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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, 
United States Senate:

May 2012: 

Tactical Aircraft:

F-22A Modernization Program Faces Cost, Technical, and Sustainment 
Risks:

GAO-12-447:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-12-447, a report to the Subcommittee on Defense, 
Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study:

The Air Force currently plans to spend $11.7 billion to modernize and 
improve reliability of the F-22A, its fifth generation air superiority 
fighter. Originally designed to counter air threats posed by the 
former Soviet Union, the post-Cold War era spurred efforts to add new 
missions and capabilities to the F-22A, including improved air-to-air 
and robust air-to-ground attack capabilities. In 2003, the Air Force 
established the F-22A modernization program to develop and insert new 
capabilities in four increments. 

GAO was asked to evaluate (1) cost and schedule outcomes and (2) 
testing results and risks going forward in the F-22A modernization 
program and related efforts. To do this, GAO examined the program’s 
budgets and schedule estimates over time and discussed any changes 
with program officials, and reviewed progress and results from 
developmental and operational testing, and plans to mitigate risks and 
resolve system deficiencies. 

What GAO Found:

Total projected cost of the F-22A modernization program and related 
reliability and maintainability improvements more than doubled since 
the program started–-from $5.4 billion to $11.7 billion-–and the 
schedule for delivering full capabilities slipped 7 years, from 2010 
to 2017. The content, scope, and phasing of planned capabilities also 
shifted over time with changes in requirements, priorities, and annual 
funding decisions. Visibility and oversight of the program’s cost and 
schedule is hampered by a management structure that does not track and 
account for the full cost of specific capability increments. 
Substantial infrastructure costs for labs, testing, management, and 
other activities directly support modernization but are not charged to 
its projects. The Air Force plans to manage its fourth modernization 
increment as a separate major acquisition program, as defined in DOD 
policy and statutory requirements. 

Figure: Comparison of Estimated F-22A Modernization Program and 
Related Costs (Nominal Dollars in Millions, not Inflation Adjusted): 

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Then-year dollars: 

Year: 2004; 
Direct charges to modernization increments: $1.652 billion; 
Activities in support of modernization: $2.962 billion; 
Reliability improvements and structural repairs: $762 million; 
Total: $5.376 billion. 

Year: 2012; 
Direct charges to modernization increments: $3.070 billion; 
Activities in support of modernization: $6,665 billion; 
Reliability improvements and structural repairs: $1.951 billion; 
Total: $11.686 billion. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Air Force data. 

Note: The 2004 estimate reflects costs from 2003 to 2012. The 2012 
estimate reflects costs from 2003 to 2023. 

[End of figure] 

Testing of new capabilities to ensure operational effectiveness and 
suitability is ongoing. Results to date have been satisfactory but 
development and operational testing of the largest and most 
challenging sets of capabilities have not yet begun. Going forward, 
major challenges will be developing, integrating, and testing new 
hardware and software to counter emerging future threats. Other risks 
are associated with greater reliance on laboratory ground tests and 
relocating an F-22A lab needed to conduct software testing. While 
modernization is under way, the Air Force has undertaken parallel 
efforts to improve F-22A reliability and maintainability to ensure 
life-cycle sustainment of the fleet is affordable and to justify 
future modernization investments. But the fleet has not been able to 
meet a key reliability requirement, now changed, and operating and 
support costs are much greater than earlier estimated.

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends that DOD evaluate capabilities to determine if future 
F-22A modernization efforts meeting DOD policy and statutory 
requirements should be established as separate major acquisition 
programs. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-447]. For more 
information, contact Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841, 
sullivanm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents:

Letter:

Background:

F-22A Modernization Costs Have Increased and Deliveries of New 
Capabilities to the Warfighter Have Been Delayed:

Visibility and Oversight of the Program's Cost and Schedule Is 
Hampered by a Management Structure and Funding Mechanism:

Performance Outcomes Have Been Judged Satisfactory, but Testing and 
Improving Reliability and Affordability of the Fleet Will be 
Challenging:

Conclusions:

Recommendation for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

Related GAO Products:

Table:

Table 1: Current Status of F-22A Modernization Operational Testing for 
Each Increment, as of December 2011:

Figures:

Figure 1: Comparison of Estimated F-22A Modernization Program and 
Related Costs (Nominal Year Dollars in Millions, not Inflation 
Adjusted):

Figure 2: Initial and Latest F-22A Modernization Schedules (as of 
December 2011):

Figure 3: F-22A Modernization Planned Capabilities in Increments Have 
Changed over Time:

Figure 4: Air Force Current Estimate of F-22A Modernization and Other 
Improvement Costs:

Abbreviations:

AT&L: Acquisition, Technology and Logistics:

DCMA: Defense Contract Management Agency:

DOD: Department of Defense:

DOT&E: Director, Operational Test and Evaluation:

DTM: Directive-Type Memorandum:

IFDL: Intra Flight Data Link:

JDAM: Joint Direct Attack Munition:

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:

O&S: Operating and Support:

MADL: Multifunction Advanced Data Link:

MDAP: Major Acquisition Defense Program:

MTBM: Mean Time Between Maintenance:

RAMMP: Reliability and Maintainability Maturation Program:

[End of section]

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 2, 2012:

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Air Force currently plans to spend about $11.7 billion to 
modernize and improve the reliability of the F-22A, the Air Force's 
fifth generation air superiority fighter. About $9.7 billion will be 
spent on specific modernization increments and related support costs, 
and nearly $2 billion will be used to improve the reliability of the F-
22A and make structural repairs. Originally designed to counter air 
threats posed by the former Soviet Union, the post-Cold War era 
spurred efforts to add new missions and capabilities to the F-22A, 
including improved air-to-air and robust air-to-ground attack and 
capabilities. In 2003, the Air Force established the F-22A 
modernization program to develop and insert new capabilities. The 
timing and scope of the modernization program has changed over time, 
costs have significantly increased, and fielding of some capabilities 
has been delayed. In this context, you asked us to evaluate cost, 
schedule, and performance outcomes and risks of the F-22A 
modernization program.[Footnote 1]

