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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

October 2013: 

Joint Military Education: 

Actions Needed to Implement DOD Recommendations for Enhancing 
Leadership Development: 

GAO-14-29: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-14-29, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

To facilitate unified operations across the services, DOD has provided 
JPME programs at departmental and service academic institutions for 
almost 30 years. In July 2012, the Director for Joint Force 
Development, who reports to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
tasked the MECC to review DOD’s joint education objectives and 
institutions to help ensure that outcomes match requirements for the 
strategic environment projected for Joint Force 2020. Subsequently, 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated 
GAO to report to Congress on the analytical approach used by the MECC 
not later than 90 days after the Director submitted the MECC’s report 
to GAO, which the Director did on July 1, 2013. In this report, GAO 
(1) identifies the purpose of DOD’s study of the JPME program, and (2) 
assesses DOD’s methodology used to conduct the Joint Professional 
Military Education study and its planning for follow-on actions. GAO 
analyzed the MECC’s final report and relevant planning documents, 
interviewed DOD officials who conducted portions of the study, and 
reviewed leading practices for evaluating programs by GAO and other 
entities. 

What GAO Found: 

The purpose of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) study of its Joint 
Professional Military Education (JPME) program was to identify (1) 
desired leader attributes as part of the JPME career-long learning 
experience needed to support DOD’s strategic vision and (2) any gaps 
in the current educational program to facilitate the development of 
the leaders needed to achieve that vision. Specifically, a Military 
Education Coordination Council (MECC)—following direction from the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director for Joint Force 
Development—proposed six desired leader attributes, including, for 
example, the ability to anticipate and respond to surprise and 
uncertainty, and concluded that the existing institutional structure 
for providing JPME should be retained. The MECC’s gap analysis, 
however, indicated that in order to support the development of these 
attributes, a greater emphasis on career-long self-directed learning 
is also needed, among other things. In line with its findings, the 
MECC made 21 recommendations to improve the JPME program that address 
increased accessibility of educational programs, changes to teaching 
methodologies and assessment mechanisms, and enhanced use of 
technology. 

DOD’s methodology generally included leading practices for assessing 
training programs, but DOD has not yet fully planned for follow-on 
actions and engaged all stakeholders, nor has it assessed the costs of 
the MECC’s recommendations to provide decision makers with more timely 
and complete information and help ensure that the study’s results are 
implemented. Specifically, the MECC reviewed other related studies, 
conducted a gap analysis to identify gaps based on existing and future 
needs, used the best available data and acknowledged limitations—all 
practices identified by GAO and other government agencies and research 
institutions as leading practices for successful evaluations of 
training and other programs. By contrast, DOD documents state that the 
results of the study were intended to inform and shape the fall 2013 
academic year, but the MECC did not complete its study until June 24, 
2013 and provided its report to GAO on July 1, 2013. Further, DOD has 
not yet identified milestones and timeframes for implementing all of 
its recommendations. Subsequently, the department developed an update 
to inform actions for moving forward on its recommendations. DOD 
identified target dates for completion not later than September 2014 
for 9 recommendations, but did not include interim milestones, and has 
not yet developed target dates for 12 recommendations. In addition, 
the MECC did not formalize plans to achieve the buy-in of all 
stakeholders for recommendation implementation. Without this 
information, it may be difficult for DOD to ensure that stakeholders 
agree on and are accountable for implementing the recommendations in a 
timely manner. Finally, the MECC did not analyze the costs or 
efficiencies associated with implementing its recommendations, but it 
identified 5 recommendations that could incur additional costs because 
they require further study. Leading practices such as accounting for 
program resources enable managers to better manage existing resources 
and plan for future programmatic needs. Without cost data on the study’
s recommendations or plans to assess cost in the near term as part of 
continued efforts to implement the results of the JPME study, decision 
makers could be hindered in determining the most efficient allocation 
of departmental resources for JPME. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD establish well-defined timeframes for 
conducting any follow-on actions and include stakeholders necessary 
for implementation, and assess the costs of implementing 
recommendations made in the MECC’s recent study of joint professional 
military education. DOD concurred with both of GAO’s recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-29]. For more 
information, contact Brenda S. Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or 
farrellb@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DOD's Study Was Intended to Identify Leader Attributes, Career-Long 
Education Goals, and Educational Gaps: 

Study's Methodology Generally Included Leading Practices, but DOD Has 
Not Yet Fully Planned for Follow-on Actions and Engaged All 
Stakeholders, or Considered Potential Implementation Costs: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Officer Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 
Institutions: 

Appendix III: Recommendations Made by the Military Education 
Coordination Council (MECC) in Its Study of Joint Professional 
Military Education: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Gaps in Officer Curricula Associated with the Desired Leader 
Attributes: 

Table 2: Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) 
Recommendations by Category: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: The Five Levels of Officer Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME): 

Figure 2: Evolution of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 
Study Objectives: 

Figure 3: Map of Officer JPME Institutions: 

Abbreviations: 

AJPME: Advanced Joint Professional Military Education: 

DLA: Desired Leader Attribute: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

EMERC: Enlisted Military Education Review Council: 

EPMEP: Enlisted Professional Military Education Policy: 

JCOA: Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division: 

JPME: Joint Professional Military Education: 

MECC: Military Education Coordination Council: 

NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act: 

OPMEP: Officer Professional Military Education Policy: 

PAJE: Process for the Accreditation of Joint Education: 

PME: Professional Military Education: 

[End of section] 

GAO:
United States Government Accountability Office: 
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

October 23, 2013: 

Congressional Committees: 

Professional military education is key to the development of the 
nation's armed forces, and it is the quality of that military 
education that distinguishes U.S. forces around the world.[Footnote 1] 
As operations over the last decade have demonstrated, military 
officers must think critically, communicate well, conduct themselves 
with integrity, and lead others in difficult and often dangerous 
situations that require forces from across the military departments. 
The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act in 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) marked one of the most 
significant attempts over the past few decades to coordinate service 
efforts.[Footnote 2] Among other things, the act sought to establish 
clearer lines of command and control and improve the ability of the 
services to work with each other in truly joint, rather than simply 
multi-service, operations. In the wake of Goldwater-Nichols, a panel 
chaired by Representative Isaac N. "Ike" Skelton IV in 1989 undertook 
a comprehensive review of joint professional military education (JPME) 
and made a number of specific recommendations on how the joint reforms 
of Goldwater-Nichols should be institutionalized among the services 
through officer in-residence education. Since the Skelton Report, 
Congress has passed additional legislation affecting the professional 
military education system, including a requirement to create a program 
of JPME, through which military officers would be educated on joint 
matters throughout their careers.[Footnote 3] Over time, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and others have conducted studies that, to 
some extent, reviewed the cumulative effects of these legislative 
changes. 

The commitment within DOD to JPME demonstrates a major investment, 
both of time and money. Some of the education programs are an academic 
year in length, which represents a significant part of an officer's 
career. To support the academic programs, in fiscal year 2012, DOD 
spent approximately $47.8 million on its JPME schools within National 
Defense University alone.[Footnote 4] 

In July 2012, DOD's Director for Joint Force Development, expanding on 
a white paper signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
directed DOD's Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) to 
prepare a report on the value of the JPME program, the educational 
outcomes sought, and any changes necessary to strengthen the program's 
value to DOD. According to the director's memo, this review was 
necessitated by changes in the security environment, the fiscal 
climate, and the experiences of DOD's joint force since the passage of 
Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. Subsequently, the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 required us to report to 
Congress on the analytical approach used by the MECC for that report 
not later than 90 days after receiving DOD's report from the Director 
for Joint Force Development.[Footnote 5] Our report (1) identifies the 
purpose of DOD's study of the Joint Professional Military Education 
program, and (2) assesses DOD's methodology used to conduct the Joint 
Professional Military Education study and its planning for follow-on 
actions. To identify the purpose of DOD's study of the JPME program, 
we reviewed the documents directing the study, the minutes of the MECC 
meetings, interim briefing report, and the MECC's final report, dated 
June 24, 2013.[Footnote 6] We also interviewed knowledgeable DOD 
officials from the Joint Professional Military Education Division 
within DOD's Joint Staff's Directorate for Joint Force Development 
(J7). The Joint Professional Military Education Division, in 
conjunction with the MECC, was responsible for leading DOD's effort. 
To assess the methodology DOD used to conduct the JPME study and its 
planning for follow-on actions, we analyzed relevant reports and 
guidance by GAO, the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of 
Personnel Management, and private sector organizations such as the 
RAND Corporation, among others.[Footnote 7] We identified key 
practices contained in these documents for evaluating educational 
programs and information that were applicable for the purposes of this 
engagement. We then compared DOD's methodology with these select 
leading practices for educational program evaluation. We also reviewed 
documents identified by DOD officials as project plans for the study, 
as well as documentation of the department's intended follow-on 
actions. Again, we interviewed DOD officials from the Joint 
Professional Military Education Division within the Directorate for 
Joint Force Development. We also met with officials across DOD, 
representing institutions such as the National Defense University, the 
U.S. Army War College, and the Joint Forces Staff College, among 
others, who were identified as Team Leads for the study. Further 
details about our scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from March through October 2013 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

Joint education is provided to some extent at all levels of officer 
and enlisted professional military education. The professional 
development and career progression for both officers and enlisted 
personnel through DOD's professional military education is a service 
responsibility; embedded within the professional military education 
systems is a program of JPME that is overseen by the Joint Staff. 

