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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO: 

Report to the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate: 

October 2012: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

Future Aerostat and Airship Investment Decisions Drive Oversight and 
Coordination Needs: 

GAO-13-81: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-13-81, a report to the Subcommittee on Emerging 
Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Use of lighter-than-air platforms, such as aerostats, which are 
tethered to the ground, and airships, which are free-flying, could 
significantly improve U.S. ISR and communications capabilities, and 
move cargo more cheaply over long distances and to austere locations. 
DOD is spending about $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2012 to develop and 
acquire numerous aerostats and airships. 

GAO was asked to determine (1) what key systems governmentwide are 
being developed and acquired, including funding, purpose, and status; 
(2) any technical challenges these key efforts may be facing; and (3) 
how effectively these key efforts are being overseen to ensure 
coordination, and identify any potential for duplication. To address 
these questions, GAO reviewed and analyzed documentation and 
interviewed a wide variety of DOD and civil agency officials. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO identified 15 key aerostat and airship efforts that were underway 
or had been initiated since 2007, and the Department of Defense (DOD) 
had or has primary responsibility for all of these efforts. None of 
the civil agency efforts met GAO’s criteria for a key effort. Most of 
the aerostat and airship efforts have been fielded or completed, and 
are intended to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) support. The estimated total funding of these efforts was almost 
$7 billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. However, funding 
estimates beyond fiscal year 2012 decline precipitously for aerostat 
and airship efforts under development, although there is an 
expectation that investment in the area will continue. 

Figure: Aerostat (left) and Airship (right): 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

Sources: left to right: U.S. Army and U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

Three of the four aerostat and airship efforts under development, plus 
another airship development effort that was terminated in June 2012, 
have suffered from high acquisition risks because of significant 
technical challenges, such as overweight components, and difficulties 
with integration and software development, which, in turn, have driven 
up costs and delayed schedules. 

DOD has provided limited oversight to ensure coordination of its 
aerostat and airship development and acquisition efforts. 
Consequently, these efforts have not been effectively integrated into 
strategic frameworks, such as investment plans and roadmaps. At the 
time of GAO’s review, DOD did not have comprehensive information on 
all its efforts nor its entire investment in aerostats and airships. 
Additionally, DOD’s coordination efforts have been limited to specific 
technical activities, as opposed to having a higher level authority to 
ensure coordination is effective. DOD has recently taken steps to 
bolster oversight, including the appointment of a senior official 
responsible for the oversight and coordination of airship-related 
programs. However, as of August 2012, DOD has not defined the details 
relating to the authority, scope, and responsibilities of this new 
position. Whether these steps are sufficient largely depends on the 
direction DOD intends to take with aerostat and airship programs. If 
it decides to continue investing in efforts, more steps may be needed 
to shape these investments. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD take actions based on the extent of its future 
investments in this area: (1) if investments are curtailed, ensure it 
has insight into all current and planned efforts in the short term; 
(2) if investments increase significantly, include the efforts in 
strategic frameworks to ensure visibility and coordination, guide 
innovation, and prioritize investments; and (3) ensure the roles and 
responsibilities of the senior official responsible for the oversight 
and coordination of airship-related programs are defined. DOD 
concurred with the recommendations. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-81]. For more 
information, contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or 
chaplainc@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

Most Key Aerostat and Airship Efforts Underway or Initiated Since 2007 
Have Been Fielded or Completed: 

Aerostat and Airship Efforts under Development Are Experiencing 
Technical Challenges: 

DOD Has Provided Limited Oversight to Ensure Coordination of Its 
Aerostat and Airship Efforts: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Examples of Civil Government Use of Aerostats: 

Appendix III: DOD Aerostat and Airship Development, Acquisition, and 
Operations Efforts: 

Appendix IV: Funding Calculations for Aerostats and Airships, Fiscal 
Years 2007 through 2016: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Inventory of Aerostat and Airship Efforts as of June 2012: 

Table 2: Comparison of LEMV and Blue Devil Block 2 Capabilities as of 
June 2012: 

Table 3: Civil Government Agencies' Aerostat Usage: 

Table 4: Aerostat and Airships Essentials, Purpose, and Status: 

Table 5: Total Aerostat Funding, Fiscal Years 2007 through 2016: 

Table 6: Total Airship Funding, Fiscal Years 2007 through 2016: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Aerostat System (U.S. Army's Persistent Threat Detection 
System): 

Figure 2: Conventional Airship (U.S. Navy's Advanced Airship Flying 
Laboratory): 

Figure 3: Hybrid Airship (U.S. Army's Long-Endurance Multi-
Intelligence Vehicle): 

Figure 4: Funding for DOD Aerostat and Airship Efforts for Fiscal 
Years 2007 through 2012: 

Figure 5: Fiscal Years 2007 through 2016 Funding for Aerostats and 
Airships under Development: 

Abbreviations: 

AAFL: Advanced Airship Flying Laboratory: 

DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOC: Department of Commerce: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency: 

FPDS-NG: Federal Procurement Data System--Next Generation: 

FY: fiscal year: 

GARP: Geospatial Airship Research Platform: 

HALE-D: High Altitude Endurance-Demonstrator: 

ISIS: Integrated Sensor is Structure: 

ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance: 

JLENS: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor: 

LEMV: Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle: 

LTA: lighter-than-air: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

OASDR&E: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering: 

O&M: operations and maintenance: 

PGSS: Persistent Ground Surveillance System: 

PSST: Persistent Surveillance System-Tethered: 

PTDS: Persistent Threat Detection System: 

RAID: Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment: 

RDT&E: research, development, test, and evaluation: 

REAP: Rapidly Elevated Aerostat Platform: 

TARS: Tethered Aerostat Radar System: 

TRL: technology readiness level: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

October 23, 2012: 

The Honorable Kay R. Hagan:
Chairman:
The Honorable Rob Portman:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate: 

Platforms that utilize lighter-than-air (LTA) technologies--such as 
aerostats (buoyant craft tethered to the ground), and airships 
(buoyant craft that are free-flying)--may hold the potential for 
significantly increasing capabilities in the areas of persistent 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and 
communications, as well as lowering the costs of transporting cargo 
over long distances and to austere locations, such as those without 
aircraft runways.[Footnote 1] The Department of Defense (DOD) has 
embarked on a variety of efforts to develop and acquire LTA platforms 
for these purposes. DOD's investments in these platforms totaled about 
$1.3 billion in fiscal year 2012. Additionally, other federal 
agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), are using 
or are considering using these platforms in conducting their missions. 
However, the visibility into and progress of these efforts, as well as 
how much they are being coordinated, has been unclear. 

Because of the variety and number of aerostat and airship programs and 
interest in the extent of coordination across programs and potential 
for unnecessary duplication, you asked us to determine (1) what key 
aerostat and airship systems across the government are being developed 
and acquired, including funding, purpose, and status; (2) any 
technical challenges these key efforts may be facing; and (3) how 
effectively these key efforts are being overseen to ensure 
coordination, and identify any potential for duplication. 

To determine what key aerostat and airship systems across the federal 
government are being developed and acquired, including funding, 
purpose, and status of those systems, we reviewed documentation and 
interviewed officials on the status and progress of aerostat and 
airship development efforts in areas such as requirements, budgets, 
funding, costs, schedule, contracting, technology maturation, and 
actual or planned operational characteristics. In doing so, we 
developed an inventory of key airship and aerostat development and 
acquisition efforts which enabled a comparison of platform types, 
performance attributes, and costs. Based on funding data we collected, 
we determined that our definition of "key aerostat and airship systems 
being planned, developed, and acquired" includes two key criteria (1) 
total funding of $1 million or more for fiscal years 2007 to 2012, and 
(2) efforts to plan, develop, or acquire systems that include both a 
platform and payload (such as sensors or cargo) capability. We 
analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from various offices 
of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army, Navy, and 
Air Force; U.S. Central Command; Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency; and Defense Logistics Agency. We also analyzed documentation 
and interviewed officials from civil agencies, including the 
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy, Environmental 
Protection Agency, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence. We did not examine the development 
and utilization of LTA technologies outside of the federal government. 

To identify any technical challenges these key aerostat and airship 
efforts may be facing, we analyzed documentation and interviewed 
officials from the organizations mentioned above. We used the 
collected information to assess any identified technical problems 
impacting the funding, cost, schedule, and performance of airships and 
aerostats. 

To determine how the various key aerostat and airship efforts are 
being overseen to ensure coordination, and identify any potential for 
duplication, we assessed aerostat and airship investments, 
acquisitions, capabilities, and operations by analyzing documents and 
interviewing officials from the organizations listed above, analyzing 
the inventory of key efforts developed under our first objective, and 
reviewing prior GAO work for relevant criteria. Specifically, we 
assessed oversight at the programmatic and enterprise levels by 
reviewing organizational roles, responsibilities, and authorities as 
they relate to aerostat and airship development, acquisition, and 
operations efforts. We also determined the extent to which plans and 
planning activities integrated aerostat and airship development and 
acquisition efforts and capabilities within DOD. Reviewed plans and 
planning activities included architectures, roadmaps, investment 
plans, and requirements development. We also used the information 
relating to various aspects of the development and acquisition 
efforts, such as requirements, and actual or planned performance 
attributes, to assess whether any of the efforts are potentially 
duplicative. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to October 2012 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide reasonable basis for 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional 
details on our scope and methodology are provided in appendix I. 

Background: 

This report examines two types of LTA platforms: aerostats and 
airships. Both use a lifting gas--most commonly helium--but an 
aerostat is tethered to the ground while an airship is free moving. 
Aerostats lack a propulsion mechanism and are connected to a mooring 
station on the ground by a long cable called a tether. The tether, in 
addition to securing the aerostat to one general area above the 
ground, usually provides power to the payload, such as ISR sensors and 
communications equipment, and carries data between the payload and 
ground control station. Airships, on the other hand, are manned or 
unmanned, self- propelled vehicles that have directional control. See 
figure 1 for an example of an aerostat system. 

Figure 1: Aerostat System (U.S. Army's Persistent Threat Detection 
System): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: U.S. Army. 

[End of figure] 

There are three basic types of airships: (1) non-rigid--which has no 
frame and maintains its envelope (external structure) shape through 
the slightly pressurized gas it contains; (2) semi-rigid--which also 
maintains its shape through the slightly pressurized gas it contains, 
but also has a structural keel along the bottom of the envelope to 
help distribute loads; and (3) rigid--which has an internal rigid 
frame to maintain its shape and to distribute lift and load weight. 
Blimps flying above sporting events are commonly non-rigid airships, 
whereas the Hindenburg airship of the 1930s is an example of a rigid 
airship. 

