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Have Been Implemented, but Concerns Remain About Crime Reporting' 
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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO:  

Report to Congressional Requesters:  

December 2013:  

Cruise Vessels:  

Most Required Security and Safety Measures Have Been Implemented, but 
Concerns Remain About Crime Reporting:  

GAO-14-43:  

GAO Highlights:  

Highlights of GAO-14-43, a report to congressional requesters.  

Why GAO Did This Study:  

In 2011, almost 11 million passengers took a cruise from a U.S. port. 
Media reports about passenger personal safety while aboard cruise 
vessels—-including those related to the January 2012 grounding of the 
cruise vessel Costa Concordia off the coast of Italy, which resulted 
in 32 deaths—-combined with the increasing number of passengers taking 
cruises has raised questions about passenger safety and security. With 
the enactment of the CVSSA in 2010, cruise vessels that visit U.S. 
ports were required to meet certain security and safety requirements, 
such as having rail heights of at least 42 inches and reporting 
allegations of certain crimes to the FBI. GAO was asked to review 
cruise vessel safety as well as security issues—related to keeping 
passengers safe from crime.  

GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which the cruise vessel industry and 
federal agencies have implemented the CVSSA, and (2) any actions taken 
following the Costa Concordia accident to enhance the safety of cruise 
vessels visiting U.S. ports.  

GAO reviewed the CVSSA and related agency and industry documents, and 
interviewed officials from the Coast Guard, FBI, CLIA, five cruise 
lines which accounted for over 80 percent of North American cruise 
vessel passengers in 2012, and two crime victim advocacy groups. The 
cruise lines were selected based on several factors including their 
volume of North American passengers. Crime victim advocacy groups were 
selected based on their knowledge about cruise ship crime issues.  

What GAO Found:  

The cruise industry and federal agencies have implemented 11 of 15 
Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA) provisions, but 
implementation of 4 provisions requires the development of regulations 
and policy, and is underway. Officials from all five cruise lines GAO 
met with said most required measures were in place when the CVSSA was 
enacted. According to U.S. Coast Guard officials, a notice of proposed 
rulemaking is in development to address 3 of the 4 remaining 
provisions. The 3 provisions relate to technologies to (1) detect a 
person going overboard, (2) maintain a video surveillance system to 
assist in documenting crimes on the vessel, and (3) transmit 
communications and warnings from the ship to anyone in surrounding 
waters. A policy linked to the fourth provision on the certification 
of trainers who provide the CVSSA course on crime scene preservation 
to cruise line personnel, is, as of December 2013, undergoing review 
at the Department of Transportation. With respect to CVSSA crime-
reporting requirements, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 
the Coast Guard have implemented these provisions as required. 
Accordingly, the agencies publish on a website information on reported 
crimes that are no longer under investigation. However, GAO identified 
some limitations in the usefulness of the publicly reported data. 
Specifically, (1) allegations for which investigations are not opened 
are never published; (2) the data are not timely-—due to the length of 
the criminal justice process-—and thus, crime data may be posted 
months or years after the alleged crime occurred and (3) the data 
reported are not put into context, such as a city’s crime rate, to 
provide the public with the information needed to compare rates and 
make decisions. However, some cruise lines are making efforts to 
improve reported crime data. In August 2013, several cruise lines 
began voluntarily disclosing alleged crime data on their websites. 
Also, in July 2013, legislation was introduced to amend the CVSSA that 
would revise and expand crime-reporting requirements, among other 
items. As of November 2013, however, these actions were either new or 
pending. Thus, GAO could not assess whether, or to what extent, the 
voluntary reporting or potential legislation might provide more useful 
data than current requirements.  

Following the Costa Concordia accident, the cruise industry, an 
international maritime organization, and the Coast Guard took actions 
to improve passenger safety. The Cruise Lines International 
Association (CLIA)-—which represents over 98 percent of cruise lines 
in the United States—-identified 10 safety-related policies in 2012 
that were adopted by all member cruise lines by July 2013. These 
policies include improvements to vessel passage planning and life 
jacket stowage, among other things. The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO)—a United Nations agency responsible for maritime 
matters—has also adopted a regulation, effective January 2015, 
requiring passengers to participate in a safety and evacuation 
exercise (muster drill) prior to or immediately upon departure—rather 
than within 24 hours of departure. CLIA member cruise lines adopted a 
similar muster policy weeks after the Costa Concordia accident. The 
Coast Guard is monitoring IMO’s consideration of additional 
regulations. The agency has also started witnessing predeparture 
muster drills and has reported no major concerns. In addition, the 
Coast Guard has worked with the cruise industry for several years to 
plan and hold disaster exercises, including one in April 2013 to 
practice a mass rescue from a cruise vessel.  

What GAO Recommends:  

GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.  

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-43]. For more 
information, contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or 
caldwells@gao.gov.  

[End of section]  

Contents:  

Letter:  

Background:  

Cruise Industry and Federal Agencies Have Implemented Most CVSSA 
Provisions, and Additional Crime-Reporting Efforts Are Under Way:  

The Cruise Industry Made Changes after the Costa Concordia Accident 
and Potential International Regulations Remain under Consideration:  

Agency Comments:  

Appendix I: Key Stakeholders with Maritime Safety and Security 
Activities:  

Appendix II: Provisions in the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act:  

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:  

Tables:  

Table 1: Differing Viewpoints on the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety 
Act's (CVSSA) Man Overboard Technology Provision:  

Table 2: Differing Viewpoints on the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety 
Act's (CVSSA) Video Recording Requirements Provision:  

Table 3: Differing Viewpoints on the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety 
Act (CVSSA) Training Certification Provision:  

Table 4: Alleged CVSSA Crimes Reported to the FBI by Cruise Lines from 
January 2010 through September 2013:  

Table 5: Alleged CVSSA Crimes No Longer under Investigation by the FBI 
(Published on Coast Guard Website) from January 2010 through September 
2013:  

Table 6: Stakeholders with Maritime Safety and Security Activities:  

Table 7: Summary of Provisions in the Cruise Vessel Security and 
Safety Act (CVSSA):  

Figures:  

Figure 1: Regulatory Oversight Regime Affecting Cruise Vessels:  

Figure 2: Law Enforcement Process for Investigation of Cruise Crime 
within FBI's Jurisdiction:  

Figure 3: Timeline of CLIA Actions Relative to the Costa Concordia 
Accident:  

Figure 4: Timeline of IMO MSC Actions following the Costa Concordia 
Accident:  

Abbreviations:  

AAJ: American Association for Justice:  

BRM: Bridge Resource Management:  

CBP: Customs and Border Protection:  

CCTV: closed circuit television:  

CEO: chief executive officer:  

CLIA: Cruise Lines International Association:  

CVSSA: Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act:  

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:  

ICV: International Cruise Victim's Association:  

IMO: International Maritime Organization:  

ISM Code: International Safety Management Code:  

MARAD: Maritime Administration:  

MSC: Maritime Safety Committee:  

NPRM: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking:  

NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board:  

OMB: Office of Management and Budget:  

RFI: Request for Information:  

SMS: safety management system:  

SOLAS: International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea:  

STD: sexually transmitted disease:  

UCR: Uniform Crime Reports:  

[End of section]  

GAO:
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548:  

December 20, 2013:  

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John Thune: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Science, Commerce and Transportation: 
United States Senate:  

The Honorable Bennie Thompson: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 
The Honorable Doris O. Matsui: 
House of Representatives:  

The popularity of cruise vessels as a vacation option continues to 
grow. Since 1980, the cruise industry has had an average annual 
passenger growth rate of 7.6 percent, and in 2011, over 16 million 
passengers traveled aboard cruise vessels worldwide.[Footnote 1] About 
10.9 million of these passengers traveled from U.S. ports.[Footnote 2] 
Media reports about passenger personal safety while aboard cruise 
vessels, combined with the increasing number of cruise vessel 
passengers and the January 2012 Costa Concordia cruise vessel 
grounding off the coast of Italy, which claimed 32 lives, raised 
questions about personal security and passenger safety when aboard 
cruise vessels. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), from 2005 through 2010, sexual assaults and physical assaults 
on cruise vessels were the leading cruise vessel crimes investigated 
and reported by the FBI. However, the public was often not aware of 
these crimes because the federal government did not require 
information about them to be published. Moreover, cruise vessels 
carrying U.S. passengers often travel to foreign ports before 
returning to the United States, a fact that can introduce the possible 
involvement of law enforcement from a variety of foreign countries--in 
addition to the federal and local law enforcement agencies that may be 
involved if a crime occurs during a voyage. The involvement or 
potential involvement of foreign governments can add to the confusion 
of crime victims as they attempt to navigate various justice systems. 

The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA), enacted in July 
2010, requires cruise lines operating ships that visit U.S. ports and 
the federal government to take certain actions related to these 
issues.[Footnote 3] For example, the CVSSA requires the cruise lines 
to report allegations of certain crimes to the FBI and the United 
States Coast Guard as well as to ensure that passengers have key 
information available to them--such as U.S. embassy contact 
information for all of the countries on the cruise vessel itinerary--
and to implement specific personal security measures onboard such as 
ensuring that all stateroom doors have peepholes, among other things. 
[Footnote 4] The CVSSA also requires that the Coast Guard maintain a 
website that provides a numerical accounting of certain crimes that 
have been reported by cruise lines, but are no longer under FBI 
investigation.[Footnote 5] The CVSSA places much of the responsibility 
for implementing the law with the Coast Guard and FBI. The Coast Guard 
is the federal agency responsible for a wide array of maritime safety 
and security activities, including those involving cruise vessels and 
their landside facilities, while the FBI is responsible for 
investigating certain cruise vessel crimes, among other 
responsibilities. 

In addition to the issue of personal security of passengers, the 
January 2012 grounding of the cruise vessel Costa Concordia off the 
coast of Italy raised questions about vessel management and the 
procedures for safeguarding passengers in emergency situations. For 
example, although international maritime law requires all passengers 
to be evacuated within 30 minutes of an order to abandon a vessel, the 
Italian government reported that the evacuation of the Costa Concordia 
took over 6 hours. The accident resulted in the death of 32 
passengers. The Italian government investigated the accident and 
reported in May 2013 on numerous lapses in emergency procedures and 
management, including problems with vessel evacuation, voyage 
planning, and emergency communication. 

You requested that we review the implementation of the CVSSA as well 
as any safety actions taken by federal government agencies and the 
cruise industry following the Costa Concordia accident. This report 
examines the following questions:  

* To what extent have the cruise industry and federal agencies taken 
actions to implement the requirements of the CVSSA? 

* What actions, if any, have federal agencies and the cruise industry 
taken to enhance the safety of cruise vessels visiting U.S. ports as a 
result of the Costa Concordia accident? 

To address both objectives, we conducted visits to four cruise vessel 
ports, which we selected in large part because of their high cruise 
traffic and passenger embarkation volume, among other things--Los 
Angeles, California; Miami, Florida; Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and 
Seattle, Washington. To understand how the Coast Guard checks for 
CVSSA compliance and other safety issues on cruise vessels, we 
accompanied Coast Guard officials on cruise vessel exams in the Port 
of Los Angeles and Port Everglades, the port for Fort Lauderdale. 
During these visits, we interviewed security and safety officials from 
five cruise lines to understand how they implemented the provisions of 
the CVSSA and what safety changes they have implemented as a result of 
the Costa Concordia accident.[Footnote 6] Additionally, we interviewed 
Coast Guard officials in the field and in headquarters on their role 
in implementing the CVSSA, any challenges encountered during 
implementation, and any actions taken following the Costa Concordia 
accident. We also interviewed officials from the Cruise Lines 
International Association (CLIA)--which currently represents over 98 
percent of the cruise industry operating in the United States--for 
their perspective on the impact of the CVSSA and to discuss the safety 
changes they have implemented among their members as a result of the 
Costa Concordia accident. Finally, during our visits to cruise vessel 
ports, we also interviewed FBI and local law enforcement agency 
officials to discuss their role in handling crime aboard cruise 
vessels. The information we obtained from personnel at the ports and 
the cruise lines cannot be generalized across all U.S. ports and the 
cruise industry--although CLIA does represent a substantial portion of 
the industry--but the information provided us with a perspective on 
the implementation of the CVSSA as well as any changes resulting from 
the Costa Concordia accident. 

To address the first objective, we reviewed relevant documents, 
guidance, and policy from federal agencies, such as the Coast Guard's 
policy letter on CVSSA implementation procedures. Additionally, we 
reviewed the provisions in the CVSSA and assessed the extent to which 
federal agencies and cruise lines were implementing those provisions. 
We also analyzed alleged and published cruise vessel crime data 
obtained from the FBI. Specifically, we analyzed all CVSSA crimes 
reported to the FBI from January 2008 through September 2013 (pre- and 
post-CVSSA implementation) as well as analyzed for the same time 
period the number of closed cases that appeared on the Coast Guard's 
public website. To determine the reliability of these data, we 
interviewed FBI and cruise line officials familiar with the data 
regarding their procedures for obtaining, analyzing, and reporting 
cruise vessel crime data. We determined that the data were 
sufficiently reliable for our purposes.[Footnote 7] While the 
publication of the CVSSA crime data is consistent with the law, these 
data have some limitations. These limitations were identified through 
our independent analysis, as well as through comments from officials 
at the FBI, CLIA, the cruise lines we met with, and a crime victim 
advocacy groups. We discuss these limitations later in this report. We 
interviewed Coast Guard officials as well as representatives of two 
victim advocacy groups and two academic researchers who have written 
extensively on cruise vessel crime for their perspectives on the 
implementation of the CVSSA. The interest groups and researchers were 
selected based on their knowledge about cruise vessel crime--either 
advocating for victims or researching cruise crime trends.[Footnote 8] 
We also interviewed officials from the Department of Transportation's 
Maritime Administration (MARAD)--which works to improve and strengthen 
the U.S. marine transportation system--to determine its role in 
implementing the CVSSA and discuss any challenges MARAD had 
encountered. 

