This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-14-323 
entitled 'Uranium Contamination: Overall Scope, Time Frame, and Cost 
Information is Needed for Contamination Cleanup on the Navajo 
Reservation' which was released on May 5, 2014. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

May 2014: 

Uranium Contamination: 

Overall Scope, Time Frame, and Cost Information is Needed for 
Contamination Cleanup on the Navajo Reservation: 

GAO-14-323: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-323, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Four million tons of uranium ore were extracted from mines on the 
Navajo reservation primarily for developing the U.S. nuclear weapons 
stockpile. For over 30 years, the Navajo people have lived with the 
environmental and health effects of uranium contamination from this 
mining. In 2008, five federal agencies adopted a 5-year plan that 
identified targets for addressing contaminated abandoned mines, 
structures, water sources, former processing sites, and other sites. 
Federal agencies also provide funding to Navajo Nation agencies to 
assist with the cleanup work. 

GAO was asked to examine the agencies' cleanup efforts. This report 
examines (1) the extent to which the agencies achieved the targets set 
in the 5-year plan and reasons why or why not; (2) what is known about 
the future scope of work, time frames, and costs; and (3) any key 
challenges faced by the agencies in completing this work and any 
opportunities to overcome them. GAO examined agency documents; 
interviewed agency officials, tribal leaders, and stakeholders; and 
visited sites on the Navajo and Hopi reservations. 

What GAO Found: 

Federal agencies implementing the 2008 5-year plan, including the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy, the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the Indian Health Service, met the 
targets in six of the plan's eight objectives, working in cooperation 
with tribal agencies, including the Navajo Nation Environmental 
Protection Agency. Reasons agencies met the targets were primarily 
because additional federal and other resources were dedicated to these 
efforts compared with prior years. For example, from 2008 through 
2012, EPA spent $22 million to test and replace contaminated houses, 
compared with $1.5 million spent in the preceding 5 years. In 
contrast, targets for two objectives—-cleanup of the Northeast Church 
Rock mine and Tuba City Dump-—were not met primarily because EPA's and 
BIA's estimated schedules were optimistic, and EPA added additional 
work that extended the time frames. BIA experienced project and 
contract management challenges in conducting work at Tuba City Dump 
and did not always follow best practices when estimating the schedule 
for assessment work at the site. These challenges, if not addressed, 
could affect BIA's ability to meet future targets for cleanup at the 
site and successfully plan for project resources. 

Federal agencies have not identified the full scope of remaining work, 
time frames, or costs to fully address uranium contamination on or 
near the Navajo reservation, although they recognize that significant 
work remains. In 2008, congressional decision makers requested the 
agencies provide an overall estimate of the full scope of work needed 
to address the contamination. The 5-year plan the agencies developed 
in response to this request does not provide a comprehensive estimate; 
instead, it focuses on the highest priorities over 5 years. EPA 
officials said that they typically do not provide cost or schedule 
estimates until a specific cleanup action is selected and that a 
number of current uncertainties make developing such an estimate 
difficult. Even with significant uncertainties, GAO has reported that 
agencies can create high-level estimates of costs and time frames that 
can be useful for decision makers and stakeholders. The agencies have 
collected important information that could provide a starting point 
for such an estimate. However, absent a statutory requirement to 
develop such a comprehensive estimate, it appears unlikely that the 
agencies will undertake such an effort. As a result, decision makers 
and stakeholders will not have the information they need to assess the 
overall pace of the cleanup efforts or make resource allocation 
decisions. 

Federal agencies face a variety of challenges in continuing to address 
uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation. For example, 
according to EPA officials, funding for EPA's efforts at the Navajo 
abandoned uranium mines is expected to decrease from funding levels 
available during the 2008 5-year plan because of overall declining 
federal resources for cleanup. Further, agencies face challenges in 
effectively engaging tribal communities, in part, because agencies 
have not always collaborated on their outreach efforts. These agencies 
identified opportunities to enhance their collaboration by creating a 
coordinated outreach strategy for the next 5-year plan. Creating such 
a strategy is consistent with one of the several key practices that 
GAO has reported can enhance and sustain interagency collaboration and 
help ensure that agencies make efficient use of limited resources. 

What GAO Recommends: 

Congress should consider requiring federal agencies to develop an 
overall estimate of the remaining scope of work, time frames, and 
costs to fully address uranium contamination. GAO also recommends that 
BIA address its project management challenges, and agencies 
incorporate key practices into their coordinated outreach strategy. In 
commenting on a draft of this report, the agencies generally agreed 
with GAO's recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-323]. For more 
information, contact J. Alfredo Gómez at (202) 512-3841 or 
gomezj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Agencies Met the Targets in Six Out of Eight Plan Objectives Primarily 
Because of Additional Federal Resources: 

Agencies Have Not Estimated the Full Scope of Work, Time Frames, or 
Costs Needed to Address Uranium Contamination but Recognize That 
Significant Work Remains: 

Agencies Face Challenges Meeting Funding Needs and Engaging Affected 
Communities, Though Opportunities Exist for Improving Relationships 
with the Navajo and Hopi People: 

Conclusions: 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency and Third Party Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Detailed Results of GAO Assessment of the Schedule for 
the Tuba City Dump Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study Work 
Plan: 

Appendix III: Detailed Results of GAO Assessment of the Tuba City Dump 
5-Year Cost Estimate: 

Appendix IV: The 43 Highest Priority Mines, Their Locations, and the 
Status of Assessment and Cleanup Efforts: 

Appendix V: Additional Information about the Remaining Scope of Work, 
Time Frames, and Costs to Address Uranium Contamination on or Near the 
Navajo Reservation: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency: 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior: 

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services: 

Appendix X: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

Appendix XI: Comments from the Navajo Nation: 

Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Federal Agencies, Their Roles, and Selected Actions Taken to 
Address Uranium Contamination on or Near the Navajo Reservation Prior 
to 2008: 

Table 2: Assessment of Actions Taken by Federal Agencies and Their 
Partners to Address Navajo Uranium Contamination Targets in the 2008 5-
year Plan: 

Table 3: Assessment of the January 2013 Tuba City Dump RI/FS Work Plan 
Schedule: 

Table 4: Assessment of the Tuba City Dump 5-Year Cost Estimate: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Map of the Navajo and Hopi Reservations with 521 Abandoned 
Uranium Mines, Four Former Uranium Processing Sites, and Other Key 
Sites: 

Figure 2: Uranium Mining Areas in the Rocky Mountain and Colorado 
Plateau Regions of the United States, Including on the Navajo 
Reservation: 

Figure 3: Uranium Mining and Processing That Occurred on or Near the 
Navajo Reservation: 

Figure 4: Current Pathways for Exposure to Uranium and Other Radiation 
Hazards: 

Figure 5: Superfund Remedial Action Process: 

Figure 6: 521 Abandoned Uranium Mines on or Near the Navajo 
Reservation, Radiation Levels, Distance From Homes or Structures, and 
the 43 Highest Priority Mines: 

Figure 7: Federal Agency Expenditures on Actions Taken to Address 
Uranium Contamination on or Near the Navajo Reservation, 2003-2007 and 
2008-2012: 

Figure 8: Photographs of A&B #3 Mine, Uranium-Bearing Rock Located On-
site, and Nearby Homes and Structures: 

Abbreviations: 

ATSDR: Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry: 

AUM: abandoned uranium mine: 

BIA: Bureau of Indian Affairs: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: 

CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act: 

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency: 

IHS: Indian Health Service: 

NNEPA: Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency: 

NPL: National Priorities List: 

NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

RI/FS: remedial investigation and feasibility study: 

UMTRA: Navajo Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action program: 

UMTRCA: Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 5, 2014: 

Congressional Requesters: 

Beginning in the 1940s and continuing for approximately 40 years, 
private companies extracted approximately 4 million tons of uranium 
ore from mines on the Navajo reservation. Until 1970, the U.S. 
government purchased most of the ore to meet the demand for developing 
the nation's first atomic bomb and the subsequent production of 
weapons for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Uranium production 
directly affected the Navajo people who worked in the mines to extract 
the uranium ore or who lived and raised families in close proximity to 
the mines. Active uranium mining on the reservation ceased by 1986, 
and companies often abandoned the mines. Nearly 30 years later, the 
Navajo people continue to live with the environmental and health 
effects from mining operations: more than 500 abandoned mines are 
located across the reservation, some close to homes and communities, 
and an unknown number of homes and drinking water sources contain 
radioactive elements. According to the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and other federal agencies, health effects--including lung 
cancer, bone cancer, and impaired kidney function--can result from 
exposure to elevated levels of uranium and other radionuclides. 
[Footnote 1] Uranium contamination at one location also directly 
affects the Hopi Tribe.[Footnote 2] 

After uranium mining on the Navajo reservation ended, some federal and 
tribal agencies began to address different aspects of the legacy of 
uranium contamination. These efforts on the whole have been sporadic, 
with some exceptions. The largest effort was conducted by the 
Department of Energy (DOE), which completed remedial actions at four 
uranium mill sites on the Navajo reservation where uranium ore was 
processed under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 
1978, as amended (UMTRCA).[Footnote 3] DOE also began monitoring 
groundwater contamination or implementing plans to address groundwater 
contamination at three of these sites. Among other efforts, from the 
1970s to the mid-2000s, EPA surveyed 65 structures and replaced 2 that 
had elevated levels of radiation; federal and tribal agencies and 
others sampled thousands of unregulated water sources to identify 
contamination; and a Navajo mine reclamation program addressed many of 
the physical hazards posed by abandoned mines. Even though these 
efforts represented some progress, Navajo and Hopi tribal officials 
have repeatedly expressed the tribes' frustrations with the pace of 
federal efforts to address uranium-related issues. 

In October 2007, the House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform held hearings on the health and environmental effects of 
uranium contamination on the Navajo reservation. Based, in part, on 
information received in that hearing, in January 2008, the committee 
requested that five federal agencies create a 5-year plan to address 
the effects of uranium contamination on Navajo and Hopi tribal lands. 
All five agencies were either directly involved with uranium mining 
and processing or with addressing the environmental and health effects 
of uranium contamination, or both, and included: EPA, DOE, the 
Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the 
Department of Health and Human Services' Indian Health Service (IHS), 
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). This plan--referred to in 
this report as the 2008 5-year plan--was the first collective plan and 
included actions organized under eight objectives, each of which was 
to be carried out by one or more of the federal agencies from 2008 
through 2012.[Footnote 4] The plan focused on addressing, over the 5-
year period, what the agencies identified as the most urgent uranium-
related problems and was not intended to be a long-term plan for fully 
resolving the entirety of the contamination. The eight objectives were 
as follows: 

1. Assess abandoned uranium mines for contamination and begin to 
identify potentially responsible parties. Assessments are needed to 
understand the scope of contamination and to identify necessary 
cleanup actions, and range from radiation scans to field surveys to 
more thorough site evaluations. Potentially responsible parties, such 
as former owners or operators of mines, can be compelled to clean up 
the contamination or to pay cleanup costs under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 
[Footnote 5] 

2. Clean up the Northeast Church Rock mine. The Navajo Nation 
identified this mine, which produced one of the largest volumes of 
uranium of all the Navajo uranium mines, as its highest priority for 
cleanup. Located near Church Rock, New Mexico, a former operator of 
the mine is involved in the cleanup efforts. 

3. Assess and clean up contaminated houses and other structures. Some 
Navajo community members used materials from the sites that were 
contaminated with uranium, such as rocks and pieces of wood or metal, 
to build homes and other structures. 

4. Test and provide alternatives to contaminated, unregulated drinking 
water sources. Federal and tribal agencies have estimated that from 15 
to 30 percent of Navajos do not have regulated, piped drinking water 
in their homes.[Footnote 6] These residents typically haul water to 
their homes, and it is not uncommon for them to use unsafe, 
unregulated water sources, such as livestock wells, for domestic water 
use. 

5. Continue to remediate groundwater at former uranium processing 
sites. DOE is developing or implementing plans to clean up groundwater 
contamination found at three of the four former processing sites. DOE 
also conducts long-term surveillance and maintenance at the sites. 

6. Assess the "Highway 160 site." This site, located across a highway 
from one of the former uranium processing sites, consists of an area 
where waste from the processing site was dumped and buried. 

7. Clean up the Tuba City Dump. A former dump serviced by BIA, Tuba 
City Dump is located primarily on Hopi land, but it encompasses an 
area of Navajo land as well, and was used by the nearby communities 
for more than 50 years. BIA, EPA, and the tribes have identified high 
levels of uranium in the groundwater underneath a portion of the 
landfill, and BIA has entered into an administrative settlement 
agreement with EPA to assess contamination and potential cleanup at 
the site.[Footnote 7] 

8. Assess and treat health conditions. IHS is responsible for treating 
health conditions in eligible Indians, including any health conditions 
that may result from exposure to uranium. 

Under each plan objective, the relevant federal agencies established 
targets that they expected to meet by the end of the 5-year period, in 
consultation with the Navajo Nation. Although not identified as a 
specific objective, Members of Congress also requested that the 
federal agencies work together to ensure a coordinated federal 
response. During the course of the 5-year plan period, health research 
efforts by a sixth agency--the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry (ATSDR)--was rolled into the health objective.[Footnote 8] 
The federal agencies published a summary report in January 2013, 
outlining their accomplishments under the plan.[Footnote 9] 

Since the 2008 5-year plan period ended in 2012, the federal agencies 
have continued their work and started the process of developing their 
next plan, which they intend to publish in 2014. During this 
transition, you asked us to report on the federal agencies' efforts 
under the 2008 5-year plan and going forward. This report examines (1) 
the extent to which federal agencies achieved the targets identified 
in the 2008 5-year plan, and the reasons why or why not; (2) what is 
known about the scope of work, time frames, and estimated costs of 
fully addressing uranium contamination; and (3) the key challenges, if 
any, faced by federal agencies in completing this work and the 
opportunities, if any, which may be present to help overcome these 
challenges. 

To determine the extent to which federal agencies achieved the targets 
identified in the 2008 5-year plan, and reasons why they did or did 
not, we compared the agencies' targets with the actions taken by the 
agencies and their partners over the 5-year plan period, reviewed key 
documents, and interviewed federal agency and tribal officials. To 
identify what is known about the scope of work, time frames, and 
estimated costs of fully addressing uranium contamination on or near 
the Navajo reservation, we reviewed available documents and 
interviewed federal agency and tribal officials. We also assessed the 
schedule and cost estimates for the Tuba City Dump based on our March 
2009 cost estimating and assessment guide, a compilation of cost-
estimating best practices drawn from across government and industry, 
and our May 2012 schedule assessment guide.[Footnote 10] To ascertain 
any key challenges faced by federal agencies in completing this work 
and the opportunities that may be present to help overcome these 
challenges, we reviewed reports and interviewed federal agency and 
tribal officials, as well as knowledgeable stakeholders, who included 
local government officials and community members, university 
researchers, and representatives of nonprofit organizations. We also 
visited abandoned uranium mines, a former uranium processing site, and 
other relevant sites on the Navajo and Hopi reservations; we selected 
these sites based on the level of activity that federal and tribal 
agencies conducted there during the 2008 5-year plan or because the 
agencies identified the sites as needing cleanup in the near future. 
Appendix I describes our objectives, scope, and methodology in more 
detail. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2013 to May 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

In keeping with its trust responsibility with respect to Indian 
tribes, the federal government holds title to the Navajo and Hopi 
tribal land in trust for the benefit of the tribes and their members. 
In this context, this section provides information on (1) the Navajo 
Nation and Hopi Tribe; (2) uranium mining and processing on the Navajo 
reservation and its environmental effects; (3) Navajo people's 
exposure to uranium contamination and related health effects; (4) key 
statutes relevant to addressing uranium contamination; and (5) the 
roles of federal and tribal agencies and selected actions taken to 
address uranium contamination on the Navajo and Hopi reservations 
prior to 2008. 

Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe: 

The Navajo reservation consists of more than 24,000 square miles of 
land--about the size of the state of West Virginia--in the states of 
Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, making it the largest reservation, 
geographically, in the United States. The Hopi reservation consists of 
approximately 2,500 square miles of land in northeastern Arizona, 
entirely surrounded by the Navajo reservation. Figure 1 shows the 
locations of the Navajo and Hopi reservations, as well as the 
locations of 521 abandoned uranium mines and other key sites. 

Figure 1: Map of the Navajo and Hopi Reservations with 521 Abandoned 
Uranium Mines, Four Former Uranium Processing Sites, and Other Key 
Sites: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Depicted on the map: 

Navajo reservation; 
Hopi reservation; 
Highway 160 site; 
Mexican Hat processing site; 
Monument Valley processing site; 
Shiprock processing site; 
Rare metals processing site; 
Tuba City Dump. 

Number of abandoned uranium mines (AUM) in each AUM region[A]: 
Eastern AUM region: 84; 
Northern AUM region: 229; 
North Central AUM region: 63; 
Central AUM region: 28; 
Southern AUM region: 6; 
Western AUM region: 111. 

Sources: GAO analysis of EPA and DOE data; Map Resources (map). 

Note: The eastern portion of the Navajo reservation, as depicted here, 
is referred to as the Checkerboard area and consists of land with 
different ownership and statuses, including tribal trust lands; Indian 
allotments; Navajo tribal fee lands; and private, state, and federal 
lands. 

[A] The Western, North Central, Northern, and Eastern abandoned uranium 
mine (AUM) regions extend up to 1 mile beyond the borders of the Navajo 
reservation. 

[End of figure] 

According to the 2010 Census, 174,000 people lived on Navajo land, 
and, according to Census Bureau estimates, more than 90 percent of the 
population identified as Navajo. Navajo culture is historically 
agrarian, and the Navajo people tend to live in small group clusters 
that are widely dispersed across the reservation. Many Navajo graze 
sheep and other livestock, which they use for wool and for 
consumption, among other things. According to Census Bureau estimates, 
the Navajo reservation's poverty rate is more than twice as high as 
the poverty rate in the state of Arizona, with 38 percent of people on 
the reservation--and 44 percent of all children on the reservation--
living in poverty. Most homes do not have electricity or telephones; 
roads are unpaved, and there are no urban centers, although there are 
large towns generally found near the boundaries of the reservation. 
Residents living in homes without piped, regulated water sources haul 
their water from a nearby source, and many of these sources are 
unregulated, untreated water sources such as livestock wells or 
natural springs. The Navajo Nation government includes 110 local 
government subdivisions, known as chapters. 

There are more than 5,000 Hopi living on Hopi land, according to the 
2010 Census. Poverty rates on the Hopi reservation are similar to 
those among the Navajo. There were no uranium mines on the Hopi 
reservation. 

Uranium Mining and Processing on the Navajo Reservation and its 
Environmental Effects: 

The Navajo reservation is located on the southern end of a stretch of 
naturally occurring uranium deposits that spans the western United 
States (see figure 2). The uranium found on the reservation is 
primarily located in sandstone formations that range from surface 
outcrops to deposits more than 4,000 feet deep. 

Figure 2: Uranium Mining Areas in the Rocky Mountain and Colorado 
Plateau Regions of the United States, Including on the Navajo 
Reservation: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map] 

Map depicts mining districts in the following states: 
Arizona; 
Colorado; 
New Mexico; 
South Dakota; 
Utah; 
Wyoming. 

Sources: DOE; Map Resources (map). 

Notes: 

The eastern portion of the Navajo reservation, as depicted here, is 
referred to as the Checkerboard area and consists of land with 
different ownership and statuses, including tribal trust lands; Indian 
allotments; Navajo tribal fee lands; and private, state, and federal 
lands. 

According to DOE, Texas, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington also contain 
significant uranium mining areas. 

[End of figure] 

On the Navajo reservation, uranium ore was removed from the ground at 
more than 500 mines, generally through open pit mining for ore 
deposits located relatively close to the surface, or underground 
mining for deeper deposits. The mines were often located in 
mountainous areas and consisted of multiple features, such as portals 
and vertical shafts. The material left behind after the ore was 
removed--known as waste rock--was then disposed, often in nearby 
piles, and contained dangerous materials, such as radium, radon, and 
heavy metals. Once mining ceased at a site, companies often abandoned 
the mines, leaving the waste rock piles in place without conducting 
any cleanup or posting signs warning about the dangers of 
contamination or physical hazards. The extracted ore was sent to an 
off-site processing facility called a mill. At the mill, the mined 
uranium ore was crushed, ground, and then fed to a leaching system 
that produced yellow slurry--called yellowcake--that was further 
processed for use in nuclear weapons or, as of the mid-1960s, for use 
in nuclear power plants. The leaching system left a waste product 
known as mill tailings that retained some toxic contaminants. The 
tailings were of a sandy consistency and mixtures of tailings and 
water were placed in unlined evaporation ponds at the mill site. DOE 
estimates that millions of gallons of water contaminated by mill 
tailings were released into the groundwater over the life of the sites 
through the unlined ponds. In addition, on July 16, 1979, the largest 
release of radioactive materials in the United States occurred when a 
dam on one of the evaporation ponds broke at a processing site near 
Church Rock, New Mexico, resulting in the release of 94 million 
gallons of radioactive waste to the Puerco River, which flowed through 
nearby communities. Figure 3 depicts the uranium mining and processing 
that occurred on or near the Navajo reservation. 

Figure 3: Uranium Mining and Processing That Occurred on or Near the 
Navajo Reservation: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Open pit mining; 
Underground mining; 
Uranium processing. 

Sources: GAO; Art Explosion (trees and heavy equipment images). 

[End of figure] 

Most of the uranium mining and processing on the Navajo reservation 
occurred from the late 1940s through the 1960s, and the federal 
government played a variety of roles during this time. For example, as 
reported by EPA and the Navajo Nation, beginning in the 1940s, the 
Secretary of the Interior, along with the Navajo Nation, and later 
BIA, issued leases and permits to private companies and individuals 
for uranium mining on the Navajo reservation.[Footnote 11] In another 
example, the Atomic Energy Commission (Commission)--a precursor agency 
to DOE--established a series of financial incentives for the discovery 
and production of domestic uranium, including guaranteed minimum 
prices for uranium ore and financial bonuses for uranium ore mined 
from any previously unidentified site, according to a report prepared 
by the Commission. According to the report, the Commission also 
provided infrastructure support, such as roads needed to survey mine 
sites and transport ore. Finally, the federal government was the sole 
customer of the processed uranium from 1947 to 1965. 

Beginning in 1970, uranium from the Navajo reservation was sold 
exclusively to the commercial sector for use in nuclear power plants, 
but prices fell in the 1980s, and uranium mining operations on the 
reservation ended in 1986. Because of lingering contamination and its 
effects, in 2005 the Navajo Nation enacted a law placing a moratorium 
on uranium mining and processing on any site within the tribe's 
territorial jurisdiction. In 2012, the Navajo Nation enacted a law 
prohibiting transportation of uranium ore or radioactive waste through 
lands under the tribe's territorial jurisdiction unless fees, bonding, 
and other requirements were met. The 2012 law also stated that the 
Navajo Nation generally opposed transportation of uranium ore or 
radioactive materials, except for the purpose of disposing of 
materials from past mining or milling in a long-term facility outside 
of the tribe's territorial jurisdiction or a temporary facility within 
the jurisdiction. Even with these laws, however, increases in the 
price of uranium during the past 10 years have sparked renewed 
interest in uranium mining and processing on and near the Navajo 
reservation, and opinions over new mining appear split, especially 
given the potential for job creation offered by the industry in 
economically depressed areas.[Footnote 12] For example, a committee of 
the Navajo Nation Council approved a resolution in December 2013 
acknowledging a private company's right-of-way across tribal land near 
Church Rock, New Mexico, and authorizing its use for a demonstration 
project that extracts uranium from beneath the surface. The Navajo 
Nation Department of Justice has concluded that the resolution 
conflicts with the 2005 and 2012 laws. 

Exposure to Uranium and Its Health Effects: 

Uranium is present naturally in virtually all soil, rock, and water, 
and is spread throughout the environment by geological processes, as 
well as by wind and rain. On the Navajo reservation, winds blow during 
most of the year, exceeding 50 miles per hour at times, and localized, 
heavy rainstorms occur throughout the summer. When uranium is present 
in the environment, people may be exposed to it, as well as the 
radioactive by-products that are created as uranium decays--including 
radium and radon (a gas)--through a variety of exposure pathways. For 
example, Navajo people have been exposed to naturally occurring 
uranium and its by-products by drinking water from unregulated wells 
that tap into groundwater that comes into contact with underground 
uranium deposits. People are also exposed to naturally occurring radon 
when it migrates into their homes from the uranium-bearing soil 
underneath. 

Mining and milling processes on the Navajo reservation created new 
pathways for exposure to uranium, increasing the amount of potential 
exposure at the surface. When the uranium mines were in operation, 
uranium miners inhaled radioactive dust and radon in and near the 
mines where they worked. Miners tracked the dust into their homes, 
exposing their families. Community members occasionally used materials 
from the mines and mill sites to build their houses and ceremonial 
structures, leading to increased radon inside these structures. When 
waste rock piles were left next to abandoned mines, wind and rain at 
times spread--and could continue to spread--the hazardous materials, 
sometimes through intermittent streams, where these materials could 
come into contact with residents of nearby communities, who could then 
be exposed by inhalation or ingestion. Residents of some communities 
located near the mines reported playing as children in and around the 
open mines. Many of the exposure pathways that existed when the mines 
and processing sites were in operation have been eliminated, and the 
Navajo Nation has stated that the most significant safety hazards that 
were present at the abandoned mines have been addressed. However, 
there are pathways of exposure that remain for Navajo residents today 
(see figure 4). 

Figure 4: Current Pathways for Exposure to Uranium and Other Radiation 
Hazards: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Depicted: 

Radiation from waste rock; 
Hazardous dust spread by wind and rain-fed streams and deposited on 
ground; 
Radon from waste rock built into foundations and/or from the soil 
underneath; 
Unregulated water sources containing uranium and other hazardous 
constituents from groundwater. 

Sources: GAO; Art Explosion (trees and sheep). 

[End of figure] 

Although historic, occupational exposure to uranium has been shown by 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and others to 
have affected human health, the extent to which the Navajo people have 
experienced health effects resulting from uranium exposures in other 
ways has not been thoroughly examined and remains uncertain. For 
nonoccupational exposures, comprehensive health studies have not been 
conducted to assess the health effects of uranium contamination on 
Navajo communities or other communities located near active or 
abandoned uranium mines and processing sites, but Navajo community 
members who have lived near these sites have reported a variety of 
serious health effects, including cancers, according to CDC.[Footnote 
13] EPA reports that exposure to gamma radiation--such as from waste 
rock located near abandoned mines--can cause a variety of cancers, 
including lung cancer and leukemia, and that exposure to radon can 
cause lung cancer. Because of these potential dangers, EPA recommends 
that people stay away from areas on the Navajo reservation with 
especially high levels of radiation--more than 10-times above the 
naturally-occurring, background radiation--in order to avoid potential 
health effects.[Footnote 14] ATSDR and EPA have noted that the 
abandoned mines pose a risk especially to children, since children 
tend to put dirt in their mouths, and the dirt at the mines could be 
contaminated. EPA noted in the 2008 5-year plan that inhabitants of 
structures constructed with uranium mining waste are at risk of 
developing lung cancer because of the increased presence of radon in 
indoor air. In addition, given the consumption by Navajo residents of 
livestock that have grazed on plants located on or near abandoned mine 
sites, residents and researchers have identified the need to study the 
potential for exposure to radiation through consuming these animals. 