To determine the extent to which the F-22A modernization program is 
meeting cost and schedule goals, we researched the history of the 
program, plans and expectations at the start, and tracked budgets and 
schedule estimates over time. We identified changes in plans and 
estimates and discussed these changes with Air Force and Department of 
Defense (DOD) officials. To determine performance outcomes and risks 
remaining, we reviewed progress and results from developmental and 
operational testing and plans to mitigate risks and resolve system 
deficiencies. This included reviewing and discussing annual test 
reports from DOD's Office of the Director, Operational Test & 
Evaluation (DOT&E), briefings to defense oversight and requirements 
offices, summaries of recent operational test results provided by Air 
Force test officials, and program risk information related to testing 
new capabilities.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to April 2012 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Background:

The Air Force's F-22A Raptor is the only operational fifth-generation 
tactical aircraft, incorporating a low observable (stealth) and highly 
maneuverable airframe, advanced integrated avionics, and a supercruise 
engine capable of sustained supersonic flight. The F-22A acquisition 
program began in 1991 with an intended development period of 12 years 
and a planned quantity of 648 aircraft. The system development and 
demonstration period eventually spanned 14 years, during which time 
threats, missions, and some requirements changed. In particular, the 
F- 22A was originally designed to fly primarily air-to-air missions; 
however, since that time the Air Force has decided to add air-to-
ground capabilities to the F-22A. Development costs substantially 
increased and total quantities were eventually decreased to 188 
aircraft. When the final aircraft is delivered in May 2012, the F-22A 
acquisition program will be complete at a cost of $67.3 billion.

In 2003, the Air Force established a modernization program to develop 
and insert new and enhanced capabilities considered necessary to meet 
the threat. According to Air Force officials, modernization is defined 
as a process of upgrading and modifying aircraft with a focus on 
adding new capabilities. The modernization is now proceeding in four 
related increments, each with multiple projects:

* Increment 2,[Footnote 2] the initial phase of modernization, 
addressed some requirements deferred from the acquisition program and 
added some new ground attack capability. It has been fielded.

* Increment 3.1 began fielding in November 2011 and adds enhanced 
radar and enhanced air-to-ground attack capabilities.

* Increment 3.2A is a software upgrade to increase the F-22A's 
electronic protection, combat identification, and Link-16 
communications and data link capabilities.

* Increment 3.2B will increase the F-22A's electronic protection, geo- 
location, and Intra Flight Data Link (IFDL) capabilities, and adds 
AIM- 9X and AIM-120D missiles.

In addition to these efforts, in 2006, the Air Force began a 
Reliability and Maintainability Maturation Program (RAMMP). Although 
the Air Force does not consider this part of the modernization 
program, it is integral to making the F-22A weapon system more 
available, reliable, and maintainable. Since the F-22A's initial 
fielding in 2006, maintenance issues have prevented it from achieving 
reliability and availability requirements, and fleet operating and 
support (O&S) costs are much higher than projected earlier in the 
program.

F-22A Modernization Costs Have Increased and Deliveries of New 
Capabilities to the Warfighter Have Been Delayed:

Total projected cost of the F-22A modernization program has more than 
doubled since it started. While the program has completed and fielded 
some of its planned capabilities, the overall schedule to complete 
integration and testing of planned capabilities and deliver them to 
the warfighter has slipped by nearly 7 years. The content, scope, and 
phasing of planned capabilities also shifted over time with changes in 
requirements, priorities, and annual funding decisions. Visibility and 
oversight of the program's cost and schedule is hampered by a 
management structure that does not directly track and account for the 
full cost of specific capability increments. The Air Force plans to 
separately break out and manage the fourth increment as a major 
defense acquisition program, which should improve management and 
oversight.

F-22A Modernization Costs Have Risen Sharply Since the Program Began:

The Air Force is now expected to spend around $11.7 billion to 
modernize and improve the reliability of the F-22A, compared with the 
$5.4 billion projected soon after the start of development. Officials 
underestimated the scope of the total program and the time and money 
that would eventually be needed to develop and field new capabilities. 
Contributing factors to this cost growth include (1) changed and added 
requirements; (2) unexpected expenses for building a support 
infrastructure; and (3) unplanned efforts to improve aircraft 
reliability and maintainability. Program officials also said that 
instability in modernization funding contributed to some of the cost 
growth by stretching the time required to complete projects. Figure 1 
shows increased cost estimates over time for the modernization program 
and other related costs.

Figure 1: Comparison of Estimated F-22A Modernization Program and 
Related Costs (Nominal Year Dollars in Millions, not Inflation 
Adjusted):

[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph] 

Then-year dollars: 

Year: 2004; 
Direct charges to modernization increments: $1.652 billion; 
Activities in support of modernization: $2.962 billion; 
Reliability improvements and structural repairs: $762 million; 
Total: $5.376 billion. 

Year: 2012; 
Direct charges to modernization increments: $3.070 billion; 
Activities in support of modernization: $6,665 billion; 
Reliability improvements and structural repairs: $1.951 billion; 
Total: $11.686 billion. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Air Force data. 

Note: The 2004 estimate reflects projected costs from 2003 to 2012. 
The 2012 estimate reflects costs from 2003 to 2023. 

[End of figure] 

Modernization increments include development and procurement costs 
directly tied to one of the four increments for acquiring upgraded 
capabilities. These include infrastructure costs for lab support, test 
operations, program management, retrofit to bring all aircraft to a 
common configuration, and other efforts integral to supporting 
modernization increments. Other improvement costs principally include 
the RAMMP reliability and maintainability projects and making 
structural repairs needed for the aircraft to achieve its required 
8,000 hour service life. At this point, an estimated $5.5 billion of 
the $11.7 billon has been spent. A future investment of around $6.2 
billion remains: $1.3 billion for Increment 3.2B, $3.6 billion for 
other modernization and support activities, and $1.3 billion for 
completing the RAMMP and structural repairs.