For officers, this system is designed to fulfill the educational 
requirements for joint officer management as mandated by law.[Footnote 
8] The joint education program is intended to prepare aspiring 
military leaders for both conducting operations in a coherently joint 
force and thinking their way through uncertainty. Officer JPME program 
courses are taught at multiple sites across the country, including the 
service Staff and War Colleges and the National Defense University. 
[Footnote 9] See appendix II for a list and map of DOD's academic 
institutions where officer JPME courses are taught. 

According to the Officer Professional Military Education Policy 
(OPMEP),[Footnote 10] the JPME program for officers comprises 
curriculum components in the five levels of the officer professional 
military education system and includes three-statutorily mandated 
levels of JPME designed to progressively develop the knowledge, 
analytical skills, perspectives, and values that are essential for 
U.S. officers to function effectively in joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental, and multinational operations. For each of those 
levels, the emphasis changes to provide instruction in target areas to 
enhance leader attributes of attending service members at their 
specific rank and tenure. 

Within officer PME, the first level of JPME--precommissioning--
provides officer candidate and officer training school, Reserve 
Officer Training Corps, and Military Service Academy students with a 
basic foundation in defense structure, roles and missions of other 
military services, the combatant command structure, and the nature of 
American military power and joint warfare. The second level of JPME--
primary--provides junior officers at the O-1 through O-3 ranks 
[Footnote 11] with primary education on the tactical level of war. 
This level of JPME helps to foster an understanding of the Joint Task 
Force combatant command structure and how national and joint systems 
support tactical-level operations, among other subjects. 

The third level begins the first statutorily-mandated level of JPME 
requirements--JPME Phase I.[Footnote 12] This phase generally focuses 
on tactical and operational levels of war, and is typically attended 
by intermediate-level officers at the O-4 rank, as well as some 
officers at the O-5 and O-6 ranks.[Footnote 13] JPME Phase I is 
incorporated into the curricula of the intermediate-and senior-level 
service colleges, as well as other appropriate educational programs 
that meet JPME criteria and are accredited by the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. This level of education provides officers the 
opportunity to gain better understanding from a service component 
perspective of joint force employment at the operational and tactical 
levels of war. The subject matter to be covered by JPME Phase I 
instruction must, by law, include at the least (1) national military 
strategy; (2) joint planning at all levels of war; (3) joint doctrine; 
(4) joint command and control; and (5) joint force and joint 
requirements development.[Footnote 14] 

The fourth level of JPME provides Phase II of the statutorily-directed 
JPME requirements.[Footnote 15] JPME Phase II is a follow-on for 
selected graduates of service schools and other appropriate education 
programs that complements and enhances the JPME Phase I instruction. 
Phase II is taught at National Defense University's National War 
College and Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and 
Resource Management, the Joint Forces Staff College's Joint and 
Combined Warfighting School and Joint Advanced Warfighting School to 
both intermediate-and senior-level (O-5 and O-6) students, and at 
senior-level service colleges to senior-level students, and consists 
of courses on the operational and strategic levels of war. Phase II 
helps prepare officers for high-level policy and command and staff 
responsibilities, with a focus on areas such as national security 
strategy and joint strategic leadership. In addition to the subjects 
specified in JPME Phase I, the curriculum for JPME Phase II must, by 
law, include: (1) national security strategy; (2) theater strategy and 
campaigning; (3) joint planning processes and systems; and (4) joint, 
interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and the 
integration of those capabilities.[Footnote 16] This phase completes 
the educational requirement for joint officer management. 

The fifth and final level of instruction is the CAPSTONE course of 
JPME for general/flag officers[Footnote 17] and focuses on the 
operational and strategic levels of war for high-level joint, 
interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational 
responsibilities.[Footnote 18] Specifically, the CAPSTONE course 
focuses on (1) the fundamentals of joint doctrine; (2) integrating 
elements of national power across military operations to accomplish 
security and military strategies; and (3) how joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental, and multinational operations support strategic 
goals and objectives. This level of JPME is tiered to ensure the 
progressive and continuous development of executive level officers. 
Figure 1 summarizes the five levels of JPME. 

Figure 1: The Five Levels of Officer Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME): 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated list] 

Precommissioning: 
Who attends: 
* Officer Candidate,
* Officer Training School,
* Reserve Officer Training Corps, and, 
* Military Service Academy students; 
Course focus: 
* Provides a basic foundation in U.S. defense structure, roles and 
missions of other military services, the combatant command structure, 
and the nature of American military power and joint warfare. 

Primary: 
Who attends:
* Junior Officers at the O-1 through O-3 ranks; 
Course focus:
* Focus is on the tactical level of war; 
* Helps foster understanding of the Joint Task Force combatant command 
structure and how national and joint systems support tactical-level 
operations, among other subjects. 

JPME Phase I[A]: 
Who attends: 
* Intermediate Level Officers at the O-4 rank; 
* Senior Level Officers at the O-5 and O-6 ranks; 
Course focus:
* Focus is on the tactical and operational levels of war; 
* Required course elements include:
- national military strategy; 
- joint planning at all levels of war; 
- joint doctrine; 
- joint command and control; 
- joint force and joint requirements development. 

JPME Phase II[A]: 
Who attends:
* Senior Level Officers at the O-5 and O-6 ranks; 
Course focus:
* Focus is on the operational and strategic levels of war; 
* Required course elements include: 
- national security strategy; 
- theater strategy and campaigning; 
- joint planning processes and systems; 
- joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational 
capabilities and the integration of those capabilities (as well as 
subjects specified in Phase I). 

CAPSTONE[A]: 
Who attends:
* General/flag officers; 
Course focus:
* Focus is on the operational and strategic levels of war; 
* Course elements include high-level joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental, and multinational responsibilities; 
* Other elements include:
- the fundamentals of joint doctrine; 
- integrating elements of national power across military operations to 
accomplish security and military strategies; 
- how joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational 
operations support strategic goals and objectives. 

[A] Denotes a statutorily-directed JPME course level. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documents and policy. 

[End of figure] 

In addition to meeting legislative requirements to provide education 
on JPME matters, DOD's colleges and universities that provide academic 
year-long programs for officers are Master's Degree-granting 
institutions. According to the Middle States Commission for Higher 
Education, the body that accredits National Defense University, among 
others, accreditation is the means of self-regulation and peer review 
adopted by the educational community. The accrediting process is 
intended to strengthen and sustain the quality and integrity of higher 
education, making it worthy of public confidence and minimizing the 
scope of external control. Accreditation by the Commission is based on 
the results of institutional reviews by peers and colleagues and 
attests to the judgment that the institution has met the following 
criteria: 

* that it has a mission appropriate to higher education; 

* that it is guided by well-defined and appropriate goals, including 
goals for student learning; 

* that it has established conditions and procedures under which its 
mission and goals can be realized; 

* that it assesses both institutional effectiveness and student 
learning outcomes, and uses the results for improvement; 

* that it is substantially accomplishing its mission and goals; 

* that it is organized, staffed, and supported so that it can be 
expected to continue to accomplish its mission and goals; and: 

* that it meets the Requirements of Affiliation and accreditation 
standards of the Middle States Commission on Higher Education. 

DOD also conducts periodic assessments of the three statutorily-
mandated levels of officer JPME to ensure that the curricula meet the 
prescribed joint educational requirements at each level, and uses the 
results of these assessments to update educational policy as 
appropriate. 

For enlisted personnel, the Enlisted Professional Military Education 
Policy[Footnote 19] circulates the policies, procedures, objectives, 
and responsibilities for enlisted professional military education and 
enlisted JPME. According to that policy, enlisted professional 
development and progression through the enlisted military education 
continuum is a service responsibility. The initial focus of enlisted 
professional military education is military occupational specialty 
training and education required to produce enlisted personnel capable 
of performing assigned tasks. Beyond occupational specialty training, 
the Enlisted Professional Military Education Policy states that all 
enlisted personnel also should be exposed to enlisted JPME as they 
progress through their respective services' enlisted professional 
military education system. In addition, the policy states that, for 
some enlisted personnel, more comprehensive joint education is 
required to prepare those servicemembers for specific joint 
assignments. 