To address the second objective, we reviewed relevant documents and 
policies from CLIA and the selected cruise lines, including the safety 
measures that CLIA introduced after the Costa Concordia accident. We 
also reviewed documents from the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO)--a United Nations agency that specializes in maritime issues--as 
well as the Costa Concordia marine casualty investigation report 
issued by the Italian government in 2013. We interviewed Department of 
State and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) officials to 
understand their agencies' roles in relation to cruise vessel safety 
and the Costa Concordia accident. During our port visits, we also 
interviewed officials from two classification societies to better 
understand their roles in ensuring cruise vessel safety.[Footnote 9] 
We also witnessed a cruise vessel mass rescue exercise, conducted by 
the Coast Guard, which involved numerous cruise line personnel, 
federal agency personnel, and local authorities in the Bahamas. The 
exercise was part of a series of mass rescue operation-based exercises 
designed to educate and prepare participants for a potential 
catastrophic event--similar to the Costa Concordia accident--involving 
a mass rescue operation at sea. 

We conducted this performance audit from January 2013 to December 2013 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background:  

Many Stakeholders Involved in Cruise Vessel Safety and Security 
Regulation:  

International, national, state, and local requirements regulate 
maritime safety and security. At the international level, IMO is 
responsible for developing an international maritime regulatory 
framework. IMO member states (nations) have adopted the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), which is designed to 
help ensure maritime security and safety worldwide. Among other 
things, SOLAS provides that companies and vessels should comply with 
the requirements of the International Safety Management Code (ISM 
Code), which was adopted by IMO in 1993. Federal laws, regulations, 
and guidance direct federal agencies and vessel operators within U.S. 
ports and waters, and state and local requirements may also further 
direct activities of vessel operators within their jurisdictions. 

The enforcement of safety and security requirements for all maritime 
vessels is governed by two different systems: flag state control and 
port state control. A flag state that signed on to the SOLAS 
Convention has responsibility for verifying that vessels flying its 
flag meet international safety and security standards and that the 
flag state's standards are at least as stringent as those included in 
the convention's ISM Code. A port state is the country where a port is 
located. Port state control is the process by which a nation exercises 
its authority over foreign-flagged vessels operating in waters subject 
to the port state's jurisdiction. Port state control is generally 
intended to ensure that these visiting vessels comply with the various 
international and domestic requirements established to help ensure the 
safety of the visited port, its environment, and its personnel. Figure 
1 shows the regulatory oversight regime affecting cruise vessels; 
however, there are many additional international and domestic 
stakeholders with roles contributing to the security and safety of 
cruise vessels. For a list of key stakeholders and their activities, 
see appendix I. 

Figure 1: Regulatory Oversight Regime Affecting Cruise Vessels:  

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]  

Regulatory structure:  

International Maritime Organization (IMO): 
IMO is the United Nations specialized agency with responsibility for 
the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine 
pollution by vessels. IMO is responsible for creating international 
regulations for maritime safety.  

Flag state: 
A cruise vessel must be registered to a country. However, the country 
of registration is at the discretion of the owner of the vessel. Once 
a country, or flag state, is chosen, the vessel is bound to that 
country’s jurisdiction and control in administrative and technical 
matters over vessels flying its flag.  

Classification society: 
Classification societies are private, third-party organizations whose 
main function is to inspect the vessel at regular intervals to ensure 
its seaworthiness. They verify that the vessel’s structure and 
machinery are being maintained as required by classification societies’
rules. Classification societies may, if authorized by the vessel's 
flag state, also conduct safety audits for compliance with 
international regulations.  

Owner: 
The vessel owner has the overall responsibility for the safety and 
integrity of a vessel, including the manner in which it is operated 
and maintained. As required by the International Safety Management 
Code, the vessel owner is to carry out annual internal safety audits.  

U.S. Coast Guard port state control: 
The Coast Guard conducts preconstruction concept review, 
midconstruction inspections, and an initial operating inspection for 
foreign-flagged vessels that plan to visit U.S. ports. Once the cruise 
vessel is in service, Coast Guard inspectors board the vessel (at 
least annually) to check that the vessel’s major systems are in 
compliance with applicable international standards and domestic 
requirements, and that the crew possesses sufficient proficiency to 
safely operate the vessel.  

Source: GAO analysis of regulatory entities affecting cruise vessels; 
Art Explosion (clip art).  

[End of figure]  

The Coast Guard administers the U.S. port state control program for 
foreign-flagged cruise vessels that enter U.S. waters or a U.S. port, 
to enforce maritime safety and security in the United States.[Footnote 
10] The Coast Guard exercises this enforcement through port state 
control activities, which include initial, annual, and periodic 
examinations of foreign flag cruise vessels. These exams allow the 
Coast Guard to examine vessels at various times:  

* Initial exams: Conducted on vessels with potential U.S. itineraries, 
these exams include concept reviews during the very earliest stages of 
design, preconstruction plan reviews by Coast Guard naval architects 
and fire protection engineers, and mid-construction inspections at the 
shipbuilder's yard by Coast Guard marine inspectors. 

* Annual inspection: The Coast Guard inspects each cruise vessel 
visiting the United States at least twice a year. The first 
inspection, an annual inspection, focuses on the vessel's fire 
protection, lifesaving, and emergency systems as well as any 
modifications to the vessel that would affect its structural fire 
protection and means of escape. 

* Periodic inspection: The second Coast Guard inspection, a periodic 
inspection, focuses on the performance of the officers and crew, with 
specific attention paid to their training and knowledge of the 
vessel's emergency procedures, fire fighting, lifesaving systems, and 
performance during drills. 

From January 2008 through March 2013, the Coast Guard performed 1,208 
cruise vessel examinations (71 initial, 673 annual, and 464 periodic) 
and identified 1,802 deficiencies. Nearly half of these deficiencies 
were related to fire-fighting systems. For example, according to the 
Coast Guard's Cruise Ship National Center of Expertise, the most 
common deficiency identified in 2012 was the improper operation of 
fire screen doors. In 2011, the most commonly identified deficiency 
was the improper stowage of combustibles. According to Coast Guard 
officials, most deficiencies are corrected on the spot or within the 
time frames allowed by the Coast Guard. Moreover, officials reported 
that the Coast Guard rarely detains cruise vessels based on 
substandard compliance--for example, from January 2008 through March 
2013, they have detained seven cruise vessels as a result of their 
1,208 cruise vessel examinations. Four of the seven cruise vessels 
made corrections and were released from detention the same day, while 
the others took 2, 3, and 8 days to make corrections.[Footnote 11] 

As part of its regulatory role, the Coast Guard also maintains data on 
marine casualties (accidents) that occur upon the navigable waters of 
the United States and its territories or possessions, or whenever an 
accident involves a U.S. vessel. Coast Guard regulations require that 
certain types of accidents be reported to the Coast Guard--including 
accidents that result in the loss of main propulsion or primary 
steering, or that materially and adversely affect the vessel's 
seaworthiness, among other things.[Footnote 12] Our analysis of Coast 
Guard data shows that from January 2008 through March 2013, there were 
256 marine casualties that involved cruise vessels: 128 of these were 
classified as failures of equipment or material; 64 were classified as 
accidents that caused damage to the environment (mostly discharge of 
oil); and 64 were classified in a variety of other categories--such as 
fire, loss of electrical power, or collision.[Footnote 13] 

Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act Added to Regulatory Framework:  

Enacted in July 2010, the CVSSA, as discussed above, required cruise 
lines and federal agencies to take certain actions designed to further 
bolster the security and safety of U.S. passengers aboard cruise 
vessels. The CVSSA applies to all passenger vessels that are 
authorized to carry at least 250 passengers, have onboard sleeping 
facilities for each passenger, are on voyages that embark or disembark 
passengers from the United States, and are not engaged on coastwise 
voyages.[Footnote 14] The CVSSA includes 15 provisions aimed at, among 
other things, increasing information available to passengers--such as 
requiring cruise lines to provide contact information in passenger 
staterooms for local embassies and providing crime victims with free 
and immediate access to sexual assault hotlines--as well as provisions 
requiring training to increase the capability of a cruise vessel's 
crew to document crimes and preserve crime scenes. Many CVSSA 
requirements are aimed at the cruise lines and were effective with 
CVSSA enactment or by January 27, 2012--18 months after CVSSA's 
enactment. The topics addressed by these 15 provisions are listed 
below (for a more detailed summary of these provisions please see 
appendix II):  

* Rail heights:  

* Peepholes:  

* Security latches and time-sensitive keys:  

* Capture of images/detection of passengers who have fallen overboard:  

* Acoustical hailing and warning devices:  

* Video recording requirements:  

* Availability of passenger safety information:  

* Medical treatment for victims of sexual assault:  

* Access to information and communications for victims of sexual 
assault:  

* Confidentiality of sexual assault examination and support 
information:  

* Logbook details and requirement to report alleged crimes:  

* Crew access to passenger staterooms:  

* Crime data on Coast Guard website and link on cruise line websites:  

* MARAD certification of crew training on crime scene preservation:  

* Crew training on crime scene preservation:  

Costa Concordia Accident Identified Numerous Potential Safety 
Shortcomings:  

On January 13, 2012, an Italian-flagged cruise vessel, the Costa 
Concordia, ran aground with over 4,000 passengers and crew onboard off 
the coast of Giglio Island, Italy. The vessel was so badly damaged 
that five contiguous watertight compartments--which housed machinery 
and equipment vital for the propulsion and steering of the vessel--
rapidly flooded. The vessel then lost propulsion and suffered 
intermittent power outages, as the emergency backup systems could not 
handle an emergency on such a scale. The accident resulted in 32 
deaths, including 2 U.S. citizens. 

The Costa Concordia accident triggered an investigation led by the 
Italian government to ascertain the reasons that the vessel went 
aground. In May 2013, the Italian government issued its findings and 
recommendations. The investigation found that the root cause of the 
accident rested with the vessel's master for transiting too close to 
the coastline. According to the investigation, the accident was 
compounded because of poor emergency management by the master, some 
staff deck officers, and the vessel's hotel director. However, the 
report also offered additional recommendations, including improvements 
in bridge resource management, emergency power generation, and search 
and rescue operations, among other things.[Footnote 15] 

Cruise Industry and Federal Agencies Have Implemented Most CVSSA 
Provisions, and Additional Crime-Reporting Efforts Are Under Way:  

In 2011, the Coast Guard issued guidance on most of the provisions in 
the CVSSA, and the cruise lines had already implemented most of the 
safety measures required by the law. However, as of December 2013, the 
Coast Guard and MARAD were in the process of developing and 
publicizing new regulations before moving forward with the 
implementation of the remaining provisions related to items such as 
new technology and training certifications required or authorized by 
the CVSSA. Provisions regarding the publication of information on 
crimes on cruise vessels have been fully implemented by the FBI and 
Coast Guard in accordance with the law. Even so, efforts are under way 
that could address remaining concerns related to the thoroughness, 
timeliness, and context of reported crime data. 

The Coast Guard Issued CVSSA Guidance, and Cruise Lines Have 
Implemented Most CVSSA Requirements:  

The Coast Guard issued guidance for 11 of the 15 CVSSA provisions in 
June 2011.[Footnote 16] The Coast Guard guidance was issued in the 
form of internal Coast Guard policy letters with the main purpose of 
providing instructions to Coast Guard port state control officers 
regarding CVSSA requirements.[Footnote 17] Guidance was provided in 
the following 11 areas: (1) rail heights; (2) peepholes in passenger 
stateroom doors, (3) security latches and time-sensitive keys for 
stateroom doors, (4) safety information provided to passengers, (5) 
medical licensing and proper equipment to perform sexual assault 
exams, (6) patient access to information and communications in the 
event of sexual assault, (7) confidentiality of sexual assault 
examination and support information, (8) crew access to passenger 
staterooms, (9) logbook and reporting requirements for CVSSA crimes, 
(10) availability of crime data on the Coast Guard's website and the 
link on cruise lines' webpages to the Coast Guard's website,[Footnote 
18] and (11) training standards and curricula--which resulted in the 
development of the required course on crime scene preservation. 
[Footnote 19] Coast Guard officials stated that the guidance was 
necessary to help clarify some aspects of the CVSSA, especially in 
those areas that are outside the Coast Guard's normal area of 
expertise. For example, the guidance provides specific questions for 
inspectors to ask medical personnel to verify that adequate training, 
equipment, and medicine are in place in the event of a sexual assault. 