Completion of F-22A Modernization Projects Has Been Significantly 
Delayed as Content, Scope, and Phasing of Capabilities Changed over 
Time:

When the F-22A modernization development program began, the Air Force 
expected to have all current planned capabilities integrated and 
fielding started by 2010. Now, the final increment is not expected to 
begin fielding until 2017, 7 years later than initially planned. Air 
Force officials stated that they underestimated the sheer magnitude of 
the modernization effort, both in the amount of time required to 
develop and integrate the capability, and costs to complete the 
modernization. According to program officials, contributing factors to 
delays include (1) additional requirements, (2) unexpected problems 
and delays during testing, and (3) research, development, testing, and 
evaluation funding fluctuations. Figure 2 compares the initial and 
latest schedules.

Figure 2: Initial and Latest F-22A Modernization Schedules (as of 
December 2011):

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

2004 Plan: 

Spiral 2 (now Increment 2): 
Development and integration: 2005 to mid-2006; 
Developmental test: late 2005 to mid-2006; 
Operational test and evaluation: mid to late 2006. 

Spiral 3 (now Increment 3.1): 
Development and integration: 2006 to late 2007; 
Developmental test: late 2007 to mid-2008; 
Operational test and evaluation: mid-2008 to late 2008. 

Spiral 3B (now Increment 3.2A and 3.2B): 
Development and integration: 2008 to mid-2010; 
Developmental test: mid-2008 to mid-2010; 
Operational test and evaluation: mid 2010 to late 2010. 

2011 Plan: 

Increment 2: 
Development and integration: 2005 to mid-2006; 
Developmental test: 2006; 
Operational test and evaluation: 2006 and early-to-mid 2007. 

Increment 3.1: 
Development and integration: 2007-2009; 
Developmental test: mid-2008 to late 2010; 
Operational test and evaluation: late 2010 to mid-2012. 

Increment 3.2A: 
Development and integration: mid-2011 to mid-2014; 
Developmental test: mid-2012 to mid 2013; 
Operational test and evaluation: late 2013 to early 2014. 

Increment 3.2B: 
Milestone B: 2012; 
Development and integration: mid-2012 to mid-2017; 
Milestone C: 2015; 
Developmental test: mid-2014 to early 2016; 
Operational test and evaluation: mid-2016 to early 2017. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Air Force data. 

Note: The Air Force has now replaced the term spiral development with 
increments which more accurately defines their approach to 
modernization. DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008), provides for three decision points 
or phases. They include: milestone A (entry point for the technology 
development phase); milestone B (entry point for engineering and 
manufacturing development phase--which is comprised of two major 
efforts called integrated system design, and system capability and 
manufacturing process demonstration); and milestone C (entry point for 
the production and deployment phase). 

[End of figure] 

According to Air Force officials, the program currently intends to 
upgrade 143 aircraft with the full complement of modernized 
capabilities by fiscal year 2020 and retain 36 aircraft with only 
Increment 2 capabilities to be used in training. Increment 3.1 is 
being fielded in fiscal years 2011 to 2016 and Increment 3.2A from 
fiscal years 2014 to 2016. Increment 3.2B, the last currently planned 
increment, is expected to field from fiscal years 2017 and 2020. 
Future capability enhancements are expected to follow the current 
modernization program, but have not been defined.

The content, scope, and phasing plan changed over time, contributing 
to cost and schedule problems. Figure 3 illustrates the changing 
nature of modernization projects, particularly in the later increments.

Figure 3: F-22A Modernization Planned Capabilities in Increments Have 
Changed over Time:

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Increment 2: 

Candidate 38A: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

Chaff Track Delete: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

Full Chaff Fix: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

Intra-Flight Data Link Widenet: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

Launch Zone Improvement: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

Over-the-Horizon Data Transmit: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Not included in increment as of this year. 

Supersonic JDAM: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

Increment 3.1: 

Air to Ground Radar: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

Airborne Network Transmit: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Not included in increment as of this year. 

Electronic Attack: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

Geolocate 1: 
2005: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

Geolocate 2: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Not included in increment as of this year. 

JDAM Self Target: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

SDB Basic: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

Increments 3.2A and 3.2B: 

AIM-9X[B]: 
2005: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

AIM-120D[B]: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Not included in increment as of this year. 

Autonomous Search: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Not included in increment as of this year. 

Combat ID[A]: 
2005: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

Electronic Protection Update[A,B]: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

Enhanced Data Recording: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Not included in increment as of this year. 

Geolocate 1.5: 
2005: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Not included in increment as of this year. 

Geolocate 2[B]: 
2005: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

Geolocate 3 and 3A: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Not included in increment as of this year. 

Ground Moving Target Indication and Tracking: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Not included in increment as of this year. 

IFDL Upgrades[B]: 
2005: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

Multi-function Advanced Data Link: 
2005: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Not included in increment as of this year. 

Multi-function Radar: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Not included in increment as of this year. 

Link 16 Upgrades[A]: 
2005: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Included in increment as of this year. 

SDB Full: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Not included in increment as of this year. 

Selective Available and Anti-Spoofing Module: 
2005: Included in increment as of this year; 
2008: Not included in increment as of this year; 
2011: Not included in increment as of this year. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Air Force data.

Note: Upgrades generally provide classified capabilities, 
communications, cockpit displays, radar, situational awareness, and 
weapons.

[A] Included in Increment 3.2A.

[B] Included in Increment 3.2B. 

[End of figure] 

Some capabilities, such as the Multifunction Advanced Data Link, have 
been eliminated because of changes in requirements and immature 
technology. Some, like the AIM-9X missile, have been added to the 
program to meet emerging threats. Some required capabilities have been 
reduced, such as the Geolocate project, which will now field a less- 
capable version than initially planned.

