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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate: 

March 2014: 

Nuclear Safety: 

Countries' Regulatory Bodies Have Made Changes in Response to the 
Fukushima Daiichi Accident: 

GAO-14-109: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-109, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, Committee on Environment and Public 
Works, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The March 2011 accident at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
plant led to a worldwide review of nuclear power programs. NRC 
licenses and oversees civilian nuclear reactors. The State Department 
coordinates policy matters with international organizations and 
treaties, including those dealing with nuclear safety. 

GAO was asked to examine (1) the actions nuclear regulatory bodies 
from selected countries have taken to strengthen nuclear safety; (2) 
the extent to which these countries have established automated systems 
to collect and transmit accident data; and (3) steps international 
organizations have taken to support nuclear regulatory bodies and 
promote nuclear safety worldwide since the accident. The countries GAO 
selected represent a cross section of established and emerging nuclear 
power countries. GAO also reviewed relevant documents and interviewed 
or obtained information from U.S. federal agencies, 15 foreign nuclear 
regulatory bodies, and international organizations. 

What GAO Found: 

All the nuclear regulatory bodies in the 16 selected countries in 
GAO's review—-13 of which currently operate nuclear power reactors and 
3 of which are developing or considering developing civilian nuclear 
power programs—-have taken steps to strengthen nuclear safety in 
response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan. Japan in 
particular has fundamentally restructured its nuclear regulatory 
framework, and 3 other countries—China, Sweden, and Vietnam—are 
providing additional resources to their nuclear regulatory bodies. 
Countries are taking steps to improve safety with a focus on 
considering previously unimagined accident scenarios. Specifically, 
regulatory bodies in several countries (e.g., Belgium, Canada, Russia, 
and the United States) are now planning for accident scenarios that 
could involve multiple reactors at a single power plant. In addition, 
new requirements for emergency equipment, such as backup electric 
generators, in case of the loss of off-site power, as occurred at the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, are an area of focus among the 
regulatory bodies in GAO's review. 

Officials from 6 of the 13 countries with operating nuclear power 
reactors in GAO's review said they have automated systems for 
collecting and transmitting critical nuclear power plant data to the 
nuclear regulatory body or designated technical experts who work with 
the regulatory body during an accident, and officials from a seventh 
country said that it has plans to build such a system. Officials from 
3 of the countries with automated systems, including the United 
States, told GAO they are considering steps to ensure their systems 
can operate in certain emergency conditions, such as during the loss 
of off-site power, but none has a specific timetable for doing so. For 
example, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is first 
completing higher priority nuclear safety enhancements before deciding 
whether or how to upgrade its automated system because how 
enhancements are done may affect how upgrades to an automated system 
would be implemented. By delaying its decision on upgrades to enable 
the system to function under emergency conditions, the system may not 
function when needed most—-during a severe accident. 

Three key international organizations—-the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), the World Association of Nuclear Operators, and the 
European Union—-along with the Convention on Nuclear Safety, have 
taken steps to support nuclear regulatory bodies and help them 
identify the most important lessons of the Fukushima Daiichi accident 
and promote regulatory changes to enhance nuclear safety worldwide. 
For example, one key way IAEA helps countries improve nuclear safety 
and regulatory effectiveness is through peer review missions, which 
evaluate, among other things, a country's nuclear safety regulatory 
framework based on IAEA Safety Standards and good regulatory 
practices. However, according to IAEA officials, the agency does not 
systematically track whether the recommendations of the peer review 
missions are implemented by the host countries. Without this 
information, IAEA cannot fully determine the impact and effectiveness 
of the peer review missions. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends (1) that State and NRC work with and encourage IAEA to 
systematically track the status of recommendations made by IAEA peer 
review missions and (2) NRC consider expediting its decision on 
whether or how to upgrade its automated system for transmitting key 
reactor data. NRC neither agreed nor disagreed with the 
recommendations. State partially concurred with the first 
recommendation and had no comment on the second. GAO believes that 
fully implementing these recommendations would enhance nuclear safety. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-109]. For more 
information, contact David C. Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or 
trimbled@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Nuclear Regulatory Bodies Have Taken Steps to Strengthen Safety: 

Nearly Half of Countries with Nuclear Power Reactors in Our Review 
Have Automated Data Transmission Systems: 

International Efforts Taken to Support Nuclear Regulatory Bodies and 
Promote Nuclear Safety: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Civilian Nuclear Profiles of Selected Countries: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Number of IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) 
Missions by Country, 1992 through June 30, 2013: 

Table 2: Number of IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) 
Missions by Country, 1983 through June 30, 2013: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Unit 3 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 
Following the March 11, 2011, Earthquake and Tsunami: 

Figure 2: NRC's Headquarters Operations Center: 

Abbreviations: 

Action Plan: Action Plan on Nuclear Safety: 

ASN: Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire: 

CNSC: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission: 

Convention: Convention on Nuclear Safety: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

ENS: Emergency Notification System: 

ENSREG: European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group: 

ERDS: Emergency Response Data System: 

EU: European Union: 

EURATOM: European Atomic Energy Community: 

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency: 

IRRS: Integrated Regulatory Review Service: 

IRRT: International Regulatory Review Team: 

NEA: Nuclear Energy Agency: 

NEPC: Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Commission: 

NISA: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency: 

NRA: Nuclear Regulation Authority: 

NRC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

NSSC: Nuclear Safety and Security Commission: 

OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: 

ONR: Office for Nuclear Regulation: 

OSART: Operational Safety Review Team: 

SSM: Swedish Radiation Safety Authority: 

TEPCO: Tokyo Electric Power Company: 

UN: United Nations: 

VPN: Virtual Private Network: 

WANO: World Association of Nuclear Operators: 

WENRA: West European Nuclear Regulators' Association: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 6, 2014: 

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
Committee on Environment and Public Works: 
United States Senate: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The March 2011 accident at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
plant destroyed three nuclear reactors and resulted in the most 
extensive release of radioactive material at a nuclear power plant 
since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.[Footnote 1] The accident, which led 
to the evacuation of over one hundred thousand residents from the area 
around the plant and is expected to cost Japan tens of billions of 
dollars, has led to a review of civilian nuclear power programs 
worldwide. For example, Germany accelerated the shutdown of its 
nuclear power reactors, and Jordan reassessed plans to establish a 
civilian nuclear power program.[Footnote 2] Nuclear regulators and 
industry officials question whether public acceptance of civilian 
nuclear power could survive another severe accident. The Secretary 
General of the United Nations (UN) noted at a September 2011 UN high-
level summit on nuclear safety and security that "the effects of 
nuclear accidents respect no borders." 

Any event that compromises a nuclear power plant's power supplies can 
create the conditions for a nuclear accident. The Fukushima Daiichi 
accident resulted from a prolonged loss of electrical power when a 
powerful earthquake triggered a tsunami wave that exceeded the plant's 
seawall and flooded the site. The loss of power also largely disabled 
Japan's automated system for collecting and transmitting data during 
emergencies. Various stakeholders, including Tokyo Electric Power 
Company (TEPCO), which operated the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, 
acknowledged that design and operational shortcomings contributed to 
the accident sequence. Furthermore, numerous studies have concluded 
that failures in regulation contributed to those shortcomings. For 
example, according to the Kurokawa Commission[Footnote 3]--an 
investigation commissioned by Japan's parliament--Japan's nuclear 
regulatory body at the time of the accident, the Nuclear and 
Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), and TEPCO were aware of the risks of 
a station blackout and reactor core damage from the loss of seawater 
pumps from a tsunami. According to the investigation, NISA knew that 
TEPCO had not taken actions to mitigate those risks but did not 
require any corrective measures. The Kurokawa Commission attributed 
NISA's reluctance to require greater preparedness of TEPCO to a flawed 
safety culture and to the fact that NISA was part of the government 
ministry responsible for promoting nuclear power, finding that NISA 
was not independent of the nuclear industry that it was charged with 
regulating or of the government agency responsible for promoting that 
industry.[Footnote 4] NISA's lack of independence is believed by the 
Kurokawa Commission to have contributed to NISA's lax oversight of the 
nuclear industry. Nuclear industry representatives have said that 
their industry needs effective nuclear safety regulation and that the 
regulatory body must be independent from both operators and politics. 
The international cooperative and assistance programs of the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)--the nuclear regulatory body of 
the United States--over the past 20 years have focused on promoting 
the independence and effectiveness of such bodies. 

Nuclear power reactors generated about 11.3 percent of the world's 
electricity in 2012. As of November 2013, there are 435 civilian 
nuclear power reactors operating in 30 countries and 71 more under 
construction, primarily in China and Russia. In addition, as we 
reported in November 2010, countries such as Vietnam and Jordan, which 
do not yet have operating civilian nuclear power reactors, are 
building the necessary regulatory infrastructure for nuclear programs. 
[Footnote 5] In April 2013, international regulators from 49 countries 
gathered in Ottawa, Canada, for a conference organized by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) devoted to improving nuclear 
regulatory systems following the Fukushima Daiichi accident.[Footnote 
6] The conference concluded that nuclear regulatory bodies have 
learned many lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident and that 
implementing these lessons will take time and commitment. 

In light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, you asked us to examine 
worldwide nuclear regulation and safety.[Footnote 7] This report 
examines: (1) the actions regulatory bodies from selected countries 
with existing or planned civilian nuclear power reactors have taken to 
strengthen nuclear safety; (2) the extent to which these countries 
have established automated systems for collecting and transmitting 
data to the nuclear regulatory body and taken steps to enable such 
systems to withstand emergency conditions; and (3) steps key 
international organizations have taken to support nuclear regulatory 
bodies and promote nuclear safety worldwide since the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident and the impact of some of these steps. 

To examine the actions that national regulatory bodies have taken to 
strengthen nuclear safety in the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident, we selected a nonprobability sample of 16 countries for case 
studies to represent a cross section of established and emerging 
civilian nuclear power countries in terms of program size,[Footnote 8] 
the country's dependence on nuclear power, and the country's nuclear 
regulatory framework.[Footnote 9] Of these 16 countries, the 13 
countries with established nuclear power programs operate 78 percent 
of the world's nuclear power reactors; the other 3 countries do not 
currently operate nuclear power reactors but have emerging civilian 
nuclear power programs or have stated an interest in developing such 
programs.[Footnote 10] Appendix II contains a complete list of these 
countries and information on their civilian nuclear power programs. 
For the 16 countries selected, we reviewed reports they prepared to 
document the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, 
including reports prepared for various international meetings on 
nuclear safety, and/or presentations in which they summarized those 
lessons.[Footnote 11] We interviewed one or more officials from each 
selected regulatory body and/or technical support organization and/or 
received written responses to our questions. For some countries, we 
interviewed nuclear power plant operators and/or other nuclear energy 
industry officials. We also interviewed NRC and U.S. nuclear industry 
officials, as well as two former NRC chairmen. To examine the extent 
to which other countries have established or are considering 
establishing automated systems for collecting and transmitting data to 
the nuclear regulatory body during emergencies, we interviewed 
officials or received written answers to our questions from the 
respective nuclear regulatory bodies and some power plant operators. 
Because some country officials were more responsive than others, the 
amount of corroborating evidence we were able to obtain varies by 
country. For more information, see appendix I. To examine the steps 
key international organizations have taken to support nuclear 
regulatory bodies and promote nuclear safety worldwide since the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident, we first identified such organizations 
through interviews with officials from the U.S. State Department, 
Department of Energy (DOE), and NRC officials. Based on these 
discussions, we identified IAEA, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development's (OECD)[Footnote 12] Nuclear Energy 
Agency (NEA),[Footnote 13] the World Association of Nuclear Operators 
(WANO),[Footnote 14] and the European Union (EU). We then reviewed, as 
applicable, the reports or action plans of these organizations and 
interviewed or exchanged written questions with relevant officials 
from them. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to March 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I 
contains more detailed information on our scope and methodology. 

Background: 

This section describes (1) the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, (2) 
nuclear energy and its regulation, (3) automated data transmission 
systems used by some nuclear regulatory bodies, and (4) international 
organizations and a treaty involved in promoting nuclear safety. 

