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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

May 2013: 

Defense Infrastructure: 

DOD Should Improve Reporting and Communication on Its Corrosion 
Prevention and Control Activities: 

GAO-13-270: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-270, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

According to DOD, corrosion can significantly affect the cost of 
facility maintenance and the expected service life of DOD facilities. 
While corrosion is not always highly visible, it can lead to 
structural failure, loss of capital investment, and environmental 
damage. In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed DOD’s 
corrosion prevention and control program for facilities and 
infrastructure. In this report, GAO assessed the extent that DOD (1) 
met reporting requirements, (2) maintained accurate return-on-
investment data in its records, and (3) fully informed relevant 
officials of its corrosion-control efforts. GAO reviewed DOD policies 
and plans, met with corrosion-control officials, and visited and 
interviewed officials at 32 installations. 

What GAO Found: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) has invested more than $68 million in
80 projects in fiscal years 2005 through 2010 to demonstrate new 
technology addressing infrastructure-related corrosion, but project 
managers have not submitted all required reports on the results of 
these efforts to the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office (Corrosion 
Office). The DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan 
requires project managers to submit a final report when a project is 
complete, and submit a follow-on report within two years after the 
military department implements the technology. As of November 2012, 
GAO found that project managers had not submitted final reports for 50 
of the 80 projects (63 percent) funded in fiscal years 2005 through 
2010. Also, project managers had not submitted follow-on reports for 
15 of the 41 projects (37 percent) funded in fiscal years 2005 through 
2007. GAO found that the Corrosion Office’s tracking system lacks key 
information to help ensure that project managers meet reporting 
requirements. Furthermore, the Corrosion Office is not fully 
exercising its authority to identify and implement options or 
incentives to address funding and other reasons given for not meeting 
reporting milestones. Also, GAO found inconsistency among the military 
departments’ Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives’ (Corrosion 
Executives) in holding project managers accountable for submitting the 
required reports. Without effective actions to ensure timely 
submission of final and follow-on reports, decision makers may be 
unaware of potentially useful technologies to address corrosion. 

The Corrosion Office maintains records on its infrastructure-related 
corrosion projects, including initial and reassessed return-on-
investment estimates, for internal and external reporting, such as in 
DOD’s annual budget report to Congress. GAO found that the Corrosion 
Office’s records showed updates to the initial estimates for the 
proposed projects, but the office has not consistently updated its 
records to show the reassessed estimates included in the follow-on 
reports. Specifically, GAO found that the Corrosion Office did not 
update data in its records for 5 of 25 projects (20 percent) with 
completed follow-on reports. Federal internal control standards 
require agencies to use internal controls to provide assurance that 
they have reliable financial and other reports for internal and 
external use. Without accurate and timely data, Congress and DOD 
managers may not have reliable information on the estimated return on 
investment as they oversee corrosion projects. 

DOD’s Corrosion Executives use mechanisms, such as briefings and site 
visits, to collect and disseminate information on corrosion-control 
activities in their departments; however, GAO found that slightly more 
than half of public works officials interviewed at 32 installations 
were unaware of DOD’s corrosion-related offices and resources. Under 
federal statute, Corrosion Executives are tasked with coordinating 
corrosion activities in their departments. GAO found that many 
relevant service officials interviewed did not receive key corrosion-
control information because their Corrosion Executives do not have 
targeted communication strategies and accompanying action plans. 
Without a strategy and action plan, managers of facilities and 
infrastructure may not have access to all available information on 
efficient methods for corrosion prevention and control. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends five actions to improve DOD’s project reporting and 
tracking, the accuracy of its return-on-investment data, and its 
communication with stakeholders on corrosion-control activities for 
facilities and other infrastructure. DOD partially concurred with 
three recommendations and did not agree with two. DOD plans to 
implement a web-based tracking tool to improve data timeliness and 
standardization, among other actions. GAO continues to believe that 
its recommendations to improve project reporting are warranted, that 
the Corrosion Office should use its existing authorities to identify 
and implement other incentives for project managers to meet reporting 
milestones and that DOD should revise its guidance so that Corrosion 
Executives would assist with the oversight of project reporting. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-270]. For more 
information, contact James R. McTigue Jr. at (202) 512-7968 or 
mctiguej@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DOD Has Not Ensured the Submission of All Reports on the Results of 
Its Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Projects: 

Corrosion Office Has Not Updated All Records to Accurately Reflect the 
Return-On-Investment Estimates in the Military Departments' Follow-On 
Reports: 

Corrosion Executives Have Mechanisms to Disseminate Information, but 
Have Not Ensured That All Relevant Service Officials Receive Key 
Corrosion-Control Information: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: DOD Studies on the Cost of Corrosion for Facilities and 
Other Infrastructure: 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Returns on Investment for DOD's Infrastructure-Related 
Corrosion Technology Demonstration Projects: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Status of Final Reports for the 80 Infrastructure-Related 
Corrosion Projects Funded in Fiscal Years 2005 through 2010: 

Table 2: Status of Follow-On Reports for the 41 Infrastructure-Related 
Corrosion Projects Funded in Fiscal Years 2005 through 2007: 

Table 3: Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Projects That Had 
Discrepancies between the Reassessed Return-on-Investment Estimates in 
the Follow-on Reports and the Estimates Contained in Corrosion Office 
Records: 

Table 4: Estimated Expenditures to Address Corrosion of DOD Facilities 
and Other Infrastructure (by Maintenance Categories for Fiscal Year 
2008; $ in Millions): 

Table 5: Military Departments' Original Return-on-Investment Estimates 
in Project Plans Compared to Return on Investment Shown in Follow-on 
Reports: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Timeline for Project Submissions: 

Figure 2: Breakout of the Number of Projects That Reached Various 
Reporting Milestones (as of November 2012): 

Figure 3: Selected Installations Where GAO Interviewed Facilities and 
Other Infrastructure Officials: 

Abbreviation: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 
441 G St. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 31, 2013: 

The Honorable Robert Wittman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Madeleine Z. Bordallo: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Readiness: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable J. Randy Forbes: 
House of Representatives: 

In 2013 the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that the estimated 
cost of corrosion was about $20.8 billion annually to prevent and 
mitigate corrosion of all of its assets, including military equipment, 
weapons, and facilities and other infrastructure.[Footnote 1] While 
the vast majority of these costs are related to corrosion issues on 
military equipment and weapons, the cost of corrosion at DOD 
facilities and other infrastructure[Footnote 2] was estimated to be 
about $1.9 billion annually.[Footnote 3] The vast size of DOD's real-
estate portfolio of more than 555,000 facilities--including barracks, 
commissaries, data centers, office buildings, laboratories, 
maintenance depots, storage tanks, and piers--and linear structures, 
such as pipelines, roads, and runways, on more than 28-million acres 
provides additional challenges for DOD in preventing and repairing 
damage from corrosion of its infrastructure. Corrosion is defined in 
Section 2228 of Title 10 of the United States Code as the 
deterioration of a material or its properties due to a reaction of 
that material with its chemical environment.[Footnote 4] Corrosion is 
not always highly visible; nevertheless, it can lead to structural 
failure, loss of capital investment, and environmental damage. 

Congress has taken a series of legislative actions aimed at enhancing 
DOD's ability to effectively address corrosion prevention and 
mitigation and provide the Congress with greater transparency over the 
department's efforts. In 2002, Congress passed legislation that led to 
the creation of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight 
(hereafter referred to as the Corrosion Office) within the Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics. The Corrosion Office is responsible for the prevention and 
mitigation of corrosion of military equipment and infrastructure. 
[Footnote 5] Among other things, Section 2228 of Title 10 of the 
United States Code requires the Secretary of Defense to develop and 
implement a long-term strategy to reduce corrosion and the effects of 
corrosion on the military equipment and infrastructure of the 
department, including, among other things, (1) expansion of emphasis 
on corrosion prevention and mitigation to include infrastructure; (2) 
uniform application of requirements and criteria for testing and 
certifying new technologies for equipment and infrastructure with 
similar characteristics, missions or operating environments; and (3) 
implementation of programs to ensure a focused and coordinated 
approach to collect, review, validate, and distribute information on 
proven corrosion prevention methods and products. Additionally, the 
statute requires the Secretary of Defense to annually submit, along 
with the defense budget materials, a report to Congress on corrosion 
funding, including funding requirements for the long-term strategy, 
and including the returns on investment[Footnote 6] for corrosion-
control technology demonstration projects. 

In 2008, section 903 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 required the Departments of 
Army, Navy and Air Force to each designate a Corrosion Control and 
Prevention Executive (hereafter referred to as Corrosion Executive) to 
be the senior official in each military department with responsibility 
for coordinating department-level corrosion prevention and control 
program activities.[Footnote 7] Section 903, among other things, 
assigned responsibility to the three Corrosion Executives for (1) 
coordinating department-level corrosion prevention and control 
activities (including budget programming) with the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, the program executive officers of the military 
departments, and relevant major subordinate commands of each military 
department; (2) ensuring that corrosion prevention and control is 
maintained in each department's policy and guidance, including 
military infrastructure design, construction, and maintenance; (3) 
identifying the funding levels necessary for accomplishing certain 
corrosion-related priorities in each department, and (4) submitting an 
annual report to the Secretary of Defense with recommendations 
pertaining to the corrosion prevention and control program of each 
department. Section 903 also designated each military department's 
Corrosion Executive as that department's principal point of contact 
with the Director of the Corrosion Office. 

To carry out its responsibilities, the Corrosion Office took a number 
of actions, including the development of an instruction to establish 
policy, assign responsibilities and provide guidance for corrosion 
prevention and control within DOD; and development of a strategic plan 
to describe policies, strategies, objectives and plans aimed toward an 
effective DOD-wide approach to prevent and mitigate corrosion of 
military equipment and infrastructure. Additionally, the Corrosion 
Office and military departments have identified and funded corrosion 
projects in which the military departments demonstrated new technology 
to address corrosion, and the Corrosion Office has required military 
departments' project managers to submit periodic reports on the status 
and outcomes of these projects. 

We have examined DOD's corrosion issues for a number of years and this 
is our first report focusing on DOD's corrosion-control activities for 
DOD facilities and other infrastructure, including projects to 
demonstrate new technology that can prevent or mitigate corrosion. 
[Footnote 8] In response to your request, GAO reviewed DOD's corrosion 
prevention and mitigation program for facilities and other 
infrastructure. This report addresses (1) the extent to which the 
military services have met DOD requirements to submit reports on 
corrosion technology demonstration projects; (2) the extent to which 
the return-on-investment data submitted by the military departments is 
accurately reflected in records maintained by the Corrosion Office; 
and (3) the extent to which DOD's corrosion-control officials have 
fully informed relevant officials within each department about efforts 
to prevent and mitigate corrosion of facilities and other 
infrastructure. We also provide information on the results of the 
Corrosion Office-sponsored cost-of-corrosion studies of DOD facilities 
and other infrastructure (see appendix I).[Footnote 9] 

To address our first objective, we obtained project information on 80 
infrastructure-related corrosion projects proposed by the military 
departments and approved for funding by the Corrosion Office for 
fiscal years 2005 through 2010.[Footnote 10] We reviewed project 
documentation--project plans, bimonthly or quarterly status reports, 
final project reports, and project follow-on reports--to determine if 
reports were submitted and the data met the Corrosion Office's 
reporting requirements. To assess the reliability of the data, we met 
with Corrosion Office officials to identify the process by which DOD 
generated and tracked project data, and we reviewed the documents for 
any missing data, outliers, or other errors. If the military 
departments did not provide the required information, we interviewed 
the Corrosion Executives and the military departments' research and 
development officials (project managers)--who were the principal 
authors and points of contact for the facilities and other 
infrastructure projects--to determine their rationale for not 
completing the required reports. According to the DOD Corrosion 
Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan, a final report must be 
submitted when each demonstration project is completed. According to 
Corrosion Office officials, each demonstration project typically is 
completed within two years after the receipt of funding. For the 
purposes of our work in reviewing projects funded in fiscal years 2005 
through 2010, we considered a final report to be submitted if the 
Corrosion Office had a copy of the report in its records system. We 
did not consider the timeliness of the submitted reports. 
Additionally, the DOD strategic plan requires that follow-on reports 
be submitted for completed projects within two years after the 
projects have been completed and transitioned to use within the 
military departments According to Corrosion Office officials, the 
transition period to implement the demonstrated technology in a 
military department can be up to one year. As a result, for follow-on 
reports, we could assess only the projects funded in fiscal years 2005 
through 2007 (41 of the 80 projects). For completed projects, we 
documented the initial return-on-investment estimates shown in the 
project plans and the resulting change, if any, shown in the follow-on 
reports. We determined that the project reporting data was 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining the extent to 
which the military departments met the Corrosion Office's reporting 
requirements, but we did not determine the timeliness of the reports 
or assess elements of reports. 

