

The Department requests the following changes be considered in the 
final version of the report: 

* The draft report does not reflect that fiscal budget constraints 
forced the Army to address its funding priorities and requirements 
regarding the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) program. 
In November 20 13, the Army Configuration Board de-scoped the WIN-T 
Increment 3 program by removing hardware requirements and the 
President's FY 20 IS budget submission reflected this decision. The 
Army intends to complete software development in FY 20 15 and testing 
in FY 2016 that is required to transition Network Operations Build 4/5 
and Net Centric Waveform 10.x capability to Increment I and Increment 
2. The Army will complete development of the Highband Networking 
Waveform 3.0 and demonstrate its capability prior to entering it into 
the DoD Waveform Information Repository. 

* Table 2 should be updated to reflect that the Handheld, Manpack, 
Small Form Fit (HMS) Acquisition Strategy (includes Rifleman and 
Manpack radios) was approved by the Defense Acquisition Executive on 
May 1, 2014. 

* Update the draft report to reflect current information regarding the 
WIN-T Increment 3 and HMS Rifleman and Manpack Radio programs. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. If you have any questions, my point of contact is Mr. Rich 
Pino, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3, 
Cyber, and Business Systems, at richard.d.pino.civ@mail.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Singed by: 

Katrina McFarland: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Belva M. Martin, (202) 512-4841 or martinb@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, LaTonya Miller, Assistant 
Director; Marie P. Ahearn; William C. Allbritton; Marcus C. Ferguson; 
William Graveline; James Haynes; Sean C. Seales; Wendy P. Smythe; 
Robert S. Swierczek; and Paul G. Williams made key contributions to 
this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Army Networks: Size and Scope of Modernization Investment 
Merit Increased Oversight, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-179] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 
2013). 

[2] GAO, Army Networks: Opportunities Exist to Better Utilize Results 
from Network Integration Evaluations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-711] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 
2013). 

[3] Network Integration Evaluations are held semi-annually and 
typically last about six weeks. NIEs provide a venue for operational 
testing of formal acquisition programs and for demonstrating 
government and industry provided systems under evaluation in an 
operational environment. 

[4] In addition to your interest in this area, the House Armed 
Services Committee's report accompanying H.R. 1960, one of the bills 
for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 also 
indicated an interest in the cost savings that could be realized 
through enhanced competition and alternative contracting mechanisms. 
H.R. Rep. No. 113-102, at 9 (2013). 

[5] Capability sets are numbered in sequence with the year they are 
fielded, so capability set 13 was fielded beginning in 2013, 
capability set 14 is being fielded in 2014, and so on. 

[6] Full and open competition--achieved when all responsible sources 
are permitted to compete--is the preferred method for federal agencies 
to award contracts. 

[7] See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 111-23 §§ 202 and 203, as amended. 

[8] Interim Department of Defense Instruction No. 5000.02, Operation 
of the Defense Acquisition System (Nov. 25, 2013), which incorporated 
and canceled previously existing Department of Defense, Undersecretary 
of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Directive-Type 
Memorandum (DTM) 09-027--Implementation of the Weapon Systems 
Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 4, 2009) with 
the exception of Enclosure 9, which pertains to DOD's acquisition of 
services. 

[9] The Army can prepare directed requirements in cases where a 
specific limited but necessary urgent need exists. Per Army 
regulation, the scope of a directed requirement will be limited to 
addressing urgent operational needs that fall outside the established 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System requirements 
process and if not addressed immediately will seriously endanger 
personnel or pose a major threat to the success of ongoing operations. 
Army Regulation 71-9, Warfighter Capabilities Determination (Dec. 28, 
2009). 

[10] An IDIQ contract is a type of indefinite delivery contract that 
provides for an indefinite quantity of supplies or services within 
stated limits, during a fixed period. 

[11] In accordance with FAR 6.102(d)(3), use of the GSA Schedules 
Program is considered a "competitive procedure" under the Competition 
in Contracting Act of 1984 when the GSA Schedule ordering procedures 
are followed. 

