This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-11-233SP 
entitled 'Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon 
Programs' which was released on March 29, 2011. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

March 2011: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs: 

GAO-11-233SP: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-233SP, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

This is GAOís ninth annual assessment of Department of Defense (DOD) 
weapon system acquisitions, an area that is on GAOís high-risk list. 
The report is in response to the mandate in the joint explanatory 
statement to the DOD Appropriations Act, 2009. It includes 
observations on the performance of DODís 2010 portfolio of 98 major 
defense acquisition programs; data on selected factors that can affect 
program outcomes; an assessment of the knowledge attained by key 
junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 40 programs, 
which were selected because they were in development or early 
production; and observations on the implementation of acquisition 
reforms. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and 
quantity data from DODís Selected Acquisition Reports and collected 
data from program offices on performance requirements and software 
development; technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge; and the 
implementation of DODís acquisition policy and acquisition reforms. 
GAO also compiled one- or two-page assessments of 71 weapon programs. 
These programs were selected based on their cost, stage in the 
acquisition process, and congressional interest. 

DOD disagreed with GAOís use of total program cost growth as a 
performance metric because it includes costs associated with 
capability upgrades and quantity increases. GAO believes it remains a 
meaningful metric and that the report explicitly accounts for the cost 
effect of quantity changes. 

What GAO Found: 

Since 2008, DODís portfolio of major defense acquisition programs has 
grown from 96 to 98 programs, and its investment in those programs has 
grown to $1.68 trillion. The total acquisition cost of the programs in 
DODís 2010 portfolio has increased by $135 billion over the past 2 
years, of which $70 billion cannot be attributed to quantity changes. 
A small number of programs are driving most of this cost growth; 
however, half of DODís major defense acquisition programs do not meet 
cost performance goals agreed to by DOD, the Office of Management and 
Budget, and GAO. Further, 80 percent of programs have experienced an 
increase in unit costs from initial estimates; thereby reducing DODís 
buying power on these programs. 

Table: Changes in DODís Fiscal Year 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs over the Past 2 Years (Fiscal Year 2011 Dollars 
in Billions): 

Total estimated research and development costs:	
Estimated portfolio cost in 2008: $407 billion; 
Estimated portfolio cost in 2010: $428 billion; 
Estimated portfolio cost growth since 2008[A]: $15 billion; 
Percentage growth since 2008[A]: 5%. 

Total estimated procurement costs:	
Estimated portfolio cost in 2008: $1.089 trillion; 
Estimated portfolio cost in 2010: $1.219 trillion; 
Estimated portfolio cost growth since 2008[A]: $121 billion; 
Percentage growth since 2008[A]: 11%. 

Total estimated acquisition cost:	
Estimated portfolio cost in 2008: $1.531 trillion; 
Estimated portfolio cost in 2010: $1.680 trillion; 
Estimated portfolio cost growth since 2008[A]: $135 billion; 
Percentage growth since 2008[A]: 9%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] These columns do not include $6 billion in research and 
development and $9 billion in procurement cost changes for the 
Ballistic Missile Defense System. DOD does not consider these 
adjustments to represent cost growth because the program has been 
allowed to add 2 years of new funding with each biennial budget. 

[End of table] 

GAO continues to find that newer programs are demonstrating higher 
levels of knowledge at key decision points, but most are still not 
fully adhering to a knowledge-based acquisition approach, putting them 
at a higher risk for cost growth and schedule delays. For the programs 
GAO assessed in depth, GAO found that a lack of technology maturity, 
changes to requirements, increases in the scope of software 
development, and a lack of focus on reliability were all 
characteristics of programs that exhibited poorer performance outcomes. 

Last year GAO reported that DOD had begun to incorporate acquisition 
reforms that require programs to invest more time and resources at the 
beginning of the acquisition process refining concepts through early 
systems engineering and building prototypes before beginning system 
development. Many, but not all, planned acquisition programs are 
adopting these practices. As GAO has previously recommended, more 
consistently applying a knowledge-based approach, as well as improving 
implementation of acquisition reforms, can help DOD achieve better 
outcomes for its portfolio of major weapon system programs. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-233SP] or key 
components. For more information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 
512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Foreword: 

Letter: 

Observations on DOD's 2010 Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolio: 

Observations on Factors That Can Affect Program Outcomes: 

Observations from Our Assessment of Knowledge Attained by Key 
Junctures in the Acquisition Process: 

Observations about DOD's Implementation of Recent Acquisition Reforms: 

Assessments of Individual Programs: 

Two-Page Assessments of Individual Programs: 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite: 

AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM): 

Apache Block III (AB3): 

Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (Army IAMD): 

B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability, Increment 1: 

BMDS: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD): 

BMDS: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): 

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS): 

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP): 

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP): 

CH-53K - Heavy Lift Replacement: 

CVN 21 Future Aircraft Carrier: 

DDG 1000 Destroyer: 

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE): 

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile: 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): 

F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter): 

Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T): 

Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B): 

Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA: 

GPS III OCX Ground Control Segment: 

Gray Eagle: 

Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT): 

Intelligent Munitions System-Scorpion: 

Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM): 

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM): 

Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV): 

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System 
(JLENS): 

Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS): 

Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System (AMF 
JTRS): 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radios (GMR): 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form 
Fit (HMS): 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): 

Littoral Combat Ship-Mission Modules: 

LHA Replacement Amphibious Assault Ship: 

Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform: 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS): 

Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT): 

P-8A Poseidon: 

PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Combined Aggregate 
Program (CAP) Fire Unit: 

Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System: 

Ship to Shore Connector (SSC): 

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II: 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program: 

Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM): 

Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV): 

Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774): 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2: 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 3: 

One-Page Assessments of Individual Programs: 

Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR): 

B-2 Defensive Management System (DMS) Modernization: 

B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability, Increment 2: 

BMDS: Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB): 

BMDS: Flexible Target Family (FTF): 

C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA): 

DDG 51 Destroyer: 

Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS): 

Enhanced Polar System (EPS): 

F-22A Raptor: 

H-1 Upgrades (UH-1Y/AH-1Z): 

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): 

KC-X Program: 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS): 

Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Aircraft Carrier Demonstration (UCAS- 
D): 

Nett Warrior Increment I: 

Ohio-Class Replacement (OR)/Sea Based Strategic Deterrent: 

Space Fence: 

Stryker Modernization (SMOD): 

Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR): 

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (Osprey): 

Presidential Helicopter (VXX): 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Changes in DOD's 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs over Time: 

Appendix III: Current and Baseline Cost Estimates for DOD's 2010 
Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs: 

Appendix IV: Knowledge-Based Acquisition Practices: 

Appendix V: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

184: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Changes in DOD's 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs over the Past 2 Years: 

Table 2: Changes in Total Acquisition Cost and Program Acquisition 
Unit Cost for 10 of the Highest-Cost Acquisition Programs: 

Table 3: Program Office Composition for 44 DOD Programs, as of 2010: 

Table 4: Changes in DOD's 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs over Time: 

Table 5: Current Cost Estimates and Baseline Cost Estimates for DOD's 
2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Programs Meeting DOD, OMB, and GAO Cost Performance Metrics: 

Figure 2: Change in Planned Quantities and Program Acquisition Unit 
Cost for the F-22 Raptor and DDG 51 Destroyer: 

Figure 3: Relationship between Key Performance Parameter Changes, 
Research and Development Cost Growth, and Delays in Achieving Initial 
Operational Capabilities: 

Figure 4: DOD's Acquisition Cycle and GAO Knowledge Points: 

Figure 5: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by a Program 
Beginning Engineering and Manufacturing Development since 2009: 

Figure 6: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by Programs 
Holding Their Critical Design Review since 2009: 

Figure 7: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by Programs 
Holding Their Production Decision since 2009: 

Figure 8: Depiction of Notional Weapon System Knowledge as Compared 
with Knowledge-Based Practices: 

Abbreviations: 

BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System: 

DAMIR: Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

IAMD: Integrated Air and Missile Defense: 

MDA: Missile Defense Agency: 

NA: not applicable: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

RDT&E: research, development, test, and evaluation: 

SAR: Selected Acquisition Report: 

TRL: Technology Readiness Level: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

March 29, 2011: 

Congressional Committees: 

I am pleased to present GAO's ninth annual assessment of selected 
weapon programs. This report provides a snapshot of how well the 
Department of Defense (DOD) is planning and executing its major 
defense acquisition programs--an area that is on GAO's high-risk list. 
[Footnote 1] It comes at a time when DOD is pressing forward with 
implementation of the weapon acquisition reforms put in place over the 
past few years and searching for efficiencies that will allow it to 
instill fiscal discipline into weapon programs and obtain better 
buying power for the warfighter and taxpayer. These reforms and 
efficiency initiatives are consistent with the recommendations we have 
made over the years emphasizing the need for DOD to acquire greater 
knowledge about programs' requirements, technology, and design before 
they start; improve the realism of cost estimates for both ongoing and 
new programs; and achieve a balanced mix of weapon systems that are 
affordable, feasible, and provide the best military value to the 
warfighter. 

To its credit, DOD has demonstrated a strong commitment, at the 
highest levels, to address the management of its weapon system 
acquisitions, and the department has started to reprioritize and 
rebalance its weapon system investments. Since 2009, the Secretary of 
Defense has proposed canceling or significantly curtailing weapon 
programs, such as the Army's Future Combat System, which he 
characterized as too costly or no longer relevant for current 
operations. Congress's support for several of the recommended 
terminations indicates a willingness to make difficult choices on 
individual weapon systems and DOD's major defense acquisition program 
portfolio as a whole. 

The focus of this year's report is slightly different than in years 
past. We still provide information on the cumulative cost growth 
experienced by the 98 programs in DOD's 2010 portfolio of major 
defense acquisition programs, but much of our cost analysis examines 
program performance over the last 2 years. This allows us to better 
focus on the department's management of its major defense acquisition 
programs since key acquisition reforms were put into place by Congress 
and DOD. In addition, our cost analysis now explicitly accounts for 
cost growth associated with changes in weapon system quantities, 
identifies the programs that drive most of DOD's cost growth, and 
assesses DOD against cost performance goals agreed to by DOD, the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and GAO. 

Our review this year indicates that DOD is making decisions that put 
most new or planned programs in a better position to succeed, but 
still faces challenges to effectively managing its current weapon 
system programs. DOD can help assure it delivers the promised return 
on investment for its weapon system spending by using the knowledge-
based acquisition approach that is now embodied in law and policy. Our 
review this year found continued improvement in the knowledge DOD 
officials had about programs' technologies, designs, and manufacturing 
processes for programs that recently progressed through key points in 
the acquisition process. However, most programs are still proceeding 
with less knowledge than best practices suggest, putting them at 
higher risk for cost growth and schedule delays. In fact, a majority 
of DOD's major defense acquisition programs did not meet cost 
performance goals agreed to by DOD, OMB, and GAO for total cost growth 
over 2-year and 5-year periods and from their initial program 
estimates. More consistently applying a knowledge-based approach, as 
well as improving implementation of acquisition reforms, can help DOD 
achieve better outcomes for its portfolio of major weapon system 
programs. 

While recent acquisition reforms have put newer programs in a better 
position to field capabilities on-time and at the estimated cost, 
existing programs such as the Joint Strike Fighter--which began 
without following knowledge-based acquisition strategies--continue to 
drive poor outcomes for DOD's major defense acquisition program 
portfolio. Over the last 2 years, the total acquisition cost of the 
programs in DOD's 2010 portfolio has grown by $135 billion (in fiscal 
year 2011 dollars). About half of this growth can be associated with 
quantity changes, versus poor management and execution problems, but 
at least $70 billion is indicative of such problems. The cost growth 
on the Joint Strike Fighter alone accounted for almost $34 billion of 
that amount. Cost overruns of this magnitude on programs that have 
already spent years in development can only be meaningfully offset by 
reductions in planned capabilities or quantities. Serious 
consideration by DOD of these types of tradeoffs will be essential to 
getting cost growth under control. 

This report provides insights that will help DOD place programs in a 
better position to succeed, thus helping the department maximize its 
investments. The current acquisition reform environment, coupled with 
fiscal imperatives, constitute an opportunity to leverage the lessons 
of the past and manage risks differently. This environment is shaped 
by significant acquisition reform legislation, constructive changes in 
DOD's acquisition policy, and initiatives by the administration, 
including making difficult decisions on individual weapon systems. To 
sustain momentum and make the most of this opportunity, it will be 
essential that decisions to approve and fund acquisitions be 
consistent with the reforms and policies aimed at achieving better 
outcomes. Such decisions will need the support of both DOD and 
Congress. 

Signed by: 

Gene L. Dodaro: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

March 29, 2011: 

Congressional Committees: 

This is GAO's ninth annual assessment of selected Department of 
Defense (DOD) weapon programs and the third in response to the mandate 
in the joint explanatory statement to the DOD Appropriations Act, 
2009.[Footnote 2] This report provides a snapshot of how well DOD is 
planning and executing its weapon programs--an area that is on GAO's 
high-risk list. Congress and DOD have long explored ways to improve 
the acquisition of major weapon systems, yet poor program outcomes 
persist. In the past 2 years, we have reported improvements in the 
knowledge programs attained about technologies, design, and 
manufacturing processes at key points during the acquisition process. 
However, we have found that most programs continue to proceed with 
less knowledge than recommended, putting them at higher risk for cost 
growth and schedule delays. Recent reforms place additional emphasis 
on applying knowledge-based acquisition practices, which, if 
implemented, put programs in a better position to field capabilities 
on time at the estimated cost. 

This report includes (1) observations on the performance of DOD's 
portfolio of 98 major defense acquisition programs, (2) data on 
factors, such as performance requirements and software management, 
that can affect program outcomes, (3) our assessment of the knowledge 
attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 
40 weapon programs--primarily in development or the early stages of 
production--from the 2010 portfolio, and (4) observations on the 
extent to which DOD is implementing recent acquisition reforms. 

There are three sets of programs on which our observations are 
primarily based in this report. We assessed all 98 major defense 
acquisition programs for our analysis of portfolio performance; 40 
programs in development or early production for our analysis of 
factors that can affect outcomes and knowledge attained by key 
junctures; and 14 planned major defense acquisition programs for our 
analysis of DOD's progress in implementing selected acquisition 
reforms. To develop our observations on the performance of DOD's 
portfolio of 98 major defense acquisition programs, we obtained cost, 
schedule, and quantity data from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports 
(SAR) and from the Defense Acquisition Management Information 
Retrieval Purview system.[Footnote 3] For unit cost reporting, DOD 
breaks several of these 98 programs into components. Therefore, some 
of our analysis is based on 100 or 101 programs or components. To 
analyze factors that can affect program outcomes and to assess how 
well programs are adhering to a knowledge-based acquisition approach, 
we examined a subset of 40 major defense acquisition programs and 
components from DOD's 2010 portfolio that were in development or early 
production as of June 2010. We submitted a questionnaire to program 
offices to collect information on aspects of program management 
including performance requirements, manufacturing planning, software 
development, and program office staffing. All 40 major defense 
acquisition programs we surveyed that were in development or early 
production responded to our questionnaire. We also obtained 
information on the extent to which they follow knowledge-based 
practices for technology maturity, design stability, and production 
maturity using a data collection instrument provided to 40 programs. 
To examine the extent to which DOD is implementing recent acquisition 
reforms, we used additional information from a questionnaire submitted 
to 17 planned major defense acquisition programs approaching program 
start; 14 of these planned programs responded. In addition to our 
observations, we present one-or two-page assessments of 71 weapon 
programs. We chose these 71 programs based on their estimated cost, 
stage in the acquisition process, and congressional interest. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to March 2011 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains detailed 
information on our scope and methodology. 

Observations on DOD's 2010 Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolio: 

Since 2008, the number of programs in DOD's portfolio of major defense 
acquisition programs has increased from 96 to 98, and DOD's total 
planned investment in these programs has increased by $45 billion to 
$1.68 trillion.[Footnote 4] Thirteen programs with a total estimated 
cost of $174 billion left the portfolio.[Footnote 5] Fifteen programs 
with an estimated cost of $77 billion entered the portfolio.[Footnote 
6] These programs are smaller, on average, than those already in the 
portfolio. Our analysis of the 98 programs in DOD's 2010 portfolio of 
major defense acquisition programs allows us to make five observations 
about the overall portfolio, as well as about the performance of 
individual programs. First, the total cost of the programs in DOD's 
portfolio has grown by about $135 billion, or 9 percent, over the last 
2 years, of which about $70 billion cannot be attributed to quantity 
changes. We focused on this 2-year period instead of program 
performance against initial estimates in order to assess the 
department's recent management of major defense acquisition programs. 
[Footnote 7] Second, over half of the portfolio's total cost growth 
over the last 2 years is driven by 10 of DOD's largest programs, which 
are all in production. As these programs leave the portfolio through 
completion or cancellation, their cost will leave with them. Third, 
about half of the programs in the portfolio have experienced cost 
increases that exceed cost performance goals agreed to by DOD, OMB, 
and GAO.[Footnote 8] Fourth, almost 80 percent of the programs in the 
portfolio have experienced an increase in unit cost when compared to 
their original estimates, thereby reducing DOD's buying power on these 
programs. Fifth, on average, the majority of cost growth materialized 
after programs entered production, meaning they continued to 
experience significant changes well after the programs and their costs 
should have stabilized. Additional details about each of these 
observations follow. 

* The total cost of DOD's 2010 portfolio of major defense acquisition 
programs has grown by $135 billion, or 9 percent, over the past 2 
years, of which about $70 billion cannot be attributed to changes in 
quantities of some weapon systems. As shown in table 1, since 2008, 
the total cost to develop and procure all of the weapon systems in 
this year's portfolio has increased by $135 billion, or 9 percent. 
[Footnote 9] About $65 billion of that growth can be attributed to 
quantity changes on 57 programs.[Footnote 10] The DDG 51 Destroyer, 
Joint Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, and C-17A aircraft 
programs experienced the largest cost increases due to increased 
quantities and account for almost half of that growth. The remaining 
$70 billion in cost growth is not attributable to quantity changes. 
For example, the procurement cost of the Joint Strike Fighter program 
increased by $28 billion in the last 2 years without a change in 
quantities. This type of cost growth could be indicative of production 
problems and inefficiencies or flawed initial cost estimates. 
Additionally, research and development costs increased by $15 billion 
over the past 2 years. Five programs--the Joint Strike Fighter, CH-53K 
Heavy Lift Replacement, F-22 Raptor, Space Based Infrared System High, 
and Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite--accounted for 70 
percent of this increase with each experiencing research and 
development cost growth of over $1 billion. With the exception of CH-
53K, these programs are all in production, but are still incurring 
additional research and development costs. For the most part, these 
programs began with unrealistic business cases, which contributed to 
these poor outcomes.[Footnote 11] 

Table 1: Changes in DOD's 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs over the Past 2 Years: 

Fiscal year 2011 dollars: 

Total estimated research and development cost; 
Estimated portfolio cost in 2008[A]: $407 billion; 
Estimated portfolio cost in 2010: $428 billion; 
Estimated portfolio cost growth since 2008[B]: $15 billion; 
Percentage growth since 2008[B]: 5%. 

Total estimated procurement cost; 
Estimated portfolio cost in 2008[A]: $1.089 trillion; 
Estimated portfolio cost in 2010: $1.219 trillion; 
Estimated portfolio cost growth since 2008[B]: $121 billion; 
Percentage growth since 2008[B]: 11%. 

Total estimated acquisition cost; 
Estimated portfolio cost in 2008[A]: $1.531 trillion; 
Estimated portfolio cost in 2010: $1.680 trillion; 
Estimated portfolio cost growth since 2008[B]: $135 billion; 
Percentage growth since 2008[B]: 9%. 

Average delay in delivering initial capabilities; 
Estimated portfolio cost growth since 2008[B]: 5 months; 
Percentage growth since 2008[B]: 8%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: In addition to research and development and procurement costs, 
total acquisition cost includes acquisition operation and maintenance 
and system-specific military construction costs. Details on program 
costs used for this analysis are provided in appendix III. 

[A] The 2008 estimate includes costs for the 83 programs that are at 
least 2 years old, and the first available estimate for the remaining 
15 programs that are new to the 2010 portfolio. 

[B] The portfolio cost columns include the reported cost of the 
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS); however, the portfolio cost 
growth columns do not include $6 billion in research and development 
and $9 billion in procurement cost changes for the BMDS. DOD does not 
consider these adjustments to represent cost growth because the 
program has been allowed to add 2 years of new funding with each 
biennial budget. 

[End of table] 

In addition to higher costs, programs in the 2010 portfolio have also 
experienced additional delays within the past 2 years. The average 
delay in delivering initial capabilities increased by 5 months. When 
examined from a longer-term perspective, the average delay in 
delivering initial capabilities is 22 months for these programs when 
measured against their first full estimates. See appendix II for our 
analysis of cost growth and delays in delivering initial capabilities 
against first full estimates for DOD's 2010 portfolio of major defense 
acquisition programs. 

* Ten of DOD's largest acquisition programs account for over half the 
portfolio's total acquisition cost growth over the past 2 years. DOD's 
largest programs represent more than half of its total investment in 
major defense acquisition programs. These programs range in age from 3 
to 32 years; all 10 are in production; and 8 have attained initial 
operational capability. Collectively, the estimated cost of these 
programs is $853 billion. These 10 programs account for $79 billion in 
cost growth over the last 2 years, or over half of the $135 billion in 
total cost growth for this period. Of the $79 billion in cost growth, 
$35 billion is attributable to increased purchases--primarily of the C-
17A aircraft, DDG 51 Destroyer, and Joint Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected family of vehicles, which has been in high demand because of 
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. When examined from a more 
historical perspective, the total acquisition cost of these 10 
programs has grown by $196 billion over their first full estimates, 
which is almost half of the $402 billion in total cost growth for the 
2010 portfolio. As these programs leave the portfolio through 
completion or cancellation, their cost will leave with them. While 
some of these programs are nearing the end of their procurement, 
others such as the Joint Strike Fighter, Virginia Class Submarine, V-
22, and CVN 21 will continue to demand large amounts of annual 
funding. Table 2 provides a summary of 10 of the largest DOD 
acquisition programs. 

Table 2: Changes in Total Acquisition Cost and Program Acquisition 
Unit Cost for 10 of the Highest-Cost Acquisition Programs: 

Program: Joint Strike Fighter; 
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008 
estimate: $249,690; 
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $283,674; 
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $33,984; 
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 
2008 estimate: $101.7; 
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $115.5; 
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2 
years: 13.6%. 

Program: DDG 51 Destroyer; 
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008 
estimate: $77,382; 
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $94,344; 
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $16,961; 
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 
2008 estimate: $1,248.1; 
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $1,328.8; 
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2 
years: 6.5%. 

Program: C-17A Globemaster III; 
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008 
estimate: $75,046; 
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $82,347; 
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $7,301; 
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 
2008 estimate: $395.0; 
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $369.3; 
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2 
years: -6.5%. 

Program: Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774); 
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008 
estimate: $83,194; 
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $82,193; 
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: -$1,002; 
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 
2008 estimate: $2,773.1; 
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $2,739.8; 
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2 
years: -1.2%. 

Program: F-22 Raptor; 
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008 
estimate: $75,200; 
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $77,393; 
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $2,193; 
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 
2008 estimate: $408.7; 
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $411.7; 
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2 
years: 0.7%. 

Program: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (Osprey); 
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008 
estimate: $56,659; 
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $56,061; 
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: -$598; 
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 
2008 estimate: $123.7; 
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $122.4; 
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2 years: 
-1.1%. 

Program: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet; 
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008 
estimate: $52,824; 
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $54,625; 
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $1,801; 
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 
2008 estimate: $107.1; 
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $106.1; 
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2 
years: -1.0%. 

Program: Trident II Missile; 
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008 
estimate: $50,611; 
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $51,410; 
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $799; 
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 
2008 estimate: $90.2; 
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $91.6; 
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2 
years: 1.6%. 

Program: Joint Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP); 
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008 
estimate: $22,792; 
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $36,375; 
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $13,583; 
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 
2008 estimate: $1.5; 
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $1.6; 
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2 
years: 7.2%. 

Program: CVN 21 Future Aircraft Carrier; 
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008 
estimate: $30,513; 
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $34,186; 
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $3,673; 
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 
2008 estimate: $10,171.0; 
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: $11,395.2; 
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2 
years: 12.0%. 

Program: Total; 
Total acquisition cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 2008 
estimate: $773,911; 
Total acquisition cost: 2010 estimate: $852,607; 
Total acquisition cost: Change over the last 2 years: $78,696; 
Program acquisition unit cost: (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 
2008 estimate: [Empty]; 
Program acquisition unit cost: 2010 estimate: [Empty]; 
Program acquisition unit cost: Percentage change over the last 2 
years: [Empty]. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Figures may not add due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

* Fewer than half of the programs in DOD's 2010 portfolio are meeting 
established performance metrics for cost growth. In December 2008, 
DOD, working with OMB and GAO, developed a set of outcome metrics and 
goals to measure program performance over time. As shown in figure 1, 
less than half of the programs in DOD's 2010 portfolio met the total 
acquisition cost growth goals that were set.[Footnote 12] The metrics 
also show that those programs experiencing significant cost growth-- 
more than 15 percent over initial estimates--dominate DOD's portfolio, 
representing about 72 percent of DOD's total investment in its major 
defense acquisition programs.[Footnote 13] 

Figure 1: Programs Meeting DOD, OMB, and GAO Cost Performance Metrics: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph and pie-chart] 

2-year comparison, less than 4% growth: 
Programs that meet criteria: 49; 
Programs that do not meet criteria: 51. 

5-year comparison, less than 10% growth: 
Programs that meet criteria: 49; 
Programs that do not meet criteria: 51. 

Baseline comparison, less than 15% growth: 
Programs that meet criteria: 44; 
Programs that do not meet criteria: 57. 

Percent of DODís total investment in major defense acquisition 
programs: 
Programs that meet criteria: 28%; 
Programs that do not meet criteria: 72%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: The number of programs represents those in the 2010 portfolio-- 
those with December 2009 SARs--which break down several programs into 
smaller elements for reporting purposes. One program, Airborne Signals 
Intelligence Payload (ASIP)-Baseline, was not included in 2-year and 5-
year comparisons because data were not available to make those 
comparisons. 

[End of figure] 

* DOD's buying power has been reduced for almost 80 percent of its 
portfolio of major defense acquisition programs. Of the 100 programs 
or components in DOD's 2010 portfolio that reported program 
acquisition unit cost data, 79 are planning to deliver capabilities at 
higher unit costs than originally estimated, while only 21 are 
planning to deliver capabilities at or below initial estimates. 
[Footnote 14] We did not examine whether these programs delivered a 
lower or higher level of performance than initially promised. To 
quantify the change in DOD's buying power, we examined changes in 
program acquisition unit cost and quantities.[Footnote 15] An example 
of a program that experienced reduced buying power is the F-22 Raptor. 
Despite a 70 percent reduction in quantities for the program, total 
acquisition costs have only decreased by 14 percent, due to research 
and development and average procurement unit cost increases. As a 
result, program acquisition unit costs for the F-22 Raptor have almost 
tripled, from $139 million to $412 million per airplane. For the 
current 188 aircraft program, the $273 million increase per plane 
translates to $51.3 billion in lost buying power for the F-22 program 
as a whole. Conversely, some programs are planning to deliver more 
quantities than planned at a lower program acquisition unit cost, 
which translates into increased buying power for DOD. For example, 
despite research and development costs almost tripling and the total 
program cost increasing by $79 billion, the DDG 51 Destroyer's program 
acquisition unit cost has decreased by about 20 percent, because it 
has spread out those research and development costs over significantly 
higher quantities and its average procurement unit cost has decreased 
over time. For the currently planned fleet of 71 ships, the $333 
million reduction per ship corresponds to $24 billion in increased 
buying power for the program as a whole. 

Figure 2: Change in Planned Quantities and Program Acquisition Unit 
Cost for the F-22 Raptor and DDG 51 Destroyer: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 vertical bar graphs] 

F-22 Raptor: 

Baseline estimate: 
Total quantity: 648; 
Program acquisition unit cost: $139 million. 

Current estimate: 
Total quantity: 188; 
Program acquisition unit cost: $412 million. 

DDG 51 Destroyer: 

Baseline estimate: 
Total quantity: 9; 
Program acquisition unit cost: $1,662 billion. 

Current estimate: 
Total quantity: 71; 
Program acquisition unit cost: $1,329 billion. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

* On average, the majority of cost growth materialized after programs 
entered production, meaning they continued to experience significant 
changes well after the programs and their costs should have 
stabilized. For the 56 major defense acquisition programs in DOD's 
2010 portfolio that had production cost estimates as of the end of 
2009, we found that the average program experienced the majority of 
its research and development and procurement cost growth after its 
production decision. Fifty-two percent of the average program's 
research and development cost growth was incurred after production 
start. Additionally, 65 percent of the average program's procurement 
cost growth materialized after production start. On average, these 
programs are 14 years old. Given the age of the programs in this 
group, most of them were started before DOD acquisition polices were 
revised to promote a knowledge-based, evolutionary acquisition 
approach. Therefore, newer programs that follow a knowledge-based 
approach may be better positioned to avoid cost growth this late in 
the acquisition cycle. 

