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United States Government Accountability Office: 


Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, Committee on 
Armed Services, House of Representatives: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT: 
Wednesday, October 26, 2011: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

Future Ground-Based Vehicles and Network Initiatives Face Development 
and Funding Challenges: 

Statement of Belva M. Martin, Director Acquisition and Sourcing 


GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of [hyperlink,], a 
testimony before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

After the Army canceled the Future Combat System in June of 2009, it 
began developing modernization plans, including developing a new Ground 
Combat Vehicle (GCV) and additional network capability. At the same 
time, the Army was considering options on how to improve its light 
tactical vehicles. 

This statement addresses potential issues related to developing (1) the 
new GCV, (2) a common information network, and (3) the Joint Light 
Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) in a constrained budget environment. The 
statement is based largely on previous GAO work conducted over the last 
year in response to congressional requests and results of other reviews 
of Army modernization. 

To conduct this work, GAO analyzed program documentation, strategies, 
and test results; interviewed independent experts and Army and 
Department of Defense (DOD) officials; and witnessed demonstrations of 
current and emerging network technologies. DOD reviewed the facts 
contained in this statement and provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

What GAO Found: 

Delivering a feasible, cost-effective, and executable GCV solution 
presents a major challenge to the Army, with key questions about the 
robustness of the analysis of alternatives, the plausibility of its 7-
year schedule, and cost and affordability. DOD and the Army have taken 
steps to increase oversight of the program, but resolving these issues 
during technology development will remain a challenge. For example, the 
Army has already reduced some requirements and encouraged contractors 
to use mature technologies in their proposals, but the 7-year schedule 
remains ambitious, and delays would increase development costs. 
Independent cost estimates have suggested that 9 to 10 years is a more 
realistic schedule. Over the next 2 years during the technology 
development phase, the Army faces major challenges in deciding which 
capabilities to pursue and include in a GCV vehicle design and 
determine whether the best option is a new vehicle or modifications to 
a current vehicle. 

The Army’s new information network strategy moves away from a single 
network development program to an incremental approach with which 
feasible technologies can be developed, tested, and fielded. The new 
strategy has noteworthy aspects, such as using periodic field 
evaluations to assess systems that may provide potential benefit and 
getting soldier feedback on the equipment being tested. However, the 
Army has not articulated requirements, incremental objectives, or cost 
and schedule projections for its new network. It is important that the 
Army proceed in defining requirements and expected capabilities for the 
network to avoid the risk of developing individual capabilities that 
may not work together as a network. With the cancellation last week of 
its ground mobile radio and continuing problems in developing 
technology to provide advanced networking capability, the Army will 
still need to find foundational pieces for its network. 

The Army is reworking earlier plans to develop and acquire the JLTV and 
is planning to recapitalize some of its High Mobility, Multipurpose 
Wheeled Vehicles (HMWWV). These efforts have just begun, however, and 
their results are not yet assured. To reduce risk in the JLTV program, 
the services relied on multiple vendors during technology development 
to increase their knowledge of the needed technologies, determine the 
technology maturity level, and determine which requirements were 
achievable. As a result, the services identified trades in requirements 
to drive down the cost of the vehicle. For example, the services found 
that JLTV could not achieve both protection level and transportability 
goals, so the services are accepting a heavier vehicle. A potential 
risk for the services in allowing industry to build vehicles for 
testing is that the prototypes may not be mature; the Army will need to 
keep its options open to changes that may result from these tests. Both 
the Army and the Marine Corps have articulated a significant future 
role for their Up-Armored HMMWV fleets, yet the fleets are experiencing 
reduced automotive performance, the need for better protection as 
threats have evolved, and other issues. The Army is planning to 
recapitalize a portion of its Up-Armored HMMWV fleet to increase 
automotive performance and improve blast protection. The Marine Corps’ 
plans to extend the service life of some of its HMMWVs used in light 
tactical missions are not yet known. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is not making any recommendations with this statement; however, 
consistent with previous work, this statement underscores the 
importance of developing sound requirements and focusing up front on 
what modernization efforts will deliver and at what cost. 

