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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

March 2014: 

Joint Professional Military Education: 

Opportunities Exist for Greater Oversight and Coordination of 
Associated Research Institutions: 

GAO-14-216: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-216, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

DOD"s colleges and universities that provide JPME, including their 
research institutions, are intended to develop military personnel 
throughout their careers by broadening them intellectually and fostering
collaboration across the military services. JPME research institutions
generally provide studies and analysis research that can support 
academic programs or inform DOD policymakers. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013 mandated GAO to
review JPME research institutions. GAO"s report (1) describes how JPME
research institutions have changed in number, funding, and size; (2)
evaluates the extent to which DOD assesses JPME research institution
performance; and (3) evaluates the extent to which DOD coordinates the
research requests of these and other DOD-funded research organizations.
GAO identified and examined the 20 JPME research institutions that
conduct research as their primary mission and have dedicated personnel. 
GAO reviewed DOD documents and interviewed officials on changes at the
20 institutions and how they are overseen, as well as the processes to
coordinate their research activities and those of 14 other DOD-funded
research organizations GAO determined conduct research activities. 

What GAO Found: 

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) research institutions, 
particularly at the National Defense University, experienced growth in 
number, funding, and size in terms of staffing levels from fiscal year 
(FY) 2007 through FY 2011, but the number of institutions as well as 
funding and staffing levels declined over the past 2 years. For 
example, total funding for JPME research institutions increased
from $30.8 million in FY 2007 to $47.7 million in FY 2011, but 
subsequently decreased to $40.6 million in FY 2013. GAO identified 
several factors that contributed to these institutions" growth, 
including increases in funding provided by outside organizations for 
research and the creation of new research institutions. Department of 
Defense (DOD) officials reported that DOD-wide budget reductions, 
including the effects of sequestration, contributed to decreases in 
the number, size, and funding for JPME research institutions. 

The extent to which DOD can assess the performance of JPME research
institutions is limited by the lack of a comprehensive framework to 
systematically assess their performance in meeting professional 
military education and other departmental goals and objectives. JPME 
colleges and universities have not consistently established measurable 
goals or objectives linked with performance metrics for their 
associated research institutions. Best practices state that achieving 
results in government requires a framework with measurable goals and
objectives and metrics to assess progress. Further, oversight 
mechanisms for the colleges and universities, such as accreditation 
processes, focus on the quality of JPME academic programs and not on 
the research institutions" performance. There is no DOD-wide guidance 
that addresses the intended role of the research institutions in 
supporting JPME or other departmental goals, or assigns 
responsibilities for conducting reviews of them, leaving the 
department without a basis to assess the institutions" stated mission 
and actual performance against planned or expected results. Therefore, 
DOD does not have a basis to assess the institutions" missions and 
performance against expected results, as called for by best practices. 
Without measurable goals and objectives linked with performance 
metrics, and clear guidance on their intended roles and assignment
of oversight responsibilities, DOD cannot ensure JPME research 
institutions are effectively accomplishing their missions. 

DOD has not established mechanisms to coordinate requests for research
conducted by JPME research institutions and other DOD-funded research
organizations because there is no requirement to do so. Although many 
of these organizations have missions to conduct research in similar 
topic areas, DOD uses a variety of processes to request studies and 
analysis research. Specifically, offices within the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and the military departments each have their own 
separate internal processes to manage research requests and do not 
participate in one another"s processes. Best practices on managing for 
results state that organizations involved in similar missions should 
coordinate and share information to avoid unnecessary duplication of 
work. At a time of constrained budgets, fragmentation in DOD"s 
approach to managing its research requests across the department exposes
DOD to the risk of potential overlap of studies and analysis research. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD take actions to define the role of JPME 
research institutions, assign responsibilities for assessing 
performance, and establish a mechanism to coordinate studies and
analysis research requests. DOD concurred with the recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-216]. For more 
information, contact Johana Ayers at (202) 512-5741 or ayersj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

JPME Research Institutions Expanded from 2007 through 2011 Due to 
Several Factors, but Have Subsequently Contracted: 

DOD Is Limited in Its Ability to Assess the Performance of JPME 
Research Institutions: 

DOD Does Not Formally Coordinate Studies and Analysis Research 
Requests Performed by JPME and Other DOD-Funded Research Institutions, 
Although Some Conduct Work in Similar Topic Areas: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Joint Professional Military Education Research 
Institutions: 

Appendix III: Research Project Title Analysis: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: JPME Colleges and Universities and Associated Research 
Institutions, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2013: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Map of Service and Joint Colleges and Universities Certified 
to Provide Joint Professional Military Education (JPME): 

Figure 2: Number of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 
Research Institutions, Fiscal Years 2007 through 2013: 

Figure 3: Total Funding for Joint Professional Military Education 
(JPME) Research Institutions by JPME College and University, Fiscal 
Years 2007 through 2013: 

Figure 4: Staffing Levels for Joint Professional Military Education 
(JPME) Research Institutions by JPME College and University, Fiscal 
Years 2007 through 2013: 

Figure 5: Total Reimbursable Funding for the National Defense 
University's (NDU) Research Institutions, Fiscal Years 2007 through 
2013: 

Figure 6: Similarities in Research Topic Areas for 34 Research 
Organizations, According to Mission Statements: 

Figure 7: Similarities in Research Topic Areas for 34 Research 
Organizations, According to 2012 and 2013 Research Project Titles: 

Abbreviations: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

JPME: Joint Professional Military Education: 

PME: Professional Military Education: 

NDU: National Defense University: 

GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act: 

CCO: Center for Complex Operations: 

CSR: Center for Strategic Research: 

CSCMA: Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs: 

CSWMD: Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 

CRRC: Conflict Records Research Center: 

CTNSP: Center for Technology and National Security Policy: 

CTSS: Center for Transatlantic Security Studies: 

AFRI: Air Force Research Institute: 

AFCPC: Air Force Counterproliferation Center: 

CSAT: Center for Strategy and Technology: 

SRD: Strategic Research Department: 

CMSI: China Maritime Studies Institute: 

ILD: International Law Department: 

SSG: Strategic Studies Group: 

HD: History Department: 

MES: Middle East Studies: 

TRG: Translational Research Group at Center for Advanced Operational 
Culture Learning: 

SSI: Strategic Studies Institute: 

CAL: Center for Army Leadership: 

CSI Combat Studies Institute: 

RAND PAF: RAND Project Air Force: 

RAND NDRI: RAND National Defense Research Institute: 

CNA: Center for Naval Analyses: 

IDA: Institute for Defense Analyses: 

Marshall Center: George C. Marshall European Center for Security 
Studies: 

NESA: Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies: 

Perry Center: William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies: 

ACSS: Africa Center for Strategic Studies: 

NPS: CI: Naval Postgraduate School: Cebrowski Institute for 
Information and Innovation: 

NPS: MOVES: Naval Postgraduate School: Modeling, Virtual Environments 
and Simulation Institute: 

NPS: CIRPAS: Naval Postgraduate School Center for Interdisciplinary 
Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Studies: 

CAA: Center for Army Analysis: 

TRAC: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 10, 2014: 

Congressional Committees: 

As operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere over the past decade 
have demonstrated, military personnel must think critically, 
communicate well, conduct themselves with integrity, and lead others 
in difficult and often dangerous situations that involve forces from 
across the four military services. To that end, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) relies on joint professional military education (JPME), 
a subset of professional military education (PME),[Footnote 1] to 
educate servicemembers throughout their careers, broaden their 
knowledge, improve performance during joint assignments, and foster 
collaboration across the military services. In 1989, a congressional 
panel undertaking a comprehensive review of PME strongly expressed the 
importance of JPME in guiding intellectual thought on doctrine, 
tactics, strategy, and the future of each of the military services. 
[Footnote 2] DOD has colleges and universities throughout the country 
that not only provide academic instruction in PME and JPME, but also 
conduct research.[Footnote 3] At JPME-granting colleges and 
universities, research is conducted by students and professors, as 
well as by specifically dedicated research institutions. These JPME 
research institutions[Footnote 4] primarily conduct studies and 
analysis research that may directly support both PME and JPME academic 
programs by providing new concepts for the classroom or DOD's broader 
needs, such as policy development and planning efforts.[Footnote 5] 

Given its importance in educating military leaders, a 2010 report from 
the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 
concluded that PME, of which JPME is a subset, warrants more-frequent 
congressional oversight.[Footnote 6] However, our prior work[Footnote 
7] has found that past studies of PME were unable to fully identify 
the costs associated with DOD's JPME programs. Specifically, we found 
that without reliable cost information, decision makers could be 
hindered in determining the most-efficient allocation of departmental 
resources for JPME. Moreover, the Joint Staff has expressed concerns 
about considerable budgetary growth at the National Defense University 
(NDU), which DOD has characterized as the premier center for JPME. For 
example, in a 2012 review, the Joint Staff concluded that it could not 
identify a clear link between some of the activities of NDU's research 
institutions and its JPME mission. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated 
that we review the work performed by JPME research institutions in 
support of PME and DOD's broader mission.[Footnote 8] In this report, 
we (1) describe how JPME research institutions have changed in number, 
funding, and size and the factors that contributed to any changes; (2) 
evaluate the extent to which DOD is assessing the performance of JPME 
research institutions in meeting PME and other departmental goals and 
objectives; and (3) evaluate the extent to which DOD coordinates 
research requests for JPME research institutions and other DOD-funded 
research organizations. 

To address these objectives, we included in the scope of our review 
the intermediate-and senior-level colleges and universities that 
provide JPME certification--that is, NDU, the Army War College, Army 
Command and General Staff College, Air University, Naval War College, 
and Marine Corps University. Research conducted at these JPME colleges 
and universities can be accomplished by research institutions 
associated with the colleges and universities as well as by students 
and professors as part of academic coursework. For the purposes of 
this report, we focused on research institutions that conduct research 
as their primary mission and have dedicated personnel to do so. We 
excluded certain centers and institutes associated with JPME colleges 
and universities because we determined they did not have a mission to 
primarily conduct research or did not have dedicated personnel. 
[Footnote 9] We also excluded from our analysis research conducted by 
students as part of their academic coursework and by professors not 
affiliated with the research institutions. To identify the JPME 
research institutions included within the scope of our review, we 
examined documentation and gathered testimonial evidence related to 
the missions, activities, and organization of the institutions that 
conduct research at the JPME colleges and universities. Based on this 
evidence, we determined that 20 institutions were conducting research 
as their primary mission and had dedicated personnel assigned to them 
and therefore were included in the scope of our review. 

To determine the extent to which JPME research institutions have 
changed in number, funding, and size, and the factors contributing to 
any changes, we obtained questionnaire responses and other 
documentation on the number of research institutions that existed at 
JPME colleges and universities from fiscal years 2000 through 2013 and 
collected and analyzed available JPME research institute funding and 
staffing data[Footnote 10] for these years. We assessed the 
reliability of the funding and staffing data collected by analyzing 
questionnaire responses from JPME colleges and universities, which 
included information on their data-system management, data quality-
assurance processes, and potential sources of errors and mitigations 
of those errors. Based on our review of the data provided and our 
review of the questionnaire responses, we concluded that the systems 
used to provide the data, and thus the data they provide, are 
sufficiently reliable for our audit purposes. However, based on this 
evidence, we determined that we were unable to report consistent data 
on JPME research institution funding and staffing levels prior to 
fiscal year 2007 and therefore we are providing trend data on JPME 
research institutions from fiscal years 2007 through 2013.[Footnote 
11] Furthermore, although we have identified a number of factors that 
could affect data quality, we concluded that these were the best 
available data on JPME research institutions. We also concluded that 
the data would not lead to an incorrect or unintentional message since 
they are corroborated through interviews with DOD officials. We also 
discussed the reasons for any trends in these budget and staffing data 
with knowledgeable officials in DOD and at the JPME colleges and 
universities. 

To determine the extent to which DOD is assessing the performance of 
JPME research institutions in meeting PME and other departmental goals 
and objectives, we obtained and reviewed documentation from the Joint 
Staff and the JPME colleges and universities that identify any goals, 
objectives, or performance measures for JPME research institutions. 
Specifically, we reviewed current strategic plans, mission statements, 
and other documentation describing activities of the JPME research 
institutions. We also reviewed documentation describing external 
oversight mechanisms that monitor the academic quality of JPME 
colleges and universities. To further our understanding of any 
processes used to assess the performance of JPME research 
institutions, we used a standard set of questions to interview DOD 
officials and personnel at the JPME colleges and universities. We then 
reviewed the results of the interviews and related documents to 
develop summary findings. In reviewing this documentation and 
testimonial evidence, we referred to our prior work on best practices 
that identifies elements that constitute a comprehensive oversight 
framework. Specifically, these best practices[Footnote 12] state that 
such a framework should include measurable goals and objectives linked 
with metrics for assessing progress, which is consistent with the 
framework identified in the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA), as amended by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010.[Footnote 13] 
We also reviewed this evidence in light of key internal-control 
standards that state that federal agencies should conduct reviews by 
management at the functional or activity level and compare actual 
performance to planned or expected results.[Footnote 14] 

To determine the extent to which research activities of JPME research 
institutions and other DOD-funded research organizations are 
coordinated, we included in the scope of our review the 20 JPME 
research institutions discussed above and 14 other DOD-funded research 
organizations. To identify the other DOD-funded research institutions, 
we gathered DOD documentation from the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Research and Engineering and canvassed knowledgeable DOD officials 
in offices responsible for requesting research, such as the military 
departments, science and technology executive agents, studies and 
analysis research program managers, and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, including the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy. We reviewed documentation from and interviewed 
officials with these offices to better understand the process for 
requesting studies and analysis research from JPME institutions and 
other DOD-funded research organizations. Specifically, we used a 
standard set of questions to interview officials with the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense and the military services about the processes 
used to share information with other offices that also request studies 
and analysis research. We then reviewed the results of the interviews 
and related documents to develop summary findings. We reviewed the 
documentary and testimonial evidence in light of key practices for 
enhancing and sustaining coordination as described in our prior work 
on best practices. Specifically, best practices state that 
organizations involved in similar missions should coordinate and share 
information to avoid unnecessary duplication of work.[Footnote 15] 
Further, we assessed similarities and dissimilarities among the 
missions of the JPME research institutions and other DOD-funded 
research organizations in the following four ways: (1) we determined 
the general category of research being conducted at JPME and other DOD-
funded research institutions, for example, whether the research was 
studies and analysis-or science and technology-focused; (2) we 
reviewed the current mission statements for all research organizations 
included in our scope to determine the topic areas in which they 
conduct research; (3) we categorized research project titles from 2012 
and 2013 provided to us by all research organizations included in our 
scope to determine the topic areas in which they conduct research; and 
(4) we reviewed documentation about the offices that request JPME and 
other DOD-funded research institutions, along with testimonial 
evidence gathered during our interviews with DOD officials, to provide 
context for any similarities or dissimilarities we identified through 
our analysis of mission statements and project titles. The results of 
our analysis are not generalizable beyond the 20 JPME research 
institutions and 14 other DOD-funded research institutions included in 
the scope of our review. A more-detailed discussion of our scope and 
methodology is included in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 through March 
2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Overview of Professional Military Education: 

The primary purpose of PME is to develop military personnel, 
throughout their careers, for the intellectual demands of complex 
contingencies and major conflicts. The military services provide PME 
at their respective staff and war colleges. Each service educates 
service members in their core competencies according to service needs. 
Air Force colleges, for example, primarily teach air and space 
warfare. Similarly, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps colleges focus on 
land, maritime, and expeditionary warfare, respectively. DOD depends 
on the services' PME institutions to develop personnel with these 
service-specific skills. However, the JPME program places emphasis on 
preparing leaders to conduct operations as a coherently joint force in 
complex operating environments. 

Following the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act[Footnote 16] (the 
Act) in 1986, DOD developed JPME as a subset of learning within the 
PME program, to comply with the "joint" requirements outlined in the 
Act and subsequent legislation.[Footnote 17] Currently, JPME is 
provided at multiple sites across the country, including the services' 
staff and war colleges and NDU. Together, PME and JPME, prepare 
service members in successive stages throughout their careers to 
engage intellectual challenges appropriate to increases in their ranks 
and responsibilities. See figure 1 for a map of service and joint 
colleges and universities where JPME is provided. 

Figure 1: Map of Service and Joint Colleges and Universities Certified 
to Provide Joint Professional Military Education (JPME): 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

Leavenworth, Kansas: 
* U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. 

Montgomery, Alabama: 
* Air University; 
* Air War College; 
* Air Command and Staff College. 

Newport, Rhode Island: 
* Naval War College; 
* College of Naval Warfare; 
* College of Naval Command and Staff. 

Norfolk, Virginia: 
* Joint Forces Staff College; 
* Joint Combined Warfighting School; 
* Joint Advanced Warfighting School; 
* Advanced JPME. 

Quantico, Virginia: 
* Marine Corps University; 
* U.S. Marine Corps War College; 
* U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College. 

Washington, D.C.
* National Defense University; 
* National War College; 
* Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Management; 
* National Intelligence University. 

Source: DOD. 

Note: Marine Corps University comprises two JPME-granting colleges--
U.S. Marine Corps War College and U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff 
College. Similarly, Air University comprises the Air War College and 
Air Command and Staff College. 

[End of figure] 

The military services are primarily responsible for overseeing PME at 
their respective staff and war colleges. As part of their oversight 
efforts, the military services' leader-development efforts are 
included in education programs. For example, the Army's Training and 
Doctrine Command serves as the executive agent for ensuring leader 
development is integrated into PME courses at the Army War College and 
the Army Command and Staff College. In contrast, JPME is overseen by 
the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff is responsible for developing the 
learning objectives for JPME and for accrediting the service staff and 
war colleges and the joint institutions to provide JPME coursework. 
The Joint Staff also has oversight responsibility of NDU. The Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is statutorily responsible for 
formulating policies for coordinating the military education and 
training of members of the armed forces.[Footnote 18] The Military 
Education Coordination Council, which consists of representatives from 
the Joint Staff, the service and joint colleges and universities, and 
other JPME-accredited institutions, serves as an advisory body to the 
Joint Staff on joint education issues. The purpose of the council is 
to address key educational issues of interest to the joint educational 
community, promote cooperation and collaboration among the colleges 
and universities certified to grant JPME degrees, and coordinate joint 
education initiatives. 