Observations on Factors That Can Affect Program Outcomes: 

For 40 individual weapon programs in DOD's 2010 portfolio, we 
collected and assessed data on DOD's management of requirements, 
software, and program office staffing. We previously reported that 
both requirements changes and increases in the scope of software 
development were associated with poor program outcomes.[Footnote 16] 
We found similar results this year. Our analysis of the data allows us 
to make three observations. First, over half of the programs in our 
assessment made a change to a key performance requirement after 
development start and experienced higher levels of cost growth and 
longer schedule delays than programs with unchanged requirements. 
Second, half of the programs in our assessment that provided data on 
software lines of code saw the scope of software development increase 
after development start, which also corresponded with poorer outcomes. 
Third, programs continue to use contractors to make up for staffing 
shortfalls, though programs' reliance on nongovernment personnel has 
declined from last year's assessment. Additional details about each of 
these observations follow. 

* Programs that modified key performance requirements after 
development start experienced higher levels of cost growth and longer 
delays in delivering capabilities. Of the 39 programs in our current 
assessment that reported tracking requirements changes since 
development start, 21 reported having had at least one change to a key 
performance parameter--a top-level requirement. Specifically, 10 of 
the 21 programs reported adding or enhancing a key performance 
parameter; 3 of the 21 programs reported reducing, deferring, or 
deleting a key performance parameter; and 8 of the 21 programs 
reported making both types of changes to key performance parameters. 
Most of the programs that experienced requirements changes are 
programs that started prior to 2005. While changing requirements 
creates instability and, therefore, can adversely affect program 
outcomes, it is also possible that some programs experiencing poor 
outcomes may be decreasing program requirements in an effort to 
prevent further cost growth. As shown in figure 3, programs with 
changes to performance requirements experienced roughly four times 
more growth in research and development costs and three to five times 
greater schedule delays compared to programs with unchanged 
requirements. Similarly, programs with increases to key system 
attributes--lower level, but still crucial requirements of the system--
experienced greater, albeit less pronounced, cost growth and schedule 
delays than other programs. 

Figure 3: Relationship between Key Performance Parameter Changes, 
Research and Development Cost Growth, and Delays in Achieving Initial 
Operational Capabilities: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Programs with decreased, deferred, or deleted requirements (11 
programs): 
Average increase in research and development costs: 84%; 
Average increase in length of acquisition cycle: 40%. 

Programs with new or enhanced requirements (18 programs): 
Average increase in research and development costs: 75%; 
Average increase in length of acquisition cycle: 27%. 

Programs with no change in requirements (18 programs): 
Average increase in research and development costs: 18%; 
Average increase in length of acquisition cycle: 8%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: Programs that had both increases and decreases in key 
performance parameters are included in both categories. Cost and 
schedule data were not available for the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff 
Missile Extended Range variant, which had a new or enhanced 
requirement. 

[End of figure] 

* Substantial increases in the scope of software development efforts 
after development start also correspond to higher cost growth and 
longer schedule delays. In our last several assessments, we reported 
that programs experiencing more growth in software lines of code since 
development start had higher development cost growth and longer 
schedule delays than other programs. Similarly, for the 25 programs in 
our current assessment that reported data on lines of code, we found 
that increases in total lines of code after development start 
correlate highly with both increases in research and development costs 
and longer delays in achieving initial operational capability. Over 
half of these programs, or 14 of 25, estimated that the number of 
lines of code required for the system to function has grown or will 
grow by 25 percent or more. These programs tend to be those that began 
development more than 5 years ago. Newer programs have also 
experienced some software growth, though it has been less severe, on 
average. In addition to measuring growth in software lines of code, we 
have previously reported that collecting earned value management data 
for software development is a good management practice. Thirty-two of 
the 40 programs in our assessment reported collecting such data to 
help manage software development by allowing visibility into schedule 
and cost performance of software. These programs generally had 
software efforts that were more than twice as large, on average, as 
those programs that reported not collecting earned value data for 
software development. Finally, we have previously reported that 
tracking and capturing software defects in-phase is important because 
discovering defects out of phase can cause expensive rework later in 
programs. For the 21 programs that reported collecting some type of 
software defect data, on average, only 69 percent of the defects were 
corrected in the phase of software development in which they occurred. 

* Programs continue to use contractors to make up for staffing 
shortfalls, but reliance on nongovernment personnel has decreased. 
Congress and DOD have made it a priority to ensure the acquisition 
workforce has the capacity, personnel, and skills needed to properly 
perform its mission. Most programs, however, continue to struggle to 
fill all staff positions authorized. Specifically, 36 of the 44 
programs we surveyed reported having been authorized all the positions 
they requested, but a majority--23 programs--were unable to fill all 
of them.[Footnote 17] A majority of programs we assessed reported that 
they are in the process of staffing unfilled positions. Several cited 
delays and difficulty in finding qualified candidates as reasons for 
not being able to fill these positions. Additionally, almost all 
programs--39 of 44--reported using support contractors to make up for 
shortfalls in government personnel or capabilities. Program offices' 
reliance on contractors has decreased since last year's assessment. As 
shown in table 3, more than half (55 percent) of all program office 
staff for the 44 programs in our assessment were government personnel--
a reversal of the downward trend in the percentage of government 
personnel that we have reported in the previous 3 years.[Footnote 18] 
The percentage of support contractors declined in every discipline. 
Support contractors still fill the majority of administrative support 
positions; however, the greatest numbers of support contractors 
continue to be in engineering and technical positions. 

Table 3: Program Office Composition for 44 DOD Programs, as of 2010: 

Percentage of staff: Military personnel; 
Program management: 30%; 
Engineering: 7%; 
Contracting: 6%; 
Business functions: 3%; 
Administrative support: 8%; 
Other: 11%; 
Total: 10%. 

Percentage of staff: Civilian government; 
Program management: 43%; 
Engineering: 45%; 
Contracting: 84%; 
Business functions: 57%; 
Administrative support: 30%; 
Other: 25%; 
Total: 46%. 

Percentage of staff: Total government; 
Program management: 73%; 
Engineering: 52%; 
Contracting: 90%; 
Business functions: 60%; 
Administrative support: 37%; 
Other: 36%; 
Total: 55%. 

Percentage of staff: Support contractors; 
Program management: 27%; 
Engineering: 40%; 
Contracting: 10%; 
Business functions: 38%; 
Administrative support: 61%; 
Other: 64%; 
Total: 39%. 

Percentage of staff: Other nongovernment[A]; 
Program management: 0%; 
Engineering: 8%; 
Contracting: 0%; 
Business functions: 2%; 
Administrative support: 2%; 
Other: 0%; 
Total: 6%. 

Percentage of staff: Total nongovernment; 
Program management: 27%; 
Engineering: 48%; 
Contracting: 10%; 
Business functions: 40%; 
Administrative support: 63%; 
Other: 64%; 
Total: 45%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding. 

[A] Other nongovernment includes federally funded research and 
development center and university-affiliated employees. 

[End of table] 

Observations from Our Assessment of Knowledge Attained by Key 
Junctures in the Acquisition Process: 

Good acquisition outcomes require the use of a knowledge-based 
approach to product development that demonstrates high levels of 
knowledge before significant commitments are made. In essence, 
knowledge supplants risk over time. In our past work examining weapon 
acquisition issues and best practices for product development, we have 
found that leading commercial firms pursue an acquisition approach 
that is anchored in knowledge, whereby high levels of product 
knowledge are demonstrated by critical points in the acquisition 
process.[Footnote 19] On the basis of this work, we have identified 
three key knowledge points during the acquisition cycle--development 
start; design review, which occurs during engineering and 
manufacturing development; and production start--at which programs 
need to demonstrate critical levels of knowledge to proceed. Figure 4 
compares DOD acquisition milestones with the timing of the three 
knowledge points. 

Figure 4: DOD's Acquisition Cycle and GAO Knowledge Points: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Technology Development: 
DOD acquisition milestones: Development start (milestone B); 
GAO knowledge points: Knowledge point 1: Technologies and resources 
match requirements. 

Engineering and manufacturing development: Integration: 
GAO knowledge points: Knowledge point 2: Design performs as expected. 

Engineering and manufacturing development: Demonstration: 
GAO knowledge points: Knowledge point 3: Production can meet cost, 
schedule, and quality targets. 

Production: 
DOD acquisition milestones: Production start (milestone C). 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

The building of knowledge consists of information that should be 
gathered at these three critical points over the course of a program: 

* Knowledge point 1: Resources and requirements match. Achieving a 
high level of technology maturity by the start of system development 
is an important indicator of whether this match has been made. This 
means that the technologies needed to meet essential product 
requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended 
environment. In addition, the developer has completed a preliminary 
design of the product that shows the design is feasible. 

* Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This point occurs when 
a program determines that a product's design will meet customer 
requirements, as well as cost, schedule, and reliability targets. A 
best practice is to achieve design stability at the system-level 
critical design review, usually held midway through system 
development. Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings 
at this point or 100 percent of the 3D product models for ships at 
fabrication start provides tangible evidence that the product's design 
is stable, and a prototype demonstration shows that the design is 
capable of meeting performance requirements. 

* Knowledge point 3: Manufacturing processes are mature. This point is 
achieved when it has been demonstrated that the developer can 
manufacture the product within cost, schedule, and quality targets. A 
best practice is to ensure that all critical manufacturing processes 
are in statistical control--that is, they are repeatable, sustainable, 
and capable of consistently producing parts within the product's 
quality tolerances and standards--at the start of production. 

A knowledge-based acquisition approach is a cumulative process in 
which certain knowledge is acquired by key decision points before 
proceeding. In other words, demonstrating technology maturity is a 
prerequisite for moving forward into system development, during which 
the focus should be on design and integration. Additional details 
about key practices at each of the knowledge points can be found in 
appendix IV. 

For 40 individual weapon programs in development and early production 
in DOD's 2010 portfolio, we assessed the knowledge attained by key 
junctures in the acquisition process. In particular, we focused on the 
17 programs that progressed through these key acquisition points since 
2009 and evaluated their adherence to knowledge-based practices. While 
we continue to find that newer programs are demonstrating higher 
levels of knowledge at key decision points, most are still not fully 
adhering to a knowledge-based acquisition approach, putting them at a 
higher risk for cost growth and schedule delays.[Footnote 20] Only one 
program in our assessment began system development since 2009, and it 
did so with all its critical technologies nearing maturity, in 
accordance with DOD and statutory requirements. However, it did not 
fully mature its critical technologies before beginning development, 
in accordance with knowledge-based practices, and only three nonship 
programs in our assessment had done so by development start. Six of 
nine programs that held a critical design review since 2009 did so 
with a stable design; however, these programs did not implement other 
practices that increase confidence that the design is stable and 
capable of meeting performance requirements. Finally, almost all 
programs that held a production decision since 2009 identified key 
product characteristics and critical manufacturing processes; however, 
none of the programs demonstrated that critical manufacturing 
processes were in control and only half tested production-
representative prototypes prior to this decision. Additional details 
about these observations follow. 

* The one program in our assessment that began development since 2009 
did so with all its technologies nearing maturity, but few programs 
overall began development with fully mature technologies. The Army's 
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) program began development in 
2009 with all critical technologies at least nearing maturity--that 
is, demonstrated in a relevant environment--in accordance with DOD and 
statutory requirements,[Footnote 21] but did not demonstrate them in a 
realistic environment as GAO has recommended.[Footnote 22] Our 
analysis of the 26 nonship programs in our assessment that provided 
technology data shows that only three of these programs began 
development with fully mature technologies--that is, demonstrated in a 
realistic environment. Our analysis also shows that mature 
technologies are associated with improved program outcomes. 
Specifically, the 3 programs that began development with fully mature 
technologies have experienced 4 percent less growth in research and 
development costs over their first estimates, on average, compared to 
the 11 programs that began development with all technologies at least 
nearing maturity, and 33 percent less growth, on average, than the 12 
programs with at least one immature technology at the start of system 
development. In addition, as shown in figure 5, the IAMD program did 
not implement other knowledge-based practices before beginning 
development, including holding a program-level preliminary design 
review and constraining the length of system development. We have 
previously reported that before starting development, programs should 
hold key system engineering events, such as the preliminary design 
review, to ensure that requirements are defined and feasible and that 
the proposed design can meet those requirements within cost, schedule, 
and other system constraints.[Footnote 23] IAMD did hold a system 
requirements review and a system functional review before development 
start, which is a major improvement over other programs in our 
assessment, which held these reviews, on average, 18 months and 25 
months after development start, respectively. Knowledge-based 
acquisition practices also recommend that a system or increment be 
developed in 5 to 6 years or fewer.[Footnote 24] Further, DOD 
acquisition policy states that a condition for exiting technology 
development is that a system or increment can be developed for 
production within a short time frame, defined as normally less than 5 
years for weapons systems. Constraining development time increases the 
predictability of funding needs and the likelihood of program success. 
While IAMD plans to follow an incremental approach, system development 
will take almost 7 years. 

Figure 5: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by a Program 
Beginning Engineering and Manufacturing Development since 2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Knowledge-based practices at development start: Knowledge point 1: 

Mature all critical technologies: 
IAMD: Practice not implemented by program. 

Hold system requirements review: 
IAMD: Practice implemented by program. 

Hold system functional review: 
IAMD: Practice not implemented by program. 

Hold preliminary design review: 
IAMD: Practice not implemented by program[A]. 

Constrain development phase to 6 years or less: 
IAMD: Practice not implemented by program. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] The IAMD program received a waiver for the requirement to hold a 
preliminary design review before beginning system development. 

[End of figure] 

* Six of nine programs in our assessment that held a critical design 
review since 2009 did so with a stable design; however, these programs 
did not implement other knowledge-based practices to increase 
confidence that the design is stable. Knowing a product's design is 
stable before system demonstration reduces the risk of costly design 
changes occurring during the manufacturing of production- 
representative prototypes--when investments in acquisitions become 
more significant. The overall design knowledge that programs have 
demonstrated at their critical design review has increased over the 
last few years, and six of nine programs that held a design review 
since 2009 did so with a stable design. However, as shown in figure 6, 
none of the nine programs in our assessment that held their critical 
design review since 2009 demonstrated that their design is capable of 
meeting performance requirements by testing an integrated prototype 
before the design review. We have previously reported that early 
system prototypes are useful to demonstrate design stability and that 
the design will work and can be built. On average, the nine programs 
tested or plan to test an integrated prototype 13 months after the 
critical design review, which is an improvement over the 31-month 
average we reported in last year's assessment. 

Figure 6: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by Programs 
Holding Their Critical Design Review since 2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Knowledge-based practices at development start: Knowledge point 2: 

Mature all critical technologies: 
AB3: Practice not implemented by program; 
AMF JTRS: Practice not implemented by program; 
CH-53K: Practice not implemented by program; 
FAB-T: Practice not implemented by program; 
GPS IIIA: Practice implemented by program; 
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice not implemented by program; 
JPALS: Practice not implemented by program; 
Patriot/Meads Cap Fire Unit: Practice implemented by program; 
Reaper: Practice implemented by program. 

Release at least 90 percent of design drawings: 
AB3: Practice not implemented by program; 
AMF JTRS: Practice implemented by program; 
CH-53K: Practice implemented by program; 
FAB-T: Practice not implemented by program; 
GPS IIIA: Practice implemented by program; 
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice not implemented by program; 
JPALS: Practice implemented by program; 
Patriot/Meads Cap Fire Unit: Practice implemented by program; 
Reaper: Practice implemented by program. 

Test a system-level integrated prototype: 
AB3: Practice not implemented by program; 
AMF JTRS: Practice not implemented by program; 
CH-53K: Practice not implemented by program; 
FAB-T: Practice not implemented by program; 
GPS IIIA: Practice not implemented by program; 
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice not implemented by program; 
JPALS: Practice not implemented by program; 
Patriot/Meads Cap Fire Unit: Practice not implemented by program; 
Reaper: Practice not applicable or information not available. 

Use a reliability growth curve: 
AB3: Practice not implemented by program; 
AMF JTRS: Practice not implemented by program; 
CH-53K: Practice not implemented by program; 
FAB-T: Practice not implemented by program; 
GPS IIIA: Practice not implemented by program; 
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice implemented by program; 
JPALS: Practice implemented by program; 
Patriot/Meads Cap Fire Unit: Practice implemented by program; 
Reaper: Practice not implemented by program. 

Conduct producibility assessments to identify manufacturing risks for 
key technologies: 
AB3: Practice implemented by program; 
AMF JTRS: Practice implemented by program; 
CH-53K: Practice implemented by program; 
FAB-T: Practice not applicable or information not available; 
GPS IIIA: Practice implemented by program; 
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice implemented by program; 
JPALS: Practice not applicable or information not available; 
Patriot/Meads Cap Fire Unit: Practice implemented by program; 
Reaper: Practice not applicable or information not available. 

Complete failure modes and effects analysis: 
AB3: Practice implemented by program; 
AMF JTRS: Practice implemented by program; 
CH-53K: Practice implemented by program; 
FAB-T: Practice implemented by program; 
GPS IIIA: Practice implemented by program; 
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice implemented by program; 
JPALS: Practice not applicable or information not available; 
Patriot/Meads Cap Fire Unit: Practice implemented by program; 
Reaper: Practice not applicable or information not available. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Many of these programs are also still concurrently developing 
technologies and finalizing designs, which can lead to cost and 
schedule inefficiencies and rework. Of the nine programs, only three 
had fully matured all critical technologies at this point in the 
acquisition cycle. The remaining programs accepted technologies into 
their product's design based on no more than a laboratory 
demonstration of basic performance, technical feasibility, and 
functionality instead of a representative model or prototype in a 
realistic environment. 

Despite not demonstrating that their design is stable, many of these 
programs are taking steps to plan for production. Almost all programs 
that held their critical design review since 2009 reported completing 
failure modes and effects analysis to identify potential failures and 
early design fixes and conducting producibility assessments to 
identify manufacturing risks for key technologies. However, only three 
programs reported having a reliability growth curve at the time of the 
critical design review. Reliability growth testing provides visibility 
over how reliability is improving and uncovers design problems so 
fixes can be incorporated before production begins. Our assessment of 
programs in development or early production that provided cost data 
shows that on average, programs using a reliability growth curve have 
experienced about one-third the research and development cost growth 
after development start than programs that have not used a reliability 
growth curve. 

* Almost all programs that held a production decision since 2009 took 
steps to plan for manufacturing; however, none of the programs 
demonstrated that critical manufacturing processes were in control, 
and only half tested production-representative prototypes prior to 
this decision. Capturing critical manufacturing knowledge before 
entering production helps ensure that a weapon system will work as 
intended and can be manufactured efficiently to meet cost, schedule, 
and quality targets. Identifying key product characteristics and the 
associated critical manufacturing processes is a key initial step to 
ensuring production elements are stable and in control. As shown in 
figure 7, almost all of the programs in our assessment that made a 
production decision since 2009 reported conducting these activities 
before entering production. However, none of the 10 programs that made 
a production decision since 2009 demonstrated that their critical 
manufacturing processes were in statistical control at production 
start.[Footnote 25] Bringing processes under statistical control 
reduces variations in parts manufacturing, thus reducing the potential 
for defects, and is generally less costly than performing extensive 
inspection after a product is built. 

Figure 7: Implementation of Knowledge-Based Practices by Programs 
Holding Their Production Decision since 2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table] 

Knowledge-based practices at production decision: Knowledge point 3: 

Mature all critical technologies: 
AB3: Practice implemented by program; 
C-130 AMP: Practice implemented by program; 
E-2D AHE: Practice implemented by program; 
GPS IIIA: Practice implemented by program; 
Gray Eagle: Practice not implemented by program; 
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice not implemented by program; 
NMT: Practice implemented by program; 
P-8A: Practice implemented by program; 
SM-6: Practice implemented by program; 
WIN-T Increment 2: Practice implemented by program. 

Release at least 90 percent of design drawings: 
AB3: Practice implemented by program; 
C-130 AMP: Practice implemented by program; 
E-2D AHE: Practice implemented by program; 
GPS IIIA: Practice not applicable or information not available; 
Gray Eagle: Practice implemented by program; 
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice not implemented by program; 
NMT: Practice not applicable or information not available; 
P-8A: Practice implemented by program; 
SM-6: Practice not implemented by program; 
WIN-T Increment 2: Practice not applicable or information not 
available. 

Identify key product characteristics: 
AB3: Practice implemented by program; 
C-130 AMP: Practice implemented by program; 
E-2D AHE: Practice not implemented by program; 
GPS IIIA: Practice not applicable or information not available; 
Gray Eagle: Practice implemented by program; 
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice implemented by program; 
NMT: Practice implemented by program; 
P-8A: Practice implemented by program; 
SM-6: Practice implemented by program; 
WIN-T Increment 2: Practice implemented by program. 

Identify critical manufacturing processes: 
AB3: Practice implemented by program; 
C-130 AMP: Practice implemented by program; 
E-2D AHE: Practice implemented by program; 
GPS IIIA: Practice implemented by program; 
Gray Eagle: Practice implemented by program; 
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice implemented by program; 
NMT: Practice implemented by program; 
P-8A: Practice implemented by program; 
SM-6: Practice implemented by program; 
WIN-T Increment 2: Practice not applicable or information not 
available. 

Demonstrate critical processes are in statistical control: 
AB3: Practice not implemented by program; 
C-130 AMP: Practice not implemented by program; 
E-2D AHE: Practice not implemented by program; 
GPS IIIA: Practice not implemented by program; 
Gray Eagle: Practice not implemented by program; 
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice not implemented by program; 
NMT: Practice not implemented by program; 
P-8A: Practice not implemented by program; 
SM-6: Practice not implemented by program; 
WIN-T Increment 2: Practice not applicable or information not 
available. 

Demonstrate critical processes on a pilot production line: 
AB3: Practice implemented by program; 
C-130 AMP: Practice implemented by program; 
E-2D AHE: Practice implemented by program; 
GPS IIIA: Practice not implemented by program; 
Gray Eagle: Practice implemented by program; 
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice implemented by program; 
NMT: Practice implemented by program; 
P-8A: Practice implemented by program; 
SM-6: Practice implemented by program; 
WIN-T Increment 2: Practice not applicable or information not 
available. 

Test a production-representative prototype: 
AB3: Practice implemented by program; 
C-130 AMP: Practice implemented by program; 
E-2D AHE: Practice implemented by program; 
GPS IIIA: Practice not implemented by program; 
Gray Eagle: Practice not implemented by program; 
Increment 1 E-IBCT: Practice not implemented by program; 
NMT: Practice implemented by program; 
P-8A: Practice not implemented by program; 
SM-6: Practice not implemented by program; 
WIN-T Increment 2: Practice implemented by program. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Several programs also began production without knowledge they ought to 
have gained much earlier in their acquisition process. One program-- 
Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT)--entered 
production without mature technologies or a stable design. Another 
program--Gray Eagle Unmanned Aircraft System--also did not have mature 
technologies by its production decision, while the Standard Missile-6 
(SM-6) began production without completing its design. These programs 
are at risk of continued cost growth. 

Additionally, many of these programs are still not testing production- 
representative prototypes before committing to production. We 
previously reported that production and postproduction costs are 
minimized when a fully integrated, capable prototype is demonstrated 
to show that the system will work as intended in a reliable manner. 
These benefits are maximized when tests are completed prior to a 
production decision, because making design changes after production 
begins can be both costly and inefficient. Moreover, DOD's December 
2008 revision to its acquisition policy requires programs to test 
production-representative articles before entering production. Only 5 
of the 10 programs that held a production decision since 2009 reported 
testing a production-representative prototype before their production 
decision. However, 11 of the 13 programs that are scheduled to hold 
their production decision after 2010 and provided data do plan to test 
a fully configured prototype before that decision. 

Observations about DOD's Implementation of Recent Acquisition Reforms: 

Last year we reported that DOD had begun to incorporate recent 
acquisition reforms into the strategies of new programs. These 
reforms--in DOD's December 2008 revised acquisition policy, the Weapon 
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, and recent defense 
authorization acts--require programs to invest more time and resources 
at the beginning of the acquisition process refining concepts through 
early systems engineering and building prototypes before beginning 
system development, among other requirements. In addition, for ongoing 
programs, DOD policy and statute require establishment of annual 
configuration steering boards to review all program requirements 
changes as well as to make recommendations on proposed descoping 
options that could help maintain a program's cost and schedule 
targets. Our examination of the extent to which weapon systems are 
adhering to recent acquisition reforms indicates that many, but not 
all, programs are implementing these reforms. 

Our assessment allows us to make five observations concerning DOD's 
progress in implementing legislative and policy reforms. First, almost 
all of the 14 planned major defense acquisition programs we reviewed 
intend to hold preliminary design reviews before beginning 
development, but fewer are taking other actions, such as developing 
prototypes, that could improve their chances of success.[Footnote 26] 
Second, seven of these programs reported making major cost, schedule, 
or performance tradeoffs to-date, as required under a DOD and 
statutory requirement that programs make appropriate tradeoffs before 
beginning development. Third, six of the planned programs have 
acquisition strategies that include competition after the start of 
development. Fourth, of the 40 programs in our assessment that have 
begun development or are in the early stages of production, about one-
third have not yet held a configuration steering board meeting, and 
only five programs reported presenting descoping options at this 
meeting. Finally, as part of DOD's effort to "do more without more," 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics is beginning to implement a range of efficiency initiatives 
that focus on affordability, tradeoffs, and portfolio reviews, and are 
consistent with past GAO recommendations. Additional details about 
these observations follow. 

* Almost all of the planned major defense acquisition programs in our 
assessment intend to conduct a preliminary design review before 
development start, but fewer are taking other actions, such as 
developing prototypes, that could improve their chances of success. 
Thirteen of the 14 planned major defense acquisition programs we 
reviewed intend to hold a preliminary design review,[Footnote 27] and 
all 10 that provided dates for this review plan to hold it before 
milestone B--the beginning of system development--as required by the 
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. Nine of the 14 planned 
programs intend to develop prototypes of the proposed weapon system or 
a key system element before milestone B.[Footnote 28] Programs can 
seek a waiver of the prototyping requirement, as provided by the 
policy. Holding a preliminary design review before beginning 
development can help ensure that program requirements are defined and 
feasible, but by not developing prototypes, some programs might be 
missing an opportunity to further reduce technical risk, refine 
requirements, validate designs and cost estimates, and evaluate 
manufacturing processes. 

Programs can also put themselves in a better position to succeed by 
implementing incremental acquisition strategies that limit the time in 
development and constrain requirements. Seven of the 14 planned 
programs in our assessment reported using DOD's preferred incremental, 
or evolutionary, acquisition approach, while the other 7 programs 
planned for a single-step-to-full-capability. The single-step-to-full- 
capability approach affords few, if any, opportunities to 
incrementally, and thus more quickly and inexpensively, adapt the 
final system to the changing needs of the warfighter. Conversely, an 
evolutionary acquisition strategy emphasizes a more flexible approach 
that can help reduce risk because it delivers the weapon system in 
more manageable increments. In addition, six of the nine planned 
programs in our assessment that provided data plan to deliver 
capabilities in less than 6 years, the recommended time limit for 
system development, while the remaining three programs are planning 
for longer development periods. We have previously reported that 
constraining development cycles increases the predictability of 
funding needs and the likelihood of program success, while 
unconstrained and lengthy cycle times lead to higher costs and 
diminished military effectiveness. 

* Half of the planned programs we reviewed reported making major cost, 
schedule, or performance tradeoffs before beginning development. DOD 
acquisition policy and statute require that the Milestone Decision 
Authority certify, before a program begins development, that 
appropriate tradeoffs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives 
have been made to ensure that the program is affordable. Seven of the 
14 planned programs in our assessment reported making major cost, 
schedule, or performance tradeoffs during the technology development 
phase to-date. For example, in an effort to reduce cost, the Mobile 
Landing Platform program reduced requirements for size, personnel 
accommodations, and cargo fuel. The Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council is also statutorily required to consider cost, schedule, and 
performance tradeoffs when validating joint military requirements. 

* Fewer than half of planned programs have acquisition strategies to 
ensure competition throughout the acquisition cycle. The Weapon 
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 requires that DOD ensure that 
the acquisition strategy for each major defense acquisition program 
includes measures to ensure competition, or the option of competition, 
throughout the program's life cycle. These measures may include 
developing competitive prototypes, dual-source contracting, and 
periodic competitions for subsystem upgrades. Incorporating 
competition throughout a program's life cycle can be used to drive 
productivity and thereby reduce program costs. Six of the 14 planned 
programs in our assessment reported having acquisition strategies that 
call for competition post-milestone B at the system or subsystem level. 

* About one-third of the major weapon programs in our assessment 
reported that a configuration steering board meeting has not been held 
for the program, and few program managers presented descoping options. 
Under DOD's revised acquisition policy and in statute, ongoing 
programs are required to conduct annual configuration steering boards 
to review requirements changes and significant technical configuration 
changes that have the potential to result in cost and schedule effects 
on the program. Since January 2009, 10 programs in our assessment 
reported changing either a key performance parameter or key system 
attribute, but only 4 of these reported holding a configuration 
steering board meeting during that period. In addition, as of June 
2010, 12 of the 40 programs in our assessment reported never having 
held a configuration steering board. In addition to conducting an 
annual board meeting, the program manager is expected to present 
descoping options that could reduce program costs or moderate 
requirements. Only five programs in our assessment reported having 
presented descoping options and four programs had their options 
approved. 