The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident: 

The March 11, 2011, tsunami wave that flooded the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear station destroyed the station's power supplies and emergency 
equipment, which, in turn prevented the plant's operators from cooling 
the reactors. The tsunami wave, at 13.1 meters, or nearly 43 feet was 
beyond the Fukushima Daiichi plant's "design basis"--that is, it 
exceeded the size of the tsunami that the site was designed and built 
to withstand, which was 3.1 meters, or slightly more than 10 feet 
above sea level. The station's emergency power supplies, including 
diesel generators and batteries, were below ground and not in 
waterproof containers. The station's three operating reactors had shut 
down during the earthquake that preceded the tsunami,[Footnote 15] but 
the radioactive fuel continued to decay and produce heat. The tsunami 
destroyed the Fukushima Daiichi power station's emergency power 
supplies, with the exception of one diesel generator for the sixth 
reactor.[Footnote 16] The electric wiring system for the three 
operating reactors, as well as seawater pumps, which were used to 
remove heat from the plant and cool diesel generators, were also 
destroyed. Without power to cool the reactors, the water in the 
reactor vessels boiled away and exposed the fuel, which melted. The 
steam from the boiling water increased pressure inside the primary 
containment vessel, allowing steam and other gases to move into the 
reactor building.[Footnote 17]The steam reacted with melting fuel, 
generating hydrogen gas that built up in at least two of the reactor 
buildings before eventually exploding. In the wake of the accident, 
the Japanese government has directed that all but 2 of Japan's 50 
civilian nuclear power reactors be shut down pending a complete safety 
review and, as of this writing, all reactors have been shut down. It 
is uncertain when these reactors will be brought back online. Figure 1 
shows Unit 3 of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station following 
the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami. 

Figure 1: Unit 3 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 
Following the March 11, 2011, Earthquake and Tsunami: 

[Refer to PDF for image: series of 5 photographs] 

Source: NRC. 

[End of figure] 

Nuclear Energy and Its Regulation: 

The safe operation of nuclear power reactors worldwide has been a long-
standing concern of the international community. According to IAEA, it 
is a fundamental safety principle that nuclear power plant operators 
have primary responsibility for nuclear safety during the life of the 
plant. However, nuclear regulatory bodies play a key role in ensuring 
nuclear safety. In the United States, NRC, an independent federal 
agency composed of five commissioners, licenses civilian nuclear power 
reactors and regulates and oversees their safe operation and security. 

According to IAEA documents, effective nuclear regulatory bodies are 
characterized by independence, as well as other key factors, such as 
transparency and commitment to safety culture. NRC, for example, 
defines regulatory independence as independence from: 

* economic interests regarding the use of any nuclear materials or 
technology, 

* policy interests, and: 

* political interests. 

To that end, according to NRC, it does not (1) make decisions based on 
financial costs to nuclear plant operators when considering matters of 
safety significance or (2) consider the impact of its actions on the 
future of nuclear energy or any particular technology. Furthermore, 
NRC does not report to a cabinet agency or to the White House. 

Automated Data Transmission Systems: 

Automated systems for collecting and transmitting data enable 
operators to provide data on selected nuclear power plant parameters--
such as the status of reactor coolant and containment systems, 
radiation monitoring and containment, and weather--directly to 
regulators. According to NRC officials, receiving automated, accurate, 
real-time data directly from automated sources at the site reduces the 
burden placed on operators to manually transmit information during an 
emergency and gives confidence to government authorities involved in 
responding to the event and the public that the plant operator is not 
withholding information. 

International Organizations and Treaty Involved in Promoting Nuclear 
Safety: 

IAEA, WANO, and the EU play an important role in promoting nuclear 
safety worldwide. Specifically: 

* IAEA develops (nonbinding) international standards for nuclear 
safety, as well as criteria for nuclear regulatory independence. IAEA 
also offers technical cooperation and peer review missions to its 
member states. These peer review missions evaluate, among other 
things, a country's nuclear safety regulatory framework based on the 
IAEA Safety Standards and conduct in-depth reviews of operational 
safety performance at nuclear power plants. A Secretariat, headed by 
the Director General, is responsible for implementing the agency's 
policies and programs. The U.S. State Department is the lead agency on 
U.S. policy regarding the IAEA, including the promotion of effective 
functioning in the agency and management reform. In addition, the 
department coordinates U.S. policy matters with international 
organizations and treaties, including those dealing with nuclear 
safety. NRC participates regularly in a variety of IAEA activities 
related to, among other things, nuclear safety. For example, NRC 
serves as the U.S. government's representative to the IAEA Commission 
on Safety Standards, as well as other technical committees. 

* WANO, established in 1989, 3 years after the Chernobyl accident, 
promotes the safe and reliable operations of all of the world's 
civilian nuclear power plants. WANO works to achieve its goals through 
confidential peer reviews, shared access to members' operating 
experience, technical support and exchange activities, and 
professional and technical development sessions. These peer reviews 
help members compare their operational performance against standards 
of excellence through an in-depth, objective, and confidential review 
of their operations conducted by nuclear experts drawn from other WANO 
members' plants. To permit the free and open exchange of information 
among WANO members, plant specific information, such as that gathered 
in the course of a peer review, may not be released outside WANO 
without the approval of the originating member. Since 1992, WANO has 
conducted more than 500 peer reviews of operating nuclear power plants 
in 31 countries or regions--including at least one at every WANO 
member plant. Membership is voluntary, but every nuclear operator in 
the world is currently a member, and participation in these activities 
is mandatory for members. WANO members are committed to take timely 
action to correct performance issues identified during peer reviews. 

* The EU was active in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, 
exploring and implementing options for using its authorities to 
advance nuclear safety in Europe, particularly among the 14 EU member 
states with operating nuclear power plants. The requirements in the EU 
nuclear safety directive and nuclear waste directive are legally 
binding in all EU member states. 

The Convention on Nuclear Safety (the Convention) is a multilateral 
treaty that, among other things, seeks to strengthen the safety of 
civilian nuclear power reactors. In the mid-1990s, representatives of 
over 50 nations, including the United States, participated in the 
development of the Convention in the aftermath of the Chernobyl 
accident. Today, 75 countries, including the United States, and one 
international organization, the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM), are contracting parties to the Convention.[Footnote 18] The 
Convention calls on parties to establish and maintain a legislative 
and regulatory framework and a regulatory body with adequate 
authority, competence, and financial and human resources to govern the 
safety of nuclear installations, among other things. Specifically, 
parties to the Convention are obligated to take steps to ensure an 
effective separation between the regulatory body and any other body or 
organization concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear 
energy. Under the terms of the Convention, each contracting party--
regardless of whether it operates nuclear power plants--is obligated 
to submit a national report, months in advance of the review meeting, 
which identifies the measures taken to implement each of the relevant 
nuclear safety obligations contained in the Convention. Obligations 
cover such points as siting, design, construction, and operation of 
civilian nuclear power installations. Parties that do not operate 
nuclear power plants submit reports focusing on, among other things, 
the steps they have taken to prepare and test emergency plans to deal 
with an accident in a neighboring country that operates nuclear power 
plants. Countries considering establishing nuclear power programs are 
expected to provide information in their national reports about the 
steps they are taking to meet the Convention's obligations including, 
for example, reactor design and siting requirements. The parties to 
the Convention have also established detailed guidance to help parties 
prepare their national reports. The purpose of the guidance is to 
encourage parties to describe the steps they are taking to meet the 
Convention's obligations and to facilitate other parties' review of 
the national reports of other countries. The countries meet every 3 
years in Vienna, Austria, for review meetings to present their 
national report, address questions that may arise about the report, 
and assess and ask questions about the reports of other parties. This 
is considered a peer review process. Parties may also submit written 
questions in advance of the review meeting on other parties' national 
reports and receive written responses to these questions. 

Nuclear Regulatory Bodies Have Taken Steps to Strengthen Safety: 

The nuclear regulatory bodies in the selected 16 countries in our 
review have taken steps to strengthen nuclear safety. Countries are 
taking steps with an increased focus on considering previously 
unimagined accident scenarios, such as those affecting multiple 
reactors within a given power plant. In addition, most countries with 
operating reactors in our review are considering or have issued new 
requirements in common categories: emergency equipment, hydrogen 
control, and filtered venting. Japan has fundamentally restructured 
its regulatory framework, and 3 other countries--China, Sweden, and 
Vietnam--are providing their nuclear regulatory bodies with additional 
resources. Four countries--France, South Korea, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom--have also reformed their regulatory framework but not 
specifically in response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. 

Countries Are Strengthening Regulatory Effectiveness and Considering 
Previously Unimagined Events and Accident Scenarios: 

All 16 selected countries in our review have taken regulatory action 
in response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. For example, in the 
United States, NRC formed the Near-Term Task Force in March 2011 to 
conduct a comprehensive assessment of NRC's processes and regulations 
in light of the accident to determine whether the agency should make 
additional improvements to its regulatory system or reactor safety in 
the United States. This task force issued a report in July 2011 with 
its findings and 12 recommendations, which were prioritized in an 
October 2011 report into three tiers. The commission then approved the 
NRC staff's three-tier prioritization in December 2011. Tier 1 
recommendations were those that NRC staff determined should be started 
without unnecessary delay and for which resources are sufficient. Tier 
2 comprises recommendations requiring further technical assessment or 
that depended on Tier 1 issues or availability of resources. Tier 3 
recommendations require further study, depend on a shorter-term action 
to be completed to inform the longer-term action, or depend on the 
availability of resources or on the resolution of Task Force 
Recommendation 1, which deals with clarification of the regulatory 
framework. All of the items identified for long-term evaluation fall 
into Tier 3. 

Each of the other selected countries in our review, with the exception 
of Vietnam, which does not have operating power reactors--undertook 
safety inspections, including comprehensive risk safety assessments, 
more commonly known as stress tests.[Footnote 19] The findings from 
the stress tests were used to consider further action to improve 
nuclear safety. Stress tests examine what are known as "beyond design-
basis events"--those where conditions exceed what the facility or site 
was designed to withstand. For example, one of the beyond design-basis 
scenarios considered by the Belgian Doel nuclear power plant operator 
was a severe storm combined with an unfavorable wind direction--which 
together could breach the embankment protecting the plant from a 
flood.[Footnote 20] For this scenario, the plant's operator analyzed 
the consequences of such a breach, estimating flooding levels and 
potential consequences, including weak points--such as buildings not 
designed to be watertight--as well as ways in which the plant was 
adequately prepared, such as emergency equipment that remains 
protected. 

The results of the stress tests served as a basis for corrective 
measures. For example, the proposed corrective measure for the 
scenario described at the Doel plant is to reinforce the top of the 
embankment with concrete tiles. In Sweden, regulators are considering 
a revision of the country's emergency planning zones after stress 
tests revealed that the existing emergency planning zones were 
insufficient for a radioactive release similar to that of the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident.[Footnote 21] In the United Arab Emirates, 
which does not have operating power reactors, the regulatory body 
commissioned a task force to study the implications of the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident from the standpoint of facilities with pending 
license applications, where operators were asked to supplement their 
license applications in consideration of external event contingencies, 
according to regulatory officials we interviewed. In the United 
States, NRC did not require plant operators to conduct stress tests. 
Instead, nuclear power plant operators were required to complete 
detailed inspections and engineering assessments of their plants, 
known as "walk-downs," to check that all safety features were in 
operating condition and to submit reports to NRC for review. Any 
issues identified in the walk-downs were to be addressed by plants' 
corrective action programs.[Footnote 22] For example, the flooding 
walk-down at the Vermont Yankee power plant identified a discrepancy 
in the procedure for sandbag barricades. The procedure has since been 
enhanced to provide specific, detailed guidance on the placement of 
sandbag barriers, and an exercise in accordance with the new procedure 
was successfully completed. 

According to a 2013 IAEA nuclear safety review, nuclear regulatory 
bodies are now focusing more on a wider range of possible events as a 
result of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. According to this review, 
nuclear regulatory bodies have not historically required nuclear 
operators to include multireactor accidents in their design basis. 
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) officials also told us that 
a significant shift in regulatory focus in Canada pertains to the 
management of multiple reactors. They said that prior to the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident, which destroyed four reactors, CNSC's guidelines did 
not consider the possibility of an event that could impact multiple 
reactors. These officials told us that certain safety features are 
more complicated for multireactor plants because some systems and 
equipment are shared among reactors, allowing for common-cause 
failures during an accident. CNSC officials told us that, in response 
to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, they are incorporating multireactor 
specifications into their regulations. Similarly, a Belgian nuclear 
regulatory official said that the Fukushima Daiichi accident has led 
regulatory bodies to "think outside the box" in considering scenarios 
that could threaten nuclear power plants. For example, one of the 
items in a national action plan that the Belgian nuclear regulatory 
body developed after the accident pertains to an internal emergency 
plan in case of an event that impacts multiple reactors. A Russian 
regulatory official also told us that regulators need to consider 
previously unimagined events, including the impact on nuclear power 
plants from a meteor, such as the one that struck Russia in February 
2013.[Footnote 23] In March 2012, in keeping with the shift toward 
considering events that may impact multiple reactors, Russia's nuclear 
regulatory body approved a corrective action plan that includes 
special consideration for plants with multiple reactors.[Footnote 24] 
In the United States, NRC is revisiting its beyond design-basis 
requirements to better integrate them into its overall regulatory 
procedures. For example, NRC's Near-Term Task Force report contains a 
section that focuses on operators' capabilities to respond to a 
prolonged station blackout--that is, a loss of power--and events that 
impact multiple reactors. This report explains that the accident at 
Fukushima Daiichi has shown that such events are realities that must 
be addressed as part of emergency planning because, although they are 
of low probability, they have the potential for severe consequences. 
[Footnote 25] In that vein, an NRC commissioner said, in June 2013, 
that the accident has blurred the distinction between design-basis and 
beyond design-basis. 

