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Comptroller General
of the United States
Washington, D.C. 20548

Decision

Matter of: Inner Harbor West Joint Venture
File: B-249945.3
Date: March 11, 1993

Mary Beth Bosco, Esq., and James L. Lester, Esq., Patton, Boggs & Blow, for the protester.
John R. Tolle, Esq., Barton, Mountain & Tolle, and Alex D. Tomaszczuk, Esq., and Devon E. Hewitt, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge for Boston/Knott Limited Partnership, an interested party.
Amy J. Brown, Esq., General Services Administration, for the agency.
Richard P. Burkard, Esq., and John Brosnan, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1. Protest that agency should have evaluated alleged "operating cost advantages" of selecting protester's building as opposed to awardee's building is denied where solicitation did not state that the agency intended to conduct such an evaluation.
2. Protester's allegation that contracting agency improperly evaluated both its own and awardee's technical proposals under solicitation which sought offers for the design and construction of building is denied where record shows that the agency reasonably evaluated the proposals under each of the solicitation evaluation criteria.
3. Agency reasonably found that awardee's proposal offered the required office space based upon an "errata sheet" submitted with its drawings which specifically stated that the areas on the drawings were, in some cases, incorrect, and which listed the correct dimensions showing that the proposed facility would comply with the office space requirement.

DECISION

Inner Harbor West Joint Venture protests the award of a contract to Boston/Knott Limited Partnership under solicitation for offers (SFO) No. SMD 90169, issued by the General Services Administration (GSA) for the design and construction of a building to house the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). Inner Harbor asserts that GSA failed to properly consider certain cost advantages associated with its building and challenges various aspects of the agency's evaluation of both its own and Boston's proposals. The protester also argues that the building proposed by Boston did not comply with the SFO's minimum office space requirement.

We deny the protest.

BACKGROUND

The SFO, which was issued on June 21, 1991, contemplated the design and construction of a minimum of 664,100 net usable square feet (NUSF) of space to serve as a consolidated national headquarters for HCFA. In addition to 433,646 NUSF of office space, the building was to include "support facilities" such as a childcare facility, fitness center, cafeteria, automated data processing (ADP) facility, and hearing rooms. The SFO also requested prices for elevator maintenance and minor mechanical maintenance for a 3-year period.

The SFO designated two separate acceptable locations for the building: one in downtown Baltimore, Maryland, and the other in Baltimore County, Maryland. Inner Harbor proposed a high-rise building in downtown Baltimore, while the awardee offered a multi-wing facility in Baltimore County.

Award was to be made to the "offeror whose offer will be most advantageous to the Government, price and other evaluation factors listed . . . combined." The SFO stated that price is equally important as the combination of the technical factors. Price was to be evaluated based on the total purchase price, which included land cost, site development, excavation, general construction, financing cost, and design/developer fee, as well as the requested elevator and mechanical maintenance prices. The SFO stated that "the purchase price would be evaluated based on the actual Price Proposal and will not be discounted."

Concerning the evaluation of technical proposals, the SFO provided that the following four factors would be considered, listed in descending order of importance:
(1) Building Quality; (2) Employee Transportation/Public

Accessibility; (3) Offeror's Qualifications; and (4) National Headquarters Identity. Each of the factors was divided further into subfactors. For example, the Building Quality factor contained the following six subfactors: (1) architectural features: use of materials, blocking/modulation, design of entrances, and facility orientation; (2) design of HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning), lighting, building automation system, and security system; (3) functional adequacy/maintainability of: security control, system integration, space layout, circulation, HVAC/plumbing, vertical transportation, and power system; (4) energy efficient design; (5) life cycle costing; and (6) recycled materials.

The agency established a source selection evaluation board consisting of four members and a nonvoting chairperson to evaluate and point score the technical proposals and report to the contracting officer. These evaluators were assisted by nonvoting technical advisors, including two independent architectural and engineering firms and GSA technical advisors.

The agency received five proposals by the November 8 closing date. The evaluators identified and advised the contracting officer of the strengths, weaknesses, and deficiencies of the offers and scored the proposals under each of the four evaluation factors on a scale of 0-100. While the evaluators found flaws in Boston's proposal, they noted that if the flaws were corrected, "a viable proposal is envisioned" and awarded the proposal a technical score of 75.74. The evaluators awarded Inner Harbor's proposal the highest score of the five proposals, 83.10. Boston's price was \$114,626,878, while Inner Harbor's was \$130,292,000. The contracting officer determined that only these two firms submitted proposals that were in the competitive range.