* The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics is beginning to implement a range of efficiency initiatives 
that focus on affordability, tradeoffs, and portfolio reviews, and are 
consistent with past GAO recommendations. In September 2010, the Under 
Secretary issued a memorandum intent on obtaining greater efficiency 
and productivity in defense spending. Several of the proposed 
initiatives build on the recent acquisition reforms that DOD has 
already begun to implement. For example, the memorandum emphasizes the 
need to set shorter program timelines and manage to them to avoid 
costly delays in delivering capability to the warfighter. To target 
affordability, the memo directs program managers to treat 
affordability as a requirement before programs are started. In 
addition, the memo underscores the policy and statutory requirement 
for making tradeoffs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives 
using systems engineering analysis prior to system development. To 
ensure competition throughout a program's life cycle, the memo 
proposes requiring the presentation of a competitive strategy at each 
program milestone. Finally, the Under Secretary proposed conducting 
portfolio analyses to eliminate redundancies across programs, 
providing the potential for substantial savings. 

Assessments of Individual Programs: 

This section contains assessments of individual weapon programs. Each 
assessment presents data on the extent to which programs are following 
a knowledge-based approach to system development and other program 
information. In total, we present information on 71 weapon programs. 
For 49 programs, we produced two-page assessments discussing 
technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge obtained, as well as 
other program issues. Each two-page assessment also contains a 
comparison of total acquisition cost from the first full estimate for 
the program to the current estimate. The first full estimate is 
generally the cost estimate established at development start; however, 
for a few programs that did not have such an estimate, we used the 
estimate at production start instead. For shipbuilding programs, we 
used their planning estimates if those estimates were available. For 
programs that began as non-major defense acquisition programs, we used 
the first full estimate available. Forty-one of these 49 two-page 
assessments are of major defense acquisition programs, most of which 
are in development or early production; 3 assessments are of 
components of major defense acquisition programs, including elements 
of MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense System; and 5 assessments are of 
programs that were projected to become major defense acquisition 
programs during or soon after our review. In addition, we produced one-
page assessments on the current status of 22 programs, which include 
13 pre-major defense acquisition programs, 4 major defense acquisition 
programs that are past their full-rate production decision, 2 elements 
of MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense System, 1 major defense acquisition 
program that was recently terminated, 1 major defense acquisition 
program that is a commercially derived aircraft, and 1 technology 
demonstration program. 

How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed: 

For our two-page assessments, we depict the extent of knowledge gained 
by key points in a program using a stacked bar graph and provide a 
narrative summary at the bottom of the first page of each assessment. 
As illustrated in figure 8, the knowledge graph is based on three 
knowledge points. The key indicators for the attainment of knowledge 
are technology maturity (in orange), design stability (in green), and 
production maturity (in blue). A "best practice" line is drawn based 
on the ideal attainment of the three types of knowledge at the three 
knowledge points. The closer a program's attained knowledge is to the 
best practice line, the more likely the weapon will be delivered 
within estimated cost and schedule. A knowledge deficit at development 
start--indicated by a gap between the technology maturity attained and 
the best practice line--means the program proceeded with immature 
technologies and faces a greater likelihood of cost and schedule 
increases as risks are discovered and resolved. 

Figure 8: Depiction of Notional Weapon System Knowledge as Compared 
with Knowledge-Based Practices: 

[Refer to PDF for image: graph illustration] 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

Depicted on the graph are three levels of attainment of product 
knowledge: 
Technology maturity; 
Design and technology maturity; 
Production, design, and technology maturity. 

An ascending desired level of knowledge is depicted for the following: 
Development start; 
DOD design review; 
GAO review; 
Production decision. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

An interpretation of this notional example would be that system 
development began with critical technologies that were partially 
immature, thereby missing knowledge point 1, which is indicated by the 
orange diamond. By the design review, technology knowledge had 
increased, as indicated by the orange bar, but all critical 
technologies were not yet mature; only 33 percent of the program's 
design drawings were releasable to the manufacturer, as indicated by 
the green bar. Therefore, knowledge point 2, which is indicated by the 
green diamond, was not attained. At the time of GAO's review, this 
program had matured all of its critical technologies and released 
approximately 75 percent of its design drawings, as indicated by the 
green bar. When the program plans to make a production decision, it 
expects to have released all of its design drawings and have half of 
its critical manufacturing processes in statistical control. The 
expected knowledge at this future point is captured in the outlined 
region marked "projection." This program is not projected to reach 
knowledge point 3, which is indicated by the blue diamond, by the time 
it makes a production decision. For shipbuilding programs, knowledge 
point 1 occurs when a program awards a detailed design and 
construction contract, and knowledge point 2 occurs when the lead ship 
starts fabrication. We do not assess production maturity at knowledge 
point 3 for shipbuilding programs. 

[End of section] 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite: 

Illustration: Source: © 2009 Lockheed Martin Corporation. All rights 
reserved. 

The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing 
Milstar system with higher-capacity, survivable, jam-resistant, 
worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and 
tactical warfighters. The program includes satellites and a mission 
control segment. Terminals used to transmit and receive communications 
are acquired separately by each service. AEHF is an international 
program that includes Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. 
We assessed the satellite and mission control segments. 

Concept: 
Program start (4/99); 

System development: 
Development start: (9/01); 
Design review (4/04); 
Low-rate decision (9/08). 

Production: 
Production decision: (6/04); 
First launch: (8/10); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Initial capability (TBD). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $566.8 million:
Procurement: $2,765.5 million:
Total funding: $3,332.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 2: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 10/2001: $4,843.9; 
Latest 12/2009: $7,346.3; 
Percent change: 51.7. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 10/2001: $1,432.6; 
Latest 12/2009: $5,573.3; 
Percent change: 289.0. 

Total program cost: 
As of 10/2001: $6,276.5; 
Latest 12/2009: $12,919.6; 
Percent change: 105.8. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 10/2001: $1,255.309; 
Latest 12/2009: $2,153.272; 
Percent change: 71.5. 

Total quantities: 
As of 10/2001: 5; 
Latest 12/2009: 6; 
Percent change: 20.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 10/2001: 111; 
Latest 12/2009: 170; 
Percent change: 53.2. 

[End of table] 

The first AEHF satellite (AEHF-1) was launched in August 2010; 
however, an anomaly with the satellite's propulsion system will delay 
the satellite from reaching its planned orbit and will affect the 
launch dates of the two satellites currently in testing. According to 
the program office, all 14 AEHF critical technologies are mature and 
its design is stable. However, the program is investigating the cause 
of the propulsion failure. We have not assessed the AEHF's production 
maturity because the program office does not collect statistical 
process control data. The Air Force plans to acquire six AEHF 
satellites that are expected to be clones except for changes to 
address obsolete parts, and is evaluating requirements and 
alternatives for meeting future military satellite communication needs 
beyond the sixth satellite. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 
Development start: 9/01; 
DOD design review: 4/04; 
Production decision: 6/04; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

AEHF Program: 

Technology, Design, and Production Maturity: 

According to the program office, all 14 AEHF critical technologies are 
mature and its design is stable with all of its expected design 
drawings released. However, the program office is investigating the 
cause of a propulsion system failure on the first launched satellite. 
The propulsion system was not a critical technology and did not 
experience problems during prelaunch testing. We did not assess the 
AEHF's production maturity because the program office does not collect 
statistical process control data. 

Other Program Issues: 

AEHF-1 was launched in August 2010 on an Atlas V rocket; however, an 
anomaly with the propulsion system will delay the satellite from 
reaching its planned orbit and will affect the launch dates of the two 
satellites currently in testing. According to Air Force officials, the 
satellite separated from the rocket, as planned, and was expected to 
reach its intended orbit in about 3 months using its liquid apogee 
engine and hall current thrusters. The satellite's software aborted 
the liquid apogee engine burns due to low acceleration of the 
spacecraft, and this engine was rendered unusable because of the 
propulsion system anomaly. The Air Force plans to use the propulsion 
systems designed for controlling and repositioning the satellite to 
raise the satellite into its planned orbit. As a result, the satellite 
arrival on orbit will be delayed by about 7 to 9 months. Once the 
satellite is in its designated orbit, the program office will conduct 
about 100 days of satellite checkout and system testing before the 
satellite becomes available for operations. The planned February 2011 
launch of AEHF-2 was intended to provide enough time between launches 
to allow the first satellite to reach orbit and complete on-orbit 
checkout so any problems identified could be corrected in AEHF-2. 
Following the same model, the program office will delay the AEHF-2 
launch until (1) it is cleared for flight in light of the AEHF-1 
propulsion system anomaly and (2) AEHF-1 is on orbit and tested. AEHF-
3 will launch about 8 months after AEHF-2. The program's initial 
operational capability, which requires two on-orbit satellites to 
achieve, will be delayed as well. The program office plans to complete 
a review to identify the root cause of the propulsion system anomaly 
by the end of 2010. After that, the program office will determine what 
actions are required to clear AEHF-2 and AEHF-3 for launch. 

The Air Force plans to procure three additional AEHF satellites--for a 
total of six--which will be clones of the first three except for 
obsolete parts. There will be an approximately 4-year break in 
production between the third and fourth satellites. The program office 
is working to resolve several obsolescence issues and has identified 
between 12 and 15 flight boxes that have parts that are no longer 
available from the original manufacturer. Program officials do not 
anticipate encountering significant technical challenges, but 
integrating, testing and requalifying the new parts will require 
additional time and money. The notional launch dates for satellites 
four through six are 2017, 2018, and 2020, respectively. The Air Force 
is in the process of developing a new acquisition program baseline 
that includes these satellites. 

With the cancellation of the Transformational Satellite Communications 
System (TSAT) program in April 2009, the Air Force is in the process 
of reevaluating its military satellite communications requirements 
beyond the sixth AEHF satellite. It plans to conduct an analysis of 
alternatives to assess options for meeting future requirements, 
including the possible use of commercial satellite communications. 

Program Office Comments: 

The AEHF program office provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM): 

Photograph: Source: U.S. Navy. 

The Navy's AARGM is an air-to-ground-missile for carrier-based 
aircraft designed to destroy enemy radio-frequency-enabled surface-to-
air defenses. The AARGM is an upgrade to the AGM-88 High Speed Anti- 
Radiation Missile (HARM). It will utilize the existing HARM propulsion 
and warhead sections, a modified control section, and a new guidance 
section with Global Positioning System and improved targeting 
capabilities. The program is following a phased approach for 
development. We assessed Phase I. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (6/03); 
Design review (3/06); 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (9/08); 
GAO review (1/10); 
Initial capability (TBD); 
Full-rate decision (TBD). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: ATK Missile Systems Company:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $7.8 million:
Procurement: $1,018.5 million:
Total funding: $1,026.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 1,814: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

[Empty]; As of; 07/2003; Latest 07/2010; Percent change. 

Research and development cost: 
As of 7/2003: $627.8; 
Latest 7/2010: $702.8; 
Percent change: 11.9. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 7/2003: $949.4; 
Latest 7/2010: $1,135.5; 
Percent change: 19.6. 

Total program cost: 
As of 7/2003: $1,577.2; 
Latest 7/2010: $1,838.3; 
Percent change: 16.6. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 7/2003: $.881; 
Latest 7/2010: $.958; 
Percent change: 8.7. 

Total quantities: 
As of 7/2003: 1,790; 
Latest 7/2010: 1,919; 
Percent change: 7.2. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 7/2003: 85; 
Latest 7/2010: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The AARGM program entered production in September 2008 with its 
critical technologies mature and design stable, but without 
demonstrating production maturity. Since then, the program has 
experienced multiple test delays, which could affect the program's 
planned delivery of initial operational capability in May 2011. The 
program began operational testing in June 2010 after a 9-month delay 
due to deficiencies in the missile's reliability and situational 
awareness and concerns about the production-representativeness of test 
missiles. The Navy halted operational testing in September 2010 after 
hardware and software issues caused a series of missile failures. 
According to Defense Contract Management Agency officials, the program 
is working with the contractor to identify the cause of the failures 
and develop corrective action plans. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 
Development start: 6/03; 
DOD design review: 3/06; 
Production decision: 9/08; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

AARGM Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The AARGM program began system development in 2003 with its two 
critical technologies--the millimeter wave software and radome-- 
nearing maturity. According to the program office, these technologies 
were mature and demonstrated in a realistic environment when the 
program entered production in September 2008. However, during 
development tests, the program identified deficiencies related to the 
missile's reliability and situational awareness that delayed the start 
of operational testing. As a result of these deficiencies, the program 
requested and received approval to defer demonstration of its 
lethality requirement for a specific target in a specified scenario 
until follow-on operational testing and evaluation. The Director, 
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), noted in its fiscal year 2009 
assessment that software development challenges, including those 
related to the millimeter wave, continue to pose a risk to the 
program's schedule and the missile's reliability. 

Design Maturity: 

The design of the AARGM appears stable and all drawings were 
releasable to manufacturing by the start of production. 

Production Maturity: 

The AARGM program's production processes were not mature when it 
entered production in September 2008. According to the program office, 
the contractor identified 18 critical manufacturing processes, of 
which 5 are currently in statistical control. The program plans to 
demonstrate that all 18 processes are mature during the second lot of 
low-rate initial production. Since entering production, the program 
has experienced multiple production delays and operational test 
failures. According to Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and 
DOT&E officials, the test failures were caused by both hardware and 
software issues. The hardware failures involved multiple 
subcontractors and were primarily attributed to poor parts quality. 
DCMA officials said that the contractor is conducting detailed 
supplier assessments to determine the cause of the failures and 
formulate corrective action plans. According to DOD's manufacturing 
readiness level deskbook, assessments of critical suppliers should be 
performed before a program enters production. Due to the operational 
test failures, the program halted missile deliveries. According to 
DCMA officials, the program will return all delivered production 
missiles and production-representative test rounds to the contractor 
to implement any corrective actions. Prior to the test failures, the 
AARGM program office had already been working with the contractor to 
improve manufacturing planning, risk identification, and reporting. It 
also included a requirement for the contractor to develop a detailed 
manufacturing plan in the second low-rate production contract, awarded 
in July 2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

The AARGM program has experienced multiple test delays, which could 
affect the program's planned delivery of initial operational 
capability in May 2011. The program began operational testing in June 
2010 after a 9-month delay due in part to concerns from DOT&E about 
the production-representativeness of test missiles. The Navy halted 
operational testing in September 2010 after hardware and software 
issues caused a series of missile failures. According to DOT&E, the 
program plans to conduct additional developmental tests and a new 
operational test readiness review in April 2011 before restarting 
operational tests. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
Program Executive Office, with the support of the Office of the 
Director of Air Warfare and the Commander, Operational Test and 
Evaluation Force, decertified AARGM from operational testing as a 
result of intermittent weapon failures and inaccurate weapon health 
reporting to the aircrew. Upon decertification, the program 
established a review team to assist in root cause analysis and system-
level assessments. The team found immature manufacturing processes and 
software coding errors. A software development and test program is 
underway and has demonstrated improved performance. Manufacturing 
processes are being updated. The first rescreened missiles will enter 
flight testing by December 2010. An integrated test phase has been 
coordinated with DOT&E and the Commander, Operational Test and 
Evaluation Force, to reduce risk upon reentering operational test. The 
Italian Air Force remains committed to the program. Italian missile 
deliveries begin in 2011. The Navy also provided technical comments, 
which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Apache Block III (AB3): 

Photograph: Source: U.S. Army. 

The Army's Apache Block III (AB3) program will upgrade AH-64D Longbow 
Apache helicopters. It is expected to improve performance, situational 
awareness, lethality, survivability, interoperability, and the 
prevention of friendly fire incidents. Each Apache goes to the factory 
for hardware changes. Software improvements can be installed in the 
field, which reduces the time an aircraft is away from the unit and 
increases the training time for soldiers in the field. Upgraded AH-
64Ds are scheduled to enter service starting in 2011. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (6/03); 
System design review: (1/08); 
Production design review (3/09). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (10/10); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Full-rate decision (7/12); 
Initial capability (5/13). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $799.7 million:
Procurement: $8,726.3 million:
Total funding: $9,526.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 682: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 8/2006: $1,138.4; 
Latest 7/2010: $1,629.6; 
Percent change: 43.1. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 8/2006: $5,996.7; 
Latest 7/2010: $11,112.6; 
Percent change: 85.3. 

Total program cost: 
As of 8/2006: $7,135.1; 
Latest 7/2010: $12,742.2; 
Percent change: 78.6. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 8/2006: $11.852; 
Latest 7/2010: $18.334; 
Percent change: 54.7. 

Total quantities: 
As of 8/2006: 602; 
Latest 7/2010: 695; 
Percent change: 15.4. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 8/2006: 79; 
Latest 7/2010: 82; 
Percent change: 3.8. 

[End of table] 

Latest cost and quantities include 56 new-build helicopters. 

In October 2010, the AB3 received approval to enter production with 
mature critical technologies and a stable hardware design. AB3 
upgrades involve a time-phased series of hardware and software-related 
technical insertions. According to program officials, the design 
reviews for the hardware portion of the program have been held, all 
the expected design drawings are releaseable to manufacturing, and the 
last two software-related design reviews are scheduled for fiscal 
years 2012 and 2014. In May 2010, the Director, Defense Research and 
Engineering, assessed the AB3 as ready for production using 
engineering manufacturing readiness levels, a metric that includes 
technology and design maturity and production readiness. The AB3 
program experienced a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical 
threshold in June 2010, due to the addition of 56 new-build 
helicopters to the upgrade program.
Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 
Development start: 7/06; 
DOD design review: 3/09; 
Production decision: 10/10; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

AB3 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The AB3 program's one critical technology--an improved drive system--
is mature. This is the first time this technology will be used in a 
helicopter transmission, and it is expected to provide more power and 
be more reliable than the existing transmission. A developmental test 
aircraft has successfully completed flight tests and has demonstrated 
the maturity of the drive system in a realistic environment. 

Design Maturity: 

The AB3 hardware design is stable. AB3 upgrades involve a time-phased 
series of hardware and software-related technical insertions. The 
design reviews for the hardware portion of the program have been held 
and all the expected design drawings are releasable to manufacturing. 
According to program officials, the last two critical design reviews, 
which are software-related, should not significantly affect the total 
number of design drawings. These reviews are scheduled for fiscal 
years 2012 and 2014--after upgraded AH-64Ds are scheduled to start to 
enter service. According to program officials, the AB3 program uses a 
contract provision requiring the completion of 85 to 90 percent of the 
estimated design drawings for each design review as a mechanism for 
ensuring design stability. In addition, the success of each design 
review determines whether the program will move forward. 

Production Maturity: 

In October 2010, AB3 received approval to enter production. We did not 
assess production maturity because the program has not started to 
collect statistical process control data. However, the Director, 
Defense Research and Engineering, assessed the AB3 as ready for 
production in May 2010. The assessment used engineering manufacturing 
readiness levels, a metric that includes technology and design 
maturity and production readiness, as the basis for reaching this 
conclusion. 

Other Program Issues: 

The AB3 program experienced a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the 
critical threshold in June 2010 due to the addition of new-build 
helicopters to the upgrade program. The original AB3 program involved 
taking legacy aircraft and remanufacturing them with upgraded 
capabilities. However, decreases in the numbers of legacy aircraft 
available for remanufacture due to combat losses, combined with 
increasing wartime demands and the addition of a 13th Combat Aviation 
Brigade, has resulted in a new acquisition strategy that includes 
acquiring 56 new-build aircraft. Since new-build Apaches cost three 
times more than a remanufactured Apache, a cost breach occurred. As 
part of its Nunn-McCurdy restructuring, the AB3 will be divided into 
two separate major defense acquisition programs--one for 
remanufactured aircraft and one for new builds. This division will 
permit visibility into the cost, schedule, and performance of both 
programs. Even after the program restructuring, risks remain in the 
AB3 program. An analysis by DOD's Program Assessment and Root Cause 
Analyses office noted that even though the AB3 contractor has 
performed well on its development contract, increasing software 
content, extensions of the development schedule, and the ability of 
the contractor to provide production aircraft at prices consistent 
with the existing program baseline, all pose risks for the current 
program. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (Army IAMD): 

Photograph: Source: Northrop Grumman. 

The Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) program is being 
developed to network sensors and weapons and a common battle command 
system across a single integrated fire control network to support the 
engagement of air and missile threats. The IAMD Battle Command System 
(IBCS) will provide control and management for IAMD sensors and 
weapons, such as the Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated 
Netted Sensor System and PATRIOT through an interface module that 
supplies battle management data and enables networked operations. 

Concept: 
Technology development: (2/06); 

System development: 
Development start (12/09); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Design review (8/11). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (12/14); 
Initial capability (8/16). 
Full-rate decision (5/17). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space & Mission Systems Corp:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,177.4 million:
Procurement: $3,382.6 million:
Total funding: $4,560.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 285: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 12/2009: $1,571.4; 
Latest 12/2009: $1,571.4; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 12/2009: $3,382.6; 
Latest 12/2009: $3,382.6; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost: 
As of 12/2009: $4,954.0; 
Latest 12/2009: $4,954.0; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 12/2009: $16.737; 
Latest 12/2009: $16.737; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total quantities: 
As of 12/2009: 296; 
Latest 12/2009: 296; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 12/2009: 80; 
Latest 12/2009: 80; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

IAMD entered development in December 2009 with its four critical 
technologies nearing maturity. However, according to program 
officials, the technologies will not be fully mature until after the 
design review in August 2011. As a result, the program will not have 
demonstrated that the proposed design meets requirements until after 
the design review, which puts it at risk for late design changes. The 
platform the IBCS was originally planned to be fielded on will not be 
available when production begins in 2014, but according to program 
officials, an alternative has been selected. The cost and schedule of 
the IAMD program may also be affected by an Army proposal to 
substitute the IBCS for the current battle management system under 
development for the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). If 
this option is selected for any of the MEADS partners, the development 
schedule for IAMD will need to be synchronized with MEADS. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 12/09; 
GAO review; 11/10; 
DOD design review: 8/11 (not assessed); 
Production decision: 12/14 (not assessed). 

[End of figure] 

Army IAMD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

IAMD entered development in December 2009 with its four critical 
technologies--integrated battle command, integrated defense design, 
integrated fire control network, and distributed track management-- 
nearing maturity. In August 2009, the Office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology approved a 
technology readiness assessment that stated that all of the critical 
technologies were tested in a relevant environment using digital 
simulations. In addition, the integrated fire control network and the 
distributed track management technologies were demonstrated through 
hardware tests, and the integrated defense design was demonstrated 
through a prototype. Program officials estimate that the technologies 
will be mature by the IAMD production decision in 2014, but not by its 
planned August 2011 design review. 

Design Maturity: 

The IAMD program is preparing for its August 2011 design review; 
however, the risk of late and potentially costly design changes will 
persist because the program will not have demonstrated that the 
program's critical technologies are fully mature or the proposed 
design meets requirements by then. The Army completed a partial 
preliminary design review prior to development start for the IAMD and 
its components. The IBCS preliminary design review is complete, and 
the reviews for IAMD, the interface modules, and the overall 
integration of the components were expected to be complete in November 
2010. Officials stated that the Army expects to modify the IBCS design 
because the platform it was planned to be fielded on--the High 
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle--will not be available when it 
enters production in 2014. The Army and the contractor evaluated 
alternatives and selected a chassis from the Family of Medium Tactical 
Vehicles (FMTV) as a replacement. The program is now working on 
integrating the FMTV chassis into the design for the IBCS. 

Other Program Issues: 

The cost and schedule of the IAMD program could be affected by an Army 
proposal to substitute the IBCS for the Battle Management Command, 
Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence (BMC4I) system 
under development for the MEADS program. According to Army officials, 
a number of issues would need to be resolved before the proposal could 
be adopted. These issues include a decision between the IBCS and BMC4I 
contractors about whether the substitution is feasible and a decision 
about whether to adopt it for any or all of the MEADS partners. If any 
of the MEADS partners agree to the substitution, the development 
schedule for IAMD will need to be synchronized with MEADS. 
Specifically, IBCS would be needed for integration testing prior to 
the MEADS low-rate initial production decision, currently planned for 
November 2012. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army stated that the 
IAMD program entered the engineering and manufacturing development 
(EMD) phase in December 2009 after a competitive prototyping phase 
lasting 15 months. During this phase, the competitors (Raytheon and 
Northrop) developed IBCS prototypes which were demonstrated to the 
government prior to the selection of one contractor (Northrop). Both 
contractors were assessed at technology readiness levels necessary for 
entry into the EMD phase. Subsequently, Northrop's design was 
reassessed in December 2010, and all critical technologies were at the 
level needed for the current phase of the program. The program is on 
track to conduct the critical design review in August 2011. With 
regards to the insertion of the IBCS into the MEADS program, the Army 
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed to withdraw the 
proposal based on cost and schedule considerations. Any use of the 
IBCS with the MEADS components will be after fiscal year 2016. The 
Army also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability, Increment 1: 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Air Force] 

The Air Force's B-2 EHF satellite communications upgrade is being 
developed in three increments. Increment 1 upgrades the computing 
system speed and storage capacity of the current avionics 
infrastructure to facilitate future B-2 upgrades. Increment 2 will 
provide connectivity through low-observable antennas and radomes, and 
includes nonintegrated Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight 
Terminals and related hardware. Increment 3 will enable connectivity 
with the Global Information Grid and net-ready capability. We assessed 
Increment 1. 

Concept: 
Program start: (3/02). 

System development: 
Development start (2/07); 
Design review (10/08); 
GAO review (11/10). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (7/11); 
Full-rate decision (7/12); 
Required assets available: (3/14); 
Last procurement: (2014). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $119.7 million:
Procurement: $116.7 million:
Total funding: $236.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 16: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 5/2007: $577.7; 
Latest 7/2010: $501.9; 
Percent change: -13.1. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 5/2007: $121.7; 
Latest 7/2010: $116.7; 
Percent change: -4.1. 

Total program cost: 
As of 5/2007: $699.4; 
Latest 7/2010: $618.6; 
Percent change: -11.6. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 5/2007: $33.303; 
Latest 7/2010: $30.929; 
Percent change: -7.1. 

Total quantities: 
As of 5/2007: 21; 
Latest 7/2010: 20; 
Percent change: -4.8. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 5/2007: 85; 
Latest 7/2010: 85; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

According to the program office, the B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 will 
have mature critical technologies and a stable design by its planned 
July 2011 low-rate initial production decision. The program office 
also plans to demonstrate critical manufacturing processes using a 
pilot production line and high levels of manufacturing readiness for 
two key technologies prior to the production decision. The program 
expects an operational assessment to be completed by the Air Force 
Operational Test and Evaluation Center in early 2011 to support the 
production decision. The B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 program completed 
software certification in April 2010 and flight testing began in 
September 2010, after a 5-month delay. According to the program 
office, this delay has added pressure to the test schedule and the 
program's plan to begin initial operational test and evaluation in 
fiscal year 2012. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 2/07; 
DOD design review: 10/08; 
GAO review; 11/10. 
Production decision: 7/11. 

[End of figure] 

B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 Program: 

Technology and Design Maturity: 

The B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 program entered system development in 
February 2007 with all six of its critical technologies nearing 
maturity. The program office expects all critical technologies to be 
mature and flight-qualified by the program's planned July 2011 
production decision. The B-2 EHF Increment 1 design also appears 
stable. According to the program office, all of the expected drawings 
were releasable at the October 2008 design review and the number of 
design drawings has not grown. 

The development and successful integration of new disk drive units and 
integrated processing units is a primary objective for Increment 1. 
The Air Force has completed disk drive unit qualification and design 
verification without discovering any significant issues, and 
integrated processing unit durability and airworthiness testing was 
also completed. 

Production Maturity: 

Although we did not fully assess production maturity because the 
program does not have statistical process control data, we did assess 
aspects of production maturity. According to the program office, the B-
2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 is based on commercial-off-the-shelf 
technology with proven manufacturing processes. The program is 
implementing other practices that will also help demonstrate 
production maturity. For example, according to the program office, 
system-level development testing of a fully configured, production-
representative prototype in its intended environment began in July 
2010, and critical manufacturing processes will be demonstrated on a 
pilot production line using production-representative articles prior 
to the July 2011 production decision. In addition, the program plans 
to complete a manufacturing readiness level assessment to support a 
production readiness review in April 2011 and demonstrate a high level 
of manufacturing readiness for the disk drive units and integrated 
processing units. 

Other Program Issues: 

B-2 EHF SATCOM Increment 1 testing is progressing; however, earlier 
delays have added schedule risk to the test program. The program 
completed software certification in April 2010, after recovering from 
early software development issues that delayed the start of 
developmental test and evaluation by 9 months. Flight testing began in 
September 2010 after a 5-month delay. The delay has added pressure to 
the current test schedule and increased the schedule risk for the 
start of initial operational test and evaluation in fiscal year 2012. 
According to the program office, the delay was a result of 
installation issues, test aircraft concerns, and higher B-2 testing 
priorities. The program office has taken steps to address the 
installation issues and the health of the test aircraft. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the B-2 program office 
noted that despite the delays in software development and in the start 
of flight test, the B-2 EHF Increment 1 schedule remains a year ahead 
of the July 2012 threshold date for its low-rate initial production 
decision, and 7 months ahead of the September 2012 threshold date for 
completion of initial operational test and evaluation. The Air Force 
also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

BMDS: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD): 

Photograph: Source: Missile Defense Agency. 