Most Countries in Our Review Are Considering Common Categories of New 
Regulatory Requirements--Emergency Equipment, Hydrogen Control, and 
Filtered Venting Systems: 

To improve nuclear safety based on the lessons learned from the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident, the regulatory bodies in our review are 
considering or have issued new requirements with regard to the 
following common categories: emergency equipment, hydrogen control, 
and filtered venting systems. In the course of the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident, the loss of emergency equipment--including backup power 
supplies, such as batteries and diesel generators, as well as water 
supplies, such as pumps--prevented operators from cooling the 
reactors. Consequently, as the water in the reactors boiled and the 
fuel melted, hydrogen built up and exploded, destroying three reactor 
containment structures and releasing radioactivity into the 
environment. New regulatory requirements worldwide in response to 
these events include the following: 

* Emergency equipment. New requirements for emergency equipment--for 
example, the number of diesel generators on-site and their placement--
are an area of focus among the regulatory bodies in our sample. 
Examples are as follows: 

- South Korea's regulatory body issued a list of 50 action items, 
which included securing the availability of a portable electric power 
generator vehicle and batteries and installing paths for the injection 
of emergency cooling water. 

- The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission has issued new requirements 
for emergency equipment and resources, such as requirements for backup 
power at emergency facilities; on-site storage of emergency equipment, 
such as portable generators; and the availability of portable backup 
power and emergency response equipment. 

- NRC has issued an order to address operators' capabilities to move 
water to maintain or restore reactor core cooling, among other things. 
A senior NRC official said that, because the order requires these 
capabilities to be maintained even if power is lost, the order 
includes implicit requirements for emergency power supplies or 
suitable alternative methods to continue reactor core cooling 
indefinitely. 

* Hydrogen control. All but one of the 13 nuclear regulatory bodies in 
our review with operating nuclear power reactors in their countries 
have issued additional requirements for hydrogen control systems or 
are studying alternative options for hydrogen removal. In some cases, 
countries that already have some hydrogen control systems are looking 
to test existing systems and further strengthen hydrogen safety. For 
example, Russia's regulatory body required complete implementation of 
hydrogen monitoring and removal systems in reactors where they were 
not part of the original design and also required an analysis of the 
adequacy of existing hydrogen monitoring and removal systems to 
prevent the formation of explosive gas mixtures in the most 
unfavorable scenarios in severe accidents. Similarly, France's 
regulatory body has required that one type of hydrogen control system 
be qualified for external hazards beyond the level currently 
considered,[Footnote 26] and has issued requirements for the detection 
of hydrogen in places not planned for in the design. 

* Filtered venting systems. Eleven of the 13 regulatory bodies in our 
review with operating reactors have issued new requirements or are 
studying options for filtered venting systems to minimize the release 
of radioactive materials into the environment in the event of an 
accident. For example, filtered venting systems are included in 
Japan's new safety regulations under "measures for preventing core 
damage/containment failure." Canada's Action Plan in response to the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident includes requirements for "Emergency 
Filtered Containment Venting." Countries that already have filtered 
venting systems, such as Sweden, are studying potential updates and 
improvements to their systems--for example, to ensure that they 
function in prolonged accident scenarios. France's regulatory body has 
required the operator to submit a detailed study of possible 
improvements to its venting-filtration system, taking into account the 
possibility of needing filtration in two or more reactors 
simultaneously. In the United States, NRC announced that it is in the 
process of a technical evaluation to support rulemaking on filtering, 
with the deadline for the final rule set for 2017. NRC staff 
recommended that the commission order the installation of filtered 
venting systems at boiling water reactors with Mark I and II 
containments--those similar to the ones at Fukushima Daiichi.[Footnote 
27] However, the commission voted against issuing an immediate order 
to require installation of filtered venting systems and instead gave 
NRC staff a year to produce a technical evaluation to support 
rulemaking on filtering,[Footnote 28] thus deciding to address 
filtered venting through its regular process rather than as an 
emergency issue. The commission directed the staff to consider both 
the use of a filter to be placed on the vent, as well as a more 
performance-based approach using existing systems to achieve a similar 
reduction in radioactive release during an accident. 

Japan Restructured Its Nuclear Regulatory Framework, and China, 
Sweden, and Vietnam Devoted Additional Resources to Nuclear Safety: 

Japan was the only country in our review that fundamentally 
restructured its nuclear regulatory framework in response to the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident. Specifically, in June 2012, Japan's 
parliament passed the Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation 
Authority Act, which, effective in September 2012, established the new 
Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) as an independent commission in 
charge of all of the nation's nuclear regulatory functions. NRA 
replaced the organizations previously responsible for nuclear safety 
regulation, including NISA. This restructuring separated the 
government's nuclear regulatory function from that of nuclear power 
promotion. The reform also established a Nuclear Emergency 
Preparedness Commission (NEPC) under Japan's cabinet and required the 
new regulatory body to incorporate the latest scientific and technical 
knowledge into the nation's nuclear regulatory basis, in keeping with 
the Kurokawa Commission finding that NISA had a negative attitude 
toward new advances in knowledge and technology from outside Japan. An 
NRA commissioner told us that Japan's restructuring of its nuclear 
regulatory system is necessary to address the issue of "regulatory 
capture"--the collusion between NISA and the nuclear industry--that 
compromised the nation's nuclear safety prior to the accident and to 
regain the public trust, which the commissioner told us was NRA's 
biggest challenge. NRA's mission statement lists among the agency's 
core values and principles the fostering of a genuine safety culture, 
where public safety is the highest priority. 

According to the commissioner, NRA's structure is largely modeled on 
NRC's, and, to a lesser extent, on that of France's nuclear regulatory 
body. For example, NRA will have a five-commissioner voting system 
like the U.S. and French nuclear regulatory bodies. However, the 
Japanese government has not determined how to reconcile NRA's 
independence from the Japanese bureaucracy with its status as a 
government agency within that bureaucracy. According to the 
commissioner, the fragmentation under the previous system--with 
multiple agencies responsible for various aspects of nuclear safety--
was problematic, and the need for integration "obvious" and that 
integrating all nuclear oversight agencies into one is an 
international trend. He said, however, that merging the staff and 
budgets of previously separate agencies will take time, as NRA is an 
amalgam of these disparate agencies. The commissioner said that NRA 
currently has no budget autonomy, as its budget, as that of any other 
Japanese government agency, is allocated by the government. However, 
the issue of NRA funding has not been finally settled, and fees from 
nuclear operators are still under consideration as a funding source. 
The commissioner said that funding the agency independently of the 
government will be difficult but that not having budgetary 
independence could limit organizational and personnel independence, 
which are essential. 

The NRA completed new regulations for civilian nuclear power plants in 
Japan in July 2013. All of Japan's nuclear power plants with operators 
that wish to restart their reactors must meet criteria established by 
the new regulations. In addition, reactors built in the 1970s and 
1980s will be reexamined in light of the latest science on earthquakes 
and geology. Once the safety of each reactor is assessed based on the 
new regulations--a process that is expected to take 2 to 3 years--the 
Japanese government is to determine whether each reactor can restart. 
The operator of each reactor must also obtain the support of the 
public; the governor of the prefecture where the reactor is located 
and, in some cases, the governors of nearby prefectures; and the 
national government of Japan. NRA will only be involved in the 
technical deliberations and will not have a role in other aspects of 
the governmental decisions to restart reactors. 

Three other countries in our review--China, Vietnam, and Sweden--did 
not change their regulatory structures in response to the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident, but senior nuclear regulatory officials we 
interviewed from those countries said that the accident reinforced to 
their governments the importance of a strong regulatory body. As a 
result, the officials said that their governments provided additional 
human and financial resources to their nuclear regulatory bodies. 
According to the respective regulatory officials, the governments of 
China and Vietnam paused or slowed their nuclear programs after the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident to strengthen their regulatory authorities. 
The Chinese government suspended the licensing of new reactors in 
2011--there were 14 operating reactors and additional ones under 
construction at that time--until a National Nuclear Safety Plan was 
developed and safety inspections were completed, according to a senior 
regulatory official. The Chinese government also agreed to nearly 
double the regulatory body's staff to 1,100 and increased its budget. 
In Vietnam, the government plans to begin construction on its first 
nuclear power plant in 2014 and to begin operation in 2020. However, 
since the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the nuclear regulatory body sees 
this timeline as overly ambitious as the country needs time to develop 
a nuclear safety infrastructure that meets IAEA standards. To that 
end, Vietnam's Atomic Energy Law will be reevaluated in the aftermath 
of Fukushima with regard to regulatory independence, among other 
things. According to the Department of Energy, Vietnam announced in 
January 2014 that the start of construction on its first nuclear power 
plant may be delayed until the 2017-2018 timeframe. In Sweden, senior 
regulatory officials told us that the government had previously 
hesitated to fund the regulatory body with the amount it had requested 
but, after the accident, it provided a larger budget allocation than 
requested, allowing the regulatory body to hire more staff.[Footnote 
29] 

Four Countries' Regulatory Changes Were Not Made in Response to the 
Fukushima Daiichi Accident: 

Four countries in our sample--France, Sweden, South Korea, and the 
United Kingdom--have recently made changes to their regulatory 
structures that were not directly in response to the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident. Two of the countries, France and Sweden, made changes to 
their structures before the accident occurred. The other two countries 
(South Korea and the United Kingdom) made changes after the accident 
but, according to regulatory officials from those countries, these 
changes were planned prior to the accident. In all four countries, the 
regulatory changes were consistent with the lessons learned from the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident. 

Specifically, France did not change its regulatory structure in 
response to Fukushima but overhauled its nuclear regulatory system in 
2006 with a law on "Transparency and Security in the Nuclear Field," 
which established the Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN) as an 
independent commission.[Footnote 30] ASN has responsibility for 
nuclear safety, but not physical security, which is the responsibility 
of a separate authority. French regulatory officials told us that they 
would prefer that security also fall under the nuclear regulatory 
body--that integration of these functions would give the regulatory 
body more expertise and lead to more thoughtful and comprehensive 
regulation. According to French officials, regulatory and others, the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident did not drive more nuclear regulatory 
changes within France because France had already implemented many 
nuclear safety improvements in response to vulnerabilities exposed in 
1999, when strong winds raised the tide, and water breached the 
seawalls of the Blayais nuclear power plant near Bordeaux and flooded 
it, including its safety-significant equipment. The plant shut down 
without incident but, in response, the regulatory body and the plant 
operator launched a 10-year program to create a more systematic 
approach to flooding hazards, including raising seawalls and making 
underground facilities watertight. Studies on flood preparedness at 
French nuclear power plants were commissioned, and new flood scenarios 
were considered and modifications made, such as raised seawalls. 

Sweden also made changes to its nuclear regulatory structure 
independently of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The Swedish Radiation 
Safety Authority (SSM), established in July 2008 to consolidate 
various agencies previously involved in nuclear regulation, oversees 
nuclear safety and security, among other things. In 2010, the Swedish 
government assigned SSM to review the nation's regulatory framework 
and strategy. Sweden, like France, had also already implemented many 
nuclear safety improvements in response to events prior to Fukushima. 
For example, the Swedish Parliament decided to require filtered 
venting equipment to protect against large-scale ground contamination 
following the Three-Mile Island accident in 1979 in the United States. 
Sweden also established a Severe Accident Management Program in 
response to the Three-Mile Island accident.[Footnote 31] 

In 2011, the South Korean government established a new stand-alone 
regulatory body, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC), 
which comprises a panel of commissioners that reports directly to the 
President of South Korea. The establishment of NSSC separated nuclear 
promotional functions from regulatory ones by removing regulatory 
decision making from South Korea's Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology, which previously oversaw nuclear regulation, as well as 
nuclear policy and research and development support. South Korean 
nuclear regulatory officials said that plans for this restructuring 
were in place before the Fukushima Daiichi accident. According to 
these officials, NSSC responded to recent nuclear safety incidents, 
such as the falsification of documents for reactor components at the 
Yeonggwang nuclear power plant in November 2012, with 20 measures to 
address such issues, including a program to improve safety culture. 
[Footnote 32] 

The United Kingdom also created a new regulatory body in April 2011--
the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR)--to replace the Nuclear 
Installations Inspectorate, a quasi-autonomous nongovernmental 
organization.[Footnote 33] According to the memorandum announcing the 
body's creation, this change was unrelated to the United Kingdom's 
response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. However, the memorandum 
stated that the events at Fukushima further confirmed the need for a 
modern, independent and flexible nuclear regulatory body. According to 
a senior ONR official, the change was prompted by recruitment and 
retention challenges the nuclear regulatory body was facing in 
competing with the nuclear industry. According to this official, 
recruiting from the nuclear industry was a challenge because the pay 
and conditions within the government, restrained by a public pay 
policy, were not competitive with those in the industry. An 
independent study recommended taking the nuclear regulatory body out 
of the civil service where it would not be subject to the same pay 
policy. The body remains under the umbrella of the Health and Safety 
Executive but is not subordinate to it; rather, it is a separate 
agency. The additional flexibility of this change has allowed ONR to 
retain staff and to better recruit staff from the industry, which 
helps meet the needs for new licensing applications. ONR manages the 
conflicts of interest that could arise from recruiting inspectors 
directly from industry by starting recruits out in its lower rungs, in 
technical assessment posts, where inspectors have no contact with 
operators, with particular care to avoid contact with the operators 
that had employed them. 