The Joint Staff conducts periodic assessments of the three statutorily 
mandated levels of officer JPME to ensure that the curricula being 
taught at service staff and war colleges and the joint institutions 
meet the prescribed joint educational requirements outlined in the 
Officer Professional Military Education Policy.[Footnote 19] According 
to the policy, the JPME program includes curriculum components that 
JPME colleges and universities should follow to develop the knowledge, 
analytical skills, perspectives, and values that are essential for 
U.S. servicemembers to function effectively in joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental, and multinational operations. Moreover, Enclosure A 
of the policy states that senior officer studies at JPME-degree-
granting colleges and universities should emphasize analysis, foster 
critical examination, and provide progressively broader educational 
experiences. 

DOD Funds Various Types of Research, Including Research Conducted at 
JPME Research Institutions: 

DOD funds several kinds of research. One type of research is studies 
and analysis research, which DOD officials describe as analysis and 
advice done to support DOD policy development, decision making, 
alternative approaches, and new ideas for the DOD community. Studies 
and analysis research is conducted by different organizations across 
DOD. For example, JPME research institutions can enhance strategic 
thought by providing, publishing, and disseminating research products 
for academic coursework, such as on emerging threats students may face 
in their future leadership positions. To provide broad educational 
experiences, students can conduct research at the JPME research 
institutions as part of their academic program. Students may also work 
together with the research faculty resident at the institutions, 
providing them with access to subject-matter experts in their field of 
study. Table 1 provides a list of the 20 research institutions that 
are associated with JPME colleges and universities and are within the 
scope of our review. 

Table 1: JPME Colleges and Universities and Associated Research 
Institutions, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2013: 

College or university: National Defense University (NDU); 
Associated research institution: 
Center for Complex Operations;
Center for Strategic Research;
Center for Study of Chinese Military Affairs;
Center for Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction;
Center for Technology & National Security Policy;
Conflict Records Research Center;
Center for Transatlantic Security Studies[A]. 

College or university: Air University; 
Associated research institution: 
Air Force Research Institute;
Center for Strategy and Technology;
Air Force Counterproliferation Center. 

College or university: Naval War College; 
Associated research institution: 
Strategic Research Department;
China Maritime Studies Institute;
International Law Department;
Strategic Studies Group. 

College or university: Marine Corps University; 
Associated research institution: 
History Division;
Middle East Studies;
Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning Translational 
Research Group. 

College or university: Army War College; 
Associated research institution: 
Strategic Studies Institute. 

College or university: Army Command & General Staff College; 
Associated research institution: 
Center for Army Leadership;
Combat Studies Institute. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] NDU's Center for Transatlantic Security Studies was disestablished 
in September 2012. 

[End of table] 

Other DOD-funded organizations also conduct studies and analysis 
research. For example: 

* Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, such as the 
Center for Naval Analyses and the Institute for Defense Analyses, 
maintain capabilities to conduct research in core competencies in 
areas of importance to DOD, such as analysis, acquisition support, and 
research and development. According to a May 2011 memorandum from the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 
the mission of Federally Funded Research and Development Centers is to 
provide DOD with unique capabilities in many areas where the 
government cannot attract and retain personnel in sufficient depth and 
numbers. The memorandum further explains that Federally Funded 
Research and Development Centers are a vital component of the 
department's overall acquisition workforce because they operate in the 
public interest, free from organizational conflicts of interest. 

* Service-affiliated organizations, such as the Naval Postgraduate 
School and the Center for Army Analysis, provide research products to 
their parent services to help with decision making and analysis on 
critical issues facing the service. 

* DOD's Regional Centers for Security Studies support DOD's objective 
to build the defense capacity of partner nations.[Footnote 20] In our 
prior work, we reported that the Regional Centers' activities include 
education, exchanges, research, and information sharing.[Footnote 21] 
For example, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security 
Studies conducts research on European security issues relevant to U.S. 
interests. 

JPME research institutions receive funding through their colleges and 
universities and other departmental offices for their operations, 
which include research activities. Specifically, most JPME colleges 
and universities receive direct funding from their respective military 
service to fund their PME and JPME programs, and some of those 
resources are used to fund their JPME research institutions. For 
example, the Naval War College receives operation and maintenance and 
military personnel funding from the Department of the Navy as well as 
funds in the form of monetary gifts from the Naval War College 
Foundation. In turn, the college allocates some of those resources to 
fund its associated research institutions, such as the China Maritime 
Studies Institute. However, NDU receives operation and maintenance 
funding from defense-wide appropriations for its JPME program and 
research institutions. With these funds, JPME research institutions 
can support PME and JPME programs as well as the research needs of 
those entities that provide their funding. For example, the Air 
University's Center for Strategy and Technology produces research that 
is responding to key questions and topics of interest posed by the 
Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

Additionally, some JPME research institutions receive funding on a 
reimbursable basis from other departmental offices, such as the 
directorates within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint 
Staff, and the military services.[Footnote 22] These offices receive 
their own funding, such as research, development, test, and evaluation 
funds and operation and maintenance funds, which may be used in part 
to fund annual requirements for research projects. To fulfill these 
annual research requirements, funding may be allocated to JPME 
research institutions, Federally Funded Research and Development 
Centers, or think tanks[Footnote 23] to conduct individual research 
projects in support of those offices' annual research requirements. 
For example, NDU's research institutions have received funding from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense to study and build subject-
matter expertise on issues related to Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

DOD also funds science and technology-related research. According to 
testimony in April 2013 by Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Defense Research & Engineering, science and technology research is 
funded to mitigate new or emerging capabilities that could degrade 
U.S. capabilities, enable new or extended capabilities in existing 
military systems, and develop new concepts and technologies through 
science and engineering applications to military problems.[Footnote 
24] Science and technology research is conducted under the auspices of 
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering. According to DOD guidance, this office develops the 
strategies and supporting plans for utilizing technology to respond to 
DOD needs and ensures U.S. technological superiority.[Footnote 25] The 
office is the executive secretary for DOD's Research and Engineering 
Executive Committee. This committee brings together leadership from 
the DOD components that have science and technology research 
investments for the purpose of strengthening coordination and 
enhancing the efficiency of research and engineering investments in 
areas that cannot be addressed adequately by any single component. 
Science and technology research comprises basic research, applied 
research, and advanced technology development.[Footnote 26] JPME 
research institutions do not conduct science and technology research. 
Science and technology research is generally conducted by DOD 
laboratories associated with the military services, such as the Army 
Research Laboratory, and some Federally Funded Research and 
Development Centers, such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Lincoln Laboratory, among other organizations. 

JPME Research Institutions Expanded from 2007 through 2011 Due to 
Several Factors, but Have Subsequently Contracted: 

JPME research institutions, particularly at NDU, experienced 
considerable growth in number, funding, and size in terms of staffing 
levels from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011 but have 
declined over the past 2 years. Several factors contributed to JPME 
research institution growth, including increases in reimbursable 
funding from outside offices sponsoring JPME research, the creation of 
new research institutions, and the realignment of institutions at some 
JPME colleges and universities. While a variety of factors contributed 
to the expansion of JPME research institutions, it has primarily been 
department-wide budget reductions that contributed to their decreases 
in number, funding, and size since 2011. 

Number, Funding, and Size of JPME Research Institutions Grew from 2007 
through 2011, Then Declined: 

JPME research institutions, particularly at NDU, experienced 
considerable growth in number, funding, and size in terms of staffing 
levels from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011, but have 
declined over the past 2 years. The following sections discuss overall 
trends in the number of research institutions at JPME colleges and 
universities from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2013, as well 
as overall trends in funding and staffing levels for this same 
period.[Footnote 27] Appendix II provides more-detailed information 
for each of the 20 JPME research institutions from fiscal year 2004 
through fiscal year 2013, as available. 

Number of JPME Research Institutions: 

From 2007 through 2011, the number of JPME research institutions grew 
from 14 to 20. During this period, the number of research institutions 
at NDU increased by 3. At Marine Corps University and Air University, 
the number of research institutions increased by 2 and 1, 
respectively. Since 2011, however, the number of research institutions 
has slightly declined due to the disestablishment of the Center for 
Transatlantic Security Studies at NDU in 2012. Figure 2 shows the 
total number of JPME research institutions for fiscal years 2007 
through 2013. 

Figure 2: Number of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 
Research Institutions, Fiscal Years 2007 through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Number of JPME Institutions: 14. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Number of JPME Institutions: 16. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Number of JPME Institutions: 17. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Number of JPME Institutions: 20. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Number of JPME Institutions: 20. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Number of JPME Institutions: 20. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Number of JPME Institutions: 19. 

[End of figure] 

Funding for JPME Research Institutions: 

Funding for research institutions at JPME colleges and universities 
experienced growth from fiscal year 2007 through 2011. Specifically, 
total funding for JPME research institutions increased from about 
$31.0 million in fiscal year 2007 to about $47.7 million in fiscal 
year 2011. Much of the growth took place at NDU, where research 
institutions' total funding increased by about 78 percent. Other JPME 
colleges and universities also experienced considerable increases in 
funding for the operation of their associated research institutions. 
For example, with the establishment of the Middle East Studies 
institute and the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning's 
Translational Research Group in 2007 and 2010, respectively, funding 
for Marine Corps University's research institutions increased from 
$156,000 in fiscal year 2007 to about $4.9 million in fiscal year 2011. 

Since fiscal year 2011, funding for JPME research institutions 
decreased overall. Specifically, total funding for JPME research 
institutions fell by about 15 percent from fiscal year 2011 through 
2013, from about $47.7 million to about $40.6 million. Much of the 
decline reflects decreases at NDU, where research institutions 
experienced a 21 percent decrease in total funding from about $21.4 
million in fiscal year 2011 to about $16.8 million in fiscal year 
2013. The Army Command and General Staff College's Combat Studies 
Institute and the Center for Army Leadership also experienced 
considerable declines during this period, as total funding for both 
decreased by about 19 percent. Figure 3 provides total funding for 
JPME research institutions by JPME college and university for fiscal 
years 2007 through 2013. 

Figure 3: Total Funding for Joint Professional Military Education 
(JPME) Research Institutions by JPME College and University, Fiscal 
Years 2007 through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Naval War College: $5.843 million; 
National Defense University: $12.018 million; 
Marine Corps University: $0.156 million; 
Army War College: $2.921 million; 
Army Command and General Staff College: $7.95 million; 
Air University: $2.063 million. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Naval War College: $5.831 million; 
National Defense University: $12.644 million; 
Marine Corps University: $2.768 million; 
Army War College: $2.972 million; 
Army Command and General Staff College: $12.344 million; 
Air University: $4.087 million. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Naval War College: $5.679 million; 
National Defense University: $18.335 million; 
Marine Corps University: $3.345 million; 
Army War College: $2.94 million; 
Army Command and General Staff College: $7.367 million; 
Air University: $4.862 million. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Naval War College: $6.801 million; 
National Defense University: $17.941 million; 
Marine Corps University: $3.84 million; 
Army War College: $2.174 million; 
Army Command and General Staff College: $10.087 million; 
Air University: $4.82 million. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Naval War College: $6.615 million; 
National Defense University: $21.355 million; 
Marine Corps University: $4.904 million; 
Army War College: $3.744 million; 
Army Command and General Staff College: $6.676 million; 
Air University: $4.43 million. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Naval War College: $6.638 million; 
National Defense University: $18.496 million; 
Marine Corps University: $4.594 million; 
Army War College: $4.275 million; 
Army Command and General Staff College: $6.557 million; 
Air University: $4.55 million. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Naval War College: $6.752 million; 
National Defense University: $16.827 million; 
Marine Corps University: $3.724 million; 
Army War College: $3.515 million; 
Army Command and General Staff College: $5.44 million; 
Air University: $4.298 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Nominal dollars, unadjusted for inflation. 

[End of figure] 

Staffing Levels at JPME Research Institutions: 

Staffing levels at JPME research institutions also increased 
considerably from fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011. 
Specifically, staffing levels, in terms of full-time equivalents, 
increased from 207 in fiscal year 2007 to 384 in fiscal year 2011, 
about an 86 percent increase.[Footnote 28] In particular, total 
staffing levels at NDU's research institutions increased by about 58 
percent during this period while other JPME colleges and universities 
also experienced growth in staffing levels. For example, total 
staffing levels at Air University's research institutions increased 
from 19 to 97. 

Since 2011, total staffing levels at JPME research institutions 
decreased from 384 to 310, about a 19 percent decrease. Much of the 
decrease is the result of a decline in staffing levels at NDU, where 
research institutions experienced a 31 percent decline during this 
period. Figure 4 shows staffing levels for JPME research institutions 
by JPME college and university for fiscal years 2007 through 2013. 

Figure 4: Staffing Levels for Joint Professional Military Education 
(JPME) Research Institutions by JPME College and University, Fiscal 
Years 2007 through 2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked line graph] 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Naval War College: 26; 
National Defense University: $68; 
Marine Corps University: 1; 
Army War College: 24; 
Army Command and General Staff College: 68; 
Air University: 19. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Naval War College: 29; 
National Defense University: 63; 
Marine Corps University: 22; 
Army War College: 25; 
Army Command and General Staff College: 92; 
Air University: 79. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Naval War College: 30; 
National Defense University: 80; 
Marine Corps University: 23; 
Army War College: 25; 
Army Command and General Staff College: 84; 
Air University: 88. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Naval War College: 31; 
National Defense University: 93; 
Marine Corps University: 33; 
Army War College: 25; 
Army Command and General Staff College: 80; 
Air University: 95. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Naval War College: 29; 
National Defense University: 109; 
Marine Corps University: 35; 
Army War College: 25; 
Army Command and General Staff College: 89; 
Air University: 97. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Naval War College: 23; 
National Defense University: 104; 
Marine Corps University: 38; 
Army War College: 22; 
Army Command and General Staff College: 86; 
Air University: 82. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Naval War College: 34; 
National Defense University: 75; 
Marine Corps University: 33.5; 
Army War College: 22; 
Army Command and General Staff College: 72; 
Air University: 74. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Several Factors Contributed to JPME Research Institution Expansion and 
Subsequent Contraction: 

Several factors contributed to JPME research institution growth from 
fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011, including increases in 
reimbursable funding provided by outside offices sponsoring JPME 
research, the creation of new research institutions, the realignment 
of institutions such that they were incorporated into JPME colleges 
and universities, and an increase in resources dedicated to research 
at some JPME colleges and universities. According to DOD officials, 
these increases occurred within the context of the then-ongoing 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, for which the Joint Staff and the 
military services expected the JPME research institutions to provide 
increased support to the warfighter. In particular, these factors led 
to an expansion at NDU's research institutions during this period. For 
example, NDU's research budget grew primarily due to increases in 
reimbursable research funded by outside offices such as the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. Reimbursable funding 
provided to NDU's research institutions increased from about $5.6 
million in 2007 to about $14.6 million in fiscal year 2011, as shown 
in figure 5. Specifically, reimbursable funding for NDU's Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy's research increased from 
about $3.8 million in fiscal year 2007 to about $6.9 million in fiscal 
year 2011. Additionally, funding for NDU's Center for Study of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, which is funded entirely on a reimbursable basis, 
more than doubled from $1.5 million in fiscal year 2007 to $3.1 
million in fiscal year 2011. 

Figure 5: Total Reimbursable Funding for the National Defense 
University's (NDU) Research Institutions, Fiscal Years 2007 through 
2013: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Total Reimbursable Funding: $5.604 million. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Total Reimbursable Funding: $6.216 million. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Total Reimbursable Funding: $8.725 million. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Total Reimbursable Funding: $9.547 million. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Total Reimbursable Funding: $14.597 million. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Total Reimbursable Funding: $12.314 million. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
Total Reimbursable Funding: $12.129 million. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Nominal dollar, unadjusted for inflation. 

[End of figure] 

NDU officials attributed the growth in reimbursable funding to the 
fact that research had evolved into a key area of emphasis for the 
university. These officials also noted that, as a result, faculty 
members at the research institutions were encouraged to pursue 
research directly funded by other DOD entities and other U.S. 
government agencies. To meet the increased demands for reimbursable 
research, particularly when in-house expertise did not exist, NDU 
increased the number of contractor and noncontractor researchers at 
its research institutions.[Footnote 29] Joint Staff officials noted 
that because a significant portion of the NDU workforce, including 
that of its research institutions, is made up of senior-level 
positions, researcher salaries contributed to the growth in NDU's 
research budget. 

We also found that funding for NDU's research institutions increased 
as the result of the transfer of research institutions to NDU as well 
as the broadening of missions of other research institutions. For 
example, according to DOD officials, in an effort to better deliver 
education to DOD and other U.S. government personnel on issues related 
to ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as irregular 
warfare, counterinsurgency, and stability and reconstruction 
operations, the Center for Complex Operations was transferred from the 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency to NDU in 2009. Furthermore, 
funding for the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at 
NDU increased due to DOD's decision to broaden the Center's 
counterproliferation focus government-wide. Moreover, the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the center as the focal point for 
weapons of mass destruction education for JPME. As a result, the Joint 
Staff began to fund the center in 2008 to perform that mission. 

Other JPME colleges and universities also experienced considerable 
increases in research institution funding and staffing levels from 
fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011 due to factors such as the 
creation of new research institutions and the realignment of others 
within JPME colleges and universities. For instance, according to Air 
Force documentation and officials, Air University's increase in 
staffing levels for its research institutions can largely be 
attributed to the establishment of the Air Force Research Institute in 
2008. According to an Air University official, the establishment of 
the Air Force Research Institute resulted from the consolidation and 
realignment of personnel from existing Air Force institutions as well 
as the creation of 18 new positions. Air Force officials also stated 
that staffing levels at the Air Force Counterproliferation Center and 
the Air Force Center for Strategy and Technology increased due to 
increased research requests from the Air Staff on nuclear and 
strategic-level research projects, respectively. Marine Corps 
University's increase in staffing levels at its three research 
institutions can be attributed to the establishment of the 
Translational Research Group in 2010 and increases in staff positions 
within the History Division and Middle East Studies center. 