MDA's GMD is being fielded to defend against limited long-range 
ballistic missile attacks during their midcourse phase. GMD consists 
of an interceptor with a 3-stage booster and kill vehicle, and a fire 
control system that formulates battle plans and directs components 
integrated with BMDS radars. We assessed the maturity of all GMD 
critical technologies, as well as the design of the Capability 
Enhancement II (CE-II) configuration of the Exoatmospheric Kill 
Vehicle (EKV), which began emplacements in fiscal year 2009. 

Technology/System development: 
Program start: (2/96); 
Directive to field initial capability: (12/02); 
1st emplaced CE-I interceptor (7/04); 
Design readiness review (3/06); 
Low-rate decision (9/08). 

Initial capability: 
Initial capability (10/04); 
1st emplaced CE-I successful intercept (9/06); 
1st emplaced CE-II interceptor (10/08); 
Failed intercept test (1/10); 
GAO review (11/10). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Redstone Arsenal, AL:
Funding FY11-FY15:
R&D: $5,512.2 million:
Procurement: $0.0 million:
Total funding: $5,553.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 0: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 2/2010: $37,844.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 2/2010: $0.0; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 2/2010: $38,082.4; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 2/2010: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 2/2010: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of: NA; 
Latest 2/2010: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

Columns include costs from program inception through fiscal year 2015. 
Totals do not include the future cost of the European component. 

MDA continues to put the GMD program at risk for further cost growth 
and delays as it buys and emplaces CE-II interceptors before all the 
critical technologies have been demonstrated in a realistic 
environment. After a 1-year delay, MDA tested the CE-II EKV in January 
2010, but it failed to achieve an intercept. GMD reconducted the test 
in December 2010 and although the booster and EKV were successfully 
launched, it again failed to achieve an intercept. Almost all of the 
CE-II kill vehicles currently under contract will have been delivered 
before the test is successfully conducted. Moreover, developmental 
testing is expected to continue until fiscal year 2021, well after the 
last planned EKV deliveries. Due to the concurrent testing and 
production of the CE-II EKV, the program could experience costly late 
design changes and retrofits if problems are discovered during flight 
testing. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: NA; 
DOD design review: 5/06; 
GAO review; 11/10;
Production decision: TBD (not assessed). 

[End of figure] 

BMDS: GMD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All nine technologies in the GMD operational configuration are mature, 
but two technologies developed for the CE-II interceptor--an upgraded 
infrared seeker and onboard discrimination--are nearing maturity. 
Although the program delivered and fielded more upgraded interceptors 
in fiscal year 2010, its full capability has yet to be verified 
through flight tests. 

Design Maturity: 

The design of the enhanced interceptor appears stable with all of its 
expected drawings released to manufacturing. However, the design could 
still change because two technologies are still being developed and 
have not had their capability verified through flight testing. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the maturity of the production processes for the GMD 
interceptors. The program is buying interceptors for operational use, 
but officials do not plan to make an official production decision or 
collect statistical control data because the planned quantities are 
small. However, according to GMD officials, the program does track 
defects per unit for each major interceptor component. In addition, 
GMD employs a manufacturing capability assessment process in which all 
critical manufacturing indicators are assessed on a monthly basis. 

Other Program Issues: 

GMD continues to concurrently develop, manufacture, and field the CE-
II EKVs putting it at risk for further cost growth, schedule delays, 
and performance shortfalls in delivered capability. After experiencing 
over a 1-year delay, GMD conducted an intercept flight test to assess 
the capability of the CE-II EKV in January 2010; however, it did not 
intercept the target because of a failure in the EKV. GMD reconducted 
this test in December 2010. Although the booster was successfully 
launched and deployed the EKV, it failed to intercept the target. The 
next flight test will be determined after identification of the cause 
of the failure. Although the emplaced CE-II ground-based interceptors 
(GBI) have not been declared operational, the production of the CE-II 
is nearly complete. Consequently, the program is at risk for costly 
late design changes and retrofits if problems are discovered during 
flight testing. 

In fiscal year 2010, GMD conducted a nonintercept flight test of its 
two stage GBI, which was originally designed for a European site. 
Although all flight test objectives were achieved, an EKV anomaly was 
experienced that might affect system performance. 

MDA is currently developing plans to sustain the GMD element through 
2032; however, key unknowns and a lack of analysis have hindered these 
efforts. In fiscal year 2010, GMD continued to develop its fleet 
rotation strategy and aging and surveillance test plan and completed 
its stockpile reliability plan. GAO has been unable to fully assess 
these efforts because they lack key analysis. For example, the 
sufficiency of the planned inventory of operational GBIs is based on 
various assumptions, including the reliability of the interceptor. 
However, developmental testing is expected to continue until at least 
2021 and the reliability of the interceptor is not fully known. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

BMDS: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): 

Photograph: Source: Missile Defense Agency. 

MDA's THAAD is being developed as a rapidly-deployable, ground-based 
missile defense system with the capability to defend against short-and 
medium-range ballistic missiles during their late midcourse and 
terminal phases. A THAAD battery includes interceptor missiles, three 
to six launchers, an X-band radar, and a fire control and 
communications system. MDA is scheduled to deliver the first two of 
nine planned THAAD batteries to the Army in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 
for initial operational use. 

Technology/System development: 
Program start: (1/92); 
Transition to MDA: (10/01); 
Contract award for Batteries 1 and 2: (12/06). 

Initial capability: 
Contract award for Battery 3 interceptors: (9/10); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Materiel release to Army: (3/11); 
Battery 1 initial capability delivery: (9/11); 
Battery 2 initial capability delivery: (3/12). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding FY11-FY15:
R&D: $1,892.4 million:
Procurement: $3,881.9 million:
Total funding: $6,544.9 million:
Procurement quantity: NA: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 2/2010: $15,973.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 2/2010: $4,412.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 2/2010: $21,156.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 2/2010: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 2/2010: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of: NA; 
Latest 2/2010: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

Columns include costs from the program's inception through fiscal year 
2015. 

[End of table] 

THAAD has mature technologies and has had a production contract since 
2006, but the program is still experiencing design and production 
issues. Problems with a safety switch have caused interceptor 
production issues, design changes, and schedule delays. Deliveries of 
Batteries 1 and 2 have been delayed at least 1 year; the number of 
design drawings has increased by more than 20 percent since production 
began due to the switch redesign and other related changes; and the 
Army's acceptance of THAAD batteries has been delayed 6 months until 
testing on the switch is complete. Most THAAD ground component 
deliveries for Batteries 1 and 2 are complete, but there will be a 
production gap of more than a year for future battery ground and 
missile components, which could increase costs. In fiscal year 2010, 
THAAD successfully proved out its objective software in flight testing. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 6/00 (not assessed); 
DOD design review: 12/03; 
Production decision: 12/06; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

BMDS: THAAD Program: 

Technology and Design Maturity: 

The THAAD program's major components--the fire control and 
communications system, interceptor, launcher, and radar--are mature. 
According to the program office, the prime contractor has released 100 
percent of the expected design drawings. However, the number of design 
drawings has increased by more than 20 percent since production 
started in December 2006, due primarily to fire control risk reduction 
efforts, design changes for a safety system called an optical block 
that prevents inadvertent launches, and associated changes to the 
flight sequencing assembly, which houses the optical block. Additional 
drawings or design work could still be required based on the results 
of remaining ground and flight testing. 

Production Maturity: 

MDA awarded a contract for its first two initial operational batteries 
in December 2006 before completing developmental testing on all the 
system's critical components and has experienced production delays as 
a result. While we did not assess THAAD's overall production maturity 
because the program has not collected statistical process control data 
on its critical manufacturing processes, the program's production 
readiness assessments highlighted a number of risks including design 
producibility and qualification of critical components. The delivery 
of the first two batteries has been delayed by at least a year after 
these risks materialized in parts of the THAAD interceptor. A 
qualified optical block design failed during integration qualification 
testing in early fiscal year 2010 due to contamination during 
manufacturing. The program changed to cleaner manufacturing processes 
and subsequently completed this qualification testing in September 
2010. According to program officials, the program plans to develop a 
more producible design of the optical block for use on future THAAD 
battery interceptors. All of the ground components necessary for 
Batteries 1 and 2 have been delivered except for the launchers which 
are experiencing a 2 year delay in completing the government 
acceptance process because of production issues as well as delays to 
the qualification process due to design changes. In addition, 
discoveries during a recent ground test have led to further design 
changes. The launchers are expected to complete the government 
acceptance process by the end of the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. 

Other Program Issues: 

The THAAD program delayed its conditional release of batteries to the 
Army from September 2010 until March 2011 because of ongoing safety 
issues with interceptor components. For the release to occur, the Army 
must certify that the batteries are safe, suitable, and logistically 
supported. According to program officials, the results from optical 
block safety testing in February 2011 are needed before the release 
board can make its decision. 

The THAAD program is facing a production gap that poses cost and 
schedule risks. Product qualification issues delayed contract award 
for Battery 3 interceptors by approximately 6 months to the end of 
fiscal year 2010, and there will be as much as a 1-year production gap 
for some interceptor components. The program did not plan to award the 
contract for THAAD ground components and Battery 4 interceptors until 
the first quarter of fiscal year 2011, which means there will be a 
production gap of up to 3 years for some ground components. As a 
result of these gaps, the program will have to retrain workers and 
recertify and requalify parts. The effect of these gaps on cost is not 
yet known. 

Despite test delays due to target issues, the program was able to 
conduct one flight test in June 2010 to successfully demonstrate the 
complete objective software for the THAAD battery. 

Program Office Comments: 

Program officials stated that the THAAD program is significantly more 
mature than indicated in the "Attainment of Product Knowledge" graph 
and associated language. At production start all production design was 
completed except for two items associated with the fire control and 
interceptor. At the time of this review, none of the interceptors for 
the THAAD batteries were delivered, but all THAAD system and component 
qualifications were completed except for two interceptor-related 
tests. All but one of the subassemblies for each of the 50 
interceptors was delivered. Other technical comments were incorporated 
as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS): 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Navy. 

The Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System 
(BAMS UAS) is intended to provide a persistent maritime intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. BAMS UAS will be 
part of a family of maritime patrol and reconnaissance systems that 
recapitalizes the Navy's airborne ISR assets. Increments 2 and 3 of 
the program will upgrade the system's communication relay and add a 
signals intelligence capability. We assessed Increment 1. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/Development start (4/08); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Design review (1/11); 
Low-rate decision (9/08). 

Production: 
Low-rate production: (5/13); 
Initial capability (12/15); 
Full capability (2019). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,106.5 million:
Procurement: $9,501.8 million:
Total funding: $11,988.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 65: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 2/2009: $3,094.5; 
Latest 12/2009: $3,150.0; 
Percent change: 1.8. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 2/2009: $9,185.3; 
Latest 12/2009: $9,501.8; 
Percent change: 3.4. 

Total program cost: 
As of 2/2009: $12,656.7; 
Latest 12/2009: $13,031.5; 
Percent change: 3.0. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 2/2009: $180.811; 
Latest 12/2009: $186.165; 
Percent change: 3.0. 

Total quantities: 
As of 2/2009: 70; 
Latest 12/2009: 70; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 2/2009: 92; 
Latest 12/2009: 92; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

The BAMS UAS program began development in 2008 with all technologies 
nearing maturity and plans to demonstrate its design is stable by its 
critical design review in January 2011. The program office continues 
to monitor six watch-list items that were identified in a 2007 
independent technology readiness assessment that could affect the 
program's cost, schedule, and performance. The BAMS UAS program plans 
to enter production in May 2013. According to program officials, the 
BAMS air vehicle is based on the RQ-4B Global Hawk and uses sensor 
components or entire subsystems from other existing platforms. There 
are some structural changes to the airframe, but none of these require 
significant changes to manufacturing processes. The program expects to 
purchase two developmental aircraft and begin testing prior to 
production. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 4/08; 
GAO review; 11/10; 
DOD design review: 1/11; 
Production decision: 5/12 (not assessed); 

BAMS UAS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

DOD and the Navy certified that all BAMS UAS technologies were nearing 
maturity and had been demonstrated in a relevant environment before 
the start of system development. The program is monitoring six watch-
list items that were identified in a 2007 independent technology 
readiness assessment, which could cause cost, schedule, or performance 
issues during development. According to the program, the Navy 
conducted an additional independent technology readiness assessment 
after the program's February 2010 preliminary design review. DOD was 
reviewing the results at the time of our assessment. 

Design Maturity: 

The BAMS UAS program expects the air vehicle's design to be stable by 
its January 2011 critical design review. However, the program will be 
at risk for design changes until it integrates all of its key 
subsystems and components and tests them through an integration 
laboratory or an early system prototype demonstration. This will not 
occur until January 2012. According to the program office, about 79 
percent of the BAMS UAS air vehicle's expected drawings are releasable 
to manufacturing and 8 of the 11 subsystem critical design reviews 
have been successfully completed. 

Production Maturity: 

The BAMS aircraft is based on the Global Hawk RQ-4B currently in 
production, and, according to program officials, uses sensor 
components or entire subsystems from other existing platforms. There 
are some significant changes to the airframe, such as deicing and 
structural reinforcements for the wings, but none of these require 
significant manufacturing process changes. The program expects to 
purchase two developmental aircraft and begin testing them prior to 
production. 

Other Program Issues: 

In 2010, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council directed the Navy 
and Air Force to seek efficiencies in the Global Hawk and BAMS UAS 
programs. According to BAMS UAS program officials, the Air Force and 
Navy programs are investigating commonality opportunities in areas 
such as sense-and-avoid capabilities, a common ground control station 
architecture, a consolidated maintenance hub, and basing options for 
both UASs. According to program staff, thus far, only minor changes to 
the configuration of the BAMS UAS are anticipated. 

The BAMS UAS program is also continuing to leverage knowledge from the 
BAMS demonstrator program. The demonstrator consists of two Block 10 
Global Hawk UASs. It is used to support BAMS UAS design activity, test 
ground station capabilities, and develop concepts of operations. For 
example, a BAMS UAS official noted the demonstrator has been 
successful using mission operating bases, which conduct data analysis 
and operate flight controls, located in the continental United States. 
As a result, the program office plans to update its concept of 
operations to reflect this lesson learned. According to the program, 
forward operating bases, responsible for launch and recovery of the 
aircraft, will remain in theater as planned. 

The BAMS UAS program poses a significant software development 
challenge. The program will utilize more than 6 million lines of code, 
including more than 1 million lines of new code. Total lines of code 
have increased by about 13 percent since development start, which 
according to the program, were the result of selecting a different 
sense-and-avoid radar subsystem, and shifting from reused code to new 
software for the synthetic aperture radar. The program is closely 
monitoring the software effort and software is being developed in 
three blocks of capability to decrease risks. 

Program Office Comments: 

According to the Navy, the program continues to meet its cost, 
schedule, and performance requirements. In support of the engineering 
and manufacturing development decision, the Navy stated that the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense assessed the technology and 
determined BAMS had been demonstrated in a relevant environment, since 
the program leverages existing DOD investment in its airframe, engine, 
avionics, payloads, and software. The Navy also stated that the 
program is capturing and applying lessons learned from the programs it 
is leveraging in order to maximize its effectiveness and efficiency. 
Furthermore, the Navy stated that the BAMS UAS and Air Force Global 
Hawk programs continue to work closely together to seek synergistic 
opportunities in all phases of the programs. The Navy also provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP): 

Photograph: Source: Lockheed Martin. 

The Air Force's C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5. The 
RERP is designed to enhance the reliability, maintainability, and 
availability of the C-5 by replacing the propulsion system; modifying 
the mechanical, hydraulic, avionics, fuel, and landing gear systems; 
and making required structural modifications. Together with the C-5 
Avionics Modernization Program, these upgrades are intended to improve 
C-5 mission capability rates and reduce total ownership costs. 

Concept: 
Program start: (2/00). 

System development: 
Development start (11/01); 
Design review (4/04). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (3/08). 
Full-rate decision B-Model (10/10); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Last procurement (2014). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $49.0 million:
Procurement: $4,409.2 million:
Total funding: $4,458.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 40: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 11/2001: $1,726.6; 
Latest 3/2010: $1,760.6; 
Percent change: 2.0. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 11/2001: $9,013.3; 
Latest 3/2010: $5,582.9; 
Percent change: -38.1. 

Total program cost: 
As of 11/2001: $10,743.7; 
Latest 3/2010: $7,348.8; 
Percent change: -31.6. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 11/2001: $85.267; 
Latest 3/2010: $141.323; 
Percent change: 65.7. 

Total quantities: 
As of 11/2001: 126; 
Latest 3/2010: 52;
Percent change: -58.7. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 11/2001: 100; 
Latest 3/2010: 135; 
Percent change: 35.0. 

[End of table] 

The C-5 RERP entered production in March 2008 with mature technologies 
and a design that was nearing completion. We did not assess production 
maturity because the program office does not require process control 
data to be collected. To determine the program's readiness to enter 
full-rate production, the program completed a manufacturing readiness 
assessment, which concluded its manufacturing processes were capable, 
in control, and affordable. The assessment was performed on the first 
low-rate initial production aircraft and may not reflect all 
manufacturing risks. A production aircraft was not used for initial 
operational testing. The Air Force test organization found the system 
to be effective, suitable, and mission capable; however, it noted that 
incomplete development and testing of the aircraft's defensive systems 
and thrust reversers increased the risk of operating in certain 
environments. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 11/01; 
DOD design review: 4/04; 
Production decision: 3/08; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

C-5 RERP Program: 

Technology and Design Maturity: 

According to an independent technology readiness assessment conducted 
in October 2001, the C-5 RERP's technologies are mature. In addition, 
the C-5 RERP design is stable. 

Production Maturity: 

The C-5 RERP program entered production in March 2008. We did not 
assess production maturity because the program office does not require 
process control data to be collected as part of the production 
contract. In order to determine the program's readiness to enter full- 
rate production, the Air Force and the prime contractor, Lockheed 
Martin, performed a manufacturing readiness assessment in early 2010. 
According to the final report, a manufacturing readiness assessment is 
normally conducted near the end of low-rate initial production. 
However, the assessment was performed on the first low-rate initial 
production aircraft while it was in production and may not reflect all 
the manufacturing risks. Program officials stated that conducting the 
assessment at the beginning of low-rate initial production was driven 
by full-rate production decision requirements established in an 
acquisition decision memorandum and the expected date of the decision. 
The Air Force accepted delivery of the first production aircraft in 
October 2010. 

The C-5 RERP program's manufacturing assessment concluded that the 
manufacturing risk was understood and that the manufacturing processes 
for the system were capable, in control, and affordable. The 
assessment identified what program officials believe to be two minor 
issues with the aircraft engine's thrust reverser, which will not 
affect production, and an air exit door that could affect production. 
According to program officials, design changes are being made to the 
thrust reverser to prevent freezing and will be ready for testing in 
April 2011. The thrust reverser modifications will be installed on all 
modernized C-5 aircraft, including those that have already been 
upgraded. The malfunctioning air exit door will be addressed through a 
change to production processes and will not require additional flight 
testing. The program expects all aircraft in the modernized C-5 fleet 
to eventually receive modified air exit doors. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Commander, Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, found 
the C-5 RERP to be effective, suitable, and mission-capable during 
operational testing conducted from October 2009 to January 2010. The 
Air Force did not provide a low-rate initial production aircraft for 
operational testing as recommended by the Director, Operational Test 
and Evaluation, because one was not available. However, according to 
program officials, a production-representative aircraft was used in 
operational testing. According to the test report, the modified 
development aircraft increased the C-5 maximum operating weight, 
significantly surpassed its reliability requirement, and performed its 
required mission better than the C-5 legacy fleet. However, the Air 
Force test organization also noted that incomplete development and 
testing of the aircraft's defensive systems and thrust reversers 
increased the risk of operating in certain environments. 

In February 2010, DOD released the Mobility Capabilities Requirements 
Study-2016, which concluded that the Air Force has excess strategic 
airlift capacity. As a result, the Air Force is requesting approval to 
retire 22 C-5A aircraft. This would reduce the number of aircraft in 
the C-5 Avionics Modernization Program, but it would not affect the 
number of aircraft in the C-5 RERP program. 

Program Office Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP): 

Photograph: Source: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program. 

The Air Force's C-130 AMP will standardize the cockpit and avionics 
for three combat configurations of the C-130 fleet. The program is 
intended to ensure the C-130 global access and deployability by 
satisfying navigation and safety requirements, installing upgrades to 
the cockpit systems, and replacing many systems no longer supportable 
due to diminishing manufacturing resources. It is also expected to 
increase the reliability, maintainability, and sustainability of the 
upgraded aircraft. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (7/01); 
Design review (8/05). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (6/10); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Full-rate decision (2/13); 
Last procurement (2018). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $55.9 million:
Procurement: $3,942.8 million:
Total funding: $3,998.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 214: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 7/2001: $764.0; 
Latest 4/2010: $1,895.6; 
Percent change: 148.1. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 7/2001: $3,307.2; 
Latest 4/2010: $4,100.0; 
Percent change: 24.0. 

Total program cost: 
As of 7/2001: $4,071.2; 
Latest 4/2010: $5,995.6; 
Percent change: 47.3. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 7/2001: $7.844; 
Latest 4/2010: $27.129; 
Percent change: 245.8. 

Total quantities: 
As of 72001: 519; 
Latest 4/2010: 221; 
Percent change: -57.4. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 7/2001: NA; 
Latest 4/2010: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The C-130 AMP program entered production in June 2010 with mature 
technologies and a stable design. The program reported that it 
demonstrated critical manufacturing processes prior to production; 
however, it did not assess manufacturing readiness levels at key 
suppliers and installation facilities. The first two aircraft to 
receive the AMP upgrade have begun the modification process. During 
low-rate production, the program plans to qualify a second contractor 
to compete for the full-rate production contract. In February 2010 the 
program reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the significant 
cost growth threshold, which it attributed to factors such as the 
omission of training devices and adequate spares from initial 
estimates, and delays in the production decision. The program has been 
restructured and planned dates for key events have been pushed back by 
more than 1 year. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 7/01; 
DOD design review: 8/05; 
Production decision: 6/10; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

C-130 AMP Program: 

Technology and Design Maturity: 

The C-130 AMP program's three current critical technologies--global 
air traffic management, defensive systems, and combat delivery 
navigator removal--are mature. After a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach 
of the critical cost growth threshold in 2007, the program was 
restructured and the number of critical technologies was cut from six 
to three. The removed technologies were intended for Special Mission C-
130 aircraft configurations, which were eliminated from the program. 
The design of the C-130 AMP combat delivery configuration is stable, 
with all of the expected drawings releasable to manufacturing. 

Production Maturity: 

The C-130 AMP program reported that it demonstrated critical 
manufacturing processes using production-representative articles prior 
to entering production, but it did not assess manufacturing readiness 
levels at key suppliers and installation facilities. Program officials 
reported that they will perform these assessments during low-rate 
production and develop manufacturing maturity plans as needed in order 
to demonstrate its readiness to begin full-rate production. We did not 
assess the overall production maturity of the program because it does 
not collect statistical process control data on its critical 
manufacturing processes. However, the program does track quality 
metrics related to the numbers of nonconformance and corrective action 
reports, as well as the percentage of inspection points passed. 

Other Program Issues: 

After 2 years of delays and the threat of program cancellation, the C- 
130 AMP received approval to enter production in June 2010. The first 
two aircraft scheduled for AMP kit installation began the modification 
process in August and October 2010, respectively. During low-rate 
production, the program will conduct a full and open competition to 
select a second contractor. The program will qualify the second 
contractor by providing installation and maintenance training, and the 
second contractor will perform up to five low-rate production kit 
installations. This contractor will compete with the current 
contractor for the full-rate production contract, which includes the 
procurement of 198 kits and up to 141 kit installations. The 
competition and planned contract award for the second source have been 
delayed by about 4 months to early 2011 and early 2012, respectively, 
because the program has changed the acquisition approach for this 
effort. These delays could affect the program's planned entry into 
full-rate production in early 2013. 

The C-130 AMP program has completed developmental testing, which 
identified key deficiencies in the areas of crew workload and 
avionics. Specifically, testing found that the core avionics were not 
well adapted to the C-130 tactical missions, and identified the need 
to reduce crew workload during airdrop, low-level, and certain 
formation operations. The program plans to develop additional software 
builds to correct these issues. However, the program has reported a 
delay in awarding the contract for one of these software builds, which 
could affect its ability to begin operational testing in fiscal year 
2012 as planned. 

In February 2010, the C-130 AMP program reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit 
cost breach of the significant cost growth threshold after the average 
procurement unit cost increased by almost 18 percent over its existing 
baseline. According to the program office, the cost breach was due to 
the omission of training devices and adequate spares in initial 
program estimates, inflation, delays in the program's production 
decision, and a change in the kit installation strategy. The program 
has been restructured, and the completion of operational testing and 
low-rate production kit installation, as well as the full-rate 
production decision, are now scheduled to occur more than 1 year later 
than previously planned. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office concurred with this assessment. 

[End of section] 

CH-53K - Heavy Lift Replacement: 

Illustration: Source: © 2008 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation. 

The Marine Corps' CH-53K helicopter will perform heavy-lift assault 
transport of armored vehicles, equipment, and personnel to support 
operations deep inland from a sea-based center of operations. The CH- 
53K program is expected to replace the legacy CH-53E helicopter and 
improve range and payload, survivability and force protection, 
reliability and maintainability, and coordination with other assets, 
while reducing total ownership cost. 

Concept: 
Program start: (11/03). 

System development: 
Development start (12/05); 
Design review (7/10); 
GAO review (11/10). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (9/14); 
Initial capability (9/18); 
Full-rate decision (3/19). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation:
Program office: Patuxent River NAS, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $3,703.2 million:
Procurement: $15,986.9 million:
Total funding: $19,690.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 196: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 12/2005: $4,313.6; 
Latest 7/2010: $5,915.4; 
Percent change: 37.1. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 12/2005: $11,997.9; 
Latest 7/2010: $15,986.9; 
Percent change: 33.2. 

Total program cost: 
As of 12/2005: $16,311.5; 
Latest 7/2010: $21,902.3; 
Percent change: 34.3. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 12/2005: $104.561; 
Latest 7/2010: $109.512; 
Percent change: 4.7. 

Total quantities: 
As of 12/2005: 156; 
Latest 7/2010: 200; 
Percent change: 28.2. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 12/2005: 119; 
Latest 7/2010: 153; 
Percent change: 28.6. 

[End of table] 

According to program officials, both CH-53K current critical 
technologies are nearing maturity and are expected to be fully mature 
by its production decision in 2014. A third technology, the 
viscoelastic lag damper, has been replaced with a modified version of 
an existing technology to reduce cost and weight. The program 
completed its design review in July 2010--16 months later than 
planned--with over 90 percent of its total expected design drawings 
released. Developmental testing and initial operational capability 
have been delayed, and the overall cost of development has increased 
by $1.7 billion. The program is revising its acquisition strategy to 
move the start of production up by 1 year to align with its production 
decision. The program will also update its schedule and cost estimate. 
As it stands now, delivery of the capability will occur more than 2 
years later than planned. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 12/05; 
DOD design review: 7/10; 
GAO review; 11/10; 
Production decision: 9/14. 

[End of figure] 

CH-53K Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The CH-53K program began development in 2005 with three critical 
technologies, all of which were immature. One of these technologies, 
the viscoelastic lag damper, was replaced by a modified version of an 
existing technology to reduce cost and weight. According to the 
program office, the CH-53K's two remaining critical technologies--the 
main rotor blade and the main gearbox--were nearing maturity when the 
program's design review was held in July 2010. The program office 
plans for these technologies to be fully mature and demonstrated in a 
realistic environment prior to its production decision in 2014. 

Design Maturity: 

The CH-53K design appears stable. In July 2010, the program office 
completed its critical design review with over 90 percent of total 
expected design drawings released. However, the continuing maturation 
of critical technologies could result in design changes as testing 
progresses. 

Other Program Issues: 

CH-53K developmental testing and initial operational capability have 
been delayed, and the overall cost of development has increased by 
$1.7 billion. To avoid further cost and schedule problems, the program 
has taken several steps, including allowing more time to review the 
design and deferring certain requirements. For example, the program 
delayed its critical design review to ensure that all subsystems had 
completed their design reviews before moving forward. In addition, the 
program has received approval to defer three net ready capabilities--
variable message format (VMF), mode 5, and link 16--to later in 
production to reduce development costs. According to the program 
office, deferring these capabilities would save approximately $103.5 
million in the near term. However, it will also decrease the initial 
capability that is delivered to the warfighter. The program is 
currently revising its acquisition strategy to move the start of 
production up by 1 year to align with its production decision. 
Currently, there is a 1-year gap between the production decision date 
and the scheduled start of production. According to the program 
office, it is also updating its schedule and cost estimates. 

Delays in the CH-53K program may result in the extended use of and 
increased costs for legacy systems, such as the CH-53E and CH-53D 
helicopter. Currently deployed CH-53E aircraft are flying at almost 
three times the planned utilization rate. This operational pace is 
expected to result in higher airframe and component repair costs, as 
the Marine Corps seeks to minimize CH-53E inventory reductions until 
CH-53K deliveries reach meaningful levels. According to program 
officials, all available decommissioned CH-53E and CH-53D helicopters 
have been reclaimed and all available parts have been salvaged to keep 
the current inventory of aircraft in service. However, as a cost-
saving measure, the Marine Corps now plans to begin retiring the 
entire CH-53D fleet earlier than anticipated. 

