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GAO-12-152R: 

October 26, 2011: 

The Honorable Marlin A. Stutzman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Bruce L. Braley: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Economic Opportunity: 
Committee on Veterans' Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Bill Johnson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Joe Donnelly: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: 
Committee on Veterans' Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

Subject: Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: 
Additional Improvements to Fraud Prevention Controls Are Needed: 

This report formally transmits the briefing held with your staff on 
October 20, 2011 in response to a request from your subcommittees to 
evaluate the design of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) fraud 
prevention controls within the Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small 
Business (SDVOSB) verification program instituted in response to 
Public Law 111-275. (See enclosure for the briefing slides.) This work 
is part of our ongoing audit of the SDVOSB program governmentwide, 
which, in part, assesses the design of the three areas of a fraud 
prevention framework including preventive controls, detection and 
monitoring controls, and investigations and prosecutions. We will 
report the results of the larger audit at a later date. To conduct 
this work, we reviewed VA materials, including verification process 
guidelines, internal control policies, and Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) report, and interviewed VA officials. With the exception of 
undercover tests to assess initial screening controls of VA's 
verification process, we did not test the effectiveness of VA's fraud 
prevention controls or attempt to project the extent of fraud and 
abuse. 

In summary, VA's fraud prevention controls for the SDVOSB program have 
improved since Public Law 111-275 was enacted including steps taken 
since your July 28, 2011 hearing; however, further enhancements would 
help to reduce the program's vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. 
VA has made progress in implementing a valid verification program with 
preventive controls to deter ineligible firms from attempting to 
become verified. VA enhanced deterrents and developed controls to 
identify firms in its VetBiz database that did not meet SDVOSB 
eligibility requirements, resulting, according to VA, in over 1,800 
ineligible firms being denied SDVOSB verification. However, even with 
the control enhancements, program weaknesses and vulnerabilities 
remain. While improvements in preventive controls have been 
significant, progress has been limited in the areas of detection and 
monitoring and investigations and prosecutions. VA's monitoring and 
detection efforts, which now include status protests and announced 
site visits, lacked periodic compliance reviews and formal processes 
for unannounced site visits. Moreover, while VA established a 
debarment committee and is conducting ongoing investigations of 
suspicious firms, it does not yet have specific criteria in place to 
implement legislation requiring debarment actions for firms that 
misrepresent their SDVOSB eligibility. Thus there has been limited 
actual debarment action against firms found to have misrepresented 
their SDVOSB status. 

To address identified vulnerabilities, we recommend that VA take 13 
actions in the three areas of the fraud prevention framework-- 
preventive controls, detection and monitoring, and investigations and 
prosecutions--to provide reasonable assurance that the contracting 
opportunities meant for our nation's service-disabled veteran 
entrepreneurs make it to the intended beneficiaries. Our 
recommendations are on pages 26 to 28 of the enclosure. 

In commenting orally on a draft of this briefing provided to VA on 
October 13, 2011, VA's Executive Director of Small and Veteran 
Business Programs generally concurred with our recommendations. The 
Executive Director noted a number of significant additional actions 
planned and taken since the time of our site visits and in response to 
our ongoing discussions of our findings during the course of our work 
which, according to VA, address many of the identified 
vulnerabilities. For example, VA stated that it had formalized many 
processes related to referral of cases to OIG and debarment officials, 
and formalized processes for unannounced site visits to high-risk 
firms. VA also outlined actions that if substantiated by GAO, should 
address many of our recommendations. As part of our ongoing work, we 
will attempt to validate actions taken by VA to improve the design of 
its controls. A summary of VA's oral comments are included on pages 29 
to 33 of the enclosure. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this 
briefing until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will 
send copies to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, appropriate 
congressional committees, and other interested parties. In addition, 
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. 