Key Statutes Relevant to Addressing Uranium Contamination: 

Two key statutes involved with addressing uranium contamination are 
(1) CERCLA,[Footnote 15] also known as Superfund, and (2) UMTRCA. 
[Footnote 16] 

CERCLA: 

CERCLA established the Superfund program in 1980 to protect human 
health and the environment from the effects of hazardous substances, 
including uranium. Under CERCLA, potentially responsible parties--such 
as current or former owners or operators of a mine site containing 
hazardous substances--are liable for conducting or paying for cleanup 
of hazardous substances at contaminated sites.[Footnote 17] If the 
federal government is a potentially responsible party at a site, it is 
liable for cleanup costs even if there are nonfederal potentially 
responsible parties. For example, one court has held that the federal 
government was liable as an owner under CERCLA for the cleanup costs 
at a mine located within an Indian reservation.[Footnote 18] 

Under CERCLA, EPA has the authority to compel potentially responsible 
parties to clean up contaminated sites, or to conduct cleanups itself 
and then seek reimbursement from the potentially responsible parties. 
EPA may compel cleanup by bringing an enforcement action against a 
potentially responsible party or by attempting to reach an 
administrative agreement--known as an administrative order on consent, 
or a settlement agreement--requiring the responsible party to perform 
and pay for site cleanup. Sometimes, however, potentially responsible 
parties cannot be identified or may be financially unable to perform 
the cleanup. 

Under the Superfund program, EPA and potentially responsible parties 
can undertake two types of cleanups: (1) removal actions and (2) 
remedial actions.[Footnote 19] 

Removal actions are generally shorter-term or emergency cleanups to 
mitigate immediate threats. These include time-critical removals for 
threats requiring action within 6 months, and non-time-critical 
removals for threats where action can be delayed to account for a 6-
month or longer planning period, which includes a site evaluation to 
characterize the site and identify and analyze removal alternatives. 
[Footnote 20] Removal actions can include, for example, installing a 
fence around a contaminated site and excavating contaminated soils for 
disposal, and can be quite complex. Removal actions can be financed by 
the Hazardous Substance Superfund Trust Fund (Superfund Trust Fund). 
[Footnote 21] 

Remedial actions typically are longer-term actions that involve a more 
elaborate process to permanently and significantly reduce 
contamination. Remedial actions are taken instead of, or in addition 
to, a removal action. Before undertaking a remedial action, a remedial 
investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS) is conducted in accordance 
with an approved work plan to (1) characterize site conditions and 
assess the risks to human health and the environment, among other 
things, and (2) evaluate various options to address the problems 
identified. A remedy is selected for addressing the site's 
contamination in a record of decision, and the design of the selected 
remedy is then developed and implemented (see figure 5). Only sites on 
the National Priorities List (NPL)--EPA's list of the nation's most 
contaminated sites--are eligible to have remedial actions financed by 
the Superfund Trust Fund.[Footnote 22] None of the mine sites on the 
Navajo reservation are currently listed on the NPL. 

Figure 5: Superfund Remedial Action Process: 

[Refer to PDF for image: process illustration] 

Milestone: Agency initiates cleanup process, or settlement agreement 
signed, or National Priorities List listing. 

Phase: Remedial investigation. 

Phase: Feasibility study. 

Milestone: Record of decision. 

Phase: Remedial design. 

Phase: Remedial action. 

Milestone: Construction complete. 

Phase: Postconstruction completion. 

Source: GAO analysis of EPA data. 

[End of figure] 

UMTRCA: 

UMTRCA required DOE to take remedial actions at certain uranium mill 
sites across the country--and properties in the vicinity that were 
contaminated with radioactive materials from the mill sites--to 
stabilize and control the mill tailings in a safe and environmentally 
sound manner and to minimize or eliminate health hazards, among other 
things. UMTRCA included four sites on the Navajo reservation: 
[Footnote 23] Mexican Hat, Monument Valley, Shiprock, and Tuba City, 
which we refer to as the Rare Metals site in this report.[Footnote 24] 
Under the act, DOE is also responsible for ensuring that any residual 
radioactive minerals entering the groundwater do not exceed specified 
limits; therefore, DOE maintains groundwater remediation systems at 
sites where groundwater contamination has persisted. In accordance 
with the act, the Secretary of Energy has entered into cooperative 
agreements with the Navajo Nation to perform the remedial actions at 
the sites located on the tribe's land; the current agreement lasts 
until 2017.[Footnote 25] The act also required DOE to complete the 
remedial actions at the processing sites and vicinity properties 
before DOE's authority under the act, as amended, to perform these 
actions expired in 1998; DOE's authority to perform groundwater 
restoration activities has not expired. UMTRCA did not include 
provisions for DOE to remediate abandoned uranium mines.[Footnote 26] 

Federal and Tribal Agencies' Roles and Selected Actions Taken to 
Address Uranium Contamination on or Near the Navajo Reservation Prior 
to 2008: 

A variety of federal agencies have specific roles in addressing 
uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation. Table 1 
outlines the agencies, their roles, and selected actions they took to 
begin addressing the contamination prior to 2008. 

Table 1: Federal Agencies, Their Roles, and Selected Actions Taken to 
Address Uranium Contamination on or Near the Navajo Reservation Prior 
to 2008: 

Agency: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); 
Role addressing uranium contamination: EPA Region 9 addresses issues 
related to contaminated abandoned uranium mines and contaminated homes 
and other structures. EPA conducts this work under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).[A] 
EPA also approves BIA's work at the Tuba City Dump under a settlement 
agreement entered into pursuant to CERCLA and will select the remedy 
at this site. In addition, EPA funds construction of drinking water 
infrastructure projects under the Safe Drinking Water Act[B]; 
Selected actions taken prior to 2008: From the 1970s to the 1990s, EPA 
and the Navajo Nation assessed 65 structures for uranium contamination 
and replaced 2 contaminated structures. In addition, from 2000 to 
2007, EPA worked with Navajo tribal agencies to collect and map 
information about the abandoned uranium mines on the reservation.[C] 
Further, in 2007, EPA conducted its first interim removal action at 
the Northeast Church Rock mine, removing approximately 6,500 cubic 
yards of contaminated soils from a residential area located adjacent 
to the mine. 

Agency: Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA); 
Role addressing uranium contamination: BIA serviced the Tuba City 
Dump, located near the Navajo town of Tuba City and the Hopi Villages 
of Moenkopi, which was used by the surrounding communities for 50 
years until its administrative closure in 1997. BIA is a potentially 
responsible party at the site; 
Selected actions taken prior to 2008: In 1998, BIA began assessment 
activities, including analyses of groundwater and pathways of 
contaminant migration that were conducted by various consultants and 
other federal agencies, including the U.S. Geological Survey and EPA. 
In 2006, BIA initiated the CERCLA remedial action process so that a 
final remedy could be evaluated, selected, and ultimately implemented 
at the site. 

Agency: Department of Energy (DOE); 
Role addressing uranium contamination: DOE is responsible, under the 
Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) of 1978, for long-
term surveillance and maintenance at the four former uranium 
processing sites located on the Navajo reservation.[D] DOE maintains 
groundwater remediation systems at three sites; 
Selected actions taken prior to 2008: DOE completed surface remedial 
actions at the four former sites from 1986 to 1995, and constructed 
disposal cells at the Mexican Hat, Shiprock, and the Rare Metals 
sites. DOE adopted groundwater compliance action plans for the 
Shiprock and Rare Metals sites and began evaluating options at the 
Monument Valley site to address the continued presence of groundwater 
contamination. DOE also remediated 31 contaminated properties in the 
vicinity of former processing sites that were contaminated with 
radioactive materials from the mill sites. 

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); 
Role addressing uranium contamination: NRC regulates and licenses 
DOE's activities under UMTRCA at the three former uranium processing 
sites on the Navajo reservation that contain disposal cells and 
conducts oversight of DOE's monitoring and maintenance activities at 
all four of the former processing sites; 
Selected actions taken prior to 2008: As required by UMTRCA, NRC 
evaluated and concurred on DOE's remedial action plans at Mexican Hat, 
Shiprock, and Rare Metals and then issued licenses to DOE for the 
custody and long-term care of radioactive disposal cells at these sites 
in the 1990s. 

Agency: Indian Health Service (IHS); 
Role addressing uranium contamination: IHS's Navajo Area Indian Health 
Service provides health care to eligible American Indians through a 
network of hospitals and health centers. IHS also funds and develops 
water infrastructure projects to serve Navajo homes; 
Selected actions taken prior to 2008: IHS provided uranium-related 
health services to a specific set of Navajos, including former uranium 
miners, former uranium millers, and community members who may have 
been exposed to fallout from the detonation of nuclear devices[E]. 

Agency: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)/Agency for 
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR); 
Role addressing uranium contamination: CDC, among other things, 
conducts scientific research and provides health information to 
communities; ATSDR was established under CERCLA to carry out that 
law's health-related activities, which included survey and screening 
programs to determine the relationships between toxic exposures and 
illness[F] ATSDR is located within CDC's Office of Noncommunicable 
Disease, Injury, and Environmental Health; 
Selected actions taken prior to 2008: CDC was involved in efforts in 
2006 and 2007 to sample unregulated drinking water sources and educate 
Navajo communities about the results; ATSDR did not conduct work 
related to uranium contamination on the Navajo reservation before 
2008. 

Sources: GAO analysis of agencies' information. 

[A] Pub. L. No. 96-510 (1980), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
9601-9675. 

[B] Pub. L. No. 93-523 (1974), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
300f to 300j-26. 

[C] EPA, et al., Abandoned Uranium Mines and the Navajo Nation: Navajo 
Nation AUM Screening Assessment Report and Atlas with Geospatial Data 
(August 2007). 

[D] Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat. 3021 (1978). 

[E] IHS provided these services to eligible Navajos through the 
Radiation Exposure Screening and Education Program, which was created 
in response to the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act Amendments of 
2000, which recognized the federal government's responsibility to 
initiate and support programs designed for the early detection, 
prevention and education on diseases to aid the thousands of 
individuals adversely affected by the mining of uranium and testing of 
the country's nuclear weapons. 

[F] Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 104(i), 94 Stat. 2767, 2778-2779 (1980). 

[End of table] 

In addition to the federal agencies, tribal agencies play key roles 
and have been actively addressing the impacts of historical uranium 
mining and processing on or near the Navajo reservation. 

* Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency (NNEPA). NNEPA is the 
lead Navajo agency for regulating radiological contamination at 
abandoned uranium mines. NNEPA addresses uranium contamination on the 
Navajo reservation through a variety of programs, including the Navajo 
Superfund program, which is responsible for assessing hazardous waste 
sites on the reservation, including abandoned uranium mines. NNEPA 
partners with EPA in working under the structures, abandoned mines, 
and unregulated drinking water objectives of the 2008 5-year plan, and 
provides input on the other objectives as well. 

* Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation/Uranium Mill Tailings 
Remedial Action (UMTRA) Department. This Navajo department consists of 
two programs, the Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program and the 
UMTRA program. The Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program reclaims 
abandoned mines on the Navajo reservation.[Footnote 27] From the 1990s 
through 2005, the Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program reclaimed 
more than 900 abandoned uranium mine features found at the 521 mines 
located on or near the reservation, primarily addressing surface 
hazards, including stabilizing steep areas and burying uranium-
contaminated soils.[Footnote 28] According to Navajo Nation officials, 
this work did not address all associated radiological hazards, and the 
program continues to conduct maintenance on past reclamation work. The 
department's UMTRA program provides assistance to DOE under an UMTRCA 
cooperative agreement at the four former uranium processing sites on 
the reservation.[Footnote 29] Under the 2008 5-year plan, the Navajo 
Nation chose not to have the Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program 
coordinate its reclamation work with EPA and NNEPA's abandoned mine 
work. The UMTRA program, however, supported DOE's efforts at the 
former processing sites under the 5-year plan. 

Agencies Met the Targets in Six Out of Eight Plan Objectives Primarily 
Because of Additional Federal Resources: 

Federal agencies met the targets in six of the eight objectives they 
established in the 2008 5-year plan, but they did not meet the targets 
in two of the eight objectives. Reasons the agencies met the targets 
in five objectives were primarily because additional federal 
resources, including funding and staff time, were dedicated to their 
efforts. DOE met the targets in a sixth objective because the agency 
set targets that represented a continuation of previously required 
activities. By contrast, the reasons federal agencies did not meet the 
targets in two objectives were, in part, because of decisions to 
conduct additional assessment and outreach activities before 
identifying final cleanup actions. Remaining actions are necessary to 
meet the targets in these two objectives. 

Agencies Met the Targets in Six Out of Eight Plan Objectives: 

In the 2008 5-year plan, federal agencies identified targets under 
each of the eight objectives that they intended to meet, in 
cooperation with tribal agency partners, by the end of the plan period 
in 2012. We found that the agencies met the targets in six of the 
eight objectives. According to the agencies' January 2013 summary 
report, the 2008 5-year plan outlined a strategy for gaining a better 
understanding of the scope of the problem and addressing the greatest 
risks first. The scope of work required to meet most of the targets 
did not represent the entirety of work necessary to fully address the 
issues encompassed by each objective. Table 2 explains the actions 
taken by the federal agencies--and the tribal agencies with whom they 
worked--during the period of 2008 through 2012, and our assessment of 
whether these actions met the targets in the 2008 5-year plan. 
[Footnote 30] 

Table 2: Assessment of Actions Taken by Federal Agencies and Their 
Partners to Address Navajo Uranium Contamination Targets in the 2008 5-
year Plan: 

2008 5-year plan: objective: Abandoned uranium mines--assessment and 
enforcement; 
Targets established by federal agencies in 2008: 
* Conduct initial assessments of up to 250 mines and detailed 
assessments of approximately 35 mines[A]; 
* Search for potentially responsible parties; 
Key actions taken by federal agencies from 2008 through 2012: 
* The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) completed initial 
assessments, which included radiation scans, of 521 mines and more 
detailed assessments of 45 mines to determine whether the mines could 
potentially be eligible for listing on the National Priorities List 
and/or if they should be referred to the agency's emergency 
response program for immediate action; 
* EPA continued to search for potentially responsible parties and, by 
the end of 2012, had signed agreements with potentially responsible 
parties for 3 mines, and identified potentially responsible parties at 
24 additional mines; 
Lead federal agency (federal and tribal agency partners): EPA; 
(Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency (NNEPA)); 
GAO assessment: Met. 

2008 5-year plan: objective: Northeast Church Rock mine; 
Targets established by federal agencies in 2008: 
* Complete cleanup of the former Northeast Church Rock uranium mine; 
Key actions taken by federal agencies from 2008 through 2012: 
* EPA and the potentially responsible party conducted two interim 
removal actions to remove 130,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil 
found in the surrounding community but did not begin a final cleanup 
action at the mine; 
* EPA completed its analysis of alternatives for the site and 
organized an interagency work group to provide technical design 
assistance, comprised of other federal agencies and others; 
Lead federal agency (federal and tribal agency partners): EPA; 
(NNEPA, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Department of Energy 
(DOE)); 
GAO assessment: Not met. 

2008 5-year plan: objective: Contaminated houses and other structures; 
Targets established by federal agencies in 2008: 
* In coordination with the Navajo Nation, assess up to 500 structures; 
* Where contaminated structures are found that pose a health risk, 
take appropriate response actions using EPA's Superfund authority; 
Key actions taken by federal agencies from 2008 through 2012: 
* EPA and NNEPA assessed 878 structures for contamination; EPA then 
conducted more thorough assessments using more sensitive equipment for 
527 structures that posed potential health risks; 
* EPA identified 43 structures and 18 yards that posed health risks. 
Of these, EPA demolished and rebuilt or provided financial settlements 
for 31 structures, excavated 18 yards, and awarded a grant to a Navajo 
housing agency to rebuild 9 structures[B]; 
Lead federal agency (federal and tribal agency partners): EPA; 
(NNEPA); 
GAO assessment: Met. 

2008 5-year plan: objective: Unregulated drinking water sources; 
Targets established by federal agencies in 2008: 
* Test up to 70 unregulated water sources located near abandoned 
uranium mines to determine if they contain safe levels of radiation or 
radionuclides and provide results to affected communities; 
* Provide alternative water supplies where feasible; 
Key actions taken by federal agencies from 2008 through 2012: 
* EPA tested 97 unregulated water sources; through this and work 
completed prior to the 5-year plan, EPA, NNEPA, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and other partners identified 29 
sources with unsafe uranium levels, and worked to communicate the 
results to communities; 
* EPA and the Indian Health Service (IHS) funded 13 water 
infrastructure projects to provide alternative water supplies to 
communities near more than half of the 29 contaminated sources; EPA 
funded a pilot project for the Navajo Nation to haul water to remote 
communities[C]; 
Lead federal agency (federal and tribal agency partners): EPA; 
(CDC, IHS, NNEPA, Navajo Dept. of Water Resources); 
GAO assessment: Met. 

2008 5-year plan: objective: Former uranium processing sites; 
Targets established by federal agencies in 2008: 
* Continue existing groundwater treatment strategies at three former 
uranium processing sites with contaminated groundwater; 
* Continue long-term surveillance and maintenance at the four former 
processing sites; 
Key actions taken by federal agencies from 2008 through 2012: 
* DOE continued its active groundwater treatment at two sites under 
treatment plans that were adopted prior to the initiation of the 2008 
5-year plan and continued examining passive treatment options at a 
third site. DOE also conducted technical studies of groundwater 
conditions at the sites; 
* DOE continued long-term surveillance and maintenance at the four 
sites; 
Lead federal agency (federal and tribal agency partners): DOE; (NRC, 
Navajo Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action program, NNEPA); 
GAO assessment: Met. 

2008 5-year plan: objective: Highway 160 site; 
Targets established by federal agencies in 2008: 
* Understand the best approach for characterization of the site and 
any required cleanup based on that characterization; 
Key actions taken by federal agencies from 2008 through 2012: 
* DOE and NNEPA completed characterization and cleanup at the site, 
which included disposing of 5,700 cubic yards of waste at DOE's 
disposal cell in Grand Junction, Colorado; 
Lead federal agency (federal and tribal agency partners): DOE; (NNEPA); 
GAO assessment: Met. 

2008 5-year plan: objective: Tuba City Dump; 
Targets established by federal agencies in 2008: 
* Work together with the Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe to assess 
whether interim actions are needed to address urgent threats; complete 
a remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS) and select a 
remedial action; complete cleanup at the site by December 2012; 
Key actions taken by federal agencies from 2008 through 2012: 
* The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), in consultation with the tribes, 
found no imminent threat to drinking water wells; BIA installed a 
fence around the site, implemented quarterly groundwater monitoring, 
and conducted additional studies. BIA and its contractor implemented 
the agency's settlement agreement with EPA by conducting various 
assessments of contamination at the site but did not complete the RI/
FS. Also, DOE funded a study to characterize the groundwater between 
the Rare Metals processing site and the landfill. EPA did not select a 
remedial action for the site, and BIA did not complete cleanup at the 
site; 
Lead federal agency (federal and tribal agency partners): BIA; (EPA, 
NNEPA, Hopi Water Resources Program, DOE); 
GAO assessment: Not met. 

2008 5-year plan: objective: Health conditions; 
Targets established by federal agencies in 2008: 
* Continue to diagnose and treat known health conditions in eligible 
Indians; 
* Support a university-led Navajo uranium assessment and kidney health 
project; 
* Develop plans for future health studies, and assessment and 
surveillance of health conditions; 
Key actions taken by federal agencies from 2008 through 2012: 
* IHS continued to diagnose and treat health conditions. IHS also 
initiated a program that holds community forums to enhance education 
about uranium-related health impacts; provides health screenings in 
communities; updates patients' health records to include information 
about exposures to uranium; and provides uranium-specific training to 
health care workers; 
* IHS staff completed medical evaluations on kidney health project 
participants living in one region of the Navajo reservation; 
* An epidemiologist on detail to IHS from CDC helped evaluate options 
for future health studies and developed plans for assessment and 
surveillance of health conditions; 
Lead federal agency (federal and tribal agency partners): IHS; (CDC); 
GAO assessment: Met. 

Sources: GAO analysis of information provided by BIA, DOE, EPA, IHS, 
and NRC. 

Note: In addition to establishing targets under eight objectives, the 
2008 5-year plan included a more detailed discussion of each objective 
which, in some cases, identified specific actions the federal agencies 
planned to take and interim milestones the agencies planned to meet. 
This table shows the targets established in the 5-year plan but does 
not identify all actions contained in the plan. 

[A] Initial assessments involve field surveys of each mine, including 
on-the-ground radiation scans at all accessible mines. As described 
here, detailed assessments evaluate the extent to which people are 
likely to be exposed to radiation at each mine in order to determine 
whether mines are eligible for listing on the National Priorities List. 

[B] EPA also identified three contaminated structures for which the 
agency did not provide financial compensation or rebuild because they 
were rebuilt by the owner or had been abandoned. In July 2012, EPA 
awarded a $3 million grant to Navajo Community Housing and 
Infrastructure Department to rebuild nine houses in Haystack, New 
Mexico. The Navajo agency accepted the grant in February 2013, and 
work on rebuilding the houses was under way during our site visit in 
July 2013. 

[C] Department of Housing and Urban Development's Community 
Development Block Grants were also used to fund these projects. 

[End of table] 

We also found that federal agencies completed additional actions and 
produced results beyond the targets in the 2008 5-year plan during the 
plan period and in 2013. Among other things, EPA, working with the 
Navajo Nation, conducted a time-critical removal action at the Skyline 
mine, located within the Oljato Chapter in southern Utah. The action 
involved moving 25,000 cubic yards of radioactive mine waste--most of 
which was located at the bottom of a 700-foot high mesa--to a 
repository constructed on-site at the top of the mesa. According to 
EPA officials, the agency built the repository to be permanent, but 
the waste could ultimately be removed from the site given the Navajo 
Nation's preference that all contamination be removed from the 
reservation. EPA undertook smaller, interim removal actions at three 
other sites, including the Quivira mine, which is located near the 
Northeast Church Rock mine.[Footnote 31] At two of the sites, EPA 
built temporary storage repositories to hold the waste on-site until a 
final disposal option is selected. 

In addition, EPA and NNEPA identified 43 of the 521 abandoned mines as 
the highest priority for additional assessment work and cleanup 
actions; EPA officials said these mines are the highest priority 
because they pose the greatest exposure risks to the Navajo people 
since elevated radiation levels are present at the mines and they are 
located near houses or other potentially inhabited structures. 
[Footnote 32] EPA recommends that people stay away from areas on the 
Navajo reservation with such elevated levels of radiation in order to 
avoid potential health effects. The 43 highest priority mines include 
37 mines where radiation levels measured at or above 10-times the 
background radiation at the mine and where a potentially inhabited 
house or structure is within one-quarter mile of the mine. Of these 
mines, 8 mines measured at or above 50-times the background radiation, 
and 3 mines measured above 95-times the background radiation. EPA and 
NNEPA identified 6 additional mines as part of the 43 highest priority 
mines where radiation levels were lower--from 2-times to 10-times 
background--but that posed especially high risks because, for example, 
a potentially inhabited house or structure is within 200 feet. EPA 
Region 9 officials we spoke with said prioritizing the mines benefits 
both federal and tribal agencies by providing a common road map for 
their efforts. Figure 6 shows how the 43 highest priority mines relate 
to the rest of the 521 abandoned uranium mines in terms of radiation 
levels and distance to homes or structures. 

Figure 6: 521 Abandoned Uranium Mines on or Near the Navajo 
Reservation, Radiation Levels, Distance From Homes or Structures, and 
the 43 Highest Priority Mines: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Distance from potentially inhabited home or structure: Within 1/4 mile; 
Radiation levels measured at mines: 
At or above 10x background: 37 (Highest priority mines); 
Between 2x and 10x background: 6[D] (Highest priority mines(); 
Below 2x background: 10; 
Unknown[A]: 0; 
Total[B]: 82. 

Distance from potentially inhabited home or structure: Farther than 
1/4 mile; 
Radiation levels measured at mines: 
At or above 10x background: 188; 
Between 2x and 10x background: 154; 
Below 2x background: 61; 
Unknown[A]: 0; 
Total[B]: 403. 

Distance from potentially inhabited home or structure: Total; 
Radiation levels measured at mines: 
At or above 10x background: 227; 
Between 2x and 10x background: 187; 
Below 2x background: 71; 
Unknown[A]: 36; 
Total[B]: 521. 

Source: GAO analysis of EPA data. 

Note: Background radiation is the radiation that is emitted from 
naturally occurring materials, such as from radium that is present in 
nearly all soils and rocks, or from other elements found in the 
earth's crust, including thorium and potassium. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) considered radiation levels of more than 2-
times background levels as evidence of an observed hazardous release 
that may require further investigation under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). 

[A] EPA officials said that radiation levels are unknown at these 
mines because they could not access the mines to gather radiation 
data, either because of locked gates or fences or remote, mountainous 
locations. 

[B] Figures in this column do not add to 521 since the mines with 
unknown radiation levels are not included in the Total column. 

[C] There are 2 mines with radiation levels at or above 10-times 
background and within one-quarter mile of a potentially inhabited 
structure that are not included on the list of 43 highest priority 
mines. According to an EPA Region 9 official familiar with the mines, 
these mines are not included on the list because EPA did not have 
radiation data for them at the time EPA and the Navajo Nation 
Environmental Protection Agency (NNEPA) created the list, and the 
agencies may add these mines to the list when they update it in the 
future. 

[D] Of these 6 mines, 5 are within 200 feet of a potentially inhabited 
structure and 1 is located near the Northeast Church Rock mine, which 
is among the 43 highest priority mines. 