Officials from all five of the cruise lines we spoke with, as well as 
CLIA, told us that there were minor issues with implementing these 11 
CVSSA requirements and that most of the safety and security measures 
required by the law were already in place when the CVSSA was enacted, 
in July 2010. For example, each of the cruise line officials we met 
with told us that their vessels already were in compliance with most 
CVSSA provisions including having peepholes in stateroom doors, using 
certified medical personnel for sexual assault exams, and carrying 
rape kits onboard. As a result, according to all of the cruise lines 
we spoke with, meeting the CVSSA deadline for most of the requirements 
was not difficult. In the case where a modification was needed to meet 
a CVSSA requirement, the cruise lines we spoke with described the 
modification as minor. For example, officials from CLIA stated that, 
for the most part, the rail heights on their members' vessels already 
met the 42-inch height specified in the CVSSA. In one case, officials 
from a cruise line identified isolated locations where the rail height 
was below the requirement--such as around entrance gangways and by 
lifeboat stations--and thus they took steps to modify the railing 
height to meet the new standard. CLIA officials also reported that 
developing security information guides for passenger staterooms 
required a moderate amount of effort for the cruise lines because of 
the variations in their vessels' itineraries, which required cruise 
lines to collect and update information for all of their vessels' 
ports of call. Additionally, officials from one cruise line we spoke 
with discussed going beyond what the CVSSA requires. For example, this 
cruise line told us it was involved in discussions with officials from 
a victim advocacy group to evaluate and enhance the cruise line's 
procedures for preventing sexual assault and responding to sexual 
assault allegations. Additionally, this cruise line also told us it 
uses strict criteria to credential its professional staff to meet at 
least the minimum guidelines of the American College of Emergency 
Physicians and uses outside vendor software to help ensure credentials 
are kept up to date. Furthermore, these officials stated that an 
electronic medical record system is being introduced to improve the 
documentation and accessibility of health care information for guests 
and crew. 

The Coast Guard and MARAD Are in the Process of Developing Regulations 
and Policy for Four CVSSA Provisions:  

There are four CVSSA provisions that require the development of 
regulations and policy for enforcement, and these are in development 
by the Coast Guard and MARAD. These provisions are (1) man overboard 
technology, which detects and alerts the crew to a person falling 
overboard; (2) video recording requirements, which are to assist in 
documenting crimes on the vessel and in providing evidence for the 
prosecution of such crimes; (3) acoustical hailing and warning 
devices, which provide communication capability around a vessel 
operating in high-risk waters; and (4) certification of training 
providers that teach the CVSSA training course on crime prevention, 
detection, evidence preservation, and reporting.[Footnote 20] The 
Coast Guard is responsible for developing regulations for the first 
three provisions, while MARAD is responsible for developing policy for 
the training certification provision. 

Coast Guard CVSSA Provisions:  

The Coast Guard issued a Request for Information (RFI) in May 2011 to 
obtain the public's input on the CVSSA requirements on man overboard 
technology and video recording because they involved complex 
technology and the CVSSA language was not specific enough, according 
to Coast Guard officials, for them to use it to verify compliance on 
cruise vessels. In response to its RFI, the Coast Guard received 
comments from nine entities: CLIA, two cruise victim advocacy groups, 
five companies stating that they had effective technology in these 
areas, and one private citizen. In addition to the RFI responses, 
officials that we interviewed from CLIA, cruise lines, and cruise 
victim advocacy groups also provided insights on some of the 
challenges associated with two of the technology provisions of the 
CVSSA. Comments from the RFI as well as additional information 
provided to us from interested stakeholders are discussed in tables 1 
and 2:  

Table 1: Differing Viewpoints on the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety 
Act's (CVSSA) Man Overboard Technology Provision:  

Man overboard technology: CVSSA language: 
The vessel shall integrate technology that can be used for capturing 
images of passengers or detecting passengers who have fallen 
overboard, to the extent that such technology is available.[A]  

Cruise Lines International Association's (CLIA) request for 
information (RFI) comments: 
CLIA noted that there are two different parts to the man overboard 
technology: image capturing and detection. CLIA stated that the 
technology exists to reliably capture images of people falling 
overboard through closed circuit television (CCTV), thermal imaging, 
and so forth. However, the technology to reliably detect persons as 
they are in the process of going overboard does not presently exist. 
CLIA believes the technology is not yet reliable in a maritime 
environment because of the movement of a vessel, weather and sun glare, 
and lens encrustation caused by saltwater, among other things.  

Cruise victim advocacy group's RFI comment: 
An official from the International Cruise Victim's Association (ICV) 
stated that all CCTV systems of public areas should be monitored at 
all times and recorded by qualified shipboard security personnel in a 
dedicated watch center. Such a system would provide a safety blanket 
that envelops the vessel, making it impossible for someone to go 
overboard without being seen on a video camera.  

Five cruise lines interviewed comments: 
All five of the cruise lines we met with agreed with CLIA's 
perspective that the technology to detect persons as they are in the 
process of going overboard is not yet reliable. However, officials 
from four of the five cruise lines we met with have or are currently 
testing different technologies onboard their cruise vessels. Officials 
from four of the five cruise lines also said one problem with the 
technology relates to the potential impact of false readings, both 
positive and negative. Specifically, one cruise line official 
commented that if cruise lines are going to be required to invest 
significant amounts of money in man overboard technology they want to 
be sure it does not produce inaccurate results that could result in 
increased operational costs such as conducting unnecessary searches or 
disrupting an itinerary, among other costs. Similarly, if the 
technology failed to detect a passenger who had gone overboard, and as 
a result the vessel failed to conduct a search for that person, this 
type of error could expose the cruise line to costly litigation.  

Source: RFI comments provided to Coast Guard and GAO interviews. 

[A] 46 U.S.C. § 3507(a)(1)(D).  

[End of table]  

Table 2: Differing Viewpoints on the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety 
Act's (CVSSA) Video Recording Requirements Provision:  

Video recording requirements: CVSSA language: Requirement to maintain 
surveillance. The owner of a vessel to which this section applies 
shall maintain a video surveillance system to assist in documenting 
crimes on the vessel and in providing evidence for the prosecution of 
such crimes, as determined by the Secretary.[A]  

Cruise Lines International Association's (CLIA) request for 
information (RFI) comments: 
CLIA said that two main factors must be considered in developing 
regulations for a video surveillance system: locations on the vessel 
that should be under video surveillance and the length of time that 
images should be retained. CLIA commented that each vessel is 
different in size, layout, and design as well as the number and 
demographics of its passengers, and the type and location of prior 
crime allegations. As a result, CLIA commented that there should be a 
risk-based approach, rather than arbitrary standards, that guide video 
recording requirements. CLIA also recommended a video retention period 
of 7 days, as the average cruise length of its member lines is 7.2 
days.  

Cruise victim advocacy groups' RFI comments: 
Cruise victim advocacy groups state they would like to see more video 
cameras onboard, and the cameras monitored continuously. Two advocacy 
groups that provided RFI comments on the video recording requirements 
differed about how long video recordings should be kept. One group 
stated that the video recordings should be retained for 30 days; 
another stated the recordings should be retained for 90 days.  

Five cruise lines interviewed comments: 
Officials from two cruise lines we spoke to said that most crimes are 
reported within 1 to 2 weeks after they occur, so video retention 
requirements longer than that would be unnecessary. Specifically, 
officials from one cruise line we spoke with commented that its 
current retention storage is 14 days, but if it was to double the 
retention period to 28 days, it would be at a one-time cost of $21.7 
million. This cruise line also noted that it is standard practice to 
keep video footage indefinitely if it is tied to an ongoing 
investigation. This cruise line also reported that ensuring that video 
footage of a crime is maintained is generally not an issue, as 95 
percent of crimes are reported to it within 24 hours. Officials from 
two cruise lines also said that because of the large number of cameras 
onboard it is not feasible to have continuous monitoring.  

Source: RFI comments provided to Coast Guard and GAO interviews. 

[A] 46 U.S.C. § 3507(b).  

[End of table]  

The Coast Guard's RFI did not solicit feedback on the final provision, 
on acoustical hailing; however, Coast Guard officials told us that 
this provision would still be part of the final regulation as the 
technology already exists for acoustical hailing and warning devices. 
The term "high-risk waters" used in the provision was problematic to 
some cruise victim advocacy groups, according to Coast Guard 
officials, as they perceived the definition to be different from the 
Coast Guard's definition. For example, Coast Guard officials said that 
some cruise victim advocacy groups believe that those places that may 
be high-risk terrorism targets near land should be considered high-
risk waters (e.g., New York Harbor and waterways). However, Coast 
Guard officials told us they have a long-standing definition of high-
risk waters, and that they are typically waters where terrorism, 
piracy, and armed robbery occur (i.e., the waters off the Horn of 
Africa, etc.). Therefore, Coast Guard officials said that they felt it 
was necessary to include this provision in the proposed rule to allow 
for public comments because it was not clear from the law how the 
provision should be implemented. 

In July 2013, Coast Guard officials told us that they had drafted a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that will encompass these three 
provisions of the CVSSA. They added that the regulation will likely be 
performance based--focusing on what must be achieved--rather than 
prescriptive. Coast Guard officials noted that the NPRM is currently 
going through final agency review. According to the website of the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is the final reviewer in 
the rulemaking process, the NPRM will be issued in June 2014. There is 
no timetable for when the final regulation will be issued. 

All cruise line officials we spoke with reported that one of their key 
frustrations with the implementation of the CVSSA was not having 
timely information related to these three technology areas of the 
CVSSA. They expressed concern with how long it has taken to develop 
the regulations as well as concern about the lack of interim 
communication from the Coast Guard on the status of the rulemaking 
process. Cruise line officials stated that this affects their 
business, and that they want to be in full compliance with the law. 
Coast Guard officials commented that the time they have taken to 
develop the proposed rule was to ensure that they were adequately 
addressing CVSSA requirements and incorporating all viewpoints, while 
MARAD officials said that the time they took was to determine the best 
approach for implementation. Furthermore, Coast Guard officials told 
us that once a rulemaking process is under way, federal agencies 
generally do not discuss it with outside parties to avoid concerns 
regarding ex parte communications. According to Coast Guard officials, 
engaging with outside parties to update them on the process, as cruise 
line officials wished had been done, could hinder transparency, unless 
the agency gave all parties and the public the same opportunity to 
comment and provide information. 

While the Coast Guard is drafting its NPRM to address these three 
outstanding CVSSA provisions, in July 2013, legislation was introduced 
that would amend the video recording requirements of the CVSSA, among 
other items.[Footnote 21] The proposed bills detail requirements for 
placement of video surveillance equipment on cruise vessels, access to 
video records, and video retention standards, among other items. As of 
December 2013, the two bills have been referred to the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the House 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure's Subcommittee on Coast 
Guard and Maritime Transportation, respectively, and have not been 
voted on. It is unclear what effect these bills may have on the 
impending regulation from the Coast Guard if they become law. 

MARAD CVSSA Provision:  

For the fourth CVSSA provision, MARAD issued a notice of proposed new 
policy in the Federal Register in May 2013 for certifying providers of 
the CVSSA training course on crime prevention, detection, evidence 
preservation, and reporting.[Footnote 22] While the CVSSA did not 
mandate that MARAD develop a training provider certification--the 
language of the CVSSA states that MARAD "may" develop a certification--
MARAD officials stated that they were intent on pursuing certification 
because there were requests from both the Coast Guard and CLIA to 
provide clarity on the certification portion of the CVSSA. MARAD 
proposed a voluntary certification program for training providers to 
assure the general public that passenger cruise vessel security and 
safety personnel have received training that is in strict compliance 
with the CVSSA-mandated model training course. According to MARAD, 
certification would serve to assist the cruise industry in identifying 
and obtaining qualified training services. Training providers seeking 
to be certified by MARAD would be required to submit training plans 
and supporting information for review. If the training provider's 
plans meet the CVSSA model course criteria, the agency would offer its 
certification subject to the training provider entering into an 
agreement that, in addition to other terms, would subject the 
organization to program audits. Four comments were received on the 
proposed policy from CLIA, ICV, the American Association for Justice, 
and a practicing maritime attorney. Their comments on the proposed 
policy are summarized in table 3. MARAD is reviewing the comments, and 
officials said that it will promulgate a final policy as soon as 
practicable. 

Table 3: Differing Viewpoints on the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety 
Act (CVSSA) Training Certification Provision:  

Maritime Administration (MARAD) training certification: CVSSA 
language: The Administrator of the Maritime Administration may certify 
organizations in the United States and abroad that offer the curriculum 
for training and certification [for crime prevention, detection, 
evidence preservation and reporting].[A]  

Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA): 
CLIA had both questions and suggested changes for MARAD to consider 
when developing its final policy. Specifically, CLIA addressed the 
process MARAD plans to use to certify training providers that may have 
already been independently certified, as well as a request for MARAD 
to provide additional details on the qualifications it will be looking 
for in a training provider in order to obtain certification, amongst 
other items. CLIA also made numerous suggestions including a request 
for a quicker turnaround for certification approval and for MARAD not 
to publicize the course materials of certified training providers for 
proprietary reasons, among other items.  

Cruise victim advocacy group's perspective: 
International Cruise Victims' (ICV) comments include a request to make 
the certification mandatory, as well as for MARAD to have 
responsibility for issuing uniform course completion certificates to 
training providers. ICV also asked about the criteria MARAD plans to 
use to evaluate training providers. Additionally, ICV sought more 
clarity from MARAD on the frequency of the compliance audits that MARAD 
plans to perform for training providers, amongst other items.  