Nearly Half of Countries with Nuclear Power Reactors in Our Review 
Have Automated Data Transmission Systems: 

Six of the 13 countries that have operating nuclear power reactors in 
our review have established automated system for collecting and 
transmitting critical data to the nuclear regulatory body or 
designated technical experts who work with the regulatory body during 
an accident, and a seventh country has plans to build such a system. 
However, officials from some of these countries, including the United 
States, told us that their automated data transmission systems are not 
currently designed to operate under severe emergency conditions, such 
as loss of off-site power and lines of communication as occurred at 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.[Footnote 34] Officials from 
5 of the other countries with operating nuclear power reactors told us 
they either had no plans to establish such a system or they might 
consider establishing such a system in the future. We were unable to 
determine whether a sixth country has or plans to establish such a 
system. 

Six Countries Have Automated Systems, and Some Are Considering Steps 
to Ensure They Can Operate in Emergency Conditions: 

Officials from 6 of the 13 countries in our review with operating 
nuclear power reactors--Japan, the United States, France, South Korea, 
China, and Argentina--told us that they have automated data 
transmission systems, and officials in a seventh country, Sweden, told 
us they are working to install such a system. However, none of these 
officials told us that their automated data transmission system is 
currently designed to operate under severe emergency conditions, such 
as loss of off-site power and lines of communication as occurred at 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Although nuclear regulatory 
officials from 3 countries (Japan, the United States, and France) told 
us they are considering upgrading their automated data transmission 
systems to operate under emergency conditions--to a satellite-based 
system, for example--only Japan, according to a senior Japanese 
official, has made a final decision to upgrade its system to a more 
durable and reliable satellite-based communications system. None of 
these countries' officials told us they have a specific timeline for 
upgrading their system. 

We obtained the most information regarding automated data systems from 
the United States and France. 

United States. NRC established an automated data transmission system 
in the aftermath of the 1979 Three-Mile Island accident due to a high 
error rate from plant operators in data transmission during the 
accident. At that time, NRC relied on telephone calls with its 
resident inspectors and plant operators to verbally communicate 
technical data to NRC. In order to substantially improve access to key 
plant and reactor data, NRC began developing what became the Emergency 
Response Data System (ERDS) in 1985, and the system became operational 
in 1993. At present, when activated, ERDS data flow directly to NRC's 
Operations Center at its Maryland headquarters and are also available, 
as needed, at NRC regional offices in Pennsylvania, Georgia, Illinois, 
and Texas. According to NRC officials, approximately 39 of the 62 U.S. 
nuclear power plants have opted to transmit ERDS data continuously at 
all times; the remainder has the capability to do so in the event of 
an incident or emergency. Figure 2 shows NRC's new Headquarters 
Operations Center. 

Figure 2: NRC's Headquarters Operations Center: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: NRC. 

[End of figure] 

However, according to NRC officials, ERDS' capacity to collect and 
transmit information would be compromised under certain emergency 
conditions, such as the loss of off-site power and lines of 
communication, as occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
plant. Although NRC has not required that ERDS be upgraded to function 
under these conditions, NRC had taken steps before the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident to upgrade ERDS--to move the system from an analog 
based platform to a digital one and to address cybersecurity concerns. 
In particular, NRC officials told us that, prior to 2009, ERDS used a 
process requiring the use of a modem to transmit data. Over time, 
modems have become obsolete, making it difficult to maintain the 
system. Modems also inherently introduce cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities. ERDS has been upgraded to use a Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) to create a secure point-to-point data pathway from each 
operator site to NRC headquarters.[Footnote 35] VPN technology, 
according to NRC, is the current, stable, and reliable information 
technology industry standard. 

NRC is considering additional upgrades to ERDS so that it would 
function more reliably during severe emergency conditions but has not 
yet acted because ERDS is not considered a "safety related" system, as 
it does not directly ensure the safety of a facility or play a direct 
or essential role in emergency response. These officials added that 
they thought ERDS was "a nice supplement" to voice communications but 
that it was not essential because NRC can communicate directly by 
telephone with its resident inspectors and the operator. They added 
that telephone communications have been upgraded since the 1979 Three-
Mile Island accident. Specifically, NRC funded the establishment of 
the Emergency Notification System (ENS), which bypasses the local 
telephone switching network. Plant operators are now required to 
establish multiple, continuously-staffed ENS telephone lines early in 
any accident scenario. NRC and licensees have also developed response 
plans using ENS and conduct frequent exercises to validate these plans. 

NRC officials acknowledge that data transmission via ERDS improves the 
efficiency of information sharing between the licensee and the NRC 
Headquarters Operations Center but said that the practices and 
procedures used to obtain the data using ENS would enable NRC to 
evaluate the severity of the reactor accident without ERDS if 
necessary. Accordingly, these officials told us that NRC is first 
completing higher priority post-Fukushima nuclear safety enhancements 
before deciding whether or how to upgrade ERDS because how these 
enhancements are resolved could affect how any ERDS upgrade might be 
implemented. They also noted that both the Three-Mile Island and 
Fukushima Daiichi accidents were managed without the benefit of 
functioning automated data transmission systems. However, an IAEA fact-
finding mission to Japan in the aftermath of Fukushima stated that 
greater consideration should be given in the future to providing 
hardened systems, communications, and sources of monitoring equipment 
for providing essential information for on-site and off-site 
responses, especially for severe accidents. Moreover, without upgrades 
to enable ERDS to function under emergency conditions, it may not be 
available when the need for it is greatest, such as during a severe 
accident. 

France. French officials told us, during our tour of one of their 
national crisis centers--the French government's emergency response 
center for dealing with events with possible radiological implications-
-that France also does not consider its automated data transmission 
system a "safety system." These officials told us that there are 
accident scenarios under which emergency diesel generators would power 
their automated data transmission system, but whether the system would 
function would depend on the severity of the accident and level of 
damage to the plant's electrical system. In particular, if power were 
lost during a severe accident as it was during the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident, the automated system would not function. French officials 
also told us that they maintain close telephone contact with plant 
operators during an accident. Regardless of whether its automated data 
transmission system functions, France requires that "quarter-hour 
messages" be sent from the nuclear power plant control room to 
technical experts at its national crisis centers. According to French 
officials, these messages convey data on the most important nuclear 
power reactor parameters, a subset of data collected by the automated 
transmission system. These data are read by plant operator technicians 
from the control room instruments, copied by hand to a paper form, and 
then faxed to its national crisis centers every 15 minutes. 
Nonetheless, France is also considering upgrading its automated data 
transmission system to reliably function without off-site power; 
according to French officials, studies are in progress, but no 
decisions have been made. 

Nuclear regulatory officials we spoke with from 5 of the 6 remaining 
countries with operating reactors--Armenia, Belgium, Canada, Russia, 
and the United Kingdom--told us they do not currently have automated 
data transmission systems, and officials from 3 of these countries 
said their countries may consider establishing such systems in the 
future. We were unable to determine whether a sixth country, Pakistan, 
has or plans to establish such a system. 

For the 3 countries with emerging or potential nuclear power programs, 
regulatory officials in Vietnam told us that they plan to develop an 
automated data transmission system; officials in the United Arab 
Emirates told us they have not yet decided whether to do so and, in 
the case of Indonesia, which has not yet decided whether to pursue a 
civilian nuclear power program, we were unable to obtain information. 

International Efforts Taken to Support Nuclear Regulatory Bodies and 
Promote Nuclear Safety: 

Three key international organizations--IAEA, WANO, and the EU--along 
with the Convention on Nuclear Safety have taken steps to support 
nuclear regulatory bodies and promote nuclear safety worldwide since 
the Fukushima Daiichi accident--including playing a significant role 
in helping nuclear regulatory bodies identify the most important 
lessons from the accident and supporting the associated regulatory 
changes to enhance nuclear safety. 

IAEA: 

IAEA adopted an Action Plan on Nuclear Safety (Action Plan) in 
September 2011, 6 months after the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The 
plan's purpose is to define a program of work to strengthen global 
nuclear safety by taking into account lessons learned from the 
accident. The Action Plan focuses on, among other things, safety 
assessments of nuclear power plants in light of their vulnerabilities 
to extreme natural hazards, peer reviews of nuclear regulatory bodies 
and nuclear power plants, provisions for emergency preparedness and 
response, and the adequacy of existing IAEA safety standards. The 
success of the Action Plan, according to IAEA, depends on its 
implementation through the full participation and cooperation of the 
member states, with the involvement of relevant stakeholders such as 
international organizations, nuclear industry associations, and 
research organizations. The plan is divided into 12 actions, each of 
which is divided into subactions and activities. The status of each 
action is tracked at the activity level and posted on IAEA's publicly 
available website. According to IAEA officials, the agency does not 
track the efforts of member states under the Action Plan but 
encourages member states to share information on progress in the 
implementation of the Action Plan through international conferences 
and international experts' meetings on nuclear safety-related topics. 

One of the key ways in which IAEA helps countries improve nuclear 
safety and regulatory effectiveness is through peer review missions. 
The most prominent peer review missions are the Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service (IRRS) and Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) 
missions. These missions evaluate the operations of a member state's 
nuclear regulatory system and civilian nuclear power plant operational 
safety, respectively, and make recommendations and suggestions for 
improvement. According to IAEA officials, countries and plant 
operators hosting peer review missions are also encouraged and 
expected by IAEA to host follow-up missions, typically 2 to 4 years 
after the initial review in the case of IRRS missions and 18 to 24 
months in the case of OSART missions. According to these officials, 
follow-up missions have been a part of IRRS and OSART peer reviews 
since 2006 and 1989, respectively. 

IRRS missions, which are voluntary to all but EU member states, assess 
the safety practices of the requesting country through an examination 
of its regulatory framework and organization and compare the country's 
practices with IAEA Safety Standards and good regulatory practices. 
[Footnote 36] IRRS mission teams include experts drawn largely from 
IAEA member countries' nuclear regulatory bodies, including NRC. The 
requesting country is typically provided with recommendations and 
suggestions for improvement at the conclusion of the mission. 
According to IAEA officials, recommendations are proposed to host 
countries where aspects of their regulatory system relative to the 
IAEA Safety Requirements are missing, incomplete, or inadequately 
implemented. These recommendations, according to IAEA officials, 
should be specific, realistic, and designed to result in tangible 
improvements to regulatory effectiveness. When IAEA peer reviewers 
identify opportunities for improvement not directly related to 
inadequate conformance with IAEA Safety Requirements, but that may 
contribute to improvements in national regulatory arrangements, they 
make IRRS suggestions. According to IAEA, suggestions are primarily 
intended to make the regulatory body's performance more effective or 
efficient, and to point out potential improvements to current 
regulatory activities. 

IAEA conducted 75 IRRS missions to 45 countries from 1992 through the 
end of June 2013.[Footnote 37] In addition, according to IAEA 
officials, a special module focused on the regulatory implications of 
the Fukushima Daiichi accident was incorporated into the scope of IRRS 
missions immediately after the accident for countries having nuclear 
power plants. Table 1 lists the number of IRRS missions, including 
follow-up missions, which member states have hosted through June 30, 
2013. 

Table 1: Number of IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) 
Missions by Country, 1992 through June 30, 2013: 

Country: Armenia; 
Number of IRRS missions: 2. 

Country: Australia; 
Number of IRRS missions: 2. 

Country: Botswana; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Bulgaria; 
Number of IRRS missions: 3. 

Country: Cameroon; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Canada; 
Number of IRRS missions: 2. 

Country: China; 
Number of IRRS missions: 3. 

Country: Côte d'Ivoire; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Czech Republic; 
Number of IRRS missions: 2. 

Country: Finland; 
Number of IRRS missions: 3. 

Country: France; 
Number of IRRS missions: 2. 

Country: Gabon; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Germany; 
Number of IRRS missions: 2. 

Country: Greece; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Hungary; 
Number of IRRS missions: 2. 

Country: Indonesia; 
Number of IRRS missions: 2. 

Country: Iran; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Japan; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Kenya; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Korea, Republic of; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Lebanon; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Lithuania; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Madagascar; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Mauritius; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Mexico; 
Number of IRRS missions: 2. 