The agency held face-to-face discussions with each offeror during which the contracting officer identified all of the strengths, weaknesses, and deficiencies noted by the evaluators. Following discussions, GSA requested that both firms submit best and final offers (BAFO), which were received on April 17, 1992.

The agency concluded that Boston's BAFO successfully addressed the most serious concerns identified by the evaluators in its initial proposal. For instance, the evaluators were initially concerned that the Baltimore County site proposed by Boston did not provide the National Headquarters image desired. In its BAFO, the agency found that Boston's "improvements made to the building elevations and to the site . . . with the use of landscaping, perimeter buffers and enhanced main entrance treatment," greatly improved this aspect of the proposal. The evaluators stated

that despite minor concerns, Boston submitted a "very responsive proposal which will provide a very workable solution." Based upon its BAFO, Boston's score was increased to 85.64.

With respect to Inner Harbor's BAFO, the evaluators noted that the National Headquarters identity and the qualifications of the offeror's team "remain the strongest aspects of this proposal." On the other hand, they found that "Blocking, circulation and design of entrances have all deteriorated in relation to the previous submission in an attempt to rectify previously cited weaknesses and deficiencies." The protester's BAFO received a slightly decreased score of 82.34.

Based on the BAFOs, the source selection authority concluded that "given the virtually equal technical score, Boston's proposal, which was approximately \$18 million less expensive, offered the best value to the government. Upon further review and before the award was made, however, the agency discovered that Boston's proposed facility would provide a total of approximately 645,000 NUSF instead of the required 664,100. The agency subsequently reopened negotiations with each firm and requested that each submit a second BAFO by July 10.

The evaluators found that despite significant improvements in parking assurances and HVAC design in the second BAFO submitted by Inner Harbor, there remained "serious problems with the blocking, modulation and circulation," which could "significantly impact agency functionality within the building." The BAFO received a technical score of 85.5. The protester's final price was \$138,892,000.

The evaluators found that Boston's second BAFO increased the total proposed square footage to meet the net usable space requirement, but they also noted that this "has resulted in a shortage of office space." The evaluators concluded, however, that the problems caused by the shortage were not "insurmountable." In addition, the evaluators stated that the "independence and capability of the HVAC systems" had improved. The BAFO received a final technical score of 86. Boston's final price was \$122,624,051.

The decision to award the contract to Boston was based on a document entitled "Determination of Greatest Value" dated July 31 and an addendum dated August 13. These documents were signed by the source selection chairperson, with concurrences by each of the evaluators, the contracting officer, and the source selection authority. According to these documents, the award decision was based on the following three considerations: (1) Boston's proposal was approximately \$16 million below Inner Harbor's;

(2) technical scoring was essentially equal; and (3) Inner Harbor's proposal had "serious problems" related to blocking, modulation, stacking, circulation and space planning. In addition, the document noted that Inner Harbor had two opportunities to resolve these issues as a result of "our reviews and negotiation sessions." Accordingly, GSA awarded the contract to Boston. Inner Harbor subsequently filed three protests against the award decision. We have consolidated the protests, and this decision addresses all of the issues raised.

OVERVIEW OF PROTEST

Inner Harbor challenges the selection of Boston because, in its view, the evaluations of both its and Boston's proposals were flawed. First, the protester argues that in making its selection, the agency improperly failed to consider the cost savings inherent in the nature of the high-rise structure which it proposed. Second, Inner Harbor complains that its proposal was improperly downgraded under the National Headquarters Identity factor based on the agency's speculation that the construction of a building on an undeveloped adjacent lot might block the view of the Baltimore Harbor from the proposed site. The protester also complains that GSA unreasonably raised the awardee's score under the same factor because of minor improvements in its BAFO and that the agency improperly considered the expansion capability of the awardee's building as a strength of the proposal also under that factor. Third, the protester states that its proposal was improperly downgraded because of the failure of its building to provide elevator access to the proposed childcare center and the failure of its drawings to depict a tie-in between the ADP cooling system and the main building cooling system.¹ Finally, Inner Harbor argues that GSA could not have properly accepted Boston's proposal because the firm's drawings did not show that it would provide the required 433,646 NUSF of office space.