Other interested parties' perspectives: 
Two others commented on MARAD's proposed policy. These included the 
American Association for Justice (AAJ) as well as a maritime attorney. 
First, AAJ commented that the certification program does not provide 
immunity to cruise lines for failure to preserve evidence; instead it 
is simply a certification of a training standard and nothing more. 
Second, AAJ urged caution in relying on the certification program to 
successfully and skillfully preserve evidence, as those that are 
certified remain cruise line personnel and are not agents of the 
government. The maritime lawyer had one main concern about the 
transparency of the training provider, and would like to see MARAD 
require cruise lines to post on their websites their training providers 
and the names of the crew who are certified.  

Source: Notice of proposed new policy comments provided to MARAD. 

[A] 46 U.S.C. § 3508(a).  

[End of table]  

The FBI and the Coast Guard Have Fully Implemented CVSSA Crime Data 
Reporting Requirements:  

The FBI and the Coast Guard have fully implemented the CVSSA 
provisions regarding crime data reporting. Specifically, the FBI is 
responsible for implementing two main areas of the CVSSA: reviewing 
safety guides that the cruise lines prepare[Footnote 23] and reporting 
CVSSA crime data (regarding crimes that occur onboard cruise ships) to 
the Coast Guard which publishes it on a public website.[Footnote 24] 
FBI officials reported that they provide data for cases no longer 
under investigation, as stated in the CVSSA. The CVSSA identifies 
eight crimes that, if within the FBI's jurisdiction, cruise lines must 
report to the FBI.[Footnote 25] These crimes are homicide, suspicious 
death, missing U.S. national, kidnapping, assault with serious bodily 
injury, firing or tampering with the vessel, theft of money or 
property in excess of $10,000, and certain sexual assault offenses. 
[Footnote 26] The CVSSA then requires the Coast Guard to publish on 
its website a statistical compilation of all allegations of CVSSA 
crimes reported to the FBI that are no longer under FBI 
investigation.[Footnote 27] The data are to be updated at least 
quarterly, aggregated by cruise line, and each type of crime is to be 
identified including whether it was committed by a passenger or a crew 
member. Figure 2 explains the FBI's general process for receiving a 
CVSSA-related crime report and, if appropriate, opening and closing 
its investigation of a CVSSA-related crime. 

Figure 2: Law Enforcement Process for Investigation of Cruise Crime 
within FBI's Jurisdiction:  

[Refer to PDF for image: process map]  

FBI “preopening” period:  

1) Crime occurs.  

2) Cruise line security officials respond.  

3) If Cruise Vessel Safety and Security Act (CVSSA) crime, reported by 
telephone and by written report to FBI and U.S. Coast Guard (to occur 
as soon as possible); or: 
If not CVSSA crime, cruise line does not have to report it to FBI.[A]  

4) FBI analyzes information received from cruise line; meets cruise 
line at next U.S. port to: 
* collect evidence; 
* interview witnesses.  

5) Does not meet the standard for opening an investigation[A] or: 
Investigation conducted by appropriate state, local, or foreign law 
enforcement entities[A]; or: 
FBI determines that the allegations meet the standards to open an 
official investigation[B].  

Active investigation period:  

Cases no longer under investigation: 
Case is fully adjudicated (all trials and appeals are over)[B]; or: 
Statute of limitations has run out[B]; or: 
U.S. Attorney’s Office declines prosecution[B].  

[A] Crimes that are alleged but not publicly reported.  

[B] Crimes that are publicly reported.  

Source: GAO analysis of FBI interviews.  

Note: Figure 2 describes the general process law enforcement might use 
to investigate a cruise vessel crime. However, each case is different 
and the facts and circumstances will drive how the case is approached. 
Additionally, the FBI continues to gather information and evidence 
during the "active investigation period." However, we did not include 
specific methods the FBI uses because the purpose of this graphic is to 
show which alleged crimes are eventually reported publicly, and not to 
detail the FBI's investigative methods.  

[End of figure]  

FBI Involvement--"Pre-opening" Period:  

When an alleged crime occurs aboard a cruise vessel, according to 
cruise line officials, the security officer onboard the vessel 
typically receives notification of the alleged crime. If the alleged 
crime is believed to be a CVSSA-related crime, the security officer is 
usually required to notify the vessel owner, since under the CVSSA it 
is the owner's responsibility to report any CVSSA crime to the FBI and 
the Coast Guard as soon as possible.[Footnote 28] FBI officials stated 
that initial reports of crimes can come in varying forms, but 
generally for CVSSA crimes, they are notified within 24 hours by 
telephone. FBI officials also stated that, in most instances, they are 
relying on cruise vessel personnel to preserve the crime scene aboard 
the vessel since the FBI cannot typically get to a cruise vessel until 
it arrives in a United States port.[Footnote 29] To help address these 
circumstances, the FBI has provided the cruise lines with a standard 
form for detailing initial information about the alleged crime that 
includes a description of the incident; the names of victims, 
witnesses, and suspects; any statements made by those involved; and 
any evidence preserved (rape kits, video recordings, photos, etc.). 
The cruise lines are to send this form to the FBI and Coast Guard as 
soon as possible after the crime is reported. The FBI considers the 
information as it determines what further actions need to be taken. 

According to a cruise victim advocate group's official, this "pre-
opening" phase has been a stated source of concern for the group 
because of the following issues:  

* Law enforcement response: At sea, unlike on land, generally, a crime 
victim cannot call 911 to reach an independent local law enforcement 
authority. Instead, it is the responsibility of the cruise line's 
security personnel to respond. This can be disconcerting to the victim 
of a crime, particularly if the alleged perpetrator is a cruise line 
employee. An ICV official stated that the group realizes that it is 
the cruise line's responsibility to respond initially, but the ICV 
believes that victims should be given immediate access to a private 
phone and contact information to call the FBI directly, and other 
support organizations.[Footnote 30] 

* Jurisdiction: Cruise vessels generally sail through multiple local 
and foreign jurisdictions during a cruise. A cruise victim advocate 
group official stated that this can result in a victim feeling 
confused in dealing with the different legal systems.[Footnote 31] 
Depending on where the reported crime occurs, there can be several 
foreign ports that the cruise line may visit before arriving back in 
the United States. Each of these foreign jurisdictions may investigate 
the crime if it so chooses. 

* Evidence integrity: Cruise vessel personnel preserve crime scene 
evidence until law enforcement personnel board the vessel to begin 
reviewing the allegations, generally upon the vessel arriving at a 
U.S. port. For cruise victim advocates, this raises questions about 
evidence preservation, conflict of interest, the feasibility of 
conducting an investigation days after a crime may have occurred, and 
the potential contamination of a crime scene if other jurisdictions 
investigate prior to the vessel arriving back in the United States. 

In response to these concerns, FBI officials stated that they believe 
it is important to have cruise line security officials begin some 
evidence preservation work. They added that this is important given 
that there is no law enforcement agency onboard and that the FBI 
interviews and evidence collection are generally conducted when the 
cruise vessel has arrived in a U.S. port. To help support this effort, 
the FBI has provided CLIA with information on how to preserve crime 
scenes.[Footnote 32] FBI officials in all field offices we visited 
told us they have never been concerned about the information they 
received or the integrity of an investigation as a result of the 
security officer being a cruise line employee. Most cruise line 
officials mentioned that the circumstances of an international cruise--
where no independent law enforcement agency is available in 
international waters--may make it necessary for their security 
personnel to begin preserving evidence and collecting information 
while the vessel is still at sea to assist law enforcement personnel. 
FBI officials in one port city noted that they had seen an improvement 
in evidence preservation since the CVSSA came into law. 

FBI Investigation--Active Investigation Period:  

Upon boarding the vessel, the FBI can more readily gather evidence, 
interview witnesses, and survey the crime scene. If the alleged crime 
meets the standard for opening an investigation, the FBI will open an 
investigation and certain statistics about the case are to be 
published on the Coast Guard's website when the case is closed. 
Whether the FBI opens an investigation depends on a number of factors 
related to the facts and circumstances of each case. However, for a 
crime allegation to eventually appear on the Coast Guard's public 
website, under the law, an investigation would have to have been 
officially opened by the FBI. 

FBI Investigation--Cases No Longer under Investigation, or "Closed" 
Cases:  

According to FBI officials, an open case may no longer be under 
investigation if (1) the case has reached a final disposition in court 
(e.g., a verdict was rendered and appeals have concluded); (2) the 
statute of limitations has run out; and (3) at some point following 
the opening of an official investigation, the U.S. Attorney declines 
prosecution. Once a case is closed, FBI provides statistics on these 
closed cases to the Coast Guard for posting on the website. 

However, there is a difference between the number of reported cases 
and the number of closed cases. Table 4 identifies alleged CVSSA 
crimes reported to the FBI by year, and table 5 identifies closed 
CVSSA cases published on the Coast Guard's public website by year. As 
tables 4 and 5 demonstrate, there were 287 alleged CVSSA crimes 
reported to the FBI during this nearly 4-year time period and 81 CVSSA 
crimes that were published on the website as closed. 

Table 4: Alleged CVSSA Crimes Reported to the FBI by Cruise Lines from 
January 2010 through September 2013:  

Crime: Homicide; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
2013 (January-June): 0; 
Total: 0. 

Crime: Death-suspicious; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 3; 
2012: 0; 
2013 (January-June): 1; 
Total: 5. 

Crime: Missing U.S. national; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 5; 
2012: 7; 
2013 (January-June): 7; 
Total: 22. 

Crime: Kidnapping; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
2013 (January-June): 0; 
Total: 0. 

Crime: Assault with serious bodily injury; 
2010: 12; 
2011: 3; 
2012: 10; 
2013 (January-June): 7; 
Total: 32. 

Crime: Firing or tampering with vessel; 
2010: 1; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 1; 
2013 (January-June): 0; 
Total: 2. 

Crime: Theft greater than $10,000; 
2010: 19; 
2011: 16; 
2012: 15; 
2013 (January-June): 8; 
Total: 58. 

Crime: Sexual assault; 
2010: 50; 
2011: 43; 
2012: 30; 
2013 (January-June): 22; 
Total: 145. 

Crime: Total allegations; 
2010: 86; 
2011: 70; 
2012: 63; 
2013 (January-June): 45; 
Total: 264. 

Source: GAO analysis of FBI data, prepared as of August 7, 2013. 

Note: According to FBI officials, the FBI receives reports of alleged 
serious violations of U.S. law directly from the cruise lines in 
accordance with the CVSSA. The FBI then assesses the reports and 
classifies the allegations into one of the eight serious violations 
outlined in the CVSSA.  

[End of table]  

Table 5: Alleged CVSSA Crimes No Longer under Investigation by the FBI 
(Published on Coast Guard Website) from January 2010 through September 
2013:  

Crime: Homicide; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
2013 (January-September): 0; 
Total: 0. 

Crime: Death-suspicious; 
2010: 4; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 1; 
2013 (January-September): 0; 
Total: 5. 

Crime: Missing U.S. national; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
2013 (January-September): 1; 
Total: 1. 

Crime: Kidnapping; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 0; 
2013 (January-September): 0; 
Total: 0. 

Crime: Assault with serious bodily injury; 
2010: 3; 
2011: 3; 
2012: 0; 
2013 (January-September): 2; 
Total: 8. 

Crime: Firing or tampering with vessel; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 1; 
2013 (January-September): 0; 
Total: 1. 

Crime: Theft greater than $10,000; 
2010: 0; 
2011: 0; 
2012: 2; 
2013 (January-September): 0; 
Total: 2. 

Crime: Sexual assault; 
2010: 28; 
2011: 13; 
2012: 11; 
2013 (January-September): 12; 
Total: 62. 

Crime: Total crimes no longer under investigation; 
2010: 35; 
2011: 16; 
2012: 15; 
2013 (January-September): 15; 
Total: 81. 

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.  

[End of table]  

Efforts Are Under Way to Provide Additional Data in Crime Reporting:  

While the FBI reporting of CVSSA crime data is consistent with the 
law, these data have some limitations. For example, the crime data 
currently reported are limited in that (1) allegations for which 
investigations are not opened are not reported, (2) the data reported 
are not timely, and (3) the data reported are not put into context 
that would provide the public with the magnitude of crime on vessels, 
as discussed below. 

* Allegations for which investigations are not opened are never 
published: As shown in tables 4 and 5, there are more than three times 
the number of alleged crimes reported to the FBI by the cruise lines 
than the CVSSA requires the FBI to post publicly. The data in table 4 
on alleged crimes are not available publicly. According to a cruise 
victim advocate we interviewed, and to some members of Congress, there 
are questions about whether the public is adequately informed about 
the numbers of alleged CVSSA crimes on cruise lines. An official from 
a cruise victim advocacy group we interviewed stated that without 
complete data on the crimes that have occurred on cruise vessels, the 
public may not have the necessary information to make informed 
decisions about cruise travel. However, information on allegations of 
crime also may not accurately reflect crime on cruise vessels, as some 
allegations may be unfounded. 