In 2008, the program office was directed to increase the number of 
planned CH-53K aircraft from 156 to 200 to accommodate an increase in 
Marine troop levels from 174,000 to 202,000. The quantity increase 
added $5 billion in procurement cost to the program. 

Program Office Comments: 

In its comments on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that, 
during 2010, the CH-53K program completed the critical design review 
and began assembly of the engineering development model test articles. 
Critical technologies are maturing as planned in the approved 
technology maturation plan. In August 2010, the Director, Defense 
Research and Engineering, certified that both critical technology 
elements had achieved technology readiness level 6, which is the 
appropriate level of maturity for this stage of program development. 
The President's 2011 budget fully funded the program to achieve a 
fiscal year 2018 initial operational capability. The Navy also 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

CVN 21 Future Aircraft Carrier: 

Photograph: Source: U.S. Navy. 

The Navy's CVN 21 program is developing a new class of nuclear-powered 
aircraft carriers. The carriers will include advanced propulsion, 
aircraft launch and recovery, and survivability technologies designed 
to improve operational efficiency, enable higher sortie rates, and 
reduce manpower. The Navy awarded a contract for detail design and 
construction of the lead ship, CVN 78, in September 2008 and expects 
delivery of the ship by September 2015. The Navy plans to award a 
construction contract for the second ship, CVN 79, in December 2012. 

Concept: 
Program start (6/00); 

System development: 
Construction-preparation contract award: (5/03); 

Production: 
Lead-ship fabrication start: (9/08); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Construction contract award--second ship (12/12); 
First ship delivery: (9/15); 
Initial capability (9/16). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding-Newport News:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $991.2 million:
Procurement: $19,047.6 million:
Total funding: $20,038.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 2: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 4/2004: $4,732.3; 
Latest 6/2010: $4,588.0; 
Percent change: -3.1. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 4/2004: $30,316.2; 
Latest 6/2010: $29,597.8; 
Percent change: -2.4. 

Total program cost: 
As of 4/2004: $35,048.5; 
Latest 6/2010: $34,185.7; 
Percent change: -2.5. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 4/2004: $11,682.827; 
Latest 6/2010: $11,395.246; 
Percent change: -2.5. 

Total quantities: 
As of 4/2004: 3; 
Latest 6/2010: 3; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 4/2004: 137; 
Latest 12/2009: 149; 
Percent change: 8.8. 

[End of table] 

CVN 78 began construction in September 2008. However, 7 of the 
program's 13 critical technologies are still not fully mature because 
they have not been demonstrated in a realistic, at-sea environment. Of 
these technologies, the electromagnetic aircraft launch system 
(EMALS), advanced arresting gear, and dual band radar present the 
greatest cost and schedule risk. The ship's three-dimensional product 
model was completed in November 2009, but the contractor is making 
design changes and could experience more as EMALS and other systems 
complete testing. Seventy-two percent of the ship's structural units 
are complete, accounting for about 19 percent of the total production 
hours. A number of units are behind schedule due to late materials. 
The program's shift from a 4-to 5-year build cycle could increase 
costs if it results in the type of inefficiencies predicted by the 
shipbuilder. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Contract award: (5/04; 
Lead ship fabrication: 9/08; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

CVN 21 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Seven of the CVN 21 program's 13 current critical technologies have 
not been demonstrated in a realistic, at-sea environment. Of these 
technologies, EMALS, the advanced arresting gear, and dual band radar 
present the greatest risk to the ship's cost and schedule. Program 
officials stated that EMALS development has been one of the primary 
drivers of CVN 78 cost increases. Problems have occurred in EMALS 
testing which could result in more design changes later in the 
program. Testing uncovered a crack in the motor, which has already 
resulted in several design changes; and in January 2010, a motor 
controller software error caused damage to the EMALS hardware. Both 
fixes have successfully been retested. The program completed the first 
four F/A-18E launches in December 2010. The advanced arresting gear is 
nearing maturity and has completed extended reliability testing. 
However, delays in land-based testing with simulated and live aircraft 
could lead to late delivery. The Navy finalized a fixed-price 
production contract for EMALS and the advanced arresting gear in June 
2010. Although the Navy continues to pay design and testing costs, any 
EMALS changes identified during development will be incorporated into 
the production units at no cost to the government. The dual band 
radar, which includes the volume search and multifunction radars, is 
being developed by the DDG 1000 destroyer program and is also nearing 
maturity. However, as a part of a program restructuring, the DDG 1000 
eliminated the volume search radar from the program. According to Navy 
officials, radar development has not been affected, but CVN 78 will 
now be the first ship to operate with this radar. Radar equipment will 
be delivered for installation and testing beginning September 2011 for 
the multifunction radar and in January 2012 for the volume search 
radar. 

Design Maturity: 

In September 2008, CVN 78 began production with only 76 percent of its 
three-dimensional product model complete. The three-dimensional 
product model was completed by November 2009, but the contractor is 
currently making design changes to prevent electrical cable routing 
from interfering with other design features. As EMALS and other 
systems complete testing, additional design changes may be necessary. 

Production Maturity: 

The Navy awarded the CVN 78 construction contract in September 2008. 
Construction of approximately 65 percent of the ship's structural 
units is complete. These units account for about 19 percent of the 
ship's total production hours. As of July 2010, construction of the 
hull in dry dock was behind schedule because of late material 
deliveries from suppliers. 

Other Program Issues: 

In 2010, the CVN 21 program shifted from a 4-to 5-year build cycle, 
which could increase program costs. According to program officials, 
the shipbuilder projects that this change will increase costs by 9 to 
15 percent due to the loss of learning and effect on the supplier 
base, among other inefficiencies. The Navy disagrees with this 
assessment and reported to Congress that the shift will have minimal 
negative consequences. The dual band radar also presents cost risks 
for the program. Program officials are considering buying the radar 
for both CVN 79 and CVN 80 at the same time, in order to reduce the 
risks associated with the production line being idle for up to 5 
years. However, this strategy could lead to increased costs if changes 
identified during at-sea testing on CVN 78 need to be incorporated 
into the already-procured systems for the two follow-on ships. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy generally 
concurred with this assessment. Officials stated the program is 
addressing the technology and construction challenges for a successful 
September 2015 delivery, and that CVN 79 is on track to award a 
construction contract by the first quarter fiscal year 2013. The Navy 
stated that while the change from a 4-to 5-year build cycle will 
increase the unit cost of the CVN 78 class carrier, it facilitates a 
reduced average yearly funding requirement over a longer period of 
time. The Navy also provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

DDG 1000 Destroyer: 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Navy. 

The Navy's DDG 1000 destroyer is a multimission surface ship designed 
to provide advanced land-attack capability in support of forces ashore 
and littoral operations. Construction has begun on the first and 
second ships, and the Navy anticipates awarding a construction 
contract for the third ship in the second quarter of fiscal year 2011. 
Bath Iron Works will build all three ships in this class with key 
segments built by Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding Gulf Coast. 

Concept: 
Program start (1/98); 

System development: 
Development start (3/04); 

Production: 
Production decision: (11/05); 
Contract award--construction detail design: (8/06); 
Lead ship construction start: (2/09); 
Second ship construction start: (3/10); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Initial capability (6/16). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: BAE Systems, Bath Iron Works, Northrop Grumman 
Shipbuilding, Raytheon:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 1/1998: $2,240.4; 
Latest 1/2011: TBD;
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 1/1998: $32,043.5; 
Latest 1/2011: TBD;
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost: 
As of 1/1998: $34,283.9; 
Latest 1/2011: TBD;
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 1/1998: $1,071.372; 
Latest 1/2011: TBD;
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities: 
As of 1/1998: 32; 
Latest 1/2011: TBD;
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 1/1998: 128; 
Latest 1/2011: 221; 
Percent change: 72.7. 

[End of table] 

Latest cost data resulting from the June 2010 Nunn-McCurdy 
restructuring were not available at the time of this assessment. 

The second ship in the DDG 1000 class began construction in March 2010 
with a complete design. While all 12 of the program's critical 
technologies are now nearing maturity or are fully mature, 8 of these 
technologies will not be demonstrated in a realistic environment until 
after installation on the first ship. Software development for the 
total ship computing environment also continues to be a challenge. In 
fiscal year 2008, the Navy truncated the DDG 1000 program to three 
ships, triggering a critical Nunn-McCurdy cost breach and a 
restructure of the program. DOD removed the volume search radar from 
the baseline design and will modify software for the remaining 
multifunction radar to meet volume search requirements. The 
restructured program delayed initial operational capability by 1 year 
to allow additional time for the program to retire remaining software 
and production risks. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Construction award: 8/06; 
Lead ship fabrication: 2/09; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

DDG 1000 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Three of DDG 1000's 12 critical technologies are mature, and the 
remaining 9 have been demonstrated in a relevant environment. The Navy 
plans to fully demonstrate the integrated deckhouse before 
installation on the ship, but the remaining 8 technologies will not be 
demonstrated in a realistic environment until after ship installation. 
The design review for one of the technologies--the ship's long-range 
land-attack projectile--was delayed from 2010 to 2011 to allow time to 
correct issues found during rocket motor testing, but program 
officials noted that the projectile has performed well and met 
accuracy and range requirements in flight tests completed to date. The 
total ship computing environment (phased over six releases and one 
spiral) is now nearing maturity, and, according to program officials, 
the integration and testing of software release 5 is complete. 
However, software development challenges remain. According to the 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), there has been significant 
cost growth due to testing delays for release 5, and several 
unresolved problems have been deferred to release 6. DCMA has reported 
that these deferred requirements, coupled with software requirements 
changes for release 6, could create significant cost and schedule 
challenges. 

Design Maturity: 

The DDG 1000 design appears stable. The design was 88 percent complete 
at the start of lead ship construction and 100 percent complete 
shortly thereafter. 

Production Maturity: 

The first DDG 1000 began construction in February 2009 and the Navy 
estimates that approximately 30 percent of the ship is complete. 
Fabrication of the second ship began in March 2010, and 38 percent of 
the units that make up the ship are now in various stages of 
production. The Navy reported that it contractually requires the 
shipbuilders to specify detailed structural attributes to be monitored 
during unit fabrication and integration in order to reduce the risk of 
rework. While the shipbuilders are not currently meeting some of the 
production metrics, program officials reported that these issues have 
been addressed in part by retraining personnel. 

Other Program Issues: 

In fiscal year 2008, the Navy truncated the DDG 1000 program to three 
ships, triggering a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical 
threshold and a restructure of the program. To reduce program costs, 
DOD removed the volume search radar from the design, leaving only the 
multifunction radar on the ship. According to program officials, 
removing the volume search radar will save the program $300 million 
and will not preclude DDG 1000 from meeting its key performance 
parameters. However, the software for the multifunction radar will 
have to be modified to provide a volume search capability that meets 
all planned threat scenarios. The program office has not yet estimated 
the cost of these multifunction radar modifications; it does not 
expect them to affect the program's schedule. According to program 
officials, the ship could accept the volume search radar in the future 
because space and weight will be reserved, but there are currently no 
plans to include it. The program restructure also delayed initial 
operational capability by 1 year to the third quarter of fiscal year 
2016 to allow additional time for the program to retire remaining 
software and production risks. The program expects all three ships to 
be operational by 2018. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
program received milestone B approval, after the critical Nunn-McCurdy 
breach, in October 2010 and is closely monitoring and managing risk 
through comprehensive program metrics, program reviews, and an earned 
value management system. At the time of the review, all critical 
technologies had been at the appropriate level of maturity for the 
program phase. Earned value assessments of both shipbuilders and an 
independent logistics assessment are to be completed in fiscal year 
2011. All 26 major mission systems equipment are in production and on 
track for on-time delivery to the shipyard. Software release 6 is on 
track to support land-based testing for the propulsion system and 
light off of the main engine. The first advanced gun system magazine 
was delivered on time and the first gun has been shipped for testing. 
A successful test mission readiness review and associated tests for 
the multifunction radar were completed in September 2010. The Navy 
also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE): 

Photograph: Source: u.S. Navy. 

The Navy's E-2D AHE is an all-weather, twin-engine, carrier-based 
aircraft designed to extend early warning surveillance capabilities. 
It is the next in a series of upgrades the Navy has made to the E-2C 
Hawkeye platform since its first flight in 1971. The key objectives of 
the E-2D AHE are to improve target detection and situational 
awareness, especially in the littorals; support theater air and 
missile defense operations; and provide improved operational 
availability for the radar system. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/Development start (6/03); 
Design review (10/05). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (5/09); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Initial capability (10/14); 
Last procurement (2019). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Corp.
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $276.5 million:
Procurement: $12,237.2 million:
Total funding: $12,528.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 65: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 6/2003: $3,784.3; 
Latest 6/2010: $4,230.8; 
Percent change: 11.8. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 6/2003: $10,750.2; 
Latest 6/2010: $13,556.9; 
Percent change: 26.1. 

Total program cost: 
As of 6/2003: $14,534.5; 
Latest 6/2010: $17,830.7; 
Percent change: 22.7. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 6/2003: $193.794; 
Latest 6/2010: $237.743; 
Percent change: 22.7. 

Total quantities: 
As of 6/2003: 75; 
Latest 6/2010: 75; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 6/2003: 95; 
Latest 6/2010: 136; 
Percent change: 43.2. 

[End of table] 

The E-2D AHE was approved for entry into production in May 2009 with 
all its critical technologies mature and its design stable. We did not 
assess production maturity; however, according to E-2D program and 
Defense Contract Management Agency officials, the contractor is 
performing well on a variety of production metrics and inspections 
have not identified any significant concerns. The program must 
complete a second operational assessment and improve radar reliability 
before it can award its next production contract. According to program 
officials, the Navy completed a second operational assessment in 
November 2010. However, the program's test plan for improving the 
reliability of the radar system remains aggressive. The program also 
experienced delays in development testing and the delivery of pilot 
production aircraft related to a now-resolved problem with the engine 
mount design. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 6/03; 
DOD design review: 10/05; 
Production decision: 5/09; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

E-2D AHE Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the Navy, all five of the E-2D AHE's critical 
technologies are mature. The Navy completed a technology readiness 
assessment in 2009 to support the program's low-rate initial 
production decision, and DOD concurred with that assessment. The 
assessment included one new critical technology--the high-power UHF 
circulator. In the assessment, DOD raised concerns about the UHF 
transmitter's durability and its potential effect on life-cycle costs 
and operational availability. According to program officials, the 
durability of the parts has improved as a result of increased quality 
control efforts. 

Design Maturity: 

The E-2D AHE design is stable. Program officials said that all current 
design drawings are releasable, but some design changes will be 
necessary to incorporate recent modifications to the aircraft, 
including those related to an engine heat shield puncture issue 
discovered during carrier suitability testing. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess production maturity; however, according to E-2D 
program and Defense Contract Management Agency officials, the 
contractor is performing well on a variety of postproduction metrics, 
and inspections have not identified any significant concerns. The 
contractor reports monthly to the Defense Contract Management Agency 
and the program office on a series of production metrics, such as 
scrap and rework rates, and the program office reported that the 
contractor is meeting its rework goal. The program did not identify 
any critical manufacturing processes associated with the E-2D AHE, nor 
does the program require the contractor's major assembly site to use 
statistical process controls to ensure its critical processes are 
producing high-quality and reliable products because components are 
assembled using manual processes that do not lend themselves to such 
measures. 

Other Program Issues: 

The E-2D AHE program must complete a second operational assessment and 
improve radar reliability before it can award its next production 
contract. The program plans to award this contract after a March 2011 
Defense Acquisition Board review of the program's progress. According 
to program officials, the Navy completed a second operational 
assessment in November 2010. However, the program's test plan for 
improving the reliability of the radar system remains aggressive. The 
radar must demonstrate a reliability rate greater than or equal to 65 
hours. As of November 2010, the program reported a radar reliability 
rate of 46.7 hours. Program officials expect that the radar will 
exceed the 65-hour threshold by the March review because some 
corrective actions have already been implemented, several fixes for 
identified root causes are waiting to be implemented, and few new 
types of errors are occurring. According to program officials, 
forthcoming software updates should address a number of existing 
failures and improve reliability. 

The program also experienced delays in development testing and the 
delivery of pilot production aircraft related to a now-resolved 
problem with the engine mount design discovered during carrier 
suitability testing. Specifically, engine movement led to a 
temperature sensor puncturing a heat shield and making contact with a 
bulkhead during simulated aircraft carrier landings. In response, 
certain carrier landing tests were stopped and other flight tests 
reduced from October 2009 through July 2010 while the program 
implemented a new engine mount design to address the problem. The 
program office decided to adopt this design modification and others on 
the program's three pilot production aircraft, which resulted in a 3-
to 4-month delay in the delivery of each aircraft. According to 
program officials, the third pilot production aircraft was delivered 
in November 2010. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile: 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Army. 

The Army's Excalibur is a family of global positioning system-based, 
fire-and-forget, 155 mm cannon artillery precision munitions intended 
to provide improved range and accuracy. The near-vertical angle of 
fall is expected to reduce collateral damage, making it more effective 
in urban environments. The Army plans to develop the unitary warhead 
version in three increments--Ia-1, Ia-2, and Ib. We assessed 
increments Ia-1 and Ia-2 and made observations on increment Ib. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/Development start (5/97); 
Design review (5/05). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision--increment Ia-2 (7/07). 
GAO review (11/10); 
Initial capability--increment Ia-2 (6/11); 
Last procurement (2016). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, NJ:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $67.2 million:
Procurement: $285.6 million:
Total funding: $352.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 3,930: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 2/2003: $754.2; 
Latest 11/2010: $975.1; 
Percent change: 29.3. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 2/2003: $3,951.7; 
Latest 11/2010: $695.8; 
Percent change: -82.4. 

Total program cost: 
As of 2/2003: $4,705.9; 
Latest 11/2010: $1,670.9; 
Percent change: -64.5. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 2/2003: $.061; 
Latest 11/2010: $.237; 
Percent change: 286.2. 

Total quantities: 
As of 2/2003: 76,677; 
Latest 11/2010: 7,050; 
Percent change: -90.8. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 2/2003: 136; 
Latest 11/2010: 171; 
Percent change: 25.7. 

[End of table] 

Excalibur increments Ia-1 and Ia-2 are in production. According to 
program officials, their critical technologies are mature and designs 
are stable. The program received approval to begin production of 
increment Ia-1 in May 2005 to support an urgent requirement in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Increment Ia-2 entered production in July 2007 and 
completed initial operational test in February 2010. After a design 
and prototype demonstration phase, the Army began engineering and 
manufacturing development for increment Ib in August 2010. The two 
critical technologies for this increment are mature. In May 2010, the 
Army reduced overall program quantities from 30,000 to 6,264 based on 
a review of precision munition needs. The resulting unit cost increase 
led to a Nunn-McCurdy breach of the critical threshold. The program 
expects to be certified to continue in early 2011. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 5/97; 
DOD design review: 5/05; 
Production decision: 7/07; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

Excalibur Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The Excalibur's three critical technologies for increments Ia-1 and Ia-
2--the airframe, guidance system, and warhead--are mature. According 
to the program office, the technologies were demonstrated in a 
realistic environment at the time of their respective design reviews 
in May 2005 and March 2007. After an 18-month prototype design and 
demonstration phase, the Army began engineering and manufacturing 
development for increment Ib in August 2010. According to program 
officials, the two critical technologies for this increment--the 
guidance systems and safe-and-arm fuze--are mature. The contractor for 
increment Ib plans to leverage existing technology from the increment 
Ia program. 

Design Maturity: 

The Excalibur increment Ia-1 and Ia-2 designs are stable. According to 
the program office, more than 90 percent of each increment's expected 
design drawings were releasable at the time of their design reviews. 
The number of design drawings increased by almost 20 percent between 
increment Ia-1 and Ia-2. According to a program official, the increase 
was due to parts changes on increment Ia-1, as well as upgrades and 
changes for increment Ia-2. 

Production Maturity: 

The Excalibur program appears to have overcome a series of quality 
lapses that increased program costs, halted deliveries, and delayed 
the qualification of the Ia-2. As a result of those problems, the 
program manager asked the contractor to review acceptance procedures 
and implement processes to control product quality. The program also 
qualified a new supplier for the inertial measurement unit--a part of 
the projectile's guidance system--which has improved program 
reliability. While we could not assess Excalibur's overall production 
maturity because statistical process controls have not been 
implemented at the system level, the program is taking steps to 
utilize these controls at the assembly plants and subcontractors. The 
contractor has started to compile these data and, as production 
continues and quantities increase, plans to look for key areas at the 
subcontractor level to place under control. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Excalibur program is following an incremental acquisition 
strategy. Increment Ia-1 Excalibur was fielded in Iraq and first used 
in combat in 2007. The program office reported that over 85 percent of 
the rounds expended in combat operations have functioned as expected. 
The program plans to complete production of increment Ia-1 in fiscal 
years 2010 and 2011. Increment Ia-2 is currently in production and 
completed initial operational test and evaluation in February 2010. 
During operational tests, it demonstrated an overall reliability rate 
of 73 percent by successfully completing 35 of 48 shots. The increment 
Ib projectile, which is planned to increase reliability and lower unit 
costs, is scheduled to begin production in fiscal year 2012. 

In May 2010, the Army reduced overall program quantities from 30,000 
to 6,264 based on a review of precision munition needs. The resulting 
unit cost increase--from $47,000 to $99,000 per projectile--led to a 
Nunn-McCurdy breach of the critical threshold. Congress was notified 
of the breach in August 2010. The program expects to be restructured 
and certified by the Secretary of Defense to continue in January 2011. 
As a result of the Nunn-McCurdy breach, the program projects the full-
rate production decision for increment Ia-2 will move from August 2010 
to February 2011. The effects of the program restructure on increment 
Ib are still being determined by the program office. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments on a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Marine Corps. 

The Marine Corps' EFV is designed to transport troops from ships 
offshore to inland locales at higher speeds and from longer distances 
than its predecessor, the Assault Amphibious Vehicle 7A1 (AAV 7A1). 
The EFV will have two variants--a troop carrier for 17 combat-equipped 
Marines and 3 crew members and a command vehicle to manage combat 
operations. Since the program started, DOD has also awarded contracts 
to redesign key subsystems to improve reliability and to develop an 
armor kit to protect EFVs from improvised explosive devices. 

Concept: 
Program start (12/00); 
Nunn-McCurdy breach (2/07); 

System development: 
Development start (7/08); 
GAO review (11/10); 
KP-2 demonstrated reliability (1/11); 
Operational testing (7/11). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (1/12); 
Initial capability (8/16). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics:
Program office: Woodbridge, VA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $575.7 million:
Procurement: $9,993.4 million:
Total funding: $10,637.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 573: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 12/2000: $1,625.2; 
Latest 11/2010: $3,740.2; 
Percent change: 130.1. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 12/2000: $7,299.8; 
Latest 11/2010: $10,208.4; 
Percent change: 39.8. 

Total program cost: 
As of 12/2000: $9,018.7; 
Latest 11/2010: $14,043.7; 
Percent change: 55.7. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 12/2000: $8.799; 
Latest 11/2010: $23.682; 
Percent change: 169.2. 

Total quantities: 
As of 12/2000: 1,025; 
Latest 11/2010: 593; 
Percent change: -42.1. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 12/2000: 138; 
Latest 11/2010: 257; 
Percent change: 86.2. 

[End of table] 

The EFV's critical technologies are mature, but its design is still 
evolving. In 2007, DOD extended system development, and the program 
revised its approach to meeting its reliability requirements. In 
addition to reliability, the program is monitoring risks related to 
its schedule, the vehicle's weight, and the potential for increased 
unit costs. Seven new prototypes, which incorporate significant design 
changes, are now undergoing development and reliability growth 
testing, and the program plans to demonstrate the prototypes' initial 
reliability in January 2011. The Secretary of Defense has proposed 
canceling the program. If it is not canceled, the program will 
determine whether schedule or quantity changes--such as delaying its 
production decision or reducing initial quantities--are warranted. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 12/00; 
DOD design review: 12/08; 
GAO review; 11/10; 
Production decision: 1/12; 

[End of figure] 

EFV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the program office, all four EFV critical technologies-- 
high-pressure jet, high-speed planing, lightweight armor, and power 
diesel--are mature. 

Design Maturity: 

The EFV's design is still evolving. In 2007, DOD extended system 
development, and the program revised its approach to meeting its 
reliability requirements. One part of this approach involved a 
restructured development effort to test redesigned components on 
existing prototypes. Another part involved building seven new 
prototypes, which incorporate 180 significant subsystem design changes 
to improve the EFV's ability to move, shoot, communicate, and carry 
and protect troops. The initial reliability goal of the design changes 
is to increase system reliability from the 4.5 hours mean time between 
operational mission failures measured in the program's 2006 
operational assessment to 16.4 hours prior to the next operational 
assessment, which is planned for July 2011. The prototypes are now 
undergoing development and reliability growth testing, and the program 
plans to demonstrate this 16.4 hour goal in January 2011. The eventual 
goal is for low-rate initial production vehicles to demonstrate 43.5 
hours of reliability during initial operational test and evaluation, 
which is scheduled to begin in July 2015. These operational test 
results will support the program's full-rate production decision in 
September 2016. 

Production Maturity: 

According to the EFV program, it is too early to determine the 
maturity of the EFV production processes. While the seven 
developmental prototype vehicles were built using tooling and 
processes that were representative of those used in production, the 
program does not intend to collect data on key manufacturing processes 
or use statistical process controls until low-rate production begins. 
EFV suppliers are performing inspections of the program's key product 
characteristics and recording the data in preparation for future 
statistical process control analysis. 

Other Program Issues: 

The EFV program is entering a period that could determine whether or 
not it continues. In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense proposed 
canceling this program, stating that the EFV would be an enormously 
capable vehicle if completed, but that the mounting costs of acquiring 
it needed to be weighed against other priorities. 

The program is currently monitoring four risk areas that could affect 
the ultimate success of the program. Reliability growth has been 
identified as a risk because there is a chance that the design changes 
the program has made may not be significant enough to provide the 
needed improvement in reliability. The program has also identified 
vehicle weight as a risk. Program officials expect aggressive weight 
management throughout the current development effort and low-rate 
initial production to mitigate this risk. While the program's current 
weight assessment shows that the prototype design will not accommodate 
the required weight growth for future upgrades and increased loads, 
the program currently projects that the low-rate initial production 
design will meet the weight growth margin in the EFV's requirement 
document for production. The program's schedule leading up to the 
program's production decision also faces risks. Specifically, 
technical and software issues could delay key events, such as 
developmental testing and the start of the program's July 2011 
operational assessment. Finally, there is a risk that redesign of the 
EFV could increase unit costs as well as operations and support costs 
for the program. If the program continues, it will determine whether 
schedule or quantity changes--such as delaying its production decision 
or reducing initial quantities--are warranted to address these risks 
and its overall affordability. 

Program Office Comments: 

DOD provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which 
we incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter): 

Illustration: Source: 2010 Lockheed Martin. 

DOD's JSF program is developing a family of stealthy, strike fighter 
aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. allies, with 
the goal of maximizing commonality to minimize life-cycle costs. The 
carrier-suitable variant will complement the Navy F/A-18E/F. The Air 
Force variant will primarily be an air-to-ground replacement for the F-
16 and the A-10, and will complement the F-22. The short take-off and 
vertical landing variant will replace the Marine Corps F/A-18 and AV-
8B aircraft. 

Concept: 
Program start (11/96); 

System development: 
Development start (10/01); 
Design review (2/06 and 6/07); 
Production decision (6/07). 

Production: 
GAO review (11/10); 
Initial capability--USMC (12/12); 
Initial capability--USAF & USN (4/16); 
Last procurement (2035). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Arlington, VA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $8,359.6 million:
Procurement: $215,146.0 million:
Total funding: $223,815.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 2,385: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 10/2001: $38,402.1; 
Latest 8/2010: $53,663.1; 
Percent change: 39.7. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 10/2001: $170,372.1; 
Latest 8/2010: $229,467.6; 
Percent change: 34.7. 

Total program cost: 
As of 10/2001: $210,557.6; 
Latest 8/2010: $283,674.5; 
Percent change: 34.7. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 10/2001: $73.467; 
Latest 8/2010: $115.456; 
Percent change: 57.2. 

Total quantities: 
As of 10/2001: 2,866; 
Latest 8/2010: 2,457; 
Percent change: -14.3. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 10/2001: 116; 
Latest 8/2010: 174; 
Percent change: 50.0. 

[End of table] 

Latest cost data do not fully account for cost and schedule changes 
resulting from the program's critical Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach. 

The JSF is in production but three critical technologies are not 
mature, manufacturing processes are not proven, and testing is not 
complete. Continuing manufacturing inefficiencies, parts problems, and 
technical changes indicate that the aircraft's design and production 
processes may lack the maturity needed to efficiently produce aircraft 
at planned rates. With most of developmental and operational flight 
testing still ahead, the risk of future design changes is significant. 
DOD restructured the JSF program in February 2010 to address 
development challenges. The projected cost growth triggered a Nunn- 
McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical threshold. According to 
program officials, the JSF is tracking well against its new, less 
aggressive test schedule despite late deliveries of test aircraft and 
lower than expected availability rates for short take-off/vertical 
landing test aircraft. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 10/01; 
DOD design review: 2/06 & 6/07; 
Production start: 6/07; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

JSF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JSF program entered system development in 2001 with none of its 
eight critical technologies fully mature. According to the program 
office, five of these technologies are now mature and three 
technologies--mission systems integration, prognostics and health 
management, and radar--are nearing maturity. However, significant 
development risks remain as the program integrates and tests these 
technologies. 