[End of figure] 

Further, ATSDR worked with the Navajo Nation, the University of New 
Mexico, and IHS to develop and begin the Navajo Birth Cohort Study, a 
health study that is intended to improve the understanding of the 
relationship between uranium exposures and human health--specifically 
that of mothers and babies--on the Navajo reservation. According to 
the study proposal, for the Navajo Nation, congenital anomalies remain 
the leading cause of infant deaths, and the infant mortality rate 
among the Navajo people is 8.5 deaths per 1,000 live births, compared 
with 6.9 deaths per 1,000 live births overall in the United States. 
ATSDR awarded a research cooperative agreement to the university in 
August 2010, and ATSDR and the university received approval to begin 
recruiting participants in February 2013; this approval occurred after 
a lengthy review process that included obtaining multiple, separate 
approvals, including from the university, the Navajo Nation, and the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).[Footnote 33] The Navajo Nation 
and others expressed frustration about the length of time spent 
developing and approving the study, which took longer than anticipated 
for a variety of reasons. For example, one reason for the overall 
amount of time is that OMB did not approve the information collection 
necessary for the study, or take other actions, within the 60-day 
regulatory deadline, but rather approved it after more than 300 days. 
[Footnote 34] Now that the study is under way, however, ATSDR 
officials told us that it has already had positive outcomes in Navajo 
communities. For example, according to ATSDR officials, recent 
observations of increased levels of prenatal care across the 
reservation may be a result of the outreach and community education 
that has occurred as part of the study. Moreover, according to ATSDR's 
study proposal, the results of the study will answer long-standing 
questions on whether or not exposures to uranium wastes and other 
environmental contaminants are associated with adverse birth outcomes 
or developmental delays on the Navajo reservation. Navajo Nation 
officials, however, stated that the Navajo Birth Cohort Study is just 
a small step and that more comprehensive studies are needed to better 
assess the health effects of uranium contamination on the Navajo 
people. 

We found that some of the agencies' actions during the 2008 5-year 
plan period yielded additional benefits. For example, outreach to 
affected communities was an important component of some of the 
objectives under the 2008 5-year plan, although the plan did not 
include a strategy for coordinating agencies' outreach. Regardless, 
federal agencies began to coordinate these efforts, and, for example, 
held five joint workshops for stakeholders, including members of 
Navajo communities affected by uranium contamination, during which the 
agencies presented information about their efforts and solicited 
feedback. Federal agencies also partnered with Navajo agencies on some 
outreach efforts, which was important for their success in some cases. 
For example, EPA and NNEPA officials told us EPA relied heavily on 
NNEPA's outreach staff to communicate with affected community members 
in identifying and addressing contaminated structures. NNEPA outreach 
staff's ability to speak Navajo and their familiarity with Navajo 
cultural practices allowed them to work more effectively with 
community members than if EPA had conducted outreach on its own. Other 
benefits from the agencies' actions included tribal capacity building 
and career development and education opportunities for Navajos. For 
example, EPA helped enhance capacity building within NNEPA by training 
some of its staff to assess potentially contaminated structures, and 
it also provided job training to 20 Navajo hazardous waste workers 
through EPA's Superfund Job Training Initiative program. In another 
example, DOE continued to sponsor a summer internship program to give 
assistance to American Indian college students--including Navajo 
students--who are pursuing degrees in science, engineering, and 
technology. 

Agencies Met the Targets in Six Objectives Primarily Because of 
Additional Federal Resources or Because Targets Continued Previously-
Established Efforts: 

We found that a key reason why agencies met the targets for five 
objectives in the 2008 5-year plan was because additional resources, 
mostly federal but also private, were dedicated to their efforts. For 
their work on the objectives addressing contaminated houses, abandoned 
mines, unregulated drinking water sources, the Highway 160 site, and 
treatment of health conditions, the agencies either dedicated more 
funds and staff resources than during the previous 5-year period or 
received additional appropriations for work related to Navajo uranium 
contamination. DOE was able to meet the targets for a sixth objective, 
regarding former uranium processing sites, primarily because its 
targets largely represented a continuation of previously required 
activities. 

Additional Resources: 

In accomplishing the targets under five of the objectives outlined in 
the 2008 5-year plan, according to agency officials, agencies 
benefited from dedicating additional resources from their existing 
budgets, receiving additional appropriations to conduct the work, or 
leveraging funds from private parties. Examples are as follows: 

* Additional funding and staff time from agencies' existing budgets. 
EPA prioritized its work under three objectives of the 2008 5-year 
plan by dedicating additional resources from its existing budget for 
addressing contaminated houses, assessing abandoned uranium mines, and 
addressing unregulated drinking water sources. EPA provided from $1.8 
million to $7.8 million annually to the Region 9 Superfund Removal 
program to fund the program's Navajo uranium work during the 5-year 
plan period--a significant increase over the previous 5-year period. 
For example, from fiscal years 2008 through 2012, EPA reported that it 
expended $22 million on efforts to identify and address contaminated 
houses and other structures, compared with the $1.5 million it 
expended on similar efforts in the preceding 5 years. Throughout the 
2008 5-year plan period, the additional Superfund Removal program 
funds allowed EPA Region 9 to increase the amount of money it spent on 
the Navajo work even as the national Superfund budget decreased, 
according to a senior EPA Region 9 official. Further, EPA officials 
told us that they conducted work that went beyond the 5-year plan 
targets because of the increased funding the agency dedicated to 
Navajo uranium work. Specifically, these officials said they could not 
have completed the removal action at the Skyline mine without the 
increased funding since the Region 9 Superfund removal program's prior 
budget would have been insufficient, and there was no potentially 
responsible party to contribute funds. In addition to increased 
funding, EPA Region 9 also increased the number of full-time 
equivalent employees that it dedicated to its Navajo uranium work from 
approximately 3.68 in 2008 to 6.95 in 2012. Similarly, IHS reported 
that its Navajo Area identified nearly $1 million from within its 
existing budget that it used to support the creation of a uranium-
related health screening program, which was established in 2010. 

* Additional funding from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009 (Recovery Act).[Footnote 35] EPA and IHS used Recovery Act 
funds for some of the water infrastructure projects that were selected 
to serve Navajo communities in which contaminated, unregulated water 
sources had been identified. For example, in fiscal year 2009, EPA 
contributed $3 million in Drinking Water Infrastructure Grants Tribal 
Set Aside funds, and IHS contributed about $2 million from the IHS 
Recovery Act Sanitation Facilities Construction Fund toward a nearly 
$10 million, 50-mile extension of a water main to the communities 
around Sweetwater, Arizona. An EPA official familiar with the project 
told us that it will supply water to homes within the vicinity of four 
contaminated, unregulated wells, including a well that had the highest 
uranium levels of all unregulated water sources tested during the 5-
year plan period. 

* Additional appropriations. In fiscal year 2009, DOE received a $5 
million appropriation to carry out a remedial action of the Highway 
160 site.[Footnote 36] The 2008 5-year plan included a target for 
assessing the site and identifying the best path forward, but not for 
completing cleanup at the site. According to DOE and NNEPA officials 
involved with the project, having the resources available to fund 
assessment and cleanup work allowed the agencies to move forward and 
complete the cleanup more quickly than they had anticipated. Moreover, 
NNEPA and DOE also used the appropriated funds to begin to address 
recently discovered, contaminated structures in the area of the 
Highway 160 site and the nearby Rare Metals processing site.[Footnote 
37] In addition, ATSDR officials we spoke with said they would not 
have been able to fund the Navajo Birth Cohort Study without 
additional appropriations for such research. These officials said 
ATSDR received an increase of $2 million in funding for fiscal year 
2010 to begin the study, and that the agency has subsequently put that 
amount toward the study.[Footnote 38] 

* Leveraging funding from private, potentially responsible parties and 
other federal agencies. According to EPA officials, the agency was 
able to complete some of the work that went beyond the targets in the 
2008 5-year plan, including conducting the interim time-critical 
removal actions at the Quivira mine and others, because of funding 
that came from private, potentially responsible parties. Specifically, 
EPA issued an administrative order to one of the former operators of 
the Quivira mine to conduct and pay for the interim removal action. In 
addition, EPA and NNEPA used funds from a bankruptcy settlement with 
another potentially responsible party to pay for the interim actions 
at three other mines or mine-related sites.[Footnote 39] Without funds 
from the private, potentially responsible parties, EPA officials said 
they would not have been able to conduct these actions during the 5-
year plan period. Further, EPA officials said that funds from the 
bankruptcy settlement were instrumental in providing the initial 
funding for the agency's efforts to pursue potentially responsible 
parties at other abandoned uranium mines on the Navajo reservation. 

Federal agencies' ability to share resources was also an important 
factor in meeting the targets in at least one objective. Specifically, 
IHS officials told us the agency would not have been able to 
contribute funding to all 13 drinking water infrastructure projects 
funded during the 5-year plan period without combining its funds with 
funds from EPA and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
IHS officials said the agency's ability to fund these drinking water 
projects would have been limited because IHS's share of some of the 
projects' costs would have exceeded the agency's limit for economic 
feasibility. For example, if the agency had to solely fund a $4.75 
million project in Dennehotso, in the northern part of the 
reservation, it would have cost the agency about $44,000 per home, an 
amount that would have been considered economically infeasible for IHS 
in fiscal year 2009, the year the project was funded. However, 
contributions of $2 million from EPA and $1 million from the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development reduced IHS's per-home 
cost so that the agency was able to participate in funding the project 
that provided piped drinking water to 107 homes that did not 
previously have piped water. 

Overall, the federal agencies reported spending $121 million on work 
performed under the 2008 5-year plan.[Footnote 40] These amounts do 
not include the approximately $17 million in private funds spent 
during the 5-year plan period, including by potentially responsible 
parties at the Northeast Church Rock mine, the Quivira mine, and from 
the bankruptcy settlement, according to the federal agencies' January 
2013 summary report. In contrast, agencies reported spending 
approximately $42 million during the prior 5 years, and more than half 
of that amount was spent by DOE at the four processing sites. Figure 7 
compares the amount of funds spent by the federal agencies under each 
objective in the 5-year plan period with the previous 5 years. Because 
the 2008 5-year plan did not include an overall cost estimate for 
conducting the work, we cannot determine whether the total amount 
spent by the agencies was in keeping with their expected costs. The 5-
year plan included estimated costs of varying specificity for the 
first 2 years of the plan--2008 and 2009--since agency budgets for the 
first 2 years were already in place at the time of the plan's 
development but not for the final 3 years of the plan. 

Figure 7: Federal Agency Expenditures on Actions Taken to Address 
Uranium Contamination on or Near the Navajo Reservation, 2003-2007 and 
2008-2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Dollars in millions (2013 constant dollars): 

5-Year Plan Objective: Structures; 
2003-2007: $1.5 million; 
2008-2012: $22.2 million. 

5-Year Plan Objective: Abandoned mines; 
2003-2007: $5.9 million; 
2008-2012: $19.4 million. 

5-Year Plan Objective: Water; 
2003-2007: $4. million; 
2008-2012: $30.0 million. 

5-Year Plan Objective: Former processing facilities; 
2003-2007: $28.5 million; 
2008-2012: $24.9 million. 

5-Year Plan Objective: Highway 160; 
2003-2007: $0; 
2008-2012: $5.4 million. 

5-Year Plan Objective: Tuba City Dump; 
2003-2007: $1.8 million; 
2008-2012: $9. million. 

5-Year Plan Objective: Health; 
2003-2007: $0; 
2008-2012: $8.6 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of agencies' data. 

Notes: 

The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Indian 
Health Service reported obligations, and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention and Department of Energy reported direct 
outlays. The figure includes only the agencies' direct costs and does 
not include staff time. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is not 
included in the figure because it did not report any direct costs, 
although NRC staff reported working on activities related to Navajo 
uranium-related sites, including the former processing facilities and 
the Northeast Church Rock mine. 

According to EPA officials, EPA's Northeast Church Rock mine 
expenditures are included in the Abandoned mines totals for 2003-2007, 
but most of these expenditures have been reimbursed by the private, 
potentially responsible party. 

BIA reported obligations of its 2-year appropriations but did not 
report the year the obligation was made. With input from BIA 
officials, we assigned the obligations to one fiscal year to create a 
data set that is comparable to the other agencies'. 

Dollars do not include $1.35 million in General Assistance Program 
grants provided to the Navajo Nation by EPA's Office of Water from 
2008 to 2012 for uranium-related work. 

[End of figure] 

Targets That Continued Previously Required Efforts: 

For one objective of the 2008 5-year plan--addressing contamination at 
former uranium processing sites--DOE set targets that largely 
continued previously authorized activities that the agency was already 
undertaking, which according to DOE officials, helped the agency 
accomplish the targets. DOE set targets to continue to address 
groundwater contamination at three of the sites and to continue long-
term surveillance and maintenance at all four sites--actions the 
agency was required to undertake under UMTRCA. DOE officials told us 
that continuing to carry out the already approved groundwater 
remediation strategies at the sites was the most appropriate action 
for the agency during the 2008 5-year plan period since those were the 
actions they were explicitly authorized to conduct. Navajo Nation 
officials told us that they were disappointed that DOE did not 
increase its level of effort at the sites. They also told us they were 
concerned that the remediation efforts that DOE is implementing are 
not achieving sufficient results, and that it appears that the agency 
is not expected to complete its efforts to treat contaminated 
groundwater in the foreseeable future. 

Agencies Did Not Meet the Targets in Two Objectives for a Variety of 
Reasons, Including Optimistic Schedules and Decisions to Perform 
Additional Work That Extended Time Frames: 

Federal agencies did not meet the targets for two of the eight 
objectives in the 2008 5-year plan--cleanup of the Northeast Church 
Rock mine and the Tuba City Dump--for a variety of reasons, including 
that the schedules were optimistic and ambitious, and EPA decided to 
increase outreach work at the Northeast Church Rock mine and 
assessment work at the Tuba City Dump before identifying final cleanup 
actions for the sites. EPA and BIA officials told us they estimated 
the schedules based on the information they had at the time, but 
neither agency anticipated the need for additional steps in the 
assessment process and therefore did not include these steps in their 
schedules. Officials from both agencies said they deliberately created 
ambitious schedules for these sites, in part, to acknowledge the 
threats they posed and to make it clear that the agencies were 
committed to cleaning them up. Work remains for both agencies to 
complete the cleanups at the two sites, and the agencies expect that 
time frames will likely extend beyond the agencies' 2014 5-year plan 
and that federal costs will be in the tens of millions of dollars at 
each site. 

Northeast Church Rock Mine: 

EPA did not meet its target to complete cleanup of the Northeast 
Church Rock mine in part because its schedule was optimistic and 
ambitious. According to the 2008 5-year plan, EPA expected to select 
the removal action for the site in December 2008; however, this 
selection did not occur until September 2011. According to EPA 
officials familiar with the project, selecting the removal action took 
longer than anticipated for a number of reasons. First, completing the 
cleanup assessment for the site took 8 months longer than planned. 
Second, after EPA issued the cleanup assessment, the agency postponed 
selecting the removal action by 2 years so that agency officials could 
better understand and attempt to address community concerns. Over this 
2-year period, EPA conducted 10 public meetings and brought in a 
Navajo peacemaker to facilitate discussions and improve communication 
between the agency and the community. According to EPA officials we 
spoke with, in order to further respond to community concerns, EPA 
also began work on some predesign analyses that are normally conducted 
at a later stage in the cleanup process. EPA officials told us they 
felt the meetings were valuable and that they have conducted more 
outreach at this site than at most other sites, but community members 
we spoke with said they remain frustrated with the decision process 
and disappointed with the outcome. 

Third, when estimating the schedule under the 2008 5-year plan, EPA 
Region 9 officials did not anticipate that additional approval 
processes would be necessary to implement the removal action for the 
site that EPA ultimately selected. EPA's selected action involves 
disposing of approximately 1 million cubic yards of mine waste within 
an existing disposal cell for mill tailings at a former uranium 
processing site. The site is located less than 1 mile from the 
Northeast Church Rock mine and is regulated and managed by NRC and EPA 
Region 6, respectively. The former operator of the processing site--
which is also the former operator and a potentially responsible party 
for the mine--currently holds a license from NRC for the existing 
disposal cell at the former processing site. According to EPA Region 9 
officials, for EPA to transfer waste from the mine to the disposal 
cell, EPA headquarters officials determined that EPA Region 6 would 
need to approve a Record of Decision, which took 18 months to complete. 

A number of steps remain for EPA to fully meet the target of cleaning 
up the mine. As of February 2014, EPA was in the removal predesign 
phase of the cleanup process. NRC and DOE are both participating in an 
EPA-led design work group since NRC will transfer responsibility for 
the site to DOE once the processing site is closed for long-term 
surveillance and maintenance pursuant to UMTRCA. Once the design phase 
is complete, the former operator of the processing site must submit a 
license amendment request and receive an amended license from NRC 
before disposing of the mine waste at the former processing site. This 
former operator and potentially responsible party for the mine is 
expected to implement the removal action if and when NRC issues the 
amended license. In addition, NNEPA officials told us they have 
concerns regarding groundwater contamination at the site that have yet 
to be examined. 

EPA's current schedule estimate is to complete the removal action in 
2020. EPA officials, however, acknowledged that this schedule is also 
optimistic since it assumes that NRC's approval process for the 
license amendment will take 1 year, and that the cleanup itself will 
take 4 years. NRC officials also said they felt the schedule was too 
optimistic, and they told us that NRC's safety and environmental 
reviews will take approximately 2 years but, if a public hearing on 
the license amendment is requested, the approval process could take up 
to 5 years.[Footnote 41] An EPA project manager for the mine told us 
EPA is working with NRC to revise the schedule to provide 2 years for 
the license amendment approval process in order to better account for 
NRC's process. Moreover, although the former operator and potentially 
responsible party at Northeast Church Rock mine is taking the lead for 
the cleanup, the government will pay up to 33 percent of future 
cleanup costs; in 2009, EPA estimated that these total future costs 
could be $44 million.[Footnote 42] 

Tuba City Dump: 

BIA also did not meet its targets in the 2008 5-year plan for the Tuba 
City Dump, in part, because the schedules were optimistic and 
ambitious. Under the plan, BIA was to (1) complete a set of studies to 
assess whether interim actions were warranted to protect Hopi water 
supplies, including drinking water wells, by mid-2008; (2) create a 
work plan for, then conduct and complete a RI/FS by late 2009; and (3) 
complete a remedial action by the end of 2012. Partway through BIA's 
implementation of the 5-year plan, in August 2010, BIA entered into a 
settlement agreement with EPA to conduct the RI/FS. Under the 
settlement agreement, BIA's work is subject to EPA's approval, and EPA 
will select the remedial action. As of the end of the 5-year plan 
period in 2012, BIA had completed the interim action studies, which 
found the dump did not pose an immediate threat to the wells, and it 
had implemented certain actions recommended by the studies, including 
installing a fence around the perimeter and conducting a detailed 
analysis of one location with high levels of uranium. BIA developed 
the RI/FS work plan but had not completed the plan's required work. 
EPA had not selected a remedial action and, therefore, BIA had not 
begun or completed a remedial action. 

Further, BIA's actions under the 5-year plan took longer than 
expected, for various reasons, which also contributed to the agency 
not meeting the targets. First, BIA spent nearly 1 year longer than 
expected conducting the interim action studies, and implementing the 
recommended actions took an additional year that had not been 
accounted for in the 5-year plan. BIA officials said they 
underestimated the amount of time needed to complete these efforts. 
Second, BIA spent more time developing the work plan for the RI/FS 
than had been anticipated, in part because EPA directed it to 
significantly revise the work plan. Under the settlement agreement, 
BIA was responsible for submitting a work plan for EPA approval that 
specified the activities and deliverables, as well as deadlines, for 
BIA in the development of the RI/FS.[Footnote 43] The work plan and 
its deadlines are legally enforceable once EPA approves the work plan. 
EPA approved the initial work plan developed by BIA in January 2011, 
and BIA awarded a $2 million contract for its implementation in June 
2011.[Footnote 44] However, in July 2011, 1 month later, EPA notified 
BIA that it would need to revise the RI/FS work plan, which 
significantly increased the amount of work to be performed. BIA then 
spent an additional year working with EPA revising the work plan, 
which EPA ultimately approved in July 2012. According to EPA 
correspondence to BIA, although it would delay completion of the 
RI/FS, the additional investigative work was necessary to resolve 
conflicting interpretations of data collected over the previous years 
of assessments and to support a defensible selection of a remedial 
action for the site. EPA officials said the additional work has 
yielded valuable information, including determining whether 
groundwater contamination at the site can reach nearby Hopi drinking 
water wells.[Footnote 45] Hopi tribal leaders, however, told us that 
although they appreciate the additional understanding that has been 
gained through the RI/FS, they are frustrated that the federal 
agencies have continued to dedicate resources to conducting additional 
assessments instead of cleanup actions,[Footnote 46] especially in 
light of the fact that, as of 2013, BIA had overseen assessment work 
at the site for more than 10 years. 

Third, implementing the RI/FS has taken longer than expected by BIA 
under the 2008 5-year plan, in part because BIA conducted additional 
work under the work plan at EPA's direction. In addition to the work 
EPA directed BIA to add in 2011, EPA subsequently required BIA to 
conduct additional field investigations. EPA officials explained that 
the scope of an RI/FS is often changed in response to conditions found 
on the ground, and that the Tuba City RI/FS has been typical in that 
respect. According to EPA and BIA documents, conducting this 
additional fieldwork contributed to BIA missing some of the work plan 
deadlines. 

Moreover, project and contract management challenges faced by BIA have 
also contributed to the length of time spent on the RI/FS. BIA 
officials told us they had communication problems with the agency's 
contractor for the RI/FS and performance problems regarding the 
quality and timeliness of the contractor's deliverables. For example, 
in correspondence with the contractor, BIA noted multiple instances 
when the contractor was late in providing draft deliverables to BIA, 
which did not provide sufficient opportunity for BIA to review the 
deliverables before they were due to EPA. In addition, when BIA 
completed its review of the deliverables, it found they did not all 
meet the terms and conditions of the contract. BIA also noted in its 
correspondence with the contractor that the contractor's performance 
problems began soon after the contract was signed. After the problems 
continued to mount, according to BIA officials, they worked informally 
through phone calls and e-mails to correct the performance problems; 
however, BIA did not formally notify the contractor of the problems 
and require corrective action until about 16 months after the problems 
began.[Footnote 47] During that time period, BIA modified the contract 
four times, each time increasing the work to be performed in 
accordance with direction from EPA; these modifications totaled nearly 
$1.6 million, about an 80 percent increase above the value of the 
original contract. By adding work to the contract without correcting 
the contractor's poor performance and adding stronger performance 
provisions, BIA was effectively rewarding the contractor for its poor 
performance. In hindsight, BIA officials responsible for managing the 
contract told us, had they known the problems would not improve, they 
would have initiated formal action against the contractor sooner; 
however, they were reluctant to further delay the project. Had they 
terminated the contractor for default, BIA would have had to award a 
new contract, taking a minimum of 90 days, plus the additional time it 
would take to bring a new contractor up to speed to perform the 
contract. The BIA officials said, instead, they prioritized meeting 
the deadlines in the work plan and avoiding the delay of awarding a 
new contract. These officials told us that the RI/FS contract, valued 
at $4 million, is not typical for their region and is much larger than 
any other contract they manage. For example, the next largest 
environmental contract in BIA's Western region is worth $300,000. 
Learning from its challenges in managing the RI/FS contract will 
become even more important to BIA in the next few years as the agency 
moves from assessment to cleanup work after a remedial action is 
selected. At that time, BIA officials said their agency will award and 
manage a new contract, one that is even larger and more complicated 
that will increase costs significantly. In August 2011, we reported 
that incorporating lessons learned from past contracts is an important 
element of successful acquisition planning when preparing to award a 
new contract.[Footnote 48] Through this process, agencies ensure that 
knowledge gained from prior acquisitions is used to refine 
requirements and acquisition strategies. Without examining lessons 
learned from managing the RI/FS contract and considering these lessons 
as part of the acquisition planning process for the remedial action 
contract, BIA could face contract management challenges on a larger 
scale. 

Further, according to EPA and BIA officials, BIA's management of the 
project also contributed to BIA's missing some legally enforceable 
deadlines in the work plan within months of EPA approving it in July 
2012. Specifically, BIA did not comply with the settlement agreement's 
terms for requesting an extension to these deadlines in the work plan. 
[Footnote 49] As a result, BIA was subject to stipulated penalties 
under the settlement agreement for the deadlines it missed.[Footnote 
50] EPA officials told us the agency held the penalties in abeyance; 
as a result, EPA did not calculate the total amount of the penalties. 
[Footnote 51] As EPA noted in correspondence to BIA, the missed 
deadlines only led to a few weeks of direct delays to the work plan 
schedule, but the missed deadlines used much of the contingency, or 
slack, in the schedule, meaning any future delays could not be 
absorbed without directly lengthening the project.[Footnote 52] In 
2013, according to EPA officials, BIA notified EPA that it was going 
to miss another work plan deadline, however, BIA again did not submit 
the extension request before the deadline passed, potentially 
subjecting it to additional stipulated penalties.[Footnote 53] 

Further complicating its management of the project, we found that the 
schedule BIA used to manage its responsibilities under the RI/FS was 
not created based on best practices for effective scheduling. We have 
reported that a sound schedule is comprehensive, well-constructed, 
credible, and controlled.[Footnote 54] The RI/FS schedule generated by 
BIA's contractor and approved by EPA minimally met these criteria. For 
example, we could not verify that the schedule included all the 
actions needed to complete the RI/FS, which is an essential practice 
in ensuring that the schedule is comprehensive. If a project schedule 
does not fully reflect the scope of the project, it can result in 
unreliable estimated completion dates and delays. In another example, 
neither BIA nor EPA regularly updated the schedule based on actual 
progress, an important aspect of a controlled schedule. BIA officials 
explained that they do not keep a copy of the schedule file that they 
can update; BIA relies on its contractor to update the schedule, and 
EPA maintains control of the master schedule file for the RI/FS. 
Without an updatable version of the schedule, BIA cannot effectively 
monitor its contractor's progress and cannot evaluate the quality of 
changes to the schedule proposed by the contractor, which BIA then 
proposes to EPA for approval. According to BIA officials, not having 
information about the basis for the proposed schedule changes 
contributed to the agency proposing a new RI/FS schedule to EPA in 
2012 that contained errors and was not achievable. Appendix II 
contains additional details about our analysis. 

A number of steps remain for BIA to meet the target of completing 
cleanup at the Tuba City Dump. As of February 2014, the full scope of 
remaining cleanup work--and an estimate of when it may be completed--
had not been determined since the RI/FS was ongoing. BIA requested two 
extensions to the deadlines in the work plan in 2013;[Footnote 55] as 
a result, the current deadline for completion of the RI/FS is May 
2014, more than 4 years after the completion date in the 2008 5-year 
plan. According to BIA officials, the May 2014 deadline may not be 
achieved. For example, BIA officials said they are expecting the 
schedule to change to allow for additional time for stakeholders' 
review of a key draft document and for additional analysis requested 
by EPA in December 2013. In another example, BIA has continued to 
experience performance problems with its contractor related to 
timeliness and product quality. These performance problems prompted 
BIA to send a second formal notification to take corrective action to 
its contractor in January 2014. Nevertheless, in the short-term, EPA 
officials said they plan to conduct extensive outreach with local 
communities as they evaluate the remedial options for the site. Hopi 
officials we spoke with stressed the tribe's concern over protecting 
their water sources in the area and told us that having a contaminated 
dump located on their land is affecting their ability to expand 
economic development. Because of these concerns, Hopi officials stated 
that the only acceptable solution is to remove the contamination from 
the site. DOE and EPA officials involved at the site told us, however, 
that the data collected thus far indicate the Hopi drinking water 
wells will not be affected by the dump, and there are other factors 
limiting development in the area, including the region's scarcity of 
water. 