Country: Namibia; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Niger; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Pakistan; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Peru; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Poland; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Romania; 
Number of IRRS missions: 5. 

Country: Russian Federation; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Sierra Leone; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Slovakia; 
Number of IRRS missions: 3. 

Country: Slovenia; 
Number of IRRS missions: 2. 

Country: Spain; 
Number of IRRS missions: 2. 

Country: Sweden; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Switzerland; 
Number of IRRS missions: 3. 

Country: Thailand; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Uganda; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Ukraine; 
Number of IRRS missions: 4. 

Country: United Arab Emirates; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: United Kingdom; 
Number of IRRS missions: 2. 

Country: United States; 
Number of IRRS missions: 1. 

Country: Vietnam; 
Number of IRRS missions: 2. 

Country: Total; 
Number of IRRS missions: 75. 

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

Note: IRRS missions were preceded by a similar program from 1992 to 
2004 called International Regulatory Review Team (IRRT) missions. This 
table combines both types of missions. IAEA does not consider scoping 
or expert missions to be "full" IRRT or IRRS missions and are thus not 
included in this table. 

[End of table] 

OSART missions also include experts drawn largely from IAEA member 
countries but are more narrowly targeted to review operational safety 
at specific nuclear power plants. OSART missions also typically make 
recommendations and suggestions to improve safety. According to IAEA, 
OSART recommendations provide operators ideas for improving 
operational safety and should: (1) be based on IAEA Safety Standards 
or proven, good international practices; (2) address the root causes 
rather than the symptoms of the identified concern; and (3) be 
specific, realistic, and designed to result in tangible improvements. 
An OSART suggestion is primarily intended to, among other things, make 
good performance more effective. In general, suggestions are designed 
to stimulate the plant management and supporting staff to continue to 
consider ways and means for enhancing performance. According to IAEA, 
the agency has conducted 284 OSART missions in 34 countries from 1983 
through the end of June 2013. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
station, like most nuclear power plants, has not hosted an OSART 
mission. Table 2 lists the number of OSART missions, including follow-
up missions, that member countries have hosted through June 2013. 

Table 2: Number of IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) 
Missions by Country, 1983 through June 30, 2013: 

Country: Argentina; 
Number of OSART missions: 2. 

Country: Armenia; 
Number of OSART missions: 2. 

Country: Belgium; 
Number of OSART missions: 4. 

Country: Brazil; 
Number of OSART missions: 11. 

Country: Bulgaria; 
Number of OSART missions: 8. 

Country: Canada; 
Number of OSART missions: 4. 

Country: China; 
Number of OSART missions: 19. 

Country: Czech Republic; 
Number of OSART missions: 15. 

Country: Finland; 
Number of OSART missions: 4. 

Country: France; 
Number of OSART missions: 44. 

Country: Germany; 
Number of OSART missions: 9. 

Country: Hungary; 
Number of OSART missions: 4. 

Country: India; 
Number of OSART missions: 1. 

Country: Italy; 
Number of OSART missions: 3. 

Country: Japan; 
Number of OSART missions: 9. 

Country: Kazakhstan; 
Number of OSART missions: 1. 

Country: Korea, Republic of; 
Number of OSART missions: 8. 

Country: Lithuania; 
Number of OSART missions: 4. 

Country: Mexico; 
Number of OSART missions: 6. 

Country: Netherlands; 
Number of OSART missions: 5. 

Country: Pakistan; 
Number of OSART missions: 6. 

Country: Philippines; 
Number of OSART missions: 2. 

Country: Poland; 
Number of OSART missions: 1. 

Country: Romania; 
Number of OSART missions: 6. 

Country: Russian Federation; 
Number of OSART missions: 12. 

Country: Slovakia; 
Number of OSART missions: 10. 

Country: Slovenia; 
Number of OSART missions: 6. 

Country: South Africa; 
Number of OSART missions: 6. 

Country: Spain; 
Number of OSART missions: 9. 

Country: Sweden; 
Number of OSART missions: 13. 

Country: Switzerland; 
Number of OSART missions: 9. 

Country: Ukraine; 
Number of OSART missions: 23. 

Country: United Kingdom; 
Number of OSART missions: 6. 

Country: United States; 
Number of OSART missions: 12. 

Country: Total; 
Number of OSART missions: 284. 

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

[End of table] 

According to IAEA officials, the agency is not systematically tracking 
the status of the recommendations made by the IRRS or OSART peer 
review missions, and it does not know the extent to which the 
recommendations or suggestions have been implemented by the host 
countries and plant operators unless countries and operators have 
hosted a follow-up mission. Follow-up missions to IRRS and OSART 
missions are the means for informing IAEA of progress made in 
implementing the original missions' recommendations and suggestions. 
IAEA posts on its publicly available website the names of countries 
and nuclear power plants that have hosted IRRS and OSART missions and 
follow-up missions and, in some cases, summary or full reports of the 
main conclusions of a given mission.[Footnote 38] According to IAEA 
officials, however, the agency is not authorized by member states to 
act as a nuclear safety oversight organization and so does not 
systematically track the status of such recommendations and 
suggestions. IAEA officials noted that member states are responsible 
for tracking the status of their mission findings. However, without 
this information, IAEA cannot determine the impact and effectiveness 
of the peer review missions. Nuclear regulatory officials from France 
and Canada stated that greater transparency about the results and 
follow-up to peer review missions is needed. 

The importance of tracking recommendations and improving the impact 
and effectiveness of IRRS missions was noted at a recent IAEA 
conference. Specifically, the first action item at the April 2013 IAEA 
regulators conference in Ottawa, Canada, identified issues that needed 
to be addressed, implemented, and followed up on, including: (1) 
countries should develop national action plans to implement 
recommendations made by IRRS peer review missions, (2) the results of 
the IRRS missions should be made public, and (3) IRRS missions and 
follow-up missions should be reported to IAEA's Board of Governors. 
Because not all of the recommendations and suggestions of IRRS peer 
review missions are made public, countries may have less incentive to 
follow up on them. 

The experience of the 2011 IAEA-sponsored international expert mission 
to Japan highlights the current system's limitations. This expert 
mission, which was established to find facts and identify initial 
lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi accident, noted, among other 
things, that despite the technical focus on nuclear safety and 
radiation protection, the mission also identified more general 
problems with: the regulatory framework for safety in Japan, the 
clarity of the roles and responsibilities among government entities 
and the operator, and the independence of the nuclear regulatory body. 
The expert mission noted that some of these issues had also been 
raised by the June 2007 IRRS mission to Japan, and that there had not 
been a follow-up mission. The IRRS report did not mention "regulatory 
capture"--a condition that was found by the Kurokawa Commission to 
have compromised Japan's nuclear safety prior to the accident. 
[Footnote 39] 

WANO: 

In the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, WANO is expanding the 
scope of its operations and activities to do more to help its members 
achieve its overriding goals to enhance nuclear safety and the 
operational performance of nuclear power plants. Specifically, 
according to WANO, the organization is: 

* Increasing staff. WANO is more than doubling the size of its staff 
over 3 years. It had about 170 employees in 2011 and plans to increase 
the number to 388 in 2014. 

* Requiring more frequent peer reviews focusing on issues highlighted 
by the accident. WANO is moving from 6-year to 4-year intervals for 
the peer reviews it requires of its members. WANO is also requiring 
its members to host a WANO peer review team for a follow-up 2 years 
after its peer reviews so the operator can explain what it has done to 
address the findings from the previous review. In addition, WANO has 
now expanded the scope of its peer reviews to include, among other 
things, issues highlighted by the accident, including emergency 
preparedness, severe accident prevention, and spent fuel pool 
management. 

* Increasing coordination with IAEA. WANO also signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with IAEA in September 2012 under which both 
organizations are to take a more coordinated approach to their 
activities. For example, under this memorandum, according to both 
organizations, WANO and IAEA staff are to meet regularly to discuss 
major safety related activities, share more nuclear power plant 
operating experience, and better coordinate the timing of their 
respective peer reviews so that, for example, operators will not have 
to host a WANO peer review in the same year they host an IAEA OSART 
mission. 

European Union: 

The EU, acting in concert with national nuclear regulatory bodies and 
the nuclear industry, among its member states, launched a process in 
March 2011 to carry out EU-wide comprehensive risk and safety 
assessments of nuclear power plants. The EU nuclear safety directive 
and the EU nuclear waste directive grant it the authority to make 
these assessments legally binding on EU members. Within a few weeks of 
the Fukushima Daiichi accident, all 14 EU member states that operate 
civilian nuclear power reactors--as well as two neighboring countries-
-had agreed, on a voluntary basis, to subject their power plants to 
targeted, comprehensive safety risk assessments of how well they could 
withstand the consequences of various extreme external conditions, 
including those that affected the Fukushima Daiichi plant.[Footnote 
40] These assessments were to focus on the robustness of safety 
margins of nuclear power plants in three areas: (1) accident-
initiating events such as earthquakes, floods, and extreme natural 
weather; (2) loss of safety systems, including power and ultimate heat 
sink;[Footnote 41] and (3) severe accident management capabilities. 
The methodology of these assessments was determined by EU experts from 
the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) and the West 
European Nuclear Regulators' Association (WENRA).[Footnote 42] The 
comprehensive safety and risk assessments took place from June 2011 
through April 2012 and were conducted with a three-step process as 
follows: 

1. Assessment of plants by operators (June to October 2011). 

2. Review of these assessments by national nuclear regulatory bodies 
(by the end of December 2011). 

3. European peer reviews of assessments (January to April 2012). 

Following the completion of these safety assessments, according to EU 
officials, the ENSREG action plan was approved on August 1, 2012. The 
plan is to, among other things, (1) assist in ensuring that the 
conclusions from the comprehensive safety and risk assessments and 
their peer review result in improvements in safety across European 
nuclear power plants and (2) ensure, through further peer review, that 
the recommendations and suggestions from the peer reviews of 
comprehensive safety and risk assessments (also known as "stress 
tests") are addressed by national regulators and ENSREG in a 
consistent manner. 

The EU also undertook a review of the existing legal and regulatory 
frameworks for the safety of nuclear installations to consider 
proposing any improvements that may be necessary. Having carried out 
EU-wide comprehensive risk and safety assessments of nuclear power 
plants, as well as a review of the existing legal and regulatory 
frameworks for the safety of nuclear installations, the European 
Commission concluded that improvements to European nuclear safety were 
necessary. The commission announced in June 2013 its proposal to 
update and strengthen its 2009 Nuclear Safety Directive. According to 
the commission announcement, the proposed new directive substantially 
strengthens the provisions of the existing directive by: 

* introducing EU-wide safety objectives; 

* setting up a European system of peer reviews of nuclear 
installations; 

* increasing transparency on nuclear safety matters; 

* strengthening the role and independence of national regulatory 
authorities; 

* introducing a requirement of specific safety reviews for older 
nuclear power plants for which a lifetime extension is considered; and: 

* enhancing on-site emergency preparedness and response, for example 
by implementing strict accident management guidelines and by putting 
in place emergency response centers that must be protected against 
radioactivity and earthquakes or flooding. 

If ultimately adopted by the European Council, this proposed new 
directive could enter into force as soon as 2014 and be written into 
binding national legislation by EU member states within the following 
18 months. 

Convention on Nuclear Safety: 

The Convention has convened two meetings since the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident--the regularly scheduled triennial review meeting in April 
2011, which was held, coincidentally, about 3 weeks after the 
accident, and a special meeting approximately 18 months later, in 
August 2012, to focus specifically on the accident. For the special 
August 2012 meeting, parties to the Convention (1) prepared a 
Fukushima Daiichi-related national report describing the safety 
assessments of their nuclear programs undertaken after the accident 
and measures taken to address the lessons learned from the accident; 
(2) reviewed and shared their findings and measures taken with other 
parties through the peer review process and, to varying extents, the 
public; (3) reviewed the effectiveness and provisions of the 
Convention. 

One result of these meetings was to make and adopt revisions to the 
Convention's guidelines on the preparation of the triennial national 
reports.[Footnote 43] The revised post-Fukushima guidelines provide 
more detailed suggestions for what information parties should include 
in their triennial national report and how it should be organized. 
Parties are encouraged to: 

* refer to IAEA safety standards, such as IAEA Safety Fundamentals and 
Requirements, in discussing how they are meeting their obligations to 
the Convention; 

* report in more detail about the steps they have taken to follow up 
on any issues and concerns that may have been raised in earlier review 
meetings and national reports; 

* discuss and address the results of international peer review 
missions, including IAEA IRRS missions, progress made in implementing 
recommendations, and suggestions and additional plans for further 
follow-up; and: 

* discuss lessons they have learned or actions taken in response to 
accidents and events, such as the issues highlighted by the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident. 