While a variety of factors contributed to the expansion of JPME 
research institutions, it has primarily been department-wide budget 
reductions, including the implementation of sequestration in fiscal 
year 2013, that contributed to their decreases in number, funding, and 
size. For example, officials stated that decreases in funding for 
NDU's research institutions and staffing levels resulted from overall 
reductions at the university due to declining budgets. Furthermore, 
according to officials, NDU's budget for its research institutions 
came under increased scrutiny in 2011 with the issuance of a new 
mission statement for NDU by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
that prioritized research that more-directly supported education over 
reimbursable research. Moreover, according to officials, the Joint 
Staff established full-time equivalent caps for both direct and 
reimbursable funding in 2012. As a result of actions taken to reduce 
NDU's budget, NDU's Center for Transatlantic Studies was 
disestablished in September 2012, and the decision was made in early 
2013 to defund the Conflict Records Research Center beginning in 
fiscal year 2014. 

Similarly, DOD-wide budget reductions contributed to decreases in the 
funding and size of other JPME research institutions. For example, 
Naval War College officials stated that its research institutions 
absorbed a majority of the college's budget cuts since fiscal year 
2011 because the college prioritized funds to support its principal 
education mission. Air University has also experienced decreasing 
budgets and staffing level reductions beginning in fiscal year 2011 
through fiscal year 2013. Specifically, we found that the Air Force 
Research Institute's total staffing levels decreased from a high of 81 
in fiscal year 2011 to 61 in fiscal year 2013 as a result of overall 
reductions in Air Force civilian personnel. 

DOD Is Limited in Its Ability to Assess the Performance of JPME 
Research Institutions: 

The extent to which DOD can assess the performance of JPME research 
institutions is limited by the lack of a comprehensive framework to 
systematically assess their performance in meeting PME and other 
departmental goals and objectives. With limited exceptions, the JPME 
colleges and universities, which have broad latitude in overseeing 
their associated research institutions, have not consistently 
established measurable goals or objectives linked with metrics to 
assess the performance of their associated research institutions. 
However, best practices[Footnote 30] state that achieving results in 
government requires a comprehensive framework that includes measurable 
goals and objectives and metrics for assess progress, consistent with 
the framework identified in the Government Performance and Results 
Act.[Footnote 31] Further, while there are mechanisms in place for 
overseeing JPME colleges and universities, such as the Joint Staff's 
JPME accreditation process, these are focused on the quality of 
academic programs and not on the research institutions' performance. 
There is no DOD-wide guidance that addresses the intended role of the 
research institutions in supporting PME or other departmental goals or 
assigns responsibilities for conducting reviews of them, leaving the 
department without a basis to assess the institutions' stated mission 
and actual performance against planned or expected results. This is 
inconsistent with the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government, which state that agencies should conduct reviews by 
management at the functional or activity level, which in this case 
would be the JPME research institutions, and compare actual 
performance to planned or expected results.[Footnote 32] Clearly 
establishing linkages between significant activities, their intended 
role in meeting agency-wide goals and objectives, and assigning 
oversight responsibilities underpins an agency's ability to conduct 
such reviews. 

DOD Does Not Have a Framework to Assess the Performance of JPME 
Research Institutions: 

According to officials representing the Joint Staff and JPME colleges 
and universities, DOD has provided JPME colleges and universities with 
broad latitude in overseeing their associated research institutions. 
In doing so, the Joint Staff and the military services have not 
provided guidance to assist the JPME colleges and universities in 
developing a comprehensive oversight framework for assessing the 
performance of JPME research institutions. As a result, we found that 
JPME colleges and universities have not consistently established 
measurable goals and objectives linked with performance metrics to 
assess the performance of their associated research institutions and 
therefore are unable to comprehensively assess their performance to 
determine whether they are furthering JPME or other departmental 
goals. According to best practices,[Footnote 33] achieving results in 
government requires a comprehensive oversight framework that includes 
measurable goals and objectives, and metrics for assessing progress, 
consistent with the framework identified in the Government Performance 
and Results Act. 

Based on our review of available strategic plans, mission statements, 
and other documentation, such as strategic issues lists, that has 
guided the work of the 20 JPME research institutions, we found that 
JPME colleges and universities have not consistently established 
measurable goals and objectives linked with performance metrics for 
their associated research institutions. Specifically, we identified 
limited instances where specific goals or objectives for associated 
JPME research institutions have been established. Air University's 
strategic plan, for example, establishes a goal for the Air Force 
Research Institute to produce and publish scholarly, credible, 
relevant, and useful research and outreach products. This goal is 
consistent with best practices of being measurable and specific. 
Recently, NDU has taken steps intended to provide a basis for 
assessing the performance of the university's research institutions. 
Specifically, in 2013 following a review by the Joint Staff,[Footnote 
34] NDU developed a strategic plan for research that establishes 
linkages between the university's strategic goals and objectives for 
NDU's research institutions. For example, one of the research goals is 
to address the knowledge and skills for understanding and leading in a 
rapidly changing global security environment, which reflects one of 
NDU's strategic goals. In order to carry out this objective, NDU's 
plan calls for research faculty to engage with teaching faculty to 
bring together expertise in national security studies. The NDU 
President approved the strategic plan for research in January 2014. 

We identified other examples where JPME colleges and universities 
identified broad goals and objectives for research. However, the 
linkage between these goals and objectives and JPME research 
institutions was unclear as the goals and objectives are not 
specifically assigned to associated JPME research institutions. For 
example, the Naval War College's strategic plan contains a guiding 
principle to keep the college's research and scholarly activities 
relevant to the needs of the Navy and the nation. Similarly, Marine 
Corps University's strategic plan contains a goal related to 
strengthening professional scholarship and outreach. However, neither 
of these goals makes reference to the college's or university's 
research institutions. Additionally, JPME colleges and universities, 
such as Air University and Army War College, have developed lists of 
research priorities on an annual basis. According to officials, these 
lists are developed to reflect the priorities of senior leadership 
within their service and have been used to guide the research 
activities of JPME students. In 2013, the Army War College completed a 
strategic review of its academic programs and, as a result of this 
review, has aligned the development of its Key Strategic Issues List 
with a specific strategic goal of influencing national security 
decision-making. However, the Army War College has not clearly linked 
its strategic issues list with the education goals of the college. 

Furthermore, we found that JPME colleges and universities have not 
consistently established metrics to assess the performance of JPME 
research institutions in meeting PME or other departmental needs. 
Based on our review, we identified some examples where JPME colleges 
and universities had established performance metrics for their 
associated research institutions. For example, Air University 
established a performance measure for the Air Force Research Institute 
that includes a count of the requested versus the delivered research 
studies for senior Air Force staff. Similarly, Marine Corps University 
established several measures to assess the progress its research 
institutions have made in achieving desired outcomes. For example, the 
university established a measure for the History Division intended to 
assess its responsiveness to research inquiries. 

Officials from JPME colleges and universities, including JPME research 
institutions, told us that they recognize the need to establish 
measures for assessing the research institutions' performance. They 
explained, however, that they have faced difficulties in developing 
them for research institutions. For example, officials representing 
JPME colleges and universities stated that it is challenging to 
compile quantitative data that represent the value or the usefulness 
of research. Although we recognize that it is difficult to establish 
performance measures for outcomes that are not readily observable or 
in some cases systematic,[Footnote 35] the department does use metrics 
to assess the performance of other DOD-funded organizations that 
conduct studies and analysis research. For example, DOD guidance 
directs organizations that sponsor a Federally Funded Research and 
Development Center to assess their performance.[Footnote 36] According 
to the guidance, sponsoring organizations must develop procedures to 
annually monitor the value, quality and responsiveness of their work. 
For instance, officials we spoke with within the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics stated 
that their office compiles data on metrics for the RAND National 
Defense Research Institute--a Federally Funded Research and 
Development Center--that are primarily based upon quantitative ratings 
and comments gathered from surveying organizations that contracted for 
research projects with it. For those research projects that received 
low ratings or negative comments, the RAND National Defense Research 
Institute is required to follow up with sponsors to understand what 
had happened and provide a plan for corrective actions. 

Without a framework that includes measurable goals and objectives 
linked with metrics, DOD, including its JPME colleges and 
universities, does not have a systematic basis to comprehensively 
assess the performance of JPME research institutions. Best practices 
state that a framework that consists of measurable goals and 
objectives linked with metrics for assessing progress would better 
enable DOD to determine whether JPME research institutions are 
achieving results. Moreover, it would provide the DOD with a sounder 
basis for making resource determinations to ensure that these research 
institutions are furthering JPME and other departmental goals and that 
JPME continues to provide servicemembers with the expertise necessary 
for their careers. 

Established Oversight Processes Do Not Assess the Performance of JPME 
Research Institutions: 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that 
agencies should conduct reviews by management at the functional or 
activity level and compare actual performance to planned or expected 
results.[Footnote 37] Clearly establishing linkages between 
significant activities, their intended role in helping meet agency-
wide goals and objectives, and assigning oversight responsibilities 
underpins an agency's ability to conduct such reviews. According to 
these standards, such controls are an integral part of an agency's 
planning, implementing, reviewing, and accountability for stewardship 
of government resources and achieving effective results. However, the 
oversight conducted by the Joint Staff and by external accrediting 
bodies reviews the quality of JPME academic programs and not the JPME 
research institutions' performance. For example, the Joint Staff's 
Process for Accreditation of Joint Education process is DOD's primary 
mechanism of oversight, assessment, and improvement of JPME academic 
programs. The instruction governing this process[Footnote 38] lays out 
seven educational standards common to all PME colleges and 
universities, including JPME colleges and universities, which the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff considers essential.[Footnote 
39] Officials from the Joint Staff JPME Division stated that this 
office conducts reviews of the JPME colleges and universities every 6 
years to determine how well their academic programs are meeting these 
education standards. 

Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is statutorily 
responsible for overseeing the officer joint education system, the 
Joint Staff instruction that serves as the primary guidance for JPME-
related policy does not address what the intended role of research 
institutions should be at JPME colleges and universities and it does 
not assign responsibilities for conducting oversight of their 
activities. Without clarity as to the intended role of research 
institutions in support of JPME academic programs or for another 
purpose, there is no basis by which to compare the research 
institutions' respective stated missions as well as actual performance 
to planned or expected results, as required by Standards for Internal 
Control.[Footnote 40] Specifically, the instruction contains standards 
to evaluate the quality of JPME academic programs, but it does not 
define the role of JPME research institutions and it contains no 
educational standards, learning areas, or specific objectives for 
research that would enable DOD to assess the performance of research 
institutions at JPME colleges and universities.[Footnote 41] Further, 
no organization is assigned specific responsibility for overseeing the 
performance of the research institutions. 

Joint Staff officials agreed that their accreditation process is 
focused specifically on JPME academic programs and pertains only to 
academic curricula development and quality and the assurance of 
uniformity in course content across the different JPME colleges and 
universities. As a result, JPME research institutions are not reviewed 
as part of the Joint Staff's accreditation process. Moreover, 
according to Joint Staff officials, while they are statutorily 
responsible for overseeing the quality of JPME academic programs, 
there is no statutory responsibility for the Joint Staff to oversee 
the performance of JPME research institutions. One JPME official with 
whom we met noted that if the department had goals, objectives, and 
performance measures for JPME research institutions as part of the 
instruction governing the Joint Staff accreditation process, it would 
strengthen the department's oversight process for JPME research 
institutions. In the absence of DOD-wide guidance that defines the 
role of research institutions as part of the JPME system and 
establishes roles and responsibilities for conducting oversight of 
JPME research institutions, the department and JPME colleges and 
universities cannot systematically assess the performance of JPME 
research institutions and whether they are furthering JPME. 

In addition to the Joint Staff's accreditation process, oversight of 
JPME academic quality is performed by external accrediting bodies. 
Accreditation is a means of self-regulation and peer review to ensure 
agreed upon standards are met. The regional accreditation process is 
intended to examine academic institutions as a whole. While the 
accreditation process may review the extent to which research is 
conducted at a JPME college or university among a number of other 
activities, these evaluations are not intended to assess the 
performance of JPME research institutions in meeting JPME and other 
departmental goals and objectives.[Footnote 42] 

JPME colleges and universities, as Master's Degree-granting 
institutions, are accredited by the following four regional 
accreditation bodies: 

* Middle States Commission on Higher Education accredits NDU and the 
Army War College; 

* Higher Learning Commission accredits the Army Command and General 
Staff College; 

* New England Association of Schools and Colleges accredits the Naval 
War College; and: 

* Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges 
accredits Air University, including its Staff and War Colleges, and 
Marine Corps University, including its Staff and War Colleges. 

JPME colleges and universities are subject to the regional 
accreditation processes every 10 years and these processes are 
intended to strengthen and sustain the quality and integrity of higher 
education. For example, according to the Middle States Commission on 
Higher Education, accreditation by the commission is based on the 
results of institutional reviews by peers and colleagues and attests 
to the judgment that the institution has met certain criteria, such as 
that it has a mission appropriate to higher education; it is guided by 
well-defined and appropriate goals, including goals for student 
learning; and it has established conditions and procedures under which 
its mission and goals can be realized. 

While the accreditation process reviews the quality at JPME colleges 
and universities, it does not specifically assess the performance of 
JPME research institutions. Our review of reports prepared through the 
regional accreditation process as well as interviews with JPME 
officials knowledgeable about the accreditation processes confirmed 
that their reviews are generally focused on the curriculum of JPME 
academic programs and not the performance of JPME research 
institutions. Therefore, the accrediting processes also do not provide 
DOD or JPME colleges and universities with a means for evaluating the 
performance of JPME research institutions and whether they are 
furthering JPME and other departmental goals. 

DOD Does Not Formally Coordinate Studies and Analysis Research 
Requests Performed by JPME and Other DOD-Funded Research Institutions, 
Although Some Conduct Work in Similar Topic Areas: 

DOD does not formally coordinate requests for studies and analysis 
research conducted by JPME research institutions and other DOD-funded 
research organizations, even though many of these organizations have 
missions to conduct work in similar topic areas. Our analysis found 
that multiple organizations, including JPME research institutions and 
other DOD-funded research organizations, such as Federally Funded 
Research and Development Centers, have missions to conduct work in 
similar topic areas. However, DOD relies on a variety of separate 
processes to manage research requests that can be conducted at either 
JPME research institutions or other DOD-funded research organizations. 
Specifically, offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
and the military departments have their own separate internal 
processes to request such research. Because there is no requirement 
for them to do so, these offices do not have mechanisms in place to 
participate in one another's processes, thereby limiting opportunities 
to share information on DOD-wide priorities and collective research 
efforts, and to identify any areas of potentially similar research. 
Although there are notable differences even among the JPME research 
institutions and other DOD-funded organizations that have missions to 
conduct work in similar topic areas, we note that, as we concluded in 
September 2009, organizations involved in similar missions should 
coordinate to avoid unnecessary duplication of work.[Footnote 43] 
Furthermore, results-oriented management practices call for 
establishing a means to operate across organizational boundaries to 
enhance and sustain coordination.[Footnote 44] 

Some DOD Research Organizations Have Missions to Conduct Work in 
Similar Topic Areas: 

Although we did not identify specific instances of duplication through 
our analyses of mission statements and the research project titles of 
20 JPME and 14 other DOD-funded research institutions, we identified 
similarities in their research topic areas. Through our analysis of 
the mission statements, we identified multiple instances in which 
several DOD research organizations conduct work in similar topic 
areas.[Footnote 45] For example, we found that: 

* 11 JPME research institutions, 5 Federally Funded Research and 
Development Centers, 3 regional centers and 2 service-affiliated 
research organizations have missions to conduct research related to 
DOD strategy, policy, and doctrine; 

* 5 JPME research institutions, 1 Federally Funded Research and 
Development Center, and 3 regional centers have missions that include 
researching issues related to civilian-military issues and irregular 
warfare; and: 

* 2 JPME research institutions, 5 Federally Funded Research and 
Development Centers, and 4 service-affiliated research organizations 
have missions that include researching technology, acquisition, and 
systems issues. 

Our analysis of mission statements also identified instances in which 
more-limited numbers of DOD research organizations conduct work in 
similar topic areas. For example, we found that: 

* 2 JPME research institutions and 1 service-affiliated research 
organization have missions that include researching issues related to 
cyber issues; and: 

* 2 JPME research institutions and 2 regional centers have missions 
that include researching issues related to Africa. 

Figure 6 summarizes the results of our analysis of similarities in 
research topic areas for the 20 JPME research institutions and 14 
other DOD-funded research organizations, according to 23 areas of 
concentration.[Footnote 46] A checkmark indicates a research 
institution's mission statement identified that category is a topic 
area in which it conducts research. 

Figure 6: Similarities in Research Topic Areas for 34 Research 
Organizations, According to Mission Statements: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

National Defense University: 
CCO: 
Africa: [Check]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Check]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Check]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CSR:
Africa: [Check]; 
Asia: [Check]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Check]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Check]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Check]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Check]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CSCMA:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Check]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Check]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CSWMD:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Check]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CRRC:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Check]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Check]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CTNSP:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Check]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Check]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Check]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CTSS:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Check]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Air University: 

AFRI:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

AFCPC:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Check]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CSAT:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Check]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Naval War College: 

SRD:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Check]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Check]; 
Cyber: [Check]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Check]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Check]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Check]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Check]. 