Air Force officials stated that potential new capabilities are 
analyzed and vetted by evaluating technical maturity and applying cost 
as independent variable principles[Footnote 3] to determine which to 
include in the F-22A modernization program. As a result of this 
evaluation process, certain capabilities have been modified, deferred, 
added, or eliminated. Most changes affect the final two increments. 
For example, MADL, which was intended to provide communications 
interoperability with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, was removed from 
Increment 3.2B. MADL and other deferred efforts, such as the full 
Small Diameter Bomb capability, may eventually be delivered in future 
increments yet to be defined.

Visibility and Oversight of the Program's Cost and Schedule Is 
Hampered by a Management Structure and Funding Mechanism:

Tracking and accounting for the full and accurate cost of each 
modernization increment, and individual projects within each 
increment, are limited by the way the modernization program is 
structured, funded, and executed. As depicted in figure 4, only 26 
percent of total projected costs can be traced directly to the four 
modernization increments. About 57 percent of total costs go to fund 
activities that support all the modernization efforts and the overall 
F-22A program but are not charged to specific increments. These 
activities include test operations, the building and use of government 
labs, management activities, retrofit efforts to bring the fleet to a 
common configuration, and other infrastructure accounts. The remaining 
17 percent funds the RAMMP program and structural repairs. While Air 
Force officials do not consider these efforts as part of the funded 
modernization program, we note that these efforts are needed to 
improve fleet affordability and achieve desired aircraft life and thus 
integral to justify future modernization investments.

Figure 4: Air Force Current Estimate of F-22A Modernization and Other 
Improvement Costs:

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Activities in support of modernization: $6.665 billion (57%); 
Direct charges to modernization increments: $3.070 billion (26%); 
Reliability improvements and structural repairs: $1.951 billion (17%). 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Air Force data. 

[End of figure]

Program accountability and oversight have been hampered by how the 
modernization program was established, managed, and funded. As we 
reported in March 2005, the Air Force embarked on the modernization 
program without a knowledge-based business case to support the 
multibillion dollar investment to significantly change the aircraft's 
capabilities and missions.[Footnote 4] We stated that the 
modernization program should have been established as an entirely 
separate acquisition program with a new business case because of the 
magnitude of the proposed changes. A sound business case would have 
matched requirements with resources--proven technologies, sufficient 
engineering capabilities, time, and funding--when undertaking new 
product development.[Footnote 5] However, information about the 
schedule and funding was not adequately known at the start of 
modernization. Rather than making the new business case to justify and 
manage the modernization program as a separate major defense 
acquisition, Air Force officials incorporated it within the existing F-
22A acquisition program and comingled funds. Their rationale was their 
belief that breaking modernization efforts out as a separate program 
would have delayed the capability. As a result, development funding 
and infrastructure expenses were added to the existing acquisition 
program's baseline.

The modernization program proceeded without establishing its own set 
of acquisition milestones and has not been subject to the same level 
of scrutiny by senior defense leaders or the performance reporting 
required of major defense acquisition programs as provided for in DOD 
acquisition policy. At their discretion, DOD chose to execute it 
within the baseline F-22A program. [Footnote 6]

In November 2004, defense leaders recognized that the size and 
importance of the modernization program warranted a higher level of 
scrutiny. The acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics directed the Air Force to hold separate 
milestone reviews for the future stages of the modernization program 
to be consistent with DOD acquisition policy. Under this Air Force 
direction, the current modernization projects would not require formal 
milestones, but Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) oversight 
would be provided by periodic reviews. In 2007, OSD directed the Air 
Force to update the F-22A Acquisition Program Baseline to reflect the 
approved Increments 3.1 and 3.2; however, the Air Force believed that 
an acquisition strategy report rather than a baseline would provide 
better insight into funding and schedule details for the modernization 
increments. Not separating the modernization program from the F-22A 
program baseline was consistent with how the Air Force had handled 
modernization programs for prior aircraft. However, had the Air Force 
initiated the program under existing guidelines established by DOD 
Instruction 5000.02 for managing and implementing major acquisition 
programs, oversight of the program would have benefited. Under these 
guidelines, programs are required to have an approved minimum set of 
Key Performance Parameters, included in the Capability Development 
Document; an approved Acquisition Strategy; Acquisition Program 
Baseline; an Analysis of Alternatives; and an Independent Cost 
Estimate, for a Milestone B decision that would allow them to proceed 
into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase.

OSD recently reiterated its requirement for the F-22A to be consistent 
with DOD policy, and in December 2011, OSD directed the Air Force to 
establish increment 3.2B as a separate major defense acquisition 
program. According to the Air Force, this increment is expected to 
cost around $1.5 billion. Given the significant slips in schedule 
experienced by increments 3.1 and 3.2A, the decision to separately 
oversee increment 3.2B is a late but positive change. Increment 3.2B 
will be reported as its own major program with system development 
starting in fiscal year 2013. This should improve management, cost 
visibility, and program oversight. Air Force officials told us that 
they expect to manage and report all future F-22A modernization 
programs as separate acquisitions, starting with Increment 3.2B.

Performance Outcomes Have Been Judged Satisfactory, but Testing and 
Improving Reliability and Affordability of the Fleet Will be 
Challenging:

Testing how well new capabilities perform is ongoing; results to date 
have been satisfactory but development and operational testing of the 
largest and most challenging sets of capabilities have not yet begun. 
Going forward, major challenges will be developing, integrating, and 
testing new hardware and software to counter emerging future threats. 
Other risks are associated with availability of unique test assets, 
greater reliance on laboratory ground tests, and relocation of a key F-
22A lab that is needed to help support testing of software for the new 
capabilities. Parallel efforts to improve F-22A reliability and 
maintainability are critical to ensure life-cycle sustainment of the 
fleet is affordable and to justify future modernization investments.