The DOD strategic plan uses the phrase "return-on-investment 
validation" to describe how project managers recompute the return-on-
investment estimate included in a project's follow-on report. This 
recomputation is based on revised cost data after the project has been 
completed and the new technology has been transitioned to the 
services' use and tracked for two years. We are using the terms 
"reassessment" or "reassessed" rather than "validation" or "validated" 
because they more closely describe the process that the project 
managers are to use to review and update, if necessary, the 
assumptions used to recompute the initial return-on-investment 
estimate. Additionally, Corrosion Office officials told us that they 
are planning to use the term "reassessment" in the revised DOD 
strategic plan. The reassessment is not an update based on actual 
results of the cost savings achieved by the project. 

To address our second objective, for all 105 infrastructure-related 
corrosion projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2012, we 
compared the return-on-investment estimates found in the project plans 
with the return-on-investment estimates maintained in the Corrosion 
Office's records to determine if any inconsistencies existed in the 
data. When we found inconsistencies between the return-on-investment 
estimates in the project plans and the Corrosion Office's records, we 
asked the Corrosion Office to explain the inconsistencies and provide 
additional information to help reconcile the differences in the 
estimates. Further, we compared the return-on-investment estimates 
maintained in the Corrosion Office's records for projects funded in 
fiscal years 2005 through 2007 with the return-on-investment estimates 
contained in the military departments' follow-on reports to check for 
any differences between the two sets of records. 

To address our third objective, we reviewed related guidance, 
documents, policies, and procedures regarding the management of DOD's 
corrosion prevention and mitigation program. We interviewed officials 
at various levels within DOD--Corrosion Office officials, Corrosion 
Executives, the military services' installation management commands, 
and facility and infrastructure managers within the services' civil 
engineering and public works components--to discuss their corrosion 
prevention and control efforts, including challenges and successes in 
implementing new corrosion technologies. We selected a nonprobability 
sample of 32 installations; conducted site visits with 6 of these 32 
military installations[Footnote 11] and completed semistructured 
interviews via conference calls with the other 26 military 
installations to collect information and views from facility and 
infrastructure management officials about their corrosion management 
efforts. In selecting the 32 installations for our nonprobability 
sample,[Footnote 12] we limited the installations for selection to 
those active-duty installations with at least 25 buildings owned by 
the federal government and ensured a range of locations were selected 
from each of the four military services and across the geographic 
regions of the United States.[Footnote 13] Our selection criteria also 
included the selection of installations with different environmental 
conditions,[Footnote 14] some joint bases, and installations that 
participated in the Corrosion Office's corrosion technologies 
demonstration projects. The purpose of our semistructured interviews 
was to understand how the installation officials (1) use policies, 
plans, and procedures to identify and address corrosion; (2) address 
corrosion prevention and mitigation; (3) determine their maintenance 
and sustainment priorities; and (4) receive and disseminate 
information on relevant corrosion topics.[Footnote 15] We determined 
that the data used to select the installations included in our review 
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of selecting our 
nonprobability sample. We provide more details about installation 
selection methodology and data-collection efforts in our scope and 
methodology section in appendix II. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to May 2013 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: 

DOD's Strategic Planning and Guidance for Corrosion Prevention and 
Control: 

DOD submitted the first version of its long-term corrosion strategy to 
Congress in December 2003. DOD developed this long-term strategy in 
response to direction in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2003.[Footnote 16] In November 2004, DOD revised 
its long-term corrosion strategy and issued its DOD Corrosion 
Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan. DOD strives to update its 
strategic plan periodically, most recently in February 2011, and 
officials stated the next update in planned for 2013. The purpose of 
DOD's strategic plan is to articulate policies, strategies, objectives 
and plans that will ensure an effective, standardized, affordable DOD-
wide approach to prevent, detect and treat corrosion and its effects 
on military equipment and infrastructure. 

In January 2008, the department first issued DOD Instruction 5000.67, 
Prevention and Mitigation of Corrosion on DOD Military Equipment and 
Infrastructure, which was canceled and reissued with the same title in 
February 2010.[Footnote 17] The stated purpose of the instruction is 
to establish policy, assign responsibilities, and provide guidance for 
the establishment and management of programs to prevent or mitigate 
corrosion of DOD's military equipment and infrastructure. This 
instruction describes legislative requirements and assigns the 
Corrosion Executives responsibility for certain corrosion prevention 
and control activities in their respective military departments. It 
requires the Corrosion Executives to submit information on proposed 
corrosion projects to the Corrosion Office with coordination through 
the proper military department's chain of command, as well as to 
develop support, and provide the rationale for resources to initiate 
and sustain effective corrosion prevention and mitigation programs in 
each military department. 

Corrosion Office Operations: 

According to statute and DOD guidance, the Director of the Corrosion 
Office is responsible for the prevention and mitigation of corrosion 
of DOD equipment and infrastructure. The Director's duties include 
developing and recommending policy guidance on corrosion control, 
reviewing the corrosion-control programs and funding levels proposed 
by the Secretary of each military department during DOD's internal 
annual budget review, and submitting recommendations to the Secretary 
of Defense regarding those programs and proposed funding levels. In 
addition, the Director of the Corrosion Office periodically holds 
meetings with the DOD Corrosion Board of Directors and serves as the 
lead on the Corrosion Prevention and Control Integrated Product Team. 
[Footnote 18] The Corrosion Prevention and Control Integrated Product 
Team includes representatives from the military departments, the Joint 
Staff, and other stakeholders who help accomplish the various 
corrosion-control goals and objectives. This team also includes the 
seven Working Integrated Product Teams which implement corrosion 
prevention and control activities. These seven product teams are 
organized to address the following areas: corrosion policy, processes, 
procedures and oversight; metrics, impact, and sustainment; 
specifications, standards, and qualification process; training and 
certification; communications and outreach; science and technology; 
and facilities. Appendix A of the DOD Corrosion Prevention and 
Mitigation Strategic Plan contains action plans for each product team, 
including policies, objectives, strategies, planned actions and 
results to date. 

To accomplish its oversight and coordination responsibilities, the 
Corrosion Office has ongoing efforts to improve the awareness, 
prevention and mitigation of corrosion of military equipment and 
infrastructure, including (1) hosting triannual corrosion forums; (2) 
conducting cost-of-corrosion studies; (3) operating two corrosion 
websites; (4) publishing an electronic newsletter; (5) working with 
industry and academia to develop training courses and new corrosion 
technologies; and (6) providing funding for corrosion-control 
demonstration projects proposed and implemented by the military 
departments. According to the Corrosion Office, these corrosion 
activities enhance and institutionalize the corrosion prevention and 
mitigation program within DOD. 

To receive funding from the Corrosion Office, the military departments 
submit project plans for their proposed projects that are evaluated by 
a panel of experts assembled by the Director of the Corrosion Office. 
The Corrosion Office generally funds up to $500,000 per project, and 
the military departments generally pledge matching funding for each 
project that they propose.[Footnote 19] The level of funding by each 
military department and the estimated return on investment are two of 
the criteria used to evaluate the proposed projects. Appendix D of the 
DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan includes 
instructions for submitting project plans, along with instructions for 
submission of final and follow-on reports. For the project selection 
process, the military departments submit preliminary project proposals 
in the fall and final project proposals in the spring, and the 
Corrosion Office considers the final proposals for funding. Projects 
that meet the Corrosion Office's criteria for funding are announced at 
the end of the fiscal year. Figure 1 provides additional details of 
the project selection process for a given fiscal year. 

Figure 1: Timeline for Project Submissions: 

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline] 

Within fiscal year: 

Early October: 
Corrosion Office data call to military departments for preliminary 
projects and cost estimates to help the Corrosion Office determine its 
funding requirements for its annual budget materials report. 

Late October to late December: 
Military departments deliver preliminary projects input with cost 
estimates to the Corrosion Office. 

February: 
DOD submits its budget; Corrosion Office's budget materials report due 
to Congress. 

Early April: 
Corrosion Office data call to military departments for actual project 
proposals. 

Early to mid-June: 
Military departments submit project plans to Corrosion Office. 

Mid-June to mid-August: 
Project submissions go through various levels of review by DOD. 

Early September: 
Corrosion Office announces approved projects. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

As part of the project selection process, DOD's strategic plan states 
that the estimated return on investment, among other things, must be 
documented for each proposed project. The total cost for each project 
is based on both the funding requested from the Corrosion Office and 
the funding provided by the military departments. DOD records reflect 
varying estimated returns on investment and savings for each proposed 
project submitted by the military departments. According to the 
Corrosion Office, a senior official within each military department 
reviews the proposed projects, including the estimated return on 
investment, before the project plans are submitted to the Corrosion 
Office. Section 2228 of Title 10 of the United States Code requires 
the Secretary of Defense to include the expected return on investment 
that would be achieved by implementing the department's long-term 
strategy for corrosion, including available validated data on return 
on investment for completed corrosion projects and activities, in his 
annual corrosion-control budget report to Congress. 

Reporting Requirements: 

DOD's strategic plan stipulates three reporting requirements for 
approved projects. According to Corrosion Office officials, the 
project managers typically are responsible for completing the 
reporting requirements. The requirements are to: (1) provide bimonthly 
or quarterly project updates until the project is completed,[Footnote 
20] (2) submit a final report as soon as each project is completed, 
[Footnote 21] and (3) submit a follow-on report within two years after 
a project is completed and the technology has transitioned to use 
within the military department.[Footnote 22] 

Figure 2 provides a breakout of the number of projects that have 
reached various reporting milestones as of November 2012. There were 
105 infrastructure-related corrosion projects funded from fiscal years 
2005 through 2012, in which: 

* 41 projects had reached the milestone for submitting final and 
follow-on reports, including return-on-investment reassessments; 

* 39 projects had reached only the milestone for submitting final 
reports; and: 

* 25 projects were not yet complete, thus they have not reached the 
milestone for submitting final or follow-on reports. 

Figure 2: Breakout of the Number of Projects That Reached Various 
Reporting Milestones (as of November 2012): 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Infrastructure-related demonstration projects: Fiscal years 2005-2012: 

105 funded projects: 

* 41 projects: FY 2005-2007; Years 5+; 
* 39 projects: FY 2008-2010; Years 3 and 4; 
* 25 projects: FY 2011-2012; Years 1 and 2; 25 projects had not 
reached the milestone for submitting final or follow-on reports. 

80 projects had reached milestone for submitting final reports: 
* 41 projects: FY 2005-2007; Years 5+; 
* 39 projects: FY 2008-2010; Years 3 and 4. 

41 projects had reached milestone for submitting follow-on reports: 

* 41 projects: FY 2005-2007; Years 5+. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Prior GAO Work on DOD's Corrosion Prevention and Control Program: 

In September 2012, we reported that the Corrosion Office performs an 
analysis to determine the average return-on-investment estimates for 
projects that it cites in its annual corrosion-control budget report 
to Congress.[Footnote 23] Additionally, we reported that the Corrosion 
Office did not use the most up-to-date data for the projects' returns 
on investment or provide support for the projects' average return on 
investment that was cited in its fiscal year 2013 corrosion-control 
budget report to Congress. We recommended that DOD provide an 
explanation of its return-on-investment methodology and analysis, 
including the initial and, to the extent available, the reassessed 
return-on-investment estimates. However, DOD did not agree with our 
recommendation. In its written comments, DOD generally restated the 
methodology in its strategic plan, which the military departments use 
to estimate the projected return on investment of each project. DOD 
did not provide any additional reasons why it did not use current 
return-on-investment estimates in its report to Congress. 
Additionally, in our December 2010 review, we recommended that DOD 
update applicable guidance, such as Instruction 5000.67, to further 
define the responsibilities of the Corrosion Executives to include 
more specific oversight and review of corrosion project plans before 
and during the selection process.[Footnote 24] However, DOD did not 
agree with our recommendation and stated that DOD-level policy 
documents are high-level documents that delineate responsibilities to 
carry out the policy and that specific implementing guidance is 
provided through separate documentation. Further, in some of our 
earlier work, we reported that the secretaries of the military 
departments did not have procedures and milestones to hold major 
commands and program offices accountable for achieving strategic goals 
to address corrosion regarding facilities and weapons systems. 
[Footnote 25] DOD agreed with our recommendations to define and 
incorporate measurable, outcome-oriented objectives and performance 
measures into its long-term corrosion mitigation strategy that show 
progress toward achieving results. Additionally, in May 2013 GAO 
issued a separate report assessing DOD's and the military departments' 
strategic plans.[Footnote 26] All the related GAO products are listed 
at the end of this report. 