The parties also agreed to consider other measures to improve the 
effectiveness of the Convention at the next review meeting, scheduled 
for March 2014. In particular, part of the outcome of the August 2012 
special meeting was the establishment of an effectiveness and 
transparency working group open to all interested parties to the 
Convention, to develop and propose various actions that could be taken 
to strengthen and amend, where necessary, the Convention. This working 
group is to consider the various proposals raised during the special 
meeting to amend the Convention, including proposals already submitted 
by Switzerland and the Russian Federation. The working group is to 
present its findings to all parties at the 2014 review meeting. Among 
the Swiss proposals are several amendments to the Convention, 
including one that would require each contracting party to have 
periodic external review of its regulatory body to confirm its 
competence, independence, and that it is provided with adequate 
authority and resources. Another Swiss proposal would also require 
that the regulatory body's findings and decisions on the safety of 
nuclear installations be made publicly available. The Russian 
proposals include (1) requiring periodic assessments of nuclear power 
plant safety and (2) affirming that new construction conforms with 
IAEA recommendations. NRC officials noted that the U.S. position is 
that changes to the Convention could be better addressed through 
guidance documents, rather than through reopening the Convention to 
amendments. 

As we reported in April 2010, IAEA officials told us it was important 
for parties to make as much information about their civilian nuclear 
power programs accessible as possible but that it was for each party 
to determine how much information should be made public and how much 
should remain confidential.[Footnote 44] We also recommended in 2010 
that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the NRC Chairman, 
work with other parties to the Convention to, among other things, 
expand efforts to increase the number of parties' national reports 
made available to the public by posting them to IAEA's public website, 
even though there is no requirement to do so. In response to these 
recommendations, NRC stated that it (1) leads by example by always 
making the U.S. national report available on the NRC and IAEA publicly 
available websites and (2) uses its leadership positions in the 
Convention to work with and encourage leaders of other countries to 
encourage all contracting parties to make their national reports 
publicly available. In addition, under U.S. leadership, according to 
NRC, the Convention on Nuclear Safety Scientific Secretary in 2010 
sent out a message to all contracting parties reminding them that "in 
the spirit of openness and transparency, Contracting Parties are 
encouraged to notify IAEA when they agree to have their National 
Reports posted on the IAEA public website." Further, NRC and the State 
Department stated that they will also raise this issue during meetings 
of the Convention working group on effectiveness and transparency and 
continue to encourage contracting parties to make as much information 
publicly accessible as possible. 

Since April 2010, an additional 13 national reports prepared for the 
four review meetings held from 1999 to 2008 have been made available 
on IAEA's publicly available website, including 8 additional national 
reports prepared for the 2008 review meeting. Notwithstanding this 
overall increase in the number of reports posted, the total number of 
reports posted on IAEA's publicly available website for the 2011 
review meeting declined to 32 reports from 34 reports in 2008 despite 
the increase in the number of contracting parties to the Convention 
obligated to submit national reports increasing from 61 to 72 parties. 
Moreover, according to summary reports prepared by the parties at the 
end of the August 2012 special meeting called to discuss the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident, 36 of 61 parties (or 59 percent) that prepared 
national reports for the meeting did not make them available on IAEA's 
public website.[Footnote 45] 

Conclusions: 

The Fukushima Daiichi accident underscored the importance of countries 
having a strong, competent, and independent regulatory body and the 
consequences of not having one. Nuclear regulatory bodies worldwide 
are taking this accident seriously and using it as an opportunity to 
strengthen regulatory procedures, requirements, and infrastructures, 
as appropriate. Nuclear regulatory bodies will continue to play key 
roles in minimizing the chances of a severe accident and ensuring the 
most effective emergency response possible should an accident occur--
factors considered to be fundamental to public safety and to the 
continued viability of the civilian nuclear power industry worldwide. 
For example, NRC participates regularly in a variety of IAEA 
activities related to, among other things, nuclear safety, and the 
State Department coordinates U.S. policy matters with international 
organizations and treaties, including those dealing with nuclear 
safety. Supporting these efforts, IAEA peer review missions provide 
countries with unique opportunities to strengthen their nuclear 
regulatory organizations. However, IAEA does not systematically track 
the status of the recommendations made by the IRRS peer review 
missions and does not know the extent to which the recommendations 
have been implemented by the host countries. According to IAEA 
officials, the agency is not authorized by member states to act as a 
nuclear safety oversight organization, and member states are 
responsible for tracking the status of their mission findings. Without 
this information, IAEA cannot fully determine the impact and 
effectiveness of these peer review missions as important tools to 
improve nuclear safety. Furthermore, because not all of the 
recommendations and suggestions of the IRRS peer review missions are 
made public, countries may have less incentive to follow up on them. 

Although NRC does not consider its automated data transmittal system--
ERDS--a safety system, the Fukushima Daiichi accident underscored the 
usefulness of having such a system fully functioning. NRC has taken 
steps to upgrade ERDS, but it is still not equipped to collect and 
transmit information when electrical power and lines of communication 
are compromised, as occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
plant. NRC is delaying its consideration of additional upgrades to 
ERDS so that it would function more reliably because it is first 
completing higher priority post-Fukushima nuclear safety enhancements. 
By delaying its decision on whether or how to upgrade ERDS, a fully 
functioning system might not be available to regulators when the need 
is greatest--during a severe accident. Further, NRC may be missing an 
opportunity to lead by example as it does in other areas to promote 
nuclear safety worldwide, such as its efforts to encourage parties to 
the Convention on Nuclear Safety to make their national reports 
publicly available. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We are making the following two recommendations in this report: 

* To further promote the safety of civilian nuclear power programs 
worldwide by enhancing the effectiveness of nuclear regulatory bodies, 
we recommend that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Commission, work with and encourage officials from IAEA to 
systematically track the status of the recommendations made by the 
IRRS peer review missions and make this information publicly available 
to the extent feasible. 

* To increase the likelihood of NRC's access to timely, accurate, and 
comprehensive information during nuclear accidents, we recommend that 
the NRC Chairman consider expediting NRC's decision on whether or how 
to upgrade ERDS so that it would remain functional during a severe 
accident. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Energy, the 
Department of State, and NRC for review and comment. We also provided 
relevant sections of the draft report to IAEA. State and NRC provided 
written comments, which are presented in appendixes III and IV. NRC 
stated that it was in general agreement with the draft report but did 
not state whether it agreed or disagreed with our two recommendations, 
including the one recommending that NRC consider expediting its 
decision on whether or how to upgrade ERDS so that it would remain 
functional during a severe accident. The Department of Energy provided 
technical comments, as did IAEA and NRC, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. 

In its written comments, the Department of State "partially concurred" 
with our recommendation that it, in coordination with the NRC 
Chairman, work with officials from IAEA to systematically track the 
status of the recommendations by the IRRS peer review missions and 
make this information publicly available to the extent feasible. In 
its comment letter, the department stated that it would work with NRC 
and raise the recommendation with appropriate safety officials at IAEA 
and seek their views to further discuss what possible steps could be 
taken. However, State raised a number of issues that it believed would 
need to be considered in discussions with IAEA officials, including: 
(1) maintaining member states' confidentiality and willingness to 
participate in IRRS missions if IAEA systematically tracks the status 
of peer review recommendations and makes those results public, (2) 
member states' acceptance of such tracking without extensive prior 
discussions, and (3) IAEA's perspective on whether such tracking would 
improve the focus of the missions. State also raised questions about 
the costs associated with such systematic tracking and how they will 
be paid. We are encouraged that the department plans to work with NRC 
and raise the recommendation with IAEA and hope that these issues can 
be addressed in discussions with IAEA officials. NRC echoed issues 
similar to State's in its technical comments and also noted that its 
more appropriate role should be to encourage--rather than work with--
IAEA to systematically track the status of the recommendations by the 
IRRS peer review missions. In response to NRC's comment, we have added 
the word "encourage" to the recommendation so that it now reads, in 
part, that "the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Commission, work with and encourage officials from IAEA to 
systematically track the status of the recommendations by the IRRS 
peer review missions..." 

We recognize the significance of the issues State and NRC have raised 
about maintaining confidentiality, member states' acceptance of 
systematic tracking, how such tracking might affect member states' 
willingness to participate in future IRRS missions, and the focus of 
such missions. We agree that these issues need to be factored into 
discussions with IAEA officials. For this reason, we recommended that 
the results of these missions be made publicly available to the extent 
feasible. If discussions among State, NRC, and IAEA officials can lead 
to greater transparency about the results of IRRS missions and improve 
prospects for analyzing the impact and effectiveness of these 
missions, they would be worthwhile. However, as we noted in our 
report, without systematic tracking of the results of mission 
findings, including follow-up, IAEA cannot fully determine the impact 
and effectiveness of the peer review missions. In addition, our 
recommendation is consistent with another ongoing international 
effort--with U.S. participation--to encourage countries to be more 
open regarding nuclear safety. For example, as we noted in our report, 
the most recent version of the Convention on Nuclear Safety's 
guidelines encouraged the contracting parties to discuss and address 
the results of international peer review missions in their national 
reports, including IRRS missions; discuss progress made in 
implementing recommendations; and discuss suggestions and additional 
plans for further follow-up. Regarding State and NRC's mention of 
potential added costs associated with any tracking system, we note 
that neither agency provided any analysis or assessment of the 
potential added costs of systematic tracking in raising it as an issue. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 15 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the appropriate congressional 
committees, and other interested parties. The report also will be 
available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

David C. Trimble: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

In light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, you asked us to examine 
worldwide nuclear regulation and safety. This report examines: (1) the 
actions regulatory agencies with existing or planned civilian nuclear 
power reactors have taken to strengthen nuclear safety; (2) the extent 
to which these countries have established automated systems for 
collecting and transmitting data and taken steps to enable such 
systems to withstand emergency conditions; and (3) steps key 
international organizations have taken to support nuclear regulatory 
bodies and promote nuclear safety worldwide since the Fukushima 
accident and the impact of some of these steps. 

To examine the actions that national regulatory agencies have taken to 
strengthen nuclear safety in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, 
we selected a nonprobability sample of 16 countries to represent a 
cross section of "emerging" and established civilian nuclear power 
countries. For countries with emerging civilian nuclear power, we 
selected the three most often suggested by U.S. agency officials and 
nuclear experts as available. For established countries, we focused on 
those where nuclear power represented more than 15 percent of the 
country's electricity production. From those, we asked agency 
officials and other interviewees to suggest countries that would 
provide good examples of actions taken to strengthen nuclear safety. 
We also considered program size and the nation's nuclear regulatory 
framework to select 13 countries with established civilian nuclear 
power.[Footnote 46] From the sample, we prioritized 5 countries to 
visit in person. We selected these 5 countries through a combination 
of suggestions from experts, size of nuclear program, and proximity to 
one another. We interviewed, at an international nuclear regulators' 
conference in Ottawa, Canada, regulatory officials from all but 1 of 
the 11 countries we did not visit in person; Armenia, the country with 
regulatory officials we did not interview in person, provided written 
answers to our questions. 

The 16 countries are Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Canada, China, 
France, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, 
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Vietnam. 
Thirteen of these 16 countries--those with established nuclear power 
programs--operated 78 percent of the world's nuclear power reactors as 
of September 2013 (the other 3 countries--Indonesia, United Arab 
Emirates, and Vietnam--do not have operating nuclear power reactors). 
[Footnote 47] For the 16 countries selected, we reviewed reports these 
countries undertook to document the lessons learned from the Fukushima 
accident, including reports prepared for various international 
meetings--including the Second Extraordinary Meeting for the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety--and reports relating to their 
comprehensive safety risk assessments, and/or presentations in which 
they summarized lessons learned.[Footnote 48] We also interviewed 
officials from each selected regulatory body and/or technical support 
organization and/or received written responses to our questions. In 
countries where we conducted in-person site visits--Belgium, Canada, 
France, Sweden, and the United States--we also visited nuclear power 
plants and interviewed nuclear power plant operators. In Canada, 
France, Sweden, and the United States, we interviewed other government 
officials in agencies or ministries related to civilian nuclear power. 
In the Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we 
interviewed nuclear industry association officials. We also 
interviewed two former chairmen of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC). GAO did not independently verify statements of foreign law. 

We selected six illustrative categories of actions taken in response 
to Fukushima; our selection was neither an attempt to identify the 
full range of regulatory responses to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, 
nor to establish them as best practices or to catalog the extent to 
which each regulatory body within our sample undertook actions in each 
category. 

To examine the extent to which the 15 selected non-U.S. countries have 
established automated systems for collecting and transmitting data to 
the nuclear regulatory body during emergencies, we interviewed 
officials from the respective nuclear regulatory agencies, technical 
support organizations, and operators, as applicable, and possible and 
corroborated these statements with documents to the extent possible. 
GAO did not receive documentary or other substantial corroborating 
information to substantiate the statements of officials from China and 
Argentina that they have automated data transmission systems, and we 
have received only limited corroborating information that South Korea 
has such a system. There is no requirement that officials from these 
countries provide such information. 