[12] The Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) Acquisition 
Strategy, which includes both Rifleman Radio and Manpack, was approved 
May 1, 2014. 

[13] The Software Engineering Institute is a nationally recognized, 
federally funded research and development center established at 
Carnegie Mellon University to address software engineering practices. 

[14] FAR Subpart 6.2. 

[15] FAR Subpart 6.3. 

[16] Capability sets are numbered in sequence with the year they are 
fielded, so capability set 13 was fielded beginning in 2013, 
capability set 14 is being fielded in 2014, and so on. 

[17] The Department of Defense's Joint Tactical Radio System is a 
family of common, interoperable, and modular software defined radios 
which operate as nodes in a network to ensure secure wireless 
communication and networking services for mobile and fixed forces. 

[18] A delivery order is an order for supplies placed against an 
established contract or with government sources. 

[19] DOD categorizes weapon systems to determine the level of review, 
decision authority, and applicable procedures. An acquisition program 
is designated category I when the dollar value for all increments of 
the program are estimated to require an eventual total expenditure for 
research, development, and test and evaluation of more than $480 
million in fiscal year 2014 constant dollars or, for procurement, of 
more than $2.79 billion in fiscal year 2014 constant dollars. An 
acquisition program can also be designated category I as special 
interest on the basis of factors such as technological complexity or 
large commitment of resources. While the MNVR is not projected to meet 
these category 1 spending levels, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics designated MNVR as an 
acquisition category ID special interest program. The Milestone 
Decision Authority is the Defense Acquisition Executive, or a 
delegate. The "D" refers to the Defense Acquisition Board, which 
advises the Defense Acquisition Executive at major decision points. 

[20] IDIQ contract defined at FN 10, p. 9 

[21] According to the SRW Appliqué performance work statement, the 
contracting officer may, if it is in the best interest of the 
government, conduct an "on ramp" to add additional contract holders to 
the SRW Appliqué contract, subject to certain criteria. For instance, 
notice of an on ramp, containing a solicitation, is to be publicized 
on an Army website for industry. Also, the award of any new contract 
cannot increase the overall ceiling of the basic contract. Conversely, 
if a contractor does not participate in the ordering process as 
expected and successfully perform the terms of their orders, the 
contracting officer may "off ramp" the contractor by executing a no-
cost settlement, terminate for convenience, or implement a termination 
for default, if applicable. 

[22] The Lockheed Martin system development contract period of 
performance expired as of August 31, 2013 and is in the process of 
being closed out by the Defense Contract Management Agency. 

[23] The JTRS HMS programs started with a single developmental 
contract for both the Rifleman and Manpack radios, but were then 
separated into two acquisition schedules as the full rate productions 
decisions were aligned with the revised acquisition strategy. 

[24] ACAT II programs are defined as those acquisition programs that 
do not meet the criteria for an ACAT I program, but do meet the 
criteria for a major system estimated by the DoD component head to 
require an eventual total expenditure for RDT&E of more than $185 
million in FY 2014 constant dollars, or for procurement of more than 
$835 million in FY 2014 constant dollars or those designated by the 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) to be ACAT II. The MDA is the DoD 
Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) or a designee. 

[25] Quantity amount of 25,086 is only for new JBC-P system hardware 
procurement and does not include FBCB2 legacy systems on which JBC-P 
will be installed. 

[26] 10 U.S.C. § 2433 establishes the requirement for the DOD to 
prepare unit cost reports on major defense acquisition programs or 
designated subprograms. If a program exceeds cost growth thresholds 
specified in the law, this is commonly referred to as a Nunn-McCurdy 
breach, which DOD is required to report to Congress and, if 
applicable, submit a certification to Congress in order to continue 
the program, in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 2433a. 

[27] The Networks Operations Software provides the monitoring, 
control, and planning tools to ensure management of the voice, data, 
and internet transport networks. 

[End of section] 

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