Gregory D. Kutz: 
Director: 
Forensic Audits and Investigative Service: 

Enclosure: 

[End of section] 

Briefing for the Subcommittees on Economic Opportunity and Oversight 
and Investigations, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, House of 
Representatives: 

Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: Additional 
Improvements to Fraud Prevention Controls Are Needed: 

October 20, 2011: 

Contents: 

* Introduction: 
* Objective: 
* Scope and Methodology: 
* Background: GAO's Fraud Prevention Framework: 
* Summary: Program Improvements and Vulnerabilities: 
* Conclusions: 
* Recommendations for Executive Action: 
* Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 
* Related GAO Products: 

Introduction:  

The SDVOSB Program:  

* Provides federal contracting opportunities for qualified firms. 

* Awarded $10.8 billion in federal contracts governmentwide in fiscal 
year 2010, according to the Small Business Administration (SBA). 

* Awarded $3.2 billion in Veterans Affairs (VA) contracts in fiscal year
 2010. 
 
* Includes more than15,000 self-certified Service-Disabled Veteran-
Owned Small Businesses (SDVOSB) in Central Contractor Registration 
(CCR). 

* Includes more than 5,000 verified firms in VA's VetBiz Vendor 
Information Pages as of October 2011 

2006 Legislation: 

* The Veterans Benefits, Heath Care, and Information Technology Act of 
2006 (P.L. 109-461) required VA to:  

- Maintain a database of SDVOSBs and Veteran-Owned Small Businesses 
(VOSB); 

- Use SDVOSB and VOSB set-aside and sole-source award authority only 
for SDVOSB and VOSB firms listed in the database; 

- Debar for a reasonable period of time, as determined by VA, firms 
that misrepresent SDVOSB and VOSB status. 

Prior GAO Work[A]: 

* Ineligible firms received about $100 million in SDVOSB contracts 
because of a lack of effective fraud prevention program (October 
2009 - May 2010): 
- Other than for VA's, no governmentwide controls to validate a firm's 
eligibility; 
- No validation of self-certified information; 
- The absence of continued monitoring of firm eligibility; 
- Ineffective process of investigations and prosecutions; 

* VA made limited progress enacting an effective verification program 
(May 2010): 
- In fiscal year 2009, according to VA, 25 percent of the contracts VA 
awarded using veteran preference authorities went to verified 
businesses; 
- As of May 2010, VA had verified about 2,900 businesses--14 percent 
of businesses in its mandated database of VOSBs and SDVOSBs; 
- Weaknesses in VA's verification program included files missing 
required information, files missing explanations of how staff 
determined that control and ownership requirements had been met, and 
no guidance for referring cases of misrepresentation for investigation 
and enforcement actions. 

[A] See Related GAO products at the end of this briefing. 

VA Office of Inspector General Report[B]: 

* Evaluated VA's oversight of VOSB and SDVOSB programs under 
verification processes required by P.L. 109-461; 

* Found that VA awarded ineligible firms at least 1,400 contracts 
worth $500 million a year; 

* Projected that VA will award $2.5 billion to ineligible firms from 
2011 through 2015 without strengthening oversight and verification; 

* Recommended comprehensive program controls to help VA effectively 
administer the programs and meet federal and VA regulations. 

[B] VA Office of Inspector General, Office of Audits and Evaluations, 
Department of Veteran Affairs: Audit of Veteran-Owned and Service-
Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Programs, Office of Audits and 
Evaluations, 10-02436-234 (July 25, 2011). 

Recent Legislation: 

* The Veterans Small Business Verification Act (section 104 of P.L. 
111-275) required VA to: 
- Verify firm eligibility; 
- Request additional documentation substantiating veteran ownership 
and control of a firm. 

* The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-240) facilitates 
prosecution of firms that willfully seek and receive small business 
awards through misrepresentation of their status, including SDVOSBs. 