Operational Testing Results on New Capabilities Have Been Mostly 
Positive to Date, but More Challenging Efforts Are Still Ahead:

New F-22A capabilities delivered by the modernization program will be 
demonstrated through follow-on operational testing and evaluation to 
assess the upgraded F-22A's effectiveness and suitability.[Footnote 7] 
Testing on the first two increments successfully demonstrated new air- 
to-ground capabilities. Testing of the third and fourth increments has 
not begun and several technical risks remain for these new 
capabilities. Successful mitigation of these risks is critical to 
keeping F-22A's planned upgrades on schedule and within planned costs. 
Table 1 shows the current status of F-22A modernization operational 
testing for each increment.

Table 1: Current Status of F-22A Modernization Operational Testing for 
Each Increment, as of December 2011:

Increment: Increment 2; 
Capabilities tested: Fixes to baseline aircraft and expanded air-to-
ground capabilities against fixed targets with 1,000 pound Joint 
Direct Attack Munition; 
Key issues during operational testing: Inspection and repair of low 
observable components required significant effort, and accounted for 
half of all maintenance hours; 
Operational testing completed: August 2007.

Increment: Increment 3.1; 
Capabilities tested: Additional air-to- ground capabilities allowing 
the F-22 to find and fix targets by itself, without the need for 
external platforms to provide coordinates; 
Key issues during operational testing: Fleet stand-down due to 
concerns about the oxygen generation system; 
unavailability of a test range for flight testing and technical delays 
related to ground support equipment; 
Operational requirement for reliability was changed during testing.; 
Operational testing completed: November 2011.

Increment: Increment 3.2A; 
Capabilities tested: Updates to electronic protection, combat 
identification and targeting capabilities; 
Key issues during operational testing: Operational testing is expected 
to begin in late 2013; 
Operational testing completed: Early 2014 (estimated).

Increment: Increment 3.2B; 
Capabilities tested: Improved strike capabilities with AIM-9X and AIM-
120D missiles, and more advanced geolocation and electronic protection 
capabilities; 
Key issues during operational testing: Operational testing is expected 
to begin in late 2016; 
Operational testing completed: Mid-2017 (estimated).

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

Increment 2:

Follow-on operational testing and evaluation for F-22A fighters 
incorporating Increment 2 capabilities, including assessments of 
expanded air-to-ground capability and improvements in system 
suitability, were successfully completed in August 2007. The F-22A's 
configured with Increment 2 capabilities were found to be 
operationally effective in suppressing and destroying fixed enemy air 
defenses, and also demonstrated successful fixes of deficiencies and 
weapons integration problems that had caused problems in previous 
testing. Flight testing demonstrated the ability to employ the Joint 
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) at supersonic speeds in a high-threat 
anti-access environment where stealth capabilities are needed. Without 
this capability, baseline aircraft were only able to launch JDAMs at 
fixed targets in lower threat environments and at slower speeds while 
using target coordinates from ground spotters.

Increment 3.1:

Increment 3.1 further enhances F-22A's air-to-ground capability by 
allowing the aircraft to find and locate ground targets with on-board 
systems, rather than relying on external personnel and platforms for 
targeting. Increment 3.1 completed follow-on operational testing in 
November 2011; a significant delay of 4 years from the original plan 
due to shortcomings identified with the baseline and upgraded 
aircraft. In 2009 and 2010, the Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation (DOT&E) reported significant stealth-related maintenance 
issues that lowered operational availability and mission capability 
rates. F-22A program officials identified technical issues in 
upgrading radar, navigation, and software that needed to be addressed 
to meet operational testing requirements.

The Air Force began Increment 3.1 operational testing in January 2011, 
but soon encountered flight delays that persisted from March to 
September 2011. The entire F-22A fleet was ordered to stand-down due 
to potential problems with the aircraft's oxygen generation system. 
Unavailability of the test range and technical problems with ground 
support equipment also contributed to the lengthy flight delay. The 
Air Force completed flight testing for Increment 3.1 in November 2011 
and expects to release the operational test report in late March 2012. 
In its 2011 annual report, DOT&E did not identify any significant 
remaining issues since flights had resumed. DOT&E also approved 
reducing trials from 16 to 8 and decreasing simulator test trials from 
96 to 64. According to program officials, hardware and software issues 
had been identified and fixed as testing progressed and test pilots 
provided very positive feedback on Increment 3.1's enhancements.

Increment 3.2A:

Increment 3.2A development began in November 2011 after significant 
delays. This increment involves updating software to enhance 
electronic protection and combat identification capabilities, so that 
F-22A can handle new threats expected in the future. Developmental 
testing for this increment is expected to start in 2012 and be 
completed in late 2013. Operational testing and evaluation will follow 
and is planned to conclude in 2014.

Program officials assessed the Increment 3.2A schedule as having 
moderate risk. Test aircraft have been operating much longer than 
planned and were to be replaced by new production aircraft; however, 
this has not happened due to the substantial reduction in the size of 
the F-22A fleet. Other risks appear lower. For example, some software 
for electronic protection and combat identification capabilities has 
already been developed for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Also, while 
the Link-16 upgrade will involve a significant amount of development 
work, program officials consider it to be moderate risk.

Increment 3.2B:

Increment 3.2B is scheduled to begin Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development in December 2012 and the decision to enter into production 
is scheduled for January 2016. Key capability upgrades include 
integrating the AIM-9X and AIM-120D missiles on the F-22A and 
upgrading geolocation and electronic protection subsystems. Early 
requirements analysis determined that AIM-9X integration may be more 
difficult and take longer than expected and officials have already 
begun risk reduction efforts. Overall, software integration is 
considered to have the highest risk for Increment 3.2B projects, while 
hardware development is rated as a moderate risk. Program officials 
believe that the full range of capabilities added in the modernization 
program can be accommodated within the weight and space limitations of 
the F-22A aircraft, but this will be a critical consideration in any 
future modernization plans.