DOD Has Not Ensured the Submission of All Reports on the Results of 
Its Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Projects: 

DOD has not ensured that all final and follow-on reports on the 
results of its infrastructure-related corrosion projects were 
submitted as required by its strategic plan. As of November 2012, our 
review found that project managers had not submitted the required 
final reports for 50 of the 80 projects (over 60 percent) funded from 
fiscal years 2005 through 2010. Also, for 41 of the 80 projects that 
were funded from 2005 through 2007, we found that the project managers 
had not submitted the required follow-on reports for more than a third 
of the projects (15 of the 41 projects). DOD's Corrosion Office, the 
military departments' Corrosion Executives, and the military 
departments' project managers cited various reasons for not meeting 
reporting milestones. DOD's Corrosion Office has not effectively used 
its existing authority to hold project management offices accountable 
for submitting required reports at prescribed milestones and the 
office lacks an effective method for tracking reports submitted by the 
project managers. Moreover, DOD has not provided clear guidance to the 
military departments' Corrosion Executives on their responsibilities 
and authorities for assisting the Corrosion Office in holding their 
project management offices accountable for submitting reports for 
their infrastructure-related corrosion projects. 

Project Managers Have Not Submitted Many Final and Follow-On Reports: 

DOD has invested more than $68 million in 80 infrastructure-related 
corrosion projects funded from fiscal years 2005 through 2010, but 
project managers have not submitted all of the required reports on 
whether the corrosion-control technologies are effective.[Footnote 27] 
DOD's strategic plan[Footnote 28] states that project plans should 
include a milestone schedule for reporting, including quarterly status 
reports, final reports and follow-on reports. According to Corrosion 
Office officials, if a project is approved, a quarterly status report 
is required starting the first week of the fiscal quarter after the 
contract award and every three months thereafter until the final 
report is submitted.[Footnote 29] Also, DOD's strategic plan requires 
a final report at project completion, and requires a follow-on report 
two years after project completion and transition to use within the 
military departments. According to Corrosion Office officials, these 
reports provide valuable information on the results of corrosion 
projects and in planning future projects. 

Over 60 Percent of Final Reports Have Not Been Submitted: 

Corrosion Office officials stated that project managers must submit 
final reports at project completion, which is typically within two 
years after the receipt of the funding of each project. As stipulated 
in DOD's strategic plan, final reports should include certain content, 
such as an executive summary, lessons learned, recommendations, and 
conclusions. However, we found that 50 of the 80 required final 
reports (63 percent) for projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 
2010 had not been submitted. Table 1 shows the status of final reports 
submitted by each service for infrastructure-related projects. 

Table 1: Status of Final Reports for the 80 Infrastructure-Related 
Corrosion Projects Funded in Fiscal Years 2005 through 2010: 

Military department: Army; 
Total number of projects: 55; 
Number of submitted final reports: 21; 
Number of outstanding final reports: 34; 
Percent of outstanding final reports: 62%. 

Military department: Navy; 
Total number of projects: 24; 
Number of submitted final reports: 9; 
Number of outstanding final reports: 15; 
Percent of outstanding final reports: 63%. 

Military department: Air Force; 
Total number of projects: 1; 
Number of submitted final reports: 0; 
Number of outstanding final reports: 1; 
Percent of outstanding final reports: 100%. 

Military department: Total; 
Total number of projects: 80; 
Number of submitted final reports: 30; 
Number of outstanding final reports: 50; 
Percent of outstanding final reports: 63%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Data as of November 2012. 

[End of table] 

More than a Third of Follow-On Reports Have Not Been Submitted: 

DOD's strategic plan also requires that follow-on reports be submitted 
within two years after a project is completed and transitioned to use 
in the military department. According to Corrosion Office officials, 
this transition period includes up to one year to implement the 
technology in a military department. Corrosion Office officials also 
told us that they expected the follow-on reports to be submitted 
within five years of a project's initial funding. Therefore, follow-on 
reports for 41 completed projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 
2007 were due on or before the end of fiscal year 2012. We found that 
project managers had not submitted 15 of the 41 required follow-on 
reports (37 percent). DOD's strategic plan states that the follow-on 
reports should include an assessment of the following areas: project 
documentation, project assumptions, responses to mission requirements, 
performance expectations, and a comparison between the initial return-
on-investment estimate included in the project plan with the new 
estimate. Table 2 shows the status of follow-on reports submitted by 
each service. In Appendix III of this report, we provide details of 
the returns on investment for all follow-on reports that were 
submitted.[Footnote 30] 

Table 2: Status of Follow-On Reports for the 41 Infrastructure-Related 
Corrosion Projects Funded in Fiscal Years 2005 through 2007: 

Military department: Army; 
Total number of projects: 28; 
Number of submitted follow-on reports: 15; 
Number of outstanding follow-on reports: 13; 
Percent of outstanding follow-on reports: 46%. 

Military department: Navy; 
Total number of projects: 12; 
Number of submitted follow-on reports: 11; 
Number of outstanding follow-on reports: 1; 
Percent of outstanding follow-on reports: 8%. 

Military department: Air Force; 
Total number of projects: 1; 
Number of submitted follow-on reports: 0; 
Number of outstanding follow-on reports: 1; 
Percent of outstanding follow-on reports: 100%. 

Military department: Total; 
Total number of projects: 41; 
Number of submitted follow-on reports: 26; 
Number of outstanding follow-on reports: 15; 
Percent of outstanding follow-on reports: 37%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: The total of 26 submitted follow-on reports includes one Army 
project that did not warrant the completion of a follow-on report, 
according to its final report. Data as of November 2012. 

[End of table] 

According to officials in the Corrosion Office, final and follow-on 
reports are used to assess the effectiveness of the corrosion projects 
and determine if continued implementation of the technology is useful. 
As Corrosion Office officials review project managers' final reports, 
they stated that they focus on any lessons learned, technical 
findings, conclusions and recommendations, and whether the results 
from the report should trigger follow-on investigations of specific 
technology and a review for broader applications of the technology. 
Officials stated that they review follow-on reports to assure that 
necessary implementation actions have been taken and to review changes 
in the return-on-investment estimates. 

Corrosion Office and Military Departments Cited Various Reasons for 
Project Managers Not Submitting Reports: 

The military departments and Corrosion Office provided various reasons 
to explain why project managers did not complete and submit mandatory 
final and follow-on reports within expected timeframes. For example, 
officials at the Army Engineering Research Development Center, 
Construction Engineering Research Laboratory--who are the project 
managers for Army infrastructure projects--stated that funding 
challenges, problems with contractor performance, and personnel issues 
contributed to delays in completing the final reports, but 
acknowledged that it was their responsibility to reduce their 
longstanding backlog. Additionally, according to the Navy's Corrosion 
Executive, officials of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
(Engineering Support Center)--who are the project managers for Navy 
infrastructure projects--did not have sufficient funding to complete 
and submit all required reports. Finally, according to a Corrosion 
Office official, the final report for the one Air Force fiscal year 
2005 project was not submitted because the project manager did not 
complete it before retiring. 

Additionally, Corrosion Office officials cited other reasons that a 
project manager may be late in completing the required reports, such 
as lengthy coordination processes and the lack of priority that 
military departments' officials place on completing required reports. 
The officials stated that they expect the military departments' 
project managers to complete final reports within two years after 
receipt of funds, and it is the military departments' responsibility 
to plan so that funding is available to complete all required reports. 
To assist the military departments with their responsibility, the 
Corrosion Office in fiscal year 2011 offered personnel and funding 
resources to the military departments to conduct the return-on-
investment reassessments needed to complete follow-on reports. 
According to the Corrosion Office, only the Navy accepted the funds to 
complete all but one return-on-investment reassessment. According to 
an official in the Army Corrosion Executive's office, he informed the 
project managers about the additional funding, but no one accepted the 
offer. We found at least four fiscal year 2006 projects where Army 
project managers did not use the available funding to complete and 
submit the required reports. Officials from the Army's project 
management office told us that the project managers did not accept the 
additional funding to complete the 2006 projects because they had some 
work performance issues with the contractor assigned to complete the 
return-on-investment reassessments. In April 2012, these officials 
told us that follow-on reports for three projects were written but 
have not been submitted to the Corrosion Office, and the remaining 
follow-on report was still under development. As of November 2012, we 
found that these reports, which were due by the end of fiscal year 
2011, still had not been submitted to the Corrosion Office. Further, 
the Air Force did not complete the follow-on report for its one 
corrosion project funded in fiscal year 2005. According to Corrosion 
Office officials, they did not require the Air Force to complete the 
follow-on report for this project because the demonstration was 
successful and the technology was implemented elsewhere within DOD. 

Corrosion Office's Tracking System Does Not Ensure That Project 
Managers Submit Required Reports: 

Corrosion Office officials told us that they track each corrosion 
project's progress and review submitted final and follow-on reports 
for findings and broad application of corrosion-prevention techniques 
and approaches, including changes in the project's initial and 
reassessed return-on-investment estimates. However, the Corrosion 
Office's tracking system is limited and does not record the reason for 
late reporting or set new reporting deadlines. According to Section 
2228 of Title 10 of the United States Code, the Secretary of Defense 
is required to report specific information including the expected 
return on investment that would be achieved by implementing the 
department's long-term strategy for corrosion, including available 
validated data on return on investment for completed corrosion 
projects and activities, in his annual corrosion-control budget report 
to Congress. The Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government require federal managers to establish internal control 
activities, such as controls over information processing, segregation 
of duties, and accurate and timely recording of transactions and 
events--including pertinent information to determine whether they are 
meeting their goals--to help ensure that management's directives are 
carried out and managers achieve desired results through effective 
stewardship of public resources.[Footnote 31] 

Specifically, the Corrosion Office employs a contractor to maintain 
electronic records about all corrosion projects. Corrosion Office 
officials stated that project managers submit copies of their reports 
to the Corrosion Office and to the respective Corrosion Executive. On 
a monthly basis, the contractor checks each project's records to 
determine if the project managers have submitted the required reports. 
If a project manager has not submitted a required report, the 
contractor notifies the Corrosion Office and that office contacts the 
relevant project manager and that manager's Corrosion Executive. At 
that point, a Corrosion Office official encourages project managers to 
submit the report as soon as possible, but the Corrosion Office does 
not record a reason for late reporting and does not set a new 
reporting deadline. Also, the Corrosion Office officials stated that 
they elevate discussions about late filers in the three forums held 
each year that include meetings between Corrosion Office officials and 
Corrosion Executives. However, the Corrosion Office's tracking system 
does not require that the project managers include certain 
information, such as stating reasons for missing a reporting deadline 
and identifying a revised deadline for submitting their reports. 
Additionally, the format developed by the Corrosion Office for 
completing the follow-on reports does not include a data field that 
would document when the project managers submitted their follow-on 
reports to the office. By not adopting an enhanced tracking system 
that includes revised deadlines, among other things, the Corrosion 
Office is unable to effectively monitor whether project managers are 
working toward new timeframes to complete overdue reports. Without 
effective tracking, the Corrosion Office will allow a number of 
project managers to continue the practice of not submitting the 
required reports and project managers will not fully inform decision 
makers of the latest outcomes of the corrosion-control projects. 

Corrosion Office Uses Routine Communication Methods to Encourage 
Project Management Offices to Submit Required Reports, but Has Not 
Employed Other Options: 

Section 2228 of Title 10 of the United States Code requires the 
Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a long-term corrosion 
strategy that should include, among other things, implementation of 
programs to ensure a focused and coordinated approach to collect, 
review, validate, and distribute information on proven corrosion 
prevention methods and products. In response to this requirement, the 
Corrosion Office oversees corrosion projects and uses routine 
communication methods and follow-up to encourage the project 
management offices to submit the required reports, but the office is 
not employing other options that would hold project management offices 
accountable for reporting milestones. For example, Corrosion Office 
officials stated that they have initiated telephone conversations and 
e-mails to project managers to reemphasize reporting requirements and 
have had limited success in obtaining some of the outstanding reports. 
However, there are other options beyond routine communications that 
the Corrosion Office could take to make project managers accountable 
for submitting timely reports, such as using funding incentives or 
changing evaluation criteria for project selection. Corrosion Office 
officials told us that they considered holding back funding for future 
projects from project management organizations that missed reporting 
deadlines, but they chose not to implement this action because it 
could delay progress in addressing corrosion control within the 
department. Although the Corrosion Office in 2011 offered the military 
departments additional funding to complete and submit follow-on 
reports, Corrosion Office officials stated that they would not set 
aside a portion of its annual funds in the future to assist project 
management offices in the completion of outstanding reports due to 
uncertainty in annual funding. 