[End of Introduction] 

Objective:  

GAO was asked to evaluate the design of VA's fraud prevention controls 
within the SDVSOB verification program, including recent VetBiz 
verification efforts, instituted in response to P.L. 111-275 

Scope and Methodology: 

* Reviewed applicable materials: 

- GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
 Government, [hyperlink, 
 http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.: 
November 1999); 
 
- GAO, Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: Fraud
 Prevention Controls Needed to Improve Program Integrity, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-740T]
 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2010); 
 
- Information provided by VA in response to recommendations in GAO, 
Department of Veterans Affairs: Agency Has Exceeded Contracting Goals 
for Veteran-Owned Small Businesses, but It Faces Challenges with Its 
Verification Program, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-458] (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 
2010); 

* Reviewed VA's Verification Process Guidelines; 

* Interviewed VA officials in July 2011 and reviewed related documents; 

* Reviewed selected VA internal control policies; 

* Reviewed recent VA Inspector General (01G) report; 

* Conducted undercover tests to assess initial screening controls of 
an individual's service-disabled veteran status within VA's 
verification process. 

* Our assessment is part of an ongoing review of fraud prevention 
controls for the entire SDVOSB program. This briefing focuses on the 
design of VA's SDVOSB verification controls within its Center for 
Veterans Enterprise (CVE) office. With the exception of undercover 
tests to assess initial screening controls, we did not test the 
effectiveness of VA's fraud prevention controls or attempt to project 
the extent of fraud and abuse. 

* We conducted this performance audit from July 2011 to October 2011 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Background: GAO's Fraud Prevention Framework: 

Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Lessons learned influence future use of preventive controls: 

Potential fraud, waste, and abuse: 
Preventive controls applied; 

Potential fraud, waste, and abuse (smaller amount): 
Detection and monitoring; 

Potential fraud (smaller amount): 
Investigation and prosecutions. 

[End of figure] 

The fraud prevention framework provides an overview of how preventive
controls would help screen out ineligible firms, and how monitoring 
controls and prosecutions can help further minimize the extent to 
which a program is vulnerable to fraud as described in previous GAO 
work, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-740T]. 

Summary: Program Improvements and Vulnerabilities:  

* VA's fraud prevention controls for the SDVOSB program have improved 
since P.L. 111-275 was enacted, but further enhancements could do more 
to reduce the program's vulnerability in three areas: 
- Preventive controls; 
- Detection and monitoring; 
- Investigation and prosecution. 

We are making recommendations to improve fraud prevention controls in 
the areas of prevention, detection and monitoring, and investigations. 

In response to our findings and recommendations, VA generally 
concurred with our recommendations. In addition, VA outlined actions 
recently taken and planned in the future that, if substantiated, 
should address many of our identified vulnerabilities and related 
recommendations for improvement. 

Preventive Controls: Criteria: 
 
Preventive controls are a key element of GAO's fraud prevention 
framework and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. 

These controls limit unauthorized access to program resources through 
front-end controls to prevent ineligible firms from being verified for 
program participation. Such controls include the following: 

* Competent personnel assigned to eligibility reviews; 

* Training on fraud awareness and prevention; 

* Verification of self reported information; 

* Coordination between agencies with key pieces of information. 

Once contracts are awarded to ineligible contractors, recovery is 
uncertain and eligible firms lose the opportunity to receive the 
contract. 

Preventive Controls: Deterrents Enhanced: 

VA enhanced deterrents to ineligible firms becoming verified through 
VetBiz after P.L. 111-275:  

* Established verification guidelines; 

* Hired more CVE staff to conduct initial file reviews and site visits; 

* Created a quality control team to inspect a subset of initial file 
examination decisions; 

* Developed a risk assessment model for examining applications; 

* Updated data systems to reduce manual data entries; 

* Verified service-disabled veteran status in VA's systems: 
- Allowed VA to prevent two fictitious ineligible SDVOSB applications 
submitted by GAO from being verified; 

* Conducted announced site visits at high-risk firms before approval; 

* Searched exact names for company and principal owners in the Excluded
Parties List System (EPLS); 

* According to VA, denied over 1,800 firms under new verification 
guidelines. 