Enlisted JPME includes programs that span an enlisted member's career 
and apply to all enlisted personnel. Basic Enlisted JPME addresses 
educational guidelines that should be completed by pay grade E-6, 
[Footnote 20] while Career Enlisted JPME addresses educational 
guidelines for senior enlisted personnel in grades E-6 or E-7 and 
above. Beyond these programs, Senior Enlisted JPME is a stand-alone 
Web-based course designed specifically for senior enlisted personnel 
in pay grades E-6 through E-9 who are serving in or are slated to 
serve in joint organizations. DOD's KEYSTONE course exists to prepare 
command senior enlisted leaders for service in flag level joint 
headquarters or joint task force organizations. This course is 
designed for personnel who are serving in pay grade E-9. The focus of 
this course is to enable command senior enlisted leaders to think 
intuitively from a joint perspective while serving in their capacity 
in a general/flag officer joint organization. 

DOD also developed a program that, since 2003, has provided JPME 
specifically to reserve officers. In response to legislative 
direction,[Footnote 21] the Joint Forces Staff College established a 
40-week, blended learning Advanced Joint Professional Military 
Education program (AJPME) that consists of two distance learning 
periods and two face-to-face periods. Similar to the active component 
courses, the Officer Professional Military Education Policy outlines 
the requirements for AJPME. The program's mission is to educate 
reserve component officers to plan and execute joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental, and multinational operations to instill a primary 
commitment to teamwork, attitudes, and perspectives. AJPME builds on 
the foundation established by the institutions teaching JPME Phase I 
and prepares reserve component officers (O-4 to O-6) for joint duty 
assignments. 

DOD's JPME programs are approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. The Director for Joint Force Development retains 
responsibility to support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and the joint warfighter through joint force development, in order to 
advance the operational effectiveness of the current and future joint 
force. The Joint Staff's Directorate for Joint Force Development (J7) 
oversees general policy for the JPME programs. The MECC, which was 
tasked with conducting the most recent DOD-initiated study on JPME, 
serves as an advisory body to the Director of the Joint Staff on joint 
education issues. The purpose of the MECC is to address key 
educational issues of interest to the joint education community, 
promote cooperation and collaboration among the MECC member 
institutions, and coordinate joint education initiatives. Its 
membership consists of the MECC principals and a supporting MECC 
Working Group. These principals include the Director for Joint Force 
Development; the Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for Military 
Education; the presidents, commandants, and directors of the joint 
professional military education colleges and service universities; and 
the heads of any other JPME-accredited institutions. Additional 
representatives from other commands and organizations may be invited 
to participate as is appropriate. The MECC Working Group is comprised 
of dean's level/O-6 representatives of the MECC principals. The Deputy 
Director of the Joint Education and Doctrine Division chairs the MECC 
Working Group. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense, service chiefs, 
and combatant commanders are invited to send participants to the MECC 
meetings to provide feedback to improve the educational process: 

DOD's Study Was Intended to Identify Leader Attributes, Career-Long 
Education Goals, and Educational Gaps: 

The purpose of DOD's issued study of the JPME program was to identify 
desired leader attributes by defining what is needed from the JPME 
career-long learning experience to support DOD's strategic vision, as 
well as any gaps in the current educational program to facilitate the 
development of the leaders needed to achieve that vision. The original 
purpose and objectives for the study were laid out in a July 16, 2012, 
white paper from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a Joint 
Staff memorandum issued with the white paper. 

In the white paper, the Chairman stated that the study's purpose was 
to support the development of the department's leaders by fostering 
the values, strategic vision, and critical thinking skills needed to 
lead and support the development of Joint Force 2020.[Footnote 22] 
This white paper also identified four attributes that the department's 
education programs should develop in its leaders. Those attributes 
include the following: 

* the ability to understand the security environment and the 
contributions of all elements of national power; 

* the ability to deal with surprise and uncertainty; 

* the ability to anticipate and recognize change and lead transitions; 
and: 

* the ability to operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and 
understanding. 

The Chairman's white paper also stated that other attributes for 
leader development would evolve and would need to be aligned with 
future operations and incorporated into curricula to help ensure that 
gaps are identified and eliminated. 

The memorandum, signed by the Director for Joint Force Development, 
identified three questions meant to shape the review. The first 
question focused on the value of joint education, why it is needed, 
and how the military will train and educate its leaders to meet the 
requirements of Joint Force 2020. The second question focused on the 
educational outcomes sought by the department, specifically with 
regard to training leaders for carrying out DOD's strategic vision, in 
order to help ensure alignment of desired leader attributes with the 
curriculum. The third question built upon the first two by focusing on 
any changes needed to strengthen and achieve the value and outcomes 
DOD seeks in building leaders for Joint Force 2020. The memorandum 
also instructed DOD's MECC to conduct the study. 

Subsequent to the issuance of the white paper and memorandum, the MECC 
met on August 23, 2012, to refine the study's specific objectives. 
According to officials, at the direction of the Director for Joint 
Force Development, the MECC removed the requirement to address the 
value of joint education and instead focused its efforts on 
identifying the intended outcomes of the educational program and 
actions needed to achieve the outcomes. The MECC's discussions also 
established two broad objectives for the study--documented in meeting 
minutes and an enclosure--based on the direction in the memorandum and 
further direction received by the Chairman. The two broad objectives 
the MECC established were to: 

1. define the Joint Education Continuum[Footnote 23] needed to meet 
the joint leader development goals for Joint Force 2020,and: 

2. determine the gaps that need to be addressed for the Joint 
Education enterprise to progress from the current joint leader 
development outcomes to producing the future desired joint leader 
attributes for Joint Force 2020. 

The evolution of the study's objectives is described below in figure 2. 

Figure 2: Evolution of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 
Study Objectives: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated list] 

1. The Director for Joint Force Development's July 16, 2012 memorandum 
called for a 3-pronged approach to JPME study focusing on: 
1. The value of joint education,
2. The educational outcomes DOD seeks, and, 
3. The changes necessary to strengthen the value proposition and 
achieve the sought after outcomes. 

2. The Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) met in August 
2012 to discuss study objectives.The Director instructed the group to 
eliminate the value element of the study. 

3. MECC discussions resulted in the development of two objectives for 
the study, based on the remaining two elements identified in the 
memorandum. The two broad objectives the MECC established were to: 
1. Define the Joint Education Continuum needed to meet the joint 
leader development goals for Joint Force 2020, and; 
2. Determine the gaps that need to be addressed for the Joint 
Education enterprise to progress from the current joint leader 
development outcomes to producing the future desired joint leader 
attributes for Joint Force 2020. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

[End of figure] 

The MECC's first objective focused on defining and improving upon both 
the officer and enlisted joint education continuums to ensure that 
they are in line with the development goals for DOD's strategic 
vision. The MECC identified a need to retain many aspects of the 
current officer joint education continuum, as well as a need to 
incorporate new elements into the proposed officer joint education 
continuum that would help to meet the changing needs of future leaders 
of Joint Force 2020. For example, the proposed officer continuum 
retains the comprehensive approach of embedding elements of JPME at 
each level of service-delivered education with an emphasis on the 
statutory requirements for JPME Phases I and II, as well as key 
milestones from the precommissioning level of JPME to the general/flag 
officer rank. In addition to retaining the existing institutional 
structure for providing JPME education, however, in its report the 
MECC also emphasized the importance of self-directed, career-long 
learning and development. This facet of officer development is 
intended to convey an expectation that an individual is responsible 
for his or her own education and development, thereby inculcating a 
culture of lifelong learning. The MECC's study concluded, on the other 
hand, that changes to the enlisted JPME continuum--specifically, 
between the Senior Enlisted JPME and KEYSTONE courses--are needed to 
improve the depiction of the Chairman's intent for enlisted 
professional military education. Currently, enlisted personnel who 
complete the Senior Enlisted JPME course at pay grade E-6 or E-7 are 
not eligible to attend the KEYSTONE course until they attain pay grade 
E-9, potentially leaving a significant interval in time between 
participation in the two courses. Accordingly, the MECC recommended 
dividing the existing Senior Enlisted JPME course into two parts. Both 
parts would be offered prior to the KEYSTONE course and reduce the 
interval of time that senior enlisted servicemembers must wait between 
phases of enlisted joint education.[Footnote 24] 

The second objective expanded upon the first, and focused on 
identifying and closing gaps in the current JPME curriculum to produce 
joint leaders with attributes that are in line with Joint Force 2020. 
Specifically, the MECC refined the four attributes proposed in the 
Chairman's white paper, added two additional attributes, and 
identified a set of subattributes associated with each of the six 
desired leader attributes, that the MECC used to analyze the current 
capabilities of the department's joint education programs. The refined 
list of desired leader attributes consists of the abilities to: 

1. Understand the security environment and contributions of all 
instruments of national power, 

2. Anticipate and respond to surprise and uncertainty, 

3. Anticipate and recognize change and lead transitions, 

4. Operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding, 

5. Make ethical decisions based on shared values of the profession of 
arms, and, 

6. Think critically and strategically in applying joint warfighting 
principles and concepts to joint operations. 

The MECC then conducted a gap analysis to identify and crosswalk the 
desired leader attributes for Joint Force 2020 with the current 
officer and enlisted personnel JPME education continuums. 