Further, a senior Corrosion Office official stated that the office has 
considered but not adopted criteria for new projects that would 
include a project management office's past reporting performance as an 
indicator for assessing corrosion project plans. DOD's strategic plan 
refers to factors that are used by the evaluation panel to assess 
project plans and determine which to approve and fund. The evaluation 
factors, among other things, include whether the proposed project can 
be completed within a two-year timeframe, the risk associated with the 
project, and the estimated return on investment. The senior Corrosion 
Office official told us that the office has considered including a 
factor that would assess a project management office's history of 
reporting performance as a criterion for deciding whether to approve 
and fund the office's future projects; however, the office decided not 
to do so. The official stated that a successful project is one that 
reduces the impact of corrosion on weapon systems and/or 
infrastructure, and a project's report in and of itself does not 
contribute to the success of the project. However, late submissions of 
reports could delay communication of project outcomes as planners are 
considering funding new projects, as well as limit key information 
that should be included in the annual corrosion-control budget report 
to Congress. The Corrosion Office has not implemented other options to 
better ensure that project managers consistently submit required 
reports. Internal control standards emphasize the importance of 
performance-based management to ensure program effectiveness, 
efficiency, and good stewardship of government resources. Without 
using its existing authorities for oversight and coordination to 
identify and implement possible options or incentives for addressing 
the various funding, personnel, or other reasons cited by project 
management offices for not meeting reporting milestones, the Corrosion 
Office may be missing opportunities to effectively reduce the number 
of outstanding reports, enforce requirements, and ensure that the 
valuable information in past projects is known and appropriately 
documented. 

Corrosion Executives Have Not Taken Consistent Actions to Ensure 
Timely Submission of Required Reports: 

The three military departments' Corrosion Executives work with project 
managers for the infrastructure-related corrosion projects to ensure 
that the reporting requirements are being met; however, they have not 
taken effective actions to ensure that all project managers submit 
their required reports on a timely basis. DOD Instruction 5000.67 
describes responsibilities for Corrosion Executives, such as being the 
principal points of contact for each military department to the 
Director of the Corrosion Office, developing, supporting, and 
providing the rationale for resources for initiating and sustaining 
effective corrosion prevention and control in the department, 
evaluating the effectiveness of each department's program, and 
establishing a process to collect information on the results of 
corrosion prevention and control activities. 

While DOD's strategic plan and other guidance--such as its corrosion 
instruction--identify the Corrosion Executives' overall role in the 
management of each military department's corrosion prevention and 
control program, the Corrosion Executives do not have clearly defined 
roles for holding their project managers accountable for submitting 
required reports. During our discussions with the military 
departments' Corrosion Executives, we found that each executive varied 
in describing the extent of his work with corrosion project managers 
to ensure that the required reports are completed. For example, 
officials within the office of the Army's Corrosion Executive told us 
that they are involved in all aspects of the corrosion demonstration 
project and receive updates and reports from the Army's project 
managers. Also, these officials stated that they are in the process of 
developing additional policy on facilities and other infrastructure to 
improve the corrosion project process and provide an Army funding 
mechanism to cover costs of reporting after expiration of initial 
project funding. However, for the infrastructure-related corrosion 
projects, the other two military departments have not been as involved 
as the Army in ensuring that project managers submit required reports. 
For example, the Air Force's Corrosion Executive stated that he 
coordinates with the Corrosion Office to track outstanding reports and 
can task the project managers to complete the required reports by 
going through the appropriate chain of command. Also, the Navy's 
Corrosion Executive told us that he maintains a level of awareness on 
the status of projects' reports, but does not play an active role in 
the submission of project reports because project managers have the 
responsibility to submit reports to the Corrosion Office. 

DOD's strategic plan and instruction assign specific responsibilities 
to the Corrosion Executives; however, these documents do not clearly 
define a role for the Corrosion Executives in ensuring that all 
project managers submit mandatory reports. Without clearly defined 
responsibilities for the Corrosion Executives to help ensure required 
reporting, the Corrosion Executives may not take a leading role in 
holding project managers accountable for completing and submitting 
mandatory reports. If a number of project managers continue to be late 
in completing mandatory reports, decision makers are unlikely to be 
fully informed about whether implemented projects used effective 
technology to address corrosion issues and whether this technology 
could have broader uses throughout the military departments' 
installations. 

Corrosion Office Has Not Updated All Records to Accurately Reflect the 
Return-On-Investment Estimates in the Military Departments' Follow-On 
Reports: 

The Corrosion Office maintains data for its infrastructure-related 
corrosion projects, but the office has not updated all of its records 
to accurately reflect the return-on-investment estimates that are 
provided in the military departments' follow-on reports. The data 
maintained by the Corrosion Office includes the financial investments 
provided by the Corrosion Office and the military departments, the 
estimated savings expected, and the calculated return-on-investment 
estimates for all of the military departments' funded and unfunded 
corrosion projects. Additionally, for each project, the Corrosion 
Office maintains data on whether the project managers have completed 
and submitted the required follow-on report and the value of the 
reassessed return-on-investment estimate in that follow-on report. The 
follow-on report shows, among other things, a comparison of the new 
estimate and the initial return-on-investment estimate included in the 
project plan. According to Corrosion Office officials, the data 
contained in its records system are used for reporting purposes, both 
internally and externally, such as the stated estimated returns on 
investment that are summarized in DOD's annual corrosion budget report 
to Congress. According to Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government,[Footnote 32] agencies should use internal controls 
that provide a reasonable assurance that the agencies have effective 
and efficient operations, and have reliable financial reports and 
other reports for internal and external use. Further, this guidance 
requires, in part, controls over information processing, and accurate 
and timely recording of transactions and events, to help ensure that 
management's directives are carried out and managers achieve desired 
results through effective stewardship of public resources. 

During our review, we found differences between the initial return-on-
investment estimates included in project plans and the initial 
estimates in the Corrosion Office's records for 44 of the 105 projects 
(42 percent). The Corrosion Office provided reasons for correcting 
data. Specifically, according to the Corrosion Office officials, there 
were two main reasons for these differences: (1) funding-level changes 
between the estimate included in initial project plan and funding 
provided when the project was approved; and (2) incorrect computations 
of the estimated returns on investment by the project managers that 
required the Corrosion Office to recalculate the estimate to ensure 
consistency and accuracy. However, when comparing the reassessed 
return-on-investment estimates included in the projects' follow-on 
reports with the reassessed estimates in the Corrosion Office's 
records, we found that the Corrosion Office had not updated all of its 
records with the return-on-investment estimates from the follow-on 
reports. Specifically, we found that for 5 of 25 projects (20 percent) 
funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2007, the Corrosion Office had not 
updated its records to reflect the reassessed return-on-investment 
estimates included in the projects' follow-on reports. The return-on-
investment estimates for these 5 projects were from outdated sources, 
such as project plans and final reports.[Footnote 33] Specifically, 
the return-on-investment estimates for 3 Army projects were taken from 
final reports that had been submitted to the Corrosion Office in June 
2007. Also, the return-on-investment estimates for one Army and one 
Navy project were from the project plans that had been submitted to 
the Corrosion Office in June 2004 and October 2004, respectively. 
Table 3 identifies the 5 projects funded in 2005 that had 
discrepancies in data. 

Table 3: Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Projects That Had 
Discrepancies between the Reassessed Return-on-Investment Estimates in 
the Follow-on Reports and the Estimates Contained in Corrosion Office 
Records: 

Army: 

Funded project: Leak Detection for Pipes and Tanks; 
Project number: AR-F-313; 
Reassessed return-on-investment estimates in follow-on reports from 
the military departments: 7.3; 
Return-on-investment estimates contained in the Corrosion Office's 
records: 10.42. 

Funded project: Surface Tolerant Coatings for Aircraft Hangars, Flight 
Control Towers, etc.; 
Project number: AR-F-320; 
Reassessed return-on-investment estimates in follow-on reports from 
the military departments: 6.96; 
Return-on-investment estimates contained in the Corrosion Office's 
records: 11.8. 

Funded project: Remote Monitoring of Cathodic Protection Systems; 
Project number: AR-F-321; 
Reassessed return-on-investment estimates in follow-on reports from 
the military departments: 13.5; 
Return-on-investment estimates contained in the Corrosion Office's 
records: 14.41. 

Funded project: Cathodic Protection of Hot Water Storage Tanks Using 
Ceramics; 
Project number: AR-F-322; 
Reassessed return-on-investment estimates in follow-on reports from 
the military departments: 8.56; 
Return-on-investment estimates contained in the Corrosion Office's 
records: 10.11. 

Navy: 

Funded project: Internal Pipeline Corrosion Inspection Red Hill Tunnel 
Fuel Lines; 
Project number: N-F-222; 
Reassessed return-on-investment estimates in follow-on reports from 
the military departments: 10.78; 
Return-on-investment estimates contained in the Corrosion Office's 
records: 6.86. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Data for projects funded in fiscal year 2005, as of November 
2012. 

[End of table] 

While the Corrosion Office has created records to track the estimated 
returns on investment of infrastructure-related corrosion projects, we 
found that the office has not adopted a best practice to maintain 
reliable data with accurate and timely information throughout its 
records. The Corrosion Office may use this return-on-investment data 
in its reporting, both internally and externally, such as in DOD's 
annual corrosion budget report to Congress. Additionally, in September 
2012, we reported that the Corrosion Office did not use current data 
for the projects' returns on investment or provide support for the 
projects' average return on investment.[Footnote 34] Without accurate 
and timely return-on-investment estimates maintained in the Corrosion 
Office's records for corrosion projects, Congress and DOD corrosion-
control managers may not have sufficient and reliable information 
about returns on investment for their oversight of completed projects. 

Corrosion Executives Have Mechanisms to Disseminate Information, but 
Have Not Ensured That All Relevant Service Officials Receive Key 
Corrosion-Control Information: 

Corrosion Executives Use Various Mechanisms to Collect and Share 
Corrosion-Control Information: 

All the military departments' Corrosion Executives use mechanisms--
such as product team meetings, briefings, conferences, and site 
visits--to collect and disseminate information on infrastructure-
related corrosion activities within their departments. Additionally, 
the Corrosion Executives host information sessions during the 
triannual DOD corrosion forums to discuss their corrosion-related 
issues. However, in our interviews with installation officials who 
were involved with corrosion work, slightly more than half of the 
officials were unaware of DOD's Corrosion Office, their respective 
Corrosion Executive, or the training, information, and other resources 
available through the related offices. According to the Duncan Hunter 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 903, 
[Footnote 35] the Corrosion Executive at each military department is, 
among other things, responsible for coordinating corrosion prevention 
and control activities with the military department and the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, the program executive officers, and relevant 
major subordinate commands. Additionally, DOD Instruction 5000.67 
directs each Corrosion Executive, in coordination with the proper 
chain of command, to establish and maintain a process to collect 
information on the results of corrosion-control activities for 
infrastructure within its department. Further, the DOD Corrosion 
Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan includes a communications 
goal to fully inform all levels of DOD about all aspects of corrosion 
work[Footnote 36] and states that the rapid and reliable exchange of 
information is the core of DOD's new corrosion-control culture. Also, 
each military department developed documents for corrosion control and 
prevention that acknowledged the importance of communication on 
corrosion control. Likewise, internal controls have shown that 
organizations benefit from communicating timely information to 
management and others to help them achieve their responsibilities. 
[Footnote 37] 

During this review, we found that the military departments' Corrosion 
Executives use various mechanisms to collect and disseminate corrosion-
related information within each department's chain of command. 
Additionally, we learned that the Corrosion Executives have 
encountered challenges in ensuring that information about their 
infrastructure-related corrosion-control initiatives reaches all 
relevant service-level officials. Specifically, each military 
department identified the following mechanisms and challenges: 

Army--In the 2012 U.S. Army Corrosion Prevention and Control Strategic 
Plan, the department established an Army Corrosion Board and an Army 
Corrosion Integrated Product Team to address corrosion issues. 
According to officials in the Corrosion Executive's office, the board 
has held its first organizational meeting and the integrated product 
team meets as needed, often virtually. Additionally, the officials 
explained that they communicate key information on corrosion of Army 
facilities and other infrastructure through the relevant Army offices 
in the chain of command for installations, using data calls. However, 
one Corrosion Executive official stated that the Army does not have a 
formal process to communicate directly to officials in the field about 
lessons learned or best practices for addressing corrosion of 
facilities and other infrastructure. The Army's strategic plan 
includes the goal to address poor communication and outreach that may 
hinder corrosion-control solutions from being implemented in the field. 

Navy--The Navy's Annual Report on Corrosion for Fiscal Year 2011 
states that a concerted awareness program is one of the cornerstones 
of improving communications about corrosion control and prevention 
within the Department of the Navy, which includes the United States 
Navy and the United States Marine Corps. The Corrosion Executive 
chairs the department's Corrosion Cross-Functional Team, an internal 
group of subject matter experts and relevant command officials, to 
serve as the primary method for coordinating within the department. 
Additionally, the Navy's Corrosion Executive noted that he works 
within the department's applicable chain of command for corrosion 
issues for facilities and other infrastructure. Further, the Corrosion 
Executive stated that the office communicated its roles and 
responsibilities through information provided in regular department 
communications, such as bulletins, briefings and conferences; and also 
through site visits and assessments. However, he noted that the 
frequency of opportunities for conferences and site visits will be 
limited in the future due to budget constraints. The Navy's strategic 
plan for corrosion notes that it will continue to use communications 
as a tool in its corrosion-control efforts. 