DISCUSSION

The evaluation of proposals is primarily within the discretion of the procuring agency, not our Office; the agency is responsible for defining its needs and the best

¹In its initial protest, Inner Harbor also complained that the agency improperly downgraded its proposal based on alleged concerns about noise levels around the site. The agency rebutted this in its report. Since the protester has not responded to the report in this regard, we deem the issue abandoned. Information Ventures, Inc., B-247479, May 22, 1992, 92-1 CPD ¶ 467.

method of accommodating them, and it must bear the burden resulting from a defective evaluation. Consequently, we will not make an independent determination of the merits of offers; rather, we will examine the agency's evaluation to ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation factors. Buffalo Central Terminal, Ltd., B-241210, Jan. 29, 1991, 91-1 CPD ¶ 82. The fact that the protester disagrees with the agency's judgment does not render the evaluation unreasonable. Id.

Operating Cost Advantages

Inner Harbor argues that GSA improperly failed to evaluate alleged cost advantages associated with the operation of its proposed building. The protester points out that its price proposal contained a section detailing cost advantages to be realized over the long term, which "were occasioned by the difference between operating a high-rise urban building as opposed to" a multi-structure suburban campus. According to Inner Harbor's proposal, its comparison was based upon what it termed as "reasonable assumptions regarding the size and massing of likely suburban projects." The proposal further explained that the "assumptions" were based on "publicly" available information about the competing site being offered." The analysis compared maintenance and operation costs associated with landscaping, parking lots, HVAC, and roofing, as well as the costs of security, telephone service, and trash removal. The analysis estimated that over a 30-year period, the urban high-rise building site offers a net present value savings over the Baltimore County site of almost \$19 million. In addition, the price proposal estimated that the proposed HCFA-owned parking deck, which would be minimally used by HCFA on evenings and weekends, could serve as a commercial parking garage during such periods and could generate a direct net present value of approximately \$5.6 million over a 30-year period. Inner Harbor contends that, based on these analyses, the agency should have considered--either in the evaluation of technical or price proposals or in the final consideration of the technical and price factors in arriving at the award selection--the cost impact of these features of its site.

Inner Harbor argues that, to the extent these long-term cost advantages relate to the technical evaluation factors and subfactors, GSA should have considered them as part of its technical evaluation. Specifically, the protester contends that these cost advantages should have been evaluated under the Building Quality factor, which encompassed such subfactors as the functional adequacy and maintainability of various building features, energy efficiency, and life-cycle costing.

It appears from the record that the GSA evaluators did not specifically consider Inner Harbor's projected long-term cost advantages under Building Quality or any other technical evaluation factor. Nevertheless, the agency's evaluators did conclude that the efficiency of the protester's proposed high-rise structure and its building systems were strengths under each of the Building Quality subfactors mentioned above. Based upon the firm's technical proposal, the evaluators were impressed with the efficiency, both from an operation and maintenance standpoint, of its building and its HVAC and power systems. The protester, however, argues that the technical evaluators should have gone further and directly considered the protester's long-term assessment of the monetary savings associated with operating its building, especially in view of the fact that the SFO included a subfactor for life-cycle costing. We disagree.

In evaluating proposals, agencies may apply only those factors specified in the solicitation. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 15.608; Service Co. of Louis Rogers, Inc., B-248995.2, Nov. 16, 1992, 92-2 CPD ¶ 347. Thus, if a cost comparison analysis of the long-term operating and maintenance costs inherent in the type of structure and system offered were contemplated as part of the technical evaluation, the agency was required to notify offerors in the SFO. See Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., B-210092, Sept. 2, 1983, 83-2 CPD ¶ 295.

We do not think that the life-cycle costing subfactor contemplated the type of comparative evaluation of long-term "operating costs" now urged by Inner Harbor. The SFO explained that "A life-cycle cost analysis shall be given for each type of major system under consideration including, but not limited to HVAC and electrical systems." In response, both the protester's and the awardee's technical proposals included a section addressing life-cycle costing. In each proposal, the focus of this section was an analysis of alternate HVAC systems. For example, Inner Harbor's proposal stated that "Several HVAC system alternatives were studied for the proposed HCEFA headquarters," and it explained that "[t]he long-term costs associated with both heating and cooling were examined as part of the analysis that resulted in the decision to use steam for heating and ice thermal storage methodology for cooling." Thus, in our view, it was clear that under the life-cycle costing subfactor, GSA intended to assess, as part of Building Quality, the cost efficiency of the building systems, particularly the HVAC, and that both of the offerors had a similar understanding of the agency's intent.