For officers, the MECC's analysis showed that, while the JPME program 
currently addresses the desired leader attribute outcomes at some 
level and also meets the intent of the existing requirements 
identified by the Skelton Panel, gaps exist where changes are needed 
to meet the challenges of Joint Force 2020. These include changes to 
teaching methodologies, assessment mechanisms, and other areas in 
support of the newly-identified desired leader attributes. Table 1 
summarizes where DOD has identified gaps in its officer JPME curricula 
associated with the identified list of desired leader attributes and 
subattributes. 

Table 1: Gaps in Officer Curricula Associated with the Desired Leader 
Attributes: 

Joint Force 2020 Desired Leader Attributes (DLAs): 1. Ability to 
understand the security environment and the contributions of all 
instruments of national power; 
DOD assessment of the existence of gaps: [A]; 
Examples of identified gaps: No gaps in curriculum. 

Joint Force 2020 Desired Leader Attributes (DLAs): 2. Ability to 
anticipate and respond to surprise and uncertainty; 
DOD assessment of the existence of gaps: [C]; 
Examples of identified gaps: Additional faculty development may be 
required for instruction. 

Joint Force 2020 Desired Leader Attributes (DLAs): 3. Ability to 
anticipate and recognize change and lead transitions; 
DOD assessment of the existence of gaps: [B]; 
Examples of identified gaps: Additional scenarios and simulations for 
instruction may be required. 

Joint Force 2020 Desired Leader Attributes (DLAs): 4. Ability to 
operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding; 
DOD assessment of the existence of gaps: [C]; 
Examples of identified gaps: Some subattributes of desired leader 
attributes are not covered in curriculum and may require additional 
technology for simulations. 

Joint Force 2020 Desired Leader Attributes (DLAs): 5. Ability to make 
ethical decisions based on the shared values of the profession of 
arms; 
DOD assessment of the existence of gaps: [A]; 
Examples of identified gaps: No gaps in curriculum. 

Joint Force 2020 Desired Leader Attributes (DLAs): 6. Ability to think 
critically and strategically and apply joint warfighting principles and 
concepts in joint operations spanning all levels of warfare; 
DOD assessment of the existence of gaps: [A]; 
Examples of identified gaps: No gaps in curriculum. 

Source: DOD. 

Legend: 

[A] DOD did not identify any gaps in its JPME curricula to meet the 
desired leader attribute, and no corrective action is needed. 

[B] DOD found potential gaps and that some refinement to the 
curriculum may 
be needed. 

[C] DOD found that gaps exist in the JPME curricula to meet the desired 
leader attribute, and that corrective action is needed. 

[End of table] 

For enlisted personnel, the MECC determined that a separate and 
distinct set of desired leader attributes should be developed for 
senior enlisted leaders that will require additional study. Officials 
from the Joint Staff initiated this work on April 8, 2013 and assigned 
this task to DOD's Enlisted Military Education Review Council (EMERC). 
[Footnote 25] The EMERC took up this effort at its August 22, 2013 
meeting and proposed a list of six desired leader attributes for 
enlisted personnel. DOD officials provided us with the proposed list 
of enlisted desired leader attributes on September 16, 2013. 

The MECC made a total of 21 recommendations, which collectively 
address the study's objectives and span four categories, including: 
(1) desired leader attributes, subattributes, or educational outcomes; 
(2) joint education continuums; (3) lifelong learning and advancements 
in learning technologies; and (4) faculty quality. See appendix III 
for a list of the 21 recommendations. Several of these recommendations 
call for additional study by the National Defense University and the 
services to support the achievement of leader attributes. Other 
recommendations emphasize the importance of strengthening the 
educational outcomes at the primary level of joint education, making 
education programs more accessible, and using prior learning 
assessments to tailor education opportunities to students' needs, 
among other things. One recommendation, in particular, calls for 
undertaking an approach to develop a separate and distinct set of 
desired leader attributes to guide enlisted joint education. 
Additionally, the MECC considered whether to make any legislative 
proposals, but did not identify the need for any legislative changes 
to the joint education enterprise based on the results of the review. 
According to officials, the results of the study will be used 
ultimately to inform updates and revisions to the Officer Professional 
Military Education Policy[Footnote 26] and the Enlisted Professional 
Military Education Policy,[Footnote 27] which are the primary 
instructions that distribute the policies, procedures, objectives, and 
responsibilities for professional military education and JPME. Our 
next section discusses DOD's plans in this area. 

Study's Methodology Generally Included Leading Practices, but DOD Has 
Not Yet Fully Planned for Follow-on Actions and Engaged All 
Stakeholders, or Considered Potential Implementation Costs: 

The methodology DOD used for its study of JPME generally included 
leading practices for evaluating strategic training and other 
programs, such as reviewing existing literature, using available data, 
and assessing skills gaps. However, the department has not yet fully 
planned for follow-on actions or fully engaged all stakeholders to 
help ensure that they are held accountable for making progress in 
implementing the study's recommendations. Specifically, the department 
has not taken steps to ensure that the results of the study will be 
implemented using an approach agreed upon by all stakeholders, or that 
the results will be implemented in a timely manner. Further, the 
department has not yet fully evaluated the potential costs associated 
with the implementation of the MECC's recommendations to provide 
decision makers with more complete information and assurance that the 
recommendations will be cost-effective. 

MECC Reviewed Existing Literature, Used Available Data, and Assessed 
Gaps: 

According to our 2012 report, Designing Evaluations,[Footnote 28] a 
key first step in designing a program evaluation is to conduct a 
literature review in order to understand the program's history, 
related policies, and knowledge base. A review of the relevant policy 
literature can help focus evaluation questions on knowledge gaps, 
identify design and data collection options used in the past, and 
provide important context for the requester's questions. Further, 
according to the RAND Corporation's Standards for High-Quality 
Research and Analysis,[Footnote 29] a study team should demonstrate an 
understanding of other related studies, which should be evident in, 
for example, how a problem is formulated and approached. The team 
should also take particular care to explain the ways in which its 
study agrees, disagrees, or otherwise differs importantly from 
previous studies. 

The MECC's report states that the initial step in its review was to 
determine the JPME enterprise's effectiveness in meeting its current 
requirements. According to an official, the MECC reviewed many 
documents as part of a literature review, but derived its findings 
from four specific sources--all issued within the last 5 years--that 
it determined were most relevant to the review. Specifically, these 
sources were: 

* The 2010 House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations (O&I), study[Footnote 30] which provided 
a detailed assessment of the state of JPME; 

* A Decade of War,[Footnote 31] conducted by the Joint and Coalition 
Operational Analysis Division[Footnote 32] within the Joint Staff (J7); 

* The Ingenuity Gap: Officer Management for the 21ST Century[Footnote 
33]; and: 

* Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America's Military Officer Corps. 
[Footnote 34] 

According to the MECC's report, these documents collectively provide a 
broad look across joint education. The MECC found that the 2010 HASC 
report, for example, provided a detailed assessment of the state of 
JPME, and concluded that while the overall PME system was basically 
sound, some areas needed improvement, such as an increased emphasis on 
joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations. 
Consistent with this finding, the MECC made a recommendation that the 
Joint Professional Military Education Division review specific subject 
areas for increased emphasis within joint education as part of the 
process of revising the officer and enlisted policies. These subject 
areas include cyber warfare, interagency and intergovernmental 
operations, and information and economic instruments of national 
power, among others. Further, these sources suggested that 
responsibilities for junior officers will increase and that joint 
education should be expanded at lower levels. Similarly, the MECC 
found that officers are receiving joint education exposure earlier in 
their careers, and also recommended that the services strengthen the 
instruction of the desired leader attributes at the primary level of 
joint education for junior officers. Additionally, these sources 
recognized the need for increased emphasis on handling uncertainty and 
critical thinking skills. DOD's study also focused on the ability to 
anticipate and respond to surprise and uncertainty, and critical 
thinking in joint operations. 