Preventive Controls: Vulnerabilities Remain: 

Even with enhancements, program weakness and vulnerabilities remain:  

* No evaluation of CVE staff experience to assess whether appropriate 
personnel are available to perform application reviews; 

* No fraud awareness training for CVE staff and VA contracting 
officials; 

* No VetBiz training for VA contracting officials to provide 
reasonable assurance that SDVOSB contracts are awarded only to 
verified firms; 

* No checks for minority partners in EPLS searches; 

* No procedures for reusing information on SDVOSB firms and related 
parties that had applied for VetBiz verification but failed to pass 
the verification process to prevent individuals and fraudulent 
companies from repeated attempts at breaching VA controls; 

* No formalized process for selecting high-risk companies for 
unannounced site visits; 

* No mechanism for validating information with Internal Revenue
 Service (IRS) records to assess integrity of self-reported 
information; 
 
* No formal procedures and criteria for referring cases to VA OIG for 
further investigation, including those of applicants who appear to be 
acting fraudulently, withdraw their application after being informed 
of site visits or further scrutiny, or misrepresent their SDVOSB 
status; 

* No sharing or publishing status protest decisions; 

* No request for denied companies to reassess their self-certified
 SDVOSB status in CCR; 
 
* No formalized procedures for considering prior SBA status protest 
decisions when evaluating SDVOSB applications. 

Detection and Monitoring: Criteria: 

Detection and monitoring activities are discussed in GAO's Standards 
for Internal Control in the Federal Government. 

These activities must involve active and continual monitoring to 
encourage continued compliance with program guidelines and continued 
firm eligibility. 

Methods of fraud and abuse identified during monitoring can be used to 
prevent future fraud and abuse. 

Specific detection and monitoring guidelines for the SDVOSB program 
include: 

* Periodic reviews of SDVOSB firm program eligibility; 

* Data mining of contracts to determine compliance with North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) size standards; 

* Data mining of contract awards to identify suspicious contract 
awards compared to firms' types of business; 

* Unannounced site visits to contract performance locations and 
discussions with VA contracting officials. 

Detection and Monitoring: Controls Enhanced: 
 
VA developed some controls that may help identify firms in the VetBiz-
verified database that do not meet SDVOSB eligibility requirements: 

* Reverification initiative designed to review previously verified 
SDVOSB firms under new P.L. 111-275 controls; 

* Protest process allows interested parties to protest firm status; 

* Random announced site visits of verified SDVOSB firms are conducted. 

Detection and Monitoring: Vulnerabilities Remain: 

Even with enhanced controls, certain weaknesses and vulnerabilities 
remain because of VA's focus on initial eligibility verification: 

* No periodic reviews of monitoring firm's compliance with NAICS size 
standards; 

* No contact with contracting officials to determine whether required 
percentage of work on SDVOSB contracts was performed; 

* No systematic data mining of existing contract awards for review and 
possible further inspection; 

* No formalized process for selecting companies for unannounced site 
visits to contract performance locations and interviews with 
contracting officials; 

* No formalized process for selecting verified companies for 
unannounced site visits to determine if the verification process is 
effective. 

Investigations and Prosecutions: Criteria: 

Investigations and prosecutions are the final elements of a 
comprehensive fraud prevention framework. 

Those elements use the lessons learned from investigations and 
prosecutions to strengthen controls earlier in the process and improve 
the overall fraud prevention framework. 

The Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 
2006 requires that any business determined to have misrepresented its 
status as an SDVOSB shall be debarred from contracting for a 
reasonable period of time. 

The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 facilitates prosecution of 
companies that willfully seek and receive small business awards 
through misrepresentation of their status, including SDVOSBs. 

GAO's fraud prevention framework and Standards for Internal Controls 
in the Federal Government encourage agencies to respond to identified 
abuse by: 

* Referring serious matters to appropriate officials; 

* Maximizing the deterrent value of successful prosecutions and 
debarments. 