Design Maturity: 

The JSF program did not have a stable design at its critical design 
reviews. The program has now released over 99 percent of its total 
expected drawings; however, the program continues to experience 
numerous design changes. With most of developmental and operational 
flight testing still ahead, the risk of future design changes and 
their potential effect on the program are significant. 

Production Maturity: 

Despite beginning production in 2006 and procuring 58 aircraft to 
date, the JSF program's manufacturing processes are still not mature 
and only 12 percent of its critical processes are in statistical 
control. DOD has reduced near-term production quantities. However, 
continuing manufacturing inefficiencies, parts problems, and technical 
changes indicate that the aircraft's design and production processes 
may lack the maturity needed to efficiently produce aircraft at 
planned rates. Managing an extensive, still-maturing global network of 
suppliers adds another layer of complexity to producing aircraft 
efficiently and on-time. The prime contractor is implementing 
manufacturing process improvements. However, due to the extensive 
amount of testing still to be completed, the program could be required 
to make alterations to its production processes, changes to its 
supplier base, and costly retrofits to produced and fielded aircraft, 
if problems are discovered. 

Other Program Issues: 

After an extensive programwide review, DOD restructured the JSF 
program in February 2010 to address development challenges. The 
restructure increased time and funding for system development, added 
more aircraft to support flight testing, reduced near-term procurement 
quantities, and incorporated additional software resources. The 
projected cost growth--including almost $104 billion since 2007--
triggered a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical threshold. A 
milestone review was scheduled for November 2010 to update cost and 
schedule estimates. 

According to program officials, the JSF is making progress when 
measured against its new, less aggressive test schedule and all three 
variants have had their first flights. However, several issues could 
affect testing. The program had only delivered eight aircraft to test 
sites as of December 2010, and short take-off/vertical landing test 
aircraft have experienced lower than expected availability rates. The 
program also continues to experience challenges in developing and 
integrating the very large and complex software requirements needed to 
achieve JSF capabilities. Further delays in either flight testing or 
software development could jeopardize the Marine Corps' planned 
initial operating capability date. Finally, the uncertain fidelity of 
test results is a risk because the program relies on an unaccredited 
network of test laboratories and simulation models to evaluate system 
performance. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office noted 
that JSF is undergoing a technical baseline review of requirements to 
complete the development effort as part of the consideration for 
recertification of the development milestone. Eight aircraft of the 10 
anticipated in 2010 have been delivered to the test sites. An 
additional 4 are projected to be delivered by June 2011. The test 
program has slightly exceeded the overall test flight and test point 
metrics planned for 2010; testing of the Marine Corps variant is 
behind plan while testing of the Air Force variant has exceeded plans. 
Mission systems testing is underway with Block 1.0 on both Air Force 
and Marine Corps mission systems test aircraft. Over half of the 
projected airborne system software is in testing including the 
foundational sensor fusion architecture. Survivability testing has 
begun (live fire testing and radar cross section signature ground 
testing) and results thus far are matching predictions. The first 
airborne dynamic signature test with aircraft AF-3 will begin December 
2010. 

[End of section] 

Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T): 

Illustration: Source: Boeing. 

The Air Force's FAB-T will provide a family of satellite 
communications terminals for airborne and ground-based users. FAB-T 
will address current and future communications capabilities and 
technologies, replacing many program-unique terminals. FAB-T is being 
developed incrementally. The first increment will provide voice and 
data military satellite communications for nuclear and conventional 
forces as well as airborne and ground command posts, including the B-
2, B-52, RC-135, E-6, and E-4 aircraft. We assessed this increment. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (9/02); 
Critical design review (1/09); 
GAO review (11/10). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (TBD); 
Full-rate production (TBD); 
Last procurement (TBD). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Hanscom AFB, MA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $220.2 million:
Procurement: $2,081.8 million:
Total funding: $2,302.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 209: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 12/2006: $1,514.4; 
Latest 12/2009: $1,735.2; 
Percent change: 14.6. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 12/2006: $1,627.0; 
Latest 12/2009: $2,194.6; 
Percent change: 34.9. 

Total program cost: 
As of 12/2006: $3,141.5; 
Latest 12/2009: $3,929.9; 
Percent change: 25.1. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 12/2006: $14.544; 
Latest 12/2009: $16.172; 
Percent change: 11.2. 

Total quantities: 
As of 12/2006: 216; 
Latest 12/2009: 243; 
Percent change: 12.5. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 12/2006: 129; 
Latest 12/2009: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The program did not provide an updated cost position or future funding 
stream because of ongoing changes related to the rebaseline. 

The FAB-T program expected to enter production in February 2010 with 
its critical technologies mature and its design stable; however, the 
program now plans to significantly extend its development phase to 
more fully develop the high-data-rate variant and reduce the 
concurrency in testing and production. A new low-rate production 
decision date has not yet been approved, but is tentatively scheduled 
for the first quarter of fiscal year 2013. Two critical technologies 
have not yet demonstrated their maturity as planned, and the FAB-T 
program office continues to monitor certification of the system's 
cryptography by the National Security Agency. The FAB-T design also 
does not appear to be stable; however, we were unable to specifically 
assess it because the program has not provided updated information on 
its design relating to its restructure and rebaseline efforts. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 9/02; 
DOD design review: 1/09; 
GAO review; 11/10; 
Production decision: TBD (not assessed); 

[End of figure] 

FAB-T Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The FAB-T program expected to enter production in February 2010 with 
all six critical technologies mature and demonstrated in a realistic 
environment. However, according to program officials, two critical 
technologies--the continuous transverse stub antenna and the high-data-
rate software configuration architecture--have not yet demonstrated 
their maturity as planned. The program has decided to extend the 
development phase, in large part to more fully develop the high-data- 
rate software variant. FAB-T's critical technologies were not assessed 
at development start in 2002 because it was not yet a major defense 
acquisition program. 

Design Maturity: 

The FAB-T design does not appear to be stable. Even though the program 
office reported a high percentage of releasable design drawings last 
year, there have been changes to the program since then that could 
affect the design. Specifically, as a result of hardware qualification 
problems and testing failures, the program decided to extend 
development and delay production. Resolving these issues could require 
design changes. According to program officials, the program also 
anticipates that two engineering changes--one related to secure 
transmissions and another related to environmental specifications-- 
will require additional design work. We were unable to specifically 
assess the design as a whole because the program has not provided 
updated information on its design relating to its restructure and 
rebaseline efforts. 

Other Program Issues: 

The FAB-T program has recently been restructured and rebaselined to 
more fully develop the high-data-rate variant and reduce concurrency 
between testing and production. The program delayed its scheduled 
February 2010 production decision and plans to extend its development 
phase. In January 2009, the contractor delivered the first FAB-T 
engineering model. According to program officials, FAB-T completed all 
the objectives for developmental flight testing of the hardware for 
the low-data-rate system in August 2009. At that time, program 
officials expected the extended or high-data-rate system to undergo 
most of its testing concurrently with low-rate production. However, 
according to the program office, hardware qualification problems and 
testing failures made this level of concurrency an unacceptable risk. 
The new low-rate production decision date is tentatively scheduled for 
November 2012. In addition, in response to cost and schedule growth on 
the FAB-T program, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the 
establishment of four integrated product teams to perform reviews 
similar to those required for a Nunn-McCurdy breach on management, 
technical, and cost issues, and to examine potential alternative 
sources and changes to requirements. 

FAB-T certification by the National Security Agency (NSA) is another 
key step in the program. FAB-T needs to properly protect information 
at various classification levels and NSA will provide a certification 
of the cryptography in certain equipment. In June 2009, NSA completed 
a review of the low-data-rate version of system software and approved 
limited use of the FAB-T cryptographic element in program testing. 
Program officials expected to be authorized to test the extended-data- 
rate version of system software around the end of 2010. The NSA is 
currently scheduled to complete final certification of this version in 
March 2013. However, delays in the maturation of the high-data-rate 
software configuration architecture technology could affect the 
certification schedule. 

Program Office Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B): 

Photograph: Source: Northrop Grumman. 

The Air Force's Global Hawk is a high-altitude, long-endurance 
unmanned aircraft with integrated sensors and ground stations 
providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. 
The Global Hawk will replace the U-2. After a successful technology 
demonstration, the system entered development and limited production 
in March 2001. The program includes RQ-4A aircraft similar to the 
original demonstrators, as well as larger and more capable RQ-4Bs. We 
assessed the RQ-4B, which is being procured in three blocks. 

Concept: 
Demonstration program start (2/94); 

System development: 

Production: 
Development start/low-rate decision (3/01). 
GAO review (11/10); 
Last procurement (2018). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,067.5 million:
Procurement: $5,339.1 million:
Total funding: $6,406.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 39: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 3/2001: $1,026.3; 
Latest 7/2010: $3,948.7; 
Percent change: 284.8. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 3/2001: $4,255.0; 
Latest 7/2010: $9,481.6; 
Percent change: 122.8. 

Total program cost: 
As of 3/2001: $5,312.4; 
Latest 7/2010: $13,575.7; 
Percent change: 155.5. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 3/2001: $84.323; 
Latest 7/2010: $176.307; 
Percent change: 109.1. 

Total quantities: 
As of 3/2001: 63; 
Latest 7/2010: 77; 
Percent change: 22.2. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 3/2001: 55; 
Latest 7/2010: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The Global Hawk RQ-4B has mature critical technologies, a stable 
design, and proven production processes, but it remains at risk for 
late design changes and costly retrofits. The completion of 
operational tests for the aircraft that make up the largest part of 
the program has been delayed nearly 4 years by testing discoveries, 
concurrent testing, resource constraints, and weather problems. The 
program will have procured more than half of those aircraft by the 
time testing is complete in December 2010. The program also plans to 
procure more than half the aircraft with advanced radar before it 
completes operational testing in 2013. The Air Force is taking steps 
to address some of the testing delays. In fiscal year 2010, the Air 
Force increased the total number of aircraft to be procured from 54 to 
77 and extended planned production through 2018. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: NA; 
DOD design review: NA; 
DEvelopment start/production decision: 3/01; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

Global Hawk Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The critical technologies for the RQ-4B are mature. However, the 
program must still successfully test two key capabilities--the 
advanced signals intelligence payload and multiple platform radar--to 
ensure they perform as expected. The first flight of an RQ-4B equipped 
with the signals intelligence payload occurred in September 2008 and 
operational testing is scheduled to be completed in December 2010. 
After delays in its development, the first flight of an RQ-4B equipped 
with the multiple platform radar is expected to occur in April 2011. 
Development testing is underway. 

Design Maturity: 

The RQ-4B basic airframe design is stable with all of its expected 
design drawings released; however, the program remains at risk for 
late design changes and costly retrofits if problems are discovered in 
testing. During the first year of production, frequent substantive 
engineering changes increased development and airframe costs and 
delayed deliveries and testing. Substantial commonality between the RQ-
4A and RQ-4B had been expected, but as the designs were finalized and 
production geared up, the design differences were much more extensive 
and complex than anticipated. 

Production Maturity: 

The manufacturing processes for the RQ-4B airframe are mature and in 
statistical control. In addition, the program reports that it is 
meeting its quality goal on the number of nonconforming parts. The RQ- 
4B aircraft is being produced in three configurations. Block 20 
aircraft are equipped with an enhanced imagery intelligence payload; 
block 30 aircraft have both imagery and signals intelligence payloads; 
and block 40 aircraft will have an advanced radar surveillance 
capability. All six block 20 aircraft have been produced. Production 
continues on block 30 and block 40 aircraft. The first block 30 
aircraft was delivered in November 2007 and the first block 40 
aircraft was delivered without the sensor in November 2009. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Global Hawk program expects to have procured all of its block 20 
aircarft, and more than half of its block 30 and block 40 aircraft 
before operational testing is complete. As a result, if problems are 
found in operational testing, it could result in costly retrofits for 
large numbers of aircraft. The Global Hawk program has continued to 
experience delays in developmental and operational testing. The 
completion of operational tests for the block 20 and 30 aircraft has 
been delayed nearly 4 years to December 2010. The start of operational 
testing for block 40 aircraft has been delayed by more than 3 years to 
March 2013. According to the Global Hawk's December 2009 Selected 
Acquisition Report, several factors contributed to the most recent 
schedule slips, including developmental test discoveries; concurrent 
development and production testing; testing resource constraints; and 
weather problems. According to program officials, a shift in focus and 
resources required to address a Joint Urgent Operational Need, using 
two block 20 aircraft, has also contributed to block 40 operational 
test delays. The Air Force is taking steps to address some of the 
testing delays. For example, the program is now conducting aircraft 
acceptance tests at Beale Air Force Base in order to free up resources 
for operational testing at Edwards Air Force Base. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force emphasized 
that the Global Hawk program has improved program execution while 
reducing program risk. The Air Force noted that older RQ-4A Global 
Hawk aircraft--which we did not assess--have been successfully used by 
the warfighters and other government agencies to carry out various 
missions. The service also noted that each of the variants of its 
larger RQ-4B aircraft is now either in operations or testing. Flight 
operations of deployed aircraft and flight testing of the advanced 
radar payload are expected to begin in 2011. The Air Force noted that 
current challenges facing the program include initial system 
deployments and normalization of operations and sustainment. In 
addition to commenting on this assessment, the Air Force provided 
technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA: 

Illustration: Source: Lockheed Martin. 

The Air Force's Global Positioning System (GPS) III program will 
develop and field a new generation of satellites to supplement and 
eventually replace GPS satellites currently in use. It consists of 
three increments: IIIA, IIIB, and IIIC. Other programs will develop 
the ground control system and user equipment. We assessed GPS IIIA, 
which intends to provide capabilities such as a stronger military 
navigation signal to improve jamming resistance and a new civilian 
signal that will be interoperable with foreign satellite navigation 
systems. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (5/08); 
Design review (8/10); 
GAO review (11/10). 

Production: 
Production decision (12/10); 
First satellite available for launch (5/14). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,238.6 million:
Procurement: $1,409.6 million:
Total funding: $2,648.2 million:
Total quantity: 8: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 5/2008: $2,486.9; 
Latest 7/2010: $2,615.2; 
Percent change: 5.2. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 5/2008: $1,396.3; 
Latest 7/2010: $1,409.6; 
Percent change: 1.0. 

Total program cost: 
As of 5/2008: $3,883.1; 
Latest 7/2010: $4,024.8; 
Percent change: 3.6. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 5/2008: $485.392; 
Latest 7/2010: $503.099; 
Percent change: 3.6. 

Total quantities: 
As of 5/2008: 8; 
Latest 7/2010: 8; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 5/2008: NA; 
Latest 7/2010: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

We could not calculate acquisition cycle times for GPS IIIA because 
initial operational capability will not occur until GPS IIIC 
satellites are fielded. 

The GPS IIIA program completed its critical design review in August 
2010 with its critical technologies mature and design stable. The 
program plans to prove its production processes by building and 
testing a prototype spacecraft prior to its December 2010 production 
decision. This prototype will include almost all satellite parts 
excluding redundant units, but will not be flight-worthy. A complete 
GPS IIIA satellite will not be available for testing prior to the 
production decision. The GPS IIIA program is using a "back-to-basics" 
approach, which emphasizes best practices such as maintaining stable 
requirements and using mature technologies. The program still faces 
risks to delivering and launching satellites as planned, due to its 
compressed schedule and dependence on a separately developed ground 
control system being fully functional. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 5/08; 
DOD design review: 8/10; 
GAO review; 11/10; 
Production decision: 12/10. 

[End of figure] 

GPS-IIIA Program: 

Technology and Design Maturity: 

The GPS IIIA program's critical technologies are mature and its design 
is stable. The critical technologies have changed for the GPS IIIA 
program as it has developed its design. Prior to contract award, the 
program's five critical technologies were based on a notional 
government architecture for the satellite. According to the program 
office, the Lockheed Martin satellite design differs significantly 
from this architecture. A postpreliminary design review technology 
readiness assessment in 2009 identified seven critical technologies. 
However, the number of critical technologies was revised to eight when 
the results of that assessment were finalized in 2010. All eight have 
been demonstrated in a relevant environment. According to the program 
office, the number of critical technologies has been stable as of the 
postpreliminary design review assessment. In addition, the design for 
GPS IIIA is stable with 98 percent of design drawings releasable at 
its August 2010 critical design review. 

Production Maturity: 

The GPS IIIA program plans to reduce risk and prove out its production 
processes by building and testing a prototype spacecraft prior to its 
December 2010 production decision. However, this prototype will not be 
production-representative. It will include almost all satellite parts, 
excluding redundant units. According to the program office, it will 
not be flight-worthy because its parts will not go through the flight 
screening process. A complete GPS IIIA satellite will not be available 
for testing prior to the production decision. We did not assess 
production maturity because the program office does not collect 
statistical process control data for its critical manufacturing 
processes, but rather uses other process and technology maturity 
metrics. 

Other Program Issues: 

The GPS IIIA program has adopted an acquisition approach that should 
increase its chances of meeting its cost and schedule goals; however, 
the program still faces risks that could affect the on-time delivery 
and launch of GPS satellites. GPS IIIA is being managed using a "back- 
to-basics" approach, which is designed to maintain stable 
requirements, implement an incremental development strategy, use 
mature technologies, and provide more oversight than under the 
previous GPS satellite program. While this approach should enable the 
GPS III program to deliver satellites more quickly than the 
predecessor GPS program, its schedule is still aggressive considering 
the complexities associated with the integration phase. The Air Force 
plans to launch the first GPS IIIA satellite in 2014. This would 
require the program to go from contract award to first launch 3.5 
years faster than the GPS IIF. 

In addition, the GPS IIIA program could be affected by the development 
schedule for the next-generation GPS ground control system, the OCX, 
which is being managed as a separate major defense acquisition 
program. Though the GPS IIIA satellites can provide positioning and 
timing services without OCX, it is needed to control other features of 
the satellites, such as the enhanced military signal and additional 
civil signals. Until OCX is operational, these additional signals 
cannot be operated on the GPS IIIA satellite, and the Air Force is 
reluctant to launch the second IIIA satellite before the first one is 
fully tested. The Air Force currently plans to deliver GPS OCX Block I 
in August 2015--15 months after the first planned GPS IIIA satellite 
launch. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, GPS program officials 
acknowledged that there is currently a disconnect between the OCX 
delivery schedule and the GPS IIIA launch schedule. As a result, the 
program office recently awarded a contract to the OCX and GPS IIIA 
contractors to study possible technical solutions to provide 
preliminary ground control capabilities to support the first GPS IIIA 
launch. The program expects this interim system to be delivered in the 
third quarter of 2013. The program officials believe that this system 
will provide the capability to launch and check out the GPS IIIA 
vehicle ahead of OCX completion. Program officials also provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

GPS III OCX Ground Control Segment: 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Air Force. 

The Air Force's next generation GPS control segment (OCX) will provide 
command, control, and mission support for the GPS Block II and III 
satellites. OCX is expected to assure reliable and secure delivery of 
position and timing signals to serve the evolving needs of GPS 
military and civilian users. The Air Force plans to develop OCX in 
four blocks to deliver upgrades as they become available. We assessed 
the first block, which will support the operations of GPS Block II and 
Block III satellites. 

Concept: 
Program start (2/07); 

System development: 
GAO review (11/10); 
Preliminary design review (4/11); 
Development start (6/11). 

Production: 
Production decision (4/15). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,675.5 million:
Procurement: $22.5 million:
Total funding: $1,873.6 million:
Procurement quantity: 0: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 7/2010: $2,693.1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 7/2010: $22.6; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 7/2010: $2,891.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 7/2010: $1,445.642
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 7/2010: 2;
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of: NA; 
Latest 7/2010: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The GPS OCX program is scheduled to enter development in June 2011 
with its 14 critical technologies nearing maturity. In February 2010, 
the Air Force awarded a cost-reimbursement contract to Raytheon for 
Blocks I and II of the OCX program. The GPS OCX program built 
prototypes and plans to hold a preliminary design review in April 2011 
prior to entry into engineering and manufacturing development, as 
required by DOD acquisition policy and statute. The GPS OCX will not 
be fielded in time for the May 2014 launch of the first GPS IIIA 
satellite. As a result, the GPS Directorate is considering funding a 
parallel effort that accelerates existing launch and checkout 
requirements to develop a command and control capability for the first 
GPS IIIA satellites. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

GAO review; 11/10; 
Development start: 6/11; 
DOD design review: TBD (not assessed); 
Production decision: 4/15 (not assessed). 

[End of figure] 

GPS OCX Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to program officials, when the GPS OCX enters development in 
June 2011, its 14 critical technologies will be nearing maturity. As 
part of its risk-reduction activities, the program selected two 
contractors, through a competitive process, to develop system-level 
prototypes. It also plans to hold a preliminary design review in April 
2011 prior to entry into engineering and manufacturing development, as 
required by DOD acquisition policy and statute. In an October 2010 
memorandum, the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, stated 
that an independent assessment of the program found that all but one 
critical technology had been demonstrated in a relevant environment. 
The technology that had not been demonstrated in a relevant 
environment has been deferred to future OCX blocks. The assessment 
also found that GPS OCX will eventually require larger bandwidths, and 
questioned whether the backup command and control site will have the 
capability to take control of all the functions managed by the primary 
site. Furthermore, the assessment found that the program did not have 
a security architecture that meets all information assurance 
requirements, and that the OCX system may not be able to handle large 
data sets required to service external users. The Director recommended 
that the Air Force conduct a technology readiness assessment on future 
OCX blocks to explain how these and any new requirements are fully 
addressed by mature technologies. 

Other Program Issues: 

In February 2010, the Air Force awarded a cost-reimbursement contract 
to Raytheon for Block I and II of the GPS OCX program. According to 
program officials, a cost-reimbursement contract was used because of 
the high level of risk associated with developing complex software 
programs for GPS OCX. 

The GPS OCX program plans to enter engineering and manufacturing 
development in June 2011--over 2 years later than initially planned. 
According to program officials, this delay was due, in part, to the 
need to hold a preliminary design review and report on its results 
before the milestone review. In addition, the GPS Directorate and GPS 
OCX program manager wanted to make sure that the program understood 
the risks associated with the development effort before moving forward 
to the next phase of the program. 

The Air Force plans to deliver GPS OCX Block I in August 2015--15 
months after the first planned GPS IIIA satellite launch. To address 
this issue, the GPS Directorate is considering funding a parallel 
effort that accelerates existing launch and checkout requirements to 
develop a command and control capability for the first GPS IIIA 
satellites. However, GPS Directorate officials indicated that the 
effort would not enable new capabilities offered by GPS IIIA 
satellites, including a military signal designed to enable resistance 
to jamming and three civil signals. The program expects to release a 
request for proposal for the parallel effort during the first quarter 
of fiscal year 2011 and receive the Air Force's authority to proceed 
during the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. 

Program Office Comments: 

The GPS Directorate provided written technical comments that were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Gray Eagle: 

Photograph: Source: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. 

The Army's Gray Eagle, formerly known as ER/MP, will perform 
reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and attack missions. 
It will operate either alone or with other platforms such as the 
Longbow Apache helicopter. Each system includes 12 aircraft as well as 
ground control stations, ground and air data terminals, automatic 
takeoff and landing systems, and ground support equipment. The program 
consists of Block 1 systems and two less-capable Quick Reaction 
Capability systems. We assessed the Block 1 configuration. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/development start (4/05); 
Design review (11/06). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (2/10); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Initial capability (7/12); 
Full capability (8/12). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Atomics:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $246.0 million:
Procurement: $2,285.1 million:
Total funding: $3,374.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 10: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 4/2005: $339.8; 
Latest 9/2010: $875.3; 
Percent change: 157.6. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 4/2005: $660.5; 
Latest 9/2010: $2,965.8; 
Percent change: 349.0. 

Total program cost: 
As of 4/2005: $1,000.2; 
Latest 9/2010: $4,844.0; 
Percent change: 384.3. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 4/2005: $200.046; 
Latest 9/2010: $372.613; 
Percent change: 86.3. 

Total quantities: 
As of 4/2005: 5; 
Latest 9/2010: 13; 
Percent change: 160.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 4/2005: 50; 
Latest 9/2010: 87; 
Percent change: 74.0. 

[End of table] 

As of December 2010, DOD had not yet approved a new cost and schedule 
baseline for the program. 

The Gray Eagle entered production in February 2010 without having all 
of its critical technologies mature. The program office reported that 
the system's design is stable and its production processes are proven, 
but the program remains at risk for late and costly design and 
manufacturing changes during production until its critical 
technologies have been fully integrated and tested. A January 2010 
risk review board identified risks related to areas including 
software, engine availability, and supplier capacity. The Army has 
identified operational availability and reliability as a risk after 
limited user testing showed that the system could not meet its key 
performance parameter for that area. The Army has plans in place to 
mitigate these risks and will undertake various risk-reduction 
activities leading up to the system's entry into initial operational 
test and evaluation in 2011. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 4/05; 
DOD design review: 11/06; 
Production decision: 2/10; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

Gray Eagle Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The Gray Eagle entered production in February 2010 without all its 
critical technologies mature, as recommended in DOD's Technology 
Readiness Assessment Deskbook. Two technologies--the heavy fuel engine 
and deicing--have been assessed as mature. The other three 
technologies--the automatic takeoff and landing system, tactical 
common data link, and manned-unmanned teaming--are nearing maturity. 

Prior to 2010, the program office had reported that all its critical 
technologies would be mature at production. However, an independent 
technology readiness assessment by the Office of the Director, Defense 
Research and Engineering, reached a different conclusion on both the 
identification and maturity level of the program's critical 
technologies. This assessment resulted in the Army dropping one 
critical technology, adding two newly identified technologies, and 
downgrading the maturity level of three technologies. According to the 
program office, the maturity levels were downgraded because the 
program office had previously assessed the technologies alone, whereas 
the independent assessment considered their maturity when integrated 
with Gray Eagle. For example, the program office had assessed the 
automatic takeoff and landing system as mature because the same 
technology is used on the already-fielded Shadow unmanned aircraft 
system, but the independent assessors rated it as nearing maturity 
because the system had not yet been fully integrated into the Gray 
Eagle and tested in an operational environment. 

Design Maturity: 

While the program office indicated that the Gray Eagle design is 
stable, the program remains at risk for late and costly design and 
manufacturing changes during production until its critical 
technologies have been fully integrated and tested. Despite this risk, 
the Army plans to proceed with production. In 2009, the Army's 
Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center 
independently assessed the program's production readiness and 
concluded that the design of the system was mature and stable enough 
such that potential design changes would not present a significant 
risk to the program during low-rate initial production. 

Production Maturity: 

According to an independent Army assessment of the program's 
production readiness, for critical or major suppliers, its 
manufacturing process maturity was satisfactory and manufacturing 
infrastructure met or exceeded requirements for low-rate initial 
production. However, in January 2010, an Army review board noted 
production risks associated with the tactical common data link 
subcontractor's capacity to produce, provide spares for, and repair 
that component as needed to meet program schedule. In addition, it 
identified issues with software development and engine availability 
resulting from issues with financial stability of the engine supplier. 
According to the program office, the data link production capacity 
issue has been largely mitigated and the prime contractor has 
qualified a second engine supplier. 

Other Program Issues: 

In October 2010, the Army identified operational availability and 
reliability as a risk after limited user testing showed that the 
system could not meet its key performance parameter for that area. The 
Army plans to undertake risk-reduction activities leading up to the 
system's initial operational test and evaluation in 2011. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of the assessment, the program office 
indicated that the DOD Technology Readiness Assessment Deskbook 
discourages the practice of evaluating technology readiness based on 
degree of integration. The program also believes that our product 
knowledge graph did not accurately capture the Gray Eagle's production 
maturity because there are more methods to assess maturity than the 
critical processes assessment we used. The program did not detail the 
methods it believed applicable. Finally, the program stated that all 
risk-mitigation plans were on schedule as of January 2011. The program 
also provided technical corrections, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

GAO Response: 

According to the DOD deskbook, technologies should be at technology 
readiness level (TRL) 7 or higher at production start. To achieve TRL 
7, a program should demonstrate a system prototype in an operational 
environment, which would require them to be integrated in the system. 

[End of section] 

Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT): 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Army. 

The Army's E-IBCT program will augment brigade-level capabilities 
through an incremental, expedited fielding of systems to current 
forces. The first increment, scheduled for fielding in late 2011, 
includes unattended sensors, unmanned ground and air vehicles, and new 
radios and battle command software. Increment 1 evolved from Army 
efforts to quickly equip current forces with the more mature 
capabilities from the now terminated Future Combat System program. The 
Army anticipates at least one follow-on increment. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/development start (7/04); 
Limited user test (9/09); 
Design review (10/09); 
Low-rate decision (12/09); 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (12/09); 
Limited user test (9/19; 
GAO review (11/10); 
Initial capability (9/11); 
Full-rate production (12/11); 
Last procurement (8/13). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Warren, MI:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $112.9 million:
Procurement: $2,182.6 million:
Total funding: $2,295.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 8: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 2/2010: $590.0; 
Latest 8/2010: $595.9; 
Percent change: 1.0. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 2/2010: $2,594.2; 
Latest 8/2010: $2,661.7; 
Percent change: 2.6. 