View []. For more information, 
contact Belva Martin at (202) 512-4841 or 

[End of section] 

Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and Members of the 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of the Army's 
recent initiatives to acquire ground-based combat and tactical vehicles 
and an information network capability. In the wake of the June 2009 
decision to cancel the Future Combat System, which included a new class 
of manned ground vehicles anchored by an advanced information network, 
the Army began developing plans for a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) 
and an incremental tactical network capability. At about the same time, 
the Army began considering ways to improve its light tactical vehicles 
and developed the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program with the 
U.S. Marine Corps. My statement today, based largely on work we have 
conducted over the last year in response to requests from this 
subcommittee and results of other reviews of Army modernization, will 
address potential issues that the Army faces as it prepares to make 
significant decisions on its GCV, network, and light tactical vehicle 
programs in this constrained budget environment. 

To assess the GCV program, we analyzed program documentation, such as 
the Initial Capabilities Document and the Technology Development 
Strategy; interviewed Army and Department of Defense (DOD) officials; 
and interviewed independent experts and reviewed their analyses. We 
analyzed the Army networking and management strategy, and compared that 
strategy with DOD acquisition policy and best practices. We also 
observed demonstrations of current and emerging networking equipment, 
analyzed evaluation results, obtained soldier feedback, and met with 
Army and DOD officials who are involved in defining the tactical 
network. To assess JLTV, we analyzed documentation, interviewed Army 
and Marine Corps officials, and analyzed how the Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected (MRAP) vehicle program, including the MRAP-All Terrain 
Vehicle (M-ATV), has influenced the JLTV program. We also obtained and 
reviewed JLTV test results and interviewed test officials. To assess 
the High Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) 
recapitalization plan, we analyzed both services' respective plans for 
future recapitalization efforts, reviewed past efforts, and interviewed 
Army and Marine Corps officials. 

We conducted work on these Army programs as part of performance audits 
from December 2010 to October 2011, in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence 
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 


The Army's ground-based military operations generally use two kinds of 
vehicles: combat vehicles designed for a specific fighting function and 
tactical vehicles designed primarily for multipurpose support 
functions. Most combat vehicles move on tracks--including the Abrams 
tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle--but some move on wheels, such as 
the Stryker. Tactical vehicles generally move on wheels, including the 
HMMWV and the JLTV. 

Most major defense acquisitions follow a structured acquisition 
process, which normally consists of three discrete phases: (1) 
technology development; (2) engineering and manufacturing development; 
and (3) production and deployment. Programs are expected to meet 
certain criteria at milestone decision points for entry into each 
phase.[Footnote 1] For anticipated major defense acquisition 
programs,[Footnote 2] like the GCV and the JLTV, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD/ATL) generally 
serves as the Milestone Decision Authority. The Milestone Decision 
Authority is responsible for approving the programs' entry into the 
defense acquisition system, approving entry into subsequent phases, and 
documenting the various approvals through acquisition decision 

The Army's GCV program is intended to modernize the current ground 
combat vehicle fleet, replacing a portion of the Bradley Infantry 
Fighting Vehicles currently in inventory. In February 2010, the Army 
issued a request for proposals for the technology development phase of 
the GCV before completing the required analysis of alternatives (AOA), 
citing schedule urgency. In May 2010, the Army convened a "Red Team" to 
assess the risk of achieving the GCV schedule. The Red Team issued its 
report in August 2010, citing major risk areas including schedule, 
technical maturity, and affordability of the system. The Army rescinded 
the original request for proposals and issued another in late 2010. The 
milestone A decision was expected in April 2011, but did not occur 
until August 2011 (see fig. 1). In August, the Army awarded technology 
development contracts to two contractor teams. A third contractor team 
submitted a proposal but did not receive a contract award and has filed 
a bid protest with GAO that is still being considered. 

Figure 1: GCV Program Events: 

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline] 

CY 2010-CY 2018: 

DOD acquisition process: 

Materiel Solution Analysis (Materiel development February 2010); 
Technology Development (Current GCV status); 
Engineering and Manufacturing development: Integrated System design 
(Preliminary design review); 
Engineering and Manufacturing development: System capability and 
manufacturing process demonstration (Critical design review); 
Production (1st production vehicle, late-2018). 

Acquisition milestones (GCV estimates): 

CY 2011; 
A: (August 2011).

CY 2013; 
B: Development start: (August 2013). 

CY 2017; 
C: Production start: (Summer 2017). 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data and the DOD acquisition process. 

[End of figure] 

The Army has been defining a strategy to develop, demonstrate, and 
field a common tactical information network across its forces. 
Generally, such a network is expected to act as an information 
superhighway to collect, process, and deliver vast amounts of 
information such as images and communications while seamlessly linking 
people and systems. The Army's current strategy is to better understand 
current Army networking capabilities, determine capabilities needed, 
and chart an incremental path forward. The Army plans regular 
demonstrations as the network grows and its capability improves. 