Based on two potential remedial actions for the site identified by 
BIA, the agency has estimated that the range of probable future 
cleanup costs is from $22 million to $72 million.[Footnote 56] BIA 
created this estimate range in order to contribute to the Department 
of the Interior's (Interior) environmental and disposal liability 
estimate, which is included in Interior's annual financial statement, 
but we found the estimate was not generated according to the 
government and industry cost-estimating best practices identified in 
our 2009 cost estimating and assessment guide.[Footnote 57] According 
to BIA officials, the estimate was created according to Interior's 
guidance. Nevertheless, according to best practices, cost estimates 
should be comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible, 
which are the four characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate of 
any type, and BIA's estimate does not fully reflect these 
characteristics. For example, the estimate did not completely define 
the program, an important aspect of a comprehensive schedule. In 
response to our questions about some aspects of the work scope that 
were included in the estimate, including whether future groundwater 
treatment was included, BIA officials stated that such treatment 
should be included in the estimate. However, after checking with the 
contractor that created the estimate, one BIA official involved with 
managing the project discovered that costs for groundwater treatment 
were not included in the estimate. Without fully accounting for all 
future costs, management will have difficulty successfully planning 
program resource requirements. In response, BIA officials said that 
they directed the contractor to include these costs in a revised 
estimate. These officials also said they did not apply all of the best 
practices when developing the estimate, in part, because it would not 
have been appropriate for BIA to expend significant resources 
developing a detailed cost estimate since they have not completed the 
RI/FS, and that once EPA selects a final remedial action, BIA will 
work to apply cost estimating protocols when it develops a more 
detailed cost estimate for the site. Appendix III provides additional 
details of the results of our analysis of the cost estimate. 

Agencies Have Not Estimated the Full Scope of Work, Time Frames, or 
Costs Needed to Address Uranium Contamination but Recognize That 
Significant Work Remains: 

The agencies that implemented the 2008 5-year plan have not identified 
the full scope of remaining work, time frames, or costs of fully 
addressing uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, 
especially at abandoned uranium mines, but have recognized that 
significant work remains for addressing such contamination beyond the 
targets in the plan. As a result, decision makers and stakeholders do 
not have sufficient information about the overall remaining work, time 
frames, and costs to assess the overall pace of the cleanup efforts. 
Given that significant work remains to address contamination on or 
near the Navajo reservation, it is likely that it will take many 
decades and cost at least hundreds of millions of dollars in 
additional funding to make significant progress in this area. 

Agencies Have Not Identified the Full Scope of Remaining Work, Time 
Frames, or Costs Needed to Fully Address Uranium Contamination, 
Especially at Abandoned Mines: 

Federal agencies that implemented the 2008 5-year plan have not 
identified the full scope of work needed to fully address uranium 
contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, especially regarding 
the abandoned uranium mines and, as a result, they have not estimated 
total time frames or costs. Prior to the development of the 2008 5-
year plan, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
reviewed short-term draft action plans that the agencies had prepared. 
In a January 2008 letter from the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform to EPA requesting the development of a 5-year plan, 
the committee wrote the following: 

The draft action plans do not clearly delineate a course of action for 
fully resolving the problem. Given the extent of the contamination 
that is already known, it is obvious that the contamination cannot and 
will not be cleaned up in the 3-to 9-month timeframes covered by the 
draft plans. We need a 5-year plan from each agency that sets out 
specific cleanup objectives, specific timeframes for achieving those 
objectives, and the new authorities and funding, if any, necessary to 
achieve those objectives. These plans will provide the Congress, the 
Navajo Nation, and the public with concrete benchmarks against which 
to measure the progress of the federal agencies in cleaning up the 
contamination. 

In its critique of the short-term action plans, the committee 
requested of the agencies additional information to understand the 
full scope of the cleanup effort. The same critique is also generally 
applicable to the 2008 5-year plan because it too did not contain 
information on the full scope of the cleanup and instead provided 
targets for achieving incremental progress under the plan. For 
example, it is still unclear what percentage of the overall cleanup 
effort was expected to be achieved in the 2008 5-year plan or how many 
additional 5-year plans may be necessary to fully address the 
contamination. As we discussed above, the agencies stated that the 
2008 5-year plan focused on addressing over the 5-year period what 
they identified as the most urgent uranium-related problems and was 
not intended to be a long-term plan for dealing with the entirety of 
the contamination. EPA officials involved with coordinating the 
development of the agencies' 2014 5-year plan told us this plan also 
will not include the full scope of the cleanup work. 

EPA officials cited a variety of reasons for not having identified 
estimates of the full scope, time frames, or costs of cleanup, 
including at the abandoned mines. These officials explained that 
providing such high-level, general estimates of required work, time 
frames, or costs is not consistent with how EPA cleans up contaminated 
sites under CERCLA. The agency typically develops detailed, site-
specific information on a site-by-site basis, and then estimates costs 
and schedules based on that specific information. They said the agency 
generally does not create even rough estimates if cleanup actions have 
not been selected or if they do not know the total number of mines 
that will need cleanup. These officials also said that a number of 
other uncertainties remain. More specifically, 

* Incomplete information about the extent of contamination. According 
to the January 2013 report summarizing the agencies' accomplishments 
under the 2008 5-year plan, EPA and NNEPA's actions resulted in an 
improved understanding of the scope of uranium contamination at the 
mines on the reservation, and the agencies identified and prioritized 
43 mines that pose the highest risk to surrounding communities. EPA, 
however, does not know the full scope of cleanup actions that will be 
necessary to address these highest priority mines (see appendix IV for 
more information about the status of each of the 43 mines), and EPA 
officials said they expect that some number of the rest of the 521 
abandoned mines will also need cleanup, but they do not know what that 
number will be. EPA officials said that they need additional 
information about, for example, the location and volume of waste 
present at each site before they can identify the scope of cleanup 
actions.[Footnote 58] However, EPA officials told us they have begun 
making assumptions about what work may be needed at the highest 
priority mines based on the site-specific information they have 
already collected. These officials stated that they expect that most 
of the highest priority mines will need removal actions, involving 
excavating and disposing from a few thousand to hundreds of thousands 
of cubic yards of mine waste at each mine, and a few of these mines 
may warrant longer-term remedial actions where surface water and/or 
groundwater may be contaminated. 

* Uncertainty about potentially responsible parties. According to EPA 
officials, the total number of abandoned mines that will have a 
potentially responsible party to lead or contribute funding for 
assessment and cleanup work is unknown, and this number will affect 
the scope of work, time frames, and costs necessary to clean up 
abandoned mines using federal funds. As of February 2014, EPA had 
signed agreements with potentially responsible parties regarding 24 
mines and received money from a bankruptcy settlement for use at 
another 49 mines--these actions covered 9 of the 43 highest priority 
mines. EPA Region 9 officials said they are continuing to pursue 
potentially responsible parties, but the total number of mines that 
could ultimately be subject to agreements with such parties may be 
limited, in part, because of difficulties associated with identifying 
parties more than 50 years after mines were abandoned. Further, there 
are other reasons why the government's ultimate share of the cleanup 
costs is unknown. If the federal government is a potentially 
responsible party at a site, it is liable for the cleanup costs even 
if a viable nonfederal potentially responsible party is also 
identified. Also, in November 2013, the Navajo Nation formally stated 
its intent to file a claim against the United States, and DOE in 
particular, for reimbursement of its cleanup costs at the abandoned 
mines on the reservation if a cooperative approach is not successful, 
which could further affect the government's share of those costs. 

* Uncertainty about disposal options. Another uncertainty that affects 
the scope, time frames, and costs of the remaining abandoned mine work 
is where the mine waste will ultimately be disposed. Currently, the 
Navajo Nation's position is that all remaining contaminated materials 
from uranium mines and at processing sites should be excavated and 
disposed off of Navajo lands. As a result, it is unclear where the 
volumes of mine waste will be disposed. As of January 2014, the Navajo 
Nation was working on drafting legislation to create a Uranium 
Commission under Navajo law that is expected to recommend options for 
mine waste disposal. However, according to a Navajo Nation official 
involved with the process, this commission is not expected to make any 
disposal recommendations until sometime in the next few years. 

Even when significant uncertainties regarding the scope of work and 
available funding remain, however, we have reported that agencies can 
create high-level estimates of costs and time frames that can be 
useful for decision makers and stakeholders.[Footnote 59] For example, 
EPA can base these estimates on the information it currently has 
regarding the removal actions that may be necessary at most of the 
highest priority mines. Specifically, according to our 2009 cost 
estimating and assessment guide of government and industry cost-
estimating best practices, agencies can create high-level cost 
estimates--for example, rough order of magnitude estimates--for 
efforts, even with significant uncertainties, that can inform decision 
makers as they evaluate resource requirements. These cost estimates 
are often in the form of a range to correspond with the level of 
uncertainty associated with the estimate and can be developed in short 
time frames of weeks or months. Although not budget-quality estimates, 
these types of estimates can be used in planning and can be created 
before detailed requirements are known. Typically, according to our 
2009 cost estimating and assessment guide, an estimate should be 
revised and contain more detail as the agency obtains more site-
specific information and the effort becomes better defined, and the 
estimate should become more certain as actual costs begin to replace 
earlier estimates. For example, as EPA obtains more detailed 
information about the site-specific characteristics at each of the 
highest priority mines, it would be able to update the scope of its 
estimate, bringing more certainty. According to our 2009 cost 
estimating and assessment guide and our 2012 schedule assessment 
guide,[Footnote 60] agencies can also create high-level schedules that 
are linked to cost estimates, based on stated assumptions, and that 
incorporate uncertainties regarding future activities through a 
schedule risk analysis. The risk analysis provides agencies with a 
range of dates that correspond with levels of confidence in the 
ability to meet those dates. 

As further evidence that it is possible to develop these types of high-
level estimates, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2013 requires the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the 
EPA Administrator and the Secretary of the Interior, to undertake a 
review of and prepare a report on abandoned uranium mines across the 
United States that previously provided uranium ore for the nation's 
nuclear defense activities.[Footnote 61] According to DOE documents, 
the agency plans to issue a report in July 2014 that will include 
information about the potential costs and feasibility of reclaiming or 
remediating abandoned uranium mines, including the mines on or near 
Navajo lands. According to a DOE presentation on the draft report, the 
report is expected to contain cost estimate ranges based on the amount 
of uranium ore produced at the mines, among other assumptions. A DOE 
official involved with developing the draft report told us that the 
cost estimate ranges are not specific to mines on the Navajo 
reservation but are based on production size categories of mines 
across the United States that provided ore to the Atomic Energy 
Commission. This work by DOE could be a good starting point for a high-
level cost estimate to clean up the uranium mines on or near the 
Navajo reservation; however, based on the statutory requirements for 
the study, we neither anticipate that it will provide information on 
the full scope or costs of any other activities covered in the 2008 5-
year plan nor any time frames. 

Although EPA, DOE, BIA, IHS, and NRC provided some information on high-
priority cleanup issues in their 2008 5-year plan, the agencies did 
not provide the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
with overall estimates of the remaining scope of work, time frames, 
and costs of fully addressing uranium contamination on or near the 
Navajo reservation as requested. Without an estimate of the remaining 
scope of work, time frames, and costs to fully address uranium 
contamination, especially at the abandoned mines, decision makers and 
stakeholders neither have the information they need to assess the 
overall pace of the cleanup efforts, nor do they have a basis to put 
the agencies' accomplishments under the 2008 5-year plan into 
perspective. Navajo Nation officials and other stakeholders told us 
that they want the federal agencies to describe the full scope of work 
that remains to fully address the contamination. 

Agencies Recognize That Significant Work Remains to Address Uranium 
Contamination: 

Although the agencies have not identified the full scope of work that 
remains to address uranium contamination on or near the Navajo 
reservation, through implementing the 2008 5-year plan, federal and 
tribal agencies have compiled information that shows that significant 
work is needed. For some plan objectives, the agencies have developed 
a significant long-term scope of work, including the objectives of 
providing regulated, piped drinking water to Navajo residents in 
uranium-affected areas, treating groundwater contamination at the 
former processing sites, and at the abandoned mines. For example, to 
help lower the number of Navajo residents without access to regulated, 
piped drinking water in their homes and to continue reducing the use 
of unregulated and potentially contaminated water sources, IHS 
developed a list of 145 potential water infrastructure projects that 
would serve approximately 3,300 homes that do not have piped water. 
[Footnote 62] IHS, however, considers just 36 of the 145 projects--
serving about 1,000 homes--as economically feasible to fund, according 
to IHS documents, so it is unclear how many of the 145 projects will 
ultimately be undertaken by IHS. In another example, according to DOE 
officials, the agency will continue its active groundwater remediation 
work at the Rare Metals and Shiprock processing sites, but the future 
scope of work at the sites is unclear. This is, in part, because the 
remediation systems that were designed to address contamination from 
millions of gallons of water contaminated by mill tailings that 
entered the ground at these sites are not performing as 
anticipated.[Footnote 63] As a result, DOE has not made as much 
progress toward meeting water quality standards as it originally 
projected. According to DOE officials, they plan to revise the two 
sites' groundwater compliance action plans beginning in 2014 and 2015, 
and these revised plans will dictate the future scope of work at these 
sites. 

For EPA's work at the abandoned uranium mines, although many 
uncertainties remain about the full scope of work needed to clean up 
the mines, EPA and Navajo Nation officials said that they recognize 
that the amount of work will be significant. During the 2014 5-year 
plan period, EPA officials said, in order to obtain additional 
information needed to select removal or remedial actions at the 
highest priority mines, the agency plans to conduct additional 
assessments at 41 of the 43 highest priority mines, beyond the initial 
screening information gathered during the 2008 5-year plan period, in 
cooperation with potentially responsible parties where applicable. EPA 
and NNEPA officials said these additional assessments range from, at a 
minimum, scanning the entire site to identify the likely boundaries of 
contamination and conducting tests to estimate the volume of waste 
present, to conducting more thorough assessments.[Footnote 64] These 
officials told us they do not anticipate conducting cleanups at any 
mines without potentially responsible parties that would require full 
funding from EPA during this time period. Appendix V contains 
additional information about the future work associated with the other 
2008 5-year plan objectives not discussed here. 

Full Scope of Additional Work Will Likely Take Many Decades to 
Complete: 

Given what is known about the significant scope of work that agencies 
have recognized as remaining to address uranium contamination on or 
near the Navajo reservation, it is clear that, at current funding 
levels, it could take at least many decades to complete. 

For example, at the abandoned uranium mines, EPA officials said that 
they are assuming that most of the remaining 42 of the 43 highest 
priority abandoned mines will need additional removal actions. For one 
of the highest priority mines--the Skyline mine--EPA has conducted a 
removal action to clean it up, but the waste remains on the 
reservation. In the absence of an EPA-estimated time frame, we roughly 
estimated time frames using information from EPA officials about the 
number of removal actions that they said they assumed EPA will need to 
fund and the costs of the agency's removal action for the Skyline 
mine.[Footnote 65] Specifically, assuming viable nonfederal 
potentially responsible parties can be identified for about half of 
these highest priority mines, which EPA officials said is a reasonable 
early assumption, federal funds would be necessary to cover the full 
cost of removal actions at the other half of these mines, or 21 mines. 
[Footnote 66] Over the 2008 5-year plan period (i.e., 2008 through 
2012), EPA funded the removal action at the Skyline mine from Region 
9's Superfund removal budget, spending about $7 million. Assuming 
Region 9's Superfund removal budget funding levels from the 2008 5-
year plan period continued, it would take EPA 105 years to fund the 
removal actions at 21 of the highest priority mines. According to our 
rough estimate, it would take even longer to also address the unknown 
number of mines without potentially responsible parties that will also 
need cleanup, but which have not been identified. 

Moreover, during the decades-long time frames for conducting cleanup 
at the highest priority abandoned mines, the Navajo people living near 
these mines could continue to be exposed to elevated radiation levels 
that pose a high risk, either by visiting the abandoned mines or by 
inhaling or ingesting contaminated dust that migrates from the mines 
into communities. For example, as of February 2014, 38 of the 43 
highest priority mines remained physically accessible and/or there 
were no signs communicating the radiation dangers present at the 
sites. We visited one such mine--the A&B #3 mine near Cameron, 
Arizona--in July 2013, where EPA measured radiation levels that were 
37-times above background (see figure 8). The mine is not signed or 
fenced and is located within one-quarter mile of nearby homes. 
According to a local government official and a Navajo agency official, 
they have seen evidence that people visit the mine site; they told us 
they have found children's toys at the site and pointed out vehicle 
tracks. 

Figure 8: Photographs of A&B #3 Mine, Uranium-Bearing Rock Located On-
site, and Nearby Homes and Structures: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 3 photographs] 

View of the A&B #3 mine; 
EPA measuring elevated gamma radiation on a rock at the A&B #3 mine; 
Looking at nearby homes and structures from the A&B #3 mine. 

Source: EPA. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, the time frames associated with addressing contamination 
under other plan objectives are lengthy as well. For example, IHS 
officials estimated that it would take approximately 38 years to 
complete 36 of the 145 projects it identified as necessary to provide 
regulated, piped drinking water to residents of areas affected by 
historic uranium mining, assuming IHS were the sole contributor of 
funds and based on IHS's Navajo Area water program budget for fiscal 
year 2013. During this time frame, residents may continue to be 
exposed to harmful constituents potentially found in unregulated 
drinking water sources. EPA and NNEPA officials told us that although 
the official position of the Navajo Nation is that unregulated water 
sources are not fit for human consumption, they continue to receive 
reports that Navajo residents use these sources, in part if there is 
no alternative, but for other reasons as well. In addition to health 
dangers posed by drinking uranium-contaminated water, which ATSDR and 
others have linked to kidney disease, IHS and EPA consider the general 
lack of regulated drinking water to be a health risk because 
contaminants often found in unregulated sources, such as E. coli 
bacteria, can pose an immediate health danger to people that consume 
them.[Footnote 67] Appendix V contains additional information about 
the potential future time frames associated with the other 2008 5-year 
plan objectives not discussed here. 

The Scope of Additional Work Will Most Likely Cost Hundreds of 
Millions of Dollars: 

For the significant amount of remaining work to address uranium 
contamination that federal agencies recognize is needed, it appears 
that associated costs could exceed hundreds of millions of dollars. 
For example, in the absence of a cost estimate from EPA for work at 
the abandoned mines, our rough estimate based on previously incurred 
costs by EPA at the Skyline mine indicates that EPA's costs to fund 
removal actions at just half of the highest priority mines, or 21 
mines, could be a minimum of about $150 million.[Footnote 68] This is 
a conservative, low-end estimate for a number of reasons but, most 
importantly, because it does not include costs to transport and 
dispose of waste off-site.[Footnote 69] According to EPA officials, 
this is one of the most significant factors influencing cleanup costs; 
disposing of waste offsite is consistent with the Navajo Nation 
position that such waste be removed from Navajo lands. 

Other federal agencies have developed cost estimates for addressing 
contamination under other plan objectives, and the costs for these 
efforts appear to reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars as 
well. For example, IHS officials estimated that the 36 economically 
feasible drinking water projects would cost about $35 million, and 
that all 145 projects would cost about $195 million to complete. 
[Footnote 70] In another example, DOE has estimated that its various 
actions at the former processing sites will cost about $193 million 
over the next 75 years, but DOE officials said that this estimate will 
need revision based on new groundwater remediation plans at the Rare 
Metals and Shiprock sites.[Footnote 71] Appendix V contains additional 
information about the potential future costs associated with the other 
2008 5-year plan objectives not discussed here. 

Agencies Face Challenges Meeting Funding Needs and Engaging Affected 
Communities, Though Opportunities Exist for Improving Relationships 
with the Navajo and Hopi People: 

Federal agencies face a variety of challenges in continuing to address 
uranium contamination on and near the Navajo reservation, including 
securing adequate funding and effectively engaging tribal communities. 
However, federal and Navajo agency officials and community members we 
spoke with identified opportunities for improving relationships with 
the Navajo and Hopi people, which could help the federal agencies more 
effectively engage these communities. In addition, other opportunities 
exist to enhance collaboration with federal agencies and with Navajo 
agencies. 

Adequate Funding for Continued Efforts to Address Uranium 
Contamination Is a Key Challenge: 

One key challenge that federal agencies face is difficulty meeting 
funding needs with available federal resources. Specifically, 
according to EPA Region 9 officials, funding for EPA's efforts to 
assess and clean up abandoned uranium mines under its Superfund 
removal program, especially those without viable private, potentially 
responsible parties, and to provide clean and safe drinking water is 
expected to decrease from funding levels that have been available from 
2008 through 2012. EPA officials told us that reducing the human 
health risks associated with abandoned uranium mines on the Navajo 
reservation is a priority and that the agency intends to continue 
providing funding as resources allow. However, these officials stated 
that declining Superfund removal program resources nationally will 
likely result in a reduction in funding available to conduct removal 
actions at Navajo abandoned mines from the level available in previous 
years. An EPA Region 9 official familiar with funding tribal drinking 
water projects on the Navajo reservation also told us that federal 
resources available for drinking water infrastructure projects are 
expected to continue to decrease.[Footnote 72] In addition, as federal 
funding resources for abandoned mines and water projects become more 
constrained, such projects on the Navajo reservation may be less 
likely to receive federal funds because the programs by which they are 
funded prioritize projects based on risk. For example, under the EPA 
Superfund removal program, which EPA has used to pay for assessment 
and cleanup at the Navajo abandoned mines, projects that address 
emergency situations, such as toxic waste spills, are prioritized for 
funding over projects that generally are not considered emergencies, 
like the abandoned mine projects. EPA officials have prioritized the 
Navajo abandoned mine projects, but these officials told us that there 
is already a high demand for Region 9's Superfund removal program 
funds with more projects that warrant selection than available funding. 

Moreover, with few exceptions, federal agencies currently have limited 
options for other sources of federal funding for uranium-related work 
on the Navajo reservation. For example, according to EPA Region 9 
officials, one possible source of funding for the typically longer-
term remedial actions that may be warranted at a few of the highest 
priority mines without potentially responsible parties is the 
Superfund Trust Fund. Although the Superfund Trust Fund can be used 
for removal actions at all sites, it can only be used for remedial 
actions at sites that are included on the NPL.[Footnote 73] None of 
the Navajo abandoned mines are currently listed on the NPL, and, 
according to EPA Region 9 officials, only a few of the highest 
priority mines on the reservation may qualify for listing. In general, 
according to these officials, to score high enough in the Hazard 
Ranking System to be included on the NPL, an abandoned uranium mine 
would need to impact a sufficient number of people using a drinking 
water supply contaminated by the mine, expose a sufficient population 
to uranium through air or soil contamination, or impact a sensitive 
environment such as a wetland. However, given the locations and 
characteristics of the mines on the reservation and the population or 
environment affected, these officials said they believe most mines do 
not meet these criteria. For example, EPA officials told us that even 
the Navajo mines located near communities affect relatively small 
populations given the dispersed nature of the Navajo population, and 
the surrounding desert conditions mean that most of the mines do not 
appear to impact surface water. EPA officials said that community 
members in rural communities, including Navajo communities, have 
expressed a deep frustration with the ranking system used to determine 
sites' inclusion on the NPL because they feel that the system unfairly 
discriminates against small communities. Nevertheless, EPA officials 
said they will continue to pursue including some of the mines on the 
NPL in order to use the Superfund Trust Fund to pay for remedial 
actions. 

Another potential source of federal funding is Interior's Central 
Hazardous Materials Fund (Fund), an appropriation available to pay for 
Interior's CERCLA response actions. BIA received $162,000 from the 
Fund for the Tuba City Dump site, in 2008 and 2009. According to BIA 
officials, this money was used, in part, to search for another 
potentially responsible party at the site, pay for project oversight, 
and hire a technical consultant. In 2011, Interior issued a memorandum 
stating that CERCLA response actions on Indian trust lands were no 
longer eligible to receive money from the Fund. BIA officials told us, 
based on this memorandum, they believed that they were no longer 
eligible to obtain money for assessment or cleanup work at the Tuba 
City Dump. These officials said that they have not requested funding 
from the Fund to pay for assessment work and do not plan to request 
funding for the eventual remedial action at the site. However, 
Interior's memorandum also stated that the Fund would continue to fund 
cleanup-related activities on Indian trust lands if BIA had received 
funding for cleanup-related activities, including those undergoing 
CERCLA assessments, in the past. According to a senior Fund official, 
because the Tuba City Dump site received Fund money prior to 2011, it 
is eligible to receive additional funds, including funding for the 
remedial action work. Pursuing this funding is important for two 
reasons: (1) once the remedial action has been selected, BIA's funding 
requirements are likely to increase substantially (BIA estimated the 
remedial action could cost about 3 to 10 times as much as the RI/FS), 
and (2) federal standards for internal control encourage agencies to 
strive for efficiency in their use of resources.[Footnote 74] Since 
the Tuba City Dump is located in BIA's Western region, the agency has 
paid for its work at the site out of that region's budget. According 
to BIA officials, BIA has prioritized the Tuba City Dump project over 
other projects in the region that also need funding, which has 
resulted in some projects not receiving funding when BIA's costs at 
the Tuba City site were especially high. 

In addition, EPA is pursuing two other funding sources to contribute 
to the work at the abandoned mines. First, EPA and a potentially 
responsible party have reached an settlement to settle a pending 
lawsuit which, if approved by the judge presiding over the lawsuit, 
could result in approximately $1 billion for the agency's and the 
Navajo Nation's cleanup efforts at 50 mines and other contaminated 
sites.[Footnote 75] Second, EPA has sought to involve DOE in 
assessments and potentially cleanups at mines that do not have 
potentially responsible parties. In June 2013, EPA Region 9 
corresponded with DOE, stating that DOE's financial assistance with 
developing and implementing an approach to conducting assessments, 
interim actions, and cleanups at highest priority mines on the Navajo 
reservation is essential. Senior DOE officials told us they 
interpreted the letter as encouraging DOE to play a larger role in 
addressing the contamination from the mines on the reservation by 
funding assessment and cleanup at some of the mines. In January 2014, 
DOE responded to EPA that, although the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2013 required a DOE report on abandoned uranium 
mines, DOE was not given budget authority in fiscal year 2013 to 
remediate uranium mines, and its authority to take remedial actions 
under UMTRCA, which was limited to the former uranium processing sites 
and vicinity properties, has expired. 