* Data reported are not timely: There can be a lag between the time an 
alleged crime is reported to the FBI and the time a case is closed. 
According to an FBI official, the crime data that are posted on Coast 
Guard's website represent incidents that may have occurred months or 
years in the past. Depending on the progression of a case, this may be 
due to the length of the investigation, criminal trial, or any 
appeals. As a result, crimes published on the public website often do 
not align with the quarter, and sometimes the year, in which the crime 
occurred. An official from a cruise victim advocacy group we 
interviewed commented that the significant time lapse from when a 
crime allegedly occurs to when it is ultimately reported on the public 
website results in the public getting less valuable information about 
crimes that may have occurred onboard cruise vessels. 

* Data reported without any context for comparison: According to a 
CLIA official, appropriate context is needed when presenting the CVSSA 
crime data figures so that the public can determine how cruise vessel 
crime rates compare with land-based crime rates. The FBI's Uniform 
Crime Reports (UCR) collects crime statistics from over 18,000 city, 
university and college, county, state and tribal, and federal law 
enforcement agencies.[Footnote 33] In an effort to provide more detail 
on the comparative prevalence of cruise crimes, one cruise line and 
CLIA have included data that compare cruise line crime rates for 
homicide, rape, and assault with serious bodily injury with similar 
land-based crime rate statistics from the UCR for homicide, forcible 
rape, and aggravated assault.[Footnote 34] As we discuss below, while 
the UCR comparison has some limitations, CLIA officials commented that 
providing this comparison would provide potential cruise passengers 
with more transparent and comprehensive crime statistics. In addition 
to using rates to compare the prevalence of cruise vessel crime with 
the prevalence of land-based crime, presenting cruise crime data in a 
rate-based format may also be useful in comparing crime statistics 
among cruise lines. 

In July 2013, CLIA officials stated that certain cruise lines would 
begin reporting additional crime data on their websites. According to 
CLIA, in August 2013, six cruise lines--which account for over 90 
percent of the North American cruise passengers--began to voluntarily 
report on their respective websites the number of alleged CVSSA crimes 
that had been reported onboard their cruise vessels.[Footnote 35] 
Officials from one of these cruise lines stated that they were 
volunteering to report this information to be more transparent about 
alleged crimes reported on their vessels. The data presented on their 
respective websites provide more information than they are required to 
report to the FBI--as the cruise line website information includes all 
alleged CVSSA crimes that have been reported regardless of FBI 
jurisdiction, even if the allegation of a crime is later determined to 
be unfounded. 

However, methodological factors may limit the usefulness of these data 
for consumers. For example, there are some limitations associated with 
the UCR data comparisons that one cruise line and CLIA are making, in 
that, only certain CVSSA crimes--violent crimes--can be reasonably 
compared with the UCR crimes because of definitional differences and 
the lack of comparison crimes identified in the UCR. In addition, some 
factors that explain the relatively low rate of alleged cruise vessel 
crimes compared with UCR land-based crime rates include the fact that 
passengers are in a confined cruise vessel environment where all 
persons and items brought onboard are screened, camera surveillance is 
ubiquitous, security personnel are present, and the demographic 
profile of the passengers on cruise vessels does not necessarily 
compare well with the profile of a major U.S. city (average income, 
for example). As a result, the differences presented by these two 
environments make the comparison between a cruise vessel environment 
and a land-based community challenging. A CLIA official commented that 
despite these limitations, the UCR is still viewed as the only 
national data set of reported crimes that can be used to make crime 
comparisons. According to a criminal justice researcher familiar with 
the cruise industry data, the UCR is being used as a comparison 
baseline in part because of the lack of an alternative baseline for 
comparing crime data, and while there may be some limitations, the 
comparative analysis is appropriate.[Footnote 36] While the 
presentation of the data on the cruise lines' and CLIA's websites may 
have limitations, the methodology for comparison generally appears 
sound and this voluntary crime data reporting is more comprehensive 
than what CVSSA currently requires. 

In July 2013, legislation was introduced in the Senate and House that 
would amend the CVSSA, including the FBI's crime-reporting 
requirements, among other provisions.[Footnote 37] These bills propose 
amending the CVSSA so that a statistical compilation of all alleged 
crimes, including non-CVSSA crimes, reported by cruise lines to the 
FBI, irrespective of their investigative status, would be publicly 
posted, quarterly, on a new website maintained by the Department of 
Transportation. Under the proposed legislation, the allegation data 
would identify whether each crime was committed (or allegedly 
committed) by a passenger or crew member and whether it was against a 
minor. The bills also propose that cruise lines report CVSSA-type 
crimes within the FBI's jurisdiction to the FBI and the nearest U.S. 
consulate within 4 hours of the crime occurring, among other items. 
[Footnote 38] In July 2013, these bills were referred to the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the House 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure's Subcommittee on Coast 
Guard and Maritime Transportation, respectively. 

The efforts of both the cruise lines and Congress could improve the 
completeness, timeliness, and context for crime data on cruise 
vessels. However, as previously stated, the cruise lines are 
publishing their information voluntarily, and it is unknown if they 
will continue to do so. Also, there are some consistency issues in how 
the data are reported, with one cruise company reporting its data in 
aggregate--combining the crime data of all of its North American 
subsidiary cruise lines into a single data set for reporting--while 
other cruise companies report crime data by individual company or by 
subsidiary cruise line. In addition, the cruise lines currently do not 
report crime in a rate-based format, which would allow for easier 
comparison among cruise lines. If enacted into the law, the proposed 
amendments to the CVSSA, introduced in July 2013, could also improve 
the timeliness, relevance, and transparency of cruise vessel crime 
data available to the public. As of November 2013, however, the cruise 
lines' voluntary reporting had just begun and the CVSSA bills remained 
in committee, and thus we cannot assess whether, or to what extent, 
these efforts may address the data limitations. 

The Cruise Industry Made Changes after the Costa Concordia Accident 
and Potential International Regulations Remain under Consideration:  

The cruise industry responded to the Costa Concordia accident by 
reviewing safety practices and implementing changes across the 
industry and potential international regulatory actions are under 
consideration at the IMO. The Coast Guard began witnessing passenger 
musters in February 2012, soon after the Costa Concordia accident, and 
has participated in a mass rescue exercise involving a cruise vessel. 
[Footnote 39] 

The Cruise Industry Adopted Safety-Related Policies Identified 
following the Costa Concordia Accident:  

In response to the Costa Concordia accident, CLIA initiated an 
operational safety review and member cruise lines adopted 10 safety-
related policies.[Footnote 40] According to CLIA's Operational Safety 
Review Executive Summary, the review was guided by cruise industry 
members with the advice and input of an independent panel of safety 
experts.[Footnote 41] Suggested policies were discussed and developed 
within CLIA's Operational Safety Review's Task Force, made up of 
senior industry executives from CLIA's member lines with 
responsibility for maritime safety, and approved by the chief 
executive officers (CEO) of member lines. The resulting 10 policies 
relate to various safety enhancements, such as improvements to 
passenger musters, vessel passage planning, and life jacket stowage. 
CLIA announced these policies throughout 2012, as shown in figure 3. 

Figure 3: Timeline of CLIA Actions Relative to the Costa Concordia 
Accident:  

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline]  

January 13, 2012: 
Costa Concordia accident.  

January 27, 2012: 
CLIA announces operational safety review.  

Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) policies and date 
announced since Costa Condordia accident:  

Date announced: February 9, 2012; 
Policy: Passenger muster; 
Brief description: Embarking passengers are to muster prior to 
departure from port. 

Date announced: April 24, 2012; 
Policy: Passage planning; 
Brief description: Makes IMO and industry bridge team management 
standards mandatory for cruise vessels; specifies certain passage plan 
briefing requirements and encourages bridge team members to raise 
operational concerns without fear of retribution.  

Date announced: April 24, 2012; 
Policy: Bridge access; 
Brief description: To prevent distractions and disruptions, access to 
the bridge is to be limited to persons having operationally related 
functions during certain defined periods, such as when the vessel is 
arriving at and departing from port.  

Date announced: April 24, 2012; 
Policy: Excess life jackets; 
Brief description: Additional life jackets are to be stored in public 
spaces readily accessible in an emergency.  

Date announced: June 26, 2012; 
Policy: Recording nationality of passengers; 
Brief description: Along with names and other relevant details, the 
nationality of passengers is to be recorded, kept ashore, and be made 
readily available to search and rescue services.  

Date announced: June 26, 2012; 
Policy: Common elements of musters and emergency instructions; 
Brief description: Twelve common elements are to be communicated to 
passengers in musters and emergency instructions.  

Date announced: September 20, 2012; 
Policy: Lifeboat loading for training purposes; 
Brief description: Every 6 months, one or more lifeboats are operated 
in the water while filled to capacity with crew members wearing life 
jackets to facilitate training of lifeboat and embarkation/boarding 
station crew.  

Date announced: November 15, 2012; 
Policy: Harmonizing of bridge procedures; 
Brief description: Bridge procedures are to be harmonized within 
companies.  

Date announced: November 15, 2012; 
Policy: Securing heavy objects; 
Brief description: Heavy objects are to be secured (restricted from 
movement so as not to cause injury) either permanently, when not in 
use, or during severe weather, as appropriate.  

Date announced: November 15, 2012; 
Policy: Location of life jacket stowage; 
Brief description: Life jackets equal to or greater than the number 
required are to be stowed in proximity to either muster stations or 
lifeboat embarkation points on newly constructed vessels.  

Source: GAO analysis of CLIA policies.  

[End of figure]  

As a condition of CLIA membership, CEOs of all member cruise lines had 
to attest in writing that their companies had adopted the 10 policies 
and had included them in their companies' safety management systems 
(SMS), according to CLIA officials.[Footnote 42] These officials said 
they expected cruise lines to implement most of the policies upon the 
dates of their announcement.[Footnote 43] Officials noted that they 
received written attestations from member cruise line CEOs at 
different times following the announcements; however, all had provided 
them as of July 2013. As a matter of international regulation, once a 
policy has been included in a company's SMS, the policy is subject to 
routine external audits. These audits are conducted by vessels' flag 
states (or classification societies acting on their behalf), which are 
responsible for ensuring that a vessel's SMS is in compliance with the 
ISM Code and that the company operates the vessel in accordance with 
the SMS, among other things.[Footnote 44] Almost all cruise vessels 
visiting U.S. ports are registered (flagged) in other countries, and 
are therefore subject to SMS compliance audits by their flag states. 
When foreign-flagged cruise vessels visit U.S. ports, their SMSs are 
also subject to verification by the Coast Guard in its role as a port 
state control authority.[Footnote 45] Coast Guard officials said their 
port state control boarding officers review the validity of the 
certificates issued by a vessel's flag state and also perform spot 
checks of a vessel's compliance with its SMS, and noted that their 
review of a vessel's SMS is less in-depth than a flag state's review. 
Officials also explained that the Coast Guard may check items in a 
vessel's SMS that go beyond domestic or international regulations--
such as the 10 CLIA policies shown in figure 3--but said that any 
deficiencies found would merely be subject to correction rather than 
vessel detention because such items are self imposed rather than part 
of any regulation. However, Coast Guard officials noted that a series 
of such deficiencies might indicate a lack of implementation of the 
SMS which could result in more serious actions by Coast Guard. 

To facilitate CLIA's operational safety review following the Costa 
Concordia accident, each member cruise line was to conduct a review of 
its own safety practices and procedures and collaborate to share best 
practices. The reviews conducted by the five cruise lines we 
interviewed varied in scope and outcomes. For example, according to a 
document provided by one company, it conducted a safety review that 
examined nine areas of its cruise operations--such as emergency 
management and damage control--and officials said this review resulted 
in over 500 recommendations. Another cruise line provided 
documentation showing that its review, conducted by an outside entity, 
focused on six objectives that in many cases relate to the human 
aspect of safety and emergency response--such as leadership 
involvement, teamwork and training, and safety culture--and the review 
resulted in 26 observations for further consideration. Representatives 
of the five cruise lines we spoke with identified some examples of 
changes they have made, or are making, after reviewing their safety 
procedures following the Costa Concordia accident. They include the 
following:  

* One cruise line, as part of its quality assurance processes, 
reported that it has its most qualified captains visit vessels and 
observe staff to determine whether they are fostering an open 
atmosphere on the bridge. These captains are to ensure that senior 
bridge officers are making their thoughts and intentions known, and 
that junior bridge officers challenge senior officers if they are 
unclear about orders or have concerns. This emphasis on bridge team 
management aligns with the new CLIA "Passage Planning" policy where, 
among other things, bridge team members are encouraged to raise 
operational concerns without fear of retribution. 

* Another cruise line reported that it changed the duty of managing 
the vessel mustering process from the captain of the vessel to the 
hotel director, to alleviate extra burden on the captain during an 
emergency. It also changed its mustering policy, so if a passenger 
refuses to muster prior to departure, then that passenger is not 
allowed to travel. 

* Another cruise line reported that it sent its officers to receive 
testing to assess how they will react during the stress of an 
emergency; the suitability of their leadership style; and human 
factors such as approachability, reliability, and acceptance of 
change. CLIA officials also said testing of crew to assess how they 
will react during the stress of an emergency was a topic of in-depth 
discussion during its operational safety review following the Costa 
Concordia accident. 

Representatives from all five cruise lines we spoke with said they 
have included, or plan to include, the safety-related changes they 
have made as a result of their internal reviews into their SMSs. 