The Army and Marine Corps generally define light tactical vehicles as 
capable of being transported by a rotary wing aircraft and with a cargo 
capacity of equal to or less than 5,100 pounds. Light tactical vehicles 
represent about 50 percent of the Army's tactical wheeled vehicle fleet 
and currently consist of the HMMWV family of vehicles. The Army's HMMWV 
program also provides vehicles to satisfy Marine Corps, Air Force, and 
other requirements. The JLTV is expected to be the next generation of 
light tactical vehicles and is being designed to provide the advances 
in protection, performance, and payload to fill the capability gap 
remaining between the HMMWV and MRAP family of vehicles.[Footnote 3] 
JLTV is being designed to protect its occupants from the effects of 
mines and improvised explosive devices without sacrificing its payload 
capability or its automotive performance, which has not been the case 
with the other tactical wheeled vehicles. 

The Army's recent history with its acquisition programs was the subject 
of a review by a panel chartered by the Secretary of the Army. In its 
January 2011 report,[Footnote 4] the panel noted that the Army has 
increasingly failed to take new development programs into full-rate 
production. From 1990 to 2010, the Army terminated 22 major defense 
acquisition programs before completion. While noting many different 
causes that contribute to a program's terminations, the panel found 
that many terminated programs shared several of the same problems, 
including weak trade studies or analyses of alternatives; unconstrained 
weapon system requirements; underestimation of risk, particularly 
technology readiness levels; affordability reprioritization; schedule 
delays; and requirements and technology creep. The panel made a number 
of recommendations to help make the Army's requirements, resourcing, 
and acquisition processes more effective and efficient. 

Army Faces Major Challenges to Identify a Feasible, Cost-Effective, and 
Executable GCV Solution: 

Over the next 2 years during the technology development phase, the Army 
faces major challenges to identify a feasible, cost-effective, and 
executable solution that meets the Army's needs. Among these are making 
choices on which capabilities to pursue and include in a GCV vehicle 
design and determining whether the best option is a new vehicle or a 
modified current vehicle. In our March 2011 testimony,[Footnote 5] we 
identified key questions about GCV pertaining to how urgently it is 
needed, robustness of the analysis of alternatives, plausibility of its 
7-year schedule, cost and affordability, and whether mature 
technologies would be used. Since that time, the Army has moved the CGV 
program into the technology development phase. DOD and the Army have 
taken positive steps to increase their oversight of the program; 
however, the timely resolution of issues surrounding the areas 
previously identified will be a major challenge. 

* Urgency of need: The Army's recent combat vehicle capability 
portfolio review confirmed the Army's need for GCV as a Bradley 
Infantry Fighting Vehicle replacement and USD/ATL approved the GCV 
acquisition program.[Footnote 6] USD/ATL agreed that the Army has a 
priority need for a GCV but the number of caveats in the approval 
decision (as discussed below) raises questions about the soundness of 
the Army's acquisition plans and time lines. 

* Analysis of alternatives: After initially bypassing completion of the 
AOA process, the Army subsequently conducted an AOA but was directed by 
USD/ATL to conduct more robust analyses, throughout the technology 
development phase, to include design and capability trades intended to 
reduce technical risks and GCV production costs. We have reported that 
a robust AOA can be a key element in ensuring a program has a sound, 
executable business case prior to program initiation and that programs 
that conduct a limited AOA tended to experience poorer outcomes--
including cost growth.[Footnote 7] The Army is expected to include 
sensitivity analyses in the AOA to explore trade-offs between specific 
capabilities and costs. These analyses will be supported by assessments 
of existing combat vehicles to determine whether they are adequate 
alternatives to a new vehicle, or whether some of the designs or 
capabilities of existing vehicles should be incorporated into a new 
GCV. Concurrently, the GCV contractor teams will conduct design trades 
and demonstrate technologies, the results of which will also be fed 
back into the AOA updates. 