Engaging Tribal Communities Continues to Be a Key Challenge: 

Another key challenge faced by federal agencies is identifying ways of 
more effectively engaging with tribal communities. According to 
outreach plans prepared by DOE and EPA, and other documents prepared 
by various federal agencies, engaging with communities is important 
for a number of reasons, including soliciting feedback on the decision-
making process, obtaining meaningful input into cleanup decisions, and 
working with community members to determine how best to limit 
exposures to uranium contamination. During the 2008 5-year plan 
period, federal agency officials increasingly recognized the 
importance of community engagement and began building bridges in the 
communities where they conducted work, both by developing 
relationships themselves, and by funding Navajo agency officials' 
outreach work. Even with the federal agencies' increased attention to 
outreach activities, agency officials and community members we spoke 
with said that the need for increased and improved outreach is great. 
Nevertheless, federal agencies face challenges in their ongoing 
efforts to effectively engage Navajo communities for at least four 
reasons: (1) building trust may require significant time and effort on 
the Navajo reservation, (2) the number of outreach staff is small 
compared with the size of the reservation, (3) commonly used tools for 
engaging communities may not be effective in Navajo communities, and 
(4) federal agencies have not coordinated their outreach efforts. 

Building Trust: 

Agency officials and community members we spoke with said that 
although building trust among the Navajo people is necessary to 
effectively engage local communities, it will take significant time 
and effort. One reason for this is that many members of the Navajo 
community distrust outsiders--especially those representing the 
federal government--because of historical events, related to both 
uranium mining and the government's treatment of Native people. The 
federal government's inconsistent attention to uranium-related issues 
on Navajo lands in recent decades may also have contributed to a lack 
of trust among community members. For example, according to EPA Region 
9 officials, EPA compiled a list of potentially contaminated houses on 
the Navajo reservation in the 1970s, but it did not take steps to 
ensure that all houses on the list were assessed for contamination 
until it began work under the 2008 5-year plan.[Footnote 76] Distrust 
of the federal government is also exacerbated by concerns about 
ongoing issues, such as fears that federal agencies will issue permits 
for new uranium mining near the Navajo reservation before 
contamination from previous mining is fully addressed.[Footnote 77] 

Another reason why building trust will be a challenge is because 
Navajo community members are concerned that the federal agencies that 
worked on the 2008 5-year plan may not have a long-term commitment to 
addressing uranium contamination, according to Navajo Nation officials 
and some stakeholders. For example, Navajo community members have 
expressed disappointment that the 2008 plan encompassed just 5 years' 
worth of work when, in their view, fully addressing the effects of 
contamination will take decades of commitment. A long-term commitment-
-along with completing cleanup work--could help build trust with 
Navajo communities. One challenge the federal agencies will continue 
to face in addressing these concerns, however, is that, in some cases, 
the agencies are limited in the types of long-term commitments that 
they can make. For example, EPA officials explained that the agency 
cannot commit to cleaning up even the 43 highest priority mines at 
this time because they do not have dedicated funding for addressing 
the highest priority mines that do not have potentially responsible 
parties and are not listed on the NPL. This is in contrast to the 
situation at the former uranium processing sites, where DOE must 
prepare and implement a long-term surveillance plan for disposal 
sites, in accordance with NRC regulations implementing UMTRCA. 
[Footnote 78] 

In addition, building trust is a challenge because Navajo Nation 
officials and some stakeholders told us they are frustrated by what 
they see as examples of environmental injustice.[Footnote 79] These 
are instances when uranium contamination on the Navajo reservation 
appears to be treated differently than contamination on non-Indian 
lands, such as the community in Moab, Utah, where DOE is excavating a 
large mill tailings pile and disposing of it elsewhere.[Footnote 80] 
In another example of environmental injustice on the Navajo 
reservation, high-level Navajo officials and others have said that the 
release of radioactive materials from the uranium processing site near 
Church Rock, New Mexico, has received far less attention nationally 
than the radioactive release at Three Mile Island--which occurred 4 
months earlier--although the amount of radioactive materials released 
in the later incident was significantly greater. 

Finally, some tribal agency officials we spoke with told us they 
believe the federal agencies had fostered mistrust by sometimes 
overstating their progress in addressing uranium contamination on the 
Navajo reservation. Specifically, some high-level Navajo Nation 
officials have stated that they believe the federal agencies have 
understated the scope of the uranium contamination problem on the 
Navajo reservation and have overstated the federal agencies' efforts 
in addressing the problem. For example, Navajo Nation officials said 
they were frustrated that the federal agencies' January 2013 summary 
report, published at the end of the 2008 5-year plan period, 
highlighted the agencies' accomplishments but did not identify or 
communicate the larger context: that, overall, significant progress 
has not been made in addressing uranium contamination on the 
reservation. 

Limited Number of Outreach Staff: 

Federal and tribal agency officials we spoke with said that the number 
of federal and tribal agency outreach staff working on engaging Navajo 
communities about uranium-related issues is very small compared with 
the size of and conditions on the reservation. Outreach staff are 
responsible for engaging communities that are spread out over three 
states across the 24,000 square-mile reservation. Many of these 
communities are not only remote, but they are also difficult to access 
because of harsh terrain and rough roads. 

* Dedicated outreach staff. As of November 2013, EPA Region 9 had the 
full-time equivalent of 1.5 outreach staff working on Navajo uranium 
issues, including only one staff member who speaks Navajo. EPA 
outreach staff are not based on the Navajo reservation; however, and 
travel time between the reservation and Region 9 headquarters in San 
Francisco limits the amount of time that staff are able to spend 
engaging communities. In addition to EPA outreach staff, NNEPA has one 
outreach staff member dedicated to uranium issues, and one additional 
staff member who incorporates outreach in her work. NNEPA's dedicated 
staff person, however, is responsible for activities in addition to 
community outreach, such as interfacing with the media on uranium-
related issues, and this staff person told us that she cannot meet all 
the outreach needs put before her. For example, she said that 
coordinating with IHS on outreach events could be a full-time 
position, but that her ability to do so is limited by other demands on 
her time. 

* Other staff conducting outreach. Other federal and tribal agencies 
that worked on the 2008 5-year plan conduct outreach as part of their 
activities, but they do not have dedicated staff working full-time on 
uranium-related outreach to Navajo communities. For example, IHS has 
two staff members who engage with communities on uranium issues, in 
addition to their other responsibilities, and DOE has one staff member 
who performs outreach activities in addition to her site management 
responsibilities. The Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation/UMTRA 
department's public affairs staff, under the UMTRA program's 
cooperative agreement with DOE, has engaged Navajo communities to 
discuss concerns about former processing sites located on the 
reservation. In addition, Navajo Nation Division of Health has used 
ATSDR funding to hire staff who conduct outreach activities as part of 
their responsibilities related to implementing the Navajo Birth Cohort 
Study. 

Limitations of Common Outreach Tools: 

For a variety of reasons, commonly used tools for communicating with 
communities--such as disseminating written materials, including 
brochures or e-mails, and putting up signs and fencing off 
contaminated areas--may generally be less effective on the Navajo 
reservation. For example, written materials may be less effective 
because Navajo and Hopi are traditionally spoken languages--not 
written languages--and many community members learned English as a 
second language. Also, many residents are not connected by Internet or 
telephone in their homes. According to EPA and NNEPA officials, the 
most effective way to communicate with many members of Navajo 
communities is through face-to-face interactions, which requires 
trusted native speakers and is more time-consuming than written 
communications. Furthermore, although signs and fences may be used to 
communicate information about risks from contamination, they may be 
less effective on the Navajo reservation. In part because of 
differences in how Navajo people traditionally view the land, it is 
generally not acceptable to restrict the use of reservation lands, 
although there are some exceptions, such as those related to grazing 
uses and home sites. As a result, knowledgeable EPA officials told us 
they did not believe that signs and fences would be sufficient to 
limit access to contaminated areas because they felt signs and fences 
would be disregarded. As an example, these officials told us that a 
mining company had erected a fence to restrict access to an area 
contaminated by uranium, but, rather than staying out of the area, a 
community member had instead used the fence to contain his livestock, 
confining them in the very area to which the agency was trying to 
restrict access. Furthermore, according to these officials, physical 
structures such as signs and fences are difficult to maintain in 
remote areas of the reservation, where vandalism and theft pose 
challenges. 

Moreover, providing information, regardless of delivery method, may 
itself be a limited tool for changing behavior because, in many cases, 
no acceptable alternatives are available. For example, according to 
Navajo agency officials and community members with whom we spoke, some 
community members--because they do not have a better alternative--
continue to get their drinking water from unregulated livestock wells 
that may be contaminated with uranium and other toxins, even though 
some of these community members understand that doing so is unsafe. 
Some community members we spoke with said that they used unregulated 
water sources for domestic purposes, such as cooking and drinking, and 
that more education would not be effective in changing this behavior 
until better alternatives were made available. 

Limited Federal Agency Collaboration on Outreach Efforts: 

Federal agencies that worked on the 2008 5-year plan have not 
generally coordinated their outreach efforts. Although the agencies 
began hosting joint workshops for stakeholders in 2008, the agencies 
generally have conducted their own public meetings in communities 
without inviting other agencies to participate, according to agency 
officials we spoke with. Agency officials told us that not 
coordinating outreach poses a challenge to effectively engaging 
communities because community members often expect these meetings to 
cover a variety of uranium-related issues, regardless of whether those 
issues fell within the jurisdiction of the agency present. For 
example, according to an EPA official we spoke with, when EPA 
conducted outreach related to abandoned uranium mines, community 
members often had questions about other uranium-related topics, such 
as health effects. In some cases, the limited scope of issues covered 
in community meetings has caused significant frustration among 
community members, according to EPA and IHS officials. An EPA official 
told us that this may hamper the efforts of outreach staff to build 
relationships in tribal communities. Because the costs of attending 
community meetings can be high for both federal agencies and community 
members--many of whom travel significant distances to attend the 
meetings--EPA officials said they realized it is important to maximize 
each contact that they have with affected communities. Officials from 
multiple agencies told us they recognize the value in coordinating on 
outreach and have begun to coordinate their efforts by, for example, 
holding joint community meetings. For example, in March 2012, IHS and 
DOE met jointly with community members to discuss the Shiprock former 
uranium processing site, including concerns about health impacts. In 
another example, in 2013, EPA and IHS jointly hosted a health 
screening in one Navajo community for residents who had been living in 
contaminated homes that were being demolished through EPA's actions to 
address and replace contaminated structures. 

Opportunities Exist to Improve Federal Agencies' Relationships with 
the Navajo and Hopi People: 

Federal and Navajo agency officials and community members we spoke 
with identified a number of opportunities that federal agencies could 
pursue to improve relationships with the Navajo people, as well as 
with the Hopi people affected by the Tuba City Dump. Opportunities 
identified for improving relationships with tribal communities include 
the following: 

* Provide information on long-term scope of work. Federal officials 
and community members identified opportunities for federal agencies to 
provide a more complete picture of the scope of the uranium 
contamination problem and their progress toward addressing the 
problem. For example, some community members, including participants 
at one of the agencies' stakeholder workshops, told the agencies they 
would like to see the next interagency plan cover a period longer than 
just another 5 years because they believe it is clear that the amount 
of work remaining will take significantly longer than 5 years. 
Stakeholders said that including information about the long-term scope 
of work in the next plan would increase their ability to hold the 
agencies accountable and provide a benchmark against which they can 
measure the agencies' progress. 

* Conduct in-person outreach. Federal officials and community members 
identified opportunities for federal agencies to improve their 
relationships with Navajo communities--and the Hopi people affected by 
the Tuba City Dump--by conducting in-person outreach where possible, 
although such methods are resource intensive. For example, in a 
community involvement plan created to guide its outreach related to 
the Tuba City Dump, EPA noted that distributing information in small 
group or door-to-door settings assists in developing trust and keeping 
misunderstandings of new materials and information to a minimum. 
According to the plan, the Hopi people have regularly requested that 
federal agencies rely on in-person outreach methods when feasible. The 
plan stated that although it is not feasible to distribute all 
information in person, doing so conveys to community members that they 
are important and are part of the process. 

* Establish agency offices on or near the reservation. One way agency 
officials identified to establish a more constant presence on the 
reservation would be for federal agencies that do not already have 
offices nearby, including EPA and DOE, to set up and assign technical 
and outreach staff to offices in the area. This would increase the 
amount of time that staff can interact with communities, since 
typically EPA and DOE staff travel to the reservation from California 
or Colorado. According to a Navajo Nation official we spoke with, 
having staff on or near the reservation would increase the federal 
agencies' ability to connect with communities, especially since it 
would help increase their cultural awareness and sensitivity. One EPA 
staff member who spent 2 months working on-site during a mine cleanup 
said that his consistent presence during that time--as well as the 
extensive outreach he conducted over a longer period--allowed him to 
build strong relationships with community members, which in turn 
increased that community's acceptance of the cleanup remedy. 

* Partner with community organizations. Some stakeholders we spoke 
with said that opportunities may exist for federal agencies to more 
effectively engage Navajo communities by partnering with trusted 
community organizations. For example, the President of a nonprofit 
community organization that works to ensure that the Navajo people--
especially those affected by uranium contamination in a remote region 
of the reservation--have access to safe drinking water and economic 
development, among other things, told us that he would welcome a 
partnership with federal agencies to conduct outreach on uranium-
related issues. Such a partnership would take full advantage of the 
organization's existing connection with Navajo communities. 
Representatives from this organization and others told us that 
community organizations are often a trusted source of information, and 
their involvement would lend credibility to federal and tribal 
agencies' engagement efforts. 

* Promote job creation and training. Navajo officials we spoke with 
also told us that the federal agencies could help improve 
relationships by identifying opportunities to promote job creation and 
training on the Navajo reservation as part of the efforts to address 
uranium contamination. Officials we spoke with said the federal 
government should provide more funding for new positions within the 
tribal agencies to address uranium contamination. They said that, in 
2007, the Navajo Nation had identified the need for 20 new full-time 
employees within NNEPA to address uranium contamination, but that 
federal agencies awarded funding for just 2 additional employees from 
2008 to 2012. Tribal officials also said that they would like to see 
the federal agencies provide job training programs similar to the one 
that EPA offered during the 5-year plan period. 

* Issue a formal apology. Some stakeholders, including Navajo 
community members, told us they felt that receiving an official 
apology from the federal government for failing to ensure that the 
companies conducting uranium mining to support U.S. nuclear weapons 
development were protective of the environment and public health would 
go a long way toward improving relationships.[Footnote 81] 

Additional Opportunities Exist for Federal Agencies to Enhance 
Interagency Collaboration and Collaboration with Navajo Agencies: 

Agency officials we spoke with said that additional opportunities 
exist for the federal agencies to enhance both interagency 
collaboration at the federal level and collaboration with Navajo 
agencies. Specifically, EPA, IHS, and DOE officials identified a 
number of opportunities for increased interagency collaboration on 
efforts to engage tribal communities. For example, an IHS official 
involved with conducting uranium-related health screenings told us 
that the joint health screening event conducted with EPA in 2013 was a 
success and that, in addition to duplicating such efforts in other 
affected communities, there may be additional opportunities for 
enhanced interagency collaboration to help ensure that the Navajo 
people receive health screenings as well as information on how they 
can most effectively protect themselves from uranium contamination. 
More specifically, the IHS official told us that there may be 
opportunities to work with partners, including CDC and EPA, to develop 
informational videos on the health effects of uranium exposure that 
could be screened in IHS clinics. In addition, EPA officials told us 
that they have initiated a pilot effort to provide more coordinated 
outreach in the Cameron region of the reservation. In that region--
where potentially responsible parties will be conducting extensive 
assessment and some cleanup of abandoned mines in the coming years--
EPA and NNEPA plan to work with other partners, including other 
federal agencies, to provide a more coordinated approach to engaging 
the communities in discussions about, among other things, steps the 
federal agencies and community members can take to mitigate exposures 
to hazardous uranium contamination. Further, EPA officials involved in 
coordinating the 2014 5-year plan told us that they plan to engage the 
other federal agencies in developing and including a coordinated 
outreach strategy in the plan to better ensure that the agencies 
maximize each contact that they have with affected communities by, for 
example, providing the communities with information on a variety of 
uranium-related issues. Officials from the other agencies agreed that 
they would engage with EPA to develop or support such a strategy. This 
is consistent with one of the key practices that, in October 2005, we 
reported can help enhance and sustain collaboration among federal 
agencies--establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies--which 
can assist partner agencies in aligning their activities and 
resources, among other things.[Footnote 82] We have reported on other 
key practices to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration, 
including, for example, for collaborating agencies to define and agree 
on their respective roles and responsibilities.[Footnote 83] In doing 
so, collaborating agencies can identify how their collaborative 
efforts will be led, clarify who will do what, organize their joint 
and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making. 

Federal and Navajo agency officials also identified opportunities for 
the federal agencies to enhance collaboration with Navajo agencies, 
some of which also present opportunities to enhance capacity building. 
For example, an EPA official we spoke with said that the agency could 
potentially train NNEPA staff to perform the more detailed assessments 
that EPA has been conducting to determine whether houses are 
contaminated and warrant replacement. In addition, Navajo Nation 
officials told us that they would like the federal agencies to work 
with them to identify as many opportunities as possible for the 
federal agencies to partner with the Navajo agencies on uranium-
related work. These officials pointed to the partnership between DOE 
and NNEPA at the Highway 160 site--where NNEPA led the implementation 
of the cleanup work--as a particular success that they would like to 
see replicated in other areas. EPA Region 9 officials also pointed to 
the partnership between EPA and the Navajo Community Housing and 
Infrastructure Department, a Navajo agency that is helping to replace 
some of the contaminated houses on the reservation. 

According to both federal and tribal agency officials, federal 
agencies could also enhance their collaboration with Navajo agencies 
by including additional tribal agencies in future efforts. For 
example, EPA and DOE identified potential opportunities for enhanced 
collaboration with the Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation 
Program, which was not involved in the abandoned mine work conducted 
under the 2008 5-year plan, although the UMTRA program under the same 
department has been working with DOE at the former uranium processing 
sites. The Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program was active 
in abandoned uranium mine-related efforts during the plan period by, 
among other things, maintaining reclamation work previously conducted 
to mitigate physical hazards at the mines. According to Navajo 
Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program officials, they plan to 
continue this maintenance work at reclaimed mine sites in the future. 
According to both federal and tribal agency officials we spoke with, 
EPA could potentially collaborate with that program and NNEPA to help 
ensure that, where feasible, any additional maintenance work on 
reclaimed uranium mines is done in coordination with NNEPA and EPA to 
help further reduce radiological hazards.[Footnote 84] EPA officials 
told us that they have begun talking with Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands 
Reclamation Program staff to identify ways to work together, whereas 
in the period of the 2008 5-year plan, the program and NNEPA each 
generally operated independently from one another. According to DOE, 
EPA and DOE have agreed to invite officials from NNEPA and both 
programs within the Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation/UMTRA 
Department to participate in activities of either federal agency. In 
another example, a CDC official told us there may be opportunities for 
CDC to increase its collaboration with the Navajo Division of Health 
to improve available data on how cancers impact the Navajo people. 

Conclusions: 

From 2008 through 2012, six federal agencies increased their overall 
efforts to address the legacy of uranium contamination that remained 
on the Navajo reservation after uranium mining and processing ceased, 
spending more than $120 million on various actions, including 
assessments of abandoned mines and cleanups of contaminated homes and 
other sites. However, nearly 30 years since the last active uranium 
mine on the Navajo reservation ceased production, federal agencies do 
not have comprehensive information about the extent of the 
contamination or the total scope of work--and associated time frames 
and costs--required to fully address it, especially the contamination 
found at the abandoned mines. When requesting the 2008 5-year plan, 
policymakers were looking for a comprehensive course of action for 
fully resolving the problem of uranium contamination on or near the 
Navajo reservation. Given that the scope of the 2008 5-year plan 
focused on addressing the most urgent problems, and the agencies' next 
5-year plan is not expected to identify the full scope of work that 
remains, it is unclear how many 5-year plans at this rate would be 
needed to estimate the remaining scope of work, time frames, and costs 
for fully addressing the contamination. While many uncertainties 
exist, it is possible to generate useful, high-level estimates of the 
work, time frames, and costs in a short period of time based on the 
information the federal agencies currently possess. However, absent a 
statutory requirement to develop such a comprehensive estimate, it 
appears unlikely that the agencies will undertake such an effort. 
Without more comprehensive information about the overall remaining 
scope of work, time frames, and costs needed to address contamination 
across the reservation, including at the abandoned mines, stakeholders 
and decision makers do not have a basis on which to assess the overall 
pace of the cleanup efforts; and without this information cannot put 
the accomplishments of the 2008 5-year plan--or any future plans--into 
perspective, and cannot make effective resource allocation decisions. 

Effectively engaging with tribal communities is a key challenge facing 
federal agencies in the efforts to address contamination on Navajo and 
Hopi lands. The 2008 5-year plan did not contain information about how 
the federal agencies would coordinate their outreach efforts to these 
communities. While the agencies began to integrate their outreach 
activities over the course of the 5-year plan period, community 
members continued to express frustration with the agencies' efforts. 
Creating a coordinated outreach strategy is consistent with the key 
practice of establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies that 
we have reported can help enhance and sustain interagency 
collaboration and help agencies better align their activities and 
resources. Such an effort should also identify how the collaborative 
effort will be led, clarify who will do what, organize their joint and 
individual efforts, and facilitate decision making. 

In addition, assessment work conducted by BIA at the Tuba City Dump 
has yielded information about the contamination at the site that has 
provided significant value to decision makers. In doing so, however, 
BIA has experienced a number of challenges, some concerning contract 
management. BIA has missed enforceable deadlines, subjecting BIA to 
stipulated penalties under its settlement agreement with EPA. 
Moreover, BIA continued to increase the value of the contract while 
the contractor was not performing according to the contract's terms 
and conditions. BIA is nearing the end of its management of the 
current RI/FS contract; these contract management challenges, however, 
if left unaddressed, will become even more pertinent in the next few 
years as BIA moves into the cleanup phase after a remedial action is 
selected. At that point, the agency will award and manage an even 
larger and more complicated contract that will increase costs 
significantly. Without examining lessons learned from managing the 
RI/FS contract and considering these lessons as part of the 
acquisition planning process for the remedial action contract, BIA 
could face contract management challenges on a larger scale. Further, 
BIA did not fully follow best practices in estimating the schedule for 
the RI/FS, which was not fully comprehensive or controlled. Without 
control over the schedule, BIA cannot effectively monitor its 
contractor's progress and cannot evaluate the quality of changes 
proposed by the contractor. BIA's estimate of probable future costs 
for the cleanup at the Tuba City Dump also did not always reflect the 
characteristics of a comprehensive high-quality cost estimate. Without 
fully accounting for all future costs, management will have difficulty 
successfully planning program resource requirements. Further, 
significantly more funds will likely be needed to implement the 
remedial action that will be selected for the Tuba City Dump site. 
Given this increased need and other competing interests for BIA's 
limited resources, other funding sources for remedial actions, such as 
Interior's Central Hazardous Materials Fund, become more important. 
The Tuba City Dump site is eligible to receive funds from the Fund for 
the RI/FS, as well as the selected remedial action, although BIA 
officials have not applied for such funding and do not plan to do so. 
Without leveraging the Fund, BIA will have difficulty meeting the 
funding needs for the remedial action cleanup phase of the project. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

To develop an estimate of the scope of work remaining to address 
uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, Congress 
should consider requiring that the Environmental Protection Agency 
take the lead and work with the other federal agencies to develop an 
overall estimate of the remaining scope of the work, time frames, and 
costs. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We are making the following four recommendations in this report: 

To ensure that agencies working on the 2014 5-year plan better align 
their activities and resources, we recommend that the Administrator of 
EPA; the Secretaries of Energy, the Interior, and Health and Human 
Services; and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as 
they develop a coordinated outreach strategy to include in the 2014 5-
year plan, take action to incorporate key practices in their 
collaborative effort, such as defining and agreeing on the agencies' 
respective roles and responsibilities. 

In light of the problems BIA has encountered in managing the cleanup 
at the Tuba City Dump site, we recommend that the Secretary of the 
Interior direct the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs to take the 
following three actions: 

* identify and examine any lessons learned from managing the RI/FS 
contract and consider these lessons as part of the acquisition 
planning process for the remedial action contract, 

* employ best practices in creating the schedule and cost estimates 
for the remedial action cleanup phase, and: 

* apply for funding from Interior's Central Hazardous Materials Fund 
in order to help meet the funding needs for the remedial action 
cleanup phase of the project. 

Agency and Third Party Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the 
Environmental Protection Agency; the Departments of Energy, the 
Interior, and Health and Human Services; the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission; the Office of Management and Budget; and the Navajo Nation 
and Hopi Tribe. EPA, DOE, BIA (responding on behalf of Interior), the 
Department of Health and Human Services, and NRC generally agreed with 
our recommendations, and their written comments are reproduced in 
appendixes VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X, respectively. Each of these 
agencies also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. The Navajo Nation also provided written comments 
(reproduced in appendix XI) and technical comments, which we 
incorporated as appropriate. The Office of Management and Budget and 
the Hopi Tribe did not comment on our report. 

DOE was the only agency that commented on our Matter for Congressional 
Consideration. Specifically, DOE acknowledged the need to identify the 
remaining scope of work, time frames, and costs of fully addressing 
uranium contamination on the Navajo reservation. However, the agency 
expressed concern about the difficulty of quantifying the full scope 
of work at this time, given the number of uncertainties that remain. 
We agree that attempting to quantify, in a detailed manner, the full 
scope of remaining work is not possible at this time because of the 
uncertainties we describe in this report, as well as those identified 
by DOE in its comments. However, we believe that the agencies' 
estimates can be improved and, for the reasons detailed in our report, 
consider it essential for Congress to have more comprehensive 
information about the remaining scope of work in order to assess the 
overall pace of the cleanup and to make informed resource allocation 
decisions. In addition, DOE commented on (1) our use of the term "Rare 
Metals" site instead of the "Tuba City Mill Site" or the "Tuba City 
Former Processing Site" and (2) an observation in the report about the 
cleanup of the former processing sites on the Navajo reservation 
versus another site near Moab, Utah. Regarding the comparison of the 
former processing sites on the Navajo reservation to the Moab site, 
DOE provided comments on the unique nature of each site. Regarding the 
Rare Metals site, we clarified our report to indicate that our use of 
the term "Rare Metals site" was solely to prevent it from being 
confused with other contaminated sites in the Tuba City area, 
including BIA's Tuba City Dump site. 

In agreeing with our recommendation that the federal agencies 
incorporate key practices for enhancing and sustaining interagency 
collaborative efforts into their coordinated outreach strategy, EPA, 
DOE, and the Department of Health and Human Services provided 
additional details about the contents of the draft outreach strategy 
that they intend to include in their 2014 5-year plan. We are 
encouraged by elements of the draft strategy, which appear to include 
some of the key practices for enhancing and sustaining interagency 
collaboration. For example, the agencies plan to leverage resources to 
fund a shared coordinator who will direct a community outreach network 
composed of representatives from the federal and tribal agencies. 