International Safety Measures Are Under Consideration and the Coast 
Guard Has Taken Some Initial Actions:  

IMO Adopted Muster Regulation and Is Considering Other Potential 
Measures:  

IMO's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)--a key IMO committee charged 
with addressing all matters related to the safety of shipping--has 
adopted one regulation, issued 18 interim safety recommendations, and 
is considering additional safety-related measures that it may take 
following the Costa Concordia accident. Specifically, MSC adopted a 
regulation in June 2013 to be effective on January 1, 2015, which 
requires that newly embarked passengers muster prior to or immediately 
upon departure, instead of within 24 hours, as stated in current 
regulations.[Footnote 46] According to a Coast Guard official, in the 
case of the Costa Concordia accident, the passengers that had embarked 
at the previous port had not yet participated in a muster drill before 
the accident occurred.[Footnote 47] 

IMO's MSC has also issued 18 interim safety recommendations for 
passenger vessel companies to implement on a voluntary basis.[Footnote 
48] Many of these recommendations closely align with the 10 CLIA 
policies discussed above. For example, as with CLIA's policy, IMO 
recommends that companies record the nationality of persons onboard 
for purposes of coordination during emergencies.[Footnote 49] However, 
in some cases the IMO recommendations offer additional guidance. For 
example, in addition to recommending that passenger vessels carry 
additional life jackets in public spaces (similar to CLIA's policy), 
IMO recommends that companies consider providing life jackets that are 
similarly designed and can be donned in a similar manner to avoid 
confusion. Following the release of the Costa Concordia safety 
technical accident investigation report in May 2013, the MSC working 
group responsible for developing these 18 interim recommendations 
expressed the view that, in the future, a decision will need to be 
made on their final status. 

Following the Costa Concordia accident, the MSC created a long-term 
action plan to facilitate the consideration of measures resulting from 
the accident. According to a MSC report, MSC uses the action plan to 
document proposals from IMO member governments and international 
organizations. The action plan is not publicly available; however, a 
Coast Guard official present at the June 2013 MSC meeting said the 
plan contains about 20 items and can be viewed as a list of issues--
similar to the list of 18 interim safety recommendations--on which the 
MSC may take further action.[Footnote 50] This action could include a 
variety of outcomes, including the development of international 
regulations. Figure 4 summarizes the main actions of IMO following the 
Costa Concordia accident. 

Figure 4: Timeline of IMO MSC Actions following the Costa Concordia 
Accident:  

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline]  

January 13, 2012: 
Costa Concordia accident.  

90th session of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee, May 16-25, 2012:  

* Established working group to consider potential actions IMO may take 
as a result of the Costa Concordia accident.  

* Issued circular recommending 5 interim measures to enhance passenger 
vessel safety.  

* Adopted a resolution inviting IMO member governments to recommend 
that passenger vessel companies conduct a voluntary review of 
operational safety measures.  

* Developed a long-term action plan on passenger vessel safety that 
incorporates proposals submitted by member states and international 
organizations.  

* 91st session of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee, November 26-30, 
2012:  

* Revised circular recommending interim measures to enhance passenger 
vessel safety (added 4 new interim measures, for a total of 9).  

* Revised long-term action plan on passenger vessel safety, based on 
progress made at the 91st Maritime Safety Committee session.  

May 14, 2013: 
Italy makes Costa Concordia safety technical investigation available 
to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).  

92nd session of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee, June 12-21, 2013:  

* Adopted amendments to international regulation to require musters of 
newly embarked passengers prior to or immediately upon departure.  

* Revised circular recommending interim measures to enhance passenger 
vessel safety (added 9 new interim measures, for a total of 18).  

* Invited Italy to provide more technical information on the Costa 
Concordia safety technical investigation report and invited member 
governments and international organizations to submit detailed 
comments and proposals related to the Italian report at the next 
Maritime Safety Committee session.  

* Updated the revised long-term action plan.  

Source: GAO analysis of IMO actions.  

[End of figure]  

Although IMO is considering additional measures that may become 
regulations, it could be years before they take effect, and the Coast 
Guard can then enforce them through its port state control 
inspections.[Footnote 51] In the interim, the one new regulation, 
adopted in June 2013, requires newly embarked passengers to muster 
prior to or immediately upon departure. 

Coast Guard Witnesses Passenger Musters and Coordinated Mass Rescue 
Exercise:  

Although the new muster requirement does not go into effect until 
January 2015, the Coast Guard initiated the practice of witnessing 
passenger musters as part of its mandatory vessel examination program 
in February 2012, just weeks after the Costa Concordia accident. Coast 
Guard officials acknowledged that they are, in effect, regulating by 
policy; however, they said the industry is supportive of this effort 
and has developed a similar policy to perform passenger musters prior 
to departure. Coast Guard officials said that when witnessing 
passenger musters, the Coast Guard actively ensures they contain the 
elements required by current regulation. For example, they check to 
ensure that crew members are appropriately directing passengers to 
their muster stations and that passengers are instructed in how to 
wear a life jacket, among other things. The Coast Guard reported it 
has witnessed about 280 musters since its policy went into effect, and 
agency officials said they have not had any major concerns with the 
musters they have witnessed.[Footnote 52] 

The Coast Guard reported that it is also continuing to monitor 
developments resulting from the Costa Concordia accident and may make 
additional policy changes in the future. For example, the Coast Guard 
and the NTSB represented the United States as a "substantially 
interested state" in the Italian-led Costa Concordia accident 
investigation, consistent with international law.[Footnote 53] Coast 
Guard and NTSB officials said they contributed to the investigation by 
interviewing U.S. passengers and providing comments on a draft of the 
report. A senior Coast Guard official noted some of the general 
lessons that all parties with an interest in the investigation have 
learned. For example, the official said that muster drills should be 
held prior to departure, vessel route changes should not be made as 
unilateral decisions by the captain, better control of a vessel's 
environment can help alleviate human error, proper training of crew to 
handle emergency situations is essential, and extra life jackets 
should be available at locations convenient to evacuating passengers. 
Coast Guard officials said they are also monitoring actions being 
taken by CLIA and IMO, and may make policy changes in the future as 
they continue to review the final Costa Concordia report and wait for 
the results of the vessel salvage.[Footnote 54] 

Additionally, the Coast Guard has also been active in exercising 
scenarios related to cruise vessel evacuation and rescue. In April 
2013, the Coast Guard coordinated an offshore cruise vessel rescue 
exercise in an effort to prepare for large-scale disasters similar to 
the Costa Concordia accident.[Footnote 55] Although the Coast Guard 
has participated in mass rescue exercises involving cruise vessels 
before, the Coast Guard reported that this exercise was the largest in 
terms of scale and complexity in the history of the international 
maritime community and the Coast Guard.[Footnote 56] The exercise was 
conducted in Freeport, Bahamas, and included Coast Guard collaboration 
with CLIA, three cruise lines, and the National Emergency Management 
Agency of the Bahamas, among others. One cruise line provided a cruise 
vessel that was used for the abandon vessel portion of the exercise, 
where we observed individuals posing as passengers boarding lifeboats 
that were lowered to the water and driven to shore. The second cruise 
line led the landing site and transportation element of the exercise, 
and the third cruise line led the sheltering operations element of the 
exercise where we observed passenger services--such as providing 
access to embassy consular affairs services, counseling, and minor 
medical services--being exercised. 

In addition to witnessing the above actions as part of the mass rescue 
exercise, we observed efforts by the Department of State and Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) as they exercised their respective 
responsibilities for managing passengers under the cruise vessel mass 
rescue scenario. For example, Department of State officials 
established a meeting room at the Freeport Airport, where they 
interacted with U.S. passenger evacuees to process their required 
passport documentation. Additionally, because Freeport is a CBP 
preclearance location--where departing U.S. passengers are processed 
through U.S. customs and immigration prior to departure to the United 
States--we witnessed CBP's approach for processing the surge of 
evacuees at the airport.[Footnote 57] The Coast Guard characterized 
the 2013 exercise as a success, and noted that the exercise had 
effectively and interactively put into effect the full spectrum of 
vessel-to-shore mass rescue operations and identified strengths and 
weaknesses in existing procedures. 

Agency Comments:  

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland 
Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation, 
the National Transportation Safety Board, and the Department of State 
for review and comment. The Department of Homeland Security, 
Department of Justice, and Department of State provided technical 
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its 
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 
30 days after its issue date. At that time we will send copies of this 
report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, 
the Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman of the National 
Transportation Safety Board, the Secretary of State, appropriate 
congressional committees, and other interested parties. This report 
will also be available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix III.  

Signed by:  

Stephen L. Caldwell, Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:  

[End of section]  

Appendix I: Key Stakeholders with Maritime Safety and Security 
Activities:  

This appendix provides information on the international and domestic 
organizations that play a role in the safety and security of cruise 
vessels. The non-U.S. stakeholders are diverse; have wide-ranging 
roles and responsibilities; and include international organizations, 
governments of nations where cruise vessels make stops or are 
registered, and private organizations that help ensure the safe 
operation of vessels. See table 6 for a list of some of the relevant 
international and domestic stakeholders involved in implementation of 
the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 (CVSSA) and cruise 
vessel safety and security issues. 

Table 6: Stakeholders with Maritime Safety and Security Activities:  

International organizations:  

Organization or agency: International Maritime Organization (IMO); 
IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations with 170 member 
states that is responsible for developing an international regulatory 
framework addressing, among other things, maritime safety and 
security; 
Maritime security or safety activities: 
* Responsible for developing and maintaining a comprehensive 
regulatory framework for cruise vessels; 
* Responsible for developing international standards for vessel 
security and safety.  

Organization or agency: Flag state; 
The flag state is the country in which the vessel is registered, and a 
flag state's control or authority over a vessel flying its flag can 
generally extend anywhere in the world that the vessel operates; 
Maritime security or safety activities: 
* Responsible for ensuring that vessels flying its flag meet all 
international safety standards.  

Organization or agency: Port state; 
The port state is the country where the port is located. Port state 
control is the process by which a nation exercises its authority over 
foreign-flagged vessels operating in waters subject to the port 
state's jurisdiction; 
Maritime security or safety activities: 
* Inspects foreign vessels in national ports to verify that the 
condition of the vessel and its equipment complies with the 
requirements of international regulations and that the vessel is 
manned and operated in compliance with these rules.  

Organization or agency: Classification societies; 
Classification societies are independent organizations that verify the 
structural strength and integrity of essential parts of the vessel's 
hull and its appendages, and the reliability and function of the 
propulsion and steering systems, power generation, and those other 
features and auxiliary systems that have been built into the vessel in 
order to maintain essential services onboard. Additionally, they 
verify the functionality of safety equipment and systems during 
inspections and verify operational procedures through audit programs; 
Maritime security or safety activities: 
* Develop and apply their own rules and verify compliance with 
international and national statutes on behalf of flag states; 
* Perform periodic surveys, carried out onboard the vessel, to verify 
that the vessel continues to meet relevant requirements.  

Organization or agency: Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA); 
CLIA is a trade association composed of 26 major cruise lines and 
represents 98 percent of the cruise line businesses operating in the 
United States; 
Maritime security or safety activities: 
* Responsible for acting as the coordinating body and conduit of 
information for its members in meetings with U.S. agencies at the 
national level; 
* Serves as a nongovernmental consultative organization to IMO.  

Federal agencies[A]:  

Organization or agency: Coast Guard; 
Maritime security or safety activities: 
* Ensures vessels in U.S. ports comply with domestic and international 
maritime security and safety standards; 
* Conducts initial, annual, and periodic exams of foreign-flagged 
cruise vessels calling in U.S. ports. This regime allows the Coast 
Guard to determine that the vessel is in substantial compliance with 
all applicable international and domestic standards; 
* Investigates marine casualties that occur on foreign cruise vessels 
in the navigable waters of the United States and its territories or 
possessions. The Coast Guard may also represent the United States as a 
"substantially interested state" in certain marine casualty 
investigations outside of U.S. jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Coast 
Guard and the National Transportation Safety Board have agreed to 
coordinate investigative responses for certain marine casualties; 
* Primary U.S. representative to IMO for all maritime policy 
development.  

Organization or agency: Maritime Administration (MARAD); 
Maritime security or safety activities: 
* MARAD is the agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation 
dealing with waterborne transportation. Among other things, it 
promotes the viability of U.S.-registered (flagged) vessels moving in 
domestic and international commerce. Almost all cruise vessels 
servicing the United States, however, are foreign flagged; 
* Responsible for developing a training curriculum for mariner use of 
force against piracy, and may certify organizations that offer a 
curriculum for training in the prevention, detection, evidence 
preservation, and reporting of criminal activities in the international 
maritime environment.  

Organization or agency: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); 
Maritime security or safety activities: 
* Responsible for investigating alleged serious crimes listed in the 
CVSSA that occur aboard cruise vessels and meet the jurisdictional 
requirements of the CVSSA; 
* Employs maritime liaison agents who are responsible for coordinating 
with other organizations that share responsibility for security at the 
nation's ports, and facilitate the sharing of information on threats 
and security measures.  

Organization or agency: National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); 
Maritime security or safety activities: 
* NTSB's Office of Marine Safety investigates major marine accidents 
on or under the navigable waters, internal waters, or the territorial 
sea of the United States as well as accidents involving U.S.-flagged 
vessels worldwide to determine the probable cause and identify safety 
recommendations that will prevent similar events in the future.  