RAND's Standards[Footnote 35] report further indicates that the data 
and information used for a study should be the best available and that 
a research team should indicate limitations in the quality of the 
available data. As part of its second objective, the MECC analyzed 
data from joint accreditation visits, that provided broad areas of 
assessment, and institutional survey and outcome assessments, that 
provided more detailed observations related to curricula. More 
specifically, the MECC conducted a review of the Process for the 
Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) reaffirmation results and 
institutional self-studies for the past 10 years.[Footnote 36] DOD 
uses these studies to document compliance with the Officer 
Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) standards and identify 
areas for improvement. These reviews have not identified systemic 
problems or required changes of PME over the past 10 years, and have 
concluded that PME institutions are successful in meeting policy and 
curricula standards, as well as the intent of the Skelton Report. The 
MECC also obtained and analyzed existing survey data[Footnote 37]--
from various JPME institutions--of students, graduates, and 
supervisors of graduates as an indirect assessment of the programs to 
identify common areas and trends in JPME, as well as outcome 
assessments such as exams, quizzes, oral presentations, among other 
things, from the past 2 years as a more direct measurement of student 
learning. Consistent with the aforementioned RAND Standards report, 
while the MECC did leverage existing data, the MECC's report also 
presented limitations of the existing survey data that it used for the 
study, stemming from variations in survey questions and measures that 
the separate JPME institutions used to conduct their own surveys. 

Regarding gap assessments, our 2004 Guide for Assessing Strategic 
Training and Development Efforts in the Federal Government[Footnote 
38] highlights the need for determining the skills and competencies 
necessary to meet current and future challenges, and to assess any 
skill and competency gaps. According to the MECC's report, to 
determine the ability of joint education to meet the Joint Force 2020 
joint leader development requirements, the MECC conducted a three-
phase gap analysis. These three phases included: (1) refinement of the 
desired leader attributes, which included breaking these attributes 
down into subattributes; (2) analysis of data provided by 27 officer 
and enlisted programs across the JPME system to identify gaps in the 
JPME program;[Footnote 39] and (3) gap analysis and documentation to 
break down the data into cohorts and rank the desired leader 
attributes. Specifically, 27 officer and enlisted programs, which 
included the services' staff and war colleges and National Defense 
University, among others, were asked to assess the current 
capabilities of their joint education programs to achieve Joint Force 
2020 outcomes by addressing the following three questions: 

* Is the curriculum effective, that is, do we teach it? 

* Are current instructional methods effective, that is, how well do we 
teach and deliver it? 

* Are we achieving the educational outcomes, that is, can we measure 
it? 

According to its report, the MECC relied on the professional opinion 
of the academic deans of the JPME schools and directors of other joint 
education programs to make determinations about the effectiveness of 
their officer and senior enlisted programs based on the 35 
subattributes identified by the MECC. To conduct the gap analysis, the 
MECC analyzed the 945 responses it received from the 27 programs and 
used a stoplight color coding scheme to summarize by cohort group each 
program's assessment of its current capabilities to achieve the Joint 
Force 2020 outcomes.[Footnote 40] The gap analysis results were then 
coded, scored and ranked by officer cohort group (precommissioning, 
intermediate, senior, CAPSTONE) using four categories to describe the 
program's current capabilities. In turn, this gap analysis helped 
inform the MECC's 21 recommendations. While the MECC conducted a 
similar gap analysis for its senior enlisted JPME programs, the 
results of that analysis led the MECC to conclude that the department 
needed to further reconsider and redefine the desired leader 
attributes for enlisted personnel. 

MECC Has Not Yet Fully Developed Timeframes and Coordinated with All 
Stakeholders, nor Assessed Costs for Follow-on Action: 

The MECC has not yet fully developed timeframes and coordinated with 
all stakeholders, nor has it assessed the costs associated with 
implementing any of the study's recommendations. As a result, it is 
not clear how the department will obtain concurrence among its 
stakeholders regarding an approach for moving forward, or how the 
department will hold its stakeholders accountable for implementing 
change. Furthermore, the department will not know whether the 
implementation of its recommendations will be cost effective. 

We have previously found[Footnote 41] that project planning is the 
basis for controlling and managing project performance, including 
managing the relationship between cost and time. Our 2004 Training 
Guide[Footnote 42] highlights the need for agencies to develop a 
formal process to help ensure that strategic and tactical changes are 
promptly incorporated in training and development efforts. 
Specifically, that report advises that agencies develop plans that 
describe or outline the way in which the agency intends to incorporate 
strategic and tactical changes into its training and developmental 
efforts. Our guide also highlights that including important agency 
stakeholders in the process can contribute to an open and continuous 
exchange of ideas and information, particularly when it comes to 
ensuring that strategic and tactical changes are promptly incorporated 
into training and developmental efforts. 

According to the July 16, 2012 memorandum that directed the MECC 
study, the March 1, 2013 deadline for the results of the study was 
intended to help shape the fall 2013 academic year. The MECC completed 
its report on June 24, 2013, and provided us with a copy of the final 
report on July 1, 2013. Subsequently, officials provided us with an 
informational paper that identifies an office of primary 
responsibility and outlines details on the status of the 
recommendations. However, this paper does not fully lay out DOD's 
planned actions in a transparent manner. For nine of the 
recommendations, the document identifies potential target dates for 
completion, one of which is to be completed later in 2013, and eight 
of which are to be completed not later than September 2014. For the 
remaining 12 recommendations, DOD identified a target date for 
completion as either "not applicable" or "to be determined" because 
most of those recommendations fall under the purview of the services, 
the services' schools, or National Defense University. Accordingly, 
officials states that consideration or implementation of any 
recommendations that fall under the purview of these stakeholders is 
at the discretion of those organizations and, according to officials, 
the department cannot identify or impose timeframes for implementing 
those recommendations. We recognize that the implementation of several 
of the recommendations fall under the purview of the services, the 
services' schools, or National Defense University. However, the MECC 
has not yet reached out to these entities to identify estimated target 
dates for implementation to help guide these efforts. Further, the 
document does not identify interim milestones for specific actions 
between the date of the report and the target completion dates. The 
document also states that completion or implementation of a number of 
the recommendations is contingent on revisions to the Enlisted 
Professional Military Education Policy or the Officer Professional 
Military Education Policy, which officials estimated may take 12-18 
months. 

Officials did tell us that the Joint Staff's Joint Professional 
Military Education Division staff and members of the MECC are 
currently in the beginning stages of incorporating the changes into 
policy and that the individual schools may begin to incorporate 
changes resulting from the study at any time. However, at the time of 
our review, the department's process for monitoring the implementation 
of the MECC's recommendations was unclear. Without established 
milestones and timeframes for taking follow-on action, and mechanisms 
for coordinating with all key officials and stakeholders and holding 
them accountable, DOD may not be reasonably assured that the study's 
recommendations will be implemented across the department or that its 
JPME program will achieve the potential benefits resulting from these 
recommendations. 

In addition, the department did not include a requirement that the 
MECC assess the costs associated with the JPME program or any 
recommendations resulting from the study. The MECC's report 
acknowledges that the resource-limited environment facing the 
Department of Defense will make it difficult to sustain current 
practices, such as maintaining small class sizes and small student-to-
faculty ratios, at the intermediate and senior courses or to consider 
additional requirements for the lower-level courses. The report states 
that leveraging new learning approaches, such as increased distance 
learning options, will not provide an inexpensive or free solution for 
increased joint education requirements.[Footnote 43] However, the MECC 
did not analyze or consider either the costs associated with 
implementing the study's recommendations or efficiencies to be derived 
from implementing the study's recommendations. Of the MECC's 21 
recommendations, the MECC identified five recommendations requiring 
further study and other possible investments, which suggests a 
potential need for additional funding resources to conduct those 
studies and implement any findings. For example, the report included 
recommendations to (1) conduct a study to identify and evaluate 
potential educational tools to achieve certain desired leader 
attributes, and (2) consider and explore opportunities to incentivize 
and reward lifelong learning. The costs associated with these 
recommendations are unclear and officials responsible for the study 
could not provide us with cost estimates. 