Air Force--In the May 2012 Air Force Enterprise Corrosion Prevention 
and Control Strategic Plan, the department acknowledged that 
facilities and other infrastructure organizations have not been 
integrated into the department's corrosion program. In its strategic 
plan, the Air Force highlighted the need to establish lines of 
communication, structures, and process to ensure that facilities 
incorporate appropriate corrosion control throughout each life cycle. 
Also, the Corrosion Executive[Footnote 38] stated that the department 
in June 2012 created a Corrosion Control and Prevention Working Group 
in which he serves as the lead and meets regularly with the working 
group members from the Air Force's major commands and relevant 
components. According to the Corrosion Executive, the means for 
disseminating and collecting information from the department's 
installations are the service organizations within the chain of 
command for the affected facilities and other infrastructure. He also 
stated that the service's training curriculum will incorporate 
important information as needed. 

All Relevant Officials Have Not Received Key Corrosion-Control 
Information: 

During our review, managers and other public works officials at 16 of 
31 installations stated that they were not familiar with the Corrosion 
Office.[Footnote 39] Officials also told us that their installations 
could benefit from the additional information on corrosion control and 
prevention offered by these offices. However, Corrosion Executives 
stated in interviews that they disseminate corrosion information 
through each department's chain of command. In response to our 
questions, installation officials provided views in the following 
areas: 

* Awareness of corrosion offices--In response to our questions of 
officials who are responsible for installation maintenance and would 
be involved in corrosion-control activities, officials at 16 of 31 
installations stated that prior to our work they were not aware of the 
Corrosion Office or the relevant military department's Corrosion 
Executive.[Footnote 40] In addition, officials at 24 of 29 
installations stated they had not contacted the Corrosion Office about 
their corrosion work in the last three years.[Footnote 41] Also, 
officials at 25 of 29 installations stated that they had not contacted 
the respective Corrosion Executive during the same period. However, 
officials at 23 of 29 installations stated that they had contacted 
their services' installation management command or major commands 
about corrosion work in the last three years. 

* Knowledge of documents--Officials interviewed at 26 of 29 
installations[Footnote 42] stated that they were unfamiliar with the 
DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan and DOD 
Instruction 5000.67, which addresses prevention and mitigation of 
corrosion for DOD equipment and infrastructure. Additionally, 
officials interviewed at 17 of 29 installations responded that they 
were unfamiliar with service corrosion-control plans or strategies. 

* Interest in additional information--Many installation officials 
stated interest in receiving additional information about corrosion 
resources. For example, more than half of the interviewed officials 
(17 of 31) stated that the Corrosion Office or the relevant military 
department's Corrosion Executive could provide more communications and 
enhance awareness about corrosion issues or corrosion-related 
resources. An identical number of officials stated that DOD's and the 
military departments' corrosion-control offices could support 
corrosion-related training as a useful resource for installations. 
Specifically, an Army installation official noted that it would be 
beneficial for the military services and DOD to disseminate 
information about the Corrosion Office and the military departments' 
Corrosion Executives, including their roles and responsibilities, and 
the assistance they can provide. 

* Other suggestions--Officials at installations noted other 
suggestions for exchanging information about installations, such as: 
holding regular forums and highlighting opportunities for contact with 
counterparts at other installations, having a centralized source for 
accessing corrosion-related information, disseminating case studies or 
best practices relevant to DOD, enhanced use of existing service-
issued newsletters, and planning conferences or communities of 
practice. In addition, five respondents suggested providing important 
corrosion-related information to the service headquarters, regional 
command, or management commands for distribution to the installations. 

Additionally, in interviews at the services' installation management 
commands, we found officials who stated similar concerns about 
communications.[Footnote 43] Officials from installation management 
commands stated that they had little contact with Corrosion 
Executives. For example, during our interview with one Air Force major 
command, a command official stated that the most recent information he 
had about the Air Force's Corrosion Executive was from 2008. Another 
major command's response did not include the Corrosion Executive as an 
organization it interacts with on corrosion issues. Similarly, 
officials at three different locations--the Commander of Navy 
Installations Command, the Marine Corps Installation Command, and the 
Army's Installation Management Command Headquarters--stated that they 
had limited or no interaction on infrastructure issues with the 
Corrosion Office and their respective Corrosion Executive.[Footnote 
44] In addition, the Army official stated that he would like to 
receive information on training by the Corrosion Office regarding 
corrosion of infrastructure, and that the best channel for the 
information would be through the Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Installation Management, an office that works with the Army's 
Corrosion Executive. 

In evaluating communications for corrosion issues for facilities and 
other infrastructure, we found that all relevant service officials do 
not receive key information because the military departments' 
Corrosion Executives do not have a targeted communication strategy for 
their military department and an accompanying action plan to ensure 
frequent communications between Corrosion Executives and all service 
officials involved in corrosion activities for facilities and other 
infrastructure. The military departments mention communication in 
their strategic plans, but they do not have specific steps for 
communicating corrosion-control information for facilities and other 
infrastructure at every level. Our prior work on federal organizations 
identified key practices and implementation steps for establishing a 
communication strategy to create shared expectations and report 
related progress.[Footnote 45] Without a targeted communication 
strategy and accompanying action plan, the Corrosion Executives cannot 
ensure that service managers of facilities and other infrastructure 
will have access to all information and resources available for 
dealing with corrosion and are aware of the most effective and 
efficient methods for corrosion control. 

Conclusions: 

The Department of Defense relies on the outcomes of its corrosion 
projects to reduce the life-cycle costs of its facilities and 
infrastructure through the timely sharing of information about the 
successful projects with all relevant corrosion-control managers. 
While the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight (Corrosion Office) 
requires project managers to submit reports on corrosion projects, 
many reports have not been submitted when due. In fact, the Corrosion 
Office has not adopted methods to enhance tracking, such as recording 
the reasons for missed reporting deadlines, new reporting deadlines, 
and the submission dates for follow-on reports. Further, although the 
Corrosion Office encourages project managers to complete outstanding 
reports, it has not exercised its existing oversight and coordination 
authorities to identify and implement possible options or incentives 
for addressing the various funding, personnel, or other reasons cited 
by project management offices for not meeting reporting milestones. 
Also, DOD's strategic plan and other guidance do not clearly define a 
role for the military departments' Corrosion Control and Prevention 
Executives (Corrosion Executives), who could assist the Corrosion 
Office, in holding the military departments' project management 
offices accountable for submitting infrastructure-related reports in 
accordance with DOD's strategic plan. Without effective actions to 
ensure timely submission of reports, decision makers may be unaware of 
potentially useful technologies to address corrosion. Moreover, the 
Corrosion Office is not always updating its records to ensure accurate 
information is maintained on reassessed return-on-investment estimates 
for infrastructure-related corrosion projects. Without accurate return-
on-investment estimates for corrosion projects, Congress and DOD 
corrosion-control managers may not have sufficient information about 
returns on investment for their oversight of completed projects. 

Finally, slightly more than half of the installation officials (16 of 
31 officials) whom we interviewed were unaware of DOD's Corrosion 
Office, their respective Corrosion Executive, or the training, 
information, and other resources available through the related 
offices. Without a targeted communication strategy and accompanying 
action plan, the military departments' Corrosion Executives cannot 
ensure that managers of facilities and other infrastructure will have 
access to all information and resources available for dealing with 
corrosion and are aware of the most effective and efficient methods 
for corrosion control. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We are making five recommendations to improve DOD's corrosion 
prevention and control program: 

To improve accountability for reporting the results of corrosion-
control demonstration projects affecting DOD infrastructure, we 
recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics direct the Director of the Office of 
Corrosion Policy and Oversight to take steps to enhance reporting and 
project tracking, such as noting the reasons why project management 
offices missed a reporting deadline and including any revised 
reporting deadlines for final and follow-on reports. 

To improve the military departments' submission of completed reports 
for infrastructure-related corrosion-control demonstration projects at 
prescribed milestones, we recommend that the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics direct the Director 
of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to use the office's 
existing authority to identify and implement possible options or 
incentives for addressing the various funding, personnel, and other 
reasons cited by project management offices for not meeting reporting 
milestones. 

Further, to provide greater assurance that the military departments 
will meet reporting milestones for future projects, we recommend that 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics--in coordination with the Director of the Office of 
Corrosion Policy and Oversight--revise corrosion-related guidance to 
clearly define a role for the military departments' Corrosion Control 
and Prevention Executives to assist the Office of Corrosion Policy and 
Oversight in holding their departments' project management offices 
accountable for submitting infrastructure-related reports in 
accordance with the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic 
Plan. 

To ensure that Congress, DOD and officials of the military 
departments' infrastructure-related corrosion activities have the most 
complete and up-to-date information, we recommend that the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics direct 
the Director of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to take 
actions to ensure that its records reflect complete, timely, and 
accurate data of the projects' return-on-investment estimates. 

To ensure that all relevant infrastructure officials receive pertinent 
corrosion information, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force departments direct their assistant secretaries 
responsible for acquisitions, technology and logistics to require the 
military departments' Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives--in 
coordination with their installation management commands and in 
consultation with the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight--to 
develop a targeted communication strategy and an accompanying action 
plan for their departments to ensure the timely flow of key 
information to all relevant service officials, particularly to 
officials at the installation level, about corrosion-control 
activities and initiatives, such as training opportunities and 
outcomes of the infrastructure-related corrosion projects. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written 
comments, reprinted in appendix IV, DOD partially concurred with three 
of our recommendations and did not agree with two recommendations. 

DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation to take steps to 
enhance the tracking and reporting of its infrastructure-related 
corrosion projects. In its comments, DOD stated that it is developing 
a web-based tracking tool for the Corrosion Office, Corrosion 
Executives, and project managers to input and extract project-related 
data, and DOD expects the change to result in increased timeliness and 
standardization of project data to include revised reporting deadlines 
for final and follow-on reports. While this system may address our 
recommendation, DOD did not state when the new system would be 
available for use. In response to our fourth recommendation that DOD 
take action to ensure that its records reflect complete, timely and 
accurate data on the projects' return on investment, DOD partially 
concurred with the recommendation and stated that this new web-based 
system would provide data including return-on-investment estimates, 
and would be accessible to other parties, including the Corrosion 
Office, Corrosion Executives and project managers. 

DOD did not agree with our second recommendation that the Corrosion 
Office use its existing authority to identify and implement possible 
options or incentives for addressing the various funding, personnel, 
and other reasons cited by project management offices for not meeting 
reporting milestones. In its written comments, DOD disagreed with our 
recommendation, but did not state what actions it would take to 
improve submission of completed reports from the military services 
that DOD's strategic plan requires for infrastructure-related 
corrosion projects. DOD stated that prior positive incentives to 
complete project reports were largely ineffective. However, as our 
report states, there are examples of military departments responding 
to incentives, such as the Navy completing 11 of 12 return-on-
investment reassessments after the Corrosion Office provided funding 
as an incentive. The reassessments are the main focus of follow-on 
reports. Also, DOD stated that its project management offices 
occasionally miss reporting milestones and generally have done an 
excellent job of meeting their reporting obligations. However, as our 
report clearly shows, the project management offices had not submitted 
50 of the 80 required final reports (63 percent) and had not submitted 
15 of the 41 required follow-on reports (37 percent) to the Corrosion 
Office. Without timely submission of reports, decision makers may be 
unaware of potentially useful technologies to address corrosion. We 
continue to believe that the Corrosion Office could use its existing 
authorities to identify and implement other incentives or methods to 
address reasons that project management offices cite for not meeting 
reporting milestones. 

DOD did not agree to our third recommendation to revise guidance to 
clearly define the role of Corrosion Executives to assist the 
Corrosion Office in holding departments' project management offices 
accountable for submitting reports in accordance with DOD's strategic 
plan. DOD stated that further guidance is not necessary as the 
requirements are clearly stated in the strategic plan. DOD also stated 
that Corrosion Executives are given the freedom to manage their 
programs in the most efficient and effective manner. However, DOD's 
strategic plan and guidance do not define a role for the Corrosion 
Executives in assisting the Corrosion Office in the project reporting 
process. Our recommendation was intended to fortify the role of 
Corrosion Executives in ensuring that project management offices 
within the Corrosion Executives' respective military departments 
submit project reports as required in the strategic plan. We continue 
to believe that the Corrosion Executives could provide the additional 
management oversight necessary to strengthen corrosion project 
reporting. 