Organization or agency: Department of State; 
Maritime security or safety activities: 
* Provides assistance to U.S. citizens on cruise vacations in the 
event of a crime, medical issue, death, or loss of passport, among 
other things; 
* Works with foreign embassies and cruise companies in the event of a 
disaster to ensure U.S. citizens are accounted for and provided 
assistance--such as accommodations, clothing, and transportation home.  

State and local governments:  

Organization or agency: Law enforcement agencies; 
Maritime security or safety activities: 
* Conduct investigations into cruise vessel crime occurring within 
their maritime jurisdictions; 
* Coordinate with the FBI regarding alleged crimes and investigations, 
as appropriate.  

Source: GAO analysis of organization and agency documents. 

[A] There are numerous federal agencies that play a role with respect 
to cruise safety and security, including (1) Customs and Border 
Protection, which is responsible for screening vessels, passengers, and 
cargo entering the United States, among other things; (2) Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, which conducts the vessel sanitation 
program to assist the cruise vessel industry in preventing and 
controlling the introduction, transmission, and spread of 
gastrointestinal illnesses on cruise vessels; and (3) United States 
Department of Agricultural Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, 
which regulates garbage arriving from outside the United 
States. However, for the purposes of this report, we focus on the 
agencies listed in table 4 because they have significant 
responsibilities in implementing the CVSSA, addressing crime, and 
ensuring the structural safety of cruise vessels.  

[End of table]  

[End of section]  

Appendix II: Provisions in the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act:  

This appendix provides summary information on the provisions of the 
Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, including time frames for 
implementation. 

Table 7: Summary of Provisions in the Cruise Vessel Security and 
Safety Act (CVSSA):  

Category: Rail heights; 
Provision: The vessel shall be equipped with rails that are located 
not less than 42 inches above the cabin deck; 
Implementation time frame: Eighteen months after enactment of the 
CVSSA.  

Category: Peepholes/other means of identification; 
Provision: Each passenger stateroom and crew cabin shall be equipped 
with entry doors that include peepholes or other means of visual 
identification; 
Implementation time frame: Eighteen months after enactment of the 
CVSSA.  

Category: Security latches and time-sensitive keys; 
Provision: Each passenger stateroom and crew cabin shall be equipped 
with security latches and time-sensitive key technology; 
Implementation time frame: Required for any vessel constructed after 
July 2010.  

Category: Capturing images of passengers/detecting persons fallen 
overboard; 
Provision: The vessel shall integrate technology that can be used for 
capturing images of passengers or detecting passengers who have fallen 
overboard, to the extent that such technology is available; 
Implementation time frame: Eighteen months after enactment of the 
CVSSA. Per Coast Guard Policy Letter 11-09, the Coast Guard is using a 
phased implementation plan to accommodate analysis and research and 
development. This provision is to be addressed by regulation or 
updated policy guidance.[A] 

Category: Acoustical hailing and warning devices; 
Provision: Vessels shall be equipped with a sufficient number of 
operable acoustic hailing or other such warning devices to provide 
communication capability around the entire vessel when operating in 
high-risk waters; 
Implementation time frame: Eighteen months after enactment of the 
CVSSA. Per Coast Guard Policy Letter 11-09, the Coast Guard is using a 
phased implementation plan to accommodate analysis and research and 
development. This provision is to be addressed by regulation or updated 
policy guidance.  

Category: Video recording requirements; 
Provision: (1) The owner of the vessel shall maintain a video 
surveillance system to assist in documenting crimes on the vessel and 
in providing evidence for the prosecution of such crimes, as 
determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security; 
(2) The owner of the vessel shall provide to any law enforcement 
official performing official duties in the course and scope of an 
investigation, upon request, a copy of all records of video 
surveillance that the official believes may provide evidence of a crime 
reported to law enforcement officials; 
Implementation time frame: Per Coast Guard Policy Letter 11-09, the 
Coast Guard is using a phased implementation plan to accommodate 
analysis, research, and development. This provision is to be addressed 
by regulation or updated policy guidance.  

Category: Safety information; 
Provision: The owner of the vessel shall have available for each 
passenger a guide that provides a description of medical and security 
personnel onboard with 24-hour contact instructions and describes the 
jurisdictional authority applicable to, and the law enforcement 
processes available for, CVSSA crimes that arise in the territorial 
waters of the United States, on the high seas, or in any country to be 
visited on the voyage. The owner of the vessel shall also provide 
passengers with U.S. embassy and consulate information for each 
country the vessel will visit during the course of the voyage; 
Implementation time frame: Effective immediately upon enactment of the 
CVSSA.  

Category: Sexual assault; 
Provision: The owner of the vessel shall; 
(1) maintain adequate antiretroviral medications to prevent sexually 
transmitted diseases (STD) after a sexual assault; 
(2) maintain on-vessel equipment and materials to perform a sexual 
assault medical evaluation; 
(3)make available at all times medical staff who have proper 
credentialing; and; 
(4) prepare, provide to the patient, and maintain documentation of the 
exam findings; 
Implementation time frame: Effective immediately upon enactment of the 
CVSSA.  

Category: Sexual assault, patient access to information and 
communications; 
Provision: The owner of the vessel shall provide patients free access 
to contact information for local law enforcement, FBI, Coast Guard, 
nearest U.S. embassy/consulate, and sexual assault hotline, as well as 
private phone line and Internet; 
Implementation time frame: Effective immediately upon enactment of the 
CVSSA.  

Category: Confidentiality of sexual Assault examination and support 
information; 
Provision: The master or other individual in charge of a vessel shall 
treat all information concerning an exam and post-assault counseling 
confidential; 
Implementation time frame: Effective immediately upon enactment of the 
CVSSA.  

Category: Crew access to passenger staterooms; 
Provision: The owner of the vessel shall establish and implement 
procedures and restrictions concerning which crew members have access 
to passenger staterooms and periods during which they have access; 
Implementation time frame: Effective immediately upon enactment of the 
CVSSA.  

Category: Logbook and reporting requirements; 
Provision: The owner of the vessel shall record in a logbook all 
complaints of CVSSA crimes, all complaints of theft of property in 
excess of $1,000, and all complaints of other crimes committed on any 
voyage that embarks or disembarks passengers in the United States. The 
owner of the vessel shall make the logbook available upon request to 
the FBI, any members of the Coast Guard, and any law enforcement 
officer performing official duties in the course and scope of an 
investigation. 
Logbook details shall include vessel operator, name of cruise line, 
flag state, age/gender of victim and assailant, description of alleged 
crime, vessel's position, time/date/method of initial report and law 
enforcement authority to which it was made, time/date of incident, 
total number of passengers and crew members, and case number. 
Additionally, the owner of the vessel shall contact the FBI by phone 
for CVSSA crimes, and shall furnish a written report to the Coast 
Guard Internet portal; 
Implementation time frame: Effective immediately upon enactment of the 
CVSSA.  

Category: Availability and access of incident data via Coast Guard 
website; 
Provision: (1) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall maintain 
statistical compilation on the Internet of CVSSA crimes that are no 
longer under investigation by the FBI. Information shall be updated 
quarterly and aggregated by cruise line, and each crime shall be 
identified as to whether it was committed by a passenger or a crew 
member; 
(2) Each cruise line taking or discharging passengers in the United 
States shall include a link on its website to the website maintained 
by the Coast Guard described above; 
Implementation time frame: Effective immediately upon enactment of the 
CVSSA.  

Category: Maritime Administration (MARAD) certification of crew 
training on crime scene preservation; 
Provision: MARAD may certify organizations in the United States and 
abroad that offer a curriculum for training and certification; 
Implementation time frame: No implementation requirement for MARAD. 
Final policy under development as of September 2013.  

Category: Crew training on crime scene preservation; 
Provision: The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with 
the FBI and MARAD, shall develop minimum training standards and 
curricula to allow for the certification of passenger vessel security 
personnel, crew members, and law enforcement officials on the 
appropriate methods for prevention, detection, evidence preservation, 
and reporting of criminal activities in the international maritime 
environment. Beginning 2 years after standards are established, no 
vessel may enter a U.S. port unless there is at least one crew member 
onboard who is certified as having completed training; 
Implementation time frame: Within 1 year of the enactment of the 
CVSSA.  

Source: GAO summary of Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act. 

[A] The Coast Guard used Policy Letter 11-09 to set dates for 
compliance with CVSSA provisions in cases where the act did not provide 
specific time frames.  

[End of table]  

[End of section]  

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:  

GAO Contact:  

Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments:  

In addition to the contact named above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director; 
Jeff Jensen; Daniel Klabunde; and Michelle R. Su made significant 
contributions to this report. In addition, David Alexander, Michele 
Fejfar, and Stan Kostyla assisted with design and methodology; Tracey 
King provided legal support; Jessica Orr provided assistance in report 
preparation; and Eric Hauswirth developed the report's graphics. 

[End of section]  

Footnotes:  

[1] Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), 2011 CLIA Cruise 
Market Overview (Fort Lauderdale, Florida: 2011). Passenger numbers 
for various years can be found on CLIA's website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.cruising.org/regulatory/industry-welcome]. 

[2] U.S. Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, North 
American Cruise Statistical Snapshot, 2011(Washington, D.C: March 
2012). Data on the number of cruise passengers for 2012 were not 
available because the Department of Transportation's Maritime 
Administration no longer collects this information. 

[3] Pub. L. No. 111-207, 124 Stat. 2243. The CVSSA applies to cruise 
vessels that are authorized to carry at least 250 passengers, have 
onboard sleeping facilities for each passenger, are on a voyage that 
embarks or disembarks passengers in the United States, and are not 
engaged on a coastwise voyage. 46 U.S.C. § 3507(k)(1). Security, as it 
relates to the CVSSA and this report, is concerned with personal 
security from crime rather than threats of terrorism. We have 
previously reported on the issue of cruise vessel security as it 
relates to threats of terrorism. See GAO, Maritime Security: Varied 
Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship Security, but Some Concerns 
Remain, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-400] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 2010).  

[4] 46 U.S.C. §§ 3507(g)(3)(A), 3507(c)(2), 3507(a)(1)(B). 

[5] Id. at § 3507(g)(4). 

[6] Throughout the report we refer to these companies as cruise lines. 
However, they include two cruise corporations that are parent 
companies to several cruise lines or brands. Additionally, we 
conducted an interview with a subsidiary company of one corporation 
related to CVSSA implementation and security, but for purposes of this 
report, we have categorized this interview under the corporation. The 
five cruise lines we interviewed represent over 80 percent of North 
American cruise vessel passengers in 2012. 

[7] The data posted on the Coast Guard website were provided to the 
Coast Guard from the FBI and were a subset ("cases no longer under 
investigation") of the information provided to us for analysis. The 
Coast Guard reported that it had no role in verifying the accuracy of 
the information.  

[8] While the information we obtained from these groups and 
individuals cannot be generalized across the entire cruise industry, 
it provided us with varying perspectives on issues associated with 
cruise vessel crime and CVSSA implementation. 

[9] A classification society verifies the structural strength and 
integrity of essential parts of a vessel's hull and appendages, and 
the reliability and function of the propulsion and steering systems, 
power generation, and those other features and auxiliary systems that 
have been built into the vessel in order to maintain essential 
services onboard. Classification societies do this through the 
development and application of their own rules and by verifying 
compliance with international and national statutory regulations. We 
interviewed two classification societies that were headquartered in 
the Miami area--the location of one of our visits. While the 
information we obtained from the classification societies cannot be 
generalized across the entire cruise industry, it did provide us with 
a perspective on issues associated with cruise vessel safety. 

[10] Almost all cruise vessels operating in and out of U.S. ports are 
foreign flagged. 

[11] According to Coast Guard officials, analysis shows that foreign 
cruise vessels have roughly 70 percent fewer deficiencies than other 
types of foreign-flagged vessels, and are less likely to be detained. 
Additionally, given the quick turnaround that can occur with cruise 
vessels at ports and the amount of time needed to conduct an 
inspection, Coast Guard inspections are scheduled in advance.  

[12] 46 C.F.R. pt. 4. 

[13] This analysis excludes 786 marine casualties that were classified 
as "personnel casualties," where one or more individuals were injured 
or died as the result of existing medical conditions or contact with 
the vessel as a result of a fall, among other things. Although in some 
instances personnel casualty data may be related to CVSSA crimes--such 
as when injury or death is the result of a CVSSA crime--we did not 
include a comparison of marine casualty data to CVSSA crime data for 
two reasons. First, there is overlap but not a direct correlation 
between some of the data associated with personnel casualties and the 
required crime-reporting categories in the CVSSA. Second, there are 
differences in reporting requirements for marine casualties versus 
CVSSA crime, based on the ownership and registry of the vessel, the 
nationality of the person(s) involved, and the location of the vessel 
at the time of the incident.  

[14] 46 U.S.C. § 3507(k)(1). A coastwise voyage is defined as a voyage 
in which a vessel in the usual course of her employment proceeds from 
one port or place in the United States to another port or place in the 
United States or from a port or place in a possession to another port 
or place in the same possession, and passes outside the line dividing 
inland waters from the high seas (a voyage exclusively on the Great 
Lakes excepted), as well as a voyage in which a vessel proceeds from a 
port or place in the United States or its possessions and passes 
outside the line dividing inland waters from the high seas and 
navigates on the high seas, and then returns to the same port or place. 