CMSI:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Check]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

ILD:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Check]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

SSG:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Check]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Marine Corps University: 

HD:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Check]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

MES:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Check]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Check]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

TRG: 
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Check]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Army War College: 

SSI:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Check]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Check]; 
Energy and environment: [Check]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Check]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Check]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Check]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Check]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

ACGSC[A]: 

CAL:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Check]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Check]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CSI:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Check]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Other DOD-funded: 

RAND PAF:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Check]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Check]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Check]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

RAND NDRI:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Check]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Check]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Check]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Check]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Check]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

RAND Arroyo:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Check]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Check]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Check]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Check]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CNA:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Check]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Check]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Check]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

IDA:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Check]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Check]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Check]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Marshall Center:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Check]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Check]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Check]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Check]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

NESA:
Africa: [Check]; 
Asia: [Check]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Check]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Perry Center:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Check]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Check]. 

ACSS:
Africa: [Check]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Check]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

NPS: CI: 
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Check]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

NPS: MOVES:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Check]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Check]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Check]; 
War gaming: [Check]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

NPS: CIRPAS:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Check]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Check]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CAA:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Check]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Check]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Check]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Check]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

TRAC:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Check]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Check]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Check]; 
Resource management: [Check]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Check]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documentation. 

[A] Army Command and General Staff College. 

Note: See Abbreviations list on page iii. 

[End of figure] 

The similarities among the DOD research organizations are also 
illustrated in the titles of the research projects conducted by JPME 
research institutions and other DOD-funded research organizations. By 
categorizing 2,217 research project titles provided to us for 2012 and 
2013 from both JPME research institutions and other DOD-funded 
research organizations, we found that multiple organizations' project 
titles were grouped in related topic areas. For example, 

* project titles from 13 JPME research institutions, 5 Federally 
Funded Research and Development Centers, and 2 regional centers were 
related to the Middle East; 

* project titles from 11 JPME research institutions, 5 Federally 
Funded Research and Development Centers, 2 regional centers, and 1 
service-affiliated research organization concerned Asia studies; and: 

* project titles from 10 JPME research institutions, 5 Federally 
Funded Research and Development Centers, 1 regional center, and 1 
service-affiliated research organization concerned force structure and 
operational issues. 

Our analysis also identified limited instances of similarities of 
specific research project titles within topic areas. For example, we 
identified four research project titles that focused on the "Arab 
Spring" and two research project titles specifically related to 
China's development-assistance efforts. However, given our objective's 
focus on research organizations as opposed to projects, we did not 
review the content of individual research projects and their 
respective methodologies. As a result, we did not assess the extent to 
which individual research projects and their findings overlapped or 
were duplicative with other research projects. Appendix III provides 
more-detailed results of our analysis of research project titles 
conducted by JPME research institutions and other DOD-funded research 
organizations in 2012 and 2013. 

There Are Notable Differences among JPME and Other DOD-funded Research 
Institutions: 

While there are similarities in the research topic areas of JPME 
research institutions and other DOD-funded research organizations, DOD 
officials also identified notable differences among these 
organizations. One such difference is that some JPME research 
institutions are required to support the PME mission at their 
respective colleges and universities, whereas that is not part of the 
mission of other DOD-funded research organizations. For example, the 
mission statement of NDU's Institute for National Strategic Studies, 
which comprises its research institutions, currently includes 
advancing the strategic thinking of NDU and the JPME community through 
research. Also along these lines, Air University's JPME research 
institutions seek to use research publications to enhance strategic 
thought within the Air Force and in Air University academic curricula. 
To carry out their mission to support JPME academic programs, the 
research institutions engage in efforts not required of other-DOD 
funded research organizations. For example, officials at Air 
University noted that the research products developed by the 
Counterproliferation Center are used to update Air Force PME 
curriculum. As another example, faculty from Naval War College JPME 
research institutions teach elective courses in the JPME academic 
program. Conversely, the mission of the Center for Naval Analyses, a 
Federally Funded Research and Development Center, is to provide 
independent, authoritative research, analysis, and technical support 
to the Navy and other DOD organizations, and this research is not tied 
to JPME academic programs. 

We identified two additional factors that differentiate JPME research 
institutions among themselves and other DOD-funded research 
organizations. The first pertains to differences among the JPME 
research institutions as to which office primarily sponsors the work 
of research institutions. For example, two JPME research institutions 
have missions to conduct research on China issues--the China Maritime 
Studies Institute at the Naval War College and the Center for the 
Study of Chinese Military Affairs at NDU. However, the two 
institutions conduct research on different aspects of China, 
reflecting the interests of their primary sponsors. Specifically, the 
China Maritime Studies Institute conducts research on Chinese maritime 
issues primarily for the Navy, while the Center for the Study of 
Chinese Military Affairs conducts broader research on Chinese 
strategic-level issues for the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary 
of Defense. 

According to officials from JPME colleges and universities and other 
DOD-funded research organizations, a second factor that differentiates 
JPME research institutions among themselves and with other DOD-funded 
research organizations is the level of technical expertise provided by 
some research organizations. Specifically, officials explained that 
Federally Funded Research and Development Centers can produce research 
with a more scientific and technical focus than that of JPME 
institutions. For example, while both the Institute for Defense 
Analyses, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center, and 
NDU's Center for Technology and National Security Policy have missions 
related to researching technology, the Institute for Defense Analyses 
conducts tests and evaluations of technologies, requiring staff to 
have specialized scientific and technical skills, while the Center for 
Technology and National Security Policy's research discusses the 
effect of technology on defense policy. 

Multiple Offices Use Fragmented Processes to Request Studies and 
Analysis Research: 

Although multiple organizations, including JPME research institutions 
and other DOD-funded research organizations, have missions to conduct 
work in similar topic areas, offices throughout DOD use separate 
processes to request studies and analysis research. This fragmentation 
across DOD occurs in the absence both of a DOD requirement to 
coordinate studies and analysis research requirements among the 
military departments and of other DOD offices and mechanisms to 
facilitate such coordination. In September 2009, we concluded that 
offices involved in similar missions should coordinate and share 
relevant information to avoid unnecessary duplication of work. 
[Footnote 47] Furthermore, results-oriented management practices call 
for establishing a means to operate across organizational boundaries 
to enhance and sustain coordination.[Footnote 48] 

We identified several separate processes used by JPME research 
institutions or DOD offices to manage requests for studies and 
analysis research, but DOD has not established formal mechanisms to 
coordinate requests. JPME research institutions, for example, 
individually manage their own research activities. According to Joint 
Staff officials, JPME research activities are not typically 
coordinated with other departmental offices that request studies and 
analysis research. At JPME research institutions, researchers have the 
discretion to determine whether research has been or is being 
conducted on a given topic. For example, JPME research institution 
officials told us that while it is not a requirement, they may contact 
other subject-matter experts to determine whether similar work is 
being conducted at another JPME research institution. Officials also 
said researchers may conduct a literature review to understand the 
existing research on a topic as part of the research process, or they 
may review completed research projects that are contained in the 
Defense Technical Information Center database to see whether DOD has 
funded past studies.[Footnote 49] However, that database does not 
contain information on ongoing research efforts, and no other formal 
mechanism for sharing information on ongoing studies and analysis 
research activities within DOD was identified. 

Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, multiple offices 
generate requests annually for studies and analysis research, but 
these research requests are determined based on individual offices' 
research requirements and are not formally coordinated with other 
departmental offices. Office of the Secretary of Defense research 
requests may be fulfilled by contracting with other DOD-funded 
research organizations or JPME research institutions to conduct the 
research. For example, research requests for the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics are 
managed at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Studies and 
Federally Funded Research and Development Center Management office. In 
doing so, officials with this office explained that they do not 
formally coordinate with other DOD offices to determine whether 
similar research requests are being funded by other departmental 
offices. Separately, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy uses a different process to manage requests for studies and 
analysis research. Specifically, the Office of the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces reviews requests 
from within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on 
an annual basis. These research requests are not formally coordinated 
with other Office of the Secretary of Defense offices or other 
departmental offices, such as service-level studies and analysis 
offices, to determine whether similar work is being conducted or 
funded elsewhere. 

Similarly, the military departments have their own respective internal 
processes for requesting studies and analysis research, but absent a 
DOD requirement to do so, these processes are not used to formally 
coordinate research requests among the military departments or with 
other DOD offices. In general, these processes are used as a mechanism 
to coordinate requests for studies and analysis research within each 
of the military departments. For example: 

* According to a senior Air Force official, the Air Staff's Analyses, 
Assessments and Lessons Learned directorate is responsible for 
collecting annual research requests from across the Air Force and for 
ensuring that the contracted studies are not duplicative. A senior 
official within this office told us that the Air Force has experienced 
challenges with regard to its oversight over the number of studies it 
has funded. In response, the Air Force has developed a policy to track 
all Air Force funded studies in an internal database. However, 
according to this official, the Analyses, Assessments and Lessons 
Learned directorate generally does not formally coordinate with 
offices outside the Air Force on annual research requests. 

* The Army Study Program Management Office within Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, issues an annual call for research requests 
from Army commands, and in turn funds the research requests according 
to Army priorities. A senior Army official in this office said that 
its process is focused on reviewing Army-specific research requests 
and does not include other DOD offices that request or conduct studies 
and analysis research. 

* The Navy's annual research requests are administered through the 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, which compiles and 
prioritizes research needs identified from across the Navy. The Navy's 
studies and analysis program guidance says that the Navy should 
coordinate analytic efforts with the Marine Corps, but according to an 
official in this office, the Navy generally does not coordinate with 
other DOD-funded research organizations or JPME research institutions 
with regard to these annual research requests. 

DOD officials within the studies and analysis research community 
observed that there are both costs and benefits to the department's 
decentralized approach to requesting studies and analysis research. 
One official told us that limited coordination among the multiple 
offices that request studies and analysis research may put DOD at risk 
for funding overlapping research activities. Furthermore, a senior Air 
Force official in the Air Staff's Analyses, Assessments and Lessons 
Learned directorate stated that the current approach makes it 
difficult for DOD to have a complete picture of how much money is 
being spent on studies and analysis research. While DOD officials 
identified costs to the current approach for coordinating studies and 
analysis research requests, officials also acknowledged that DOD's 
decentralized approach may result in several benefits. For example, a 
senior Air Force official in the Air Staff's Analyses, Assessments and 
Lessons Learned directorate stated that decentralization generates 
creativity and diversity of thought in DOD's studies and analysis 
community, which can prove useful in informing DOD decision makers. 
Furthermore, a senior Navy official in the Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations stated that the current approach allows each office 
to be concerned with its own area of functional expertise, which 
varies widely across the services and DOD. For example, the Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for funding studies 
related to naval functional areas such as designing, building, and 
maintaining ships, which is unique when compared to other service-
level studies and analysis offices such as the Air Force Analyses, 
Assessments and Lessons Learned office or the Army Study Program 
Management Office. 

In contrast to how it manages requests for studies and analysis 
research, DOD has established mechanisms to coordinate science and 
technology-specific research efforts across multiple departmental 
offices engaged in similar missions. Specifically, the science and 
technology research community has governing bodies, such as executive 
committees to facilitate such coordination. These committees are 
intended to better manage DOD's science and technology research by 
bringing together the multiple departmental offices that sponsor such 
research for the purpose of sharing information. A senior official 
responsible for coordinating science and technology research efforts 
explained that the executive committees do not require additional 
resources. Rather, they are intended to share offices' existing annual 
research plans and provide opportunities to leverage resources in a 
fiscally constrained environment. Some DOD officials we spoke with who 
are responsible for managing studies and analysis research requests 
also said that a mechanism that provided greater information on what 
studies and analysis research other departmental offices were 
sponsoring would improve their ability to identify potential overlap 
in research requests. Without a mechanism for coordinating research 
requests and sharing information on studies and analysis research 
activities among multiple offices, DOD cannot ensure that it minimizes 
potentially unnecessary overlap in research activities. Furthermore, 
making information on department-wide annual research requests 
available to JPME research institutions would provide the institutions 
an opportunity to further understand research needs and align some of 
the institutions' research with strategic priorities identified by DOD 
leadership. 

Conclusions: 

Given the ongoing and unique role of JPME research institutions in the 
development of DOD's future leaders, DOD's oversight of these 
institutions is important for helping the department to make the best 
use of the resources it devotes to the colleges and universities that 
provide PME and JPME and for decreasing fragmentation of research 
requests and the risk of potential overlap in research activities. As 
fiscal pressures facing DOD continue to mount, so too does the need 
for the department to prioritize resources for JPME research 
institutions to most-effectively meet the JPME mission. Considering 
the overall growth of JPME research institutions that occurred between 
fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2011 in number, funding, and size, it 
is paramount that DOD maintains oversight of these institutions. Best 
practices state that achieving results in government requires a 
comprehensive oversight framework that includes measurable goals and 
objectives, and metrics for assessing progress. Yet, with limited 
exceptions, the research institutions lack such goals, objectives, and 
associated metrics. Additionally, while DOD has some oversight 
mechanisms in place for JPME, DOD does not have clear guidance 
establishing the role of JPME research institutions in furthering PME 
or other departmental goals that would provide a basis for evaluating 
their performance and helping ensure that intended results are 
achieved. Further, no entity within DOD is assigned responsibility for 
overseeing the performance of JPME research institutions. 
Consequently, DOD cannot ensure the effectiveness of JPME research 
institutions and lacks a sound basis for making resource 
determinations. Furthermore, some JPME research institutions and other 
DOD funded research organizations have missions to conduct research in 
similar topic areas, but DOD uses a variety of separate processes for 
requesting studies and analysis research. Results-oriented management 
practices call for establishing a means to operate across 
organizational boundaries to enhance and sustain coordination. DOD, 
however, does not have a mechanism in place to coordinate studies and 
analysis research requests and minimize fragmentation. While DOD 
officials believe that their current decentralized approach to 
requesting studies and analysis research has its benefits, they also 
recognize that it has its costs. It is not clear that the benefits of 
DOD's current approach outweigh the risks of fragmentation and 
potential duplication, particularly in a budget-constrained 
environment. DOD's science and technology research community provides 
one mechanism for a coordination mechanism, but by no means is it the 
only mechanism that could meet the needs of the studies and analysis 
research community as it seeks to support department-wide priorities. 
Without a mechanism to facilitate coordination and reduce 
fragmentation among offices requesting studies and analysis research, 
DOD cannot ensure that it minimizes potential overlap in research 
activities and that its resources are used efficiently in support of 
department-wide priorities at its JPME research institutions and other 
research organizations. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To enhance the performance of JPME research institutions, we are 
recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the military departments 
for their respective PME and JPME colleges and universities to take 
the following three actions: 

* define the role of JPME research institutions to provide a basis for 
evaluating their performance, 

* assign responsibilities for conducting performance reviews of JPME 
research institutions, and: 

* establish a framework that includes measurable goals and objectives 
linked with metrics to assess the performance of JPME research 
institutions. 

To improve the coordination of requests for studies and analysis 
research within the department and to reduce the risk of potential 
overlap in research activities, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense establish and implement a departmental mechanism that requires 
leadership from the military services and departmental offices 
responsible for managing requests for studies and analysis research to 
coordinate their annual research requests and ongoing research efforts. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 
recommendations. The full text of DOD's written comments is reprinted 
in appendix IV. 

In concurring with our first recommendation, DOD noted that some work 
is already in progress to clarify organizational goals and establish 
metrics of success at each of the research institutions. DOD stated 
that, for example, the Joint Staff has been collaborating with NDU to 
refine its research enterprise. DOD noted that our recommendation is 
reflected in NDU's Strategic Plan for Research 2014-2019 and a 
revision of the Chairman's policy document for the university. 
According to the department, our recommendation should be fully 
implemented when the next academic year begins in the fall of 2014. We 
agree that these are positive steps towards establishing a 
comprehensive framework at NDU to systematically assess the 
performance of its JPME research institutions in meeting PME and other 
departmental goals and objectives. Notwithstanding this effort, as 
noted in our report there remains no DOD-wide guidance that addresses 
the intended role of research institutions in supporting PME, 
including JPME, or other departmental goals or assigns 
responsibilities for conducting performance reviews of them. This 
leaves the department without a sound basis to assess NDU's and the 
other research institutions' stated missions and actual performance 
against planned or expected results. Clearly establishing linkages 
between significant activities, their intended role in meeting agency-
wide goals and objectives, and assigning oversight responsibilities 
underpins DOD's ability to conduct such reviews. 

In its concurrence with our second recommendation, DOD stated that to 
improve coordination of research requests, it plans to establish a 
Studies and Analysis Executive Committee by the end of fiscal year 
2014 with regional and topical "communities of interest." DOD noted 
that the committee will be a combined effort organized through the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, with other 
representation from the JPME and PME community, as appropriate. 

DOD also provided technical comments on a draft of our report, which 
we have incorporated into the report, as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Defense, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Air 
Force, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, the report will also be 
available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact 
me at (202) 512-5741 or ayersj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 
appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Johana Ayers: 
Acting Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable James Inhofe: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Richard Durbin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Pete Visclosky: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated 
that we review the work performed by joint professional military 
education (JPME) research institutions in support of professional 
military education and the Department of Defense's (DOD) broader 
mission.[Footnote 50] In this report, we (1) describe how JPME 
research institutions have changed in number, funding, and size, and 
the factors that contributed to any changes; (2) evaluate the extent 
to which DOD is assessing the performance of JPME research 
institutions in meeting professional military education and other 
departmental goals and objectives; and (3) evaluate the extent to 
which DOD coordinates research requests for JPME research institutions 
and other DOD-funded research organizations. 

To address these objectives, we included in the scope of our review 
the intermediate-and senior-level colleges and universities that 
provide JPME certification--that is, the National Defense University, 
Army War College, Army Command and General Staff College, Air 
University, Naval War College, and Marine Corps University.[Footnote 
51] Research conducted at JPME colleges and universities can be 
accomplished by research institutions associated with the colleges and 
universities as well as by students and professors as part of academic 
coursework. For the purposes of this report, we focused on research 
institutions that conduct research as their primary mission and have 
dedicated personnel to do so. We excluded certain centers and 
institutes associated with JPME colleges and universities because we 
determined they did not have a mission to primarily conduct research 
or did not have dedicated personnel.[Footnote 52] We also excluded 
from our analysis research conducted by students as part of their 
academic coursework and by professors not affiliated with the research 
institutions. To identify the JPME research institutions included 
within the scope of our review, we examined documentation and gathered 
testimonial evidence related to the missions, activities, and 
organization of the institutions that conduct research at the JPME 
colleges and universities. Based on this evidence, we determined that 
20 institutions were conducting research as their primary mission and 
had dedicated personnel assigned to them and therefore were included 
in the scope of our review. 