To examine the steps key international organizations have taken to 
support nuclear regulatory bodies and promote nuclear safety worldwide 
since the Fukushima Daiichi accident, we first identified such 
organizations through interviews with officials from the State 
Department, Department of Energy (DOE), and nuclear regulatory 
officials. Based on these discussions, we identified the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development's (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), the World 
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), and the European Union (EU). 
We then reviewed, as applicable, the reports and action plans and 
other documents from these organizations and interviewed or exchanged 
responses to written questions with relevant officials from them. We 
also reviewed NRC documents and responses to written questions from 
NRC officials, and we reviewed State Department documents. In the case 
of IAEA, we reviewed IAEA information and details about IRRS and OSART 
missions, as well as answers to written questions and conference 
documents. We also reviewed previous GAO work and statements from IAEA 
officials and other officials from the Ottawa conference. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2012 to March 2014 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Civilian Nuclear Profiles of Selected Countries: 

Country: Argentina; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: Argentine Nuclear Regulatory Authority 
(ARN); 
Established[A]: 1997; 
Structure: Autonomous entity within the jurisdiction of the General 
Secretariat of the Presidency (reports to the President of Argentina); 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; nuclear security; 
nuclear nonproliferation; environment and public health; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: 2 power reactors (and 1 under construction) generating 
5% of the country's electricity. 

Country: Armenia; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: Armenian Nuclear Regulatory Authority 
(ANRA); 
Established[A]: 1993; 
Structure: The ANRA Chairman is appointed and dismissed by the Prime 
Minister and reports to the President, government, and Prime Minister, 
but not to any other ministry; 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; nuclear security; 
nuclear nonproliferation; environment and public health; nuclear waste; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: 1 power reactor generating 27% of the country's 
electricity. 

Country: Belgium; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: Federal Agency for Nuclear Control (FANC); 
Established[A]: 1994; 
Structure: An autonomous public institution that reports to the 
Minister of Home Affairs; 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; nuclear security; 
nuclear nonproliferation; environment and public health; nuclear waste; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: 7 power reactors generating 51% of the country's 
electricity. 

Country: Canada; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC); 
Established[A]: 2000; 
Structure: The Commission Tribunal, CNSC's central decision-making 
body, is a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal; 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; nuclear security; 
nuclear nonproliferation; environment and public health; nuclear waste; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: 19 power reactors generating 15% of the country's 
electricity. 

Country: China; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: National Nuclear Safety Administration 
(NNSA); 
Established[A]: 1984; 
Structure: Under the Ministry of Environmental Protection; 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; environment and 
public health; nuclear waste; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: 18 power reactors (and 28 under construction) 
generating 2% of the country's electricity. 

Country: France; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN); 
Established[A]: 2006; 
Structure: ASN's 5-person Commission serve for a 6-year, full-time 
term. ASN reports to the French Parliament; 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; nuclear security; 
[C] environment and public health; nuclear waste; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: 58 power reactors (and 1 under construction) 
generating 75% of the country's electricity. 

Country: Indonesia; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: BAPETEN; 
Established[A]: 1997; 
Structure: BAPETEN has the power to establish regulations and to 
conduct licensing and inspections. BAPETEN is under and directly 
responsible to the President of Indonesia; 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; nuclear security; 
nuclear nonproliferation; environment and public health; nuclear waste; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: No power reactors (3 research reactors, regulated by 
BAPETEN). 

Country: Japan; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA); 
Established[A]: 2012; 
Structure: An independent commission (under the Ministry of the 
Environment); 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; nuclear security; 
nuclear nonproliferation; environment and public health; nuclear waste; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: 50 power reactors (and 2 under construction) 
generating 2% of the country's electricity[D]. 

Country: Korea, Republic of; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: Nuclear Safety & Security Commission (NSSC); 
Established[A]: 2011; 
Structure: The 9-person commission an independent, stand-alone, 
ministry-level agency and supported by two technical support 
organizations; 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; nuclear security, 
nuclear nonproliferation; environment and public health; nuclear waste; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: 23 power reactors (and 5 under construction) 
generating 30% of the country's electricity. 

Country: Pakistan; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority 
(PNRA); 
Established[A]: 2001; 
Structure: PNRA is an independent regulator reporting directly to the 
Prime Minister. PNRA comprises a chairman and 2 full-time and 7 part-
time members. The federal government appoints the chairman and the 
members; 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; nuclear security; 
environment and public health; nuclear waste; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: 3 power reactors (and 2 under construction) generating 
5% of the country's electricity. 

Country: Russian Federation; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: Rostechnadzor (the Federal Environmental, 
Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service); 
Established[A]: 2004; 
Structure: Rostechnadzor is directly subordinate to the government and 
not to any ministry; 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; nuclear security; 
environment and public health; nuclear waste; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: 33 power reactors (and 10 under construction) 
generating 18% of the country's electricity. 

Country: Sweden; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority 
(SSM); 
Established[A]: 2008; 
Structure: SSM reports to the Ministry of the Environment but 
interprets and executes the law independently of the government; 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; nuclear security; 
nuclear non-proliferation; environment and public health; nuclear 
waste; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: 10 power reactors generating 38% of the country's 
electricity. 

Country: United Arab Emirates; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation 
(FANR); 
Established[A]: 2009; 
Structure: FANR is an independent legal entity with "full legal 
competence and financial and administrative independence." It is fully 
separate from the nuclear sector; 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; nuclear security; 
nuclear nonproliferation nuclear waste; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: 2 power reactors under construction. 

Country: United Kingdom; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR); 
Established[A]: 2011; 
Structure: ONR is a stand-alone statutory body, formed as an agency of 
the Health and Safety Executive but working toward becoming an 
independent corporation; 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; nuclear security; 
nuclear nonproliferation; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: 16 power reactors generating 18% of the country's 
electricity. 

Country: United States of America; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); 
Established[A]: 1974; 
Structure: Independent federal agency headed by five commissioners 
(commission is a quasi-judicial body); 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; nuclear security; 
nuclear nonproliferation; nuclear waste; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: 100 power reactors (with 3 under construction) 
generating 19% of the country's electricity. 

Country: Vietnam; 
Nuclear regulatory agency: Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety (VARANS); 
Established[A]: 2003; 
Structure: VARANS is under the Ministry of Science and Technology; 
Scope of regulatory authority[B]: Nuclear safety; nuclear security; 
nuclear nonproliferation; 
Operational nuclear reactor and electricity generation data as of 
September 2013: No power reactors (1 research reactor, regulated by 
VARANS). 

Source: GAO analysis of nuclear regulatory body documents; IAEA Power 
Reactor Information System as of September 4, 2013. 

Note: Scope also implies only civilian and commercial nuclear matters; 
this table does not specify the regulatory agencies that also have 
oversight over military nuclear matters. 

[A] This date represents the establishment of each country's current 
nuclear regulatory body, which may have replaced an existing nuclear 
regulatory body. 

[B] This column represents each regulatory body's scope of 
responsibilities as reported by the country and does not convey any 
GAO analysis of the regulatory body's performance of its 
responsibilities. Scope of regulatory authority comprises areas 
addressed by technical support organizations, such as Belgium's Bel-V, 
France's Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), 
and Korea's KINS; areas not included may be performed by government 
agencies. For example, the U.S. NRC is not the primary U.S. agency 
responsible for oversight of environment and public health, but shares 
in these responsibilities with regard to civilian nuclear power with 
other federal agencies and state and local governments. 

[C] France's ASN is responsible for oversight of nuclear security (for 
example, security of radioactive materials, including transportation 
of such materials) but not for oversight of physical protection of 
nuclear power plants. However, its technical support organization, 
IRSN, has a role in monitoring physical protection. 

[D] Before all but two of Japan's remaining 50 reactors were ordered 
to suspend operations after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, nuclear 
reactors generated 18% of Japan's electricity. As of this writing all 
reactors have been shutdown. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Comptroller: 
PO Box 15008: 
Charleston, SC 29415-5008: 

February 7, 2014: 

Dr. Loren Yager: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548-0010: 

Dear Dr. Yager: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"Nuclear Safety: Countries' Regulatory Bodies Have Made Changes in 
Response to the Fukushima Daiichi Accident" GAO Job Code 361412. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact 
Patricia Metz, Deputy Director; Bureau of International Security and 
Nonproliferation at (242)736-4429. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

James L. Millette: 

cc; 
GAO - David Trimble; 
ISN — Thomas M. Countryman; 
State/OIG - Norman Brown. 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Nuclear Safety: Countries' Regulatory Bodies Have Made Changes in
Response to the Fukushima Daiichi Accident (GAO-14-109, GAO Code 
361412): 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled 
Nuclear Safety: Countries' Regulatory Bodies Have Made Changes in 
Response to the Fukushima Daiichi Accident. The Department of State 
welcomes this report. Since the accident at Fukushima Daiichi, the 
United States has continued to work closely with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Contracting Parties to the Convention 
on Nuclear Safety to strengthen the implementation of the Convention 
and examine lessons learned from the accident. 

Promotion of the safe operation of nuclear reactors worldwide is one 
of the U.S. government's top foreign policy and national security 
priorities. The Convention on Nuclear Safety plays a very important 
role in realization of that objective. However, it must be understood 
that the Convention is an incentive instrument. It is not designed to 
ensure fulfillment of obligations through control and sanction, but is 
based on the common interest of the Contracting Parties to achieve 
higher levels of safety, which is to be promoted and encouraged 
through regular meetings of the Parties and peer review missions. 

GAO recommends "that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
NRC Chairman, work with officials from IAEA to systematically track 
the status of the recommendations made by IAEA Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service (IRRS) peer review missions and make this information 
publicly available to the extent feasible." 

State partially concurs. First, as GAO found in its review, although 
the IAEA promotes peer review missions to improve nuclear safety and 
regulatory effectiveness, the IAEA does not formally track whether the 
recommendations of the peer reviews are implemented by the host 
countries. While we understand the usefulness of gathering this data 
from the host countries to determine the impact and effectiveness of 
the peer review missions, we question the acceptance of this action by 
the Member that will be impacted by this decision, at least without 
extensive prior discussions. Additional issues that would need to be 
considered with the IAEA include maintaining Member State 
confidentiality and the willingness of Member States to participate in 
IRRS missions if the IAEA will be examining the status of 
implementation and making those results public; costing out a tracking 
system and how will it be paid for; and the IAEA' s perspective on 
whether the tracking system would improve the focus of such missions 
and whether countries would be more or less likely to go public with 
the results of peer missions. However, we will raise the 
recommendation with appropriate safety officials at the IAEA and seek 
their views. 

Again, State thanks the GAO for this constructive report. Please be 
assured that the Department takes the GAO's findings very seriously 
and we will work with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the 
IAEA to further discuss what possible steps can be taken. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

United States: 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001: 

February 19, 2014: 

Mr. Glen Levis: 
Assistant Director, Natural Resources: 
and the Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Levis: 

On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am 
responding to Mr. David Trimble's letter dated January 16, 2014, 
requesting NRC's comments on the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) proposed report GAO-14-109, "Nuclear Safety: Countries'
Regulatory Bodies Have Made Changes in Response to the Fukushima 
Daiichi Accident." We appreciate the opportunity to provide our 
comments for your consideration. 

As requested, the NRC has reviewed the draft report and is in general 
agreement with the draft report. The NRC has several technical 
comments. These comments are detailed in the enclosure. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

[Illegible] for: 
Mark A. Satorius: 
Executive Director for Operations: 

Enclosure: NRC's Technical Comments on Draft GAO Report GAO-14-109. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

David C. Trimble, (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Glen Levis, Assistant 
Director; Alisa Beyninson; Kevin Bray; Antoinette Capaccio; Scott 
Fletcher; Alison O'Neill; Steven R. Putansu; Kevin Tarmann; and Kiki 
Theodoropoulos made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] On April 26, 1986, the worst accident in the history of civilian 
nuclear power occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 
Ukraine, where an explosion destroyed the core of a reactor containing 
approximately 200 tons of nuclear fuel. The explosion also destroyed 
much of the reactor building, severed the reactor's cooling pipes, and 
spewed hot fragments of reactor fuel from the core. The explosion 
dispersed radioactive material over 60,000 square miles of land 
primarily in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. A separate fund was 
established to help stabilize the damaged reactor at Chernobyl by 
constructing a new containment structure. We reported in 2007 that the 
estimated cost of this effort was $1.2 billion, of which the United 
States pledged $203 million. See GAO, Nuclear Safety: Construction of 
the Protective Shelter for the Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor Faces 
Schedule Delays, Potential Cost Increases, and Technical 
Uncertainties, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-923] 
(Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2007). 