[15] A vessel's bridge is the part of the vessel from which it is 
steered and navigated. Bridge Resource Management (BRM) is the 
effective management and utilization of all resources, human and 
technical, available to the bridge team (those employed on the bridge) 
to ensure the safe completion of the vessel's voyage. BRM focuses on 
bridge officers' skills such as teamwork, team building, 
communication, leadership, decision making, and resource management 
and incorporates these into the larger picture of organizational and 
regulatory management.  

[16] CVSSA required Coast Guard to issue guidelines, training 
curricula, and inspection and certification procedures necessary to 
carry out the requirements of the law. 46 U.S.C. § 3507(i). Pursuant 
to the guidance, two of the provisions (rail heights and peepholes or 
other means of identification on stateroom doors) were not to be 
enforced by Coast Guard inspectors during their exams until January 
2012; the remaining provisions were to be enforced from the date of 
enactment of the CVSSA, in July 2010 (although implementation 
guidelines from the Coast Guard did not come out until June 2011). The 
requirement for security latches/time-sensitive keys on stateroom 
doors applies only to those vessels where the keel was laid on or 
after July 27, 2010.  

[17] The Coast Guard posted the policy guidance on its external 
website, so it was publicly available to cruise lines and others as 
well.  

[18] Policy guidance was not issued in this area; however, Coast Guard 
officials told us they maintain a website with the FBI's cruise vessel 
crime data and that they did an initial check of all cruise lines' 
webpages to ensure they had a link to this Coast Guard crime data 
website. 

[19] Three federal agencies were involved in creating the required 
course on crime scene preservation: the Coast Guard, the FBI, and 
MARAD. The Coast Guard coordinated the development of the course, the 
FBI provided much of the content for the course, and MARAD contributed 
its expertise in writing and structuring training courses, according 
to Coast Guard officials.  

[20] High-risk waters are defined by the Coast Guard as waters with a 
high risk of terrorism, piracy, or armed robbery against vessels. 

[21] S.1340, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2800, 113th Cong. (2013). 

[22] 78 Fed. Reg. 30,956 (May 23, 2013). 

[23] 46 U.S.C. § 3507(c)(1). FBI officials told us that after the 
CVSSA was enacted, the cruise lines sent them their safety guides for 
the FBI to review, and the FBI provided comments back to the cruise 
lines, as required.  

[24] Id. at § 3507(g)(4). While both the Coast Guard and the FBI have 
implementation responsibilities for the crime-reporting requirements 
in the CVSSA, the vast majority of the work in implementing the crime 
reporting provision of the CVSSA falls to the FBI. The Coast Guard's 
role is ensuring that the crime statistics that the FBI provides to it 
are posted on the Coast Guard's website in a timely manner, and it has 
done so. The website where the crime statistics are posted is 
[hyperlink, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg2/cgis/CruiseLine.asp].  

[25] 46 U.S.C. § 3507(g)(3)(A). The FBI has jurisdiction to 
investigate an alleged crime if (1) the vessel, regardless of 
registry, is owned, in whole or in part, by a United States person, 
regardless of the nationality of the victim or perpetrator, and the 
incident occurs when the vessel is within the admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction of the United States and outside the jurisdiction of any 
state; (2) the incident concerns an offense by or against a United 
States national committed outside the jurisdiction of any nation; (3) 
the incident occurs in the Territorial Sea of the United States, 
regardless of the nationality of the vessel, the victim, or the 
perpetrator; or (4) the incident concerns a victim or perpetrator who 
is a United States national on a vessel during a voyage that departed 
from or will arrive at a U.S. port. 46 U.S.C. § 3507(g)(3)(B). 

[26] The sexual assault offenses are aggravated sexual abuse, sexual 
abuse, sexual abuse of a minor, and abusive sexual contact. Prior to 
the CVSSA, in March 2007, the FBI, the Coast Guard, and CLIA reached 
an agreement on voluntary, standardized protocols for CLIA member 
lines to report allegations of serious violations of U.S. law 
committed aboard cruise vessels. The agreement listed eight categories 
of incidents that are to be reported by CLIA members to the nearest 
FBI field office or legal attaché office. These incidents are 
identical to those listed in the CVSSA. 

[27] 46 U.S.C. § 3507(g)(4). 

[28] 46 U.S.C. § 3507(g)(3)(A). The CVSSA also gives the cruise lines 
discretion to report any serious incident that does not meet the 
reporting requirements of the law if they wish. Officials from one 
cruise line we spoke with said it generally reports all crimes that 
occur onboard, including minor offenses, to the FBI. 

[29] If the next port is a U.S. port, the FBI is to meet the vessel 
upon arrival. If the next port is a foreign port, the FBI works with 
the local foreign authorities to decide who has jurisdiction over the 
case. If it is determined that a foreign country has jurisdiction, it 
would be less likely the FBI would also open its own investigation, 
according to the FBI. 

[30] The CVSSA does require cruise lines to provide victims of alleged 
sexual assault with free and immediate access to contact information 
for law enforcement, hotline services, and others and a private 
telephone line and Internet connection by which the individual may 
confidentially access law enforcement, an attorney, and information 
and support services. 46 U.S.C. § 3507(d)(5). 

[31] If a crime occurs outside the United States' jurisdiction, State 
Department officials said that if they are notified of a cruise vessel 
crime involving a U.S. citizen, the local embassy or consulate will 
provide assistance to that U.S. citizen, if needed, and coordinate 
with the FBI. 

[32] However, in the information provided to CLIA, the FBI cautions 
that cruise line personnel should not be "collecting evidence" nor 
does their effort to preserve a crime scene create an agency 
relationship such that cruise vessel or other maritime vessel 
personnel are deemed to be acting as agents of the government, or vice 
versa.  

[33] The UCR was conceived in 1929 by the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police to meet the need for reliable uniform crime 
statistics for the nation. In 1930, the FBI was tasked with 
collecting, publishing, and archiving those statistics. The FBI 
produces three annual publications: Crime in the United States, Law 
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, and Hate Crime Statistics. 
The crime data are submitted either through a state UCR program or 
directly to the FBI's UCR Program. 

[34] Although the crime data on CLIA's website are presented through 
the end of 2012, the UCR's definition of forcible rape was updated in 
January 2013 to be more broad and include rape of a male or a female. 
CLIA indicated that it would require its members to update their 
definitions as the UCR definitions change. 

[35] CLIA reports a subset of these data on its website as well. One 
of the six cruise lines is a corporation that reported the crime data 
in aggregate for its four North American-based cruise line 
subsidiaries. 

[36] There is precedent for the collection of alleged crime 
information across institutions for comparison purposes. For example, 
the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime 
Statistics Act requires colleges and universities participating in 
federal financial aid programs to maintain and disclose statistics on 
certain alleged crimes. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f). According to the 
Department of Education, the goal of this regulation is to provide 
students, and their families, as higher education consumers, with 
accurate, complete, and timely information about safety so they can 
make informed decisions. 

[37] S.1340, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2800,113th Cong. (2013). 

[38] Currently, CVSSA requires an alleged crime to be reported to the 
FBI "as soon as possible," and it does not require the nearest U.S. 
consulate to be notified. 46 U.S.C. 3507(g)(3)(A). 

[39] Musters are mandatory exercises conducted on cruise vessels to 
ensure passengers are informed of safety protocols while onboard the 
vessel, including emergency evacuation procedures. 

[40] CLIA announced its Operational Safety Review on January 27, 2012, 
about 2 weeks after the Costa Concordia accident. CLIA officials said 
they completed their review in December 2012.  

[41] CLIA, Operational Safety Review Executive Summary, accessed June 
14, 2013, [hyperlink, http://www.cruising.org/regulatory/cruise-
industry-policies/cruise-industry-operational-safety-review]. The 
panel of experts included a former chairman of the U.S. NTSB; a former 
rear admiral in the Royal Navy and head of the United Kingdom's Marine 
Accident Investigation Branch; a former director, Office of Marine 
Safety, U.S. NTSB; and a former head and executive director of the 
European Maritime Safety Agency.  

[42] An SMS is a structured and documented system enabling company 
personnel to implement effectively the company safety and 
environmental protection policy. 

[43] One policy--the location of life jacket stowage policy--went into 
effect on July 1, 2013, for newly constructed cruise vessels. CLIA 
officials said that they did not expect cruise lines to implement the 
harmonization of bridge procedures policy and the securing heavy 
objects policy upon the dates of their announcement (November 15, 
2012).  

[44] As part of enforcing the ISM Code, flag states (or organizations 
recognized by the flag administrations, such as classification 
societies) audit company and vessel compliance with its SMS, and issue 
documents of compliance and safety management certificates that are 
valid for 5 years, subject to periodic verification. The ISM Code also 
requires that companies perform annual internal safety audits to 
ensure compliance with their SMSs. 

[45] As previously discussed, through its Port State Control Program, 
the Coast Guard routinely boards foreign-flagged vessels operating in 
U.S. waters to verify that they are in compliance with applicable 
international conventions and U.S. laws and regulations. When the 
Coast Guard identifies vessels that are not in substantial compliance 
with applicable laws or regulations, it is responsible for imposing 
controls to ensure the vessels are brought into compliance. 

[46] In June 2013, the IMO Marine Safety Committee adopted amendments 
to the SOLAS convention, regulations III/19.2.2 and III/19.2.3.  

[47] According to the Italian government report on the safety 
technical investigation for the Costa Concordia accident, 1,270 of the 
3,206 passengers had participated in a muster drill, while the 
remaining passengers received safety instructions by video.  

[48] In June 2012, IMO's MSC issued a circular with 5 interim 
recommendations, and has subsequently updated the circular twice, for 
a total of 18 interim recommendations. These 18 recommendations 
address life jackets onboard passenger vessels, emergency instructions 
for passengers, common elements of musters and emergency instructions, 
passenger muster policy, access of personnel to the navigating bridge 
and avoiding distractions, harmonization of bridge navigational 
procedures, voyage planning, recording the nationality of persons on 
board, lifeboat loading for training purposes, securing heavy objects, 
and inclinometer (rolling motion) data for the voyage data recorder. 
More complete information can be accessed by creating a public account 
on [hyperlink, http://webaccounts.imo.org], and searching for the 
circular that lists the 18 interim recommendations 
(MSC.1/Circ.1446/Rev.2). 

[49] Department of State officials said they had a difficult time 
determining who the U.S. citizens were that were onboard the Costa 
Concordia at the time of the accident. Officials said the vessel's 
manifest contained only last names and first initials of passengers 
and did not have citizenship information, making it difficult for them 
to determine who the U.S citizens were so they could render 
assistance.  

[50] This same Coast Guard official noted that the long-term action 
plan was not intended to include only issues that can be linked 
directly to the Costa Concordia accident. He said the plan also 
includes issues that were already under consideration by MSC when the 
accident occurred. At the most recent MSC meeting (June 2013), MSC 
instructed the IMO Secretariat to revise the long-term action plan 
with a view to clearly identify whether proposed actions are related 
to existing issues or are new issues arising from the loss of the 
Costa Concordia. The Coast Guard informed us that this revision has 
been completed, but noted that the action plan has not been finalized 
and therefore continues to not be publicly available.  

[51] The Coast Guard generally focuses its enforcement activities on 
U.S. and international regulations. However, as of September 2013, we 
identified one international regulation and no U.S. regulations that 
have been adopted as a result of the Costa Concordia accident. 

[52] Coast Guard officials said they do not separately track the 
number of musters they have witnessed. However, the Coast Guard 
conducted 301 cruise vessel examinations from the beginning of the 
muster policy (February 2, 2012) through July 1, 2013. Officials 
estimated that they witnessed musters at about 280 of these 
examinations, and did not witness musters at the roughly 20 
examinations where passengers had embarked on the vessel elsewhere.  

[53] See IMO Resolution MSC.255(84). The investigating state should 
allow substantially interested states to interview witnesses, view and 
examine evidence and make copies of documents, make submissions in 
respect of the evidence, comment on and have their views properly 
reflected in the final report, and be provided with the draft and 
final reports.  

[54] As a result of the accident, the Costa Concordia turned on its 
side and rested on the ocean floor, with a significant portion of the 
vessel still above water. Vessel salvage refers to the process of 
removing the vessel wreck. The owner of the vessel plans to have the 
vessel removed in one piece by refloating it and having it towed away 
from the coast of the Island of Giglio, Italy, where the accident 
occurred.  

[55] This operation was the first in a 5-year mass rescue exercise 
series known as Black Swan. Future mass rescue operations are 
scheduled in Hawaii in 2015, and Norfolk, Virginia, in 2017. 

[56] The Coast Guard noted that all offshore mass rescue events 
require significant search and rescue efforts including international 
communications; coordination of rescue resources; local emergency 
management stakeholders; international health care systems to support 
medical surge capacities to care for large numbers of injured 
personnel; coordinated landing site management; sustained care for the 
rescued with clothing, food, and counseling services; and 
transportation travel documentation and logistics planning to return 
the rescued to their homes. 

[57] Preclearance operations are part of CBP's Office of Field 
Operations, which has the responsibility of managing 329 ports of 
entry nationwide. These operations are established via a formal 
agreement between the United States and host country, which allows CBP 
to staff officers at host airports and facilitate the customs and 
immigration process for passengers prior to arrival in the United 
States. As of September 2013, preclearance is in effect in Aruba, 
Bermuda, Bahamas (two locations), Ireland (two locations) and Canada 
(nine locations).  

[End of section]  

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