Investigations and Prosecutions: Debarments and Investigations 
Initiated:  

Some actions have been taken to debar firms violating SDVOSB program 
requirements, which should protect the government's interest and help 
discourage ineligible firms from abusing the SDVOSB program. These 
include: 

* Institution of VA Debarment Committee in September 2010, established 
to debar firms violating SDVOSB regulations; 

* As of October 2011, one debarment of a firm and related individuals 
that have misrepresented their status as an SDVSOB as required, for a 
reasonable period of time, by P.L. 109-461; 

* Several other debarment actions pending or currently being litigated; 

* Approximately 70 referrals by CVE officials to VA OIG of potentially 
fraudulent actions taken by firms receiving SDVOSB contracts; 

* Ongoing investigations of suspicious SDVOSB firms. 

Investigations and Prosecutions: Vulnerabilities Remain: 

Even with enhanced actions to debar ineligible firms, certain 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities identified in the investigation and 
prosecution controls include: 

* Minimal actual debarment of firms and related individuals for 
misrepresentation of eligibility; 

* No specific criteria or guidelines documenting how VA is 
implementing debarments for a reasonable period of time for 
misrepresentations as required by P.L. 109-461; 

* No specific procedures for referring companies to the Debarment 
Committee and VA OIG from CVE; 

* No specific procedures outlining the Debarment Committee's decision 
process; 

* No policies for terminating contracts with ineligible firms 
(decisions are made on case-by-case basis); 

* No advertising of suspensions, debarments, or prosecutions of firms 
misrepresenting themselves as SDVOSBs to deter future fraud. 

Conclusions: 

VA has made progress in implementing a valid verification program to 
deter ineligible firms from attempting to become verified and 
receiving SDVSOB contracts rather than eligible firms. 

However, additional opportunities exist to make improvements, 
particularly in monitoring, detection, investigations and prosecutions. 

VA does not have a process in place to implement specific legislation 
requiring debarment actions for firms that misrepresent their 
eligibility for the SDVOSB program, and VA has had limited success to 
date in pursuing debarment actions against firms found to have 
misrepresented their eligibility for the program. 

With a comprehensive framework in place, VA can be more confident that 
the billions of dollars meant to provide VA contracting opportunities 
to our nation's service-disabled veteran entrepreneurs make it to the 
intended beneficiaries. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To minimize the risk of fraud and abuse within VA's SDVOSB program, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs take the following 13 
actions in three areas: 

* Improve VA's preventive controls to provide reasonable assurance 
that only eligible firms gain access to the VetBiz database. For 
Example: 
- Provide regular fraud awareness training to CVE and VA contracting 
personnel; 
- Provide additional guidance and training to the VA contracting 
personnel on the use of the VetBiz website so that SDVOSB contracts 
are only awarded to verified firms; 
- Establish formal procedures for VA staff to refer suspicious 
applications to the OIG and provide guidance on what type of cases to 
refer to the OIG; 
- Explore the feasibility of validating applicants' information with 
third parties, for example, requesting consent from SDVOSB applicants 
to validate tax information with the IRS to assess the accuracy of the 
information provided; 
- Formalize a process for conducting unannounced site visits to firms 
identified as high risk during the verification process. 

* Strengthen VA's detection and monitoring controls on verified SDVOSB 
firms. For Example: 
- Develop and implement procedures for conducting unannounced site 
visits to contract performance locations and interviews with 
contracting officials to better assess whether verified companies 
comply with program rules after verification; 
- Develop and implement a process for unannounced site visits to 
verified companies' offices to obtain greater effectiveness and 
consistency in the verification program; 
- Develop procedures for risk-based periodic reviews of verified firms 
receiving contracts to assess compliance with NAICS size standards and 
SDVOSB program rules. 