Total program cost: 
As of 2/2010: $3,184.2; 
Latest 8/2010: $3,257.6; 
Percent change: 2.3. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 2/2010: $353.801; 
Latest 8/2010: $361.956; 
Percent change: 2.3. 

Total quantities: 
As of 2/2010 9; 
Latest 8/2010: 9; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 2/2010: 27; 
Latest 8/2010: 27; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

E-IBCT Increment 1 was approved for production in December 2009, even 
though an independent review team later found that none of its 
critical technologies were mature, and the program was still making 
design changes to address reliability issues identified in testing. 
Since that time, the Army has worked to improve performance and 
reliability of the E-IBCT systems. According to the Army, all current 
Increment 1 critical technologies are mature and its systems' designs 
are stable. The results of an updated independent technology 
assessment were not available at the time of our review. In addition, 
the Army was unable to provide production data from the contractor. 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics was scheduled to review the program in December 2010 to 
determine whether to proceed with the production of the next two sets 
of systems. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: NA; 
DOD design review: 10/09; 
Production decision: 12/09; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

Increment 1 E-IBCT Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the Army, all current E-IBCT Increment 1 critical 
technologies are mature, although independent reviewers disagree. 
Prior to the December 2009 production decision, the Army reported that 
9 out of 10 critical technologies were mature. However, a March 2010 
independent assessment reported that none of the critical technologies 
were mature and only two technologies were nearing maturity. The 
assessment found that the Army had not demonstrated two key radio 
technologies under the expected operational conditions or at the 
required range. It also found that other technologies displayed 
erratic performance, experienced excessive reboots, or were relatively 
primitive with regard to efficiency and robustness. According to Army 
officials, a September 2010 limited user test planned to demonstrate 
the improved maturity of these technologies. To support the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics' 
December 2010 review of the program, the Director, Defense Research 
and Engineering, planned to complete an updated independent technology 
assessment. The results of that assessment were not available at the 
time of our review. 

Design Maturity: 

According to the Army, the designs of the E-ICBT Increment 1 systems 
are stable with 93 percent of the total expected design drawings 
releasable to manufacturing. These designs were not stable when the 
program received approval to enter production in December 2009. The 
program has made 86 design changes since then to address performance 
and reliability issues. These design changes were incorporated into 
the equipment that was used in a September 2010 limited user test and 
into the systems' production configuration. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess production maturity because the Army was unable to 
provide statistical process control data on critical manufacturing 
processes. However, Army documents indicate that the systems have 
achieved an engineering manufacturing readiness level of 3, which 
demonstrates readiness for low-rate production. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics was scheduled to review the program in December 2010 to 
consider the systems' readiness for further testing and fielding, 
whether to proceed with additional production, and the direction for 
the remainder of the program. The review was to be based on the Army's 
progress improving the systems' reliability and network performance 
during the September 2010 limited user test. 

During tests leading up to the September 2010 limited user test, the 
Army reported that only one system failed to meet its reliability 
requirement for entrance into the limited user test. However, an Army 
assessment of the 2010 limited user test reported that only three of 
the five systems met or exceeded reliability requirements. Although 
reliability did improve since the 2009 limited user test, the systems 
were collectively assessed as not providing force effectiveness at the 
system of systems level and, with the exception of the small unmanned 
ground vehicle, provided minimal military utility. 

Program Office Comments: 

According to the program office, in 2009, significant concerns were 
raised regarding the reliability of Increment 1 systems and network 
maturity. Testing conducted in 2010 demonstrated significant 
reliability improvements with all systems (less the unmanned aerial 
system) greatly exceeding their reliability requirements. Testing also 
proved network maturity for the E-IBCT configuration and the Network 
Integration Kit was determined to be a key command and control 
enabler. The Training and Doctrine Command identified two key issues 
with the Network Integration Kit, and the program manager has already 
implemented and demonstrated fixes. The Training and Doctrine Command 
has voiced strong support for the Network Integration Kit and Small 
Unmanned Ground Vehicle. On the basis of a December 2010 Army 
Configuration Steering Board and a pending Defense Acquisition Board, 
a descoping of systems and quantities is expected. Cost and quantity 
information for the anticipated changes are predecisional and were not 
made available for this report. The Army provided additional technical 
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Intelligent Munitions System-Scorpion: 

Photograph: Source: U.S. Army. 

The Army's Intelligent Munitions System-Scorpion is a remotely 
controlled, antivehicular landmine alternative system. The Scorpion 
includes an integrated system of lethal and nonlethal munitions, 
sensors, software, and communications that detects, tracks, 
classifies, reports, engages, and kills light wheeled through heavy 
tracked vehicles. As part of the Army's capability portfolio review, 
it was determined that the Scorpion is no longer affordable. Program 
closeout was approved by a configuration steering board in October 
2010. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (5/06); 
Critical design review (4/09); 
GAO review (11/10). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (12/11);
Full-rate decision (1/11); 
Initial operational capability (9/13). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Textron Defense Systems:
Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, NJ:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $78.7 million:
Procurement: $870.0 million:
Total funding: $1,275.9 million:
Procurement quantity: 2,624: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 11/2010: $487.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 11/2010: $870.5; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 11/2010: $1,685.2; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 11/2010: $.642; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 11/2010: 2,624; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of: NA; 
Latest 11/2010: 89; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The Scorpion program's critical technologies are mature and its design 
is stable. The program initially planned to use the Joint Tactical 
Radio System, but has switched to the more mature Spider radio. While 
the Scorpion's design was not stable at its April 2009 design review, 
over 90 percent of its design drawings are now releasable and its 
critical software functionality has been tested. The program will 
conduct a series of production readiness reviews as it prepares for 
its December 2011 production decision. In addition, the program is 
already producing test hardware on the production floor using 
production processes, personnel, and tooling. Originally part of the 
Future Combat System, the program was established as a stand-alone 
program in January 2007. The separation caused cost growth which led 
to the program being designated a major defense acquisition program in 
February 2010. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 5/06; 
DOD design review: 4/09; 
GAO review; 11/10; 
Production decision: 12/11. 

[End of figure] 

Scorpion Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All four of the Scorpion's critical technologies--the control station 
computing unit, situational awareness, antivehicle effects, and 
communications through Spider radio--are mature. When the program 
began development in 2006, its critical technologies included the 
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5 radio and the JTRS 
Network Enterprise Domain soldier radio waveform. As a result of 
differences between the Scorpion and JTRS development schedules, the 
program switched to the mature Spider radio. 

Design Maturity: 

The Scorpion's design has stabilized since its April 2009 design 
review when only 61 percent of its total expected drawings were 
releasable. Over 90 percent of its design drawings are now releasable 
and its safety-critical and major software functionality has been 
tested. While risk-reduction tests completed in November 2009 have 
demonstrated the capability of the system's design utilizing 
production-representative hardware, the system's poor performance 
against heavy tracked vehicles and another required target is a design 
concern. According to the program's January 2010 post-critical design 
review assessment, the Army needs to make a decision on the importance 
of this requirement because the program is utilizing resources to try 
to meet it and it could affect the system's overall performance. In 
addition, the assessment identified system reliability and an 
aggressive program schedule as challenges. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because the program does not 
collect statistical process control data on its critical manufacturing 
processes; however, the program has taken a number of steps to prepare 
for its planned December 2011 production decision. The program has 
identified its critical manufacturing processes and key product 
characteristics and uses yield and defect data and defect management 
to track them. According to the program office, the contractor began 
identifying and developing custom tooling and test equipment that 
would be required for production shortly after development start. 
Production processes and tooling were refined during this period and 
utilized in the next phase wherein operations personnel built hardware 
with engineering oversight. All Scorpion hardware delivered for 
qualification testing has been produced on the production floor, using 
production processes, personnel, tooling, and special test equipment. 
The program will also conduct a series of production readiness reviews 
to support the transition to production. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Scorpion began development as part of the Future Combat System 
(FCS) program in 2006. It supports the National Landmine Policy 
announced in February 2004, which stated the United States would no 
longer use non-self-destructing antivehicle and antipersonnel 
landmines after December 31, 2010. In January 2007, the Army separated 
the Scorpion program from the FCS. In February 2010, due to 
development cost growth, which was attributed to negative effects from 
the separation and technical issues during development, the Scorpion 
program was designated as a major defense acquisition program. 

As part of the Army's capability portfolio reviews, it was determined 
that the Scorpion is no longer affordable and that the Army is willing 
to accept the operational risk of not fielding this capability. 
However, some of this technology will roll into the Spider program. 
The decision to conduct an orderly closeout was approved by a 
configuration steering board in October 2010 and the official 
acquisition decision memorandum is pending. 

Program Office Comments: 

The Scorpion program was developed to avoid a capability gap 
associated with the National Landmine Policy and field a capability 
prior to December 31, 2010. Due to this pressure, the program was 
initially schedule driven. Following the critical design review, the 
program plan was updated to reflect an event driven schedule. 
Following the risk-reduction testing in November 2009, design changes 
and modifications to the requirement improved performance against the 
heavy tracked vehicles, and changes to the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures by the engineer school resulted in improved performance 
against lightwheeled vehicles. These enhancements were demonstrated 
during conduct of development and live fire testing in September 2010. 
Program officials also provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM): 

Illustration: Source: Department of Defense. 

The Joint Air-to-Ground Missile is a joint Army/Navy program with 
Marine Corps participation. The missile will be air-launched from 
helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft and designed to target tanks; 
light armored vehicles; missile launchers; command, control, and 
communications vehicles; bunkers; and buildings. It is to provide line-
of-sight and beyond line-of sight capabilities and can be employed in 
a fire-and-forget mode or a precision attack mode. The missile will 
replace Hellfire, Maverick, and air-launched TOW. 

Concept: 
Technology development start (9/08); 
Preliminary design review (6/10); 
Prototype missile tests (9/10); 
GAO review (11/10). 

System development: 
Development start (TBD); 
Critical design review (TBD). 

Production: 
Production start (TBD); 
Initial operational capability (TBD). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD:
Program office: Warren, MI:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,206.9 million:
Procurement: $5,202.1 million:
Total funding: $6,409.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 33,853: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 7/2010: $1,650.8; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 7/2010: $5,202.1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 7/2010: $6,852.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 7/2010: $.202; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 7/2010: 33,853; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of: NA; 
Latest 7/2010: 69; 
Percent change: NA. 

[Empty]; As of; Latest 07/2010; Percent change. 

[End of table] 

According to the program office, the three JAGM critical technologies 
are expected to be nearing maturity and demonstrated in a relevant 
environment before a decision is made to enter development. However, 
an independent technology readiness assessment identified five 
critical technologies, at least one of which has not reached this 
level of maturity. The program office has incorporated a provision in 
the draft request for proposal for the development contract that may 
mitigate some of the technology risk by requiring both contractors to 
submit two rocket motor designs. According to program officials, the 
release of the request for proposal has been delayed until the third 
quarter of fiscal year 2011 because the program's acquisition strategy 
and requirements needed to be updated to reflect the cancellation of 
the Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter and new guidance on affordability. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

GAO review; 11/10; 
Development start: TBD; 
DOD design review: TBD (not assessed); 
Production decision: TBD (not assessed). 

[End of figure] 

JAGM Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the program office, the three JAGM critical technologies 
are expected to be nearing maturity and demonstrated in a relevant 
environment before a decision is made to start system development. The 
critical technologies include a multimode seeker for increased 
countermeasure resistance, boost-sustain propulsion for increased 
standoff range, and a multipurpose warhead for increased lethality. 
However, an independent technology readiness assessment identified 
five critical technologies, at least one of which has not reached this 
level of maturity. The program office has incorporated a provision in 
the draft request for proposal for the engineering and manufacturing 
development contract that may mitigate some of the technology risk by 
requiring both contractors to submit two rocket motor designs. 

Other Program Issues: 

In September 2008, the Army awarded two fixed-price incentive 
contracts to Raytheon and Lockheed Martin for a 27-month JAGM 
technology development phase. During technology development, each 
contractor completed three tests using prototype missiles in order for 
the program to assess the technical risks of proceeding to the next 
phase of development. In addition to testing prototypes, each 
contractor completed a preliminary design review. According to program 
officials, a post-preliminary design review assessment should be 
complete by December 2010. 

The JAGM program planned to receive approval to enter system 
development in November 2010 and award an engineering and 
manufacturing development contract in December 2010. However, the 
release of the request for proposal for this contract has been delayed 
because the program's acquisition strategy and requirements needed to 
be updated to reflect the cancellation of the Armed Reconnaissance 
Helicopter, the addition of the OH-58 Kiowa as a replacement platform, 
and new guidance on affordability. According to program officials, 
contract award is now expected no earlier than the third quarter of 
fiscal year 2011. The JAGM program office has requested a 
justification and approval for a limited competition for the 
engineering and manufacturing development contract between the two 
technology development contractors. 

The Army and the Navy will continue to rely on Hellfire and Maverick 
missiles until JAGM is fielded. The Army will continue to extend the 
fielding of Hellfire to meet the needs of the warfighter, while the 
Navy will rely on both Maverick and Hellfire until JAGM becomes 
available. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that due to the delay in the signing of the JAGM acquisition strategy, 
key dates in the development phase have the potential to be delayed. 

[End of section] 

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM): 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Air Force. 

The Air Force's JASSM program is intended to field a next-generation 
air-to-ground cruise missile capable of stealthy flight and reliable 
performance at affordable costs. It is designed to destroy enemy 
targets from outside the range of air defenses. The Air Force is 
currently producing a baseline JASSM and is developing an extended 
range version--JASSM-ER--that will more than double the range of the 
baseline version. The two variants are 70 percent common in hardware 
and 95 percent common in software. We assessed the JASSM-ER variant. 

Concept: 
Program start (6/96); 

System development: 
JASSM development start (11/98); 
ER development start (6/03); 
GAO review (11/10). 

Production: 
ER low-rate decision (12/10); 
ER Full-rate decision (6/13); 
ER Initial capability (TBD); 
ER last procurement (2025). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Eglin AFB, FL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $84.4 million:
Procurement: $4,736.2 million:
Total funding: $4,820.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 3,747: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 11/1998: $1,004.7; 
Latest 6/2010: $1,462.3; 
Percent change: 45.5. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 11/1998: $1,252.9; 
Latest 6/2010: $5,738.7; 
Percent change: 358.0. 

Total program cost: 
As of 11/1998: $2,281.6; 
Latest 6/2010: $7,201.0; 
Percent change: 215.6. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 11/1998: $.924; 
Latest 6/2010: $1.435; 
Percent change: 55.3. 

Total quantities: 
As of 11/1998: 2,469; 
Latest 6/2010: 5,018; 
Percent change: 103.2. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 11/1998: 75; 
Latest 6/2010: 87; 
Percent change: 16.0. 

[End of table] 

Latest costs include funding for both JASSM and JASSM-ER. According to 
program officials, JASSM-ER does not have an approved program baseline 
separating its costs from the baseline program, but is completing one 
for the upcoming production decision. 

According to the program office, the JASSM-ER plans to enter 
production in December 2010 with all of its critical technologies and 
manufacturing processes mature. We did not assess the design stability 
of the JASSM-ER because the program office does not collect design 
drawing data. However, the JASSM-ER design has been demonstrated to 
perform as intended. It has been successful in 10 out of 11 flight 
tests. The program plans to perform additional tests in order to 
demonstrate that it meets its reliability requirement. As part of the 
upcoming production decision, the program has assessed its 
manufacturing readiness and proven out manufacturing and quality 
processes in a pilot-line environment. The cost of the JASSM-ER could 
be higher than predicted because prior cost estimates were overly 
optimistic and flight tests will be needed to achieve its reliability 
requirement. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 6/03; 
DOD design review: 10/05; 
GAO review; 11/10; 
Production decision: 12/10. 

[End of figure] 

JASSM Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

An independent review panel recently assessed all five JASSM-ER 
critical technologies as mature. The five technologies are the engine 
system, engine lube system, fuse, low-observable features, and global 
positioning system. This assessment was conducted to support the 
upcoming JASSM-ER production decision. 

Design Maturity: 

According to the program office, the JASSM-ER design is stable. The 
design has been demonstrated to perform as intended and the missile 
has been successful in 10 out of 11 flight tests. However, we did not 
specifically assess design stability because the JASSM-ER program 
office does not track the number of design drawings. According to the 
program office, under the total system performance responsibility 
arrangement that was in place when the program was initiated, all 
design drawings were developed and managed by the contractor. The Air 
Force has since sought more control over the design of the missile. It 
now has approval authority over major configuration changes, as well 
as approval authority over configuration changes that may increase 
cost, require retrofit, or affect safety for missiles currently in 
production. 

Production Maturity: 

According to a program official, the JASSM-ER plans to enter 
production in December 2010 with all of its manufacturing processes 
mature. The Air Force recently assessed JASSM-ER at a manufacturing 
readiness level 8, meaning, among other things, that its technologies 
are mature, manufacturing and quality processes and procedures have 
been proven in a pilot-line environment, and it is ready to enter into 
low-rate production. In addition, the JASSM-ER missiles are being 
produced on the same production line as the JASSM baseline, and the 
two missiles are 70 percent common in hardware and 95 percent common 
in software. 

Other Program Issues: 

The cost of the JASSM-ER program could be higher than predicted. 
First, lower than projected annual procurement levels could increase 
production costs. The Air Force's current cost estimate for the JASSM 
program may be overly optimistic since it is based on a production 
rate of 280 missiles per year (combined JASSM and JASSM-ER production 
rate), which has not been achieved since 2005. Not producing at the 
expected rate has led to a less efficient production process and a 
longer production period, both of which increase costs. Further, 
Lockheed Martin officials stated that low production rates could cause 
skilled labor to look elsewhere for work and JASSM reliability could 
be adversely affected. In addition, according to the Air Force, as 
many as 20 flight tests may be needed to fully demonstrate JASSM-ER's 
reliability goal of 85 percent. These flight tests could cost as much 
as $70 million. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JASSM program office 
noted the reliability concerns have been alleviated by successful 
tests of JASSM-ER (10 of 11, completed November 2010) and Lot 7 JASSM 
baseline (15 of 16, completed October 2009). Additional flight tests 
beyond the budgeted operational test and reliability assessment 
programs are not required to achieve the reliability requirement of 85 
percent following JASSM-ER Lot 4. In fact, JASSM-ER is currently at 87 
percent at the conclusion of developmental tests. The risk for higher 
JASSM-ER costs stems from unforeseen budget cuts that reduce 
production quantities and drive up unit price. Additionally, the JASSM-
ER design is stable as evidenced by the last five flight tests flown 
with the current production configuration, and the program's 
successful completion of a production readiness review. The JASSM 
program also provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV): 

Photograph: Source: Austal USA. 

The JHSV is a joint Army and Navy program to acquire a high-speed, 
shallow-draft vessel for rapid intratheater transport of combat-ready 
units. The ship will be capable of operating without reliance on shore 
based infrastructure. The program intends to produce a total of 18 
ships, 13 for the Navy, and 5 for the Army. DOD authorized 
construction of the lead ship in December 2009. It is expected to be 
delivered in November 2011. 

Concept: 
Program start (4/06); 

System development: 
Contract award (11/08). 

Production: 
Lead-ship fabrication start (12/09); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Lead-ship delivery (11/11); 
Second ship delivery (1/13); 
Last ship delivery (1/17). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Austal, USA:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $18.8 million:
Procurement: $2,593.2 million:
Total funding: $2,612.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 13: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 2/2009: $126.5; 
Latest 7/2010: $125.7; 
Percent change: -0.7. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 2/2009: $3,456.0; 
Latest 7/2010: $3,543.4; 
Percent change: 2.5. 

Total program cost: 
As of 2/2009: $3,582.5; 
Latest 7/2010: $3,669.1; 
Percent change: 2.4. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 2/2009: $199.028; 
Latest 7/2010: $203.836; 
Percent change: 2.4. 

Total quantities: 
As of 2/2009: 18; 
Latest 7/2010: 18; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 2/2009: 48; 
Latest 12/2009: 50; 
Percent change: 4.2. 

[End of table] 

The JHSV program entered production in December 2009 with its critical 
technologies mature, but without a complete three dimensional design. 
Nine of the ship's 46 design zones were complete in the three- 
dimensional model when construction began. According to the Navy's own 
measure of design maturity--which takes into account other design 
metrics such as completeness of two-dimensional design drawings and 
engineering reviews, as well as the three-dimensional model--the 
design was at least 85 percent complete. Program officials state that 
the three-dimensional model was completed in September 2010. As of 
October 2010, 33 modules were in production utilizing instructions 
derived from the model. Prior to starting production, DOD agreed to 
reduce the JHSV's required transit speed, in order to avoid the need 
for a significant redesign that could have affected the program's cost 
and schedule. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Contract award: 11/08; 
Lead ship fabrication: 12/09; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

JHSV Program: 

Technology and Design Maturity: 

The JHSV program awarded its detailed design and construction contract 
in November 2008 with 17 of its 18 critical technologies mature and 
demonstrated in a realistic environment. Before production began in 
December 2009, the program was required to demonstrate that all 
technologies were mature. 

In December 2009, DOD authorized the Navy to begin construction of the 
lead ship without a complete three-dimensional design. According to 
program officials, 9 of the ship's 46 three-dimensional design zones 
were complete at the start of construction. An additional 14 design 
zones were nearing completion. According to program officials, 
construction start was delayed 34 days to complete product modeling 
for the JHSV's most complex areas, such as the ship's machinery rooms. 
This level of design maturity falls short of GAO's recommended 
shipbuilding best practices, which call for achieving a complete and 
stable three-dimensional product model before construction begins. The 
program office believes that the completion of the model prior to 
construction start was less critical for JHSV because it is not as 
complex as other Navy ships, such as the DDG 1000. According to the 
Navy's own measure of design maturity--which includes the completion 
of two-dimensional design drawings and engineering reviews as well as 
the three-dimensional model--the design was at least 85 percent 
complete. According to program officials, the three-dimensional model 
was completed in September 2010. 

Production Maturity: 

Prior to the start of production, the JHSV program was required to 
demonstrate that its manufacturing processes were in control. The 
program conducted two pilot production phases and built a pilot module 
in the shipbuilder's new module manufacturing facility. According to 
program officials, production will be monitored through the use of 
earned value management data to track the cost of the work performed, 
and through reviews and inspections performed by the American Bureau 
of Shipbuilding and the Navy's Supervisor of Shipbuilding. As of 
October 2010, the program office reported that 33 of the ship's 
modules were in production. 

Other Program Issues: 

DOD chose the JHSV to participate in the capital budget account pilot 
program, which was created to control cost growth by providing stable 
funding. Under this initiative, the program office must gain approval 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) for changes in funding or 
requirements. Program officials stated that this is useful as it 
allows them to stabilize their requirements and the flow of work to 
the shipyard. Funding for 10 of the program's 18 ships is currently 
guaranteed. 

Prior to starting production, DOD agreed to reduce the JHSV's required 
transit speed, to avoid design changes that could have affected the 
program's cost and schedule. Previously JHSV had been required to have 
a transit range of 4,700 nautical miles traveling at a speed of 25 
knots. According to program officials, transiting at this speed 
requires additional amounts of fuel that would have triggered the need 
for a significant redesign, cost increases, and schedule delays. As a 
part of a configuration steering board meeting, officials from the 
JHSV Navy requirements office, Joint Staff, and DOD agreed that the 
speed could be reduced to 23 knots to preserve the current design and 
schedule with minimal effect on meeting mission needs. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office did not concur with our findings related to design 
maturity. As certified by Navy and Defense Department officials, per 
Public Law 110-181, greater than 85 percent of the design was 
completed prior to construction start by the Navy's measure of design 
maturity. In addition, the three-dimensional model was completed prior 
to the start of fabrication of the future USS Vigilant, the first 
JHSV, on September 13, 2010. Significant production and financial risk 
has been avoided by using proven commercial production design and 
technology, ensuring stable requirements, minimizing change, and 
through the ruthless pursuit of cost reduction and efficiency. 

GAO Response: 

Our findings on the design maturity of the JHSV are based on metrics 
determined by previous audits of Navy shipbuilding programs and 
commercial best practices. 

[End of section] 

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System 
(JLENS): 

Photograph: Source: U.S. Army. 

The Army's JLENS will provide over-the-horizon detection and tracking 
of land-attack cruise missiles and other targets. The Army is 
developing JLENS in two spirals. Spiral 1 is complete and served as a 
test bed to demonstrate the concept. Spiral 2 will utilize two 
aerostats with advanced sensors for surveillance and tracking, as well 
as mobile mooring stations, communication payloads, and processing 
stations. JLENS will provide surveillance and engagement support to 
other systems, such as PAC-3, SM-6, and MEADS. We assessed Spiral 2. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (8/05); 
Design review (12/08); 
GAO review (11/10). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (3/12); 
Initial capability (9/13). 
Full-rate decision (11/14); 
Last procurement (2020). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: Redstone Arsenal, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $649.1 million:
Procurement: $5,041.9 million:
Total funding: $5,852.8 million:
Procurement quantity: 14: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 8/2005: $1,975.5; 
Latest 12/2009: $2,154.7; 
Percent change: 9.1. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 8/2005: $4,520.7; 
Latest 12/2009: $5,041.9; 
Percent change: 11.5. 

Total program cost: 
As of 8/2005: $6,566.9; 
Latest 12/2009: $7,378.0; 
Percent change: 12.4. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 8/2005: $410.432; 
Latest 12/2009: $461.122; 
Percent change: 12.4. 

Total quantities: 
As of 8/2005: 16; 
Latest 12/2009: 16; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 8/2005: 97; 
Latest 12/2009: 97; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

According to program officials, JLENS will enter production with 
mature technologies, a stable design, and proven production processes. 
The program began development in 2005 with only one of its five 
critical technologies mature, and only two of the four current 
critical technologies are mature. The design appears stable, but the 
potential for design changes remains until the maturity of JLENS 
components have been demonstrated. In September 2010, an aerostat 
accident resulted in the loss of one of the JLENS platforms. This 
accident and other system integration challenges are expected to delay 
several key program events, including the production decision. Twelve 
of the program's 15 critical manufacturing processes are currently in 
control. The JLENS program has also completed a number of key 
production planning activities, such as assessing supplier 
capabilities and risks. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 8/05; 
DOD design review: 12/08; 
GAO review; 11/10; 
Production decision: 3/12. 

[End of figure] 

JLENS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

JLENS entered system development in August 2005 with only one of its 
five critical technologies mature. The program subsequently combined 
two of the critical technologies--the communications payload and the 
processing group--into the communications processing group. The 
communications processing group and platform are currently mature. The 
program expects to demonstrate the fire control radar and surveillance 
radar in a realistic environment before the program enters production. 
Many of the JLENS radar technologies have legacy components. However, 
sensor software items related to signal processing, timing, and 
control, as well as element measurement, are not yet mature. The 
program office has successfully conducted tests of the fire control 
radar antenna, but the integration of both the fire control radar and 
surveillance radar components in the program's system integration 
laboratory has yet to occur. 

Design Maturity: 

The JLENS design appears stable, but the potential for design changes 
will remain until key JLENS components have been integrated and 
tested. For example, a first flight demonstration of the aerostat was 
successfully conducted in August 2009, but the program must still 
complete a series of tests integrating the JLENS mobile mooring 
station with the aerostat. In September 2010, the program experienced 
the loss of a platform following an aerostat accident. The program is 
analyzing the cause of the accident, as well as other system 
integration issues. The JLENS program has received approval to 
transport the mobile mooring station without armor, which mitigates a 
risk the program office has identified in the past. 

Production Maturity: 

The JLENS program projects that it will enter production with all 15 
of its critical manufacturing processes mature and stable. According 
to the program office, 12 of the program's critical manufacturing 
processes are currently in control. The JLENS program has also 
completed a number of key activities that are essential to effective 
production management, including updating its manufacturing plan and 
addressing areas such as supplier capabilities and risks, cost, 
quality control, materials, producibility, and workforce skills. 

Other Program Issues: 

The JLENS program is working to address several risks that could 
affect the program's cost, schedule, and performance. First, the 
program received $32 million less than the amount requested in the 
President's fiscal year 2010 budget. If additional funding is not 
provided in fiscal year 2012, the program reports it will not be able 
to procure the equipment to field an initial operational capability by 
the end of fiscal year 2013. Second, due to the September 2010 
aerostat accident and subsequent loss of a platform, the program 
expects several key events, including the start of production, to be 
delayed. Third, if problems occur during systems integration and 
verification tests, the program expects that cost and schedule would 
be affected. Fourth, if test site preparations are not complete by 
April 2011, then the production timeline could be jeopardized. 
Finally, the program could also be affected by alignment with the 
Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense program. As part of the 
integrated strategy, the Army extended the system development and 
demonstration phase by 12 months. The JLENS program is waiting 
approval of a new acquisition program baseline with updated cost and 
schedule estimates that reflect this change. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program stated that 
the Army is planning to request funds in its fiscal year 2012 budget 
to offset the fiscal year 2010 reduction. The program also reported 
experiencing development challenges that have caused system 
integration delays, and schedule challenges due to a September 2010 
aerostat accident. The program office continues to work on a new 
acquisition program baseline. A new cost estimate was presented to the 
Army Cost Review Board in July 2009. The estimate will be updated 
based on the results of an Army review and submission of the 
President's fiscal year 2012 budget. A revised baseline is expected to 
be approved in the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. The Army 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS): 

Illustration: Source: Department of Defense. 