The Air Force is seeking ways to reduce the costs of Increments 3.2A 
and 3.2B by streamlining program activities. Officials want to make 
more use of developmental tests to also satisfy operational test 
requirements, allowing the program to identify errors for correction 
earlier and reducing overall costs by eliminating redundant tests. The 
program also intends to increase its use of F-22A ground laboratories 
to substitute for more expensive flight tests. The F-22A lab 
infrastructure is an extensive, distributed system of dedicated labs 
that integrate and certify flight software releases to the field and 
support F-22A modernization, production and sustainment activities. 
However, there are technical risks if lab tests do not fully replicate 
the performance of actual F-22A aircraft in intended environments. 
Officials are also expecting to save money by relocating the Raptor 
Avionics Integration Lab--a critical work site that stimulates sensors 
for targeting--from Marietta, Georgia, to Ogden Air Logistics Center, 
Utah by the summer of 2012. Program officials acknowledge there are 
some risks in this. For example, unique equipment could be damaged 
during the move and experienced lab staff could decide to leave the F- 
22A program rather than relocate.

RAMMP Program Addresses Reliability and Maintainability Deficiencies 
to Improve Affordability and Justify Future Investments:

In addition to capability upgrades, the F-22A budget also funds 
efforts to address reliability and maintainability deficiencies that 
have increased support costs and have prevented the F-22A from meeting 
a key performance requirement. RAMMP is to develop and implement 
enhancements to increase aircraft availability, make maintenance 
faster and less costly, and reduce total life-cycle operating and 
support costs and cost per flying hour. While RAMMP is expected to 
reduce life-cycle costs over the long term, up-front investments to 
help realize future cost reductions have increased. The program had 
planned to spend about $258 million between 2005 and 2011, but actual 
investments through 2011 were about $528 million. The total RAMMP 
funding requirement through the year 2023 is now estimated at almost 
$1.3 billion. Air Force officials attributed part of RAMMP's increased 
costs to additional projects and increased labor hours to address 
corrosion.

Keeping the F-22A fleet affordable and meeting required performance 
measures is critical to sustaining fleet operations over the long 
term, and ensuring it is available in sufficient numbers for required 
missions. Projected operational and support costs are much higher than 
earlier estimates. For example, a 2007 independent estimate by the Air 
Force Cost Analysis Agency projected a $49,549 cost per flying hour in 
2015 (by which time the F-22A was expected to reach full maturity), 
more than double the $23,282 cost per flight hour estimated in 2005.

Air Force officials gave various reasons for sustainment cost 
increases including (1) unrealized savings from the F-22A's 
performance-based logistics contract[Footnote 8] (2) fixed costs that 
had to be spread over a smaller number of aircraft; and (3) higher 
than expected costs to refurbish or replace broken parts, including 
diminishing manufacturing sources. However, the one common 
contributing factor--and the most impactful--is the cost and 
complexity of maintaining stealth characteristics and restoring 
aircraft to the required stealth level after flight operations and 
maintenance. Our recent report found that the number of maintenance 
personnel required to maintain the F-22A's specialized stealth 
exterior has increased, posing a continuing support challenge for this 
aircraft.[Footnote 9] This has important implications for the 
affordability and life-cycle cost estimates for the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter.

When it started in 2006, a major goal of RAMMP was to improve F-22A 
reliability to meet its key performance requirement by the time the 
fleet reached maturity at 100,000 total flight hours. This performance 
indicator, known as mean time between maintenance (MTBM), required 
aircraft in the F-22A fleet to fly an average of 3 hours between 
maintenance events, excluding routine servicing and inspections. This 
performance standard was a key performance requirement in the F-22A 
acquisition contract, but the fleet has never been able to meet that 
requirement. Currently, the MTBM achieved by the operational test 
aircraft with improvements is 2.47 hours.

In April 2011, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved 
changing the main reliability metric from MTBM to another performance 
indicator, known as material availability. Officials believed the MTBM 
indicator was hard to define and measure, was unrealistic, and did not 
accurately reflect the fleet's readiness to perform missions. Material 
availability is defined as the percentage of the fleet available to 
perform assigned missions at any given time. This standard calls for 
the F-22A fleet to achieve increasing levels of availability between 
2011 and 2015 toward the final goal of 70.6 percent. Last year, the F- 
22A fleet achieved a 55.5 percent materiel availability rate. Stealth- 
related maintenance, system component reliability problems, and lack 
of spare engines were factors contributing to the fleet not achieving 
the goal. However, program officials expect the F-22A fleet to achieve 
the final availability goal by 2015 after the full fielding of 
reliability improvements. The Air Force reported that operational test 
on aircraft integrated with the current reliability improvements have 
achieved 78 percent availability; they anticipate significant gains by 
the overall fleet once reliability improvements are installed on all F-
22A aircraft.

Conclusions:

Keeping the F-22A as the world's most advanced stealth fighter 
requires the Air Force to counter changing threats, as well as ensure 
the F-22A fleet is affordable, reliable, and sustainable. In response 
to changing threats, officials began a Modernization Program to add 
new missions and capabilities while fixing problems and deficiencies 
that were carried over from the original development program. However, 
the F-22A modernization program has not had the management rigor or 
oversight on par with the $11.7 billion investment it entails. The 
program was not well-defined when it began in 2003, has had fluid 
scope and cost, and has been challenging from an oversight perspective 
as it was blended into the baseline F-22A program rather than being 
managed separately. As early as 2004, OSD began discussing the need to 
manage future modernization increments as separate acquisition 
programs. While modernization has been underway, the Air Force has 
found it necessary to invest in improved reliability and availability 
of the F-22A through the RAMMP program. The original reliability 
requirement was not met and has since been changed to another 
indicator. Meanwhile, O&S costs have been significantly higher than 
planned, with maintenance of the aircraft's stealth levels being 
particularly demanding. The lessons learned on the maintenance of the 
stealthy F-22A may have implications for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Splitting out increment 3.2B as a separate major acquisition defense 
program indicates that OSD is reasserting its role in the F-22A 
program. This is beneficial for oversight in light of the significant 
decisions and investments yet to come for the program. Increment 3.2B 
requires around $1.3 billion, while completing the RAMMP program, 
ongoing modernization projects, and other improvements will require an 
estimated $4.9 billion--a total future investment of around $6.2 
billion. The program is highly dependent on a single contractor, whose 
responsibilities encompass managing the development and production of 
the F-22A; development, production, and retrofit of modernization; 
execution of the RAMMP program; and life-cycle support of the F-22A 
fleet, including supply and maintenance. Finally, the Air Force 
informed us that it expects to manage future modernization increments 
as separate acquisitions. However, given the approach the Air Force 
has taken to date on this and other modernization programs, there is 
little assurance that this will occur without specific OSD direction.