For our first objective of determining the extent to which JPME 
research institutions have changed in number, funding, and size, and 
the factors contributing to any changes, we obtained questionnaire 
responses and other documentation on the number of research 
institutions that existed at JPME colleges and universities from 
fiscal years 2000 through 2013 and collected and analyzed available 
funding and staffing data for these years[Footnote 53] for the JPME 
research institutions. We assessed the reliability of the funding and 
staffing data collected by analyzing questionnaire responses from JPME 
colleges and universities, which included information on their data-
system management, data quality-assurance processes, and potential 
sources of errors and mitigations of those errors. Based on our review 
of the data provided and our review of the questionnaire responses, we 
concluded that the systems used to provide the data, and thus the data 
they provide, are sufficiently reliable for our audit purposes. 
However, based on this evidence, we determined that we were unable to 
report consistent data on JPME research institution funding and 
staffing levels prior to fiscal year 2007, and therefore we are 
providing trend data on JPME research institutions from fiscal years 
2007 through 2013.[Footnote 54] Furthermore, although we have 
identified a number of factors that could affect data quality, we 
concluded that these were the best available data on JPME research 
institutions. We also concluded that the data would not lead to an 
incorrect or unintentional message since it is corroborated through 
interviews with cognizant officials at the National Defense 
University, Army War College, Army Command and General Staff College, 
Air University, Naval War College, and Marine Corps University. We 
also discussed the reasons for any trends in these budget and staffing 
data with knowledgeable officials in DOD and at the JPME colleges and 
universities. Specifically, we conducted interviews with officials 
from the Joint Staff; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller); National Defense University; Army War College; Army 
Command and General Staff College; Air University; Naval War College; 
and Marine Corps University. 

For our second objective of determining the extent to which DOD is 
assessing the performance of JPME research institutions in meeting 
professional military education and other departmental goals and 
objectives, we obtained and reviewed documentation from the Joint 
Staff and the JPME colleges and universities that identify any goals, 
objectives, or performance measures for JPME research institutions. 
Specifically, we reviewed current strategic plans, mission statements, 
and other documentation describing activities of the JPME research 
institutions. We also reviewed documentation describing oversight 
mechanisms that monitor the academic quality of JPME colleges and 
universities. Specifically, we reviewed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01D, Officer Professional Military 
Education Policy, which is the DOD policy that governs the Joint 
Staff's Accreditation of Joint Education process.[Footnote 55] We also 
reviewed reports prepared by external regional accrediting 
bodies.[Footnote 56] To further our understanding of any processes 
used to assess the performance of JPME research institutions, we used 
a standard set of questions to interview officials with the Joint 
Staff; Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force; National Defense 
University; Army War College; Army Command and General Staff College; 
Air University; Naval War College; and Marine Corps University. We 
then reviewed the results of the interviews and related documents to 
develop summary findings. In reviewing this documentation and 
testimonial evidence, we referred to our prior work on best practices 
that identifies elements that constitute a comprehensive oversight 
framework. Specifically, best practices[Footnote 57] state that such a 
framework should include measurable goals and objectives linked with 
metrics for assessing progress, which is consistent with the framework 
identified in the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), as 
amended by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010.[Footnote 58] We also 
reviewed this evidence in light of key internal control standards, 
which state that federal agencies should conduct reviews by management 
at the functional or activity level and compare actual performance to 
planned or expected results.[Footnote 59] 

For our third objective of determining the extent to which DOD 
coordinates research requests for JPME research institutions and other 
DOD-funded research organizations, we included the 20 JPME research 
institutions discussed above and 14 other DOD-funded research 
organizations. To identify the other DOD-funded research institutions 
to include in the scope of our review, we gathered documentation from 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and 
canvassed knowledgeable DOD officials in offices responsible for 
requesting research, such as the military departments, science and 
technology executive agents, studies and analysis research program 
managers, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including the 
offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Based on 
this work, we determined that we would include the following 14 other 
DOD-funded research organizations for the purposes of our review: 

* DOD's Regional Centers for Security Studies: [Footnote 60] 

* George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 

* the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, 

* the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and: 

* the Africa Center for Strategic Studies; 

* service-affiliated research organizations: 

* the Naval Postgraduate School Modeling, Virtual Environments and 
Simulation Institute, 

* the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Interdisciplinary 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Studies, 

* the Naval Postgraduate School's Cebrowski Institute for Information 
and Innovation, 

* the Army's Center for Army Analysis, and: 

* U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center; 

* Federally Funded Research and Development Centers that were 
identified as studies and analysis research centers: 

* Center for Naval Analyses, 

* RAND Arroyo, 

* RAND Project Air Force, 

* RAND National Defense Research Institute, and: 

* the Institute for Defense Analyses. 

To further our understanding on the processes used to request studies 
and analysis research from JPME institutions and other DOD-funded 
research organizations, we reviewed documentation from and interviewed 
officials at the military services, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, JPME research institutions and other DOD-funded research 
organizations. We also reviewed documentation and interviewed 
knowledgeable agency officials about DOD's approach to coordinate 
research requests among DOD organizations. Specifically, we used a 
standard set of questions to interview officials with the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense and the military services about the processes 
used to share information with other offices that also request studies 
and analysis research. We then reviewed the results of the interviews 
and related documents to develop summary findings. We reviewed the 
documentary and testimonial evidence in light of key practices for 
enhancing and sustaining coordination as described in best practices. 
Specifically, best practices state that organizations involved in 
similar missions should coordinate and share information to avoid 
unnecessary duplication of work.[Footnote 61] Further, we assessed 
whether there were any similarities or dissimilarities among the 
missions of the JPME research institutions and other DOD-funded 
research organizations. We did this in four ways: 

* First, we assessed whether the JPME and DOD-funded research 
institutions were conducting science and technology-related research 
or studies and analysis-related research, using missions statements 
and other documentation provided by DOD to make this determination. We 
did not conduct further analysis on other DOD-funded organizations 
that conduct science and technology research as that type of research 
represented a notable difference from the JPME research institutions 
that primarily conduct studies and analysis research. 

* Second, for all the JPME and DOD-funded research institutions 
conducting studies and analysis research, we reviewed mission 
statements and other mission-related information provided by DOD, and 
categorized the organization's mission as falling primarily into 1 or 
more of 23 areas of concentration--for example, Asia studies or 
leadership and ethics studies. To create the 23 areas of concentration 
that were used to categorize mission statements and research project 
titles, we reviewed documentation from the JPME research institutions 
that identified general topic areas in which the institutions 
conducted research. We also reviewed documentation from Federally 
Funded Research and Development Centers that identified the core topic 
areas within which the Federally Funded Research and Development 
Centers were authorized to conduct work. The areas of concentration 
are identified as follows: Africa; Asia; Europe; Middle East; Western 
Hemisphere; civilian-military issues and irregular warfare; cyber; 
energy and environment; force structure and operational issues; 
historical; intelligence; leadership and ethics; legal; logistics; 
nuclear and weapons of mass destruction; other; personnel and 
training; public affairs and communication; resource management; 
strategy, policy, and doctrine; technology, acquisition, and systems; 
war gaming; and unable to code. We determined that these areas of 
concentration we selected were appropriate for comparing JPME research 
institutions and other DOD-funded research institutions because they 
explain the focus of each organization's primary studies and analysis 
efforts. To complete the content analysis, two GAO analysts 
independently reviewed the mission statements and other mission-
related information provided by DOD and coded them into one or more of 
the 23 areas of concentration. When the coding was completed, both 
analysts reviewed every code made by the other analyst and indicated 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the code. The analysts then met 
to discuss their coding determinations and to reach agreement where 
there were any discrepancies. The results of our analysis are not 
generalizable beyond the 20 JPME research institutions and 14 other 
DOD-funded research institutions included in the scope of our review. 

* Third, for all the JPME and DOD-funded research institutions 
conducting studies and analysis research, we collected a list of 
research projects they conducted for fiscal years 2012 and 2013. To 
complete the content analysis, one GAO analyst independently reviewed 
each of the 2,217 research project titles and coded them into one or 
more of the 23 areas of concentration. When the coding was completed, 
two GAO analysts shared responsibility to review the coding made by 
the first analyst and indicated whether they agreed or disagreed with 
the code. The analysts then met to discuss their coding determinations 
and to reach agreement where there were any discrepancies. The results 
of our analysis are not generalizable beyond the 20 JPME research 
institutions and 14 other DOD-funded research institutions included in 
the scope of our review. 

* Fourth, we reviewed documentation about the offices that request 
research from the JPME and other DOD-funded research institutions, 
along with testimonial evidence gathered during our interviews with 
DOD officials to provide context for any similarities or 
dissimilarities we identified through the mission statement and 
project title analysis. 

To further our understanding of DOD's processes for requesting 
research and of the similarities and differences among research 
organizations, we conducted interviews with officials from the Joint 
Staff; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, Studies and Federally Funded Research and Development 
Center Management Office; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Research and Engineering; Army Study Program Management Office; 
Air Force Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned office; Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations; Marine Corps Analysis Directorate; 
National Defense University; Army War College; Army Command and 
General Staff College; Air University; Naval War College; and Marine 
Corps University. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 through March 
2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Joint Professional Military Education Research 
Institutions: 

This appendix contains more-detailed information for each of the 20 
joint professional military education (JPME) research institutions 
included in the scope of our review. For each research institution, we 
provide a one-page summary that includes information on the following 
elements: 

* Location: the institution's associated JPME college or university 
and geographical location. 

* Background: the date that the institution was established and 
information on its establishment, as well as any relevant information 
such as changes in the research institution's name. 

* Mission: the institution's mission, either self-reported or as 
derived from relevant documentation. 

* Customers: a list of entities, as reported by the research 
institutions and other documents that represent the principal 
requesters and users of the research institutions' research products. 

* Nature of research and publications: a summary description of the 
types of research and studies conducted by the research institution, 
as well as the names of publications produced by the institution, if 
any. 

* Total funding: [Footnote 62]the institution's total funding, 
depicted in thousands of dollars, for fiscal years 2004 to 2013, as 
available. Total funding is subdivided into two categories--direct 
funding and reimbursable funding. Direct funding includes federal 
appropriations made available for JPME colleges or universities. 
Reimbursable funding refers to amounts earned or collected from 
outside offices for research services furnished by the institution. 

* Total staffing: the institution's total number of personnel, 
expressed as full-time equivalents[Footnote 63] for fiscal years 2004 
through 2013, as available. Full-time equivalents are calculated as 
the total hours worked divided by the number of compensable hours in a 
full-time schedule. 

[End of section] 

Joint Professional Military Education Research Institutions: 

Air Force Research Institute: 

About the Center: 

Location: Air University, Montgomery, AL: 

Background: Established in 2008 by a Special Order from Headquarters 
Air Force, the Air Force Research Institute's research roots extend 
back to the Airpower Research Institute of the late 1970s and even the 
1930s in the Air Corps Tactical School. The organizational functions 
were previously embedded in the Air War College and later the College 
of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education. 

Mission: To conduct research, outreach, and engagement to enhance 
national security and assure the effectiveness of the United States Air 
Force. 

Examples of Customers: 

* Secretary of the Air Force:
* Air Education and Training Command:
* Air University officials:
* Combatant commands:
* Chief of Staff of the Air Force:
* National security community: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The Air Force Research Institute augments Air University's and the Air 
Force's research capacity and supports airpower research inquiries from 
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, as well as other decision makers 
throughout DOD. The institute conducts research on topics related to 
air, space, and cyberspace opportunities, threats, and capabilities; 
evaluation of operational and strategic issues; conducts regional 
strategic assessments; estimates long-term strategic and technical 
capabilities; analyses of logistical constraints and basing issues, 
among other issues. The institute also serves as the focal point and 
provides support for Air University's "Call for Topics," which makes 
potential research topics of interest to Air Force leaders available to 
student researchers. The institute also operates the Air University 
Press, and publishes the Department of the Air Force's Air and Space 
Power Journal, and the Strategic Studies Quarterly. 

Figure: Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Direct funding: 

Fiscal year 2004: $0; 
Fiscal year 2005: $0; 
Fiscal year 2006: $0; 
Fiscal year 2007: $0; 
Fiscal year 2008: $956,000; 
Fiscal year 2009: $2,457,000; 
Fiscal year 2010: $2,533,000; 
Fiscal year 2011: $2,337,000; 
Fiscal year 2012: $2,281,000; 
Fiscal year 2013: $2,126,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. 

[End of figure] 

Figure: Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 
Fiscal year 2008: 58; 
Fiscal year 2009: 68; 
Fiscal year 2010: 76; 
Fiscal year 2011: 81; 
Fiscal year 2012: 67; 
Fiscal year 2013: 61. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Air Force Research Institute section] 

Air Force Center for Strategy and Technology: 

About the Center: 

Location: Air University, Montgomery, AL: 

Background: The Center for Strategy and Technology was established at 
the Air University in 1996. 

Mission: To engage in long-term strategic thinking about the 
implications of technological change and its implications for U.S. 
national security. The Center for Strategy and Technology focuses on 
education, research, and publications that support the integration of 
technology into national strategy and policy. 

Examples of Customers: 

* Educational institutions:
* Senior military and political officials:
* Think tanks: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The Center for Strategy and Technology promotes the integration of 
technology and strategy in support of Air Force and U.S. national 
security objectives. 

The center conducts research on topics such as future concepts and 
technologies and critical areas of emerging technologies such as 
directed energy, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and cyber 
technologies, among others. The center also manages a series of long-
range studies, called Blue Horizons study, looking 20 to 30 years into 
the future to provide a vision to prepare the Air Force for future 
challenges. Research conducted under the auspices of the center is 
briefed to the Air Staff, published as occasional papers and 
disseminated to senior military and political officials, think tanks, 
educational institutions, and other interested parties. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Direct funding: 

Fiscal year 2004: $684,000; 
Fiscal year 2005: $532,000; 
Fiscal year 2006: $937,000; 
Fiscal year 2007: $517,000; 
Fiscal year 2008: $594,000; 
Fiscal year 2009: $739,000; 
Fiscal year 2010: $741,000; 
Fiscal year 2011: $751,000; 
Fiscal year 2012: $910,000; 
Fiscal year 2013: $773,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2004: 6; 
Fiscal year 2005: 5; 
Fiscal year 2006: 6; 
Fiscal year 2007: 5; 
Fiscal year 2008: 4; 
Fiscal year 2009: 5; 
Fiscal year 2010: 5; 
Fiscal year 2011: 6; 
Fiscal year 2012: 5;
Fiscal year 2013: 5. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Air Force Center for Strategy and Technology section] 

Air Force Counterproliferation Center: 

About the Center: 
Location: Air University, Montgomery, AL: 

Background: Established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff 
of the Air Force by a memorandum of agreement between the Air War 
College Commandant and the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and 
Counterproliferation. 

Mission: To develop Air Force, Department of Defense, and other U.S. 
Government leaders who advance the state of knowledge, policy, and 
practices within strategic defense issues involving nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons. 

Examples of Customers: 

* Defense Threat Reduction Agency:
* National Nuclear Security Administration:
* Headquarters Department of the Air Force:
* Air Force major commands:
* U.S. Strategic Command:
* Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The center provides research articles, papers, and monographs 
addressing issues pertinent to U.S. military-response options for 
dealing with nuclear, biological, and chemical threats and attacks. 
Research topics include military and diplomatic policy and concepts 
related to weapons of mass destruction; international nonproliferation 
diplomacy; nonproliferation and arms control treaty regimes; 
counterterrorist activities; and nuclear deterrence of conflicts. The 
center develops a strategic-issues list that provides potential 
research topics to student and faculty researchers. Additionally, it 
conducts outreach on issues related to counterproliferation and nuclear 
operations through its publication of Counterproliferation Center 
Outreach Journal, and the Trinity Site Papers series, and through an 
annual conference on countering weapons of mass destruction. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Direct funding: 

Fiscal year 2004: $1,708,000; 
Fiscal year 2005: $2,245,000; 
Fiscal year 2006: $1,961,000; 
Fiscal year 2007: $1,546,000; 
Fiscal year 2008: $2,536,000; 
Fiscal year 2009: $1,666,000; 
Fiscal year 2010: $1,546,000; 
Fiscal year 2011: $1,341,000; 
Fiscal year 2012: $1,358,000; 
Fiscal year 2013: $1,399,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2004: 17; 
Fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Fiscal year 2006: 16; 
Fiscal year 2007: 14; 
Fiscal year 2008: 17; 
Fiscal year 2009: 15; 
Fiscal year 2010: 14; 
Fiscal year 2011: 10; 
Fiscal year 2012: 10;
Fiscal year 2013: 8. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Air Force Counterproliferation Center section] 

Center for Army Leadership: 

About the Center: 

Location: Army Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, KS: 

Background: The Center for Army Leadership was established in 2001 in 
response to a study chartered by the Chief of Staff of the Army to 
identify the characteristics and skills required for Army leaders in 
light of changes to the operational environment. 

Mission: To conduct leadership and leader development research, 
studies, analysis, assessment and evaluation; to provide the Army 
leadership and leader development doctrine products and services; to 
develop and maintain the Army Leader; to manage the Army Leader 
Development Program. 