* Plausibility of 7-year schedule: The Army's plan to deliver the first 
production vehicles in 7 years still has significant risk. Since GCV 
was originally conceived in 2009, the Army has already reduced some 
requirements and encouraged interested contractors to use mature 
technologies in their proposals. However, the schedule remains 
ambitious and USD/ATL has stipulated that the Army will need to 
demonstrate that the schedule is both feasible and executable. 
According to an independent Army program evaluator, the next 2 years of 
technology development will require many capability and requirements 
trades in order to better define an acceptable solution at the same 
time that technology risks for that solution are to be identified and 
mitigated. Concurrent activities can lead to poor results, calling into 
question whether the 7-year schedule is executable. The independent 
cost estimate submitted for the milestone A review featured higher GCV 
development costs with the assumption that the Army would need 9 or 10 
years to complete the program, instead of the assumed 7 years. 

* Cost and affordability: Cost continues to be a challenge, as an 
independent cost estimate was at least 30 percent higher than the 
Army's estimate for GCV procurement. USD/ATL has directed that 
continued program approval depends on the Army's ability to meet the 
$13 million procurement unit cost target. As for affordability, with 
the expectation that less funding will be available in coming years, 
the Army has made some trades within the combat vehicle portfolio. 
According to Army officials, the Army plans to proceed with GCV as 
currently planned, but several other combat vehicle programs--such as 
anticipated upgrades for the Bradley, Abrams, and Stryker vehicles--are 
being reshaped or delayed. 

* Use of mature technologies: The Army encouraged interested contractor 
teams to use mature technologies in their GCV proposals. Due to the 
current bid protest, we do not have insight into what the contractor 
teams proposed in terms of specific critical technologies or their 
maturity. A DOD official stated, and we agree, that it will be 
important that technologies be thoroughly evaluated at the preliminary 
design review before the decision to proceed to the engineering and 
manufacturing development phase. 

Ambitious Army Information Network Strategy Has Noteworthy Aspects but 
Unresolved Issues Could Affect Long-Term Implementation: 

The Army has taken a number of steps to put together a more realistic 
strategy to develop and field an information network for its deployed 
forces than the network envisioned for the Future Combat System 
program. However, the Army is proceeding without defining requirements 
for the network and articulating clearly defined capabilities. As a 
result, the Army runs the risk of developing a number of stovepipe 
capabilities that may not work together as a network, thus wasting 
resources. The Army has moved away from its plan for a single network 
development program under Future Combat System to an incremental 
approach with which feasible technologies can be developed, tested, and 
fielded. This planned approach reflects lessons learned and changes the 
way the Army develops, acquires, and fields network capabilities. Under 
this new approach, numerous programs will be developed separately and 
coordinated centrally, and network increments will be integrated and 
demonstrated in advance of fielding rather than the previous practice 
of ad hoc development and integration in the field. A key aspect of the 
implementation of the new approach will be aligning the schedules of 
the separate programs with the Army's planned, semiannual field events, 
called network integration evaluations, where emerging technologies are 
put in soldiers' hands for demonstration and evaluation. 

Several key aspects of the Army's Network Strategy include: 

* In our March 2011 testimony,[Footnote 8] we pointed out that roles 
and responsibilities for network development were not clear. Since 
then, senior Army leadership issued a directive detailing the 
collective roles, responsibilities, and functions of relevant Army 
organizations involved with the network modernization effort. 

* The Army is currently working to establish a comprehensive integrated 
technical baseline for the network and addressing prioritized 
capability gaps. With this baseline, the Army expects to build on 
elements of the network already in place with an emphasis on capturing 
emerging technologies that deliver capability incrementally to multiple 
units at the same time. This represents a significant departure from 
the previous practice of fielding systems individually and often to 
only one element of the operational force at a time (for instance, 
companies, battalions, or brigades). 

* The network integration evaluations are a key enabler of the Army's 
new network strategy and assess systems that may provide potential 
benefits and value to the Army while identifying areas requiring 
additional development. The evaluation process provides the Army an 
opportunity to improve its knowledge of current and potential network 
capability. Additionally, it provides soldier feedback on the equipment 
being tested. For example, members of the Army's network test unit, the 
Brigade Modernization Command, indicated that a number of systems 
tested should be fielded and other systems that should continue 

Several issues will need to be resolved as the Army implements its 
network strategy. For example, 

* The Army has not yet announced requirements nor has it established 
cost and schedule projections for development and fielding of its 
network. Since the Future Combat System termination, the Army does not 
have a blueprint or framework to determine how the various capabilities 
it already has will fit together with capabilities it is acquiring to 
meet the needs of the soldier. Even with an incremental approach, it is 
important for the Army to clearly articulate the capabilities the 
system is attempting to deliver. Without this knowledge, the Army runs 
the risk of acquiring technologies that may work in a stand-alone mode 
but do not add utility to the broader network strategy. 