Recommendation for Executive Action:

As new and enhanced capabilities are proposed and vetted beyond 
Increment 3.2B in the F-22A modernization program, we recommend that 
the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics evaluate 
those capabilities in accordance with DOD policy and statutory 
criteria to determine if they should be established as separate major 
defense acquisition programs, each with its own milestones, business 
case, and cost baseline that includes all applicable direct and 
indirect support costs required to complete the program.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

DOD provided us written comments on a draft of this report. The 
comments appear in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments 
that were incorporated as appropriate. During the agency comment 
period, DOD requested clarification regarding our recommendation. As a 
result, we revised the recommendation to more clearly state that the 
Under Secretary of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics will evaluate 
future planned F-22A modernization capabilities to determine if those 
meeting DOD policy and statutory criteria should be established as a 
separate major acquisition program.

DOD concurred with the revised recommendation.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force 
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 
GAO's website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].

If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact 
me at (202) 512-4841 or SullivanM@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. 

Signed by: 

Michael J. Sullivan, Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section]

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

To determine the extent to which F-22A modernization met cost and 
schedule goals and operational requirements, we reviewed documentation 
of program plans and status, including cost estimates, briefings by 
program office officials to Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force 
oversight officials, annual Selected Acquisition Reports, Defense 
Acquisition Executive Summary reports, Director, Operational Test and 
Evaluation (DOT&E) annual test result summaries, Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA) program assessment reports, acquisition 
plans, operational requirements documentation, contract documentation, 
schedules and other data. We reviewed documentation of key decisions 
made on F-22A modernization, including acquisition decision memoranda 
and Joint Requirements Oversight Council memoranda. We reviewed F-22A 
cost performance report data, contract cost data, and budgetary 
documents. In assessing the achievement of cost goals by the F-22 
modernization and other improvement efforts, we compared the program 
cost estimate from 2004, shortly before development began for 
Increment 2, with the latest available estimates. We determined what 
changes in planned capabilities occurred after modernization efforts 
began. In assessing the F-22A modernization's achievement of schedule 
goals and delivery of planned capabilities, we identified progress 
made in delivering new capabilities in accordance with plans, and 
determined what factors contributed to schedule changes. We 
interviewed program office officials having knowledge of factors 
driving cost estimate and schedule changes over time. We also 
interviewed officials from the F- 22A Program Office, DOD test 
organizations, and Air Combat Command to obtain their views on 
progress; ongoing concerns and actions taken to address them; and 
future plans to complete F-22A development procurement and operational 
testing. We used the latest cost data available during the period of 
our review; however the F-22A program office was preparing a new cost 
estimate for F-22A modernization and the estimated costs of increments 
beyond Increment 3.2B had not yet been determined or added to this 
estimate.

To determine what progress has been made in completing developmental 
and operational testing, and resolving system deficiencies, we 
reviewed DOT&E annual test report summaries and briefings to DOD 
oversight and requirements officials. We reviewed summaries of recent 
operational test results provided by Air Force test officials and 
program risk information related to developmental and operational 
testing for F-22A modernization. We reviewed documentation of program 
decisions, including acquisition decision memoranda. We reviewed data 
from prior GAO reviews on operations and support costs for F-22A and 
other stealth aircraft, Selected Acquisition Reports, Defense 
Acquisition Executive Summary reports, contract documents, and program 
cost estimates. In assessing progress made in operational testing, we 
compared initial and current operational test plans to determine if 
significant changes were made after testing began. We identified 
relevant factors contributing to testing delays. In assessing the 
resolution of system deficiencies, we identified the number of 
successful test points flown during operational testing and identified 
what changes were made in requirements after operational testing 
began. We determined what key risks and issues remain that could 
affect developmental and operational testing in the future. We 
identified issues contributing to increased operations and sustainment 
costs and to decreased aircraft availability, and actions taken by the 
F-22A program to mitigate them. We interviewed officials from the F-
22A Program Office, DOD test organizations, and Air Combat Command to 
obtain their views on progress, ongoing concerns and actions taken to 
address them, and future plans to complete developmental and 
operational testing. At the time of our review, the final follow-on 
operational test and evaluation results for Increment 3.1 were not yet 
available and other test information we had requested was not readily 
available within the reporting period for this report due to its high 
classification level. Accordingly, our analysis of actual results and 
data was somewhat constrained and our reporting limited to providing 
summary level observations due to the classification level of some of 
the data. Notwithstanding, DOD officials gave us access to sufficient 
information to make informed judgments on the matters covered in this 
report.

In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed 
officials from the F-22A Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force 
Base, Ohio; Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base Virginia; 
Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Arlington, Virginia; and the Air Force 
Operational Test and Evaluation Center, Kirtland Air Force Base, New 
Mexico. We assessed the reliability of DOD and F-22A contractor data 
by (1) obtaining and reviewing related information from various 
sources, and (2) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the 
data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 
purposes of this report. We conducted this performance audit from June 
2011 to March 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

April 30, 2011: 

Mr. Michael J. Sullivan: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Sullivan: 

This is the Department of Defense response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report, GAO-12-447, "Tactical 
Aircraft: F-22A Modernization Program, Faces Cost, Technical and 
Sustainment Risks," dated March 26, 2012 (GAO Code 120984). The
Department appreciates the effort of the GAO and the opportunity to 
comment on the draft report. 