DOD partially concurred with our last recommendation that the 
Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force direct the relevant 
assistant secretaries to require the military departments' Corrosion 
Executives--in coordination with their installation management 
commands and in consultation with the Corrosion Office--to develop a 
targeted communication strategy and an action plan for their 
departments to ensure the timely flow of key information to all 
relevant service officials about corrosion-control activities and 
initiatives, such as training opportunities and outcomes of 
infrastructure-related corrosion projects. DOD commented that 
information flow to installations follows the chain of command to 
ensure that appropriate individuals receive information necessary for 
successful mission completion. The department further stated that the 
Corrosion Office would ensure that training information and project 
outcomes would be available to all relevant officials via publication 
in appropriate media; also, DOD stated that during the next review 
cycle the Corrosion Office would evaluate the military department 
corrosion prevention and control strategic plans to determine if they 
adequately address the flow of information. However, we continue to 
believe that each military department should have a targeted 
communication strategy, developed in consultation with the Corrosion 
Office and coordinated with the installation management commands 
within the military departments, and that strategy should go beyond 
the publication of information in appropriate media and provide 
specific steps for communicating corrosion-control information to all 
relevant service corrosion officials. Such a strategy is important 
because, as our report states, we found that all corrosion officials 
within each military department, particularly at the installation 
level, were not receiving relevant corrosion prevention and control 
information. Also, we continue to believe that without a targeted 
communication strategy and action plan, Corrosion Executives cannot 
ensure that service managers of facilities and other infrastructure 
will have access to all information and resources for dealing with 
corrosion and are aware of the most effective and efficient methods 
for corrosion control. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 
committees and to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the 
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; Director of the DOD Office of 
Corrosion Policy and Oversight, and the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget. In addition, this letter will be made available 
at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-7968 or mctiguej@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this letter. GAO staff who made key 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

James R. McTigue Jr. 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: DOD Studies on the Cost of Corrosion for Facilities and 
Other Infrastructure: 

DOD's Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight (Corrosion Office) 
sponsors a series of studies to assess the cost of corrosion 
throughout the department, including three studies--two completed and 
one ongoing--to determine how much money DOD spends on corrosion 
activities for its facilities and other infrastructure. These studies 
are conducted by LMI using a method approved by the Corrosion Office's 
Corrosion Prevention and Control Integrated Product Team.[Footnote 46] 
According to LMI, its estimation methodology includes construction 
costs and actual maintenance expenditures for sustainment, 
restoration, and modernization that are known or can be identified, 
and focuses on tangible, direct material and labor costs as well as 
some indirect costs, such as research and development and training. In 
its studies, LMI noted that although corrosion maintenance costs are a 
subset of sustainment, restoration, and modernization costs, the tools 
and analysis methods used by planners to estimate sustainment, 
restoration, and modernization requirements do not specifically 
identify corrosion. 

In its first report in May 2007, LMI determined that spending on 
corrosion prevention and control for DOD facilities and other 
infrastructure for fiscal year 2005 was $1.8 billion.[Footnote 47] In 
its second report in July 2010 report,[Footnote 48] LMI found that 
spending on corrosion at DOD facilities and other infrastructure 
decreased from $1.8 billion to $1.6 billion between fiscal years 2005 
and 2007,[Footnote 49] and then increased to $1.9 billion in fiscal 
year 2008.[Footnote 50] In its 2010 report, LMI reported that spending 
on corrosion as a percent of spending on maintenance dropped from 15.1 
percent in fiscal year 2005 to 10.7 percent in fiscal year 2007 and 
increased to 11.7 percent in fiscal year 2008. 

Further, in its 2010 report, LMI reported that DOD spent more on 
corrosion-related maintenance for facilities and other infrastructure 
than it did on corrosion work related to military construction. 
Specifically, LMI reported that spending on corrosion for maintenance 
is three to four times higher than corrosion spending associated with 
construction, even though overall construction expenditures were 
nearly double that of overall maintenance expenditures. LMI provided 
two main reasons for this occurrence: (1) corrosion is rarely 
identified as a justification for the construction of a new facility; 
and (2) if estimated construction costs need to be reduced to obtain 
funding of the project, measures to prevent corrosion are among the 
first costs to be removed from the estimated costs. Additionally, LMI 
reported that DOD spent almost twice as much on corrective measures to 
address corrosion ($1,263 million) as it did on preventive measures to 
avoid corrosion ($640 million). 

LMI's 2010 report shows installations' estimated expenditures in eight 
categories of corrective and preventive maintenance for facilities and 
other infrastructure. Table 4 shows information from that 2010 report 
about the estimated expenditures for facilities and other 
infrastructure by maintenance category for fiscal year 2008. 

Table 4: Estimated Expenditures to Address Corrosion of DOD Facilities 
and Other Infrastructure (by Maintenance Categories for Fiscal Year 
2008: 

Category: General building maintenance; 
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $285 million; 
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $306 million; 
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $591 million; 
All Corrective maintenance: $3.232 billion; 
All Preventive maintenance: $410 million; 
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $3.642 billion; 
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 16%. 

Category: Exterior plumbing; 
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $82 million; 
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $47 million; 
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $129 million; 
All Corrective maintenance: $737 million; 
All Preventive maintenance: $87 million; 
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $824 million; 
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 16%. 

Category: Interior plumbing; 
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $106 million; 
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $39 million; 
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $145 million; 
All Corrective maintenance: $1.208 billion; 
All Preventive maintenance: $93 million; 
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $1.301 billion; 
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 11%. 

Category: Fuels; 
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $12 million; 
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $6 million; 
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $18 million; 
All Corrective maintenance: $151 million; 
All Preventive maintenance: $17 million; 
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $168 million; 
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 11%. 

Category: HVAC; 
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $157 million; 
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $58 million; 
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $215 million; 
All Corrective maintenance: $1.946 billion; 
All Preventive maintenance: $136 million; 
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $2.082 billion; 
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 10%. 

Category: Exterior electric; 
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $101 million; 
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $60 million; 
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $161 million; 
All Corrective maintenance: $1.494 billion; 
All Preventive maintenance: $126 million; 
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $1.620 billion; 
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 10%. 

Category: Roads and grounds; 
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $86 million; 
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $56 million; 
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $142 million; 
All Corrective maintenance: $1.345 billion; 
All Preventive maintenance: $142 million; 
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $1.487 billion; 
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 10%. 

Category: Interior electric; 
Corrective measures to address corrosion: $51 million; 
Preventive measures to avoid corrosion: $48 million; 
Total expenditures on corrosion-related work: $99 million; 
All Corrective maintenance: $1.623 billion; 
All Preventive maintenance: $129 million; 
Total expenditures on all maintenance: $1.752 billion; 
Corrosion-related work as a percentage of total maintenance: 6%. 

Source: LMI. 

[End of table] 

In August 2012, LMI began its third study of the cost of corrosion at 
DOD facilities and other infrastructure to analyze corrosion-related 
spending for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011. For this 
report, the LMI official told us that the methodology for classifying 
the environmental conditions of the installations that are included in 
their cost-of-corrosion studies would be the major difference between 
the 2012 assessment and the prior reports. LMI also acknowledged that 
there are some challenges and limitations to the methodology and data 
used in its analysis. These challenges and limitations include, but 
are not limited to: (1) limited quality controls in the services' 
facilities and other infrastructure work order data in which 
approximately 25 percent of the records obtained from the military 
services' maintenance systems could not be used due to missing key 
data elements that could not be recreated; (2) the lack of tracking 
and maintaining of asset availability data for facilities and other 
infrastructure; and (3) the three-year period between the cost of 
corrosion studies, which means there will be a significant period 
before data can be updated. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

To address our first objective to determine the extent that project 
managers submitted required reports to the DOD Office of Corrosion 
Policy and Oversight (hereafter referred to as Corrosion Office), we 
reviewed the February 2011 DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation 
Strategic Plan and used the reporting milestones outlined in the plan 
to identify types of reports required for each project. We obtained 
project information for the 80 infrastructure-related corrosion 
demonstration projects funded by the Corrosion Office for fiscal years 
2005 through 2010.[Footnote 51] We requested and reviewed the project 
documentation--project plans, bimonthly or quarterly reports, final 
reports and follow-on reports--to determine if the data and related 
reports met the Corrosion Office's reporting requirements. We reviewed 
the corrosion project documentation for these projects for missing 
data, outliers, or other errors, and documented where we found 
incomplete data and computation errors. For the purposes of our work 
in reviewing projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2010, we 
considered a final report to be submitted as required if the Corrosion 
Office had a copy of the report in its records system. We did not 
consider the timeliness of the submitted reports. Additionally, for 
follow-on reports, we could assess only the projects funded in fiscal 
years 2005 through 2007 (41 of the 80 projects) because the DOD 
strategic plan's milestone requires that follow-on reports be 
submitted for completed projects within two years after the projects 
have been completed and transitioned to use within the military 
departments. For completed projects, we documented the initial return-
on-investment estimates shown in the project plans and the resulting 
change, if any, shown in the follow-on reports. We determined that the 
project reporting data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
determining the extent to which the military departments met the 
Corrosion Office's reporting requirements, but we did not determine 
the timeliness of the report or assess elements of the actual report. 

After identifying the projects that required further review because 
the project managers had not completed and submitted the required 
reports, we interviewed and obtained documentation from the Corrosion 
Office, the military departments' Corrosion Control and Prevention 
Executives (hereafter referred to as Corrosion Executives) and the 
respective project managers to determine why the required reports were 
not submitted at the prescribed deadlines. Also, we determined what 
actions, if any, they planned to take to complete the reports. 
Specifically, to complete this task, we met with corrosion-control 
officials from the following organizations: the Corrosion Office, Army 
Corrosion Executive, Navy Corrosion Executive, Air Force Corrosion 
Executive, Army Engineering Research Development Center, Construction 
Engineering Research Laboratory, Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
(Engineering Support Center), Office of the Air Force Logistics, 
Installations and Mission Support, and the Air Force Civil Engineer 
Support Agency. We also reviewed prior GAO work on DOD's corrosion 
prevention and control program. 

To address our second objective to assess the extent to which the 
return-on-investment data submitted by the military departments is 
accurately reflected in records maintained by the Corrosion Office, 
for the 105 infrastructure-related corrosion demonstration projects 
funded from fiscal years 2005 through 2012, we reviewed the return-on-
investment estimates found in the project plans and the return-on-
investment estimates maintained in the Corrosion Office's records. We 
then compared the data from these two sources to determine if any 
differences existed in the estimated return on investment. Upon 
completion of this comparison, we provided a list of projects with 
discrepancies in the estimated return on investment to the Corrosion 
Office and asked the officials to explain why the inconsistencies 
existed and requested that they provide additional information to 
reconcile the differences in the two estimates. Further, we compared 
the return-on-investment estimates maintained in the Corrosion 
Office's records for projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2007 
with the return-on-investment estimates contained in the military 
departments' follow-on reports to check for any differences between 
the two sets of records. 

To address our third objective to assess the extent to which DOD's 
corrosion-control officials have fully informed all relevant officials 
within each department about efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion 
of facilities and other infrastructure, we reviewed relevant 
legislation and guidance, DOD policies and publications, and the DOD 
and the military departments' strategic plans to obtain information on 
the management of DOD's corrosion prevention and control program. In 
addition, we interviewed officials at all levels within DOD--Corrosion 
Office officials, Corrosion Executives, the military services' 
management commands for installations, and facility and infrastructure 
managers within the services--to discuss their corrosion prevention 
and control efforts, including challenges and successes in 
implementing new corrosion technologies. We interviewed officials 
across each of the military services and reviewed relevant service 
documentation to gather information about corrosion prevention and 
control programs within the services. We spoke with each military 
department's designated Corrosion Executive as well as officials in 
the Corrosion Executives' offices to discuss corrosion control and 
prevention activities for facilities and other infrastructure across 
the departments. We also interviewed officials from the installation 
management commands of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, including the 
Office of the Army Chief of Staff for Installations Management, the 
U.S. Army Installations Management Command, the Commander of Navy 
Installations Command, and the U. S. Marine Corps Installations 
Command. We also interviewed officials within the civil engineering or 
facilities branches at two Air Force major commands--Air Mobility 
Command and Air Combat Command. We reviewed relevant service 
documentation, including each military department's strategic plan for 
corrosion control and prevention, to identify efforts related to 
facilities and other infrastructure. During our review, we also met 
with the manager of a Defense Logistics Agency program for cathodic 
protection and corrosion control of submerged or underground steel 
structures. Other defense agencies were not evaluated as part of our 
work. 

We used data obtained from Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Installations and Environment to identify all DOD 
facilities and other infrastructure by military service and geographic 
location. Using a nonprobability sample,[Footnote 52] we limited the 
installations for selection to those active-duty installations with at 
least 25 buildings owned by the federal government and ensured that a 
range of locations were selected from each of the four military 
services and across geographic regions of the United States.[Footnote 
53] From the 390 installations that met these criteria, we selected 
installations with different environmental conditions,[Footnote 54] 
some joint military installations, and installations that did or did 
not participate in the Corrosion Office's corrosion-technology 
demonstration projects. We determined that the data used to select the 
installations for our review were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of selecting our nonprobability sample. 