Examples of Customers:
* Joint Staff:
* Combatant commands:
* Military services:
* Army commands:
* Other Department of Defense Organizations: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The Center for Army Leadership conducts research and studies to 
identify leader development trends and requirements, and to develop and 
promote leadership and leader development practices and techniques for 
the Army. Further, the Center accomplishes these outcomes by 
contributing to Army doctrine and policy by informing leadership on 
best practices for developing leader competencies, and by producing the 
Annual Survey of Army Leadership, which is a survey-based study that 
assesses Army-leader attitudes regarding leader education, including 
the quality of leadership, and the contribution of leadership to 
accomplishing the Army's overall mission. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Direct funding: 

Fiscal year 2004: $0; 
Fiscal year 2005: $0; 
Fiscal year 2006: $0; 
Fiscal year 2007: $3,512,000; 
Fiscal year 2008: $8,158,000; 
Fiscal year 2009: $3,016,000; 
Fiscal year 2010: $5,843,000; 
Fiscal year 2011: $2,709,000; 
Fiscal year 2012: $2,862,000; 
Fiscal year 2013: $2,365,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. Army Command and General Staff College officials were 
unable to provide reliable data prior to fiscal year 2007. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2004: 0; 
Fiscal year 2005: 0; 
Fiscal year 2006: 0; 
Fiscal year 2007: 24; 
Fiscal year 2008: 47; 
Fiscal year 2009: 39; 
Fiscal year 2010: 38; 
Fiscal year 2011: 44; 
Fiscal year 2012: 44;
Fiscal year 2013: 38. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Army Command and General Staff College officials were unable to 
provide reliable data prior to fiscal year 2007. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Center for Army Leadership section] 

Combat Studies Institute: 

About the Center: 

Location: Army Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, KS: 

Background: The Combat Studies Institute was established in 1979 to 
provide a range of military historical and educational support to the 
Combined Arms Center, Training and Doctrine Command, and the United 
States Army. 

Mission: To provide military historical and educational support to the 
Combined Arms Center, Training and Doctrine Command, and the United 
States Army. 

Examples of Customers:
* Army Leadership:
* Army Training and Doctrine Command: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The Combat Studies Institute researches, writes, and publishes, through 
the Combat Studies Institute Press, original interpretive works on 
doctrinal and operational issues of relevance to the U.S. Army and 
policymakers. The center also implements U.S. Army Training and 
Doctrine Command's program of military history instruction throughout 
the Army, conducts an oral history research program that targets 
Command and General Staff College students and faculty, as well as 
visitors of the Combined Arms Center, focusing on compiling their past 
operational experiences, and provides oversight responsibilities for 
the Combined Arms Center Command History program, the Staff Ride team--
which offers live and virtual battlefield tours--and the Frontier Army 
Museum. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Direct funding: 

Fiscal year 2004: $0; 
Fiscal year 2005: $0; 
Fiscal year 2006: $0; 
Fiscal year 2007: $4,437,400; 
Fiscal year 2008: $4,186,100; 
Fiscal year 2009: $4,350,900; 
Fiscal year 2010: $4,243,900; 
Fiscal year 2011: $3,966,500; 
Fiscal year 2012: $3,695,100; 
Fiscal year 2013: $3,075,300; 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. Army Command and General Staff College officials were 
unable to provide reliable data prior to fiscal year 2007. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2004: 0; 
Fiscal year 2005: 0; 
Fiscal year 2006: 0; 
Fiscal year 2007: 44; 
Fiscal year 2008: 45; 
Fiscal year 2009: 45; 
Fiscal year 2010: 42; 
Fiscal year 2011: 45; 
Fiscal year 2012: 42;
Fiscal year 2013: 34. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Army Command and General Staff College officials were unable to 
provide reliable data prior to fiscal year 2007. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Combat Studies Institute section] 

Strategic Studies Institute: 

About the Center: 

Location: Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

Background: Established in 1954 by the Commandant of the Army War 
College to create an advanced study group to undertake a program of 
long-range thinking on strategy and land power. : 

Mission: To conduct and disseminate independent strategic analysis that 
develops recommendations for addressing key national security issues. 

Examples of Customers:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense:
* Joint Staff:
* Combatant commands:
* Military services:
* U.S. Army Headquarters:
* Army commands: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The Strategic Studies Institute conducts research on topics such as the 
future of American strategy; geostrategic analyses; strategic 
landpower; Army forward presence in the Pacific; cyber security; energy 
security; Army's role in missile defense; effects of war on leadership; 
and Army profession and public trust. The institute also compiles a Key 
Strategic Issues List based on input from the U.S. Army War College 
faculty, the Army Staff, the Joint Staff, the unified and specified 
commands, and other Army organizations. This is designed to guide the 
research of the Strategic Studies Institute, the U.S. Army War College, 
and other Army-related strategic analysts. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year 2004: 
Direct funding: $2,501,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $113,000. 

Fiscal year 2005: 
Direct funding: $2,853,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $34,000. 

Fiscal year 2006: 
Direct funding: $2,812,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $45,000. 

Fiscal year 2007: 
Direct funding: $2,896,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $25,000. 

Fiscal year 2008: 
Direct funding: $2,958,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $14,000. 

Fiscal year 2009: 
Direct funding: $2,939,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $1,000. 

Fiscal year 2010: 
Direct funding: $2,174,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $0. 

Fiscal year 2011: 
Direct funding: $3,342,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $402,000. 

Fiscal year 2012: 
Direct funding: $3,775,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $500,000. 

Fiscal year 2013: 
Direct funding: $3,206,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $309,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2004: 24; 
Fiscal year 2005: 24; 
Fiscal year 2006: 24; 
Fiscal year 2007: 24; 
Fiscal year 2008: 25; 
Fiscal year 2009: 25; 
Fiscal year 2010: 25; 
Fiscal year 2011: 25; 
Fiscal year 2012: 22;
Fiscal year 2013: 22. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Strategic Studies Institute section] 

Translational Research Group: 

About the Center: 

Location: Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA: 

Background: The Translational Research Group was established in 2010 by 
the Director of the Center for Advanced Operational Culture and 
Learning at the Marine Corps University and by the Executive Deputy of 
the Marine Corps Training and Education Command. 

Mission: To identify practical applications for social and behavioral 
scientific research that will help address pressing challenges facing 
the Marine Corps. 

Examples of Customers:
* Marine Corps leadership:
* Marine Corps combat personnel: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The Translational Research Group at the Center for Advanced Operational 
Culture Learning aims to link the findings of scientists with the needs 
of Marine Corps soldiers and leadership by helping the two sides 
understand each other's needs and capabilities. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Direct funding: 

Fiscal year 2004: $0; 
Fiscal year 2005: $0; 
Fiscal year 2006: $0; 
Fiscal year 2007: $0; 
Fiscal year 2008: $0; 
Fiscal year 2009: $0; 
Fiscal year 2010: $141,000; 
Fiscal year 2011: $1,599,000; 
Fiscal year 2012: $1,610,000; 
Fiscal year 2013: $873,000; 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2004: 0; 
Fiscal year 2005: 0; 
Fiscal year 2006: 0; 
Fiscal year 2007: 0; 
Fiscal year 2008: 0; 
Fiscal year 2009: 0; 
Fiscal year 2010: 4; 
Fiscal year 2011: 9; 
Fiscal year 2012: 11;
Fiscal year 2013: 7. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Translational Research Group section] 

History Division: 

About the Center: 

Location: Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA: 

Background: Established in 1919 by Marine Corps Headquarters to record, 
preserve, and distribute the Corps' history, the History Division was 
transferred in 2005 to Marine Corps University. 

Mission: To write, document and track the history of the Marine Corps 
across the entire spectrum of time; to collect documents and accounts 
of permanent value to the history of the Marine Corps and preserve them 
for future use; and distribute the history of the Corps through 
publications, papers and other programs, in order to preserve history, 
aid combat and noncombat decision making, support Professional Military 
Education, motivate Marines, and inform the American public. 

Examples of Customers:
* Joint Staff:
* Marine Corps personnel:
* White House:
* U.S. citizens:
* Members of Congress: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The History Division's primary task is to research and write the Marine 
Corps' official history. The division provides assistance through their 
reference branch and deploying field historians to record history in 
the making during operations. The History Division and also conducts 
research through an oral history program, in which it obtains, 
catalogs, transcribes, and preserves personal narrative experiences and 
observations of historic value from active-duty and retired Marines for 
use as reference source material. The division prepares a wide variety 
of official publications that tell the Marine Corps story. Publications 
include articles, monographs, occasional papers, and definitive 
histories. It also creates material for and publishes Fortitudine, an 
online bulletin of the Marine Corps history program. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Direct funding: 

Fiscal year 2008: $2,613,000; 
Fiscal year 2009: $2,997,000; 
Fiscal year 2010: $3,346,000; 
Fiscal year 2011: $3,019,000; 
Fiscal year 2012: $2,685,000; 
Fiscal year 2013: $2,563,000; 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2008: 21; 
Fiscal year 2009: 21; 
Fiscal year 2010: 27; 
Fiscal year 2011: 24; 
Fiscal year 2012: 25;
Fiscal year 2013: 25. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of History Division section] 

Middle East Studies: 

About the Center: 

Location: Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA: 

Background: Established in 2007 at the request of the Commanding 
General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. The Marine 
Corps University Education Command Order issued in 2011 included the 
Middle East Studies Center as one of the university's staff offices. 

Mission: To serve as the Marine Corps' center of expertise on the 
Middle East, and, more broadly, Pakistan and Afghanistan, in order to 
deepen the Marine Corps' understanding of this critical region and to 
link the Marine Corps to the broader academic, intergovernmental, and 
international Middle East studies community. 

Examples of Customers:
* Marine Corps command elements:
* Marine Corps leadership:
* Military services:
* Federal agencies: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

In an effort to improve the Marine Corps' understanding of the complex 
security environment of the Middle East, the center began three forms 
of publications. The Middle East Studies Occasional Paper Series, with 
the first issue published in June 2011, aims to disseminate original, 
peer-reviewed research papers on a wide variety of subjects pertaining 
to the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The MES Monograph 
Series, with the first issue published in August 2011, focuses on 
subjects of strategic relevance to the current and future U.S. 
professional military education community and is meant to be published 
quickly to address fast-developing situations. Finally, the Middle East 
Studies institute publishes Insights, which is produced bimonthly as 
the newsletter of the center. It features short analytical pieces as 
well as information on events organized by the center and provides a 
forum for debate with readers. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Direct funding: 

Fiscal year 2007: $156,000; 
Fiscal year 2008: $156,000; 
Fiscal year 2009: $348,000; 
Fiscal year 2010: $354,000; 
Fiscal year 2011: $286,000; 
Fiscal year 2012: $299,000; 
Fiscal year 2013: $288,000; 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2007: 1; 
Fiscal year 2008: 1; 
Fiscal year 2009: 2; 
Fiscal year 2010: 2; 
Fiscal year 2011: 2; 
Fiscal year 2012: 2;
Fiscal year 2013: 2. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Middle East Studies section] 

Center for Complex Operations: 

About the Center: 

Location: National Defense University, Washington, DC: 

Background: The U.S. Congress authorized the creation of a Center for 
Complex Operations in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 
year 2009. The center was initially established in 2008 in the Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and moved in early 2009 
to the National Defense University in accordance with a memorandum of 
agreement between the National Defense University and the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, dated January 30, 2009, 
subsequently amended. 

Mission: To foster unity of effort among Department of Defense and 
interagency personnel in complex operations; to collect and analyze 
lessons from military and civilian personnel; and to incorporate those 
lessons into policy, doctrine, education, training, and exercises. 

Examples of Customers:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
* Joint Staff:
* Combatant Commands:
* U.S. Department of State:
* U.S. Agency for International Development: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The center collects and analyzes interagency lessons from the field on 
overseas contingency operations, including stabilization, irregular 
warfare, and security assistance, and integrates them into joint 
military doctrine on such topics as counterinsurgency, stability 
operations, security cooperation, and interagency coordination; as well 
as into education, policy, training, and joint military/interagency 
exercises. The center also analyzes interagency aspects of overseas 
operations on behalf of Department of Defense, the Intelligence 
Community, and several federal agencies. The center's principal 
journal, PRISM, serves to inform members of U.S. federal agencies, 
allies, and other partners on complex and integrated national security 
operations; reconstruction and nation-building; relevant policy and 
strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and education. 
The center also produces publications on issues of importance to 
interagency stakeholders and JPME, such as its recent book Convergence: 
Illicit Networks in the Age of Globalization. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year 2009: 
Direct funding: $0; 
Reimbursable funding: $2,600,000. 

Fiscal year 2010: 
Direct funding: $2,200,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $0. 

Fiscal year 2011: 
Direct funding: $2,255,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $941,000. 

Fiscal year 2012: 
Direct funding: $2,252,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $317,800. 

Fiscal year 2013: 
Direct funding: $1,628,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $1,036,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2009: 6; 
Fiscal year 2010: 12; 
Fiscal year 2011: 17; 
Fiscal year 2012: 15;
Fiscal year 2013: 10. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: National Defense University officials were unable to provide 
reliable staffing level data for the Center for Complex Operations 
prior to fiscal year 2010. According to the National Defense University 
officials, prior year staffing level data for the center were captured 
in summary-level information provided to us for the Institute for 
National Security Studies, which is the parent organization for the 
National Defense University's research institutions. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Center for Complex Operations section] 

Conflict Records Research Center: 

About the Center: 

Location: National Defense University, Washington, DC: 

Background: Established in 2009 at the direction of the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as a subelement of the Institute 
for National Strategic Studies. The center was defunded for fiscal year 
2014, but in September 2013, the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy provided funding to keep the center open. Section 
1071 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 
provided statutory authorization for the center. 

Mission: To facilitate research using records captured during combat 
operations from countries, organizations, and individuals now or once 
hostile to the United States. 

Examples of Customers:
* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
* Joint Staff:
* Combatant commands:
* Federal agencies: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

To fulfill its mission, the Conflict Records Research Center was 
charged with organizing, encouraging, and facilitating greater analytic 
and academic access to digitized copies of captured documents; 
coordinating the translation of captured documents of interest; 
conducting sponsored research and analysis on captured documents; 
developing and delivering training programs and providing research 
assistance; informing researchers of the collections in its custody; 
and publishing research in books, reports, journal articles, conference 
papers, newsletters, or other media. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Reimbursable funding: 

Fiscal year 2010: $732,000; 
Fiscal year 2011: $1,700,000; 
Fiscal year 2012: $1,200,000; 
Fiscal year 2013: $1,000,000; 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2010: 3; 
Fiscal year 2011: 6; 
Fiscal year 2012: 5;
Fiscal year 2013: 5. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Conflict Records Research Center section] 

Center for Strategic Research: 

About the Center: 

Location: National Defense University, Washington, DC: 

Background: Established in 1984 by the Secretary of Defense as the 
Research Directorate of National Defense University's Institute for 
National Security Studies, the center was originally charged to provide 
independent advice to Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commands for the formulation of 
national security policy and strategy. The center was renamed in 2010 
during the university's research reorganization. 

Mission: To provide educational support to joint professional military 
education and advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commands through studies, reports, 
briefings, and memorandums; conducts directed research and analysis in 
the areas of strategic studies and regional studies; and engages in 
independent and leading-edge research and analysis in related areas. 

Examples of Customers:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense:
* Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
* Combatant commands:
* Federal agencies:
* Military services: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The Center for Strategic Research performs research and educational 
activities in support of joint professional military education and 
explores strategic and regional topics to offer advice and strategic 
support to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the 
Joint Staff, and other senior DOD officials. The center also conducts 
outreach to share its research with policymakers through studies, 
reports, briefings, and memorandums. Strategic studies encompass 
national security and military strategy, to include defense policy and 
organization, deterrence, arms control and counter proliferation, peace 
operations and small-scale contingencies, transnational security 
problems, command and control, and future warfare. Regional studies 
encompass national security strategy, defense policy, defense 
cooperation, and military strategy issues as they relate to significant 
countries or geographic areas of the world such as Asia and the Middle 
East. The center's publication product line includes books, Occasional 
Papers, Strategic Perspectives, Strategic Forum (policy papers), 
conference papers, and journal articles. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year 2004: 
Direct funding: $0; 
Reimbursable funding: $41,000. 

Fiscal year 2005: 
Direct funding: $31,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $38,000. 

Fiscal year 2006: 
Direct funding: $81,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $213,000. 

Fiscal year 2007: 
Direct funding: $180,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $388,000. 

Fiscal year 2008: 
Direct funding: $186,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $197,000. 

Fiscal year 2009: 
Direct funding: $248,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $323,000. 

Fiscal year 2010: 
Direct funding: $2,596,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $286,000. 

Fiscal year 2011: 
Direct funding: $2,496,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $742,000. 

Fiscal year 2012: 
Direct funding: $2,545,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $468,000. 

Fiscal year 2013: 
Direct funding: $2,355,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $313,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2004: 13; 
Fiscal year 2005: 14; 
Fiscal year 2006: 13; 
Fiscal year 2007: 14; 
Fiscal year 2008: 14; 
Fiscal year 2009: 15; 
Fiscal year 2010: 14; 
Fiscal year 2011: 15; 
Fiscal year 2012: 15;
Fiscal year 2013: 13. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Center for Strategic Research section] 

Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs: 

About the Center: 

Location: National Defense University, Washington, DC: 

Background: Established in 2000 as a part of National Defense 
University's Institute for National Strategic Studies, pursuant to the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. 

Mission: To serve as a national focal point and resource center for 
multidisciplinary research and analytic exchanges on the national goals 
and strategic posture of the People's Republic of China and the ability 
of that nation to develop, field, and deploy an effective military 
instrument in support of its national strategic objectives. 

Examples of Customers:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense:
* Joint Staff:
* Military services:
* U.S. Pacific Command:
* Federal agencies: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The center's research focuses on documenting China's expanding 
international interests, understanding China's development and 
employment of new economic, military, and diplomatic capabilities, and 
analyzing Chinese debates about how these capabilities should be 
employed to advance national goals. It also explores the implications 
of these developments for U.S.-China relations and for the U.S. role in 
Asia. The center also conducts outreach to share its research with 
policymakers and informs the public debate through books, articles, 
memorandums, briefings and conferences. For example, the center 
cosponsors an annual conference on the People's Liberation Army with 
the Council for Advanced Policy Studies (a Taiwanese think tank), and 
RAND, a nonprofit institution that conducts research and analysis. The 
center's publication product line includes books, Occasional Papers, 
Strategic Perspectives, Strategic Forum (policy papers), conference 
papers, and journal articles. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year 2004: 
Direct funding: $10,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $10,000. 