The Department appreciates the collegial, professional working 
relationship the GAO established with its Department counterparts 
during this engagement. The Department believes this cooperative 
relationship resulted in a higher quality and more accurate report, 
ultimately resulting in a single recommendation to which the 
Department concurs. 

Detailed comments on the report recommendation are enclosed. The 
Department appreciates the opportunity to respond to your draft report 
and looks forward to working with you as we continue to improve our 
acquisition processes. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

David G. Ahern: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense: 
Strategic and Tactical Systems: 

Enclosure: As stated. 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated March 26, 2012: 
GAO-12-447 (GAO Code 120984): 

"Tactical Aircraft: F-22A Modernization Program, Faces Cost, Technical 
And Sustainment Risks" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendation: 

The GAO made one "recommendation for executive action" for the 
Secretary of Defense. 

Recommendation: "As new and enhanced capabilities are proposed and 
vetted beyond Increment 3.2B in the F-22A modernization program, we 
recommend that the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics evaluate those capabilities in accordance with DoD policy 
and statutory criteria to determine if they should be established as 
separate major defense acquisition programs, each with its own 
milestones business case and cost baseline that includes all 
applicable direct and indirect support costs required to complete the 
program." [page 17] 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department agrees with the spirit and intent 
of this recommendation. In fact, the Department's position is that 
this is exactly what the Department does and intends to continue doing 
for each and every potential acquisition program. Further, the Air 
Force states they "will continue to structure future modernization 
programs to achieve optimal cost effectiveness and management 
oversight, in collaboration with Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, compliant with DoD 
policy and statutory criteria. However, regulatory and statutory 
compliance is not the single remedy for cost and schedule growth. 
Application of accepted program management best practices in 
technology maturation, systems engineering, test & evaluation, risk 
and earned value management is also essential to sound program 
management. The Air Force will continue to employ this combination of 
policy, statute and program management best practices to ensure that 
future modernization increments are fielded expeditiously and 
affordably." 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact:

Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or SullivanM@gao.gov:

Staff Acknowledgments:

In addition to the contact named above, Bruce Fairbairn, Assistant 
Director; Marvin Bonner; Sean Seales; Marie Ahearn; Ana Aviles; Laura 
Greifner; Travis Masters; and Roxanna Sun made key contributions to 
this report.

[End of section]

Related GAO Products:

Tactical Aircraft: Comparison of F-22A and Legacy Fighter 
Modernization Programs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-524]. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 
2012.

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Places Program on Firmer Footing, 
but Progress Still Lags. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-325]. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 
2011.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-233SP]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 29, 2011.

Tactical Aircraft: DOD's Ability to Meet Future Requirements Is 
Uncertain, with Key Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment 
Decisions. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-789]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2010.

Defense Management: DOD Needs Better Information and Guidance to More 
Effectively Manage and Reduce Operating and Support Costs of Major 
Weapon Systems. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-717]. 
Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2010.

Defense Contracting: DOD Has Enhanced Insight into Undefinitized 
Contract Action Use, but Management at Local Commands Needs 
Improvement. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-299]. 
Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2010.

Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD's Weapon Programs 
Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-543T]. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 
2009.

GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 
2009.

Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could Improve 
Major Weapon System Program Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619]. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2008.

Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment 
Strategy. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-415]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.

Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Present a New F-22A Business Case before 
Making Further Investments. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-455R]. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 
2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Air Force Still Needs Business Case to Support 
F/A-22 Quantities and Increased Capabilities. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-304]. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 
2005.

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] A companion report, GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Comparison of F-22A 
Modernization Program and Legacy Fighter Modernization Programs, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-524] (Washington, D.C.: 
Apr. 26, 2012) addresses how the timing and strategy of the F-22A 
modernization program compares to similar past efforts on legacy 
fighter programs, including the Air Force's F-15 and F-16 and the 
Navy's F/A-18. 

[2] The Air Force numbering scheme considers increment 1 to be the 
baseline capabilities delivered by the F-22A acquisition program.

[3] Cost as an independent variable principles call for the 
establishment of cost goals for operations, sustainment, and 
procurement, and for acquisition programs to make trade-offs in terms 
of cost, schedule, and performance. 

[4] GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Still Needs Business Case to 
Support F/A-22 Quantities and Increased Capabilities, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-304] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 
2005).

[5] A business case is defined as demonstrated evidence that (1) the 
warfighter need exists and that it can best be met with the chosen 
concept and (2) the concept can be developed and produced within 
existing resources--including design knowledge, demonstrated 
technologies, adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver the 
product, GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Managing Risk to Achieve Better 
Outcomes, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-37T] 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 20, 2010).

[6] Currently, a major defense acquisition program (MDAP) is a DOD 
acquisition program that is not a highly sensitive classified program 
and that is designated by the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L as a 
MDAP or that is estimated to require an eventual total expenditure for 
research, development, test and evaluation, including all planned 
increments, of more than $365 million (based on fiscal year 2000 
constant dollars) or an eventual total expenditure for procurement, 
including all planned increments, of more than $2.9 billion (based on 
fiscal year 2000 constant dollars). Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 
09- 027, Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act 
of 2009 (Dec. 4, 2009, incorporating change 3, Dec. 9, 2011), 
Attachment 1 at § 13. See also, DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of 
the Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008) and 10 U.S.C. § 2430. 

[7] Operational effectiveness is the overall degree of mission 
accomplishment of a system when used by representative personnel in 
the environment planned or expected for operational employment and 
operational suitability is the degree to which a system can be 
satisfactorily placed in field use, with consideration given to 
reliability, availability, and maintainability.

[8] The F-22A's prime contractor, Lockheed-Martin, provides life-cycle 
product support, including supply and maintenance under this 
arrangement.

[9] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs Better Information and Guidance 
to More Effectively Manage and Reduce Operating and Support Costs of 
Major Weapon Systems, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-717] (Washington, D.C.: July 20, 
2010).

[End of section] 

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