Airships can be further categorized by their shape--conventional or 
hybrid. A conventional airship has an ellipsoidal shape reminiscent of 
those that fly over sporting events. A hybrid airship combines the 
buoyant lift of a lighter-than-air gas with the aerodynamic lift 
created by the shape of the airship as it flies through the air. 
Shaped roughly like the cross-section of an aircraft wing, a hybrid 
airship can generate up to 30 percent of its lift as it flies. 
Additional lift can be generated by directing the thrust of on-board 
propulsion systems (called vectored thrust) downward. Because of the 
additional sources of lift, hybrid airships theoretically can take off 
in a heavier-than-air configuration. See figures 2 and 3 for 
respective depictions of conventional and hybrid airships. 

Figure 2: Conventional Airship (U.S. Navy's Advanced Airship Flying 
Laboratory): 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: U.S. Navy. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 3: Hybrid Airship (U.S. Army's Long-Endurance Multi- 
Intelligence Vehicle): 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Source: Northrup Grumman. 

[End of figure] 

In the early to mid 1900s, and especially during World War II, the 
U.S. Navy operated a variety of airships for maritime patrol and fleet 
reconnaissance, including assistance in antisubmarine warfare. 
Additionally, in the early 1930s, airships were used for commercial 
transportation across the Atlantic Ocean. However, advances in fixed-
wing aircraft design, capabilities, and availability, as well as in 
enemy antiaircraft weaponry, led to a marked decline in the military 
and commercial use of airships. For instance, the Navy disbanded its 
last airship unit in 1962, and since then, the military use of 
airships for other than research and development purposes essentially 
discontinued. 

Since 1978, DOD has operated aerostats along the southern U.S. border 
for counterdrug detection and monitoring. Additionally, civil 
government agencies have used aerostats for a variety of purposes, 
such as monitoring of environmental pollution, and atmospheric and 
climate research. For example, since 2009, the Environmental 
Protection Agency has used aerostats for the purpose of sampling air 
emissions from open sources, such as prescribed forest burns. 
Additionally, the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration has used small aerostats to collect wind 
data. Furthermore, the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection is considering using aerostats for its border 
security mission. The overall investment of civil government agencies 
in LTA activities is small compared to that of DOD. See appendix II 
for examples of civil agency aerostat activities. While commercial use 
of airships has primarily been limited to sightseeing and advertising, 
there has been interest in using airships for cargo transportation to 
logistically austere locations, such as remote areas in Alaska and 
Canada. 

Several factors have increased DOD's attention toward LTA platforms. 
The lack of enemy air defense capabilities in recent military 
operations has made threats to LTA platforms appear to be low, and the 
military's demand for persistent ISR has grown significantly. For 
example, DOD plans to almost double the number of aerostats--from 66 
to 125--in Afghanistan for ISR in fiscal years 2011 and 2012. Also, 
growing budget pressures have encouraged the study of potential 
solutions to military problems, such as persistent ISR and heavy-lift 
cargo transportation, which may reduce procurement and operations and 
maintenance costs. For example, a 2008 Army Science Board study that 
compared fixed-wing unmanned aircraft, space satellites, and LTA 
platforms for providing persistent communications, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance missions, concluded that airships offered great promise 
at being effective in supporting these missions because of factors 
including ease of reconfigurability, extended time on station, large 
payload capacity, and lower cost.[Footnote 2] 

LTA platforms face several significant operational hazards. For 
example, weather phenomena such as high winds and lightning have posed 
the highest threats to aerostats deployed by the military in 
Afghanistan. Before the arrival of hazardous weather conditions, 
aerostat operations must cease and the platform must be lowered and 
secured to the mooring station to help prevent platform or payload 
damage. Additionally, high winds can make airships hard to control and 
increase fuel consumption, reducing on-station endurance. Furthermore, 
combat operations can result in punctures in the fabric caused by 
bullets and other projectiles. However, low helium pressure in the 
envelope (which is only slightly higher than the surrounding 
atmospheric pressure) means small helium leaks from bullet holes are 
typically slow and repairs can usually wait until a normally scheduled 
maintenance period. 

Most Key Aerostat and Airship Efforts Underway or Initiated Since 2007 
Have Been Fielded or Completed: 

We identified 15 key aerostat and airship efforts that were underway 
or had been initiated since 2007, and DOD had or has primary 
responsibility for all of these efforts.[Footnote 3] Most of these 
efforts have been fielded, completed, or terminated. Over the past 6 
years, DOD's overall investment has increased, and the estimated total 
funding of these efforts was almost $7 billion from fiscal years 2007 
through 2012. However, funding estimates for aerostat and airship 
efforts under development beyond fiscal year 2012 decline 
significantly, although there is an expectation that investment in the 
area will continue. 

Status of 15 Efforts: 

Highlights on the 15 aerostat and airships efforts that were underway 
or initiated since 2007 by DOD are presented in the table below-- 
details of each are provided in appendix III. Most of the aerostat and 
airship efforts have been fielded or completed, and are intended to 
provide ISR support or persistent surveillance, with on-station 
duration time typically greater than fixed-wing unmanned aircraft. 

Table 1: Inventory of Aerostat and Airship Efforts as of June 2012: 

Fielded, completed, or terminated: Aerostats: 

Name: Geospatial Airship Research Platform (GARP); 
Purpose: Test ISR and communication payloads; 
Number of units: 2; 
Total funding FY07-FY12: $9.4 million; 
Status: Fielded. 

Name: Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS); 
Purpose: Provide ISR support; 
Number of units: 59; 
Total funding FY07-FY12: $1.508 billion; 
Status: Fielded. 

Name: Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS); 
Purpose: Provide ISR support; 
Number of units: 66; 
Total funding FY07-FY12: $1.717 billion; 
Status: Fielded. 

Name: Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID); 
Purpose: Provide persistent surveillance for force protection; 
Number of units: 21; 
Total funding FY07-FY12: $127.1 million; 
Status: Fielded. 

Name: Rapidly Elevated Aerostat Platform (REAP)-XL B; 
Purpose: Army: provide persistent surveillance/Navy: extended 
communications relay system; 
Number of units: 3; 
Total funding FY07-FY12: $5.3 million; 
Status: Fielded. 

Name: Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS); 
Purpose: Support DOD's counterdrug detection and monitoring mission 
along the southern U.S. border; 
Number of units: 8; 
Total funding FY07-FY12: $213.5 million; 
Status: Fielded. 

Fielded, completed, or terminated: Airships: 

Name: Advanced Airship Flying Laboratory (AAFL, also known as MZ-3A); 
Purpose: Test ISR and communication payloads; 
Number of units: 1; 
Total funding FY07-FY12: $14.1 million; 
Status: Fielded. 

Name: Blue Devil Block 2; 
Purpose: Demonstrate persistent multi- intelligence ISR capabilities; 
Number of units: 1; 
Total funding FY07- FY12: $328.3 million; 
Status: Terminated. 

Name: High Altitude Endurance Demonstrator (HALE-D); 
Purpose: Demonstrate ISR capabilities at high altitudes; 
Number of units: 1; 
Total funding FY07-FY12: $36.3 million; 
Status: Completed. 

Name: HiSentinel; 
Purpose: Demonstrate ISR capabilities at high altitudes; 
Number of units: 2; 
Total funding FY07-FY12: $11.2 million; 
Status: Completed. 

Name: Star Light; 
Purpose: Develop and demonstrate a high altitude and long endurance 
airship; 
Number of units: 1; 
Total funding FY07-FY12: $2.1 million; 
Status: Terminated. 

Under development: Aerostat: 

Name: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor 
(JLENS); 
Purpose: Provide detection and tracking of land-attack cruise missiles 
and other targets; 
Number of units: 2; 
Total funding FY07-FY12: $2.222 billion; 
Status: Under development. 

Under development: Airships: 

Name: Integrated Sensor is Structure (ISIS); 
Purpose: Develop and demonstrate radar sensor fully integrated into a 
stratospheric airship; 
Number of units: 1; 
Total funding FY07-FY12: $466.0 million; 
Status: Under development. 

Name: Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV); 
Purpose: Develop and demonstrate a hybrid prototype airship for long-
endurance ISR support; 
Number of units: 1; 
Total funding FY07-FY12: $275.9 million; 
Status: Under development. 

Name: Project Pelican; 
Purpose: Develop and demonstrate a hybrid airship with a rigid 
internal structure and test airship buoyancy control technologies; 
Number of units: 1; 
Total funding FY07-FY12: $42.4 million; 
Status: Under development. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

DOD's pursuit of aerostats and airships is mostly due to the ability 
of these platforms to loiter for a longer period of time than fixed-
wing unmanned aircraft, which makes them very suitable for supporting 
the ISR mission. The various ISR sensors used or planned for the 
aerostats and airships in our review include: 

* electro-optical cameras to conduct optical monitoring of the 
electromagnetic spectrum from ultraviolet through far infrared; 

* ground moving target indicator radars to detect, locate, and track 
vehicles throughout a large area when they are moving slowly on or 
just above the surface of land or water; 

* unattended transient acoustic measurement and signature intelligence 
systems that use sets of microphones to capture sounds that are 
processed and analyzed to determine the direction of the points of 
origin and impact of mortar launch; and: 

* signals intelligence sensors to collect transmissions deriving from 
communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation systems. 

The aerostat and airship efforts we identified vary in terms of the 
time they can operate on station in any single session. Their on- 
station endurance time is typically greater than that of fixed-wing 
unmanned aircraft. For example, the TARS aerostat is expected to stay 
on station for 6 days, whereas the LEMV airship is expected to stay on 
station for at least 16 days. In contrast, tactical and theater-level 
fixed-wing unmanned aircraft can stay on station from 6 hours for a 
Shadow aircraft, to 40 hours for a Sky Warrior.[Footnote 4] The amount 
of time on station is greatly dependent on how often the aerostats and 
airships need to be topped off with additional helium, and in the case 
of most airships, how often they have to be refueled.[Footnote 5] 

DOD Has Invested Almost $7 Billion in Aerostats and Airships over the 
Past 6 Years: 

Over the past 6 years, overall total DOD investment in aerostat and 
airship development, acquisition, and operations and maintenance has 
increased, ranging from about $339 million in fiscal year 2007 to a 
high of about $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2010, and about $1.3 billion 
in fiscal year 2012, as illustrated in figure 4. DOD has invested 
almost $7 billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2012 on key aerostat 
and airship efforts in our review. Moreover, aerostat-related 
investment--$5.8 billion--accounted for more than 80 percent of the 
total. See appendix IV for additional details on the reported funding 
for these efforts. 

Figure 4: Funding for DOD Aerostat and Airship Efforts for Fiscal 
Years 2007 through 2012: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Total funding: $338.69 million. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
Total funding: $677.84 million. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
Total funding: $1.00 billion. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
Total funding: $2.241 billion. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
Total funding: $1.403 billion. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
Total funding: $1.318 billion. 

Source: GAO analysis od DOD data. 