[2] In 2010, Germany amended its Atomic Energy Act to align with an 
"energy concept" where nuclear power would serve a "bridging function" 
until an infrastructure for renewable fuel sources was reliably in 
place, without setting a timeline for phasing out nuclear power. On 
June 30, 2011, after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the German 
parliament voted to fully shut down its nuclear power plants by the 
end of 2022. This vote followed the suspension of operations of 8 of 
Germany's 17 nuclear power plants. 

[3] The National Diet of Japan--the Japanese parliament--commissioned 
an investigation of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, chaired by Kiyoshi 
Kurokawa, known formally as The National Diet of Japan Fukushima 
Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission. The commission 
issued its findings on June 9, 2012. 

[4] Safety culture implies individual and organizational awareness of 
and commitment to the importance of safety. It also refers to the 
personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engaged in 
any activity that has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power plants. 
We reported in 2010 that development of a positive safety culture 
often involves a shift in how workers view and address safety-related 
events. See GAO, Biological Laboratories: Design and Implementation 
Considerations for Safety Reporting Systems, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-850] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 
2010). 

[5] GAO, Nuclear Commerce: Governmentwide Strategy Could Help Increase 
Commercial Benefits from U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with 
Other Countries, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-36] 
(Washington: D.C.: Nov. 4, 2010). 

[6] IAEA is an autonomous international organization affiliated with 
the United Nations, established in Vienna, Austria, in 1957. The 
agency has the dual role of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy by transferring nuclear science and technology through its 
nuclear science and applications and technical cooperation programs, 
and verifying, through its safeguards program, that nuclear material 
subject to safeguards is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other 
proscribed purposes. The IAEA also develops (nonbinding) international 
standards for nuclear safety, as well as criteria for nuclear 
regulatory independence. 

[7] When we originally accepted this request, Senator Carper was 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, 
Committee on Environment and Public Works. In February 2014, Senator 
Carper became Chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure. As a result, we are addressing this report to him in 
his current capacity. 

[8] The 16 countries we selected are Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, 
Canada, China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, South 
Korea, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, 
and Vietnam. 

[9] Because this is a nonprobability sample, information from these 
countries is not representative of the entire population of 
established and emerging civilian nuclear power countries and cannot 
be generalized. However, this information can provide illustrative 
examples of these countries' nuclear regulatory framework. 

[10] We included countries with emerging or potential nuclear programs 
in our sample because the implications of the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident extend to such countries. 

[11] These meetings include the April 2011 Convention on Nuclear 
Safety review meeting; the August 2012 Convention Second Extraordinary 
Meeting; and the International Atomic Energy Agency's April 2013 
International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems. 

[12] The OECD is an organization of 34 countries that work together to 
address the economic, social, and environmental challenges of 
globalization. The organization provides a setting where governments 
can, among other things, compare policy experiences, seek answers to 
common problems, and seek to coordinate domestic and international 
policies. 

[13] NEA is a specialized agency within OECD, an intergovernmental 
organization of industrialized countries based in Paris, France. In 
September 2013, OECD's NEA issued a report on the actions taken and 
lessons learned by NEA member countries and standing technical 
committees in response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. 

[14] After the Chernobyl disaster, nuclear power plant operators 
worldwide were determined to work together to ensure such a disaster 
could never happen again. From this, WANO emerged and formally came 
into being on May 15, 1989, during an inaugural meeting in Moscow. The 
WANO Charter is signed by 144 power companies, committing them to work 
in support of the WANO mission to maximize the safety and reliability 
of nuclear power plants worldwide by working together to assess, 
benchmark, and improve performance through mutual support, exchange of 
information, and emulation of best practice. 

[15] Reactors 1, 2, and 3 were operating at the time of the accident. 
Reactors 4, 5, and 6 were off-line for scheduled outages. 

[16] The tsunami caused by the earthquake flooded and totally 
destroyed all but one of the emergency diesel generators, the seawater 
cooling pumps, the electric wiring system, and the direct current 
power supply for reactors 1, 2, and 4, resulting in loss of all power 
except for an external supply to reactor 6 from an air-cooled 
emergency diesel generator. In short, reactors 1, 2, 4, and 5 lost all 
power. Reactor 3 first partially lost power and later lost all power. 

[17] "Containment" refers to the structure and associated systems that 
enclose the nuclear reactor and are the final barrier to the 
radioactive materials that may otherwise be released into the 
environment in the case of an accident. Such enclosures are usually 
dome-shaped and made of steel-reinforced concrete. 

[18] EURATOM acts in several areas connected with atomic energy, 
including research, safety standards, and the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. One of the fundamental objectives of the EURATOM Treaty that 
established EURATOM is to ensure that all users in the EU enjoy a 
regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear fuels. 

[19] These assessments examined how nuclear installations can 
withstand the consequences of various extreme external events and, in 
certain cases, security threats and incidents due to malevolent or 
terrorist acts. The topics of the tests included natural initiating 
events (earthquake, tsunami, and extreme climatic conditions), loss of 
the facility's safety systems, and severe accident management. 

[20] The Doel power plant is located along the Scheldt River and has 
four reactors with a combined output of 2,912 megawatts. 

[21] NRC defines emergency planning zones as areas for which planning 
is recommended to assure that prompt and effective actions can be 
taken to protect the public in the event of a radiological incident at 
a nuclear power plant. 

[22] A corrective action program is an operator's process for 
tracking, evaluating, and resolving deficiencies. 

[23] On February 15, 2013, a meteor exploded over Chelyabinsk in 
Russia. The Mayak nuclear facility, which is near the explosion, was 
not affected. 

[24] "Updated Measures to Mitigate Consequences of Beyond-Design Basis 
Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants." 

[25] In the United States, an August 23, 2011, magnitude-5.8 
earthquake in Mineral, Virginia, which had its epicenter approximately 
11 miles from the North Anna Power Station was a beyond design-basis 
event. The ground motion at the site during the earthquake exceeded 
levels for which the plant was originally designed and licensed. 
Nevertheless, the plant did not experience significant damage to its 
structures or safety systems. 

[26] This type of hydrogen control system refers to catalytic 
recombiners, which oxidize the hydrogen (or "recombine" it with oxygen 
to make water or steam). 

[27] There are three major types of containment designs for boiling 
water reactors: Mark I, Mark II, and Mark III. The Fukushima Daiichi 
reactor Units 1-5 had Mark I containments, and reactor Unit 6 had a 
Mark II containment. According to a commissioner vote, Mark I and II 
containment structures' relatively small volume presents "long-
recognized vulnerabilities" in their ability to contain radioactive 
materials during a severe accident. A 1975 NRC study (NUREG-75/014) 
found that the risk of containment failure during severe accidents is 
higher at boiling water reactors with Mark I containments because the 
containment volume of Mark I containment designs was significantly 
less than that of the other containment designs, approximately one-
sixth the volume of large dry pressurized water reactor containments. 
In boiling water reactors with a Mark II containment design, the 
containment volume could be approximately 25 percent larger than the 
volume of Mark I containments. According to NRC's Near-Term Task 
Force, it can reasonably be concluded that under circumstances similar 
to those of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, a Mark II would have 
suffered similar consequences because its containment design is only 
slightly larger in volume than Mark I containment designs. 

[28] Generally, federal regulations, including those of NRC, can only 
be changed through the rulemaking process. An order--which is issued 
immediately--bypasses NRC's rulemaking process, which could take years 
and seeks comments from stakeholders, such as industry and the public. 
NRC's "backfit rule" requires, in order to impose new requirements on 
existing licensees, that NRC determine that the new requirements would 
result in a substantial increase in the overall protection of public 
health and safety or common defense and security and that this 
increased protection justifies the cost of implementation, unless the 
new requirement fits within one of the exceptions to the backfit rule 
in 10 C.F.R. § 50.109(a)(4)(i)-(iii). Backfitting is defined by NRC as 
the modification of or addition to systems, structures, components, or 
design of a facility; or the design approval or manufacturing license 
for a facility; or the procedures or organization required to design, 
construct, or operate a facility; any of which may result from a new 
or amended provision in NRC's regulations or the imposition of a 
regulatory staff position interpreting NRC's regulations that is 
either new or different from a previously applicable staff position, 
relative to specific dates, such as issuance of licenses. 

[29] According to Swedish nuclear regulatory officials, Sweden's 
nuclear regulatory body's nuclear safety work is funded primarily by 
user fees. The increased allocation since the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident reflects an increase in the amount of the budget funded by 
the government. 

[30] Even before the 2006 law that established ASN as an independent 
commission, the French agencies responsible for nuclear regulation 
became more independent over time. The first nuclear regulatory body 
was within the French Atomic Energy Commission, which also operated 
the reactors. 

[31] A Severe Accident Management Program is a program to prevent and 
mitigate the consequences of beyond design-basis accidents, including 
severe accidents. According to IAEA, accident management means taking 
actions during a beyond design-basis accident to prevent it from 
escalating into a severe accident, mitigate any consequences, and 
achieve a long-term safe stable state. 

[32] NSSC found 215 cases of quality-record falsification among 20 
suppliers of reactor components for the Yeonggwang nuclear power 
plant. Another incident of concern to NSSC was a safety failure at the 
Kori nuclear power plant that was not reported to NSSC until a month 
after the incident. According to Korean nuclear regulatory officials, 
both incidents had an impact on public perceptions of nuclear safety. 

[33] Under the quasi-autonomous nongovernmental organization 
construct, an agency can perform functions of the government and be 
entirely funded by the government but not controlled directly by the 
central government. 

[34] Normally, alternating current power, which is essential for safe 
operation and accident recovery at commercial (civilian) nuclear power 
plants, is supplied by off-site sources via the electrical grid. Loss 
of this off-site power can have a major negative impact on a power 
plant's ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. 

[35] A VPN is a private network that is maintained across a shared or 
public network, such as the Internet, by means of specialized security 
procedures. VPNs are intended to provide secure connections between 
remote clients, such as branch offices or traveling personnel and a 
central office. 

[36] The Nuclear Safety Directive of the European Commission requires 
all EU member states to host an IRRS mission and a follow-up mission 
once every 10 years. 

[37] IAEA has conducted IRRS missions since 1992. The present form of 
IRRS mission dates to 2006. 

[38] In the case of IRRS missions, and in accordance with IRRS 
guidelines, countries are encouraged to make their reports available 
to the public. IAEA will make a summary report publicly available 90 
days after the letter transmitting the report to the host country 
unless the country specifically requests that it remain restricted. 

[39] The Kurokawa Commission scrutinized the relationship between the 
plant operators and the regulators and found the relationship lacking 
in independence, transparency, and safety culture, calling the 
relationship a "typical example of regulatory capture in which the 
oversight of the industry by regulators effectively ceases." 

[40] In addition to the 14 EU member states with operating nuclear 
power plants (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom), and two neighboring states (Switzerland and 
Ukraine), Lithuania also participated in the comprehensive safety risk 
assessments even though the two reactors at its Ignalina nuclear power 
plant are currently being decommissioned. 

[41] An ultimate heat sink is a source of water near the nuclear plant-
-a lake, river, or ocean, or a dedicated water source--to absorb decay 
heat. An ultimate heat sink is required to provide all of the nuclear 
power reactor's cooling water needs for the first 30 days of an 
accident. Two or more pumps are used to take water from the heat sink 
to the plant. 

[42] ENSREG is an independent, authoritative expert body composed of 
senior officials from national regulatory or nuclear safety 
authorities from all member states in the EU. WENRA is an organization 
composed of the chief nuclear regulators of EU countries with nuclear 
power plants and other interested European countries. WENRA's main 
objectives are to facilitate the exchange of nuclear safety 
information and experience among regulators, develop a common approach 
to nuclear safety, and provide an independent capability to examine 
nuclear safety in affiliated countries. 

[43] According to the Convention's national report guidelines, their 
purpose is to suggest that material that may be useful for parties to 
include in their reports and to facilitate the most efficient review 
of implementation by the parties of their obligations under the 
Convention. 

[44] GAO, Nuclear Safety: Convention on Nuclear Safety Is Viewed by 
Most Member Countries as Strengthening Safety Worldwide, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-489] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 
2010). 

[45] Of the 75 parties to the Convention, and that were obligated to 
submit a national report in 2012, 61 prepared such reports. 

[46] Regulatory frameworks may differ in that a nuclear regulatory 
agency could be a cabinet agency or ministry, or an independent 
commission. We also considered structural changes undertaken by 
nuclear regulatory agencies from one type to another (e.g., agency to 
commission). 

[47] This figure includes reactors that are temporarily suspended and 
thus not "operating," including the 50 reactors in Japan suspended in 
the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The three "emerging" 
categories are in varying stages of considering, planning, or 
licensing their nuclear power programs; for example, the Indonesian 
government has not yet decided to pursue a nuclear program but had 
stated an interest in developing one. 

[48] These meetings include the April 2011 Convention on Nuclear 
Safety review meeting; the August 2012 Convention Second Extraordinary 
Meeting; and the International Atomic Energy Agency's April 2013 
International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems. 

[End of section] 

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