* The network integration evaluation provided an extensive amount of 
data and knowledge on the current Army network and candidate systems 
for the network. However, since the network integration evaluation 
serves as an evaluation instrument, it is important to have test 
protocols that capture objective measures and data on the network's 
performance. Two independent Army test oversight agencies, reflecting 
on the evaluation results, expressed concern over not having proper 
instrumentation for the overall evaluations; in particular, not having 
the necessary instrumentation to conduct operational tests on large 
integrated networks and not having clear network requirements. 

* Army officials are developing a strategy to identify, demonstrate, 
and field emerging technologies in an expedited fashion. To date, the 
Army has developed an approach to solicit ideas from industry and 
demonstrate the proposed technologies in the network integration 
evaluation. However, the Army is still formulating its proposed 
approach for funding and rapidly procuring the more promising 

* Development of the Joint Tactical Radio System ground mobile radio, a 
software-defined radio that was expected to be a key component of the 
network has recently been terminated. In a letter to a congressional 
defense committee explaining the termination, the acting USD/ATL stated 
that the termination was based on growth in unit procurement costs. He 
added that it is unlikely that Joint Tactical Radio System ground 
mobile radio would affordably meet requirements and may not meet some 
requirements at all. The radio performed poorly during the network 
integration evaluation and was given a "stop development and do not 
field" assessment by the test unit. Based on the assessment that a 
competitive market had emerged with the potential to deliver alternate 
radios to meet the capability at a reduced cost, the acting USD/ATL 
also established a new program for an affordable; low-cost; reduced 
size, weight, and power radio product. At this point, it is not yet 
clear when and how that program will proceed or how these new radios 
will be able to fit within the Army's network strategy. 

* The Army plans for the future tactical network to feature the use of 
the wideband networking and soldier radio waveforms and, in our March 
2011 testimony,[Footnote 9] we reported that the Army has had trouble 
maturing these waveforms for several years and they are still not at 
acceptable levels of maturity.[Footnote 10] Although both waveforms 
experienced limited successes during the recent network integration 
evaluation testing, Army officials indicate that the wideband 
networking waveform continues to be very complex, and not fully 
understood, and there may be substantial risk maturing it to its full 
capability requirement. With the termination of the ground mobile 
radio, it is unclear how waveform maturation will continue. 

* Although the network integration kit--expected to be a fundamental 
part of the Army's information network--was found to have marginal 
performance, poor reliability, and limited utility, the USD/ATL 
approved procurement of one additional brigade set of network 
integration kits. The decision made potential fielding of the kits--
radios, waveforms, integrated computer system, and software--contingent 
on user testing that successfully demonstrates that it can improve 
current force capabilities. The network integration kit again performed 
poorly during the recent network integration evaluation and received a 
"stop development and do not field" assessment. Army network officials 
have indicated that a senior Army leadership memorandum will be 
forthcoming that will cancel further network integration kit 
development and fielding. Earlier, the Army concluded that the network 
integration kit was not a long-term, viable, and affordable solution. 

Services to Rely on Industry to Provide Potential Solutions for 
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Needs: 

To reduce risk in the JLTV program, the Army and Marine Corps entered a 
technology development phase with multiple vendors to help increase 
their knowledge of the needed technologies, determine the technologies' 
maturity level, and determine which combination of requirements were 
achievable. The contractors delivered prototype vehicles in May 2010 
and testing to evaluate the technical risks in meeting the proposed 
requirements, among other things, was completed on the vehicles in June 
2011. Because of the knowledge gained through the technology 
development phase, the services have worked together to identify trades 
in requirements to reduce weight and to drive down the cost of the 
vehicle. A different outcome may have resulted if the services had 
proceeded directly to the engineering and manufacturing development 
phase, as had been considered earlier. 