Note: Includes research, development, test, and evaluation; 
procurement; military construction; and operations and maintenance 
funding, as applicable, during fiscal years 2007 through 2012. See 
appendix IV for specific funding types and amounts. 

[End of figure] 

Over 90 percent of all estimated aerostat investment from fiscal years 
2007 to 2012--almost $5.4 billion--is attributed to the development 
and procurement of three aerostat programs--JLENS, PGSS, and PTDS. 
Aerostat funding increased through fiscal year 2010 primarily because 
of increased demand for PGSS and PTDS aerostats in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. 

Most of the total estimated airship investment from fiscal years 2007 
to 2012--approximately $1.1 billion--consists of research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) costs. Of this amount, over 
90 percent of the airship RDT&E investment--approximately $1 billion-- 
is for the Blue Devil Block 2, ISIS and LEMV development efforts. The 
major increase depicted for fiscal year 2010 reflects an increase in 
RDT&E investment due to the beginning of funding for the Blue Devil 
Block 2 and LEMV development efforts, as well as a substantial 
increase for the ISIS development effort the Air Force began funding. 

Estimated Funding for Aerostats and Airships under Development 
Expected to Decline after Fiscal Year 2012: 

Estimated funding for JLENS, ISIS, LEMV, and Project Pelican--efforts 
under development--is expected to decline significantly after fiscal 
year 2012, as illustrated in figure 5. 

Figure 5: Fiscal Years 2007 through 2016 Funding for Aerostats and 
Airships under Development: 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year 2012 dollars: 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
JLENS: $256 million; 
ISIS: $25 million; 
LEMV: $0; 
Project Pelican: $0. 

Fiscal year: 2008; 
JLENS: $489 million; 
ISIS: $30 million; 
LEMV: $0; 
Project Pelican: $6 million. 

Fiscal year: 2009; 
JLENS: $357 million; 
ISIS: $81 million; 
LEMV: $0; 
Project Pelican: $11 million. 

Fiscal year: 2010; 
JLENS: $346 million; 
ISIS: $251 million; 
LEMV: $131 million; 
Project Pelican: $14 million. 

Fiscal year: 2011; 
JLENS: $405 million; 
ISIS: $22 million; 
LEMV: $101 million; 
Project Pelican: $11 million. 

Fiscal year: 2012; 
JLENS: $369 million; 
ISIS: $57 million; 
LEMV: $44 million; 
Project Pelican: $0. 

Fiscal year: 2013; 
JLENS: $187 million; 
ISIS: $0; 
LEMV: $26 million; 
Project Pelican: $0. 

Fiscal year: 2014; 
JLENS: $92 million; 
ISIS: $0; 
LEMV: $28 million; 
Project Pelican: $0. 

Fiscal year: 2015; 
JLENS: $31 million; 
ISIS: $0; 
LEMV: $26 million; 
Project Pelican: $0. 

Fiscal year: 2016; 
JLENS: $23 million; 
ISIS: $0; 
LEMV: $0; 
Project Pelican: $0. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Includes research, development, test, and evaluation; 
procurement; and military construction funding, as applicable, during 
fiscal years 2007 through 2016. See appendix IV for specific funding 
types and amounts. 

[End of figure] 

However, according to DOD officials, investment in this area is 
expected to continue in the future. The aggregate funding for these 
four development efforts declines from $473 million in fiscal year 
2012, to $23 million in fiscal year 2016. Funding for JLENS, the 
development effort with the highest estimated cost from fiscal years 
2012 to 2016, drops from $369 million in fiscal year 2012 to $187 
million in fiscal year 2013, $92 million in fiscal year 2014, $31 
million in fiscal year 2015, and $23 million in fiscal year 2016. The 
original funding profile for JLENS showed substantively higher amounts 
over this time period, but due to a recent decision to reduce the 
number of JLENS aerostats that DOD intends to procure from 16 to 2, 
the current funding profile reflects this significant reduction in 
procurement. There are also investment uncertainties in the near term 
for LEMV and ISIS. According to LEMV program officials, if the first 
LEMV is successfully demonstrated in Afghanistan, then it may 
transition to an acquisition program which would likely require 
additional funding. Also, ISIS program officials do not yet know if 
ISIS will become a program of record. 

According to an official in the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence, while DOD expects to continue funding 
airship and aerostat efforts beyond fiscal year 2016, specific 
information regarding funding amounts is not available at this time. 
Furthermore, we did not find any current architectures, investment 
plans, or roadmaps that incorporated aerostat and airship efforts to 
indicate DOD's commitment to increase or reduce its investment in this 
area. 

Aerostat and Airship Efforts under Development Are Experiencing 
Technical Challenges: 

Three of the four aerostat and airship efforts under development, plus 
another airship development effort that was terminated in June 2012, 
have suffered from high acquisition risks because of significant 
technical challenges, leading to cost overruns and schedule delays. 
Additionally, DOD used the rapid acquisition process to acquire 
airships that had high technical risks. 

Aerostat and Airship Technical Challenges: 

JLENS has experienced schedule delays and a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost 
breach,[Footnote 6] ISIS will not and LEMV did not meet their 
originally scheduled launch dates and have experienced cost overruns, 
and Blue Devil Block 2 was terminated to avoid substantially 
increasing costs caused by technical problems. 

* The Army initiated JLENS system development in August 2005. JLENS 
consists of two large aerostats--over 240 feet in length--each with a 
7,000 pound payload capacity for cruise missile detection and 
tracking. As we have previously reported, the program has experienced 
design issues associated with the mobile mooring transport vehicle, as 
well as schedule delays caused by synchronization of JLENS with the 
Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense program.[Footnote 7] JLENS 
was originally scheduled to enter production in September 2010. 
However, that same month, an aerostat accident resulted in the loss of 
one of the JLENS platforms. The accident, as well as recent system 
integration challenges, led to a decision to not procure production 
units. JLENS also incurred a critical Nunn-McCurdy program acquisition 
unit cost breach with the submission of the fiscal year 2013 
President's Budget due to a 100 percent reduction in planned 
procurement quantities--the program previously planned to procure 16 
aerostats. Now, the program is scheduled to only acquire 2 aerostats 
using research and development funding, and is not expected to enter 
the production phase. 

* ISIS is a joint Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
and Air Force science and technology effort initiated by DARPA in 
2004. ISIS is to develop and demonstrate a radar sensor system that is 
fully integrated into a stratospheric airship measuring 510 feet in 
length and with a payload capacity of 6,600 pounds. ISIS has 
experienced technical challenges stemming from subsystem development 
and radar antennae panel manufacturing. Consequently, earlier this 
year DARPA temporarily delayed airframe development activities, and 
instead will mainly focus on radar risk reduction activities. During 
this time period, the ISIS team will develop an airship risk reduction 
plan and conduct limited airship activities. Based on the radar and 
airship risk reduction studies, DARPA will reassess the future plan 
for ISIS with the Air Force. 

* The Army initiated development efforts on LEMV in 2010. At over 300 
feet in length and with a goal of carrying a 2,500 pound payload, LEMV 
offers substantive potential ISR capabilities--if the program can meet 
its performance objectives. LEMV's deployment is behind schedule by at 
least 10 months (about a 56 percent schedule increase) due to issues 
with fabric production, getting foreign parts cleared through customs, 
adverse weather conditions causing the evacuation of work crews, and 
first-time integration and testing issues. Also, LEMV is about 12,000 
pounds overweight because components, such as tail fins, exceed weight 
thresholds. According to program officials, the increased weight 
reduces the airship's estimated on-station endurance at an altitude of 
20,000 feet from the required 21 days, to 4 to 5 days. However, 
current plans call for operating the airship at a lower altitude of 
16,000 feet, which is expected to enable an on-station duration time 
of 16 days with minimal impacts to operational effectiveness (other 
than about a 24 percent reduction to on-station endurance). According 
to program officials, the biggest risk to program development was the 
ambitious 18-month initial development schedule (from June 2010 to 
December 2011). The Army successfully launched and recovered LEMV 
during its first flight in August 2012. The Army identified a fiscal 
year 2012 funding shortfall of $21.3 million resulting from the need 
for additional engineering and production support to mitigate and 
resolve technical issues at the LEMV assembly facility. 

* The Air Force initiated development efforts on Blue Devil Block 2 in 
2010. Much like LEMV, this effort was to deliver a large airship that 
would carry a 2,500 pound payload in support of the ISR mission. The 
length of the airship was 370 feet. Prior to its termination in June 
2012, the Blue Devil Block 2 airship effort experienced significant 
technical problems resulting in cost overruns and schedule delays. 
According to an Air Force official, the Blue Devil Block 2 development 
effort had a very aggressive development schedule because it was 
intended to meet an urgent need for use in Afghanistan. Some of the 
technical problems included the tail fins, which were overweight and 
failed structural load design testing, rendering the airship not 
flyable. Other technical problems included the flight control software 
which experienced problems due to issues related to scaling--although 
the software worked well with a much smaller scale version of the 
airship, it did not work well with the much larger Blue Devil Block 2 
airship. The Air Force terminated the Blue Devil Block 2 airship 
effort in June 2012 due to the technical problems experienced with the 
airframe and the need to avoid substantially increasing costs of the 
effort. For example, the contractor estimated that the 1-year post- 
deployment operations and maintenance costs would total $29 million, 
but the Air Force's cost estimate ranged between $100 and $120 million-
-an estimate that was at least 245 percent higher than the 
contractor's estimate. According to an Air Force official, the 
contractor's estimate did not include costs such as for spare parts 
and repairs. 

Some Rapid Acquisitions Took on Too Much Risk: 

We found that DOD used its rapid acquisition process to initiate two 
airship efforts to quickly deliver warfighter capabilities, but 
significantly underestimated the risks of meeting cost, schedule, and 
performance goals.[Footnote 8] DOD has taken a number of steps to 
provide urgently needed capabilities to the warfighter more quickly 
and to alleviate the challenges associated with the traditional 
acquisition process for acquiring capabilities.[Footnote 9] Some of 
these steps include quicker requirements validation and reduced levels 
of oversight, including exemption from disciplined analyses that help 
to ensure requirements are achievable within available technologies, 
design, and other resources, and that programs have adequate knowledge 
in hand before moving forward in the acquisition process. The success 
of this accelerated acquisition process is predicated on efforts that 
do not involve high development and acquisition risks, such as 
limiting technology development by using mature technologies. However, 
in the case of LEMV and Blue Devil Block 2, the risks of these 
acquisitions were higher than usual for rapid acquisitions. 
Specifically: 

* The LEMV acquisition strategy was initially approved when 
technologies were estimated to be at technology readiness levels 4 
through 7. At the time, DOD's acquisition guidance recommended a 
technology readiness level 6 for product development.[Footnote 10] DOD 
officials stated that they were willing to assume higher risk with the 
potential of developing an asset that had much greater on-station 
endurance and could provide capabilities on a single platform rather 
than on multiple aircraft. They stated that the higher risk of the 
effort was justified because there were multiple other efforts that 
were already providing surveillance capabilities in theater. DOD 
officials stated that, at the time the LEMV initiative was started, 
they expected the airship could be scaled up from a commercially 
existing demonstration variant and that the Army could meet the 18 
month schedule to design, fabricate, assemble, test, and deploy the 
system. However, as noted earlier, LEMV experienced schedule delays of 
at least 10 months, largely rooted in technical, design, and 
engineering problems in scaling up the airship to the Army's needs. 