From April to October 2012, we conducted semistructured interviews 
with management officials of facilities and other infrastructure from 
32 DOD installations to gather information and views about their 
corrosion control and management efforts.[Footnote 55] Figure 3 
identifies the 32 selected installations where GAO interviewed 
officials for this review. The purpose of the semistructured 
interviews was to understand how the installation officials (1) use 
policies, plans, and procedures to identify and address corrosion; (2) 
address corrosion prevention and mitigation; (3) determine their 
maintenance and sustainment priorities; and (4) receive and 
disseminate information on relevant corrosion topics. We visited and 
interviewed officials at 6 of the 32 military installations,[Footnote 
56] and conducted audio conference calls with officials at 26 of the 
32 military installations. Although our findings from the interviews 
of officials of the 32 installations are not generalizable to the 
entire universe of installations, we feel our findings provide a range 
of issues related to corrosion that are experienced at installations. 

Figure 3: Selected Installations Where GAO Interviewed Facilities and 
Other Infrastructure Officials: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated U.S. map] 

Northeast: 
Hanscom Air Force Base; 
Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth; 
Naval Support Activity Mechanicsburg, Navy; 
West Point, Army. 

South: 
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Army; 
Fort A.P. Hill, Army; 
Fort Bragg, Army; 
Fort Campbell, Army; 
Hurlburt Field, Air Force; 
Joint Base Charleston, Air Force; 
Langley Air Force Base; 
Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort; 
Marine Corps Base Quantico; 
Naval Air Station Corpus Christi; 
Naval Air Station Jacksonville; 
Norfolk Naval Shipyard; 
Red River Army Depot; 
Robinson Air Force Base. 

Midwest: 
Fort Leavenworth, Army; 
Naval Station Great Lakes; 
Rock Island Arsenal, Army; 
Scott Air Force Base. 

West: 
Fort Huachuca, Army; 
Fort Wainwright, Army; 
Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Army; 
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Navy; 
Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton; 
Naval Base Kitsap Bremerton; 
Naval Air Weapon Station China Lake; 
Vandenberg Air Force Base; 
Twentynine Palms Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center; 

Source: DOD, Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to May 2013 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Returns on Investment for DOD's Infrastructure-Related 
Corrosion Technology Demonstration Projects: 

As defined by DOD for its corrosion technology demonstration projects, 
the estimated return on investment is the ratio of the present value 
of benefits to the present value of the project's total cost. In our 
December 2010 report,[Footnote 57] we recommended that the Secretary 
of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics), in coordination with the Corrosion 
Executives, develop and implement a plan to ensure that return-on-
investment reassessments are completed as scheduled.[Footnote 58] 
Specifically, we recommended that this plan include information on the 
timeframe and source of funding required to complete the return-on-
investment reassessments. DOD concurred with our recommendation and 
stated that plans were underway to address this requirement. As of 
July 2012, DOD had not developed or implemented a formal plan that 
addresses this requirement. 

During our review, we found that the Corrosion Office required project 
managers of 41 projects to submit follow-on reports, and reports were 
completed and submitted for 25[Footnote 59] of the 41 projects funded 
for fiscal years 2005 through 2007.[Footnote 60] Of the 25 follow-on 
reports, 23 contained return-on-investment estimates. We found that 
although follow-on reports were completed and submitted for the 
remaining 2 projects, return-on-investment estimates were not 
calculated for the projects because the respective Army and Navy 
reports noted that such a calculation was not required. For the 23 
projects that have completed and submitted the required follow-on 
reports, Table 5 provides the military departments' return-on-
investment estimates included in the original project plans and the 
resulting change, if any, included in the follow-on reports. We did 
not review the military departments' calculations or their methods for 
estimating the cost and benefits of the estimated returns on 
investment. 

Table 5: Military Departments' Original Return-on-Investment Estimates 
in Project Plans Compared to Return on Investment Shown in Follow-on 
Reports: 

Military Department: Army; 

2005: 

Count: 1; 
Project number: AR-F-313; 
Project description: Leak Detection for Pipes; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 10.2; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 7.3. 

Count: 2; 
Project number: AR-F-314; 
Project description: Non-hazardous Corrosion Inhibitors/SMART Control 
Systems for Heating and Cooling; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 8.8; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 13.0. 

Count: 3; 
Project number: AR-F-317; 
Project description: Pipe Corrosion Sensors; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 16.1; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 21.6. 

Count: 4; 
Project number: AR-F-318; 
Project description: Ice Free Cathodic Protection Systems for Water 
Storage Tanks; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 20.6; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 11.8. 

Count: 5; 
Project number: AR-F-319; 
Project description: Corrosion Resistant Materials for Water and 
Wastewater Treatment Plants; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 15.0; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 14.6. 

Count: 6; 
Project number: AR-F-320; 
Project description: Surface Tolerant Coatings for Aircraft Hangars, 
Flight Control Tower, and Deluge Tanks; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 11.6; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 7.0. 

Count: 7; 
Project number: AR-F-321; 
Project description: Remote Monitoring of Cathodic Protection Systems 
and Cathodic Protection System Upgrades for Tanks and Pipelines; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 15.3; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 13.5. 

Count: 2006: 8; 
Project number: 2006: AR-F-322; 
Project description: 2006: Cathodic Protection of Hot Water Storage 
Tanks Using Ceramic Anodes; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 2006: 10.1; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 2006: 8.6. 

2006: 

Count: 9; 
Project number: FAR02; 
Project description: Smart Fluorescent and Self-Healing Coatings for 
Severely Corrosive Environments at Vehicle Wash Facilities; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 14.9; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 14.9. 

Count: 10; 
Project number: FAR11; 
Project description: Innovative Thermal Barrier Coatings to Prevent 
Corrosive Environmental Effects and Improve Energy Efficiency in Heat 
Distribution Manholes; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 9.8; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 72.7. 

Count: 11; 
Project number: FAR15; 
Project description: Development of Corrosion Indices and Life Cycle 
Prediction for Equipment and Facilities; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 33.1; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 33.1. 

Count: 12; 
Project number: FAR16; 
Project description: Corrosion Prevention of Rebar in Concrete in 
Critical Facilities Located in Coastal Environments; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 12.9; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 12.9. 

Count: Navy: 13; 
Project number: Navy: FAR20; 
Project description: Navy: Ceramic Anode Upgrades and Remote 
Monitoring of Cathodic Protection Systems for Utilities in Severely 
Corrosive Environments; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: Navy: 14.7; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: Navy: 14.7. 

Military Department: Navy: 

2005: 

Count: 14; 
Project number: N-F-221; 
Project description: Self-Priming Cladding for Splash Zone Steel; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 23.7; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 23.7. 

Count: 15; 
Project number: N-F-222; 
Project description: Internal Pipeline Corrosion Inspection Red Hill 
Tunnel Fuel Lines; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 6.9; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 10.8. 

Count: 2006: 16; 
Project number: 2006: N-F-229; 
Project description: 2006: Integrated Concrete Pier Piling Repair and 
Corrosion Protection System; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 2006: 1.9; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 2006: 1.9. 

2006: 

Count: 17; 
Project number: FNV01; 
Project description: Corrosion Protection Utilizing IR Drop Free 
Sensors and In-Situ Data Acquisition for Cross Country Pipelines; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 13.3; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 11.4. 

Count: 18; 
Project number: FNV04; 
Project description: Modeling of Advanced Waterfront Metallic Material 
Corrosion and Protection; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 6.2; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 1.1. 

Count: 19; 
Project number: FNV06; 
Project description: Wire Rope Corrosion for Guyed Antenna Towers; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 36.6; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 36.0. 

Count: 2007: 20; 
Project number: 2007: FNV07; 
Project description: 2007: Solar Powered Cathodic Protection System; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 2007: 3.4; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 2007: 3.0. 

2007: 

Count: 21; 
Project number: F07NV03; 
Project description: Corrosion Inhibitor Evaluation for Concrete 
Repairs; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 16.8; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 16.8. 

Count: 22; 
Project number: F07NV04; 
Project description: Satellite Based Remote Monitoring Systems for 
Cathodic Protection Systems in Remote Locations; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 21.0; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 17.4. 

Count: Count: 23; 
Project number: Project number: F07NV07; 
Project description: Low Cost Stainless Steel Reinforcing for Concrete 
Structures; 
Return-on-investment estimates from project plan: 2.9; 
Return-on-investment estimates from follow-on report: 2.9. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Projects Were Funded in Fiscal Years 2005 through 2007. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000
        
Mr. James R. McTigue, Jr. 
Acting Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. McTigue, 

This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report, 
GAO-13-270, "Defense Infrastructure: DOD Should Improve Reporting and 
Communication on Its Corrosion Prevention and Control Activities," 
dated April 19, 2013 GAO Code (351691). 

We have reviewed GAO Draft Report, GAO-13-270 and partially concur 
with three of the recommendations and non-concur with two of the 
recommendations. Written comments addressing each recommendation are 
provided as an enclosure to this letter. We appreciate the
GAO team's engagement and feedback as we are continuously trying to 
improve the DoD Corrosion Program. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Daniel J. Dunmire: 
Director: 
DoD Corrosion Policy and Oversight: 

Enclosure: As Stated: 

GAO Draft Report Dated April 19, 2013: 
GAO-13-270 (GAO Code 351691): 

"Defense Infrastructure: DOD Should Improve Reporting And 
Communication On Its Corrosion Prevention And Control Activities" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics direct the Director 
of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to take steps to 
enhance reporting and project tracking, such as noting the reasons why 
project management offices missed a reporting deadline and including 
any revised reporting deadlines for final and follow-on reports. 

DoD Response: Partially concur. The Corrosion Policy and Oversight 
Office believes that its current processes for project tracking are 
sufficient to maintain cognizance and control of required reports but 
that enhancements are possible. To that end, the Corrosion Policy and 
Oversight Office is developing a web-based tracking tool that will 
enable all parties involved in projects (The Corrosion Policy and 
Oversight Office, Military Department Corrosion Control and Prevention 
Executives, and project managers) to input and extract project related 
data. This will result in increased timeliness and standardization of 
project data to include revised reporting deadlines for final and 
follow-on reports. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics direct the Director 
of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to use the Office's 
existing authority to identify and implement possible options or 
incentives for addressing the various funding, personnel, and other 
reasons cited by program management offices for not meeting reporting 
milestones. 

DoD Response: Non-concur. Prior positive incentives of additional 
funding to complete project reports were largely ineffective. Negative 
incentives such as penalizing future project submittals from project 
offices that fail to submit on-time reports would be contrary to 
program objectives of reducing the impact of corrosion on DoD weapon 
systems and infrastructure by deincentivizing potential technological 
improvements. While program management offices occasionally miss 
reporting milestones, they have generally done an excellent job of 
project execution and are committed to meeting their reporting 
obligations. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in coordination 
with the Director of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight, 
revise corrosion-related guidance to clearly define the role of the 
military departments' Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives-in 
assisting the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight-in holding 
their departments' project management offices accountable for 
submitting infrastructure-related reports in accordance with the DOD 
Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan. 

DoD Response: Non-concur. The Military Department Corrosion Control 
and Prevention Executives are given the freedom to manage their 
programs in the most efficient and effective manner for their 
respective departments. The Corrosion Control and Prevention 
Executives know the reporting requirements and are working closely 
with the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office and the project 
managers to ensure reports are submitted in accordance with the DoD 
Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan. Further guidance 
is not necessary as the requirements are already clearly stated in the 
DoD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, direct the 
Director of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to take 
actions to ensure that its records reflect complete, timely, and 
accurate data of the projects' return-on-investment estimates. 

DoD Response: Partially concur. The Corrosion Policy and Oversight 
Office is developing a web-based tracking tool that will enable all 
parties involved in projects (the Corrosion Policy and Oversight 
Office, Military Department Corrosion Control and Prevention 
Executives, and project managers) to input and extract project related 
data including return-on-investment estimates. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force departments direct their assistant secretaries 
responsible for acquisitions, technology, and logistics to require the 
military departments' Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives-in 
coordination with their installation management commands and in 
consultation with the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight-to 
develop a targeted communication strategy and an accompanying action 
plan for their departments to ensure the timely flow of key 
information to all relevant service officials, particularly to those 
officials at the installation-level, about corrosion-control 
activities and initiatives, such as training opportunities and 
outcomes of the infrastructure-related corrosion projects. 