Prior studies of professional military education also did not or were 
unable to fully identify the costs associated with the overall JPME 
program, or with individual JPME programs. The Skelton Panel, for 
example, inquired into the cost per student at each school. The Office 
of the Secretary of Defense provided the panel with raw data produced 
with different methodologies by service, and sometimes by school, 
which resulted in widely varying costs for roughly similar programs. 
More recently, the House Armed Services Subcommittee for Oversight and 
Investigations[Footnote 44] made its own effort to ascertain whether a 
uniform cost accounting system existed for DOD's professional military 
education system.[Footnote 45] The Department provided cost-per-
student figures with standardized criteria. Comparative figures were 
no longer characterized by such enormous variations, but there were 
still a number of unexplained differences in the data provided by the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

Our 2004 Training Guide[Footnote 46] states that agencies should 
strategically target training and development investments to help 
ensure that resources are not wasted on efforts that are irrelevant, 
duplicative, or ineffective. Our Training Guide further recommends 
that agencies should consider the appropriate level of investment and 
prioritize funding so that the most important training needs are 
addressed first. We have previously concluded[Footnote 47] that 
leading practices such as accounting for program resources enables 
managers to better manage existing resources and plan for future 
programmatic needs. Further, accounting for program resources is 
becoming increasingly important for decision makers within the 
department who must make difficult trade-off decisions in a 
sequestration budget environment. 

According to officials, the MECC omitted any and all cost elements 
from the study so as to not limit their assessment of the department's 
needs for educating its leaders for Joint Force 2020 based on 
resources. Officials told us that they did not want to eliminate 
options for change based on the cost associated with them. However, by 
not assessing the cost of the MECC's recommendations, as well as any 
efficiencies that may be achieved through their implementation, DOD 
may not be in a position to know if it has the resources to implement 
them or whether efficiencies will be achieved, and, without plans to 
assess cost in the near term as part of continued efforts to implement 
the results of the JPME study, decision makers may not know if 
implementing their recommendations will be cost effective. 

Conclusions: 

The experiences of the last 12 years of operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have underscored the importance of U.S. military officers' 
ability to work jointly across the services and reinforced the need 
for an effective joint military education program. DOD's recently 
completed study of JPME is an important step forward as DOD considers 
how to adapt its joint military education program to reach the goals 
it laid forth for Joint Force 2020. Nonetheless, some questions remain 
about how well its findings can be applied to the task of revising the 
department's officer and enlisted JPME policies. Specifically, 
ensuring transparency and taking certain actions to ensure this 
study's findings and recommendations can be utilized effectively is 
important. For instance, without establishing milestones and 
timeframes for conducting follow-on actions, and involving necessary 
stakeholders and developing an implementation approach that provides 
for accountability, the department may not be assured that the study's 
findings and recommendations will be incorporated into the JPME 
program at institutions across the department and the services in a 
timely manner. Additionally, without reliable information on the costs 
of implementing the study's recommendations, decision makers could be 
hindered in determining the most efficient allocation of departmental 
resources for JPME. DOD's JPME program will continue to play a role in 
the future development of departmental leaders, and acting to help 
ensure the findings and recommendations of this and any future studies 
are both utilized and cost-effective could allow the department to 
make the best use of the resources it devotes to this program. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To guide the implementation of actions DOD identified in its study on 
JPME, we recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
direct the Director for Joint Force Development to take the following 
two actions: 

* establish well-defined timeframes for conducting follow-on actions, 
coordinate with all stakeholders, and identify key officials 
responsible for implementing the study's recommendations to help 
ensure the usefulness, timeliness, and implementation of any actions 
DOD takes in response to the findings and recommendations contained in 
its study, and: 

* assess the costs of implementing recommendations made and 
efficiencies to be derived from the recommendations in order to 
implement DOD's recommendations in a cost-effective manner. 

Agency Comments: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 
two recommendations to guide implementation of the actions that DOD 
identified in its review of joint education. DOD's comments are 
reprinted in appendix IV. DOD also provided technical comments on the 
draft report, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

Regarding our first recommendation that DOD establish well-defined 
timeframes for conducting follow-on actions, coordinate with all 
stakeholders, and identify key officials responsible for implementing 
the study's recommendations, DOD stated that, as the Joint Staff 
pursues implementation of the recommendations in its review, it will 
establish timelines, identify offices of primary responsibility, and 
coordinate with stakeholders as appropriate. DOD also noted that 
efforts are already underway to update the Chairman of the Joint Chief 
of Staff's professional military education policies to ensure that 
these policy directives are consistent with the results and 
recommendations of the recent study. 

Regarding our second recommendation that DOD assess the costs of 
implementing recommendations made and efficiencies to be derived from 
the recommendations, the department again concurred, stating that, 
although assessing the costs of its recommendations is beyond the 
original scope and purpose in this study, it will consider costs and 
efficiencies prior to moving forward with the implementation of any 
recommendations. It also stated that a number of recommendations will 
be implemented through policy changes which are cost neutral. Further, 
it stated that the services will also consider such costs and 
efficiencies for recommendations under their purview. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 
Directorate for Joint Force Development. In addition, this report will 
also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Brenda S. Farrell: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable James M. Inhofe: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To identify the purpose of the Department of Defense's (DOD) study of 
the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) program, we reviewed 
relevant DOD guidance and other documents related to the study, 
including the final report dated June 24, 2013, and met with 
knowledgeable officials. We reviewed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff's July 16, 2012 white paper that called for and outlined the 
general focus of the study. We also reviewed the Director of Joint 
Force Development's (J7) memorandum that was issued with the white 
paper and clarified the overall intent of the study and specific 
questions to help frame the study, and directed responsibility of the 
study to the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC). We 
analyzed the MECC's meeting minutes and interim briefing report, which 
provided insight into how the MECC addressed the questions posed in 
the Director's memorandum, as its approach differed somewhat from the 
framework provided in the memorandum. We then compared the 
aforementioned guidance documents and interim report findings to the 
final report to assess consistency. In addition, we met with 
knowledgeable officials from the Joint Professional Military Education 
Division within DOD's Joint Staff's Directorate for Joint Force 
Development who, in conjunction with the MECC, were responsible for 
guiding DOD's effort. We also met with the officers of primary 
responsibility and/or team leads responsible for carrying out the 
various elements of the study. These meetings helped to ensure our 
understanding of the purpose and objectives of the study. We reviewed 
the final report section that focused primarily on the study's 
findings and recommendations for change to gain an understanding of 
the MECC's findings and recommendations. Further, we met with 
knowledgeable officials within the Directorate for Joint Force 
Development and the team lead for the findings and recommendations 
portion of the study to gain clarification and insight into the major 
takeaways from the study, areas in need of change, and any plans for 
the way ahead. 

To assess the methodology DOD used to conduct the joint professional 
military education study and its planning for follow-on actions, we 
reviewed the MECC's final report and supporting documents. We 
interviewed DOD officials from the Joint Professional Military 
Education Division within the Directorate for Joint Force Development 
and officials from across DOD who were identified as officers of 
primary responsibility or team leads for specific study tasks 
associated with the study's two objectives. We reviewed relevant 
reports and guidance by GAO; the Office of Management and Budget; the 
Office of Personnel Management; and private sector organizations such 
as the RAND Corporation, among others, to identify select leading 
practices for evaluating training, educational, and other programs. 
The following list includes select sources we consulted for leading 
practices, in addition to those listed throughout the report, and 
against which we assessed DOD's JPME study: 

* GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project 
Schedules, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 2012), 

* GAO, Designing Evaluations: 2012 Revision, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-208G] (Washington, D.C.: January 
2012), 

* RAND Corporation, Standards for High-Quality Research and Analysis 
(Santa Monica, Calif.: November 2011), 

* The Office of Personnel Management, Training Evaluation Field Guide 
(Washington, D.C.: January 2011), 

* GAO, Government Auditing Standards: 2007 Revision, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-162G] (Washington, D.C.: January 
2007), 

* GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and 
Development Efforts in the Federal Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G] (Washington, D.C.: March 
2004), 

* The Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-94, Guidelines and 
Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 1992), and: 

* GAO, Designing Evaluations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/PEMD-10.1.4] (Washington, D.C.: March 
1991). 

We identified key practices contained in these documents for 
evaluating educational programs and information that were applicable 
for the purposes of this engagement. We then compared DOD's 
methodology with these select leading practices for program 
evaluation. We also reviewed documents provided to us and identified 
by DOD officials as project plans for the study, as well as 
documentation of the department's intended follow-on actions. 

We conducted this performance audit from March through October 2013 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Officer Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 
Institutions: 

Figure 3: Map of Officer JPME Institutions: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

Carlisle, Pennsylvania: 
* Army War College. 

Leavenworth, Kansas: 
* U.S. Army Command and General Staff School. 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 
* Air War College
* Air Command and Staff College. 

Newport, Rhode Island: 
* Naval War College; 
* College of Naval Warfare; 
* College of Naval Command and Staff, 

Norfolk, Virginia: 
* Joint Forces Staff College; 
* Joint Combined Warfighting School; 
* Joint Advanced Warfighting School; 
* Advanced JPME; 
* U.S. Joint Forces Command. 

Quantico, Virginia: 
* U.S. Marine Corps War College; 
* U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College. 