Based on the technology development results, the services concluded 
that the original JLTV requirements were not achievable and its cost 
would be too high. For example, the services found that JLTV could not 
achieve both protection levels and transportability, with weight being 
the issue. As a result, the services have adjusted the JLTV 
transportability requirement to a more achievable level and the Army 
and Marine Corps have decided that they would rely on HMWWVs for other 
missions initially intended for JLTV. In fact, the Army has chosen to 
proceed with even higher protection levels than planned earlier for 
JLTV. The Army now plans to have protection levels equal to the M-ATV, 
including underbody protection, while the Marine Corps will continue 
with the original protection level, similar to the MRAP family of 
vehicles except for the underbody protection, but plans to conduct more 
off-road operations to avoid mines and roadside bombs. As for armor 
protection, the services have found that development of lightweight, 
yet robust armor has not proceeded as rapidly as hoped and production 
costs for these new technologies are significantly higher than for 
traditional armor. 

The services have established an average procurement cost target of 
$350,000.[Footnote 11] A key component of the average procurement cost 
is the average manufacturing unit cost which includes the cost of 
labor, materials, and overhead to produce and assemble the product. 
Achieving the average procurement cost target of $350,000 would require 
an average manufacturing unit cost of $250,000 to $275,000. While one 
recent technology development projection of a fully armored JLTV 
average procurement cost exceeded $600,000, the program office now 
estimates that, by implementing requirements trades and the cost 
savings from those trades, industry can meet the average manufacturing 
unit cost and average procurement cost targets. Nevertheless, meeting 
the JLTV cost targets will be a challenge and will also likely depend 
on what type of contract the services award. The services' current JTLV 
plan is to award a multiyear procurement contract with sizable annual 
quantities, once a stable design is achieved. 

Originally, the services planned to follow a traditional acquisition 
approach for JLTV and enter the engineering and manufacturing 
development phase in January 2012. According to the Army program 
manager for light tactical vehicles, the services now plan to use a 
modified MRAP acquisition model in which industry would be asked to 
build a set of vehicles that would subsequently be extensively tested 
prior to a production decision. The Army has stated that industry had 
demonstrated several competitive prototypes whose performance and cost 
has been verified and believes that industry can respond with testable 
prototypes within about 1 year. Many details of the new strategy have 
yet to be worked out but a milestone B review is anticipated in April 
2012. While this approach is seen as saving time and money, it will 
forgo the detailed design maturation and development testing process 
typically done early in the engineering and manufacturing development 
phase. A key risk is the potential for discovering late that the 
vehicles are still not mature. 

HMWWV Recapitalization Effort: 

Both the Army and the Marine Corps have articulated a significant role 
for the Up-Armored HMMWV in combat, combat support, and combat service 
support roles beyond fiscal year 2025 but their fleets are experiencing 
reduced automotive performance, loss of transportability, higher 
operation and sustainment costs, and the need for better protection as 
the threats have evolved. The Army plans to recapitalize a portion of 
its Up-Armored HMMWV fleets by establishing requirements, seeking 
solutions from industry through full and open competition, and testing 
multiple prototype vehicles before awarding a single production 
contract. The Army's emerging effort--the Modernized Expanded Capacity 
Vehicle program--aims to modernize vehicles to increase automotive 
performance, regain mobility, extend service life by 15 years, and 
improve blast protection. The initial increment of recapitalized 
vehicles for the Army is expected to be about 5,700, but depending on 
the availability of funds, the quantity for the Army could increase. 
The Army plans a two-phased acquisition strategy for recapitalizing the 
Up-Armored HMMWV that includes awarding contracts to up to three 
vendors for prototype vehicles for testing and a production contract to 
a single vendor. The production decision is scheduled for late fiscal 
year 2013. The Army is anticipating a manufacturing cost of $180,000 
per vehicle, not including armor, based on the cost performance of 
similar work on other tactical platforms managed by the Army. 

According to the Marine Corps developers, the Marine Corps has 
concluded a recapitalized HMMWV will not meet requirements for is fleet 
of 5,000 light combat vehicles. However, it will conduct research to 
find the most effective way to sustain the balance of the fleet--about 
14,000 vehicles--until 2030. The Marine Corps plans to leverage 
components and subsystems from the Army-sponsored HMMWV 
recapitalization program. Detailed information on this effort is not 
currently available. Marine Corps and Army officials have said they 
intend to cooperate on the recapitalization effort and are sharing 
information on their individual plans to help maximize value for the 
available funding. 

As the services proceed to implement their new JLTV and HMMWV 
strategies, they have identified a point in fiscal year 2015 (see fig. 
2) where a decision will be made on whether to pursue JLTV only or both 
programs. By then, the technology and cost risks of both efforts should 
be better understood. 