The protester's long-term operating cost analysis, on the other hand, sought to compare building or site features proposed by Inner Harbor, most of which were unrelated to building systems, with hypothetical comparable features proposed by its "likely" competitor. We see nothing in the SFO which would reasonably lead offerors to believe that such a comparison and evaluation would be a basis for award. Indeed, the protester's proposal demonstrates that it understood that its long-term cost analysis would not be evaluated under the life-cycle costing subfactor. The proposal stated that "the SFO directs the offeror to consider life cycle costs to develop efficient solutions to the classical cost challenges. [Inner Harbor] has done so as discussed in [the technical proposal's response to] Evaluation Factor 1." The proposal then characterized the savings described in its long-term cost analysis as "another class of operating cost savings that GSA should consider in its evaluation of competing proposals for the HCEA building." (Emphasis added.)

Inner Harbor argues next that its long-term cost comparison should have been considered as part of GSA's price evaluation. We disagree. As stated above in connection with the technical evaluation, GSA was required to notify offerors in the SFO if it intended to evaluate long-term costs as part of its price analysis. While GSA could have chosen to include in the SFO, as part of its evaluation of price, a provision for evaluating potential parking revenue or the overall long-term operation and maintenance costs of the particular structures or building systems--as it did with elevator and minor mechanical maintenance--it did not do so. To the extent that the protester is arguing that the alleged savings should have reduced its purchase price, the SFO specifically stated that the purchase price would not be discounted.

Inner Harbor also argues that GSA should have considered its long-term cost analysis as part of the final selection decision. It asserts that under FAR § 15.605(c), the contracting officer is given the discretion to look beyond the prices proposed and to select the offeror whose proposal truly offers the greatest value to the government over

time.² We disagree with the protester's construction of this provision.

A procuring agency can consider only price and the technical evaluation factors stated in the solicitation in determining which offer is most advantageous to the government. Aero Realty Co., B-250985, Mar. 2, 1993, 93-1 CPD ¶ _____. While an agency may make a price/technical tradeoff under which cost savings are determined to offset technical advantages, it can only do so in a manner consistent with the evaluation scheme. See PharmChem Labs., Inc., B-244385, Oct. 8, 1991, 91-2 CPD ¶ 317. Since, as discussed above, the SFO did not provide for the evaluation of long-term operating costs or of projected income from unused parking facilities, the agency properly did not consider such matters in its selection decision.

Moreover, to consider Inner Harbor's unsolicited long-term cost analysis would provide the protester with an unfair advantage since Boston was not advised either in the SFO or during discussions that it should provide information concerning long-term operating and maintenance cost advantages of its headquarters configuration, and that such information would be a basis for selection.

Thus, we think that GSA acted properly in the context of the SFO in not considering in its evaluation of the technical and price proposals or in its final selection decision the projected long-term cost advantages set forth in Inner Harbor's price proposal.

TECHNICAL EVALUATIONS

Inner Harbor complains about the evaluation of both its proposal and that of Boston under the National Headquarters Identity factor. This factor contained the following three subfactors: (1) physical distance from other structures; (2) visual separateness and impact especially from most heavily traveled thoroughfare to gain access to site; and (3) compatibility with surrounding area uses within 300 feet. Inner Harbor complains that the evaluators commented that if a high-rise building were constructed on a

²FAR § 15.605(c) states that:

"While the lowest price or lowest total cost to the Government is properly the deciding factor in many source selections, in certain acquisitions the Government may select the source whose proposal offers the greatest value to the Government in terms of performance and other factors."

vacant lot adjacent to its proposed site, the new building would block the views from the site to the harbor and Downtown Baltimore and the views of the headquarters from both locations. The protester argues that the possibility of any construction on the lot is speculative and should not have formed the basis for reducing its score under the National Headquarters Identity factor.