Washington, D.C.
* National Defense University; 
* National War College; 
* Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Management; 
* National Intelligence University. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

Department of Defense Institutions: 

* National Defense University (CAPSTONE, PINNACLE), Washington, DC: 

* Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Management, 
Washington, DC: 

* National War College, Washington, DC: 

* National Intelligence University, Washington, DC: 

* Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA: 

* Joint Combined Warfighting School, Norfolk, VA: 

* Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Norfolk, VA: 

* Advanced JPME Reserve Component, Norfolk, VA: 

Department of the Army: 

* Army War College, Carlisle, PA: 

* United States Army Command and General Staff School, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: 

Department of the Air Force: 

* Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, AL: 

* Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, 
AL: 

Department of the Navy: 

* Naval War College, College of Naval Warfare and College of Naval 
Command and Staff, Newport, RI: 

United States Marine Corps: 

* United States Marine Corps War College, Quantico, VA: 

* United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Recommendations Made by the Military Education 
Coordination Council (MECC) in Its Study of Joint Professional 
Military Education: 

The MECC made a total of 21 recommendations, which collectively 
address the study's two objectives and span four categories, 
including: (1) desired leader attributes, or educational outcomes; (2) 
joint education continuums; (3) lifelong learning and advancements in 
learning technologies; and (4) faculty quality. Several of these 
recommendations call for additional study by the National Defense 
University and the services to support the achievement of leader 
attributes. Other recommendations emphasize the importance of 
strengthening the educational outcomes at the primary level of joint 
education, making education programs more accessible, and using prior 
learning assessments to tailor education opportunities to students' 
needs, among other things. Table 2 lists the recommendations by 
category. 

Table 2: Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) 
Recommendations by Category: 

Recommendation Category: Desired leader attributes/subattributes/ 
educational outcomes; 

Recommendation: The MECC should adopt the desired 
leader attributes as guideposts for officer joint education. 

Recommendation: A "whiteboard" approach should be conducted to develop 
a separate and distinct set of desired leader attributes to guide 
enlisted joint education. 

Recommendation: Develop/refine appropriate educational outcomes to 
support achievement of the desired leader attributes across a career 
via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)/Enlisted 
Professional Military Education Policy (EPMEP) revision processes. 

Recommendation: National Defense University and the services should 
conduct further study to evaluate potential educational tools 
(including online learning, gaming, and simulation technologies) that 
are available to support achieving the desired leader attributes' 
educational outcomes, particularly for specific desired leader 
attributes. 

Recommendation: Review specific subject areas for increased emphasis 
within joint education via the OPMEP and EPMEP revision processes, 
including cyber warfare, cultural considerations in planning, 
interagency and intergovernmental operations, information and economic 
instruments of national power, writing with precision, operations with 
private entities, and professional ethics. 

Recommendation: The joint training community should conduct/continue 
efforts aimed at achieving the desired leader attributes. 

Recommendation: Joint functional communities should incorporate the 
desired leader attributes into their education and training programs as 
appropriate. 

Recommendation Category: Joint education continuums; 

Recommendation: Determine the appropriate weighting of emphasis of the 
desired leader attributes along the education continuums via the 
OPMEP/EPMEP revision processes. 

Recommendation: Strengthen the educational outcomes at the primary 
level of joint education for junior officers within the OPMEP revision 
process to enhance achievement of the desired leader attributes (while 
retaining balance with Service primary level educational 
requirements). 

Recommendation: Explore the use of prior learning assessments to aid in 
tailoring education opportunities. 

Recommendation: National Defense University should explore potential 
opportunities for making increased joint education content available 
for junior officers via distance learning capabilities. 

Recommendation: Services should explore earlier determination of 
follow-on assignments from education to allow tailoring of educational 
opportunities, recognizing that experience is critical to fully develop 
the desired learning attributes in service members. 

Recommendation: National Defense University should explore breaking the 
senior enlisted JPME course into two phases, one to serve the E-6/E-7 
community and a second to serve the E-8/E-9 community. 

Recommendation: Revise the EPMEP to establish a fourth level of 
enlisted JPME: Command Senior Enlisted Leaders. KEYSTONE remains 
aligned with the enlisted PME "executive-level" for specific command 
senior enlisted leader positions. 

Recommendation Category: Lifelong learning and advancements in 
learning technologies; 

Recommendation: National Defense University should conduct a study to 
explore opportunities to implement elements of lifelong learning in 
support of joint education. The study should examine: 
Current Service efforts toward establishing lifelong learning 
capabilities; 
Best lifelong learning practices within the civilian academic 
community; 
Incorporating the development of lifelong learning skills in education 
program curricula; 
Opportunities to leverage advanced education technologies to support 
lifelong learning including potentially partnering with the Advanced 
Distributed Learning Initiative; 

Recommendation: National Defense University and the services should 
explore opportunities to make content from their education programs 
available. 

Recommendation: Services should explore opportunities to incentivize 
and reward lifelong learning. 

Recommendation Category: Faculty quality; 

Recommendation: Services should establish procedures/policies for 
special selection of military personnel for joint education faculty 
duty and to recognize/reward faculty duty. 

Recommendation: Services and National Defense University should review 
civilian hiring practices/policies to ensure the highest level of 
quality and proper breadth of subject-matter expertise within their 
faculties, with an eye on whole-of-government approaches in today's 
security environment. 

Recommendation: Services and National Defense University tailor faculty 
development programs to ensure members can educate to the desired 
leader attributes and sustain current, relevant, and rigorous 
curricula. 

Recommendation: In light of the new desired leader attributes and 
lifelong learning strategy, current standards that address the 
requirements for faculty development should be reexamined within the 
OPMEP revision process. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

The Joint Staff: 
Washington, DC: 

4 October 2013: 

Ms. Brenda Farrell: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Farrell: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report, GAO-14-29, "Joint 
Military Education: Actions Needed to Implement DoD Recommendations 
for Enhancing Leadership Development," dated 18 September 2013 (GAO 
351810). I appreciate GAO's effort in examining the analytical
approach used by the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) in 
conducting our Review of Joint Education and the opportunity to 
provide this response on behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. 

The purpose of this Chairman-directed, internal review was to ensure 
our joint education enterprise will enable us to develop agile and 
adaptive leaders with the requisite values, strategic vision, and 
critical thinking skills to keep pace with the changing security 
environment. From our perspective, the MECC accomplished the specific 
tasks as assigned and met the Chairman's intent for the review. We 
believe much of the draft GAO report validates that perspective, 
specifically stating the MECC' s methodology "generally included 
leading practices for evaluating strategic training and other 
programs, such as reviewing existing literature, using available data, 
and assessing skills gaps." 

We note that within the report the GAO makes two recommendations 
concerning timeframes for implementation of Review of Joint Education 
recommendations and assessing any associated costs of implementing 
recommendations. As we determine which of the Review of Joint 
Education recommendations will be pursued, the Joint Staff will 
develop appropriate timelines for and consider costs of implementation 
as necessary. Please see the enclosure for our detailed response to 
the two GAO recommendations. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Frederick S. Rudesheim: 
Major General, USA: 
Vice Director, Joint Staff: 

Enclosure 

GAO Draft Report Dated September 18, 2013: 
GAO-14-29 (GAO Code 351810): 

"Joint Military Education: Actions Needed to Implement DOD 
Recommendations for Enhancing Leadership Development" 

Recommendation 1: To guide the implementation of actions DOD 
identified in its study on JPME, GAO recommends that the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the Director for Joint Force 
Development, to establish well-defined timeframes for conducting 
follow-on actions, coordinate with all stakeholders, and identify key 
officials responsible for implementing the study's recommendations to 
help ensure the usefulness, timeliness, and implementation of any
actions DOD takes in response to the findings and recommendations 
contained in its study. 

DOD Response: The DOD concurs with this recommendation. As the Joint 
Staff pursues implementation of Review of Joint Education (RJE) 
recommendations, the Joint Staff will establish timelines, identify 
Offices of Primary Responsibility, and coordinate with appropriate
stakeholders as appropriate. This effort is already in progress, with 
the first phase of activity dedicated to updating the CJCS' 
Professional Military Education (PME) policies to ensure that the 
policy directives driving PME are consistent with the results and 
recommendations of the RIE. Specifically, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01, Officer Professional Military 
Education Policy (OPMEP) and CJCSI 1805.01, Enlisted Professional
Military Education Policy (EPMEP), are already in the process of being 
revised with a targeted completion of summer 2014. 

Recommendation 2: To guide the implementation of actions DOD 
identified in its study on JPME, GAO recommends that the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the Director for Joint Force 
Development, to assess the costs of implementing recommendations made, 
and efficiencies to be derived from the recommendations in order to 
implement DOD's recommendations in a cost-effective manner. 