Fiscal year 2005: 
Direct funding: $10,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $10,000. 

Fiscal year 2006: 
Direct funding: $10,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $10,000. 

Fiscal year 2007: 
Direct funding: $241,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $0. 

Fiscal year 2008: 
Direct funding: $156,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $0. 

Fiscal year 2009: 
Direct funding: $193,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $0. 

Fiscal year 2010: 
Direct funding: $600,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $0. 

Fiscal year 2011: 
Direct funding: $569,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $188,000. 

Fiscal year 2012: 
Direct funding: $529,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $0. 

Fiscal year 2013: 
Direct funding: $448,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $0. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2004: 2; 
Fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Fiscal year 2006: 2; 
Fiscal year 2007: 2; 
Fiscal year 2008: 2; 
Fiscal year 2009: 3; 
Fiscal year 2010: 3; 
Fiscal year 2011: 3; 
Fiscal year 2012: 3;
Fiscal year 2013: 2. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs section] 

Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 

About the Center: 

Location: National Defense University, Washington, DC: 

Background: Established in 1994 as the Center for Counterproliferation 
Research, pursuant to memoranda of understanding among the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Security and Counterproliferation, the 
Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff, and the 
President, National Defense University. The center was renamed the 
Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2004. 

Mission: To prepare the joint warfighter and select others to address 
the challenges posed by weapons of mass destruction through education 
and professional development, scholarship, and outreach and 
collaboration activities across the full spectrum of issues related to 
weapons of mass destruction and to become one of the preeminent 
institutions in the United States for weapons of mass destruction 
expertise. 

Examples of Customers:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense:
* Joint Staff:
* Combatant commands:
* Intelligence community:
* Federal agencies: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction performs 
research on the full spectrum of issues related to weapons of mass 
destruction, engages in educational activities, and collaborates with 
partners across the government. The center conducts directed and self-
initiated research of the following types: (1) operational and policy 
support; (2) traditional academic research; and (3) research undertaken 
to support the joint professional military education program at the 
National Defense University. Research topics related to studies in 
weapons of mass destruction include deterrence; counterproliferation 
operations; and policy and doctrinal development regarding weapons of 
mass destruction. The center also conducts outreach to share its 
research through papers, and planning and participating in various 
venues, including conferences and dialogues with participants from U.S. 
and foreign partner entities. For example, the center organizes the 
annual meeting of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Education Consortium. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year 2004: 
Reimbursable funding: $906,000. 

Fiscal year 2005: 
Reimbursable funding: $1,295,000. 

Fiscal year 2006: 
Reimbursable funding: $894,000. 

Fiscal year 2007: 
Reimbursable funding: $1,465,000. 

Fiscal year 2008: 
Reimbursable funding: $2,025,000. 

Fiscal year 2009: 
Reimbursable funding: $2,105,000. 

Fiscal year 2010: 
Reimbursable funding: $2,682,000. 

Fiscal year 2011: 
Reimbursable funding: $3,062,000. 

Fiscal year 2012: 
Reimbursable funding: $3,497,000. 

Fiscal year 2013:
Reimbursable funding: $3,349,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2004: 14; 
Fiscal year 2005: 14; 
Fiscal year 2006: 15; 
Fiscal year 2007: 15; 
Fiscal year 2008: 16; 
Fiscal year 2009: 16; 
Fiscal year 2010: 16; 
Fiscal year 2011: 18; 
Fiscal year 2012: 18;
Fiscal year 2013: 17. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction section] 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy: 

About the Center: 

Location: National Defense University, Washington, DC: 

Background: The Center for Technology and National Security Policy was 
created by the President of the National Defense University in 2001 to 
address technology and policy gaps which affect national security 
policy and decision making. 

Mission: To research national security and defense policies in the 
context of transformational changes in emerging technology, advanced 
concepts, organizational structures, and international trends to 
develop and implement actionable recommendations, to publish and 
distribute findings, and to introduce research results in the joint 
professional military education class room. 

Examples of Customers:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense:
* Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
* Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and 
Logistics:
* Joint Staff:
* Military services: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The Center for Technology and National Security Policy conducts 
research on a reimbursable basis by means of memorandums of 
understanding with sponsoring organizations on science and technology 
(chemical/biological defense, human hardiness research, counter-
improvised explosive devices, policing, and counterinsurgency); 
civilian-military integration (transformative innovation for 
development and emergency support, social media in strategic 
communication); emerging challenges (anticipatory governance 
concerning cyber security; climate change; vulnerability to severe 
space weather); and advanced education initiatives. The center's 
publication product line includes books, Defense Technology Papers, 
Defense Horizons (policy papers), conference papers, and journal 
articles. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year 2004: 
Direct funding: $0
Reimbursable funding: $3,405,000. 

Fiscal year 2005: 
Direct funding: $0; 
Reimbursable funding: $3,620,000. 

Fiscal year 2006: 
Direct funding: $0; 
Reimbursable funding: $3,297,000. 

Fiscal year 2007: 
Direct funding: $0; 
Reimbursable funding: $3,751,000. 

Fiscal year 2008: 
Direct funding: $0; 
Reimbursable funding: $3,994,000. 

Fiscal year 2009: 
Direct funding: $2,898,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $3,697,000. 

Fiscal year 2010: 
Direct funding: $1,833,000; 
Reimbursable funding: 5,847,000. 

Fiscal year 2011: 
Direct funding: $317,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $6,885,000. 

Fiscal year 2012:
Direct funding: $0; 
Reimbursable funding: $6,093,000. 

Fiscal year 2013: 
Direct funding: $0; 
Reimbursable funding: $6,431,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2004: 41; 
Fiscal year 2005: 40; 
Fiscal year 2006: 43; 
Fiscal year 2007: 34; 
Fiscal year 2008: 27; 
Fiscal year 2009: 36; 
Fiscal year 2010: 40; 
Fiscal year 2011: 39; 
Fiscal year 2012: 35;
Fiscal year 2013: 27. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Center for Technology and National Security Policy section] 

Center for Transatlantic Security Studies: 

About the Center: 

Location: National Defense University, Washington, DC: 

Background: The Center for Transatlantic Security Studies was formed in 
2010 to support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization/European-related policy development. The 
center incorporated the NATO Orientation Program that had provided 
training to NATO assigned officers since at least 1990 as was mandated 
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As of October 2012, both 
the center and the NATO Orientation Program were dissolved. 

Mission: To be the focal point for national and international 
collaboration on issues related to transatlantic security, defense 
policy, and military strategy through research, education, and 
outreach. Develops and conducts education and orientation programs for 
U.S. and allied military officers, government civilians, and 
international partners on issues relating to NATO and transatlantic 
security community. 

Examples of Customers:
* Under Secretary of Defense for Policy:
* Joint Staff:
* U.S. European Command:
* North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
* Allied Command Transformation: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The Center for Transatlantic Studies provided senior Department of 
Defense and other U.S. government leaders with the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and Transatlantic policy advice, research, 
and outreach, notably in the run-up to the 2012 NATO Summit and beyond. 
Specifically, the center conducted research on capabilities studies, 
evaluating transatlantic bargain and dialogue, and, NATO-Russia 
relations, and NATO's countering hybrid threats. It also published 
Transatlantic Currents, CTSS Flash notes, and Transatlantic 
Perspectives. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year 2010: 
Direct funding: $219,000. 

Fiscal year 2011: 
Direct funding: $218,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $1,079,000. 

Fiscal year 2012:
Direct funding: $211,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $738,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2010: 1; 
Fiscal year 2011: 7; 
Fiscal year 2012: 8. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Center for Transatlantic Security Studies section] 

China Maritime Studies Institute: 

About the Center: 

Location: Naval War College, Newport, RI: 

Background: The China Maritime Studies Institute was established as a 
subcomponent of the Strategic Research Department on October 1, 2006, 
in accordance with a Program Objective Memorandum by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

Mission: To increase knowledge and understanding of the maritime 
dimensions of China's rise; evaluate the open-source maritime 
literature in China; provide analyses for the Navy, and maintain 
collegial relationships with Chinese national security scholars: 

Examples of Customers:
* U.S. Navy leadership:
* Military leaders:
* Intelligence community:
* Federal agencies: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The China Maritime Studies Institute[Footnote 1] has four primary areas 
of activity: (1) broad, multidisciplinary research on China's maritime 
activity as it relates to its strategic orientation; (2) annual 
conferences and speaker series; (3) publications, ranging from short 
assessments and think pieces to monographs and books; and (4) support 
for U.S. Navy and joint commands. The center conducts research in areas 
related to China's maritime development, including energy, global 
commerce, law of the sea, maritime technologies, merchant marine, naval 
development, naval diplomacy, and shipbuilding. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year 2007: 
Reimbursable funding: $123,000. 

Fiscal year 2008: 
Direct funding: $211,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $83,000. 

Fiscal year 2009:
Direct funding: $712,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $141,000. 

Fiscal year 2010: 
Direct funding: $1,248,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $97,000. 

Fiscal year 2011: 
Direct funding: $1,230,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $185,000. 

Fiscal year 2012:
Direct funding: $1,316,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $58,000. 

Fiscal year 2013:
Direct funding: $1,111,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $90,000. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. Naval War College officials were unable to provide reliable 
data prior to fiscal year 2007. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2070: 3; 
Fiscal year 2008: 4.7; 
Fiscal year 2009: 5. 
Fiscal year 2010: 5; 
Fiscal year 2011: 4.6; 
Fiscal year 2012: 4.6; 
Fiscal year 2012: 6.9. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Naval War College officials were unable to provide reliable data 
prior to fiscal year 2007. 

[End of figure] 

Footnote: 

[1] Although the China Maritime Studies Institute was established as a 
subcomponent of the Strategic Research Department, it receives 
dedicated funding on an annual basis for its research activities,
including to fund its own researchers. As a result, we have 
categorized the China Maritime Studies Institute as a separate joint 
professional military education research institution for the purposes 
of this report. However, because the center is a subcomponent of the 
Strategic Research Department, Naval War College officials stated that 
it shares budgetary, personnel, and administrative functions with the 
Strategic Research Department. 

[End of China Maritime Studies Institute section] 

International Law Department: 

About the Center: 

Location: Naval War College, Newport, RI: 

Background: The International Law Department was founded in 1984 and 
opened its doors in 1986. 

Mission: To conduct and disseminate advanced international law research 
and analysis. 

Examples of Customers:
* U.S. Navy leadership:
* Federal agencies:
* Military leadership:
* Naval War College: 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The International Law Department serves as the Naval War College's 
focal point for the study of international and maritime law and oceans 
policy as they affect U.S. military policy, strategy and operations. As 
part of its research efforts, the department compiles, edits, and 
publishes the International Law Studies Series that provides a forum 
for prominent legal scholars to publish articles that contribute to the 
broader understanding of international law. Recently, in response to 
discussion with the Joint Staff, the department initiated an 
Information Paper Series. These are short papers that break down legal 
issues for further consideration by senior military leaders. 
Furthermore, in addition to the Information Paper Series and 
International Law Studies, the individual staffers of the department 
engage in independent research and writing. In addition to legal 
research and scholarly writing, Naval War College officials state that 
staff members actively support the Naval War College's core 
intermediate and senior-level Navy PME courses as professors, 
lecturers, and moderators, while hosting several operational-law 
electives throughout the academic year. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. Naval War College officials were unable to provide reliable 
data prior to fiscal year 2007. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year 2007: 
Direct funding: $415,000. 

Fiscal year 2008: 
Direct funding: $415,000. 

Fiscal year 2009:
Direct funding: $595,000. 

Fiscal year 2010: 
Direct funding: $711,000. 

Fiscal year 2011: 
Direct funding: $690,000. 

Fiscal year 2012:
Direct funding: $915,000. 

Fiscal year 2013:
Direct funding: $834,000. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. Naval War College officials were unable to provide reliable 
data prior to fiscal year 2007. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2070: 2; 
Fiscal year 2008: 2.2; 
Fiscal year 2009: 2.4. 
Fiscal year 2010: 3; 
Fiscal year 2011: 3.1; 
Fiscal year 2012: 4; 
Fiscal year 2012: 9.9. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Naval War College officials were unable to provide reliable data 
prior to fiscal year 2007. 

[End of figure] 

[End of International Law Department section] 

Strategic Research Department: 

About the Center: 

Location: Naval War College, Newport, RI. 

Background: Formally established in 1987 by the Dean of the Center for
Naval Warfare Studies, and in consultation with the Chief of Naval 
Operations. However, the Strategic Research Department dates back to
the origins of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies in 1981. 

Mission: To produce innovative strategic research and analysis for
the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, and the broader national
security community. 

Examples of Customers: 
* Secretary of the Navy; 
* Chief of Naval Operations; 
* U.S. Marine Corps leadership; 
* Combatant commands; 
* Federal agencies; 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

The Strategic Research Department"s research projects, including those 
of the China Maritime Studies Institutes, fall into three broad 
categories: (1) projects assigned by the Navy or another U.S. national 
security organization; (2) sustained projects that do not depend on 
year-to-year tasking but rather constitute multiyear, 
multideliverable, multiclient investments serving long-term U.S.
national security and Navy interests (these projects focus on 
strategic regions such as Eurasia, Africa, the greater Middle East and 
the Asia-Pacific region, as well as on functional topics such as 
maritime strategy, cyber conflict, and sea-based ballistic missile 
defense); (3) self-sponsored projects conducted in consultation with 
the leadership of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies (these
projects have no specific tasking or set of clients, rather, they 
address emerging issues that officials believe will garner substantial 
national or naval attention in the foreseeable future). 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year 2007: 
Direct funding: $1,729,000. 

Fiscal year 2008: 
Direct funding: $1,355,000. 

Fiscal year 2009:
Direct funding: $1,149,000. 

Fiscal year 2010: 
Direct funding: $1,547,000. 

Fiscal year 2011: 
Direct funding: $1,310,000. 

Fiscal year 2012:
Direct funding: $1,291,000. 

Fiscal year 2013:
Direct funding: $1,379,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. Naval War College officials were unable to provide reliable 
data prior to fiscal year 2007. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2070: 7; 
Fiscal year 2008: 7; 
Fiscal year 2009: 7.2. 
Fiscal year 2010: 8; 
Fiscal year 2011: 6.7; 
Fiscal year 2012: 6; 
Fiscal year 2012: 7.9. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Naval War College officials were unable to provide reliable data 
prior to fiscal year 2007. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Strategic Research Department section] 

Strategic Studies Group: 

About the Center: 

Location: Naval War College, Newport, RI: 

Background: The Strategic Studies Group was established by the Chief
of Naval Operations in 1981. The Strategic Studies Group is only
tasked by and reports directly to the Chief of Naval Operations. 

Mission: To generate revolutionary naval warfare concepts for the 
future. 

Examples of Customers: 
* Chief of Naval Operations. 

Nature of Research and Publications: 

Each year, the Chief of Naval Operations selects a broad governing 
theme for the Strategic Studies Group's research. The 2013 topic is 
Undersea Dominance out to 2030. The Strategic Studies Group is 
responsible for keeping the Chief of Naval Operations informed of 
progress throughout the year and produces a summary briefing and 
written report of actionable concepts with recommendations that can be 
executed by the Chief of Naval Operations in the near term. The 
products, while encompassing long-term views, are designed to help 
inform the Chief of Naval Operations on near-and mid-term program 
decisions. 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Funding: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year 2007: 
Direct funding: $3,375,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $200,000. 

Fiscal year 2008: 
Direct funding: $3,508,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $180,000. 

Fiscal year 2009:
Direct funding: $2,868,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $214,000. 

Fiscal year 2010: 
Direct funding: $2,982,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $216,000. 

Fiscal year 2011: 
Direct funding: $2,801,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $400,000. 

Fiscal year 2012:
Direct funding: $2,651,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $407,000. 

Fiscal year 2013:
Direct funding: $3,083,000; 
Reimbursable funding: $255,000. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The reported funding is in nominal dollars, unadjusted for 
inflation. Naval War College officials were unable to provide reliable 
data prior to fiscal year 2007. 

[End of figure] 

Fiscal Year 2004-2013 Total Staffing: 

[Refer to PDF for image: line graph] 

Full-time equivalents: 

Fiscal year 2070: 14.3; 
Fiscal year 2008: 15; 
Fiscal year 2009: 15. 
Fiscal year 2010: 15; 
Fiscal year 2011: 14.6; 
Fiscal year 2012: 9; 
Fiscal year 2012: 9. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Naval War College officials were unable to provide reliable data 
prior to fiscal year 2007. 

[End of figure] 

[End of Strategic Studies Group section] 

[End of Joint Professional Military Education Research Institutions] 

Appendix III: Research Project Title Analysis: 

This appendix contains the results of our research project title 
analysis. We reviewed 2,217 research project titles from 20 joint 
professional military education research institutions and 14 other DOD-
funded research organizations. These titles are associated with 
projects conducted in 2012 and 2013. Based on a project's title, we 
coded it into one or more areas of concentration. The table below 
presents the number of research project titles coded into these 23 
areas of concentration. The results do not add to 2,217 because some 
research project titles could be coded into more than one area of 
concentration and two areas of concentration are not included in the 
final results.[Footnote 64] For example, a research project title on 
North Korea's nuclear future would be coded into both the "Asia" and 
"nuclear and weapons of mass destruction" topic areas. 

Figure 7: Similarities in Research Topic Areas for 34 Research 
Organizations, According to 2012 and 2013 Research Project Titles: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

National Defense University: 

CCO: 
Africa: 1; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 25; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: 1; 
Force structure and operational issues: 1; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: 4; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: 5; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: 4; 
Resource management: 1; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 19; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CSR:
Africa: 5; 
Asia: 23; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 5; 
Cyber: 1; 
Energy and environment: 2; 
Europe: 19; 
Force structure and operational issues: 3; 
Historical: 3; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: 1; 
Legal: 5; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: 18; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: 9; 
Personnel and training: 4; 
Public affairs and communications: 1; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 30; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: 10. 