We do not think it was unreasonable for the evaluators to be concerned about this possibility. Inner Harbor concedes that the evaluation under this factor could properly include consideration of how the headquarters building is viewed from its surroundings and its "visual separateness." In addition, the protester does not deny that construction of a building on the adjacent lot would adversely affect the visual impact and separateness of its proposed headquarters. The protester's argument instead is simply that the possibility of the construction of a building on the lot is too remote and speculative to be considered. The protester has not explained, nor do we see, why the agency could not reasonably conclude that the lot, which is located in the highly-commercial Inner Harbor area of downtown Baltimore, may well be developed in this manner. Indeed, the protester itself states that "Adjacent development is a fact of life downtown. . . ." Thus, we think that it was proper for GSA to consider the potential obstruction under this evaluation factor.

In any event, it is clear from the evaluation record that the evaluator's comment was insignificant in the context of the overall evaluation of Inner Harbor's proposal under the National Headquarters Identity factor and had little impact on its score, 9.6 out of 10. The fact is the evaluators were extremely impressed with both the views from Inner Harbor's proposed building and its visual impact.

Next, Inner Harbor argues that the GSA evaluators unreasonably increased the relatively low score initially assigned to Boston's proposal under the National Headquarters Identity factor. In this regard, the protester maintains that the "minor cosmetic changes" proposed by Boston could not alone have justified the drastic increase in the firm's BAFO score to 8.4, and the protester speculates that the larger portion of the increase must instead have been due to the agency's improper consideration of the expansion capability of Boston's facility.

The record supports the agency's position that the increase in Boston's score under this factor was attributable to the firm's proposed modifications to its facility which in the evaluators' view enhanced its visual impact. In their comments on Boston's initial proposal, the evaluators expressed the view that Boston's proposal was incompatible

with the surrounding area and that it possessed "minimal visual impact." The evaluators noted that the "massing and entrance give a high school image, not appropriate for a national headquarters identity" and concluded that "stronger development of the image in relation to the surrounding areas is needed." In response to discussions, Boston addressed the agency's concerns and extensively revised its design of the building to increase its visual impact.

The revisions were well received by the evaluators. Specifically, they noted that the "curved walls, central gatehouse and landscaping all work to create [a] formal entry," that the "entry court with formal circular entrance drive is visually impressive," and that "elevations and articulation are excellent." While Inner Harbor generally argues that these changes do not support the significant increase in Boston's score, we think the evaluators could reasonably view these changes to the proposed structure and their surroundings as having a rather dramatic impact on the image of Boston's proposed site and as justifying a higher rating.

In addition to arguing that the changes proposed by Boston do not justify its revised score, Inner Harbor argues that GSA improperly considered the potential of Boston's building for expansion as a basis for increasing its score under the National Headquarters Identity factor. In the alternative, the protester argues that if it was proper for the agency to consider expansion potential, it should not have been assessed as a strength of Boston's proposal because expansion capacity of the site proposed by the firm is limited by surrounding wetlands.

It is not clear that expansion potential was used to increase the awardee's score under this factor. Rather, the increase seems to have resulted from Boston's revisions to its proposal which are discussed above, and it is unclear what weight, if any, expansion capability was given. In any event, both Inner Harbor and Boston submitted plans for proposed expansions and the agency considered expansion potential a strength of each.³

³Inner Harbor asserts that the evaluators identified limited capability for expansion as a weakness of its proposal. In support of this assertion, the protester points to a statement made by one of the GSA advisors to the evaluation board. The final evaluators' consensus report sets forth specifically as a strength that Inner Harbor's "proposal includes expansion potential by adding floors to building or parking garage." Thus, we see no basis for the protester's contention.

Next, as to the impact of the surrounding wetlands on expansion, assuming that the evaluation of expansion capability had any meaningful role at all in the evaluations, the agency's conclusion concerning the awardee's building expansion capability was reasonable. While there is little discussion of expansion capability in the evaluation record, it appears that the protester's argument that the potential for expansion of Boston's facility is limited by its surrounding wetlands is based upon a comment by one of the evaluators made during the evaluation of the initial proposals that "expansion on this site is demonstrated as possible, but not practical. Wetlands cover almost all undeveloped portions of the site." The record shows, however, that the evaluators' final consensus comment, "Expansion potential good," was based on an expansion plan proposed by Boston which would stack an additional floor over the existing north and south wings of the awardee's facility. Since expansion in this manner would not impact the surrounding wetlands, it would not be either inconsistent or unreasonable for the evaluators to conclude that these plans represented a strength in Boston's proposal.⁴

In sum, we find the scores given to each proposal under the National Headquarters Identity factor to be reasonable.