Figure 2: JLTV and HMMWV Competitive Recapitalization Schedules: 

[Refer to PDF for image: timeline] 

Proposed JLTV: 

FY 2012; 
Request for Proposals. 

FY 2012-2013; 
Milestone B. 

Within FY 2013-2015; 
Gov't performance test report. 

Within FY 2015-2018; 
Initial production. 

Within FY 2015-2016; 
Milestone C. 

FY 2015; 
Decide JLTV only or both programs. 

HMMWV Competitive Recapitalization: 

Within FY 2012-FY 2013; 
Pre-milestone C evaluation. 

Within 2013; 
Milestone C (Yes/No HMMWV competitive recapitalization decision). 

End of FY 2013; 
Initial production. 

FY 2016; 
Full rate production decision. 

Source: GAO analysis of program office information. 

[End of figure] 

Concluding Remarks: 

The Army continues to struggle to define and implement a variety of 
modernization initiatives since the Future Combat System program was 
terminated in 2009. The most recent example of this is the termination 
of the ground mobile radio, which will require the Army to develop new 
plans for relaying information to the soldier. The pending reductions 
in the defense budgets are having a significant impact on Army 
acquisition programs and the Army is already reprioritizing its combat 
vehicle investments. As plans for GCV move forward, it will be 
important for DOD, the Army, and the Congress to focus attention on 
what GCV will deliver and at what cost and how that compares to other 
needs within the combat vehicle portfolio. Beyond combat vehicles, DOD 
and the services will also be facing some tough decisions in the future 
on the tactical wheeled vehicle programs and the affordability of both 
the JLTV and the HMWWV recapitalization effort. 

Over the last few years, the Army has been conducting capability 
portfolio reviews which have proven to be very helpful in identifying 
overlaps and setting priorities. The reviews were highlighted in the 
Army Acquisition Review and have been important in getting the Army to 
think more broadly and to look beyond the individual program. On both 
JLTV and GCV, as the requirements have been examined more closely, the 
services are finding that they can make do with less in terms of 
capabilities than originally anticipated and projected unit costs have 
been reduced significantly. It is important that the Army continue to 
use and improve on its capability portfolio review processes going 
forward and to consider a broad range of alternatives. 

Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to 
answer any questions you may have at this time. 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For future questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 
512-4841 or Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this 
statement include William R. Graveline, Assistant Director; William C. 
Allbritton; Morgan DelaneyRamaker; Marcus C. Ferguson; Dayna Foster; 
Danny Owens; Sylvia Schatz; Robert S. Swierczek; Alyssa B. Weir; and 
Paul Williams. 

[End of section] 


[1] Milestone A is the point at which a program enters the technology 
development phase, milestone B is entry into the engineering and 
manufacturing development phase, and milestone C is entry into the 
production and deployment phase. 

[2] Major defense acquisition programs are those identified by DOD that 
require eventual total research, development, test, and evaluation 
expenditures, including all planned increments, of more than $365 
million, or procurement expenditures, including all planned increments, 
of more than $2.19 billion, in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. 

[3] The HMMWV has served as DOD's primary wheeled vehicle for shelter 
carriers, command and control systems, light cargo and troop carriers, 
weapons carriers, and ambulances for over 25 years. MRAPs were acquired 
to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and are designed to 
better mitigate the effects of improvised explosive devices, underbody 
mines, and small arms fire threats. 

[4] Office of the Secretary of the Army, Army Strong: Equipped, Trained 
and Ready, Final Report of the 2010 Army Acquisition Review 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2011). 

[5] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Key Questions Confront the Army's Ground 
Force Modernization Initiatives, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: March 9, 

[6] Capability portfolio reviews are the Army's process for identifying 
and eliminating redundant systems, and ensuring that funds are properly 
programmed, budgeted, and executed for surviving systems in order to 
yield the most value to the Army. 

[7] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Many Analyses of Alternatives Have Not 
Provided a Robust Assessment of Weapon System Options, [hyperlink,] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 

[8] [hyperlink,]. 

[9] [hyperlink,]. 

[10] A waveform is the representation of a signal that includes the 
frequency, modulation type, message format, and/or transmission system. 
The wideband networking and soldier radio waveforms provide key 
advanced networking capability. 

[11] The average procurement unit cost includes the average for such 
items as the costs of procuring technical data, training, support 
equipment, and initial spares. In addition, the cost of armor options 
would be an additional $60,000 per unit. 

[End of section] 

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