In its written comments, BIA asserted that our report 
disproportionately focuses on the agency's management of the Tuba City 
Dump site, a site that BIA described as comprising a very small part 
of the overall problem of uranium contamination across the Navajo 
reservation. Although we agree that cleaning up the Tuba City Dump is 
but one part of the agencies' broader efforts to address uranium 
contamination on the Navajo reservation, we believe that our detailed 
examination of BIA's and EPA's management of the assessment work at 
the site was appropriate. As explained in our report, the Tuba City 
Dump site was one of the two objectives where the federal agencies did 
not meet the targets in the 2008 5-year plan. In order to identify 
reasons why BIA did not meet those targets, we analyzed the agency's 
management of the Tuba City Dump site, including its project and 
contract management approaches. In addition, BIA commented that it 
believes the management of the cleanup has been handled responsibly 
but that circumstances beyond its control have contributed to delays. 
We acknowledge in this report that circumstances beyond BIA's control 
contributed to delays in the Tuba City Dump cleanup; however, BIA's 
own actions also contributed to these delays. For example, BIA had 
communication problems with its RI/FS contractor and performance 
problems regarding the quality and timeliness of the contractor's 
deliverables. These problems and others led BIA to miss several 
legally enforceable deadlines in the RI/FS work plan and resulted in 
BIA failing to complete the RI/FS for the site, an objective of the 
2008 5-year plan and a work plan requirement. In its comments, BIA 
appears to fault EPA and the contractor for the delays and associated 
stipulated penalties, but BIA did not explain how, if at all, EPA's 
and the contractor's actions would relieve BIA of its legal obligation 
to meet the work plan deadlines, or of the consequences of failing to 
do so. 

While agreeing with our recommendations, BIA disagreed with our 
findings regarding the agency's cost and schedule estimating at the 
Tuba City Dump. These findings were the basis for our recommendation 
that BIA employ best practices in creating the schedule and cost 
estimates for the forthcoming CERCLA remedial action at the Tuba City 
Dump. BIA asserted that its approach to developing the cost and 
schedule estimates was reasonable, and did not believe that the best 
practices found in our cost estimating and assessment guide were 
applicable, at least in part, because the details of the remedial 
action to be conducted at the site have not been identified. As 
explained in this report, the best practices in our cost estimating 
and assessment guide can be used for projects with significant 
unknowns, such as the Tuba City Dump, and include specific steps for 
properly taking those unknowns into account. For example, the guide 
discusses how every cost estimate is uncertain because of the 
assumptions that must be made about future projections. It also states 
that because many of the assumptions made at the start of a project 
turn out to be inaccurate, it is important to assess the risk 
associated with changes in assumptions. As described in our report, we 
found that BIA did not assess such risks when creating its cost 
estimate. In addition, although BIA concurred with our recommendation 
to use best practices when creating cost and schedule estimates for 
the forthcoming remedial action, BIA stated that it does not intend to 
use these best practices when developing future estimates at the site 
because it does not believe that they are applicable to environmental 
cleanup projects. To the contrary, these guides offer best practices 
that are directly relevant to a wide range of government projects, 
including environmental cleanups, and we have previously assessed such 
projects using the criteria in the guides.[Footnote 85] BIA's refusal 
to apply cost and schedule estimating best practices is troublesome, 
especially since, as we note in the report, the remedial action at the 
site will represent a more significant undertaking than the RI/FS. As 
such, it is important that BIA have reliable cost and schedule 
estimates in order to effectively manage the project. 

In written comments, the Navajo Nation stated that, overall, our 
report represented a good start toward illuminating the nature and 
extent of the damage uranium mining and processing has caused to 
Navajo lands and people. However, the Navajo Nation also noted some 
instances where it felt the report fell short. For example, the tribe 
noted that our projection of the need for hundreds of millions of 
dollars to address the remaining scope of work that has been 
identified by the agencies was a significant underestimation of the 
total projected costs for future remediation at all uranium-related 
sites on Navajo lands. The tribe stated that it believes that these 
total costs will be in the billions of dollars rather than hundreds of 
millions of dollars. As noted in our report and recognized by the 
Navajo Nation in its comments, our estimate related to the cleanup of 
highest priority abandoned mines represents a conservative, low-end 
estimate. While we cannot comment on the accuracy of the tribe's 
characterization of total future costs, the tribe's estimate further 
illuminates the need for the federal agencies involved to generate a 
high-level estimate, as discussed in our report, based on their most 
current information regarding the remaining scope of work. In 
addition, the Navajo Nation noted the absence of any discussion of 
potential groundwater contamination in the draft report, especially at 
the Northeast Church Rock mine. In response, we have made changes to 
include information about the status of federal agencies' groundwater 
assessment efforts. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency; the Secretaries of Energy, the 
Interior, and Health and Human Services; the Chairman of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission; the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget; the President of the Navajo Nation; the Chairman of the Hopi 
Tribe; the appropriate congressional committees; and other interested 
parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO 
website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or gomezj@gao.gov. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 
contributions to the report are listed in appendix XII. 

Signed by: 

J. Alfredo Gómez: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Energy and Commerce: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Peter DeFazio: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Natural Resources: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr. 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Health Committee on Energy and Commerce: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Colleen Hanabusa: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Indian and Alaska Native Affairs: 
Committee on Natural Resources: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Raúl M. Grijalva: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Public Lands and Environmental Regulation: 
Committee on Natural Resources: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Martin Heinrich: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Edward J. Markey: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ben Ray Luján: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

In this report, we examined: (1) the extent to which federal agencies, 
including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of 
Energy (DOE), the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA), the Department of Health and Human Services' Indian 
Health Service (IHS), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
achieved the targets identified in the 2008 5-year plan, and the 
reasons why or why not; (2) what is known about the scope of work, 
time frames, and estimated costs of fully addressing uranium 
contamination on the Navajo reservation; and (3) the key challenges, 
if any, faced by federal agencies in completing this work and the 
opportunities, if any, which may be present to help overcome these 
challenges. 

To determine the extent to which federal agencies achieved the targets 
identified in the 2008 5-year plan, we compared the agencies' targets 
as laid out in the 5-year plan with the actions taken by the agencies 
and their partners over the 5-year plan period from 2008 through 2012. 
We identified these actions by reviewing key documents, including the 
summary report issued by the federal agencies in January 2013. We 
corroborated information in the documents by interviewing relevant 
federal agency officials and Navajo and Hopi tribal officials from 
relevant tribal government agencies--the Navajo Nation Department of 
Justice, Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency, the Navajo 
Nation Division of Natural Resources' Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands 
Reclamation/Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action Department, and the 
Hopi Tribe Department of Natural Resources' Water Resources Program--
and by obtaining additional documentation and visiting relevant sites 
across the Navajo and Hopi reservations where federal and tribal 
agencies have been conducting their work. In addition to the five 
federal agencies listed above, other relevant federal agencies we 
spoke with included the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
(ATSDR), the Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of 
the Interior's Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance, which 
manages the Central Hazardous Materials Fund, and the Office of 
Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, which provides funding to 
the Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program. In April 2013 and 
July 2013, we visited key sites, including the Northeast Church Rock, 
Quivira, and Skyline mines, as well as abandoned uranium mines and 
mine-related sites near the communities of Cameron, Cove, and Teec Nos 
Pos, Arizona; and Haystack, and Casamero Lake, New Mexico; the former 
uranium processing site in Shiprock, New Mexico; the Highway 160 site 
near Tuba City, Arizona; and the Tuba City Dump, located on both the 
Hopi and Navajo reservations and near the Hopi Villages of Moenkopi 
and the Navajo town of Tuba City, Arizona. We selected these sites 
based on the level of activity that federal and tribal agencies 
conducted there during the 5-year plan, and in order to see some of 
the sites that the agencies have identified as needing cleanup work in 
the near future. 

To identify the reasons why the agencies met or did not meet the 
targets in the 5-year plan, we reviewed agency documents and 
interviewed federal and tribal agency officials. We also reviewed 
federal agency expenditure data for the 2008 5-year plan period 
(fiscal years 2008 through 2012) and compared it with expenditure data 
from the previous 5 years (fiscal years 2003 through 2007). These data 
represented obligations or direct outlays by the agencies and 
represent the agencies' direct costs and did not include intramural 
costs, such as staff salaries. We received data from ATSDR, BIA, CDC, 
DOE, EPA, and IHS; NRC did not provide expenditure data because NRC 
did not incur any direct obligations during the time period, although 
it did expend resources for staff time. In order to determine costs in 
constant 2013 dollars, we adjusted the amounts reported to us for 
inflation by applying the fiscal year chain-weighted gross domestic 
product price index, with fiscal year 2013 as the base year. To 
evaluate the reliability of these data and determine their 
limitations, we reviewed the data obtained from each agency. For each 
data source, we analyzed related documentation, examined the data to 
identify obvious errors or inconsistencies, and compared the data we 
received with other published data sources, where possible. We also 
interviewed officials from each agency to obtain information on the 
internal controls of their data systems. On the basis of our 
evaluation of these sources, we concluded that the expenditure data we 
collected and analyzed were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

To identify what is known about the scope of work remaining to fully 
address uranium contamination on or near the Navajo reservation, we 
reviewed available documents and interviewed knowledgeable federal 
agency and tribal officials. To identify what is known about time 
frames and costs, we reviewed documentation containing schedule and/or 
cost estimates or general information about time frames or costs, 
where available. To create estimates of time frames and costs to clean 
up the highest priority abandoned mines, we gathered information about 
the costs associated with the Skyline mine cleanup, which was the one 
cleanup EPA conducted during the 5-year plan period with the agency's 
funds, the pace of work conducted under the 5-year plan, and the 
number of mines that would need full funding from EPA. In addition, we 
analyzed the extent to which the schedule generated by BIA for the 
remedial investigation and feasibility study at the Tuba City Dump 
reflected the four general characteristics for sound schedule 
estimating, as outlined in our schedule assessment guide: 
comprehensive, well-constructed, credible, and controlled.[Footnote 
86] We selected this schedule to review because it was the most robust 
of the available schedules, and it represented an entirely federal 
effort. We also examined the extent to which BIA's estimate of 
probable future costs for Tuba City Dump reflected the four 
characteristics of high-quality cost estimates, as outlined in our 
cost estimating and assessment guide: comprehensive, well-documented, 
accurate, and credible.[Footnote 87] We selected this cost estimate to 
review since the cleanup will be paid for entirely with federal funds, 
and it represented a distinct cleanup project rather than an ongoing 
level of effort. In reviewing BIA's schedule and cost estimates, we 
analyzed supporting documentation submitted by BIA and conducted 
interviews with BIA and EPA project managers and staff. We shared our 
cost and schedule guides and the criteria against which we would be 
evaluating the estimates with BIA staff. We then compared BIA's 
methods and approaches for preparing the estimates with the best 
practices contained in the guides. 

To ascertain the key challenges faced by federal agencies in 
completing this work and the opportunities that may be present to help 
overcome these challenges, we reviewed key documents, including the 
January 2013 summary report, written materials from the federal 
agencies' Navajo uranium stakeholder workshops, agency reports, and 
Navajo Nation laws and position papers. We corroborated and 
supplemented information in the documents by interviewing relevant 
federal agency officials and Navajo and Hopi tribal officials. We also 
interviewed knowledgeable stakeholders, including community members 
living in areas affected by uranium mining or contamination. For 
example, we worked with the federal and tribal agencies and others to 
hold meetings in seven affected communities, which were attended by 50 
local government officials and community members. We also spoke with 
other knowledgeable stakeholders, such as university researchers and 
representatives of nonprofit and community organizations active on 
Navajo uranium issues. We met with most of these stakeholders during 
our July 2013 site visits and at the April 2013 Navajo Uranium 
Stakeholder Workshop held in Gallup, New Mexico, and spoke with other 
stakeholders by telephone. We identified stakeholders by performing an 
Internet and literature search for individuals and organizations 
involved in relevant issues, attending the stakeholder workshop and 
identifying participating stakeholders, and requesting referrals from 
agency officials and stakeholders with whom we spoke. The views of the 
stakeholders we spoke with are not representative of and cannot be 
generalized to all stakeholders. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2013 to May 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Detailed Results of GAO Assessment of the Schedule for 
the Tuba City Dump Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study Work 
Plan: 

Our prior work has identified 10 best practices associated with 
effective scheduling.[Footnote 88] These are (1) capturing all 
activities; (2) sequencing all activities; (3) assigning resources to 
all activities; (4) establishing the duration of all activities; (5) 
verifying that the schedule is traceable horizontally and vertically; 
(6) confirming that the critical path is valid; (7) ensuring 
reasonable total float; (8) conducting a schedule risk analysis; (9) 
updating the schedule with actual progress and logic; and (10) 
maintaining a baseline schedule. These practices are summarized into 
four characteristics of a reliable schedule--comprehensive, well-
constructed, credible, and controlled. We assessed the extent to which 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) January 2013 schedule for the 
remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS) at the Tuba City 
Dump met each of the 10 best practices,[Footnote 89] and characterized 
whether the schedule met each of the four characteristics of a 
reliable schedule. We found that the schedule minimally met each of 
the four characteristics of a reliable schedule. As a result, we are 
concerned about the validity of the dates that were forecasted by the 
schedule, as well as the identification of the critical path. Without 
an accurate critical path, management cannot focus on the activities 
that will be most detrimental to the project's key milestones and 
finish date if they slip. Table 3 provides the detailed results of our 
analysis. 

Table 3: Assessment of the January 2013 Tuba City Dump RI/FS Work Plan 
Schedule: 

Schedule characteristic: Comprehensive; 
Explanation: Capturing all activities, assigning resources to all 
activities, and establishing the durations of all activities: 
* All activities as defined in the project's work breakdown structure 
are included; 
* the labor, materials, and overhead needed to do the work and whether 
those resources will be available when needed; and; 
* how long each activity will take, allowing for discrete progress 
measurement with specific start and finish dates; 
Criterion met[A]: Minimally; 
GAO analysis: 
While our analysis found a good ratio of detail to milestone 
activities, we could not determine if the schedule reflected the work 
necessary to conduct the remedial investigation and feasibility study 
(RI/FS) work plan. Specifically, there was no work breakdown structure 
documentation submitted, and only 50 percent of the schedule activities 
had work breakdown structure elements assigned to them. As a result, we 
could not validate if all work necessary to complete the project is 
included in the schedule. In addition, there were only two resources 
used for the project, and they were both over-allocated, one by over 
5,000 percent. Consequently, it appears that those resources will not 
be available when needed. Further, our analysis found that the use of 
multiple duration units caused duration conversion issues, which made 
the schedule's activity durations unreliable. 

Schedule characteristic: Well constructed; 
Explanation: Sequencing all activities, confirming that the critical 
path is valid and ensuring reasonable total float. The schedule should 
be constructed so that: 
* all activities are logically sequenced with predecessor and successor 
logic; 
* limited amounts of unusual or complicated logic techniques are 
justified in the schedule documentation; 
* a critical path that determines which activities drive the project's 
earliest completion date can be identified; and; 
* total float that accurately determines the schedule's flexibility; 
Criterion met[A]: Minimally; 
GAO analysis: 
We found that 17 of the remaining schedule activities (29.3 percent) 
were missing logic, 4 had hard constraints without justification 
(about 7 percent), and there were lags and leads used that cause the 
sequencing to be questionable. Although hard constraints are useful 
for calculating the amount of float available in the schedule and, 
therefore, the realism of the required project finish date and 
available resources during schedule development, they may be abused if 
they force activities to occur on specific dates that are determined 
off-line without much regard for the realism of the assumptions 
necessary to achieve them. Because of these logic issues, the critical 
path as calculated by the scheduling software was deemed unreliable. 
Our analysis found that the critical path contained lags, leads, long-
duration activities, and activities with hard constraints, which by 
definition will always appear as critical. We also found that the 
driving path could not be traced, and from what few driving activities 
could be found, they differed from the default critical path. Finally, 
we encountered task inspector errors that suggested rescheduling a 
task to its resource's next available time. There were differing 
amounts of total float, on the critical path, in particular, that led 
to questionable schedule flexibility. A possible contributing factor 
may be the duration units assigned in the schedule that caused 
conversion issues, as discussed above. 

Schedule characteristic: Credible; 
Explanation: Verifying that the schedule is traceable horizontally and 
vertically, conducting a schedule risk analysis. The schedule should 
identify: 
* the order of events necessary to achieve aggregated products or 
outcomes; 
* varying levels of activities, supporting activities, and subtasks; 
* key dates that can be used to present status updates to management; 
* a level of confidence in meeting a project's completion date based 
on data about risks and opportunities for the project; and; 
* necessary schedule contingency and high-priority risks based on 
conducting a robust schedule risk analysis; 
Criterion met[A]: Minimally; 
GAO analysis: 
We found the schedule to be vertically traceable, with dates in the 
detailed schedule mapping to higher-level management correspondence. 
We also identified schedule documentation that matched the project 
start and completion dates in the schedule. In contrast, we found the 
schedule could not be traced horizontally. For example, the schedule 
did not respond appropriately when significant delays were introduced 
into the network due to the logic issues discussed above. Furthermore, 
we received no documentation to substantiate that a schedule risk 
analysis was performed, so the credibility of the dates in the 
schedule were also in question. 

Schedule characteristic: Controlled; 
Explanation: Updating the schedule with actual progress and logic, 
maintaining a baseline schedule. The schedule should be: 
* updated periodically by schedulers trained in critical path method 
scheduling; 
* statused using actual progress and logic to realistically forecast 
dates for program activities; 
* compared against a documented baseline schedule to determine 
variances from the plan; 
* accompanied by a corresponding baseline document that explains the 
overall approach to the project, defines assumptions, and describes 
unique features of the schedule; and; 
* subject to a configuration management control process; 
Criterion met[A]: Minimally; 
GAO analysis: 
It is unclear if schedule progress is updated monthly because the 
schedule's status date was outdated. Furthermore, there was no 
evidence that a formal schedule narrative accompanied the schedule 
delivery to the government. While it appeared that the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA), BIA's contractor, and Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) officials meet to discuss the schedule, it does not 
appear that the schedule is used to manage the project because EPA did 
not want to put additional information about BIA and the contractor's 
effort in the schedule. Our analysis also found that, relative to the 
assumed status date, 5 activities had start dates in the past. 
Although we cannot determine when the baseline was set, all 126 
activities have baseline start dates. Project documentation also 
stated that the schedule was baselined, but the baseline date cannot 
be found in MS Project. Nevertheless, it is commendable that the 
schedule is baselined, which allows for analysis and monitoring of 
date variances. On the other hand, there is no evidence that a 
schedule baseline document was created for this schedule baseline. 

Source: GAO analysis of BIA data. 

[A] "Met" means the program provided complete evidence that satisfies 
the entire criterion. "Substantially" means the program provided 
evidence that satisfies a large portion of the criterion. "Partially" 
means the program provided evidence that satisfies about half of the 
criterion. "Minimally" means the program provided evidence that 
satisfies a small portion the criterion. "Not met" means the program 
provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Detailed Results of GAO Assessment of the Tuba City Dump 
5-Year Cost Estimate: 

To analyze the Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) 5-year cost estimate, 
dated April 2013, for the Tuba City Dump, we determined the extent to 
which BIA followed the best practices outlined in the GAO Cost 
Estimating and Assessment Guide.[Footnote 90] The guide identifies 12 
practices that are the basis for effective cost estimation, including 
cost estimation for annual budget requests. The guide associates these 
practices with four characteristics: accurate, well-documented, 
comprehensive, and credible. The Office of Management and Budget 
endorsed this guidance as being sufficient for meeting most cost-
estimating requirements, including for budget formulation. If followed 
correctly, these practices should result in reliable and valid budgets 
that (1) can be easily and clearly traced, replicated, and updated; 
and (2) enable managers to make informed decisions. BIA created this 
cost estimate to contribute to the Department of the Interior's 
(Interior) environmental and disposal liability estimate as part of 
Interior's annual financial statement. Since a remedial action has not 
been selected for the site, BIA estimated two options, a low-cost 
option and a high-cost option. In accordance with Interior's guidance, 
BIA submitted the low-cost option as part of the liability estimate. 
We assessed the extent to which the Tuba City Dump 5-year cost 
estimate from April 2013 met each of the four characteristics 
associated with cost-estimating best practices.[Footnote 91] As table 
4 illustrates, we found that the Tuba City Dump April 2013 cost 
estimate minimally met each of these four characteristics. 

Table 4: Assessment of the Tuba City Dump 5-Year Cost Estimate: 

Cost characteristic: Comprehensive; 
Explanation: The cost estimate includes all life-cycle costs; the cost 
estimate completely defines the program, reflects the current 
schedule, and is technically reasonable; the cost estimate work 
breakdown structure is product-oriented, traceable to the statement of 
work, and at an appropriate level of detail to ensure that cost 
elements are neither omitted nor double-counted; and the estimate 
documents all cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions; 
Criterion met[A]: Minimally; 
GAO analysis: The estimate does not include all life-cycle costs, 
including both government and contractor costs, to clean up, operate, 
and maintain the Tuba City Dump. This is because a remedial action has 
not been selected for the site and because the Department of the 
Interior's (Interior) guidance suggests that agencies only include 
future costs, rather than life-cycle costs, in the liability estimates. 

Cost characteristic: Well-documented; 
Explanation: The documentation should capture in writing the source 
data used, the reliability of the data, and how the data were 
normalized; the documentation describes in detail the calculations 
performed and the estimating methodology used to derive each work 
breakdown structure element's cost; the documentation describes step 
by step how the estimate was developed so that a cost analyst 
unfamiliar with the program could understand what was done and 
replicate it; the documentation discusses the technical baseline 
description and the data in the technical baseline are consistent with 
the cost estimate; and the documentation provides evidence that the 
cost estimate was reviewed and accepted by management; 
Criterion met[A]: Minimally; 
GAO analysis: According to project officials, the estimate was 
developed in accordance with Interior's Environmental and Disposal 
Liabilities Identification, Documentation and Reporting Handbook. 
Though the handbook clearly states what should be included in the 
source data, we found that the Tuba City Dump estimate did not meet 
all of the criteria. In addition, the documentation supporting the 
cost estimate is limited. Neither the cost model nor the supporting 
documentation details the calculations or the estimating methodology 
by element. The documentation neither captures how the scope of the 
project was determined, nor does it capture at a detailed level how 
quantities of materials or labor rates were determined. As a result, a 
cost analyst unfamiliar with the Tuba City Dump and the estimating 
process would not be able to recreate the estimate based on the 
documentation package received. 

Cost characteristic: Accurate; 
Explanation: The cost estimate results are unbiased, not overly 
conservative or optimistic, and based on an assessment of most likely 
costs; the estimate has been adjusted properly for inflation; the 
estimate contains few, if any, minor mistakes; the cost estimate is 
regularly updated to reflect significant changes in the program, such 
as when schedules or other assumptions change, and actual costs so 
that it is always reflecting current status; variances between planned 
and actual costs are documented, explained, and reviewed; the estimate 
is based on a historical record of cost estimating and actual 
experiences from other comparable programs; and the estimating 
technique for each cost element was used appropriately; 
Criterion met[A]: Minimally; 
GAO analysis: The cost estimate does not include a risk and 
uncertainty analysis. While the estimate included contingency costs, 
it is unclear what statistical analysis was performed to derive these 
numbers. The escalation method was not documented in the cost 
estimate, and the estimate did not cite the source of the inflation 
rate. An inflation factor of 5 percent was used in the estimate. 
Mathematically, the calculations are accurate, and no mistakes are 
apparent. We credit the agency with keeping a documented log of 
changes to the estimate, although none of these changes are evident in 
the estimate itself. No costs were labeled as actuals in the 
documentation provided, and there is no mention of whether variances 
between the estimate and actual costs were reviewed. It is unclear 
from the evidence which estimating technique was used for each element 
and if that method was appropriate. 

Cost characteristic: Credible; 
Explanation: The cost estimate included a sensitivity analysis that 
identified a range of possible costs based on varying major 
assumptions, parameters, and data inputs; a risk and uncertainty 
analysis was conducted that quantified the imperfectly understood 
risks and identified the effects of changing key cost driver 
assumptions and factors; major cost elements were cross-checked to see 
if results are similar; and an independent cost estimate was conducted 
by a group outside the acquiring organization to determine whether 
other estimating methods produce similar results; 
Criterion met[A]: Minimally; 
GAO analysis: The cost estimate does not include a sensitivity 
analysis. The documentation says there are many unknowns associated 
with this project that may impact the probable costs. To account for 
these unknowns, a minus 30 percent/plus 50 percent range was provided 
in addition to the most probable cost. Without documentation that 
shows how they arrived at the minus 30 percent/plus 50 percent 
contingency range, we have no evidence that statistical analysis was 
performed. In addition, there is no evidence a risk and uncertainty 
analysis was conducted that quantified the imperfectly understood 
risks and identified the effects of changing key cost driver 
assumptions and factors. The documentation provides contingency 
factors, however, there is no documentation supporting how these 
numbers were derived. In addition, the documentation does not include 
the likelihood and severity of consequence for each risk, which work 
breakdown structure elements are affected by each risk, cost risk 
ranges by work breakdown structure elements, or a risk correlation 
matrix by work breakdown structure element. 

Source: GAO analysis of BIA data. 

[A] "Met" means the program provided complete evidence that satisfies 
the entire criterion. "Substantially" means the program provided 
evidence that satisfies a large portion of the criterion. "Partially" 
means the program provided evidence that satisfies about half of the 
criterion. "Minimally" means the program provided evidence that 
satisfies a small portion the criterion. "Not met" means the program 
provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: The 43 Highest Priority Mines, Their Locations, and the 
Status of Assessment and Cleanup Efforts: 

Mine name: Occurrence B; 
Region: Central; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Black Jack No. 2; 
Region: Eastern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Eunice Becenti; 
Region: Eastern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Haystack No. 1; 
Region: Eastern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Mac No. 1; 
Region: Eastern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Mariano Lake; 
Region: Eastern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Check]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Check]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Check]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Northeast Church Rock; 
Region: Eastern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Check]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Check]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Check]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Check]; 
Final removal action selected: [Check]. 

Mine name: Quivira (NE Church Rock No. 1); 
Region: Eastern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Check]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Check]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Check]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Check]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Ruby No. 3; 
Region: Eastern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Check]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Check]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Section 23; 
Region: Eastern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Section 24 (Nanabah Vandever); 
Region: Eastern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Section 25; 
Region: Eastern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Section 26 (Desidero Group); 
Region: Eastern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Check]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Standing Rock; 
Region: Eastern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Charles Keith; 
Region: North Central; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Firelight No. 6; 
Region: North Central; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Harvey Blackwater No. 3; 
Region: North Central; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Mitten No. 3; 
Region: North Central; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Rock Door No. 1; 
Region: North Central; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Skyline; 
Region: North Central; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Check]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Check][C]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: n/a; 
Final removal action selected: n/a. 