CSCMA:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 25; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Check]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 3; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CSWMD:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 1; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: 1; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: 1; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: 17; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 3; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CRRC:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 6; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: 11; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: 7; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: 7; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 2; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CTNSP:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 3; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 10; 
Cyber: 6; 
Energy and environment: 1; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: 1; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: 2; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: 5; 
Personnel and training: 11; 
Public affairs and communications: 4; 
Resource management: [Check]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 7; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: 21; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: 4. 

CTSS:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 2; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 2; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: 16; 
Force structure and operational issues: 2; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: 3; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Air University: 

AFRI:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 2; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 1; 
Cyber: 1; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: 3; 
Historical: 1; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: 1; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 2; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

AFCPC:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: 3; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: 3; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CSAT:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 2; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: 1; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: 2; 
Historical: 3; 
Intelligence: 1; 
Leadership and ethics: 1; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: 2; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 3; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Naval War College: 

SRD:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 3; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 5; 
Cyber: 2; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Check]; 
Force structure and operational issues: 2; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: 2; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: 3; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 11; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: 2; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CMSI:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 14; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 2; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: 2; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

ILD:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 5; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 2; 
Cyber: 7; 
Energy and environment: 2; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: 1; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: 42; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: 3; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

SSG:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Check]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 2; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Marine Corps University: 

HD:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: 5; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

MES:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 1; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: 1; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: 21; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: 3; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 6; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

TRG:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 1; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: 2; 
Historical: 1; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: 1; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: 1; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: 8; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Army War College: 

SSI: 
Africa: 8; 
Asia: 19; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 16; 
Cyber: 7; 
Energy and environment: 4; 
Europe: 31; 
Force structure and operational issues: 13; 
Historical: 4; 
Intelligence: 2; 
Leadership and ethics: 13; 
Legal: 1; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: 27; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: 10; 
Personnel and training: 7; 
Public affairs and communications: 4; 
Resource management: 5; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 48; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: 2; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: 8. 

ACGSC[A]: 

CAL:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: 17; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: 6; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CSI:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: 1; 
Historical: 1; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: 1; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 1; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Other DOD-funded: 

RAND PAF:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 5; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: 4; 
Energy and environment: 1; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: 14; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: 3; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: 4; 
Middle East: 2; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: 2; 
Personnel and training: 16; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: 4; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 8; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: 15; 
War gaming: 1; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

RAND NDRI:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 8; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 8; 
Cyber: 2; 
Energy and environment: 1; 
Europe: 3; 
Force structure and operational issues: 9; 
Historical: 2; 
Intelligence: 17; 
Leadership and ethics: 1; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: 5; 
Middle East: 12; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: 4; 
Personnel and training: 47; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: 22; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 33; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: 34; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

RAND Arroyo: 
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 2; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 3; 
Cyber: 2; 
Energy and environment: 2; 
Europe: 1; 
Force structure and operational issues: 13; 
Historical: 1; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: 24; 
Middle East: 1; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: 3; 
Personnel and training: 35; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: 20; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 21; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: 15; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: 1. 

CNA:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 16; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 4; 
Cyber: 6; 
Energy and environment: 6; 
Europe: 3; 
Force structure and operational issues: 24; 
Historical: 1; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: 8; 
Middle East: 6; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: 4; 
Personnel and training: 63; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: 26; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 28; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: 43; 
War gaming: 3; 
Western Hemisphere: 3. 

IDA:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 1; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 9; 
Cyber: 8; 
Energy and environment: 7; 
Europe: 1; 
Force structure and operational issues: 10; 
Historical: 2; 
Intelligence: 4; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: 8; 
Middle East: 2; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: 7; 
Personnel and training: 23; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: 29; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 11; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: 130; 
War gaming: 3; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Marshall Center: 
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 1; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 3; 
Cyber: 1; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: 9; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: 2; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Check]; 
Personnel and training: 56; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Check]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: 49; 
War gaming: 6; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

NESA:
Africa: [Check]; 
Asia: 10; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: 10; 
Europe: 2; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: 1; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: 23; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: 7; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 7; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Perry Center:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 1; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 2; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: 1. 

ACSS:
Africa: 16; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 4; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 5; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

NPS: CI:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 6; 
Cyber: 7; 
Energy and environment: 3; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: 6; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: 1; 
Public affairs and communications: 1; 
Resource management: 5; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 3; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: 16; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

NPS: MOVES: 
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: 5; 
Energy and environment: 2; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Check]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: 2; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: 56; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: 49; 
War gaming: 6; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

NPS: CIRPAS:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: 3; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Check]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Empty]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: 7; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: 40; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

CAA:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: [Empty]; 
Cyber: [Empty]; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: [Check]; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Empty]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: [Empty]; 
Public affairs and communications: [Empty]; 
Resource management: [Empty]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: [Empty]; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: [Empty]; 
War gaming: [Empty]; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

TRAC:
Africa: [Empty]; 
Asia: [Empty]; 
Civilian-military issues and irregular warfare: 2; 
Cyber: 1; 
Energy and environment: [Empty]; 
Europe: [Empty]; 
Force structure and operational issues: 2; 
Historical: [Empty]; 
Intelligence: [Empty]; 
Leadership and ethics: [Empty]; 
Legal: [Empty]; 
Logistics: [Check]; 
Middle East: [Empty]; 
Nuclear and weapons of mass destruction: [Empty]; 
Personnel and training: 5; 
Public affairs and communications: 1; 
Resource management: [Check]; 
Strategy, policy, and doctrine: 2; 
Technology, acquisition and systems: 7; 
War gaming: 1; 
Western Hemisphere: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documentation. 

[A] Army Command and General Staff College. 

Note: See abbreviations list on page iii. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

The Joint Staff: 
Washington, DC: 

6 March 2014: 

Ms. Johana Ayers: 
Acting Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Ayers: 

The Department of Defense has reviewed draft report GAO-14-216, "Joint 
Professional Military Education: Opportunities Exist for Greater 
Oversight and Coordination of Associated Research Institutions," dated 
29 January 2014 (GAO 351808). We concur with the two recommendations 
to more reliably assess the performance of JPME research institutions. 

Substantive work has already begun to clarity organizational goals and 
establish metrics of success at each of the research institutions. For 
example, the Joint Staff's Joint Force Development Directorate is 
collaborating with the National Defense University (NDU) to refine
the university's research enterprise. Such GAO-recommended efforts are 
reflected in the NDU Strategic Plan for Research 2014-2019 and in a 
revision of the Chairman's policy document for NOU. They should be 
fully implemented when the next academic year convenes in fall 2014. 

We will concentrate oversight of a Department-wide effort to improve 
coordination by establishing a 000 Studies and Analysis Executive 
Committee with appropriately defined regional and topical "communities 
of interest" by the end of FY 2014. This executive committee will be a 
combined effort through the Under,Secretary of Defense for Policy and 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engiiiepring, with 
appropriate representation from the PME and JPME enterprise. 

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, I appreciate your efforts to highlight better use of 
resources in development of future DOD leaders. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

DAVID L. Goldfein,Lt Gen, USAF:
Director, Joint Staff: 

cc:
USD(AT&L): 
USD(P): 
USD(P&R): 
Services Chiefs: 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Johana Ayers, (202) 512-5741 or ayersj@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Matthew Ullengren, Assistant 
Director; Erin Behrmann; Richard Burkard; Gabrielle A. Carrington; 
Alberto Leff; Marcus Lloyd Oliver; Michael Silver; and Cheryl Weissman 
made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] According to DOD guidance, officer professional military 
education--both service and joint--provides the education needed to 
complement training, experience, and self-improvement to produce the 
most professionally competent (strategic-minded, critical-thinking) 
servicemembers. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01D 
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2009). (Hereinafter cited as CJCSI 
1800.01D.) 

[2] Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Report of 
the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress, 101st 
Cong., 1st sess., No. 4, (1989). 

[3] For the purposes of this report, we refer to service and joint 
colleges and universities that are accredited by the Joint Staff to 
provide JPME certification as JPME colleges and universities. 

[4] For purposes of this report, we refer to research institutions 
affiliated with service and joint colleges and universities as JPME 
research institutions. 

[5] DOD broadly defines studies and analysis research as research done 
to support DOD policy development, decision making, alternative 
approaches, and new ideas for the DOD community. 

[6] Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives, Another Crossroads? Professional 
Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the 
Skelton Panel, H.R. 111-4 (2010). 

[7] GAO, Joint Military Education: Actions Needed to Implement DOD 
Recommendations for Enhancing Leadership Development, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-29] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 
2013). 

[8] Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 547(b) (2013). 

[9] For example, although the Army War College's Army Physical Fitness 
Research Institute conducted research and had dedicated personnel, we 
concluded that its resources were primarily focused on educating and 
promoting the mental and physical readiness of thousands of Army 
leaders and spouses each year. As a result, we concluded that it did 
not meet both of our criteria and is not included within our scope. 

[10] Staffing data provided by JPME colleges and universities include 
military and civilian personnel, noncontractor researchers, contractor 
researchers, as well as noncontractor administrative staff positions. 

[11] Officials at JPME colleges and universities stated that because 
federal records-retention policies generally require agencies to 
maintain data for 6 years and 3 months, they were unable to provide 
reliable data in many cases prior to fiscal year 2007. 

[12] See, for example, GAO, Building Partner Capacity: Actions Needed 
to Strengthen DOD Efforts to Assess the Performance of the Regional 
Centers for Security Studies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-606] (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 
2013) and State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and 
Training Needed for National Guard's Efforts with Foreign Partners, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-548] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 15, 2012). 

[13] Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993); Pub. L. No. 111-352 (2011). 

[14] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[15] GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional 
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, 
and Information Sharing, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 
2009). 

[16] Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433. 

[17] The statutorily mandated levels are JPME Phase I, which generally 
focuses on tactical and operational levels of war; Phase II, which is 
a follow-on for selected graduates of service schools and other 
appropriate education programs that complements and enhances the Phase 
I instruction; and the CAPSTONE course of JPME for general/flag 
officers that focuses on the operational and strategic levels of war 
for high-level joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 
multinational responsibilities. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2153-2155. 

[18] 10 U.S.C. § 153(a)(5)(c). 

[19] CJCSI 1800.01D. 

[20] DOD's Regional Centers for Security Studies include the George C. 
Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the Near East South 
Asia Center for Strategic Studies, the William J. Perry Center for 
Western Hemisphere Defense Studies, the Africa Center for Strategic 
Studies, and the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. 

[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-606]. 

[22] For the purposes of this report, reimbursable funding refers to 
amounts earned or collected from outside organizations for research 
services furnished by the institution. 

[23] For the purposes of this report, a think tank is defined as a 
nonprofit organization that conducts public policy research and 
analysis. An example of a think tank is the Brookings Institution, 
based in Washington, D.C. 

[24] Alan R. Shaffer, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Defense Research & Engineering, Budget Request for DOD Science and 
Technology Programs, testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives,113th Cong., 1st sess., April 16, 
2013. 

[25] Department of Defense, Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering, Directive 5134.3 (Nov. 3, 2003). 

[26] Basic research is the systematic study directed toward greater 
knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of phenomena and 
of observable facts without specific applications toward processes or 
products in mind. Applied research is the systematic study to gain 
knowledge or understanding necessary to determine the means by which a 
recognized and specific need may be met. Advanced technology 
development includes all efforts that have moved into the development 
and integration of hardware for field experiments and tests. 

[27] Officials at PME colleges and universities were unable to provide 
consistent data on JPME research institution funding and staffing 
levels prior to fiscal year 2007. Therefore, we are providing 
composite data on JPME research institutions from fiscal year 2007 
through fiscal year 2013. 

[28] DOD reported staffing level data in full-time equivalents, which 
are calculated as the total hours worked in jobs retained divided by 
the number of hours in a full time schedule, and include noncontractor 
researchers, contractor researchers, and noncontractor administrative 
staff positions. 

[29] According to an NDU official, the vast majority of NDU's 
noncontractor researchers serve on renewable term appointments ranging 
from 1 to 3 years. 

[30] See, for example, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-606] and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-548]. 

[31] Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993), as amended by Pub. L. No. 111-352 
(2011). 

[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[33] See, for example, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-606] and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-548]. 

[34] In April 2012, the Joint Staff conducted a management control 
review of NDU, the purpose of which was to assess the administrative 
and fiscal control processes that were in place to ensure proper 
stewardship of NDU's resources. As part of that review, the Joint 
Staff noted that throughout NDU there appeared to be a fundamental 
disagreement regarding how its research supported the JPME mission and 
courses. Accordingly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
provided NDU with a new mission statement emphasizing that its 
research should support its academic mission. 

[35] See, for example, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-606] and [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-548]. 

[36] Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Federally Funded Research and 
Development Center (FFRDC) Management Plan and Associated "How-to-
Guides," Memorandum (May 2, 2011). 

[37] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[38] CJCSI 1800.01D. 

[39] According to Enclosure E of CJCSI 1800.01D, the seven educational 
standards are (1) develop joint awareness, perspective, and attitudes; 
(2) employ predominantly active and highly effective instruction 
methods; (3) assess student achievement; (4) assess program 
effectiveness; (5) conduct quality faculty recruitment: selection, 
assignment, and performance assessment program; (6) conduct faculty 
development programs for improving instructional skills and increasing 
subject matter mastery; and (7) provide institutional resources to 
support the educational process. 

[40] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[41] While not tied to the research institutions, the process provides 
an accreditation standard for research related to faculty's 
professional development. 

[42] While these accrediting bodies are institutional accreditors, 
responsible for reviewing an entire institution and indicating that 
each of an institution's parts is contributing to the achievement of 
the institution's objectives, their reviews do not focus in detail on 
research institutions. In addition, at some JPME schools, the research 
institutions are more-loosely affiliated with the school and are not 
viewed as a central part of the institution. 

[43] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP]. 

[44] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[45] The topic areas represent 23 broad categories of research 
activities and are based on the general topic areas in which JPME 
research institutions and other DOD-funded research organizations 
categorize their research. 

[46] The results do not include the following three areas of 
concentration: (1) Public Affairs and Communication; (2) Other; and 
(3) Unable to Code. "Public Affairs and Communication" is not included 
because no mission statements were coded into that area of 
concentration. "Other" and "Unable to Code" were not included because 
these are not areas of concentration intended to show similarity. 
Rather, "Other" is intended for project titles or mission statements 
that do not fit into the other areas of concentration and "Unable to 
Code" is used for methodological purposes to categorize incomplete 
information. 

[47] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP]. 

[48] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[49] The Defense Technical Information Center manages an online 
database that makes past DOD-funded research studies available to the 
research community to enable future researchers to understand the 
purpose, scope, approach, results or outcomes, and conclusions or 
recommendations of prior work before undertaking new studies. 

[50] Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 547(b) (2013). 

[51] For the purposes of this report, we refer to service and joint 
colleges and universities that are accredited by the Joint Staff to 
provide JPME certification as JPME colleges and universities. 

[52] For example, although the Army War College's Army Physical 
Fitness Research Institute conducted research and had dedicated 
personnel, we concluded that its resources were primarily focused on 
educating and promoting the mental and physical readiness of thousands 
of Army leaders and spouses each year. As a result, we concluded that 
it did not meet both of our criteria and is not included within our 
scope. 

[53] Staffing data provided by JPME colleges and universities includes 
military and civilian personnel, noncontractor researchers, contractor 
researchers as well as noncontractor administrative staff positions. 

[54] Officials at JPME colleges and universities stated because 
federal records-retention policies generally require agencies to 
maintain data for 6 years and 3 months, they were unable to provide 
reliable data in many cases prior to fiscal year 2007. 

[55] Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Officer Professional Military Education Policy, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01D (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 
15, 2011). 

[56] The JPME colleges and universities, as Master's Degree-granting 
institutions, are accredited by four regional accreditation bodies: 
the Middle States Commission on Higher Education (which accredits the 
National Defense University and Army War College); Higher Learning 
Commission (which accredits the Army Command and General Staff 
College); New England Association of Schools and Colleges (which 
accredits the Naval War College); and Southern Association of Colleges 
and Schools Commission on Colleges (which accredits Air University and 
Marine Corps University). The accreditation process is intended to 
strengthen and sustain the quality and integrity of higher education, 
making it worthy of public confidence and minimizing the scope of 
external control. 

[57] See, for example, GAO, Building Partner Capacity: Actions Needed 
to Strengthen DOD Efforts to Assess the Performance of the Regional 
Centers for Security Studies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-606] (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 
2013) and State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and 
Training Needed for National Guard's Efforts with Foreign Partners, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-548] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 15, 2012). 

[58] Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993); Pub. L. No. 111-352 (2011). 

[59] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[60] We did not include the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 
because it did not have any research projects in 2012 or 2013 that 
could be used in our analysis of research project titles as part of 
our effort, as discussed below, to identify similarities and 
differences between research organizations. 

[61] GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional 
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, 
and Information Sharing, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 
2009). 

[62] We assessed the reliability of the funding and staffing data 
collected by analyzing questionnaire responses from JPME colleges and 
universities, which included information on their data-system 
management, data quality-assurance processes, and potential sources of 
errors and mitigations of those errors. Based on our review of the 
data provided and our review of the questionnaire responses, we 
concluded that the systems used to provide the data, and thus the data 
they provide, are sufficiently reliable for our audit purposes. 
Furthermore, although we have identified a number of factors that 
could affect data quality, we concluded that these were the best 
available data on JPME research institutions. 

[63] DOD reported staffing-level data in full-time equivalents, which 
are calculated as the total hours worked in jobs retained divided by 
the number of hours in a full-time schedule, and include noncontractor 
researchers, contractor researchers, and noncontractor administrative 
staff positions. 

[64] The results do not include the following two areas of 
concentration: (1) Other; and (2) Unable to Code. "Other" and "Unable 
to Code" were not included because these are not areas of 
concentration intended to show similarity. Rather, "Other" is intended 
for project titles that do not fit into the other areas of 
concentration, and "Unable to Code" is used for methodological 
purposes to categorize incomplete information. 

[End of section] 

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