DOD Response: The DOD concurs with this recommendation; it should 
however be noted that the recommendation expands the RJE beyond its 
original scope and purpose. This said, given the reality of resourcing 
today, the Joint Staff will, inherent to the decision process, 
consider costs and efficiencies prior to moving forward with 
implementation of any RJE recommendations. In addition, the RIE final 
report recognized current resource constraints and stated that, to the 
maximum extent possible, implementation of recommendations should take
place via OPMEP and EPMEP processes, using established procedures as 
opposed to creating separate efforts for implementation. A number of 
the recommendations will be implemented via policy changes, which are 
cost neutral. As the primary focus of the RIE was on curriculum,
potential changes will also be made within existing curriculum review 
processes. Using standing processes will lead to cost efficiencies. 
The Services will also consider costs and efficiencies for 
recommendations under their purview. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Brenda S. Farrell (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual names above, David Moser, Assistant 
Director; Richard Burkard; Timothy Carr; Gustavo Crosetto; Melissa 
Emrey-Arras; Jennifer Madison; Terry Richardson; Jennifer Weber; and 
Erik Wilkins-McKee made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] U.S. Congress, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Another 
Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel, H.R. 111-4 (Washington, 
D.C.: April 2010). 

[2] Pub. L. No. 99-433 (1986). 

[3] 10 U.S.C. § 2154. 

[4] According to its Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Estimates, DOD's National 
Defense University is the premier center for Joint Professional 
Military Education (JPME) and is under the direction of the Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The university conducts JPME seminars, 
symposia, and professional development and conferencing for DOD and 
Congressional representatives. The National Defense University is 
located at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. The dollar amount cited 
here, provided by a DOD official, includes both direct and 
reimbursable expenses and includes expenses for the Joint Forces Staff 
College (located in Norfolk, VA), the Dwight D. Eisenhower School of 
National Security and Resource Strategy, the National War College, and 
the CAPSTONE, PINNACLE, and KEYSTONE programs at the National Defense 
University. It does not include National Defense University's overhead 
costs, nor does it constitute the entirety of DOD's JPME expenses that 
are associated with the military services' JPME schools. According to 
a DOD official, it would be difficult to determine what percentage of 
the services' funding goes specifically to JPME because, in part, JPME 
is only a portion of their programs. 

[5] Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 547 (2013). 

[6] DOD provided us with a copy of its final report on July 1, 2013. 
We met our mandate with a draft copy of this report. 

[7] See appendix I for a list of reports and guidance we reviewed. 

[8] 10 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2157. 

[9] Active duty and reserve officers can also satisfy some JPME 
requirements by completing the non-resident curricula provided by 
National Defense University and the services' schools. 

[10] Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Officer Professional Military Education Policy, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01D (Washington, D.C., Dec. 
15, 2011). 

[11] O-1 through O-3 ranks denote the first through the third levels 
of commissioned military officer ranking, the titles for which vary 
among the services. O-1, or officer level 1, signifies an Army, an Air 
Force, or a Marine Corps Second Lieutenant, or a Navy Ensign. O-2, or 
officer level 2, signifies an Army, an Air Force, or a Marine Corps 
First Lieutenant, or a Navy Lieutenant Junior Grade. O-3, or Officer 
level 3, signifies an Army, an Air Force, or a Marine Corps Captain, 
or a Navy Lieutenant. 

[12] 10 U.S.C. § 2154(a). 

[13] The O-4 rank denotes the fourth level of commissioned military 
officer ranking, the title for which varies among the services. O-4, 
or officer level 4, signifies an Army, an Air Force, or a Marine Corps 
Major, or a Navy Lieutenant Commander. The O-5 and O-6 ranks denote 
the fifth and the sixth levels of commissioned military officer 
ranking, the titles for which vary among the services. O-5, or officer 
level 5, signifies an Army, an Air Force, or a Marine Corps Lieutenant 
Colonel, or a Navy Commander. O-6, or officer level 6, signifies an 
Army, an Air Force, or a Marine Corps Colonel, or a Navy Captain. 

[14] 10 U.S.C. §§ 2151(a), 2154(a)(1). 

[15] 10 U.S.C. § 2155. 

[16] 10 U.S.C. § 2155(c). 

[17] General/flag officer denotes rank above the O-6 level, the titles 
for which vary among the services. An officer at this rank in the 
Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps holds the title of Brigadier 
General or higher. A Navy officer at this level holds the title of 
Rear Admiral Lower Half or higher. 

[18] 10 U.S.C. § 2153. 

[19] Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Enlisted Professional Military Education Policy, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1805.01A (Oct. 1, 2010). 

[20] The general pay grade structure for enlisted personnel runs from 
E-1 through E-9. 

[21] See 10 U.S.C § 666. 

[22] Joint Force 2020--outlined in the September 10, 2012 Capstone 
Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020--is the concept behind 
the Chairman's plan for the future force. 

[23] The Officer Professional Military Education continuum, and 
similarly the Enlisted Professional Military Education continuum, is a 
graphic representation of key elements of career-long officer (and 
enlisted) education that takes into consideration educational 
institutions and course curricula. 

[24] We discuss DOD's efforts to address the MECC's recommendations 
later in this report. 

[25] The Enlisted Military Education Review Council (EMERC) serves as 
an advisory body to the Joint Staff's Deputy Director for Military 
Education on enlisted joint education issues. The EMERC addresses 
issues of interest to the joint education community, promotes 
cooperation and collaboration among EMERC member institutions, and 
coordinates joint education initiatives. 

[26] CJCSI 1800.01D. 

[27] CJCSI 1805.01A. 

[28] GAO, Designing Evaluation: 2012 Revision, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-208G] (Washington, D.C.: January 
2012). 

[29] RAND Corporation, Standards for High-Quality Research and 
Analysis (Santa Monica, Calif.: November 2011). 

[30] Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades 
After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel 

[31] Joint Staff J-7 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), 
Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of 
Operations (Suffolk, VA: June 15, 2012). 

[32] In support of the Chairman's Joint Lessons Learned Program, and 
as directed, the Joint Staff J7 Joint and Coalition Operational 
Analysis (JCOA) Division collects, aggregates, analyzes, and 
disseminates joint lessons learned and best practices across the range 
of military operations in order to enhance joint capabilities. JCOA 
examined over 400 findings, observations, and best practices to 
identify enduring lessons that can inform future joint force 
development in its Decade of War, Volume I study. 

[33] Maren Leed and David Sokolow, The Ingenuity Gap: Officer 
Management for the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2010). 

[34] John A. Nagl and Brian M. Burton, Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing 
America's Military Officer Corps (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New 
American Security, 2010). 

[35] Standards for High-Quality Research and Analysis. 

[36] According to the MECC's report, the peer-review PAJE process is 
conducted every 6 years and the reports provide a continuous, systemic 
examination of the health of the JPME system. The institutional self-
studies are detailed assessments and form the foundation for the PAJE 
on-site visits. 

[37] The MECC report states that because the vast majority of data 
concerning joint education have been focused on the statutorily 
mandated levels of JPME for officers (JPME Phase 1, JPME Phase II, and 
CAPSTONE), the data analysis portion of the second objective focuses 
solely on those programs. 

[38] GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and 
Development Efforts in the Federal Government, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G] (Washington, D.C.: March 
2004). 

[39] The 27 officer and enlisted programs surveyed as part of the gap 
analysis data collection included two precommissioning level, ten 
intermediate level, eight senior level and CAPSTONE programs, and six 
senior enlisted programs. According to the MECC's report, data were 
requested from primary schools but omitted from analysis due to time 
constraints. 

[40] We did not independently assess the responses of the 27 programs 
or the MECC's determinations of any gaps as part of our review. For 
the purposes of our review, we have found that conducting a gap 
analysis is a leading practice and reviewed the MECC's approach 
accordingly. 

[41] GAO, GAO Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project 
Schedules, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-120G] 
(Washington, D.C.: May 2012). 

[42] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G]. 

[43] The MECC report states that the existing JPME process implements 
an adult learning model that comes at the high price of small class 
sizes and small student-to-faculty ratios. Most courses for junior 
officers and enlisted personnel do not have the resources to support 
this model; thus adding more joint education in officer and enlisted 
policy could pose challenges at all levels. 

[44] Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades 
After the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and the Skelton Panel Study of 
1989. 

[45] The House Armed Services Committee's study was focused on 
professional military education as a whole, of which joint 
professional military education is a subset. 

[46] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-546G]. 

[47] GAO, Environmental Justice: EPA Needs to Take Additional Actions 
to Help Ensure Effective Implementation, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-77] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 6, 
2011). 

[End of section] 

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