* DOD also significantly underestimated the risk of the Blue Devil 
Block 2 development effort. The Secretary of Defense designated Blue 
Devil Block 2 as an urgent need solution to eliminate combat 
capability deficiencies that had resulted in combat fatalities. 
According to program officials, it was thought that the Blue Devil 
Block 2 airship would be a variant of commercially-available 
conventional airships and therefore deemed the technologies associated 
with the platform to be mature. However, the part of the program 
considered to be the lowest risk--the airship platform--turned out to 
be a high risk development effort. At the time of project 
cancellation, the Blue Devil Block 2 airship was more than 10,000 
pounds overweight, which limited the airship's estimated endurance. 
The weight issue contributed to other design concerns, the tail fins 
were too heavy and were damaged during testing, and the flight control 
software experienced problems related to scaling to a larger airship. 
The Air Force terminated the acquisition in June 2012. 

The experience of these two programs under the urgent needs 
acquisition process is not unique. We recently reported that urgent 
needs initiatives that required technology development took longer 
after contract award to field because of technical challenges and 
testing delays than initiatives that involved mature technologies. 
[Footnote 11] Additionally, as reported in a 2009 Defense Science 
Board Task Force Study, squeezing new technology development into an 
urgent timeframe creates risks for delays and ultimately may not 
adequately address an existing capability gap.[Footnote 12] 

DOD Has Provided Limited Oversight to Ensure Coordination of Its 
Aerostat and Airship Efforts: 

DOD has not provided effective oversight to ensure coordination of its 
aerostat and airship development and acquisition efforts. 
Consequently, these efforts have not been effectively integrated into 
strategic frameworks, such as investment plans and roadmaps. At the 
time of our review, DOD did not have comprehensive information on all 
its efforts nor its entire investment in aerostats and airships. 
Additionally, DOD's coordination efforts have been limited to specific 
technical activities, as opposed to having a higher level authority to 
ensure coordination is effective. These shortcomings may have led to 
an instance of duplication, which ended when one airship effort was 
terminated. DOD has recently taken steps to bolster oversight. Whether 
these steps are sufficient largely depends on the direction DOD 
intends to take with aerostat and airship programs. If it decides to 
make significant future investments in efforts, more steps may be 
needed to shape these investments. 

Aerostat and Airship Capabilities Not Effectively Integrated into 
Strategic Frameworks: 

We have reported on the value of strategic planning for laying out 
goals and objectives, suggesting actions for addressing those 
objectives, allocating resources, identifying roles and 
responsibilities, and integrating relevant parties.[Footnote 13] 
However, DOD has not effectively integrated aerostat and airship 
capabilities into its strategic frameworks for future acquisitions of 
unmanned or ISR systems. At the time of our review, DOD did not have a 
reliable inventory of its aerostat and airship efforts, including 
insight into its entire investment in aerostats and airships, or an 
office that could discuss the status of all of these efforts. We found 
several instances where aerostat and airship efforts were not well 
integrated into recent strategic planning documents, such as 
investment plans and roadmaps, which can help guide and prioritize 
DOD's investments.[Footnote 14] For example: 

* U.S. Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2010-2035--which is to 
inform warfighting functional concepts, contribute to capabilities- 
based assessments, and assist in the development of resource-informed 
decisions on new technologies--mentions the concept of LTA vehicles, 
but does not specify the potential contributions of specific aerostats 
or airships. 

* DOD's Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036ówhich is to 
address the recent surge in the use of unmanned systems and describe a 
common vision for the continued integration of unmanned systems into 
the DOD joint force structure--includes a description of several 
aerostat and airship efforts underway, but it does not specifically 
cover how or whether aerostats and airships could contribute to DOD's 
force structure. 

* Strategic frameworks and planning efforts can be essential to the 
effective oversight of portfolios, especially when they consist of 
multiple types of acquisitions in various stages of development, 
production, fielding, and sustainment. Such planning can help ensure 
DOD has the proper mix of platforms and a balanced investment 
portfolio among technology development, acquisitions, production, and 
sustainment activities, and thereby avoid unnecessary overlap in and 
duplication of effort. Adding aerostats and airships to the mix of 
other investments would add to the complexity of planning and 
oversight of relevant portfolios, but doing so could help to make (1) 
determinations of how aerostats and airships compare to other efforts 
and (2) effective trade-off decisions based on their capabilities and 
costs. 

Coordination Efforts Limited Mainly to Technical Collaboration: 

Since 2007, DOD significantly increased its investment in airship and 
aerostat efforts, in large part to respond to the urgent warfighter 
ISR needs in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to demonstrate LTA 
technologies and deliver new capabilities. As a result, numerous 
organizations throughout DOD have pursued aerostat and airship 
development and acquisition efforts. For example, the Army oversees 
and manages the GARP testbed, JLENS, LEMV, and some high altitude 
airship efforts; the Air Force manages TARS; DARPA and the Air Force 
are responsible for ISIS; the Navy undertook Star Light and is 
currently responsible for PGSS and AAFL; and the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering is 
responsible for Project Pelican. Given the wide variety of efforts, 
DOD has taken some positive steps to coordinate the various aerostat 
and airship development and acquisition efforts it has underway. 
However, these efforts have mostly occurred at technical levels where 
working groups, consisting of technologists from industry and 
government, collaboratively address technical issues, as opposed to 
having a higher level authority to ensure coordination is effective. 
DOD officials identified various examples of these coordination 
efforts that have taken place among the military services and 
departments: 

* The Army formed a working group in which the U.S. Navy Naval Air 
Systems Command (which manages the PGSS program) participated to 
develop plans to merge the PGSS and PTDS aerostat rapid fielding 
initiatives into a Persistence Surveillance Systems-Tethered program 
of record. This program of record transition is expected to occur in 
2014 and should help to ensure effective coordination between the 
efforts. 

* The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Ames 
Research Center signed an interagency agreement in July 2011 with the 
DOD Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering's Rapid 
Reaction Technology Office to develop a prototype airship referred to 
as Project Pelican. Project Pelican is the U.S. government's only 
airship effort to demonstrate ballast-free variable-buoyancy control 
technology through which the vehicle can control its buoyancy (and 
therefore go up and down) without the use of ballast and/or ground 
personnel and ropes. Both agencies agreed to mitigate long-term 
technical risk by demonstrating this technology. NASA is providing 
acquisition support services to DOD by overseeing the contractor's 
technical efforts and DOD is funding the effort. 

* The Air Force and DARPA are currently collaborating on the ISIS 
project. A February 2009 memorandum of agreement between the Air Force 
and DARPA outlines their respective roles, responsibilities, and 
development objectives. The project involves developing a large radar 
aperture that is integrated into the structure of a station-keeping 
stratospheric airship supporting wide-area persistent surveillance, 
tracking, and engagement of ground, maritime, air, and space targets. 
DARPA is providing program management, technical direction, security 
management, and contracting support. The Air Force is providing 
resources for program management, demonstration efforts, equipment, 
and base operations and support. Additionally, the project has used 
lessons learned from the Army's HALE-D project, as they are both 
designed to operate at a high altitude. However, ISIS is unique in 
that the radar system is integrated into the airship's platform--the 
radar is part of the airship structure. 

* LEMV coordination is occurring among various Army organizations and 
military services and agencies. For example, the Army obtained lessons 
learned and best practices for its development of LEMV by leveraging 
the Navy's AAFL program and the Army's HALE-D effort, and the Navy 
developed flight-to-ground operational procedures for LEMV. 
Additionally, the Army has had informal coordination with the Blue 
Devil Block 2 effort in the past. For example, originally both 
airships had several diesel engine commonalities (they used the same 
type of engine), and program officials shared challenges and solutions 
they discovered as part of the process to modify the engines to meet 
their respective requirements. 

* The Navy's AAFL serves as a flying laboratory and risk reduction 
test-bed for sensors and other components and has assisted the Air 
Force with its Blue Devil Block 2 airship development. In 2011, the 
Air Force provided funding to the Navy to provide training to airship 
pilots to qualify them to fly the Blue Devil Block 2 airship. 

While these efforts indicate some military services and organizations 
are sharing lessons learned and technical solutions, DOD may be able 
to realize additional opportunities for coordination within the agency 
and throughout the government. For example, DOD officials told us that 
coordination between the LEMV and Blue Devil Block 2 projects and 
opportunities to share lessons learned had been limited because of 
their concurrent and accelerated development pace. Also, according to 
a U.S. Central Command official, information sharing between the PTDS 
and PGSS efforts has been limited, because the efforts are managed by 
different services, in areas such as test reports and operational 
impacts resulting from adverse weather.[Footnote 15] According to this 
official, better sharing of information could help to inform solutions 
for making aerostats more survivable. PGSS and PTDS program officials 
stated that the respective programs have steadily increased 
information sharing (including daily system status reports, aerostat 
incident reports, contracting information, budgets, and training 
programs of instruction) and collaboration on common aerostat issues 
(such as in- theater force protection for system operators, helium 
supply priorities, aerostat safety and weather information, and staff 
and crew tactical training). 

Potential Duplication Ended with Termination of Airship Effort: 

The shortcomings in planning, insight, and collaboration may have made 
some airship efforts susceptible to duplication. We identified two 
airship development efforts--LEMV and Blue Devil Block 2--that were 
potentially duplicative at the time of our review. However, the 
potential duplication ended when the Air Force terminated the Blue 
Devil Block 2 program in June 2012. Most of the desired capabilities 
for LEMV and Blue Devil Block 2 were similar, as shown in table 3. 
According to DOD officials, these two programs were expected to 
demonstrate ISR capabilities; however, they are two different types of 
vehicles with different design objectives. LEMV is a hybrid airship 
demonstration that is developing a new platform and the Blue Devil 
Block 2 was a conventional airship that was to place sensors on a 
mature commercial-based platform. However, both were expected to have 
the capability to conduct ISR missions at low altitude, and share 
other operational characteristics. For example, both airships were to 
operate at the same operational altitude of 20,000 feet, were expected 
to handle a payload weight capacity of 2,500 pounds, and shared some 
of the same types of sensors. The two airship efforts also were being 
developed concurrently and were expected to be deployed to Afghanistan 
for testing and operations around the same time. 

Table 2: Comparison of LEMV and Blue Devil Block 2 Capabilities as of 
June 2012A: 

Airships: Payload weight capacity (pounds); 
Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle[B]: 2,500; 
Blue Devil Block 2: 2,500. 