Inner Harbor further challenges the evaluation of its proposal on various grounds. The protester argues that the agency improperly downgraded its proposal under the Building Quality factor for failure to provide direct elevator access to the proposed childcare facility since, according to the protester, there was no such requirement in the SFO. GSA explains that a handicapped accessible route to all the building's facilities was required by the SFO and that while Inner Harbor's initial proposal and its BAFO showed compliance with the requirement through the use of an elevator to access the childcare facilities, the second BAFO eliminated the elevator. As a result, the agency concluded that the protester's final offer, which would require the use of stairs in order to enter the childcare facility, failed to provide a handicapped accessible route as required by the SFO.

⁴The protester also maintains, based upon a statement by a GSA advisor to the evaluation board, that the agency improperly considered proximity to wetlands as an amenity to the awardee's property and therefore a strength of the proposal under the National Headquarters Identity factor. This was not, however, adopted by the evaluators as a strength of the proposal and thus had no impact on the selection.

In its comments, the protester does not rebut this but instead argues that the matter should have been raised by GSA during discussions. We disagree. Where deficiencies are introduced for the first time in a BAFO, the agency is not compelled to reopen discussions with the offeror, which would require both reopening with the other offerors as well and a new round of BAFOs. ABB Power Co. T&D, Inc., B-246249, Feb. 6, 1992, 92-1 CPD ¶ 157. Since the failure to provide the elevator first appeared in Inner Harbor's proposal in the second BAFO, the agency was not required to discuss the matter with the firm.⁵

The protester next argues that it was improper for GSA to downgrade its proposal under the "Building Quality" factor because the drawings submitted with its proposal failed to show that its ADP cooling system and the main building cooling system were connected. The protester points out that the SFO contained an order of preference provision which stated that discrepancies between the plans and narrative were to be resolved in favor of the narrative.

The record shows that the agency resolved the apparent conflict in the Inner Harbor proposal by concluding that the building cooling system is to act as a back-up to the ADP cooling system; in other words, the evaluators followed the SFO's order of precedence clause. However, despite resolving the conflict, the evaluators noted as a weakness that the drawings did not correspond with the narrative portion of the proposal. Although the agency noted the discrepancy, it clearly considered the protester's proposal acceptable in this regard, noting as a strength that the "house system provides 100 percent back up to ADP."

We agree with the protester that under the SFO, the discrepancy should not have been noted as a weakness of its proposal. In light of the many other uncontested weaknesses considered significant by the agency under the Building Quality factor--those relating to blocking, stacking, circulation, and space planning--the record shows that this weakness had little impact on the evaluation under this factor. Where a minor error is discovered in the evaluation

⁵Inner Harbor also complains that the agency did not advise the firm during discussions that it considered as a weakness the fact that employees must cross a street to access on-site parking. The necessity to cross this street, too, was first introduced into the proposal in the second BAFO as a result of the elimination of a pedestrian bridge, and as was the case in connection with the childcare facility access, the agency was not obligated to reopen discussions concerning the newly added problems with parking access. ABB Power Co. T&D, Inc., supra.

record, and where such error--even when viewed in the most favorable light for the protester--does not render the evaluation unreasonable, we will not disturb the agency award decision. See Textron Marine Sys., B-243693, Aug. 19, 1991, 91-2 CPD ¶ 162.

EVALUATION OF BOSTON'S PROPOSED SQUARE FOOTAGE OF OFFICE SPACE

Inner Harbor contends that the agency acted improperly by accepting Boston's proposal even though the awardee did not submit drawings which depicted the required 433,646 NUSF of office space. While the drawings did not show compliance with this requirement, Boston submitted with its drawings in its second BAFO an "errata sheet" which stated that "the area listed in the drawings are in, some case incorrect. The areas below are correct and supersede those shown (on the drawings)." The office space listed on the "errata sheet, 434,400 NUSF, exceeded the requirement 433,646. Thus, the area listed showed that the awardee's facility would comply with the office space requirement. Accordingly, we do not think that the proposal was ambiguous concerning Boston's intention to provide the required amount of office space, and we have no basis to object to the agency's conclusion that Boston submitted an acceptable proposal in this regard.

The protest is denied.

James F. Hinchman
General Counsel