Mine name: Alongo Mines; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Check]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Barton 3; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Black Rock Point Mines; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Climax Transfer Station; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Hoskie Henry; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: King Tutt Point; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Check]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Mesa II ½, Mine 4; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Check]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Mesa III Mine; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Check]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Mesa III, Northwest Mine; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: NA-0904; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: NA-0928; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: North Martin; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Oak 124, Oak 125; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Plot 3; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Check]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Plot 6; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Check]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Tsosie 1; 
Region: Northern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Hoskie Tso No. 1; 
Region: Southern; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: A & B No. 2; 
Region: Western; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: A & B No. 3; 
Region: Western; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Boyd Tisi No. 2; 
Region: Western; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Charles Huskon No. 12; 
Region: Western; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Check]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Charles Huskon No. 14; 
Region: Western; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Check]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Mine name: Juan Horse No. 3; 
Region: Western; 
Potentially responsible party identified: [Empty]; 
Fence, sign, or other barricade: [Empty]; 
Initial assessment (radiation scan): [Check]; 
Interim removal action[A]: [Empty]; 
Detailed assessment initiated[B]: [Empty]; 
Final removal action selected: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO analysis of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) data. 

[A] Removal actions conducted at these sites were done as time-
critical removal actions and are listed as interim because they did 
not constitute the final cleanup actions at the mines. 

[B] Detailed assessments listed here include remedial action 
assessments (preliminary assessment and/or site investigation) and 
removal action assessments (engineering evaluation/cost analysis). 

[C] The Skyline mine cleanup is included here because the Navajo 
Nation considers it to be temporary, given its current position 
regarding removing all mine waste from the reservation. EPA considers 
the cleanup complete. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Additional Information about the Remaining Scope of Work, 
Time Frames, and Costs to Address Uranium Contamination on or Near the 
Navajo Reservation: 

The following is a discussion of what is known about the remaining 
scope of work, time frames, and costs to assess and clean up 
contaminated structures and to assess and treat health conditions and 
conduct health research. 

Assess and Clean Up Contaminated Houses and Other Structures: 

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Navajo Nation 
Environmental Protection Agency (NNEPA) have not identified a full 
scope of work because there is no comprehensive source of information 
regarding the number of houses that may be contaminated; the agencies 
do not have an end date for this work nor an overall cost estimate. 

Scope of work: EPA Region 9 officials told us they believe living in 
contaminated homes continues to be the greatest uranium-related health 
risk to people on the Navajo reservation today. To continue mitigating 
this risk, EPA and NNEPA officials told us they plan to continue the 
work they conducted under the 2008 5-year plan, but they do not know 
how many homes they will ultimately need to assess and replace since 
there is no comprehensive source for this information. According to 
NNEPA officials, the agency has a backlog of more than 100 homes where 
residents have requested testing. A NNEPA official familiar with the 
work told us the agency expects to address this backlog in the 2014 5-
year plan period. The official also told us that the number of 
requests continues to increase significantly as more people become 
aware of the agencies' efforts to assess houses and structures, in 
part, through outreach conducted by NNEPA. NNEPA is also responsible 
for communicating the results of completed assessments to residents 
when those results indicated homes were safe. A NNEPA official told us 
that, as of February 2014, the agency had communicated the results of 
fewer than half of the completed assessments, in some cases, because 
the agency was waiting for EPA to provide the results, and that the 
agency will continue to address this backlog moving forward. Overall, 
EPA officials said that they expect the total number of homes needing 
replacement will decrease in the 2014 5-year plan period since they 
believe the homes most likely to be contaminated will have been 
addressed through earlier efforts. 

Time frame: According to EPA officials involved, there is no end date 
for this work. They expect that the work assessing and potentially 
cleaning up contaminated houses to continue into the future as long as 
NNEPA continues to receive requests. 

Cost: Given the unknown number of homes needing assessment and 
cleanup, EPA has not developed an overall cost estimate. However, EPA 
officials told us they typically spend $6,000 on a detailed assessment 
and from $80,000 to $300,000 to demolish a home and either provide 
financial compensation or a replacement home. 

Assess and Treat Health Conditions and Conduct Health Research: 

Federal agencies do not have concrete plans or available funds to 
begin additional health studies on the Navajo reservation, but the 
Indian Health Service (IHS) will continue its work and the Agency for 
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) and its partners will 
continue the Navajo Birth Cohort Study, spending up to $10 million 
from 2013 to 2018. 

Scope of work: IHS and ATSDR officials told us they intend to include 
short-term health treatment and assessment efforts in the 2014 5-year 
plan, and they are developing overall goals for health research 
related to exposure to uranium on the Navajo reservation as well. In 
the short-term, beyond health care delivery to patients, IHS plans to 
continue its efforts under the uranium health-screening program that 
it established under the 2008 5-year plan. With 3.5 staff members, 
however, this is a small-scale effort. In addition, the Navajo Birth 
Cohort Study is expected to continue. Regarding other long-term 
research studies, ATSDR officials told us they do not have specific 
plans or funding to initiate additional uranium-related health 
research studies at this time. Members of the Navajo Nation, 
researchers, and other stakeholders have repeatedly called for a long-
term epidemiological study of the effects of nonoccupational exposures 
to uranium in the communities that have lived closest to former mines 
and processing sites in order to gain a better understanding of how 
these communities have been and continue to be affected.[Footnote 92] 
IHS officials told us they have been limited in their ability to 
identify or plan potential studies because conducting research studies 
is not a part of IHS's mission, and dedicated funding is not available 
for such efforts. ATSDR officials told us that their agency 
infrequently funds such studies; for example, it is currently 
conducting two long-term epidemiological studies across the country in 
addition to the Navajo study. 

Time frame: IHS officials said they expect to extend the uranium 
health screening program into the future, at least through the 2014 5-
year plan period. In 2013, ATSDR extended its agreement with the 
University of New Mexico and the Navajo Nation for the Navajo Birth 
Cohort Study by 5 years, until 2018. 

Cost: ATSDR has committed to spending up to $10 million on the Navajo 
Birth Cohort Study from 2013 to 2018, but overall costs for potential 
future studies are unknown. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Environmental Protection Agency: 

United States Environmental Protection Agency: 
Region IX: 
75 Hawthorne Street: 
San Francisco, CA 94105: 

April 15, 2014: 

Mr. Alfredo Gomez: 
Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Gomez, 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on GAO's draft 
report, "Uranium Contamination, Overall Scope, Time Frame and Cost 
Information is Needed for Contamination Cleanup on the Navajo 
Reservation", GAO-14-323. The purpose of this letter is to provide the 
EPA's response to your recommendation. 

GAO was asked to examine the agencies' cleanup efforts under the 2008 
5-year plan, "Health and Environmental Impacts of Uranium 
Contamination in the Navajo Nation". The GAO report examines the 
extent to which the agencies achieved the targets set in the 5-year 
plan and reasons why or why not; what is known about the future scope
of work, time frames and costs; and any key challenges faced by the 
agencies in completing this work and any opportunities to overcome 
them. 

In summary, the GAO found that the five federal agencies involved in
implementing the plan met six of the plan's eight objectives. The 
agencies have not yet identified the scope of remaining work, time 
frames, or cost to fully address uranium contamination on and hear the 
Navajo Reservation. GAO concluded that while agencies face challenges 
meeting funding needs and engaging affected communities, opportunities
exist to improve relationships with Navajo and Hopi people by creating 
and implementing a coordinated outreach strategy. 

The EPA agrees with GAO's findings and conclusions. The EPA and partner
federal agencies are currently developing a second 5-Year plan to 
continue the work addressing uranium contamination on the Navajo 
Nation. The plan includes a coordinated outreach strategy as 
recommended by the GAO report. We expect this plan to be issued in May 
2014. The plan will be used as a working draft while we conduct formal
consultation with the Navajo Nation. EPA recognizes that the scope of 
the remaining work is large and that collaboration and cooperation 
with federal and Navajo partners will be essential to fully address 
uranium contamination on the Navajo Nation. EPA will continue to 
search for and work with responsible parties to pay for investigation 
and cleanup of mines. 

The GAO report makes one recommendation for EPA: 

"To ensure that agencies working on the 2014 5-year plan better align 
their activities and resources, we recommend that the Administrator of 
the EPA; the Secretaries of Energy, the Interior and the Health and 
Human Services; and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
as they develop a coordinated outreach strategy to include in the 2014 
5-year plan. take action to incorporate key practices in their
collaborative effort, such as defining and agreeing on the agencies' 
respective roles and responsibilities." 

EPA agrees with GAO's recommendation. The draft 5-year plan addresses
federal agency collaboration with the Navajo Nation by forming a 
community outreach network consisting of representatives from relevant 
federal and Navajo agencies. The network will be led by a coordinator 
working on the Navajo Nation in a location that serves as· an office 
and visitors' center where people can obtain information about
uranium-related issues from all of the agencies. Key functions of this 
network include the following: 

* Maintain a master outreach calendar that tracks outreach events 
planned by each agency. 

* Develop an easily accessible website with relevant information 
regarding uranium issues with links to resources provided by all 
agencies. 

* Plan and organize two stakeholder workshops per year. Workshops will 
be located in different geographic locations on the Nation and will 
cover topics relevant to the interest in the area. Workshops will be 
planned with assistance from local grassroots organizations. 

* Conduct a face-to-face community information effort by communicating 
with Navajo and Hopi residents in their homes and in small groups. 

* Conduct a pro-active media relations effort that educates reporters 
about uranium-related issues so they can disseminate that information 
to local residents through the news media. 

* Conduct a community involvement needs assessment for each chapter 
impacted by uranium mines. 

EPA thanks GAO for the opportunity to review the draft report. 
Enclosed are comments clarifying statements in the report regarding 
work completed at the Northeast Church Rock Mine. Please contact 
Clancy Tenley at (415) 972-3785 if you have questions or would like 
further information. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Enrique Manzanilla: 
Director: 
Superfund Division: 

Enclosure: Comments on NECR Mine Site. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Department of Energy: 
Washington, DC 20585: 

April 18, 2014: 

J. Alfredo G6mez: 
Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20458: 

Dear Mr. Gomez: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review the Government Accountability 
Office's (GAO) draft report entitled Uranium Contamination: Overall 
Scope, Time Frame, and Cost Information is Needed for Contamination 
Cleanup on the Navajo Reservation (GAO-14-323). The Department of 
Energy (DOE) concurs with GAO's recommendation to coordinate outreach 
strategy and incorporate key practices in a collaborative effort with 
other federal agencies and has included this strategy in the 2014 Five-
Year Plan (currently under development). 

We are providing comments as requested before the final report is 
issued in the enclosure to this letter. In addition, general comments 
are summarized below. 

1) To improve clarity we recommend that you refer to sites using a 
geographic reference. We suggest using the name "Tuba City Mill Site" 
or "Tuba City Former Processing Site" rather than "Rare Metals". The 
"Rare Metals" site refers to a specific owner/operator's name, which 
is not consistent with nomenclature for Uranium Mill Tailings 
Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) sites. DOE has established guidelines 
for naming or identifying sites, and has eliminated the use of company 
names or property owners. DOE uses geographical proximity to cities or 
towns, or where multiple sites exist within a city or town, a direction
name after each site (e.g. Ambrosia Lake West). 

2) We appreciate the need to quantify the scope of remaining work 
(including cost and schedule) necessary to fully address uranium 
contamination on, or near, the Navajo Nation. However, it is not 
possible, at this time, to accurately determine the full scope of the
remaining work much less provide reasonable estimates of schedule and 
cost. Factors that will influence the schedule and cost include: the 
applicability of environmental regulations and standards to mine 
remediation; the number and financial status of potentially 
responsible parties; the performance of existing and proposed 
environmental remedies; the results of ongoing health studies; the 
pervasive presence of naturally occurring uranium; the viability of 
institutional controls; and, the impacts of a recent court settlement 
(KerrMcGee) as well as ongoing and potential litigation. Given the 
potential impact of these factors it would be misleading to present a 
scope of work, with associated cost and schedule information, 
necessary to address the remaining uranium contamination on the 
Navajo, Nation. 

3) With respect to the observation: "There... are instances when 
uranium contamination on the Navajo reservation appears to be treated 
differently than contamination on non-Indian lands, such as the 
community in Moab, UT, where DOE is excavating a large mill tailings
pile and disposing of it elsewhere." 

Each former uranium milling site presents a different set of technical 
challenges, stakeholder concerns, and site history. The former milling 
sites on the Navajo Nation were a priority for DOE in the 1980s and 
1990s. Surface cleanup at these sites was completed over twenty years 
ago. Disposal cell design and decisions regarding groundwater cleanup
will continue to evolve over time. The cleanup of the four, former 
milling sites on the Navajo Nation were evaluated as required 
under.the National Environmental Policy Act. Today, the disposal cells 
are protective of human health and the environment and the
impact to groundwater has been carefully studied and is relatively 
minor. It is worth noting that because the groundwater at UMTRCA sites 
was contaminated by past milling operations, moving the contents of a 
disposal cell would do little, if anything, to improve site water 
quality. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

David W. Geiser: 
Director: 
Office of Legacy Management: 

Response to Report Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: To ensure that agencies working on the 2014 5-year 
plan better align their activities and resources, we recommend that 
the Administrator of EPA; the Secretaries of Energy, Interior, and 
Health and Human Services; and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, as they develop a coordinated outreach strategy to include 
the 2014 5-year plan, take action to incorporate key practices in 
their collaborative effort, such as defining and agreeing on the 
agencies' respective roles and responsibilities. 

Management Response: 

Concur: The need to improve community outreach was identified by the 
agencies during preparation of the second 5-year plan. As a result, a 
combined master calendar of outreach activities was prepared in 
consultation with DOE, Health and Human Services, and Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission staff and is included in the current draft of 
the second 5-year plan. The calendar represents a coordinated, 
integrated approach to schedule community outreach activities by the 
agencies. In addition, the agencies have agreed to support the 
creation of a Community Outreach Network to better coordinate outreach 
and communication with communities. A Community Outreach Coordinator 
will lead the network, will be located on Navajo Nation, and will 
staff an office/visitors' center where information about uranium and 
each agencies' activities will be available. These actions will be 
implemented upon completion of the second 5-year plan and are expected 
to continue into the foreseeable future. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of the Interior: 

United States Department of the Interior: 
Bureau Of Indian Affairs: 
Washington, DC 20240: 

April 17, 2014: 

Mr. J. Alfredo Gomez: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Gomez: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report entitled, Uranium 
Contamination: Overall Scope, Time Frame, and Cost Information is 
Needed for Contamination Cleanup on the Navajo Reservation (GAO-14-
323). We appreciate GAO's efforts to focus attention on ways to 
improve the response to uranium contamination on the Navajo 
reservation. 

The Department of the Interior concurs with the recommendations but 
does not agree with the findings associated with scheduling and cost 
estimating. 

The report's title suggests it is aimed at looking at the "overall: 
scope, time frame, and cost information needed for uranium 
contamination cleanup involving more than 500 unremediated uranium 
mines on the Navajo reservation--but the report aims its final three 
recommendations at criticizing Bureau of Indian Affair (BIA) 
management of the Tuba City Dump cleanup, a very small part of the 
overall cleanup problem. The Department does take its responsibilities 
related to this site seriously. The Department believes the management 
of the cleanup has been handled responsibly, but as explained in the 
enclosure, circumstances beyond BIA's control contributed to delays. 

Th Department believes the United State's trust relationship with the 
Navajo Nation, coupled with the actions the United States has taken 
with respect to uranium production over the decades, demands more be 
done in response to this problem. The United States has extensive 
experience over the last few decades in addressing massive 
environmental contan1ination, including that originating from war 
material and weapon production activities. That expertise should be
brought to bear on the entire current problem, rather than focusing on 
discrete and shorter term issues. 

The announcement on April 5, 2014 of the $5.1 billion Anadarko 
settlement, pursuant to which the Navajo Nation is reportedly to 
receive about $1 billion to address uranium contamination, may provide 
an opportunity for high leveL comprehensive discussions about better 
addressing the totality of the Navajo uranium contamination problem. 
The Department will be reaching out to the other governmental entities 
referenced in the report in an effort to jump-start those discussions. 

The enclosure provides additional comments to capture more accurately 
the progress made by the BIA. If you have any question about this 
response, please contact Marvin Keller, Acting Chief. Division of 
Environmental and Cultural Resources at (703)390-6470. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Michael Black: 
Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs: 

Enclosure: 

Department of The Interior: 
Comments on Draft GAO Report: 
Uranium Contamination: Overall Scope, Time Frame, and Cost Information 
is Needed/or Contamination Cleanup on the Navajo Reservation (GAO-14-
323): 

Comments and Clarifications on Recommendations for the Tuba City Dump 
(TCD) Site: 

Recommendation 1: To ensure that agencies working on the 2014 5-year 
plan better align their activities and resources the Executive Branch 
entities involved in addressing the uranium contamination on the 
Navajo reservation as they develop a coordinated outreach strategy to 
include in the 2014 5-year plan, should take action to incorporate key 
practices in their collaborative effort, such as defining and agreeing 
on the agencies' respective roles and responsibilities. 

Response: Indian Affairs (IA) concurs. To this end the Department has 
already reached out to the counterparts at the Department of Energy, 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and 
Human Services and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and suggested 
that this topic be addressed by the White House Council on Native 
American Affairs. That will raise the visibility of, and attention 
paid, to these important issues. 

Recommendation 2: Identify and examine lesson learned from managing 
the RI/FS contract and consider these lessons as part of the 
acquisition planning process for the remedial action contract. 

Response: IA concurs. We regularly review lessons learned. We plan to 
implement lessons learned with the RI/FS implementation contract in 
the next phases of the remediation process. 

Recommendation 3: Employ best practices in creating the schedule and 
cost estimates for the remedial action contract. 

Response: IA concurs. We will continue to prepare schedules and 
estimates in accordance with Interior's "Environmental and Disposal 
Liabilities Identification. Documentation and Reporting Handbook", 
dated December 2011, and other standards of the environmental 
industry. We do not believe the guides used by GAO are applicable to 
environmental actions. 

Recommendation 4: Apply for funding from Interior's Central Hazardous 
Materials Fund in order to help meet the funding need for remedial 
action cleanup phase of the project. 

Response: IA concurs with the need to seek resources through multiple 
avenues. The Central Hazardous Materials Fund is allocated to fund 
highest priorities among a very long list of property needs. Thus, as 
appropriate, we will pursue funding through the Indian Affairs budget
and other possible mean as well. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services: 

Department of Health & Human Services: 
Office of The Secretary: 
Assistant Secretary for Legislation: 
Washington, DC 20201: 

April 18, 2014: 

J. Alfredo Gomez: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Gomez: 

Attached are comments on the U.S. Government Accountability Office's 
(GAO) report entitled, "Uranium Contamination: Overall Scope, Time 
Frame, and Cost Information is Needed for Contamination Cleanup on the 
Navajo Reservation" (GAO-14-323). 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to review this report prior 
to publication. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Jim R. Esquea: 
Assistant Secretary for Legislation: 

Attachment: 

General Comments Of The Department Of Health And Human Services (HHS) 
On The Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Draft Report Entitled. 
"Uranium Contamination: Overall Scope, Time Frame, And Cost 
Information Is Needed For Contamination Cleanup On The Navajo 
Reservation" (GAO-14-323): 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on 
this draft report. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To ensure that agencies working on the 2014 5-year plan better align 
their activities and resources, recommend that the Administrator of 
EPA; the Secretaries of Energy, the Interior, and Health and Human 
Services; and the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory commission, as they
develop a coordinated outreach strategy to include the 2014 5-year 
plan, take action to incorporate key practices in their collaborative 
effort, such as defining and agreeing on the agencies' respective 
roles and responsibilities. 

HHS Response: 

HHS concurs with GAO's recommendation. The Navajo Area IHS (NAIHS) 
will continue to conduct outreach events in Navajo communities 
alerting other agencies using a planned EPA SharePoint site to 
facilitate their scheduling and participation. The NAIHS staff will 
also attend other agency outreach events and coordinate presentations 
with those agencies. 

[End of section] 

Appendix X: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001: 

April 17, 2014: 

Mr. J. Alfredo G6mez, Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Gomez: 

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am 
responding to your letter dated March 25, 2014, requesting comments on 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) draft report GAO-14-
323, "Overall Scope, Time Frame, and Cost Information is Needed for 
Contamination Cleanup on the Navajo Reservation. n We appreCiate the 
opportunity to review the draft report and provide our comments for 
your consideration. 

As requested, the NRC has reviewed the draft report and, in general, 
is in agreement. Our comments are enclosed. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Mark A. Satorius: 
Executive Director for Operations: 

Enclosure: 
NRC comments on draft GAO report. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XI: Comments from the Navajo Nation: 

Navajo Nation Department of Justice: 
Office of The Attorney General: 
Harrison Tsosie: Attorney General: 
Dana Bobroff: Deputy Attorney General: 
P.O. Box 2010: 
Window Rock, AZ 86515: 
(928)871-6345: 
Fax No. (928)871-6177: 

Via Electronic Mail and U.S. Regular Mail: 

April 15, 2014: 

Mr. J. Alfredo Gomez, Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G. St. NW: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Re: GAO Draft Report on Uranium Contamination in the Navajo Nation: 

Dear Mr. Gomez: 

First I want to take this opportunity to personally thank the 
representatives of your office who spent many hours on the Navajo 
Nation visiting abandoned uranium mine sites and former uranium
processing sites. These representatives include Jeffrey Malcom of the 
U.S. GAO Washington D.C. Office, Leslie Pollock of the U.S. GAO Denver 
Office and Emily Hanawalt of the U.S. GAO San Francisco Office. They 
traveled across the Navajo Nation visiting perhaps twenty of our 521
abandoned uranium mine sites and three of our five former uranium 
processing sites. Their effort at gathering first-hand information was 
commendable and much appreciated. 

Still, however, as I am sure all understand and agree, it is an 
impossible task to fully comprehend the nature and extent of the 
devastation to Navajo lands and people caused by past uranium mining 
and processing without living here and experiencing the impacts on a 
daily basis. 

With that in mind, here is our overall reaction to the GAO Draft 
Report. While, like the recent widely reported Tronox settlement, it 
represents a good start, the GAO Draft Report falls short in a number 
of areas, especially in its admittedly vague projections of additional 
funds necessary to address the remaining problems, in its assessment 
of certain agencies successes, and in its failure to emphasize the 
lack of groundwater characterization that has taken place concerning 
abandoned uranium mine sites. 

We illustrate the funding issue by using the recent Tronox settlement 
as a focal point. Assuming that the settlement is approved by the 
Court and assuming that all public comments can be adequately 
addressed and assuming that there are no appeals filed, the Navajo 
Nation stands to have approximately 1 billion dollars available for 
remediating 50 former Kerr-McGee operated abandoned uranium mines and 
one former mill site. It is important to note that the evidence 
presented at trial and the evidence considered in the settlement 
related only to those 50 out of 521 abandoned mine sites and one mill 
site. The amount allocated to the former mill site is 43 million. 
Given the fact that many of the former Kerr-McGee mines are located in 
rugged, remote mountainous regions, as noted in the Draft GAO Report, 
we are not at all sure that the approximate 985 million allotted to 
the mines will be sufficient to complete their remediation. We are 
hopeful. 

On the other hand we are quite sure that the 43 million allocated to 
the former Shiprock Mill site will fall far short of the money needed 
to achieve our desired result for that site, relocation of the unlined 
tailings pile to a different, safer place, as is occurring with the 
Moab tailings pile. Our projected cost of that task is close to a 
billion dollars by itself. 

Thus, it is clear to us that the best current guess as to projected 
costs for future remediation on the Navajo Nation should be expressed 
in the billions as opposed to the hundreds of millions of dollars. 

Next, we take issue with the discussion regarding the Department of 
Energy meeting its Five-Year Plan goal of continuing the funding for 
remediation of former mill sites on the Navajo Nation. Strictly 
speaking we recognize the accuracy of that statement, but, as we 
believe the writers of the Draft Report realize, the goal was achieved 
only because it was incredibly modest to begin with and contained no 
commitment for additional funds. For us it is imperative for people to 
realize that there is no substantial evidence available to indicate 
that the treatment operations at those mill sites are successfully 
remediating the groundwater contamination. They are failing and we 
challenge anyone at DOE to say otherwise. This should have been 
plainly stated in the Draft Report. 

Furthermore we believe the Draft Report understates the lack of 
progress in characterizing the potential groundwater contamination 
caused by past uranium mining. We illustrate this point by noting that 
we are just now getting firm commitments from U.S. EPA to fully 
characterize the groundwater beneath the Northeast Church Rock site. 
To our knowledge there has been no full groundwater characterization 
at any of the 521 abandoned uranium mine sites. 

Additionally, we believe there is a substantial omission in the Draft 
Report regarding what is needed in moving forward. Both the Congress 
and the Executive Branch agencies need to commit the United States to 
full and long term clean-up of the uranium contamination that 
continues to devastate Navajo people and lands. 

Finally, we would greatly appreciate you adding New Mexico Senator Tom 
Udall to the list of Congressional Representatives who will receive 
this Report. Senator Udall participated in the 2007 Congressional 
Hearing when he was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives and he
continues to stay focused on the needs of the Navajo Nation concerning 
uranium related matters. 

Attached to this letter you will find additional more specific 
comments prepared by Navajo Nation EPA Executive Director Steve 
Etsitty, Navajo EPA long time employee Cassandra Bloedel and Navajo 
Nation outside attorney Paul Frye. We ask you to also take these 
comments into consideration. 

Thank you again for your efforts and your help in giving us a good 
start at addressing these overwhelming issues. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Harrison Tsosie, Attorney General: 
The Navajo Nation: 

Attachments: 

[End of section] 

Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

J. Alfredo Gómez, (202) 512-3841 or g [Hyperlink, gomezj@gao.gov] 
omezj@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Jeffery D. Malcolm 
(Assistant Director), Juaná Collymore, John Delicath, Tisha 
Derricotte, Emily Hanawalt, John Krump, Leslie Kaas Pollock, Karen 
Richey, Dan Royer, Kelly Rubin, Jeanette Soares, Kiki Theodoropoulos, 
and Sarah Veale made significant contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Uranium is a naturally occurring radioactive element found at 
elevated levels across the Navajo reservation and the entire Colorado 
Plateau. We are using the term "contamination" to refer to the 
presence of uranium in soil and water at the point where it may 
present a health risk to humans. 

[2] Because the uranium mines in the region were located on or near 
Navajo lands, this report is focused primarily on the Navajo Nation. 
We discuss effects on the Hopi Tribe from a former landfill known as 
the Tuba City Dump, located largely on Hopi land. 

[3] Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat. 3021 (1978). 

[4] EPA, et al., Health and Environmental Impacts of Uranium 
Contamination in the Navajo Nation: Five-Year Plan as requested by 
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, June 9, 2008. 

[5] Pub. L. No. 96-510 (1980), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
9601-9675. 

[6] Federal and tribal agencies estimate the number of homes and 
people without regulated drinking water on the Navajo reservation 
through different methodologies. As a result, their estimates of these 
numbers vary. 

[7] In August 2010, EPA and BIA entered into an Administrative 
Settlement Agreement and Order on Consent for BIA to conduct a 
remedial investigation and feasibility study at the Tuba City Dump. 
BIA's work under the settlement agreement is subject to EPA's 
approval, and EPA will make the decision regarding a cleanup remedy. 