Airships: Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level); 
Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle[B]: 20,000[C]; 
Blue Devil Block 2: 20,000. 

Airships: Envelope volume (cubic feet); 
Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle[B]: 1,342,000; 
Blue Devil Block 2: 1,400,000. 

Airships: Sensor type: Electro-optical/infrared full motion video 
cameras; 
Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle[B]: [Check]; 
Blue Devil Block 2: [Check]. 

Airships: Sensor type: Wide area surveillance sensor; 
Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle[B]: [Empty]; 
Blue Devil Block 2: [Check]. 

Airships: Sensor type: Signals intelligence sensor; 
Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle[B]: [Check]; 
Blue Devil Block 2: [Check]. 

Airships: Sensor type: Ground motion target indicator radar; 
Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle[B]: [Check]; 
Blue Devil Block 2: [Empty]. 

Airships: Sensor type: Communications relay system; 
Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle[B]: [Check]; 
Blue Devil Block 2: [Check]. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] The Air Force terminated Blue Devil Block 2 in June 2012. 

[B] According to the LEMV program office, the payload is flexible 
based upon mission need as LEMV sensors are interchangeable, based 
upon mission need. 

[C] According to the LEMV program office, the current operational 
altitude requirement is 16,000 feet above mean sea level. 

[End of table] 

DOD Is Bolstering Its Oversight and Coordination but Future 
Investments Are Not Known: 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 directed 
the Secretary of Defense to designate a senior official with principal 
responsibility for DOD's airship programs.[Footnote 16] In June 2012, 
the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Research and Engineering as the senior official who will 
be responsible for the oversight and coordination of various airship- 
related programs across DOD. The statutory direction and appointment 
of the senior official are positive steps, but it is too early to 
assess the effectiveness of this official's authorities and 
responsibilities in integrating and overseeing these activities. As of 
August 2012, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering was defining the details relating to the 
authority, scope, and responsibilities of this new position. The 
overarching direction by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in 
accordance with the statutory mandate, provides the senior official 
with authority over airship- related efforts. Because aerostat efforts 
respond to some of the same warfighter requirements as airships, such 
as for persistent ISR, and share some of the same technologies used in 
airship development efforts, such as materials, design, and 
fabrication, common oversight of both airships and aerostats could 
enable DOD to have better visibility over all of its aerostat and 
airship efforts and help to ensure these efforts are effectively 
overseen, planned, and coordinated. 

While DOD's overall investment in this area has totaled nearly $7 
billion in the past 6 years, near term funding estimates sharply 
decline beyond fiscal year 2012 and the level of future investment 
beyond fiscal year 2016 is not known. Until DOD makes the decisions 
regarding its investments in this area, the proper role of the senior 
oversight official will not be known. If DOD decides to make 
significant future investments in aerostat and airship capabilities, 
the senior official could play a key role in shaping those 
investments. If no future investments are anticipated, the role of the 
senior official may necessarily be focused more narrowly on the 
systems that are fielded or already in development. 

Conclusions: 

Aerostat and airship platforms are not a new concept, but they have 
recently been embraced in DOD because of their potential to provide 
continuous coverage capabilities quickly, especially in current 
military operations. Consequently, numerous organizations throughout 
DOD have pursued aerostat and airship development and acquisition 
efforts. DOD quickly initiated some of the larger programs with an eye 
toward leveraging commercial technologies and delivering capabilities 
to warfighters quickly to support current operations. But this rush 
came with high acquisition risk--particularly since there was a lack 
of knowledge about the amount of modifications and technology 
development that was required. Moreover, DOD's limited oversight to 
ensure coordination of all of these efforts has resulted in 
ineffective integration of capabilities into broader strategic 
frameworks and limited investment knowledge and collaboration, making 
them susceptible to duplication. The appointment of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering as the senior 
official responsible for the oversight and coordination of various 
airship-related programs is a positive step, but the role of the 
position remains to be clearly defined. Yet, the future is uncertain; 
at this point, no substantive investment is planned for aerostat and 
airship capabilities. If significant future investment is planned, the 
senior official could play a valuable role in shaping investments, 
ensuring they maximize return by integrating them into broader plans 
so that their capabilities can be leveraged and not unnecessarily 
duplicative. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To address shortcomings in oversight to improve coordination, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three 
actions based on the extent of the department's future investments in 
aerostats and airships. 

* If DOD decides to curtail future investment, focus on ensuring that 
it has an inventory and knowledge of all current and planned efforts 
in the short term. 

* If DOD decides to significantly increase future investment, include 
aerostat and airship capabilities in strategic frameworks to ensure 
visibility into and coordination with relevant efforts, guide 
innovation, and prioritize investments. 

* Ensure the roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Research and Engineering, as the senior official 
responsible for the oversight and coordination of various airship- 
related programs, are defined and commensurate with the level of 
future investment. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft copy of this report to DOD, DHS, and NASA for 
comment. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred 
with all three of our recommendations to address shortcomings in 
oversight to improve coordination of aerostat and airship development 
and acquisition efforts. DHS and NASA did not have formal comments on 
the draft report. Additionally, DOD, DHS, and NASA provided technical 
comments which were incorporated as appropriate. 

DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix V. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, and the 
Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's website 
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at 
(202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are provided in 
appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

Cristina T. Chaplain:
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine what key aerostat and airship systems across the federal 
government are being developed and acquired, including funding, 
purpose, and status of these systems, we reviewed documentation and 
interviewed officials on the status and progress of aerostat and 
airship development efforts in areas such as requirements, funding, 
costs, budgets, schedule, contracting, technology maturation, and 
actual or planned operational characteristics. In doing so, we 
developed an inventory of key airship and aerostat development and 
acquisition efforts which enabled a comparison of platform types, 
performance attributes, and costs. As part of identifying the universe 
of aerostat and airship efforts in the federal government, we 
interviewed agency officials and asked them about any knowledge they 
have regarding other systems that may currently exist. We also 
conducted Federal Procurement Data System--Next Generation (FPDS-NG) 
database and internet searches to inform ourselves about existing 
efforts; the internet searches included unclassified searches and 
background research. We corroborated and confirmed the accuracy of the 
FPDS-NG and internet search information with applicable agencies. 
Based on a review of funding data collected from agencies that we 
contacted as well as from presidential budget estimates and Selected 
Acquisition Reports as available, we determined that our definition of 
"key aerostat and airship systems being planned, developed, and 
acquired" includes two key criteria (1) total funding of $1 million or 
more from fiscal years 2007 to 2012, and (2) efforts to plan, develop 
or acquire systems that include both a platform and payload (such as 
sensors or cargo) capability. We analyzed documentation and 
interviewed officials from various offices of the Secretary of 
Defense; various offices within the Army, Navy, and Air Force; U.S. 
Central Command; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; Defense 
Logistics Agency; and offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We also 
analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from civil agencies, 
including the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy, 
Environmental Protection Agency, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. We did not examine 
the development and utilization of lighter-than-air (LTA) technologies 
outside of the federal government. 

To identify any technical challenges these key aerostat and airship 
efforts may be facing, we analyzed documentation and interviewed 
officials from the organizations mentioned above. We used the 
collected information to assess any identified technical problems 
impacting the funding, cost, schedule, and performance of airships and 
aerostats. 

To determine how effectively the various key aerostat and airship 
efforts are being overseen to ensure coordination, and identify any 
potential for duplication, we assessed aerostat and airship 
investments, acquisitions, capabilities, and operations by analyzing 
documents and interviewing officials from the organizations listed 
above, analyzing the inventory of key efforts developed under our 
first objective, and reviewing prior GAO work for relevant criteria. 
Specifically, we assessed oversight at the programmatic and enterprise 
levels by reviewing organizational roles, responsibilities, and 
authorities as they relate to aerostat and airship development, 
acquisition, and operations efforts. We also determined the extent to 
which plans and planning activities integrated aerostat and airship 
development and acquisition efforts and capabilities within the 
Department of Defense (DOD). Reviewed plans and planning activities 
included architectures, roadmaps, investment plans, and requirements 
development. We also used the information relating to various aspects 
of the development and acquisition efforts, such as requirements, and 
actual or planned performance attributes, to assess whether any of the 
efforts are potentially duplicative. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to October 2012 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide reasonable basis for 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Appendix II: Examples of Civil Government Use of Aerostats: 

Table 3: Civil Government Agencies' Aerostat Usage: 

Essentials: Lead agency: Department of Commerce (DOC), National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); 
Number of units: 2; 
Total costs: $35,475; 
Purpose and status: The purpose of DOC's NOAA aerostats is to collect 
wind data up to approximately 1,641 feet above the ground. NOAA 
procured the aerostats, ground station, and supporting equipment in 
September 2011. 

Essentials: Lead agency: Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Science; 
Number of units: 1; 
Fiscal year (FY) 10 to FY12 operations and maintenance costs: $275,529; 
Purpose and status: Over the past 20 years, DOE's Office of Science 
has supported a national scientific user facility called the 
Atmospheric Radiation Measurement Climate Research Facility, which is 
a unique system for continuous observations, capturing fundamental 
data on atmospheric radiation, cloud and aerosol properties. Since 
fiscal year 2010, DOE's Office of Science has funded the use of a 
contracted aerostat to support research carried out through the 
Atmospheric Radiation Measurement Climate Research Facility. 

Essentials: Lead agency: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); 
Number of units: 5; 
FY09 to FY11 aerostats and equipment purchase costs: $35,135; 
Purpose and status: In 2009 EPA developed a tethered, aerostat-lofted 
sampling package for the purpose of sampling air emissions from open 
sources. Multiple aerostats have been purchased to support increasing 
payloads. EPA's program has been largely funded through a project with 
DOD's Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program to 
characterize emissions from open burning and open detonation of 
military ordnance. EPA will continue its emissions monitoring program 
using aerostats only if it can secure additional funding. Otherwise, 
the program will cease to exist. 

Essentials: Lead agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA); 
Number of units: NASA does not own aerostats, only funds research 
using them; 
Costs: NASA reported funding a total of $150,000 for research using 
aerostats; 
Purpose and status: According to NASA, they do not own tethered 
balloons or airships. However, they occasionally fund research that 
deploys tethered balloons for atmospheric and weather observations. 
Also, NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory continues to use tethered 
balloons for climate research. NASA plans to continue funding 
atmospheric and weather research using tethered balloons. For example, 
in fiscal year 2013, NASA plans to fund atmospheric and weather 
research that will use two tethered balloons in Yen Bai, Vietnam. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. government data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: DOD Aerostat and Airship Development, Acquisition, and 
Operations Efforts: 

Table 4: Aerostat and Airships Essentials, Purpose, and Status:
Aerostats: 

Essentials[A]: Name: Geospatial Airship Research Platform (GARP); 
Lead service/agency: Army; 
Prime contractor: Aerostar and Lindstrand Technologies; 
Total number of operational contractor personnel: 8; 
4 each for launch operation; 
Number of units: 2; 
Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level): Up to 3,000 above 
ground level; 
Sensor type: various, including electro-optical, infrared, and 
spectral cameras; radars; and communication relay payloads; 
Fiscal Year (FY) 08-FY10 costs: $9.4 million; 
Purpose and status: According to an official from the Army's U.S. Army 
Space and Missile Defense Command Battle Laboratory, the facility uses 
GARP as a testing platform for intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) and communications payloads. The Battle 
Laboratory continues to use GARP to test payloads for program offices. 