* Strengthen VA's investigative and prosecutorial actions for firms 
violating SDVOSB program laws and regulations. For Example: 
- Develop and implement specific processes and criteria for the 
Debarment Committee on compliance with the requirement in P.L. 109461 
to debar, for a reasonable period of time, firms and related parties 
that misrepresent their SDVOSB status; 
- Develop and implement specific procedures and criteria for staff to 
make referrals to VA's Debarment Committee and VA's OIG as a result of 
misrepresentations identified during initial verification and periodic 
reviews; 
- Develop specific guidelines outlining the Debarment Committee's 
decision process to debar firms that misrepresent their SDVOSB status; 
- Develop procedures on removing SDVOSB contracts from ineligible 
firms; 
- Formalize procedures to advertise debarments and prosecutions. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We requested comments on a draft of this product from the Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs. On October 13, 2011, VA's Executive Director of 
Small and Veteran Business Programs provided us with comments. 

VA generally concurred with our recommendations and noted a number of 
significant actions planned and/or taken since the time of our site 
visits and development of our findings which, according to VA, address 
many of the identified vulnerabilities. 

As part of this review, we have not substantiated actions reported by 
VA, but we plan to review the status of each reported action as part 
of our ongoing work. 

According to VA officials, VA has recently made improvements of VA's 
preventive controls. For Example: 

* Certified Fraud Examiner training is now required of CVE staff and 
most contractors assisting with application evaluation. Additionally, 
approximately 500 contracting officials have received VetBiz training; 

* VA established formal procedures to refer to the VA OIG SDVOSB 
applicants that provide a false statement or withheld material 
information; 

* VA established a process for checking minority owner information in 
EPLS; 

* VA established protocol for high risk applicants to automatically 
receive an unannounced site visit. 

According to VA officials, VA has recently strengthened the agency's 
monitoring and detection of verified SDVOSB firms. For Example: 

* Announced site visits by VA officials assisted by contractors to 
determine percentage of work completed on SDVOSB contracts; 

* Unannounced visits to verified companies either randomly, or during 
the course of a high risk SDVOSB's reverification assessment; 

* Evaluation of firms applying for VetBiz verification for compliance 
of NAICS codes, and consideration of NAICS size standards for 
contracts by VA contracting officials. 

According to VA officials, VA recently strengthened the investigative 
and prosecutorial actions for firms violating SDVOSB program laws and 
regulations. For example: 

* Created guidelines for CVE staff to refer firms misrepresenting 
their status to the Debarment Committee and VA 01G. Instructions for 
referrals made from outside CVE made public on Debarment Committee's 
website; 

* Formalized Debarment Committee's processes, criteria, and decision 
process and made information publicly available; 

* Published firm and associate names proposed for debarment or 
currently debarred on the Debarment Committee's website and released 
information to the acquisition community. 

VA officials stated that progress is being made regarding 
investigations and prosecutions, however:  

* Resource constraints on the Debarment Committee limit the number of 
actions that may be taken due to the timeliness of the due process 
considerations; 

* The Debarment Committee has been established for only 13 months and 
the due process considerations take considerable time; 

* VA focuses investigative and debarment activities on willfully 
misrepresenting firms. 

Appendix: Related GAO Products: 

Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: Preliminary 
Information on Actions Taken by Agencies to Address Fraud and Abuse 
and Remaining Vulnerabilities. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-589T]. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 
2011. 

Department of Veterans Affairs: Agency Has Exceeded Contracting Goals 
for Veteran-Owned Small Businesses, but It Faces Challenges with Its 
Verification Program. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-458]. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 
2010. 

Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: Fraud 
Prevention Controls Needed to Improve Program Integrity. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-740T]. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 
2010. 

Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: Case Studies 
Show Fraud and Abuse Allowed Ineligible Firms to Obtain Millions of 
Dollars in Contracts. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-306T]. Washington, D.C.: December 
16, 2009. 

Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: Case Studies 
Show Fraud and Abuse Allowed Ineligible Firms to Obtain Millions of 
Dollars in Contracts. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-255T]. Washington, D.C.: November 
19, 2009. 

Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: Case Studies 
Show Fraud and Abuse Allowed Ineligible Firms to Obtain Millions of 
Dollars in Contracts. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GA0-10-108]. Washington, D.C.: October 23, 
2009. 

[End of briefing slides] 

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