DoD Response: Partially concur. Information flow to the installation 
level follows the chain of command to ensure that appropriate 
individuals receive the critical and authoritative information 
necessary for successful mission completion. Neither the Corrosion 
Policy and Oversight Office nor the Corrosion Prevention and Control 
Executives are in the installation chain of command. The Corrosion 
Policy and Oversight Office will ensure that information on the DoD 
Corrosion Program, including training opportunities and outcomes of 
corrosion projects, is available to all relevant service officials 
including the Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives and 
installation level personnel via publication in appropriate media. 
During the next review cycle the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office 
will evaluate the military department corrosion prevention and control 
strategic plans and, where appropriate, recommend they adequately 
address the flow of key information. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

James R. McTigue Jr. 202-512-7968, mctiguej@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact name above, the following staff members 
made key contributions to this report: Mark J. Wielgoszynski, 
Assistant Director; Rebekah Boone; Randolfo DeLeon; Jacqueline McColl; 
Charles Perdue; Carol Petersen; Richard Powelson; Terry Richardson; 
Amie Steele and Michael Willems. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Defense Management: Additional Information Needed to Improve Military 
Departments' Corrosion Prevention Strategies. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-379]. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 
2013. 

Defense Management: The Department of Defense's Annual Corrosion 
Budget Report Does Not Include Some Required Information. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-823R]. Washington, D.C.: September 
10, 2012. 

Defense Management: The Department of Defense's Fiscal Year 2012 
Corrosion Prevention and Control Budget Request. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-490R]. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 
2011. 

Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, 
Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-318SP]. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 
2011. 

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Monitor and Assess Corrective Actions 
Resulting from Its Corrosion Study of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-171R]. Washington, 
D.C.: December 16, 2010. 

Defense Management: DOD Has a Rigorous Process to Select Corrosion 
Prevention Projects, but Would Benefit from Clearer Guidance and 
Validation of Returns on Investment. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-84]. Washington, D.C.: December 8, 
2010. 

Defense Management: Observations on Department of Defense and Military 
Service Fiscal Year 2011 Requirements for Corrosion Prevention and 
Control. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-608R]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010. 

Defense Management: Observations on the Department of Defense's Fiscal 
Year 2011 Budget Request for Corrosion Prevention and Control. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-607R]. Washington, 
D.C.: April 15, 2010. 

Defense Management: Observations on DOD's Fiscal Year 2010 Budget 
Request for Corrosion Prevention and Control. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-732R]. Washington, D.C.: June 1, 
2009. 

Defense Management: Observations on DOD's Analysis of Options for 
Improving Corrosion Prevention and Control through Earlier Planning in 
the Requirements and Acquisition Processes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-694R]. Washington, D.C.: May 29, 
2009. 

Defense Management: Observations on DOD's FY 2009 Budget Request for 
Corrosion Prevention and Control. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-663R]. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 
2008. 

Defense Management: High-Level Leadership Commitment and Actions Are 
Needed to Address Corrosion Issues. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-618]. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 
2007. 

Defense Management: Additional Measures to Reduce Corrosion of 
Prepositioned Military Assets Could Achieve Cost Savings. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-709]. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 
2006. 

Defense Management: Opportunities Exist to Improve Implementation of 
DOD's Long-Term Corrosion Strategy. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-640]. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 
2004. 

Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and 
Increase Readiness. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-753]. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 
2003. 

Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic 
Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-274]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 19, 2003. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] This cost estimate, which was produced by a DOD contractor and is 
based on data from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, is the latest 
estimate available on DOD corrosion costs. 

[2] Infrastructure is defined in Section 2228 of Title 10 of the 
United States Code as all buildings, structures, airfields, port 
facilities, surface and subterranean utility systems, heating and 
cooling systems, fuel tanks, pavements, and bridges. 

[3] The estimate of the annual cost of corrosion for DOD facilities 
and other infrastructure was produced by a DOD contractor and is based 
on data from fiscal years 2007 and 2008. This is the latest estimate 
available on DOD corrosion costs for facilities and other 
infrastructure. 

[4] Corrosion takes varied forms such as rusting; pitting; galvanic 
reaction; calcium or other mineral buildup; degradation due to 
ultraviolet light exposure; and mold, mildew, or other organic decay. 

[5] The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003 required the Secretary of Defense to designate an officer, 
employee, board, or committee as the individual or office with this 
responsibility. See Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 1067 (2002) (codified at 10 
U.S.C. § 2228). The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008 amended this requirement by designating the Director of Corrosion 
Policy and Oversight as the official with these responsibilities. See 
Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 371 (2008) (amending 10 U.S.C.§ 2228). 

[6] While the statute does not define "return on investment" for its 
corrosion-control technology demonstration projects, DOD defines the 
estimated return on investment as the ratio of the present value of 
benefits to the present value of the project's total cost. 

[7] The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2009, Pub. L. No.110-417, § 903 (2008). 

[8] This review of corrosion issues related to DOD's facilities and 
other infrastructure is part of a larger body of work that we are 
doing on DOD's corrosion-control program. GAO also has an ongoing 
review to examine DOD's corrosion projects involving military 
equipment. 

[9] DOD's Corrosion Office sponsors a series of studies to assess the 
cost of corrosion throughout the department, including how much is 
spent on DOD's corrosion activities for facilities and other 
infrastructure. These studies are conducted by LMI, a private, not-for-
profit corporation, using a method approved by the Corrosion Office's 
Corrosion Prevention and Control Integrated Product Team. We did not, 
however, independently review the methodology used by LMI or identify 
any limitations of these studies. 

[10] There are an additional 25 corrosion projects funded in fiscal 
years 2011 and 2012, which were not yet completed. 

[11] Site visits to three of the installations were completed prior to 
the development of our semistructured interview questionnaire. 

[12] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make 
inferences about a population because in a nonprobability sample some 
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown 
chance of being selected as part of the sample. 

[13] We used the four geographic regions of the United States as 
defined by the U. S. Census Bureau. 

[14] The Corrosion Office provided an environmental severity index 
level for each installation. The environmental severity index is 
derived from a database developed by the research firm Battelle with 
the corrosion rates of various metals exposed to different 
environmental conditions found at military bases throughout the world. 
The DOD Corrosion Office, for its fiscal year 2012 cost of corrosion 
study of DOD facilities and other infrastructure, utilized the 
corrosion rates for steel and developed an environmental severity 
index on a scale of 1 through 20 to show the impact of corrosion in 
different locations, with 1 being least severe and 20 being the most 
severe environmental conditions. 

[15] The results of the semistructured interviews are not 
generalizable because we used a nonprobability sample to select 
participants for these interviews. 

[16] Pub. L. 107-314, § 1067. 

[17] Department of Defense Instruction 5000.67, Prevention and 
Mitigation of Corrosion on DOD Military Equipment and Infrastructure 
(Feb. 1, 2010). 

[18] The Corrosion Executives for each of the military departments are 
members of the Corrosion Board of Directors, and they or their 
delegates are participants on DOD's Corrosion Prevention and Control 
Integrated Product Team. The Corrosion Board of Directors is not 
identified in the DOD strategic plan; however, Army and Navy corrosion 
documents acknowledge their Corrosion Executives' membership on the 
Corrosion Board. 

[19] According to officials of the Corrosion Office and the Corrosion 
Executives, the military departments' matching funds may be more or 
less than 50 percent of total costs. 

[20] From fiscal years 2005 through 2009, DOD's strategic plan 
required the military departments to provide bimonthly updates for all 
incomplete corrosion projects. Since fiscal year 2010, the Corrosion 
Office has required updates on a quarterly basis. 

[21] Corrosion Office officials stated that these reports typically 
are due within two years after each demonstration project receives 
funding. 

[22] According to Corrosion Office officials, the transition period to 
implement the demonstrated technology in a military department can be 
up to one year and that they expect the follow-on reports to be 
completed within five years of a project receiving initial funding. 

[23] GAO, Defense Management: The Department of Defense's Annual 
Corrosion Budget Report Does Not Include Some Required Information, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-823R] (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 10, 2012). 

[24] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Has a Rigorous Process to Select 
Corrosion Prevention Projects, but Would Benefit from Clearer Guidance 
and Validation of Returns on Investment, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-84] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 8, 
2010). 

[25] GAO, Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs 
and Increase Readiness, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-753] (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 
2003). 

[26] GAO, Defense Management: Additional Information Needed to Improve 
Military Departments' Corrosion Prevention Strategies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-379] (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 
2013). 

[27] DOD also invested $13 million in 25 additional corrosion projects 
funded in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. These DOD expenditures have not 
been adjusted for inflation. We did not review these 25 projects 
because their reporting milestones had not occurred. 

[28] Department of Defense, Department of Defense Corrosion Prevention 
and Mitigation Strategic Plan, Appendix D (Washington, D.C.: 2011). 

[29] From fiscal years 2005 through 2009, DOD's strategic plan 
required the military departments to provide bimonthly updates for all 
incomplete corrosion projects. Since fiscal year 2010, the Corrosion 
Office has required updates on a quarterly basis. Our limited review 
of the projects that required the bimonthly/quarterly updates found 
that the updates were submitted as required. 

[30] For its corrosion-control technology demonstration projects, DOD 
defines the estimated return on investment as the ratio of the present 
value of benefits to the present value of the project's total cost. 

[31] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999). 

[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[33] According to the final report for one Army project, a follow-on 
report was not warranted due to the nature of the project. 

[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-823R]. 

[35] Pub. L. No.110-417, § 903 (2008). 

[36] The DOD strategic plan includes a goal to "use every available 
communication channel to receive and convey all aspects of corrosion--
nature, impact, approaches and results--from and to every organization 
within the broad Department of Defense and industry sectors as well as 
national and international communities." Appendix A of the plan 
includes an action plan for the Corrosion Office's Communications and 
Outreach Working Integrated Product Team. 

[37] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]. 

[38] In April 2012, the current Corrosion Executive filled the 
position, which had been vacant for more than a year and a half. 

[39] We spoke with the managers of the public works offices and their 
staff at 32 installations, representing each military service, and 
asked them a series of questions about corrosion and corrosion control 
efforts at their locations. For additional information about these 
interviews, see appendix II. One installation did not respond to this 
question. 

[40] One installation did not respond to this question. Officials at 
13 of the remaining 15 installations responded that since the 
establishment of these corrosion-control offices there was no change 
or they were unaware of any related changes at their installations. 

[41] We interviewed officials at 32 installations; however, three 
interviews took place before development of the semistructured 
interview template that included this question. 

[42] At least four officials qualified their responses to this 
question by stating that other officials might be more knowledgeable 
about specific documents due to the nature of their positions. 

[43] The term "management commands" refers to the services' 
installation commands (Army and Navy) and major commands (Air Force) 
responsible for overseeing DOD installations. 

[44] The Department of Navy officials noted that the technical experts 
from the Naval Facilities Engineering Command may have more 
interaction with these offices. For example, the Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command is a member of the Navy's Corrosion Cross-
Functional Team. The Army official noted that he works through his 
chain of command, specifically the Office of the Assistant Chief of 
Staff for Installation Management, on infrastructure issues. 

[45] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 
2003). 

[46] LMI, located in McLean, VA, is a private, not-for-profit 
corporation that provides management consulting, research, and 
analysis to governments and other nonprofit organizations. 

[47] LMI, The Annual Cost of Corrosion for the Department of Defense 
Facilities and Infrastructure, (McLean, VA: May 2007). 

[48] LMI, The Annual Cost of Corrosion for the Department of Defense 
Facilities and Infrastructure, 2007-2008 Update (McLean, VA: July 
2010). 

[49] LMI did not assess the cost of corrosion for fiscal year 2006. 

[50] Throughout this section, we cite the dollar figures from the LMI 
reports published in 2007 and 2010. We did not adjust these figures 
for inflation. 

[51] We did not review the remaining 25 corrosion projects funded for 
fiscal years 2011 and 2012 because their reporting milestones had not 
occurred. 

[52] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make 
inferences about a population because in a nonprobability sample some 
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown 
chance of being selected as part of the sample. 

[53] We used the four geographic regions of the United States as 
defined by the U. S. Census Bureau. 

[54] The Corrosion Office provided an environmental severity index 
level for each installation. The environmental severity index is 
derived from a database developed by the research firm Battelle with 
the corrosion rates of various metals exposed to different 
environmental conditions found at military bases throughout the world. 
The DOD Corrosion Office, for its fiscal year 2012 cost of corrosion 
study of DOD facilities and other infrastructure, used the corrosion 
rates for steel and developed an environmental severity index on a 
scale of 1 through 20 to show the impact of corrosion in different 
locations, with 1 being least severe and 20 being the most severe 
environmental conditions. 

[55] The results of the semistructured interviews are not 
generalizable because we used a nonprobability sample to select 
participants for these interviews. 

[56] Site visits to 3 of the installations were completed prior to the 
development of our questionnaire for the semistructured interviews. 

[57] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-84]. 

[58] According to the DOD strategic plan, the return-on-investment 
reassessment is the focus of the corrosion projects' follow-on reports. 

[59] There was another Army project in which its project manager 
reported that a return-on-investment computation and subsequent follow-
on report was not warranted. 

[60] Since follow-on reporting milestones have not occurred for 
corrosion projects funded after 2007, we do not have reassessed return-
on-investment data to compare to the initial return-on-investment 
estimates for the 64 projects funded in fiscal years 2008 through 2012. 

[End of section] 

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