Essentials[A]: Name: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated 
Netted Sensor (JLENS); 
Lead service/agency: Army; 
Prime contractor: Raytheon; 
Total number of operational contractor personnel: not applicable, 
because system is not yet fielded; 
Number of units: 2; 
Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level): 10,000; 
Sensor type: radars; 
FY07-FY16 costs: $2,555.6 million; 
Purpose and status: The Army's JLENS major defense acquisition 
program, established in 1996 as the Joint Aerostat Project, will 
provide over-the-horizon detection and tracking of land-attack cruise 
missiles and other targets. The Army is developing JLENS in two 
spirals. Spiral 1 is complete and served as a test bed to demonstrate 
the concept. Spiral 2 will utilize two aerostats with advanced sensors 
for surveillance and tracking, as well as mobile mooring stations, 
communications payloads, and processing stations. JLENS will provide 
surveillance and engagement support to other systems. 
JLENS entered the system development phase in August 2005. As we 
previously reported, the program has experienced design issues 
associated with the mobile mooring transport vehicle, as well as 
schedule delays caused by synchronization of JLENS with the Army's 
Integrated Air and Missile Defense program. According to program 
acquisition documentation, JLENS was originally scheduled to enter 
production in September 2010. However, that same month, an aerostat 
accident resulted in the loss of one of the JLENS platforms. The 
accident, as well as recent system integration challenges, caused 
delays to the program's production decision. Moreover, according to 
program acquisition documentation, the JLENS program incurred a 
critical Nunn-McCurdy breach for program acquisition unit cost with 
the submission of the fiscal year 2013 President's Budget due to a 100 
percent reduction in planned procurement quantities. The total program 
quantity was reduced from 16 to 2 aerostats. In May 2012, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
directed the Secretary of the Army to restructure the JLENS program to 
consist of two aerostats. The Secretary of the Army was also directed 
to provide a status of the program, based on development test and 
evaluation results, during an interim program review scheduled for the 
third quarter of fiscal year 2013. 

Essentials[A]: Name: Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS); 
Lead service/agency: Navy; 
Prime contractor: Aerostar and TCOM; 
Total number of operational contractor personnel: 400; 
7 to 8 contractors needed per site; 
Number of units: 59; 
Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level): 6,000 to 9,000; 
Sensor type: electro-optical/infrared sensors; 
unattended transient acoustic measurement and signatures intelligence 
sensor, wide-area sensor system, and communications relay system; 
FY09- FY13 costs: $2,108.4 million; 
Purpose and status: The Office of the Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics initiated PGSS in fiscal year 
2010 as a joint capability technology demonstration in response to a 
series of commanders' urgent requests for additional ISR support in 
Afghanistan. PGSS is intended to provide a family of affordable and 
small footprint aerostat surveillance systems; 
A total of 59 PGSS aerostats have been purchased by the Navy for 
deployment to forward operating bases in Afghanistan: 31 were built in 
fiscal year 2010, and 28 in fiscal year 2011. Although the Navy 
acquires and operates PGSS aerostats, the Army funds the program and 
has proposed its inclusion in a new program of record--named 
Persistent Surveillance System-Tethered (PSST). A capability 
development document PSST should be finalized by the end of the summer. 

Essentials[A]: Name: Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS); 
Lead service/agency: Army; 
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Total number of operational contractor personnel: About 650; 
8 to 10 contractors needed per site; 
Number of units: 66; 
Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level): 8,000; 
Sensor type: electro-optical/infrared cameras, unattended transient 
acoustic measurement and signatures intelligence sensor, ground moving 
target indicator/dismount moving target indicator radar, and a wide-
area sensor system; 
FY07-FY16 costs: $3,170.5 million; 
Purpose and status: Like the PGSS aerostats, PTDS aerostats were 
deployed (to Iraq in 2004 and Afghanistan in 2007) in response to a 
series of commanders' urgent requests for additional ISR support. 
However, PTDS is a bigger system than PGSS that is practically 
immobile. The Army plans to have a total of 66 PTDS aerostats; 
34 have been deployed to Afghanistan, one is used for testing in the 
United States, and the remainder are in production or in transit for 
use in Afghanistan. Like PGSS, the Army also proposed PTDS for 
inclusion in the PSST program of record. However, the Army is expected 
to keep the PGSS aerostats and phase out PTDS. Upon completion of 
operations in Afghanistan, the Army is considering deploying a few 
PTDS for training and for use by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). 

Essentials[A]: Name: Rapid Aerostat Initial Development (RAID); 
Lead service/agency: Army; 
Prime contractor: Raytheon; 
Total number of operational contractor personnel: 252; 
Number of units: 21; 
Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level): 1,000 above ground 
level; 
Sensor type: thermal imaging sensors; 
FY07-FY16 costs: $225.0 million; 
Purpose and status: The RAID aerostats were first deployed to 
Afghanistan in 2001 to provide force protection in response to an 
urgent need request. However, due its small size, it was never ideal 
for use in inclement weather. As a result, the Army acquired a larger 
aerostat--PTDS. The Army procured a total of 21 RAID aerostats--19 
were deployed to Iraq and 2 were used as training assets in the United 
States. The 19 RAID aerostats deployed to Iraq were moved to Kuwait 
and are no longer in use. 

Essentials[A]: Name: Rapidly Elevated Aerostat Platform (REAP)-XL B; 
Lead service/agency: Army and Navy; 
Prime contractor: Information Systems Laboratories; 
Total number of operational contractor personnel: Army: 4, 2 per unit; 
Navy: unknown; 
Number of units: 3; 
Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level): Army: 1,000 above 
ground level; Navy: Up to 1,000; 
Sensor type: Army: electro-optical/infrared/short wave infrared 
cameras; Navy: communication equipment; 
Navy Working Capital Fund Capital Investment Program FY 10 costs: 
$668,000; 
Army: FY 11 costs: $4.7 million; 
Purpose and status: The Army needed a smaller aerostat for persistent 
surveillance during short duration missions, for example, to rebuild a 
bridge, or at a polling location during elections, in response to an 
urgent need request. REAP-XL B can be launched from the back of a High 
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (Humvee) by two people in 10 
minutes. The Navy tested a REAP-XL B platform as an extended 
communications relay system that can be operated from shore to reduce 
testing and integration costs. 
Two REAP- XL B prototype aerostats were deployed to Afghanistan. 
According to an Army official, officials from U.S. Central Command and 
the Army are conducting a 90-day assessment of REAP-XL's operational 
performance. Although it is too early to determine if REAP-XL will be 
part of a program of record, as many as 35 more could be acquired if 
it is determined that they can operate in Afghanistan's high altitude, 
according to an Army Intelligence Futures Directorate official. The 
Navy's REAP-XL B aerostat is currently in storage, according to the 
Navy. 

Essentials[A]: Name: Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS); 
Lead service/agency: Air Force; 
Current sustainment service contractor: ITT Systems; 
Total number of operational contractor personnel: approximately 249 at 
8 operational sites, logistics center, and program management office; 
Number of units: 8; 
Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level): 14,000 to 15,000 
depending on model type; 
Sensor type: radars and communication systems; 
FY07-FY16 costs: $350.0 million; 
Purpose and status: The TARS aerostat radar network began operations 
identifying low-flying, small aircraft involved in drug trafficking 
along the southern U.S. border in 1978. Currently, there are eight 
operational TARS sites supporting DOD's counterdrug detection and 
monitoring mission, as well as North American Aerospace Defense 
Command's air sovereignty mission. TARS sites are treated as remote 
surveillance sensor sources. Surveillance data from each radar is 
transmitted to DOD and DHS operations centers. 
TARS is in the operational sustainment phase of the acquisition life-
cycle and there are currently no plans to replace, augment, or 
complement its baseline capabilities. DHS is funding science and 
technology research that could enhance future TARS sensor imaging 
capabilities. 

Airships: 

Essentials[A]: Name: Advanced Airship Flying Laboratory (AAFL); 
Lead service/agency: Navy; 
Prime contractor: Integrated Systems Solutions, Inc; 
Total number of operational contractor personnel: 20; 
Number of units: 1; 
Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level): 1,000 to 7,500; 
Sensor type: AAFL operates as a surrogate test-bed for various 
communications and sensor systems; 
FY07-FY12 costs: $14.1 million; 
Purpose and status: Since 2007, the surrogate test-bed airship has 
been used across the country to evaluate a variety of DOD and other 
U.S. government sensor and communication systems (including 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets) in an 
airborne environment. The airship also assisted in the search for oil 
and distressed wildlife during the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster; 
The Navy is conducting pilot training in the United States in support 
of Army programs. The Army has provided sufficient funding for 
continued operations through March 2013. 

Essentials[A]: Name: Blue Devil Block 2; 
Lead service/agency: Air Force; 
Prime contractor: MAV6; 
Total number of operational contractor personnel: to be determined; 
Number of units: 1; 
Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level): 20,000; 
Sensor type: Wide area field of view electro-optical and infrared 
cameras; narrow field of view electro-optical and infrared full motion 
video cameras; and signals intelligence sensor; 
FY10-FY12 costs: $328.3 million; 
Purpose and status: A contract was awarded in October 2010 to begin 
the Blue Devil Block 2 airship development initiative in response to 
U.S. Central Command urgent requirements for ISR capabilities to 
address the growing need for persistent improvised explosive device 
surveillance and detection in Afghanistan. The Blue Devil Block 2 
airship is intended to demonstrate persistent multi-intelligence ISR 
capabilities for 3 to 7 days, at an altitude of 20,000 feet; 
The program was terminated effective June 2012. It had been scheduled 
to deploy "beyond September 2012," at least one year later than 
originally scheduled. However, the contractor has been directed to 
pack and crate the airframe and transport it to an Air Force storage 
facility at the end of the contract period. As a result, the Air Force 
will not deploy the Blue Devil Block 2 airship to Afghanistan as 
planned. 