[8] ATSDR was established within the Public Health Service of the 
Department of Health and Human Services. ATSDR is supported by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and located within 
CDC's Office of Noncommunicable Disease, Injury and Environmental 
Health. 

[9] EPA, et al., Federal Actions to Address Impacts of Uranium 
Contamination in the Navajo Nation: Five-Year Plan Summary Report, 
January 2013. 

[10] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March 
2009); and GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 
Project Schedules, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G] (Washington, D.C.: May 2012). 

[11] Early mining on the reservation was for the mineral vanadium, 
which was used in steel production, and uranium was extracted from the 
vanadium mill tailings. 

[12] The more recent technique for extracting uranium in the United 
States is called in situ recovery, which aims to extract uranium with 
less surface disturbance. According to NRC, this technique involves 
extracting uranium from aquifers that naturally contain uranium and 
other hazardous constituents by injecting oxygenated water and carbon 
dioxide or sodium bicarbonate hundreds of feet underground to dissolve 
uranium located in a subsurface ore body. Once dissolved, the water 
and uranium mixture is pumped to the surface. The primary risk 
associated with in situ recovery is the potential for contamination of 
nearby groundwater outside of the ore zone. When operations cease, 
companies remove and stabilize hazardous constituents found in the 
groundwater that may have been disturbed from the ore body by the 
operations. How long it will take to restore an in situ recovery site 
after production ceases is variable, and restoration to background 
levels may not be achievable for every constituent, according to NRC 
officials with whom we spoke. 

[13] House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, The Health 
and Environmental Impacts of Uranium Contamination In the Navajo 
Nation, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 2007. 

[14] Background radiation is the radiation that is emitted from 
naturally occurring materials, such as from radium that is present in 
nearly all soils and rocks, or from other elements found in the 
earth's crust, including thorium and potassium. Background radiation 
varies all over the world, depending on the makeup of soils and rocks 
in the local area and on the elevation of the local area, which 
affects the amount of exposure to cosmic radiation. EPA considers 
radiation levels of more than 2-times background levels as evidence of 
an observed hazardous release that may require further investigation 
under CERCLA. 

[15] Pub. L. No. 96-510 (1980), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
9601-9675. 

[16] Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat. 3021 (1978). 

[17] Courts have held responsible party liability under CERCLA to be 
strict, joint and several, and retroactive. Under strict liability, a 
party may be liable for cleanup even though its actions were not 
considered negligent. Because liability is joint and several, when the 
harm done is indivisible, one party can be held responsible for the 
full cost of the remedy even though other parties may have contributed 
to the release of hazardous substances at the site. Retroactive 
liability means that liability applies to actions that took place 
before CERCLA was enacted. 

[18] Specifically, a federal district court has ruled that the federal 
government, as holder of title to the land on the Spokane Indian 
Reservation and entity responsible for approving and enforcing the 
uranium mine lease, is liable under CERCLA for the restoration of land 
damaged by uranium mining. See United States v. Newmont USA Ltd, 504 
F.Supp.2d 1050, 1075 (E.D. Wash. 2007) ("[T]he drafters of CERCLA 
intended that land held by the United States in trust for Indians be 
treated the same as land owned in fee simple by the United States"). 

[19] Under CERCLA, federal agencies are generally not authorized to 
respond to a release of "a naturally occurring substance in its 
unaltered form, or altered solely through naturally occurring 
processes or phenomena, from a location where it is naturally found." 
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(3). The burden is on the responsible party to 
prove that the government lacks the authority to respond to any 
particular release for this reason. E.g., United States v. W.R. Grace -
Conn., 280 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1175 (D. Mont. 2003). Releases resulting 
from mining activity that relocates the naturally occurring substances 
are not subject to the statutory limitation. E.g., Monarch Greenback 
v. Monticello Insurance, 118 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1080 (D. Idaho 1999). In 
this report, we use the term "contamination" to refer to releases of 
hazardous substances other than those covered by the statutory 
exemption. We make no findings herein as to whether any particular 
release is subject to the limitation. 

[20] A site evaluation includes a site investigation and an 
engineering evaluation/cost analysis. 

[21] CERCLA established the Superfund Trust Fund to support Superfund 
program activities. Historically, the Superfund Trust Fund received 
revenue from four major sources: taxes on crude oil and certain 
chemicals, as well as an environmental tax assessed on corporations 
based on their taxable income; transfers via appropriations from the 
general fund of the Treasury; fines, penalties, and recoveries from 
potentially responsible parties; and interest earned on the balance of 
the Superfund Trust Fund. As of 2011, the Superfund Trust Fund's 
primary source of revenue is the transfer from the general fund of the 
Treasury. EPA's Superfund program receives annual appropriations from 
the Superfund Trust Fund. 

[22] 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1). In placing sites on the NPL, EPA uses 
a hazard ranking system to determine a site's relative threat to human 
health and the environment based on potential pathways of 
contamination and the availability of alternative state or federal 
programs that could clean up the site, among other things. EPA 
considers risks to human health and the environment, the urgency of 
the need for response, and program management factors, such as 
projected costs to the Superfund program and the timing of funding 
needs. 

[23] There is a fifth former uranium mill site that is not located on 
the Navajo reservation but is located on private land, surrounded by 
Navajo land, directly across from the Northeast Church Rock mine. In 
contrast to the four mill sites on the reservation that are UMTRCA 
Title I sites, and which DOE was required to remediate, this mill site 
is an UMTRCA Title II site, which the private licensee, not DOE, is 
required to remediate. NRC licenses the site, subjecting it to NRC's 
decontamination, decommissioning, and reclamation standards, and the 
site is listed on the NPL. EPA issued an administrative order to the 
site's former operator to undertake a CERCLA remedial action. When 
this mill site is remediated to NRC standards the site will be 
transferred to DOE, which will perform long-term surveillance and 
maintenance. 

[24] The Rare Metals Corporation and its successor, the El Paso 
Natural Gas Company, operated the Tuba City uranium processing site 
from 1956 to 1966. DOE refers to this former processing site as the 
Tuba City site, but in order to distinguish it from the other 
contaminated sites in the Tuba City area discussed in this report, we 
refer to the Tuba City former uranium processing site as the Rare 
Metals site. 

[25] DOE and the Navajo Nation entered into a cooperative agreement in 
1983 to facilitate the surface remedial actions at the sites on the 
reservation. This agreement expired in 1998, and a new cooperative 
agreement was initiated for groundwater cleanup that remains in effect. 

[26] According to DOE officials, no uranium mines met the statutory 
definition of a vicinity property. 

[27] The Navajo Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation Program conducts 
reclamation work on uranium mines using Abandoned Mine Reclamation 
Fund money. Under the Surface Mining Control Reclamation Act, the 
Navajo Nation applies for grants from the Abandoned Mine Reclamation 
Fund to reclaim non-coal lands and waters and develop infrastructure 
in communities affected by mining activities. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 
1235(k), 1240a(b); 53 Fed. Reg. 17186 (May 16, 1988); 59 Fed. Reg. 
49178 (Sept. 27, 1994). 

[28] We have reported that federal agencies do not have a consistent 
definition of an abandoned hardrock mine, including uranium mines. For 
example, some agencies count each mine feature as a separate mine 
where others group all features associated with one mine claim as a 
mine. EPA and NNEPA organize the abandoned uranium mines on the Navajo 
reservation by discrete mine claim. In this report, we are using this 
definition of an abandoned mine and therefore are reporting on the 
number of claims. For readability, we refer to these mine claims as 
mines. See GAO, Uranium Mining: Opportunities Exist to Improve 
Oversight of Financial Assurances, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-544] (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 
2012), and GAO, Hardrock Mining: Information on Abandoned Mines and 
Value and Coverage of Financial Assurances on BLM Land, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-574T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12, 
2008). 

[29] The UMTRCA cooperative agreement is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 
7915(a). 

[30] In addition to establishing targets under eight objectives, the 
2008 5-year plan included a more detailed discussion of each objective 
which, in some cases, identified specific actions the federal agencies 
planned to take and interim milestones the agencies planned to meet. 
This table shows the targets established in the 5-year plan but does 
not identify all actions contained in the plan. 

[31] EPA undertook other interim removal actions, such as constructing 
fences, at two additional sites. 

[32] EPA officials said this prioritization is based on the best 
information available and that they plan to add more mines to the list 
as necessary as they gain additional information about how the land 
surrounding the mines may be used by local residents. 

[33] In 2013, ATSDR extended its agreement with the University of New 
Mexico and the Navajo Nation for the Birth Cohort Study by 5 years, 
until 2018. 

[34] 5 C.F.R. § 1320.10(b). Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, the 
Director of OMB must review and approve agencies' proposed collections 
of information. OMB had 60 days from March 30, 2012--the date ATSDR 
submitted the proposed information collection for the study--to 
approve, disapprove, or request changes to the information collection. 
However, OMB did not request supplemental information from ATSDR until 
July 30, 2012, and did not approve the collection until February 14, 
2013. Because OMB missed the 60-day regulatory deadline, ATSDR was 
allowed to request an OMB control number to validly collect the 
information for a year. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.10(c). However, the agency did 
not make such a request since the study would take more than a year to 
collect the information. OMB staff identified a number of factors 
influencing the length of the review process, including the complexity 
of the information included in the review and the large number of 
study partners participating in discussions related to the review. 
They also noted that ATSDR may have reduced the review time by 
submitting its documents for approval earlier in the process. 

[35] Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 

[36] Pub. L. No. 111-8, Div. C, Tit. III, 123 Stat. 524, 617-18 
(2009). DOE used the existing UMTRCA cooperative agreement with the 
Navajo Nation to provide most of the funding to NNEPA, which led the 
cleanup efforts. 

[37] According to NNEPA officials, they scanned 14 structures for 
radiation and identified 2 that were contaminated and needed 
remediation. Remediation of the 2 structures was completed in March 
2014, and, as of April 2014, NNEPA had identified one additional 
structure that required scanning. 

[38] Committee reports accompanying the fiscal year 2012 and 2013 
appropriation acts directed that $2 million of funds appropriated to 
ATSDR be used to continue epidemiological studies of the health 
conditions caused by exposures to uranium released from mining and 
milling operations on the reservation. 

[39] In 2011, EPA received $13.3 million from the bankruptcy of 
Tronox, Inc., a potentially responsible party as the successor to the 
Kerr-McGee Corporation, which operated contaminated sites on the 
reservation. Of the settlement funds, EPA received $12 million to 
conduct or finance response actions at 49 sites on or near the Navajo 
reservation, including mines. EPA received $1.3 million to conduct or 
finance response actions at Quivira mine. EPA reported that they did 
not spend the Tronox bankruptcy funds on the interim time-critical 
removal action at the Quivira mine since the other former operator 
conducted and financed the action under an administrative order. 

[40] The federal agencies' January 2013 summary report of work 
accomplished under the 2008 5-year plan reported that the agencies had 
spent $110 million during the 5-year plan period; we are reporting a 
different amount because agencies provided us with updated data, and 
we are reporting it in 2013 constant dollars. According to agency 
officials, these figures represent the agencies' direct costs and do 
not include funds for salaries or benefits. 

[41] NRC officials said that, given the high level of interest in the 
site, they believe it is likely that a petition for a hearing on the 
proposed action for the license amendment request will be filed, and 
that the hearing process may take several years. 

[42] According to EPA's assessment of removal options, this is an 
order of magnitude estimate rather than a specific, point estimate. 
Due to uncertainties, total cleanup costs could fall within a range 
from minus 30 percent to plus 50 percent of the $44 million. 

[43] BIA is also responsible for implementing the approved work plan 
by awarding a contract that incorporates the requirements addressed in 
the work plan, and ensuring that its contractors properly perform the 
contract. Under the settlement agreement, BIA is responsible for 
ensuring its contractors comply with the agreement. 

[44] On June 1, 2011, BIA issued a task order for the RI/FS in the 
amount of $1,994,577, under a fixed price indefinite delivery 
indefinite quantity contract. 

[45] DOE has funded work that has contributed to the understanding of 
conditions at the site as well. Specifically, DOE provided funding to 
NNEPA to drill seven groundwater characterization wells between the 
Rare Metals site, located about 4 miles away, and the Tuba City Dump. 
According to DOE, sampling from the wells demonstrated that no 
groundwater contaminants were migrating from the Rare Metals site 
toward the dump. 

[46] Both tribes have sued the federal government over the Tuba City 
Dump and Highway 160 site. Specifically, in 2010, the Navajo Nation 
intervened in an appeal a potentially responsible party for the Rare 
Metals site filed challenging a federal district court's dismissal of 
its lawsuit over the sites. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia affirmed the dismissal. See El Paso Natural Gas 
Co. v. United States, 632 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The tribe then 
intervened in a subsequent lawsuit the potentially responsible party 
brought, which the district court also dismissed. El Paso Natural Gas 
Comp. v. United States, 774 F.Supp.2d 40 (D.D.C. 2011). The tribe and 
potentially responsible party subsequently brought additional legal 
claims against the government, which the district court also 
dismissed. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 847 F.Supp.2d 111 
(D.D.C. 2012). The tribe and potentially responsible party appealed 
this decision, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia affirmed the dismissal of the claims concerning the dump 
but allowed one of the claims concerning groundwater remediation at 
the Highway 160 site to be heard by the district court. El Paso 
Natural Gas Company v. United States, No. 12-5156, 12-5157, _ F.3d _ 
(D.C. Cir. 2014). The Hopi Tribe filed a complaint against the BIA in 
Hopi Tribal Court. See Hopi Tribe v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, No. 
2011-cv-0107 (Hopi Tribal Court). 

[47] Under the terms and conditions of the contract, BIA issued a cure 
notice to its contractor on November 9, 2012. The cure notice stated 
that BIA would terminate the contract within 10 days if the contractor 
did not cure the conditions stated in the notice that were endangering 
performance of the contract. 

[48] GAO, Acquisition Planning: Opportunities to Build Strong 
Foundations for Better Services Contracts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-672] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 9, 
2011). 

[49] The settlement agreement allows BIA to request an extension to 
deadlines in the work plan schedule from EPA in advance of a deadline 
and requires EPA to approve a timely extension request when good cause 
exists for the extension. 

[50] Under the settlement agreement, BIA is liable for specified 
stipulated penalties per violation per day for failure to comply with 
any of the agreement's requirements, including failure to perform work 
as required in the approved work plan and failure to submit timely or 
adequate reports or documents specified by EPA. EPA reviewed the 
reasons BIA gave for missing deadlines and considered BIA's past work, 
as well as its proposal for future work, to determine which missed 
deadlines were justifiable. According to EPA documents, at least 966 
days of missed deadlines in 2012 were unjustifiable, including 54 days 
due to BIA coordination and contractor performance. EPA held the 
stipulated penalties in abeyance for the missed deadlines it 
determined to be unjustifiable. 

[51] According to EPA, the issuance of penalties was held in abeyance 
because of (1) BIA's efforts to correct deficiencies in its management 
that had led to delays, reattain schedule progress, and comply with an 
optimized schedule to make up for some delays and (2) project delays 
that can result from the process of issuing penalties. EPA has 
reserved the right to issue penalties for the deadlines BIA missed in 
2012. Based on EPA documents, the penalties appear at a minimum to be 
between $443,000 and $887,500. 

[52] According to EPA documents, the 966 days of missed deadlines 
translated into a few weeks' delay because the deadlines were for 
interim products or actions, and there were multiple concurrent 
violations. 

[53] The work plan deadline for submittal of the draft Remedial 
Investigation report was on August 23, 2013. BIA requested an 
extension of this deadline on September 3, 2013, and submitted the 
draft report on the new deadline of November 15, 2013. 

[54] A schedule is comprehensive if it includes all activities for 
both the government and its contractors necessary to accomplish a 
project's objectives and realistically reflects how long each activity 
will take; is well-constructed if all its activities are logically 
sequenced; is credible if it reflects the order of events necessary to 
achieve a final outcome and data about risks are used to predict a 
level of confidence in meeting the project's completion date; and is 
controlled if it is updated by trained schedulers using actual 
progress to realistically forecast dates. See [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G]. 

[55] BIA submitted an extension request in September 2013 and another 
in October 2013. EPA did not initially approve the September 2013 
request because it found that BIA had not demonstrated good cause for 
the extension as required by the settlement agreement. However, EPA 
did not respond to the September request within the time period 
required by the settlement agreement so EPA was deemed to have 
concurred with the extension. EPA did not find the October 2013 
request to be justified but did find the October 2013 government 
shutdown to constitute good cause to adjust the schedule. 

[56] BIA and its contractor have estimated the costs for two remedial 
actions: (1) a low-cost option that involves closing the landfill in 
place and installing a cap and cover system and (2) a high-cost option 
that entails excavating the waste and contaminated material and 
disposing of it offsite. 

[57] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. 

[58] EPA has already selected cleanup actions at 2 of the 43 highest 
priority mines: Skyline mine, where the cleanup action was selected 
and has been conducted, and Northeast Church Rock mine, where EPA has 
selected the removal action but it has not been completed. According 
to EPA officials, since they conducted the cleanup at Skyline mine to 
be protective of human health and the environment in the long term, 
they consider the cleanup action to be complete. The Navajo Nation, 
however, considers the cleanup to be temporary given its current 
position regarding removing all mine waste from the reservation. 

[59] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. 

[60] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G]. 

[61] Specifically, this report is required to identify the locations 
of abandoned uranium mines across the country, including on the Navajo 
reservation; describe the risks associated with the mines; prioritize 
the remediation and reclamation of the mines; analyze the cost of 
remediating and reclaiming each mine; and describe the status of any 
efforts to remediate and reclaim the mines. Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 
3151 (2013). The statutory reporting deadline is July 2, 2014. 
According to DOE, the agency met with EPA and Navajo agencies as 
required to ensure that all mines on Navajo lands are incorporated in 
the report. 

[62] In 2012, IHS estimated that there were approximately 5,500 homes 
on the entire Navajo reservation without piped water. 

[63] Specifically, according to DOE officials, lower volumes of 
groundwater present underneath the Rare Metals site has resulted in 
reduced efficacy of the pump-and-treat system. DOE has operated the 
system since 2002, and it has not observed significant or widespread 
decreases in the concentration of contaminants under the site. DOE 
officials estimate it could take 400 years to achieve water quality 
standards with the current system. Similarly, at Shiprock, DOE has run 
a pumping system for the past 10 years, but it has not decreased 
overall contamination levels, although the extent of one plume has 
decreased, and many previously existing contaminant seeps have gone 
dry. DOE estimated in 2002 that it would need to operate portions of 
the pumping system for up to 60 years; however, DOE officials said 
that they have not recalculated that number in light of actual 
performance of the system. 

[64] The more thorough assessments, as we refer to them here, include 
(1) a site evaluation, including an engineering evaluation/cost 
analysis, to support a non-time critical removal action or (2) an 
RI/FS to support a remedial action. 

[65] We created this rough estimate based on the following 
assumptions: (1) EPA would need to fully fund removal actions at 21 of 
the highest priority mines that most likely will not have a 
potentially responsible party available to contribute to the costs; 
(2) the costs for these removal actions would average, at a minimum, 
what EPA spent on the removal action conducted at Skyline mine, or 
about $7 million; and (3) EPA Region 9's Superfund removal budget 
funding levels from the 2008 5-year plan period continue into the 
future. 

[66] In addition, if the federal government is a potentially 
responsible party at any of these highest priority sites, it is also 
liable for cleanup costs, thereby increasing the amount of federal 
funds necessary for cleanup. 

[67] Further, a NNEPA water program official explained in a 
presentation that, even if the residents choose to haul water from a 
regulated source, CDC found that the cisterns used by many residents 
to store their water at their homes contained bacteria, which could 
contaminate clean water hauled and then stored in the cistern. 

[68] This estimate is based on the same assumptions as our time frame 
estimate. 

[69] According to EPA officials, Skyline mine was a small-sized mine, 
and these officials said they believe it represents the low end of 
costs for these mines. In addition, EPA did not incur transportation 
costs at Skyline mine because the agency disposed of the waste in a 
newly constructed cell located on-site. 

[70] A senior Navajo Area IHS official told us that the agency funded 
7 of the 36 projects in fiscal year 2013, after the 2008 5-year plan 
was complete. Therefore, the remaining 28 economically feasible 
projects are estimated to cost about $29 million. 

[71] DOE created its estimate to contribute to the agency's 
environmental liability estimate and includes anticipated work 
associated with the four former processing sites on the Navajo 
reservation, DOE's cooperative agreements with the Navajo Nation and 
Hopi Tribe, and the expected disposal of waste from Northeast Church 
Rock mine at a former processing site just off the reservation. 

[72] The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 established the 
Drinking Water State Revolving Fund, which provides annual funding to 
states to finance projects for publicly and privately owned drinking 
water treatment systems. Specifically, states use the funding to 
provide low-or no-interest loans to communities or utilities, which, 
when repaid, allows the funding of future loans for additional 
projects. Tribes receive funding through a set-aside account that 
represents a percentage of the total appropriation for the fund. 

[73] According to EPA officials, EPA Region 9 has used the Superfund 
Trust Fund to pay for removal actions through its removal program. 

[74] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[75] 79 Fed. Reg. 20910 (Apr. 14, 2014); In re: Tronox, Incorp., et 
al, Case No. 09-10165 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y.). 

[76] EPA Region 9's Office of Air and Radiation developed the list of 
potentially contaminated structures, and officials from the region's 
Superfund program told us they were not aware of the list until the 
Navajo Nation presented it at a 2007 congressional hearing on Navajo 
uranium contamination. A NNEPA program official told us that, 
subsequently, in assessing homes on the list for contamination, one 
homeowner asked her if she had come to retrieve an old radon testing 
canister. The home owner presented the official with the canister--
stamped with EPA's name and logo--and told her that EPA had placed the 
canister in her home in the 1970s or early 1980s but had never 
returned to communicate the results. 

[77] In recent years, some mining companies have expressed a renewed 
interest in uranium mining on or near the Navajo reservation. For 
example, since 2005, one company has pursued NRC approval to renew its 
license for uranium mining on four sites in New Mexico that are near 
the reservation, according to NRC officials we spoke with. In 2012, 
the company also signed an agreement with the Navajo Nation allowing 
it to cross tribal trust land in order to access a site where it has 
been conducting exploration; however, the agreement specifically 
states that the company cannot begin mining uranium on that site until 
legacy waste at that site and an adjacent site has been cleaned up. 

[78] 42 U.S.C. § 7914(f)(2);10 C.F.R. § 40.27(b), (c). 

[79] In October 2011, we reported on EPA's efforts for promoting 
environmental justice, that is, the fair treatment and meaningful 
involvement of all people in developing, implementing, and enforcing 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. The concept of 
environmental justice is based on the belief that communities with 
large numbers of minority or low-income residents frequently shoulder 
a disproportionate share of environmental and health risks. Many of 
these communities are located in areas within close proximity to 
sources of pollutants that can adversely affect both the environment 
and human health. See GAO, Environmental Justice: EPA Needs to Take 
Additional Actions to Help Ensure Effective Implementation, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-77] (Washington, D.C.: 
Oct. 6, 2011). 

[80] The project involves relocating 16 million tons of tailings and 
tailings contaminated soil. DOE estimates that the project will be 
completed in 2025, at a total project cost of about $1 billion. 

[81] The U.S. government has issued formal apologies for past events. 
For example, in Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993), Congress 
apologized to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the people of the United 
States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii with the 
participation of agents and citizens of the United States. In 
addition, in the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, Congress 
apologized on behalf of the nation to underground uranium miners and 
their families, among others, for the hardships they endured. Pub. L. 
No. 101-426, 104 Stat. 920 (1990). 

[82] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). 

[83] Other key practices we identified in [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] that can enhance and sustain 
interagency collaboration are: define and articulate a common outcome; 
identify and address needs by leveraging resources; establish 
compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across 
agency boundaries; develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report 
on the results; reinforce agency accountability for collaborative 
efforts; and reinforce individual accountability for collaborative 
efforts. 

[84] In an April 2013 letter to the Executive Directors of NNEPA and 
the Navajo Nation Division of Natural Resources, which houses the 
Abandoned Mine Lands Reclamation program, the Navajo Nation Department 
of Justice encouraged the two agencies to continue to work 
cooperatively at sites contaminated by past uranium mining or 
processing while stating its position that NNEPA exercises regulatory 
authority over all actions taken by any other Navajo Nation agency at 
these sites. 

[85] We have assessed environmental cleanup projects against the 
criteria found in our cost estimating and assessment guide and our 
schedule assessment guide and have reported on the results of these 
assessments. See, for example, GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Factors Leading 
to Cost Increases with the Uranium Processing Facility, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-686R] (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 
2013); GAO, Nuclear Waste: Actions Needed to Address Persistent 
Concerns with Efforts to Close Underground Radioactive Waste Tanks at 
DOE's Savannah River Site, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-816] (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 14, 
2010); and GAO, Department of Energy: Actions Needed to Develop High-
Quality Cost Estimates for Construction and Environmental Cleanup 
Projects, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-199] 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2010). 

[86] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G]. 

[87] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. 

[88] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G]. 

[89] We determined the overall assessment rating by assigning each 
individual rating a number: Not Met = 1, Minimally Met = 2, Partially 
Met = 3, Substantially Met = 4, and Met = 5. Then, we took the average 
of the individual assessment ratings to determine the overall rating 
for each of the four characteristics. The resulting average becomes 
the Overall Assessment as follows: Not Met = 1.0 to 1.4, Minimally Met 
= 1.5 to 2.4, Partially Met = 2.5 to 3.4, Substantially Met = 3.5 to 
4.4, and Met = 4.5 to 5.0. 

[90] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. 

[91] We determined the overall assessment rating by assigning each 
individual rating a number: Not Met = 1, Minimally Met = 2, Partially 
Met = 3, Substantially Met = 4, and Met = 5. Then, we took the average 
of the individual assessment ratings to determine the overall rating 
for each of the four characteristics. The resulting average becomes 
the Overall Assessment as follows: Not Met = 1.0 to 1.4, Minimally Met 
= 1.5 to 2.4, Partially Met = 2.5 to 3.4, Substantially Met = 3.5 to 
4.4, and Met = 4.5 to 5.0. 

[92] In April 2013, Radiation Exposure Compensation Act Amendments of 
2013 were introduced in the House and Senate. The bills, if enacted 
into law, would require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
establish and administer a grant program through the National 
Institutes of Health for the study of the epidemiological impact of 
uranium mining and milling among nonoccupationally exposed 
individuals, including family members of miners and millers. As of 
February 2014, the bills had not been enacted into law. H.R. 1645, 
113th Cong. (2013); S. 773, 113th Cong. (2013). 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the 
performance and accountability of the federal government for the 
American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates 
federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, 
and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, 
and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is 
reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and 
reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's website [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, 
testimony, and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] and select 
"E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO's actual cost of 
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black 
and white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO's 
website, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

Connect with GAO: 

Connect with GAO on facebook, flickr, twitter, and YouTube.
Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 
Website: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]; 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov; 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470. 

Congressional Relations: 

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, DC 20548. 

[End of document]