Essentials[A]: Name: High Altitude Endurance-Demonstrator (HALE-D); 
Lead service/agency: Army; 
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Total number of operational contractor personnel: not applicable, HALE-
D is a science and technology effort; 
Number of units: 1; 
Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level): 60,000; 
Sensor type: high resolution electro-optical camera; 
FY08-FY11 costs: $36.3 million; 
Purpose and status: HALE-D is a science and technology effort that is 
part of the Army's High Altitude Airship program, intended to 
demonstrate persistent on-station ISR capabilities at high altitudes. 
A solar powered airship, HALE-D is supposed to fly at an altitude of 
60,000 feet for more than 14 days. 
In July 2011, on its first flight, HALE-D experienced a technical 
failure 3 hours into a planned 14-day mission. Its envelope and solar 
cells were destroyed, and its payload was damaged by a fire during 
recovery operations. According to the program office, the project does 
not currently have funding for continued demonstration efforts. 

Essentials[A]: Name: HiSentinel; 
Lead service/agency: Army; 
Prime contractor: Southwest Research Institute; 
Total number of operational contractor personnel: not applicable, 
HiSentinel is a science and technology effort; 
Number of units: 2; 
HiSentinel50 and HiSentinel80; 
Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level): HiSentinel50: 66,300; 
HiSentinel80: 66,000; 
Sensor type: HiSentinel50: High resolution camera and communication 
system; HiSentinel80: Hi-resolution electro-optical camera and 
communications system; 
FY07-FY11 costs: $11.2 million; 
Purpose and status: Like HALE-D, HiSentinel is a science and 
technology effort that is part of the Army's High Altitude Airship 
program, intended to demonstrate persistent on-station ISR 
capabilities at high altitudes. Specifically, both HiSentinel 50 and 
80 are solar-powered airships intended to fly at altitudes of 
approximately 66,000 feet for greater than one day. They are both in a 
flaccid state on the ground prior to launch and the envelopes achieve 
their final shape as the helium gas within expands with increasing 
altitudes. 
In June 2008, HiSentinel50 flew up to an altitude of 66,400 feet, and 
maintained that altitude for a total of 3 minutes. In November 2010, 
the follow-on demonstrator, HiSentinel80, experienced a propulsion 
system failure and landed 8 hours into a planned 24-hour mission. Like 
Hale-D, the program office stated that the project does not currently 
have funding for continued demonstration efforts. 

Essentials[A]: Name: Integrated Sensor is Structure (ISIS); 
Lead service/agency: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
and Air Force; 
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Total number of operational contractor personnel: not applicable, ISIS 
is a demonstration prototype; 
Number of units: 1; 
Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level): 65,000; 
Sensor type: air, ground, and surface moving target indicator radar 
system; 
FY07-FY14 costs: $499.3 million; 
Purpose and status: The joint DARPA and Air Force ISIS project, 
initiated in 2004 as a science and technology effort, is intended to 
develop and demonstrate an unprecedented radar sensor that is fully 
integrated into a stratospheric airship to support the need for 
persistent wide-area surveillance, tracking, and engagement of time- 
critical air and ground targets. The demonstrator airship is expected 
to fly for 365 days at an altitude of 65,000 feet. According to an Air 
Force acquisition official, ISIS has experienced two cost overruns due 
to technical challenges stemming from subsystem development and radar 
antennae panel manufacturing. Consequently, earlier this year, DARPA 
stopped airframe development activities, will mainly focus on radar 
risk reduction activities in fiscal years 2013 and 2014, and will not 
demonstrate the airship in fiscal year 2014 as previously planned. 
Also, during this time period, the ISIS team will develop an airship 
risk reduction plan and conduct limited activities. DARPA is in the 
process of obtaining funding information from the prime contractor and 
radar system subcontractor in order to restructure the development 
effort. It is too early to tell whether ISIS will formally enter the 
product development phase, and become a program of record, according 
to an Air Force acquisition official. 

Essentials[A]: Name: Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV); 
Lead service/agency: Army; 
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Total number of operational contractor personnel: 35; 
Number of units: 1; 
Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level): 20,000; 
Sensor type: Electro-optical/infrared full motion video cameras; 
ground motion target indicator radar; communication relay package; 
and signal intelligence system. According to the LEMV program office, 
the payload is flexible based upon mission need as LEMV sensors are 
interchangeable, based upon mission need; 
FY07-FY15 costs: $356.2 million; 
Purpose and status: LEMV is a technology demonstration project, 
expected to develop a hybrid prototype airship for ISR purposes in a 
forward combat environment. The project was initiated in response to 
an urgent need request. The Army is supposed to complete system level 
development and testing within the United States within 18 months 
after contract award (June 2010) and be ready for transport to 
Afghanistan for a joint military utility assessment and follow-on 
demonstration. The required on-station duration time is 21 days at an 
altitude of 20,000 feet. Pending the results of the joint military 
utility assessment and other reviews and evaluations, the Army will 
determine whether or not to pursue a program of record. 
According to the program office, the LEMV hybrid airship is scheduled 
to undergo 33 manned flights totaling approximately 500 hours. The 
Army successfully launched and recovered LEMV during its first flight 
in August 2012. The initial date for deployment was January 2012; 
currently, the deployment date is now expected to be December 2012, 
although theatre officials have requested a delay of a few months. 
LEMV development is behind schedule 10 months (representing about a 56 
percent schedule increase) due to issues with fabric production, 
getting foreign parts through customs, adverse weather conditions 
causing the evacuation of work crews, and first time integration and 
testing issues. Also, LEMV is 12,000 pounds overweight because it has 
weight issues with sub-systems, such as tailfins, exceeding weight 
thresholds. According to the program, the increased weight reduces the 
airship's estimated on- station endurance at an altitude of 20,000 
feet from the required 21 days to 4 to 5 days, representing at least a 
76 percent reduction However, current plans, according to program 
officials, call for operating the airship at 16,000, feet which should 
enable on-station duration time to be 16 days with minimal impacts to 
operational effectiveness (other than about a 24 percent reduction to 
on-station endurance). The biggest risk to program development is the 
ambitious schedule of 18 months. The Army identified a fiscal year 
2012 funding shortfall of $21.3 million resulting from the need for 
additional engineering and production support to mitigate and resolve 
technical issues at the LEMV assembly facility. 

Essentials[A]: Name: Project Pelican; 
Lead service/agency: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering (OASDR&E), National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), and the Air Force Research Laboratory; 
Prime contractor: Aeros Aeronautical Systems Corporation; 
Total number of operational contractor personnel: not applicable, the 
airship is a technology demonstrator and is not intended for 
operational performance beyond the requirements of the demonstration 
activities; 
Number of units: 1; 
Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level): not applicable, the 
airship is a technology demonstrator and is not intended for 
operational performance beyond the requirements of the demonstration 
activities; 
Sensor type: not applicable, the airship is a technology demonstrator 
and is not intended for operational performance beyond the 
requirements of the demonstration activities; 
FY08-FY11 costs: $42.4 million; 
Purpose and status: According to OASDR&E program officials, Project 
Pelican was initiated in 2008 as a science and technology 
demonstration effort intended to develop a hybrid airship with a rigid 
internal structure and test airship buoyancy control technologies. 
NASA's Ames Research Center, the contract servicing agent for OASDR&E, 
and the Air Force Research Laboratory are also involved in the 
management and oversight of this project that, according to the NASA 
Ames Research Center program office, "is considered a game changer in 
the airship world" because the key effort is to control buoyancy 
without using external ballast. The airship built under Project 
Pelican is not intended for operational performance beyond the 
requirements of the demonstration activities. But, according to 
OASDR&E program officials, once all the necessary technologies have 
been proven to work together, the effort will be scaled to provide ISR 
or heavy lift capabilities in the long- term. According to the NASA 
Ames Research Center program office, the Project Pelican demonstrator 
airship is expected to be tested at the end of fiscal year 2012. 

Essentials[A]: Name: Star Light; 
Lead service/agency: Navy; 
Prime contractor: Global Near Space Services; 
Total number of operational contractor personnel: 8; 
Number of units: 1; 
Operational altitude (feet above mean sea level): 65,000 to 85,000; 
Sensor type: no specific sensor was identified under the demonstration 
effort; 
FY10 costs: $2.1 million; 
Purpose and status: The Star Light airship, initiated as a science and 
technology effort, was expected to operate at between 65,000 to 85,000 
feet, with an on station duration of between 30 to 120 days, depending 
on the time of year and the wind speed. A specific sensor was never 
identified. The program began and was terminated in 2010 due to 
insufficient funding. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] Funding data have been adjusted to fiscal year 2012 dollars. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Funding Calculations for Aerostats and Airships, Fiscal 
Years 2007 through 2016: 

Table 5: Total Aerostat Funding, Fiscal Years 2007 through 2016: 

In millions of fiscal year 2012 dollars, rounded to nearest tenth: 

Effort: Geospatial Airship Research Platform (GARP); 
Total: $9.4. 

Research: 

Effort: Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E); 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: $3.2; 
2009: $2.9; 
2010: $3.3; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Effort: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted 
Sensor (JLENS); 
Total: $2,555.6. 

Effort: RDT&E; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: $255.9; 
2008: $488.6; 
2009: $357.1; 
2010: $325.7; 
2011: $405.1; 
2012: $327.3; 
2013: $187.4; 
2014: $92.4; 
2015: $30.9; 
2016: $22.6; 
Total: $2,493.1. 

Military: 

Effort: Construction; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: $20.5; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: $42.0; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $62.5. 

Effort: Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS); 
Total: $2,108.4. 

Effort: RDT&E; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: $1.5; 
2010: $1.5; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: $20.0; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $23.1. 

Effort: Procurement; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: $105.7; 
2010: $454.6; 
2011: $182.9; 
2012: $191.0; 
2013: $182.1; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $1,116.4. 

Effort: Operations and Maintenance; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: $7.8; 
2010: $13.68; 
2011: $163.3; 
2012: $366.0; 
2013: $418.3; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $968.9. 

Effort: Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS); 
Total: $3,170.5. 

Effort: RDT&E; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: $0.3; 
2008: $0.4; 
2009: $4.6; 
2010: $0.0; 
2011: $0.1; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $5.4. 

Effort: Procurement; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: $26.3; 
2009: $299.1; 
2010: $776.1; 
2011: $181.9; 
2012: $28.0; 
2013: $15.7; 
2014: $15.5; 
2015: $17.1; 
2016: $16.8; 
Total: $1,376.5. 

Effort: O&M; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: $47.4; 
2009: $60.9; 
2010: $79.4; 
2011: $104.7; 
2012: $108.0; 
2013: $339.6; 
2014: $350.3; 
2015: $349.3; 
2016: $349.0; 
Total: $1,788.6. 

Effort: Rapid Aerostat Initial Development (RAID); 
Total: $225.0. 

Effort: Procurement; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: $7.4; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $7.4. 

Effort: O&M; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: $12.2; 
2008: $20.0; 
2009: $20.7; 
2010: $21.6; 
2011: $22.3; 
2012: $23.0; 
2013: $23.6; 
2014: $24.2; 
2015: $24.7; 
2016: $25.3; 
Total: $217.5. 

Effort: Rapidly Elevated Aerostat Platform (REAP)-XL B; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $5.3. 

Effort: Navy Working Capital Fund Capital Investment Program; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: $0.7; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Effort: RDT&E; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: [Empty]; 
2011: $4.7; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: [Empty]. 

Effort: Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS); 
Total: $350.0. 

Effort: RDT&E; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: $2.0; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $2.0. 

Effort: Procurement; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: $5.4; 
2008: $5.4; 
2009: $7.2; 
2010: $5.3; 
2011: $5.4; 
2012: $5.6; 
2013: $5.8; 
2014: $5.5; 
2015: $2.8; 
2016: $3.8; 
Total: $52.3. 

Effort: O&M; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: $31.3; 
2008: $28.9; 
2009: $28.1; 
2010: $29.7; 
2011: $29.5; 
2012: $29.7; 
2013: $29.6; 
2014: $29.3; 
2015: $29.7; 
2016: $29.8; 
Total: $295.7. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

Table 6: Total Airship Funding, Fiscal Years 2007 through 2016: 

In millions of fiscal year 2012 dollars, rounded to nearest tenth. 

Effort: Advanced Airship Flying Laboratory (AAFL); 
Total: $14.1. 

Effort: RDT&E; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: $0.2; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: $0.6; 
2010: $1.6; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $2.4. 

Effort: O&M; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: $6.2; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: $5.6; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $11.7. 

Effort: Blue Devil Block 2; 
Total: $328.3. 

Effort: RDT&E; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: $93.9; 
2011: $163.2; 
2012: $71.2; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $328.3. 

Effort: High Altitude Endurance-Demonstrator (HALE-D); 
Total: $36.3. 

Effort: RDT&E; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: $16.7; 
2009: $11.5; 
2010: $5.3; 
2011: $2.8; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $36.3. 

Effort: Hi-Sentinel; 
Total: $11.2. 

Effort: RDT&E; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: $1.3; 
2008: $4.1; 
2009: $0.7; 
2010: $2.2; 
2011: $2.8; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $11.2. 

Effort: Integrated Sensor is Structure (ISIS); 
Total: $499.3. 

Effort: RDT&E; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: $24.8; 
2008: $30.5; 
2009: $80.8; 
2010: $250.6; 
2011: $22.3; 
2012: $57.0; 
2013: $25.6; 
2014: $7.7; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $499.3. 

Effort: (Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV); 
Total: $356.2. 

Effort: RDT&E; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: $130.9; 
2011: $101.4; 
2012: $43.6; 
2013: $25.8; 
2014: $28.1; 
2015: $26.5; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $356.2. 

Effort: Project Pelican; 
Total: $42.4. 

Effort: RDT&E; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: $6.3; 
2009: $10.9; 
2010: $14.4; 
2011: $10.9; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $42.4. 

Effort: Starlight; 
Total: $2.1. 

Effort: RDT&E; 
Fiscal year: 
2007: [Empty]; 
2008: [Empty]; 
2009: [Empty]; 
2010: $2.1; 
2011: [Empty]; 
2012: [Empty]; 
2013: [Empty]; 
2014: [Empty]; 
2015: [Empty]; 
2016: [Empty]; 
Total: $2.1. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

The report number changed from GAO-12-906 to GAO-13-81. 

Office of The Under Secretary of Defense: 
Intelligence: 
5000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-5000: 

October 11, 2012: 

Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain: 
Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Ms. Chaplain: 

This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report, 
GAO-12-906, "Defense Acquisitions: Future Aerostat and Airship 
Investment Decisions Drive Oversight and Coordination Needs," dated 
September 5, 2012 (GAO Code 121000). 

The contribution of airships to the ongoing warfight, especially the 
Army's Persistent Threat Detection System and the Persistent Ground 
Surveillance System, could be better stated. This would ensure the 
reader received a more balanced perspective on the life-saving value 
of these systems. A sensitivity review was accomplished and this 
report contains no information which should not be released to the 
public. 

The Department concurs with the GAO report and is actively addressing 
these recommendations as outlined in the attachment. Thank you for the 
opportunity to review and comment on this GAO report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Kevin P. Meiners: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense: 
(Intelligence Strategy, Programs and Resources) 

Attachment(s): DoD Comments to GAO Recommendations 

GAO Draft Report Dated September 5, 2012: 
Gao-12-906 (Gao Code 121000): 
"Defense Acquisitions: Future Aerostat And Airship Investment 
Decisions Drive Oversight And Coordination Needs" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, if 
DoD decides to curtail future investment, focus on ensuring that DoD 
has an inventory and knowledge of all current and planned efforts in 
the short term. 

DoD Response: Concur. While DoD acknowledges an intent to reduce its 
airship investment in the short term, it also believes that hybrid 
airship design and similar emerging technologies show great promise in 
closing current capability gaps; particularly in the areas of 
persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and 
logistics. The reduction of committed resources is a reflection of 
current fiscal realities and Department priorities. DoD agrees that 
the investment and technical information from airship efforts across 
the department needs to be captured and cataloged. This action is 
currently underway and will provide a sound stepping off point to 
develop a future strategic Lighter-Than-Air (airships and aerostats) 
roadmap and assist decision makers in maximizing the efficacy of 
future investments. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, if 
DoD decides to significantly increase future investment, include 
aerostat and airship capabilities in strategic frameworks to ensure 
visibility into and coordination with relevant efforts, guide 
innovation, and prioritize investments. 

DoD Response: Concur. Despite no intent for robust short term 
investment, the DoD is still committed to staying abreast of 
developments in the airship community, identifying potential airship 
solutions to capability gaps, monitoring commercial activity and 
engaging in collaborative efforts when appropriate. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
ensure the roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Research and Engineering, as the senior official 
responsible for the oversight and coordination of various airship-
related programs, are defined and commensurate with the level of 
future investment. 

DoD Response: Concur. The DoD recognizes the significant investment 
already made in airship technology and the imperative for strong 
Department oversight and guidance. The Senior Executive for Airship 
Programs is responsible for:  

* Oversight and coordination of airship related activities across DoD. 

* Ensure cross-fertilization of technology. 

* Identifying duplicative efforts and initiating redirection or 
termination as required. 

* Coordinating interagency efforts, especially with DoE, DoT and DHS. 

* Exploring additional DoD missions made possible by evolving airship 
technologies. 

* Directing areas of research that target the most salient technical 
challenges. 

* Sponsoring airship related conferences, reviews, table top 
exercises, and  academic studies as appropriate. 

* Providing an annual status report that outlines airship related 
developments and suggests areas for future Doctrine, Organization, 
Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities 
(DOTMLPF) efforts. 

* Creating subordinate task specific activities or assigning 
individual duties as required to ensure successful execution of these 
responsibilities. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cristina T. Chaplain, (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this 
report were Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; Ami Ballenger; Jenny 
Chanley; Maria Durant; Arturo Holguín; Rich Horiuchi; Julia Kennon; 
Tim Persons; Sylvia Schatz; Roxanna Sun; and Bob Swierczek. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Persistence is the length of time a sensor can provide continuous 
coverage of a location, target, or activity of interest. 

[2] Department of the Army, Army Science Board FY2008 Summer Study 
Final Report: Platforms for Persistent Communications, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2008). 

[3] None of the civil agency efforts we identified (see appendix II) 
met our criteria for "key" systems being planned, developed, and 
acquired (details on our scope and methodology are provided in 
appendix I). 

[4] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Achieve 
Greater Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-520] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 30, 2009). 

[5] The ISIS airship is to be solar-powered; therefore, the airship's 
on-station endurance time is expected be one year. Also, the TARS 
aerostats are powered by a generator on board that must be refueled 
after 6 days of operations. 

[6] Enacted in 1982, the Nunn-McCurdy statutory provision requires DOD 
to notify Congress whenever a major defense acquisition program's unit 
cost experiences cost growth that exceeds certain thresholds. A breach 
of the critical cost growth threshold occurs when the program 
acquisition unit cost or the procurement unit cost increases by at 
least 25 percent over the current baseline estimate or at least 50 
percent over the original baseline estimate. 

[7] The Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense program is being 
developed to connect sensors, weapons, and a common battle command 
system across an integrated fire control network to support the 
engagement of air and missile threats. See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: 
Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 
2009); and Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon 
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-233SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2011). 

[8] Section 804(b) of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, requires, among other 
things, the acquisition process the Secretary of Defense develops for 
the fielding of urgent capabilities to be appropriate only for 
capabilities that can be fielded within a 2-24 month period. 

[9] DOD's framework for planning, executing, and funding its weapon 
programs relies on three decision-making systems--the Defense 
Acquisition System that relies on DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation 
of the Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008), to guide and manage 
the development and procurement of major weapon capabilities; the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System to assess gaps 
and recommend solutions; and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and 
Execution process to allocate funding resources--all of which involve 
lengthy time frames, large budgets, and development efforts that can 
take decades to procure weapon systems. 

[10] DOD uses technology readiness levels (TRL) as a tool to assess 
technology maturity. TRLs are measured on a scale from 1 to 9, 
beginning with paper studies of a technology's feasibility (TRL 1) and 
culminating with application of the technology in its final form and 
under mission conditions (TRL 9). Demonstration that pieces will work 
together in a test laboratory is TRL 4 and demonstrating that pieces 
work together in a simulated environment is TRL 5. Testing of a 
prototype system in a relevant environment is TRL 6 and a major step 
up from TRL 6 is demonstrating an actual system prototype in a 
realistic environment, which is TRL 7. Our best practices work has 
shown that TRL 7 is the level of technology maturity that constitutes 
low risk for starting a product development program. 

[11] GAO, Urgent Warfighter Needs: Opportunities Exist to Expedite 
Development and Fielding of Joint Capabilities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-385] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 24, 
2012). 

[12] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Fulfillment 
of Urgent Operational Needs, July 2009. 

[13] GAO, Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy 
Needed to Guide Future DOD Space Efforts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-431R] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 
2008); and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Improved Strategic and 
Acquisition Planning Can Help Address Emerging Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-395T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 
2005). 

[14] Because of classification issues, we are not reporting on the 
extent to which DOD's most recent ISR Integration Roadmap includes LTA 
platforms. However, we reported in [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-465] that this roadmap does not 
represent an integrated investment strategy of ISR efforts across the 
department. Consequently, DOD was not able to readily identify all of 
its urgent needs efforts--that include aerostats or airships--or 
associated costs, including spending on ISR, because it had limited 
visibility into the entirety of the urgent needs submitted by 
warfighters. 

[15] The U.S. Central Command has a specific area of responsibility 
that covers 20 countries in the central area of the globe, including 
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, and Iraq. U.S. Central Command is 
currently assessing how these assets are used differently across the 
military bases. Aerostats are vulnerable to adverse weather conditions 
in Iraq and especially Afghanistan. From April 2010 to June 2012, 
there were 58 PGSS and PTDS weather related major incidents. 

[16] Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 903 (2011). 

[End of section] 

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