JPALS is a joint Army, Navy, and Air Force program that will replace 
the obsolete radar-based SPN-46 and SPN-35 systems. It is a Global 
Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System-based system that will 
provide a rapidly deployable, adverse weather, adverse terrain, day- 
night precision approach and landing capability for all DOD ground and 
airborne systems. Increment 1A is a Navy-led sea-based ship system, 
and increment 1B will integrate JPALS with sea-based aircraft. We 
assessed increment 1A. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (7/08); 
Preliminary design review (12/09); 
GAO review (11/10). 

Production: 
Production decision (2/13); 
Initial capability (12/14);
Full-rate decision (6/15). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: Lexington Park, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $305.2 million:
Procurement: $219.2 million:
Total funding: $524.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 26: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 7/2008: $780.2; 
Latest 7/2010: $750.3; 
Percent change: -3.8. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 7/2008: $210.1; 
Latest 7/2010: $219.0; 
Percent change: 4.2. 

Total program cost: 
As of 7/2008: $997.1; 
Latest 7/2010: $976.2; 
Percent change: -2.1. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 7/2008: $26.950; 
Latest 7/2010: $26.384; 
Percent change: -2.1. 

Total quantities: 
As of 7/2008: 37; 
Latest 7/2010: 37; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 7/2008: 75; 
Latest 7/2010: 77; 
Percent change: 2.7. 

[End of table] 

JPALS began system development in July 2008 with both of its critical 
technologies nearing maturity. JPALS is primarily a software 
development effort but also includes commercial hardware components. 
The hardware design is stable and program officials accepted the 
system's drawings in preparation for the December 2010 critical design 
review. However, design stability has been affected by requirements 
changes. As of January 2011, there were 387 requirements in the system 
performance specification--an increase of 33 since the start of 
development. Officials also report ship integration challenges on CVN 
78 may require changing the antenna placement to accommodate 
performance and maintenance requirements. The program plans to enter 
production in 2013. Increment 1B will begin development in 2012 and 
integrate the system with the avionics of the F/A-18E/F, EA-18G, and 
MH-60R/S. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 7/08; 
GAO review; 11/10; 
DOD design review: 12/10; 
Production decision: 2/13 (Not assessed). 

[End of figure] 

JPALS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JPALS program began development in July 2008 with two critical 
technologies--the geometry extra redundant almost fixed solution and 
the vertical protection level/lateral protection level--nearing 
maturity. Program officials expect both critical technologies to be 
mature and demonstrated in a realistic environment by the JPALS 
production decision in 2013. While JPALS utilizes existing commercial 
components for most of its hardware, its functionality will be enabled 
by over 700,000 lines of software code. The program plans to rely 
heavily on reused code with 77 percent of the program's total lines of 
code expected to be reused. If less software is reused than originally 
estimated, the potential consequences are longer development time and 
greater cost. 

Design Maturity: 

JPALS is primarily a software development effort, but also includes 
commercial hardware components. The hardware design is stable with 96 
percent of the total expected design drawings released to 
manufacturing. The drawings cover the JPALS ship system-radio, 
antenna, receiver, racks, and console. The program also tracks 
requirement changes to monitor design stability. As of January 2011, 
there were 387 requirements in the system performance specification--
an increase of 33 since the start of development. These changes are 
due to system design gaps uncovered for L-class ships, the Joint 
Strike Fighter, and legacy landing systems and updated maintenance 
requirements. According to program officials, detailed software 
requirements are stable and proceeding according to schedule to 
support software development. The first of seven software blocks is 
complete and blocks 2 and 3 are on schedule. 

Production Maturity: 

Program officials plan to employ various techniques to assess 
production maturity, including tool design, fabrication metrics, and 
quarterly production readiness reviews. The program will build eight 
engineering development models to be installed on aircraft carriers 
and sent to test facilities to demonstrate system performance. These 
models are expected to be delivered in fiscal years 2011 through 2012. 
The program plans to enter production in February 2013. 

Other Program Issues: 

According to program officials, several ship integration challenges 
are being addressed. Specifically, the current JPALS antenna location 
for the JPALS system on CVN 78 affects the program's ability to meet 
performance and maintenance requirements. Trade studies are 
investigating several potential antenna location changes to determine 
the optimal position for it. The cost effect of moving the antenna 
will not be known until the studies are complete. Program officials 
also continue to monitor the system's maintainability to ensure JPALS 
requires no manpower increase compared to legacy systems--a key 
performance parameter. JPALS has completed a detailed maintenance 
analysis, the results of which indicate that the estimated workload 
meets this manpower requirement. JPALS is also at risk of exceeding 
its weight limit for CVN 78. It currently exceeds the requirement by 
500 pounds. The program office reported that CVN 78 has updated the 
ship design to account for the increased weight. 

The JPALS acquisition strategy separates the program into seven 
increments. Increment 1 is separated into two phases, A and B. 
Increment 1B--aircraft integration--will begin development in 2012 and 
integrate the system with the avionics of the F/A-18E/F, EA-18G, and 
MH-60R/S. Increment 2--land-based--will be led and funded by the Air 
Force and was expected to begin development during 2011. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy generally 
concurred with this assessment. Officials stated that the JPALS 
increment 1A program is on track for system integration with 
acceptable risk, that cost and schedule performance are within the 
baseline plan, and that the system requirements and acquisition 
strategy continue to be accurate, supportable, and executable. The 
Navy also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System (AMF 
JTRS): 

Illustration: Source: Department of Defense. 

DOD's JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with existing radios and increase communications and 
networking capabilities. A joint program executive office provides a 
central acquisition authority that cuts across the military services. 
Program and product offices develop hardware and software for users 
with similar requirements. The AMF program will develop radios and 
associated equipment for integration into nearly 160 different types 
of aircraft, ships, and fixed stations. 

Technology system development: 
Program start (3/08); 
Design review (11/09); 
GAO review (11/10); 
SA production decision (11/11); 
MF production decision (6/12). 

Initial capability: 
Initial capability (8/14). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $950.4 million:
Procurement: $6,213.7 million:
Total funding: $7,164.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 26,878: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 10/2008: $1,915.8; 
Latest 7/2010: $1,998.1; 
Percent change: 4.3. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 10/2008: $6,117.1; 
Latest 7/2010: $6,213.7; 
Percent change: 1.6. 

Total program cost: 
As of 10/2008: $8,032.9; 
Latest 7/2010: $8,211.8;
Percent change: 2.2. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 10/2008: $.296; 
Latest 7/2010: $.303; 
Percent change: 2.2. 

Total quantities: 
As of 10/2008: 27,102; 
Latest 7/2010: 27,102; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 10/2008: 80; 
Latest 7/2010: 77; 
Percent change: -3.8. 

The program office reported quantities in terms of channels rather 
than radios. The program is developing a 2-channel small airborne (SA) 
radio and a 4-channel maritime/fixed station (M/F) radio based on a 
single common architecture. 

[End of table] 

The AMF JTRS program completed its design review in November 2009 with 
its five critical technologies nearing maturity and its design stable. 
There will be an independent technology readiness assessment before 
the small airborne variant production decision, currently planned for 
November 2011. AMF JTRS production processes are also approaching 
maturity with manufacturing sites having demonstrated a capability to 
produce components or subsystems in a production-relevant environment. 
Each of the AMF variants will undergo initial operational test and 
evaluation after the program's initial production decision. AMF JTRS 
quantities could increase depending on whether the Navy and Marine 
Corps decide to acquire AMF JTRS small airborne radios for their 
networking capabilities. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 3/08; 
DOD design review: 11/09; 
GAO review; 11/10; 
Production decision: 11/11. 

[End of figure] 

AMF JTRS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

DOD certified the AMF JTRS program for entry into system development 
in March 2008 with all five of its critical technologies nearing 
maturity and demonstrated in a relevant environment. Prior to the 
start of system development, the AMF JTRS program took steps to 
develop key product knowledge. In 2004, the program awarded 
competitive system design contracts to two industry teams led by 
Boeing and Lockheed Martin to help mitigate technical risks and 
address key integration challenges. According to program officials, an 
independent technology readiness assessment will be performed in 
preparation for the small airborne variant production decision, which 
is scheduled for November 2011. 

Design Maturity: 

The AMF JTRS design appears stable. The program reported that all of 
its expected design drawings were releasable when it completed its 
design review in November 2009. AMF JTRS' ability to demonstrate that 
the system meets its performance requirements is dependent on 
waveforms and network management services from the JTRS Network 
Enterprise Domain program. Of the two open items remaining from the 
design review, program officials consider the ability to route and 
retransmit between radio channels to be high risk. More specifically, 
the program is concerned that a needed waveform may not be available 
in time to allow operational testers to complete testing before the 
program's small airborne variant production decision in November 2011. 
Program officials assessed the other open item--security certification 
from the National Security Agency--as a medium risk. Both the program 
office and National Security Agency agree that there are currently no 
certification issues with the design. Once the National Security 
Agency certifies AMF JTRS, any changes will require an additional 
certification. Certification requirements may impact the system 
verification testing schedule. 

Production Maturity: 

The AMF JTRS program expects to have mature production processes 
before beginning production. A joint government-contractor assessment 
team has conducted manufacturing readiness level assessments--which 
include assessing statistical process controls--at each manufacturing 
site. Consistent with best practices, the sites are expected to 
demonstrate the ability to produce production-representative units on 
pilot lines before beginning low-rate production. Several 
manufacturing sites have already demonstrated a capability to produce 
prototype components or subsystems in a production-relevant 
environment. 

Other Program Issues: 

AMF JTRS quantities could change depending on the Navy and Marine 
Corps' strategy for acquiring networking capabilities. While all of 
the services are planning to buy maritime/fixed station radios, the 
Army and Air Force are currently the only services planning to 
purchase the small airborne AMF JTRS radios. A March 2008 acquisition 
decision memorandum removed this requirement for the Navy and the 
Marine Corps and indicated that they plan to rely on the less capable 
ARC-210 radios for their airborne communications needs. While the ARC-
210 radio is being upgraded, it will not have the waveforms for air-to-
air and air-to-ground data networking. In August 2008, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
directed the JTRS joint program executive office, the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 
Integration (NII), along with the Joint Staff and military services, 
to assess issues and options related to replacing currently fielded 
ARC-210 radios with AMF JTRS capabilities. According to an NII 
official, this assessment has still not been initiated. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Joint Program 
Executive Office JTRS provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radios (GMR): 

Illustration: Source: Department of Defense. 

DOD's JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with selected radios and increase communications and 
networking capabilities. The JTRS GMR program is developing radios for 
ground vehicles. JTRS GMR depends on waveforms being developed by the 
JTRS Network Enterprise Domain program, and shares interdependencies 
with the JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit program as well as the 
JTRS Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station program. 

Concept: 
Program start (9/97); 

System development: 
Development start (6/02); 
Design review (12/07); 
New acquisition baseline (1/08); 
Program baseline directed (9/08); 
GAO review (11/10). 

Production: 
Production decision (10/11). 
Initial capability (1/13). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $128.3 million:
Procurement: $14,170.4 million:
Total funding: $14,298.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 86,948: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 6/2002: $1,004.8; 
Latest 1/2011: $1,697.3; 
Percent change: 68.9. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 6/2002: $16,159.9; 
Latest 1/2011: $14,170.4; 
Percent change: -12.3. 

Total program cost: 
As of 6/2002: $17,164.7; 
Latest 1/2011: $15,867.7; 
Percent change: -7.6. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 6/2002: $.158; 
Latest 1/2011: $.182; 
Percent change: 15.1. 

Total quantities: 
As of 6/2002: 108,388; 
Latest 1/2011: 87,079; 
Percent change: -19.7. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 6/2002: 55; 
Latest 1/2011: 127; 
Percent change: 130.9. 

[End of table] 

The JTRS GMR program expects to have its critical technologies mature, 
design stable, and most of its production processes in control by its 
planned October 2011 production decision. However, the JTRS GMR 
limited user test and production decision may be delayed to allow the 
program to test the GMR radio with its final software build and better 
assess the maturity of the wideband networking waveform. Even if the 
JTRS GMR limited user test and production decision are delayed, the 
Army's Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team program still plans to 
request approval to procure the radios for its next two brigades. The 
JTRS GMR program has yet to fully test key networking capabilities and 
receive its final National Security Agency certification. The program 
expects the Office of the Director, Cost Analysis and Program 
Evaluation, to complete a new independent cost estimate in January 
2011. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 6/02; 
DOD design review: 12/07; 
GAO review; 11/10; 
Production decision: 10/11. 

[End of figure] 

JTRS GMR Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JTRS GMR program started system development in 2002 with none of 
its 20 critical technologies mature and demonstrated in a realistic 
environment. The JTRS GMR program expects to have its critical 
technologies mature by its planned October 2011 production decision. 
According to the program office, 11 of the 19 current critical 
technologies are now mature, 7 are nearing maturity, and 1 is still 
immature. The immature critical technology--bridging/retransmission 
software--is to be tested as part of GMR's multiservice operational 
test and evaluation, which is scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter 
of fiscal year 2012. 

JTRS GMR relies on the wideband networking waveform--among other 
waveforms--to meet the requirements of key users, most notably the 
Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) program. While program 
officials reported the wideband networking waveform to be approaching 
maturity, the Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering 
(DDR&E), assessed the waveform's maturity to be substantially lower in 
a March 2010 technology readiness assessment for the E-IBCT program. 
According to the program office, there have been discussions between 
the JTRS program executive office and the Army about delaying GMR's 
limited user test--which was scheduled for completion in December 2010-
-until later in fiscal year 2011. The delay would allow the program to 
test the GMR radio with its final software build and collect more data 
for DDR&E to better assess the maturity of the wideband networking 
waveform. Testing the radio with its final software build could reduce 
the risk of late, costly design changes in production. 

According to program officials, the most significant technical 
challenge remaining for GMR is meeting security requirements. The 
program's security verification test was scheduled for the fourth 
quarter of fiscal year 2010. The program expects to receive its final 
security certification from the National Security Agency in the third 
quarter of fiscal year 2011. 

Design Maturity: 

The design of the JTRS GMR appears stable with over 90 percent of the 
total expected design releasable to manufacturing. However, until all 
its technologies are mature, key waveforms have been fully integrated 
and tested, and the program's final security certification is 
received, the potential for design changes remains. 

Production Maturity: 

The JTRS GMR program has reported that 27 of its 35 critical 
manufacturing processes will be in statistical control by the 
program's planned October 2011 production decision. By not having all 
these processes in statistical control at production start, there is a 
greater risk that the radio will not be produced within cost, 
schedule, and quality targets. However, prior to its production 
decision, the program will demonstrate its critical manufacturing 
processes on a pilot production line. In addition, the program has 
delivered 91 engineering development model sets for use in 
developmental and operational testing. 

Other Program Issues: 

Until a complete and comprehensive cost estimate is developed, JTRS 
GMR program costs will remain uncertain. In August 2008, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
directed the JTRS GMR program to update its cost estimate and revise 
its acquisition program baseline. Program officials expect the Office 
of the Director, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, to complete an 
independent cost estimate by August 2011. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program 
Executive Office provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form 
Fit (HMS): 

Illustration: Source: © 2009-2010 General Dynamics. 

DOD's JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with existing radios and increase communications and 
networking capabilities. The JTRS HMS program has two concurrent 
phases of development. Phase 1 includes the Rifleman radio and two 
small form fit radios. Phase 2 consists of the manpack radio and two 
additional small form fit radios, all of which are for use in a 
classified security domain. We assessed phase 1 and made observations 
on phase 2. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/development start (4/04); 
Design review phase 1 (3/08); 
Design review phase I1 (9/09); 
GAO review (11/10). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision--Manpack (2/11). 
Low-rate decision--Rifleman radio (4/11) 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc.
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $79.3 million:
Procurement: $3,889.9 million:
Total funding: $3,969.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 215,551: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 5/2004: $536.6; 
Latest 7/2010: $896.2; 
Percent change: 67.0. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 5/2004: $9,352.6; 
Latest 7/2010: $3,889.9; 
Percent change: -58.4. 

Total program cost: 
As of 5/2004: $9,889.2; 
Latest 7/2010: $4,786.2; 
Percent change: -51.6. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 5/2004: $.030; 
Latest 7/2010: $.022; 
Percent change: -26.3. 

Total quantities: 
As of 5/2004: 328,674;
Latest 7/2010: 215,961; 
Percent change: -34.3. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 5/2004: 85; 
Latest 7/2010: 104; 
Percent change: 22.4. 

[End of table] 

The Rifleman radio's production decision has been delayed from August 
2010 to approximately April 2011, and the manpack radio's production 
decision is also at risk. In addition, since August 2009, the 
program's estimated procurement cost increased from $2.5 billion to 
$3.9 billion, as engineering design models were produced and the 
program learned more about actual costs. While this amount is less 
than half the program's original estimate, it is planning to buy far 
fewer radios--in particular the more expensive handheld and manpack 
radios--than initially planned. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 4/04; 
DOD design review: 3/08; 
GAO review; 11/10; 
Production decision: 4/11. 

[End of figure] 

JTRS HMS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the JTRS HMS program, its phase 1 critical technologies-- 
logical partitioning and software power management--are nearing 
maturity. In October 2010, the Army assessed the Early Infantry 
Brigade Combat Team and concluded that one of the JTRS HMS small form 
fit radios was mature, and in January 2011, the Director, Defense 
Research and Engineering, concurred with this assessment. 
Additionally, the program office reported that it will demonstrate the 
Rifleman radio is fully mature during operational testing in January 
2011. 

The Army has not assessed the maturity of any of the program's four 
phase 2 technologies, but the program office reported that it will 
demonstrate that the manpack radio is fully mature during operational 
testing in February 2011. The program office has also reported that 
the manpack radio is currently meeting its size, weight, and power 
requirements. 

Design Maturity: 

According to the JTRS HMS program office, the phase 1 design is now 
stable. The phase 1 Rifleman radio has been reconfigured to address 
issues identified in its 2009 limited user test. The program office 
reported that the radio now has fewer parts; meets size, weight, and 
battery requirements; and provides increased reliability and range. 
The phase 2 design continues to change. JTRS HMS and the Nett Warrior 
program, which will use the phase 2 small form fit B radio, are 
investigating alternatives to better accommodate Nett Warrior's 
updated requirements, but the program office does not expect this 
redesign to be a challenge because it will not involve new technology. 

Production Maturity: 

According to the JTRS HMS program, its production processes are 
mature. In 2010, the program identified one critical manufacturing 
process and reported it was in control. In 2009, the program 
identified 24 critical manufacturing processes, but it no longer 
considers any of these processes critical because their maturity has 
increased. 

Other Program Issues: 

The production decision for the Rifleman radio has been further 
delayed from August 2010 to approximately April 2011, and the manpack 
radio's planned February 2011 production decision is also at risk. The 
waveforms targeted for the radio's limited user test are being 
operationally tested in February 2011; the National Security Agency is 
not scheduled to complete certification of the manpack radio until 
after successful verification testing in May 2011; and the MUOS 
waveform that the manpack radio is required to use is not scheduled to 
be operationally tested until 2012. 

Since August 2009, the program's estimated procurement cost has 
increased from $2.5 billion to $3.9 billion, as engineering design 
models were produced and the program learned more about actual costs. 
While this amount is less than half the program's original estimate, 
it is planning to buy far fewer radios--in particular the more 
expensive handheld and manpack radios--than initially planned. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program 
Executive Office provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): 

Two photographs: Sources: Lockheed Martin (left); General Dynamics 
(right). 

The Navy's LCS is designed to perform mine countermeasures, 
antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare missions. It consists of 
the ship itself, or seaframe, and the mission package it deploys. The 
Navy is procuring the first four seaframes in two unique designs. The 
first seaframe (LCS 1) was delivered in September 2008. The second 
seaframe (LCS 2) followed in December 2009. We assessed both 
seaframes. See pages 99-100 for an assessment of LCS mission packages. 

Concept: 
Program start (9/02); 

System development: 
Development start (6/04). 

Production: 
Production decision--1st design (12/04); 
Production decision--2nd design (10/05); 
First ship delivery (9/08); 
Second ship delivery (12/09); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Initial capability (7/12). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 5/2004: $873.9; 
Latest: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 5/2004: $464.6; 
Latest: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost: 
As of 5/2004: $1,338.5; 
Latest: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 5/2004: $334.622; 
Latest: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities: 
As of 5/2004: 4; 
Latest: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 5/2004: 41; 
Latest: 98; 
Percent change: 139.0. 

Baseline estimates above are for seaframe-related costs only. Research 
and development funding includes detail design and construction of two 
ships. 

[End of table] 

The Navy is building the third and fourth LCS seaframes without having 
matured all the critical technologies or having achieved a stable 
design. Three of 19 seaframe critical technologies are still only 
nearing maturity and the Navy reported last year that LCS 3 and LCS 4 
began fabrication with only 69 percent and 57 percent of basic and 
functional drawings complete, respectively. In addition, the Navy's 
efforts to resolve technical issues affecting the lead ships have led 
to design changes to LCS 3 and LCS 4 during construction, several of 
which remain in progress. Following failed contract negotiations in 
2009 for fiscal year 2010-funded ships, the Navy twice restructured 
the program's acquisition strategy. This process culminated in 
December 2010 when the Navy awarded contracts for 10 ships of each 
design between fiscal years 2010 and 2015. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Contract award: 12/04; 
Lead ship fabrication: 2/05; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

LCS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Sixteen of 19 critical technologies for both LCS designs are mature. 
Three technologies--LCS 1's overhead launch and retrieval system and 
LCS 2's trimaran hull and aluminum structure--are nearing maturity. 
Further, launch, handling, and recovery systems, which are essential 
to the LCS antisubmarine warfare and mine countermeasures missions, 
are still being refined for both designs. For LCS 1, Navy simulations 
have identified risks in safely launching and recovering mission 
systems that experience pendulous motion during handling--such as the 
remote multimission vehicle and unmanned surface vehicle systems. 
These operations may be complicated by unacceptably high water levels 
intruding into the ship's launch bay during high sea states. On LCS 2, 
the twin boom extensible crane system--designed to launch, handle, and 
recover watercraft--contains unproven elements. The Navy reports 
recent progress on these systems including (1) successful operation 
and movement of an embarked 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat 
onboard LCS 1 in March 2010, (2) synthetic lift lines on LCS 2 
successfully completing a 200 percent lift test, and (3) routine usage 
of a straddle carrier to move an 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat 
(with stowage cradle) and berthing modules around the LCS 2 mission 
bay. Navy officials also report that testing of LCS 2's twin-boom 
extensible crane is progressing. 

Design and Production Maturity: 

The Navy provided historical data on design completeness that was 
inconsistent with data it provided to GAO last year, but officials did 
not respond to requests for clarification. The data provided by the 
Navy last year indicated that the LCS 3 and LCS 4 began fabrication 
with only 69 percent and 57 percent of basic and functional drawings 
complete, respectively. The Navy also could not provide this data for 
the LCS 1 and LCS 2. GAO's work on shipbuilding best practices has 
found that leading commercial firms assess a ship design as stable 
when 100 percent of these drawings are complete. By delaying 
construction start until basic and functional design is completed and 
a stable design is achieved, shipbuilders minimize the risk of design 
changes and the subsequent costly rework and out-of-sequence work 
these changes can drive. 

The Navy used a concurrent design-build strategy for LCS 1 and LCS 2 
seaframes, which proved unsuccessful. Implementation of new design 
guidelines, delays in major equipment deliveries, and strong focus on 
achieving schedule and performance goals resulted in increased 
construction costs. The Navy's ongoing efforts to resolve technical 
issues affecting LCS 1 and LCS 2, implement cost reduction measures, 
and increase mission capability have led to design changes for LCS 3 
and LCS 4. These changes are significant and have affected the 
configuration of several major ship systems including propulsion, 
communications, electrical, and navigation. 

Other Program Issues: 

After unsuccessful contract negotiations for fiscal year 2010-funded 
seaframes, the Navy outlined a new acquisition strategy for the LCS 
program in September 2009 aimed at improving affordability by 
selecting one seaframe design for the fiscal year 2010 ships and 
beyond. In November 2010, the Navy amended this strategy and proposed 
contracting for 10 ships of each seaframe design through fiscal year 
2015. In December 2010, Congress approved this revised strategy, and 
the Navy subsequently awarded fixed-price incentive contracts for up 
to 10 ships each to Lockheed Martin and Austal USA. 

Program Office Comments: 

According to the Navy, two industry teams (1) have each designed, 
built, and delivered to the Navy a lead ship meeting the LCS 
performance requirements and (2) are currently building their second 
ships, with lessons learned from the lead ships incorporated into the 
designs. The Navy states that both designs are stable, with LCS 3 and 
LCS 4 having experienced minimal design changes to-date, and cites 
impressive learning and investment by both shipbuilders as well as 
significant improvement in cost and schedule performance. According to 
the Navy, LCS 3 launched on December 4, 2010, at over 80 percent 
complete. This level of completeness at launch, and the improvement in 
cost and schedule performance by both shipbuilders, provides the Navy 
confidence that risk of design change and out-of-sequence work is 
minimal. The Navy also provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Littoral Combat Ship-Mission Modules: 

Illustration: Source: © Northrop Grumman Corporation. 

The Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will perform mine 
countermeasures (MCM), surface warfare (SUW), and antisubmarine 
warfare (ASW) missions using modular mission packages. Packages 
include weapons and sensors that operate from MH-60 helicopters or 
unmanned underwater, aerial, or surface vehicles. Initial packages 
include engineering development models and production-representative 
systems of some, but not all, systems planned. Mission capability 
improves with each package delivered until it reaches a baseline 
capability. 

Concept: 
LCS program start (5/04); 

System development: 
First MCM delivery (9/07); 
First SUW delivery (7/08); 
First ASW delivery (9/08); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Milestone B-LCS (2QFY11); 
Development start (6/03); 
Design review (3/06); 
Low-rate decision (9/08). 
Initial capability MCM (2013); 
Initial capability SUW (2013). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Corporation, Integrated Systems:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 8/2007: $484.5; 
Latest: TBD. 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 8/2007: $3,211.0; 
Latest: TBD. 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost: 
As of 8/2007: $3,695.6; 
Latest: TBD. 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 8/2007: $57.743; 
Latest: TBD. 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities: 
As of 8/2007: 64; 
Latest: TBD. 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 8/2007: NA; 
Latest: NA; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The Navy has accepted delivery of five partially capable mission 
packages. At full baseline capability, packages require a total of 21 
critical technologies, including 11 sensors, 6 vehicles, and 4 weapons 
for their operation. Most of these technologies are mature; however, 
some mission systems have experienced test failures and have not 
demonstrated the promised capability. Individual systems in the mine 
countermeasures packages do not meet reliability requirements, and the 
Navy is currently evaluating alternatives to replace the canceled Non- 
Line-of-Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) and missiles. The Navy is also 
reexamining the content of the ASW package. Due to developmental 
delays with key mission systems, the Navy risks acquiring significant 
numbers of seaframes and mission packages before the mission packages 
are proven. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: NA (not assessed); 
DOD design review: NA (not assessed); 
Production start: NA (not assessed); 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

LCS Modules Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

At its full baseline capability, operation of the MCM, SUW, and ASW 
packages on LCS requires a total of 21 critical technologies, 
including 11 sensors, 6 vehicles, and 4 weapons. Of these 
technologies, 18 are mature and have been demonstrated in a realistic 
environment. 

The Navy has accepted delivery of two partially capable MCM mission 
packages. According to program officials, in 2010 the MCM mission 
package completed end-to-end testing, and two MCM systems--the AN/AQS- 
20A sonar and Airborne Laser Mine Detection System--have completed 
developmental testing in separate test events. Two other systems--the 
Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) and Unmanned Surface Sweep System--have 
not yet been demonstrated in a realistic environment, and a third--the 
Remote Minehunting System (RMS)--has been delayed because of poor 
reliability. Program officials report that the Navy is assessing 
alternative USV designs because the current system does not meet power 
output requirements necessary to support the towed surface sweep 
system. The RMS, which is its own major defense acquisition program, 
experienced a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical threshold 
in December 2009, due to cost increases resulting from a 51 percent 
reduction in quantity and efforts to improve reliability. In June 
2010, the Office of the Secretary of Defense completed its review and 
certified RMS for continuation. According to Director, Operational 
Test and Evaluation, officials, RMS reliability has improved from 7.9 
hours to nearly 45 hours between failures. According to program 
officials, the Navy plans to recommence RMS production in fiscal year 
2015. Further, program officials report that the Rapid Airborne Mine 
Clearance System has been removed from the package while the Navy 
evaluates more cost-effective alternatives for meeting desired 
capability delivery time frames. 

The Navy has accepted delivery of two partially capable SUW mission 
packages and expects to accept delivery of a third mission package in 
fiscal year 2011. The Navy will resume procuring SUW packages in 
fiscal year 2012. The 30 millimeter gun was test-fired from LCS 1 in 
September 2009 and according to program officials, integrated with the 
LCS 1 combat system and demonstrated at sea in April 2010. In May 
2010, DOD canceled the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System due to cost and 
technical challenges. Officials note the Navy is evaluating other 
alternatives and expects to complete evaluation by the second quarter 
of fiscal year 2011. 

The Navy accepted delivery of one partially capable ASW mission 
package in September 2008. However, program officials stated that the 
Navy plans to introduce new mission systems and classified 
capabilities before procuring additional ASW packages. Program 
officials report that the Navy has completed development and testing 
of the first ASW mission package to evaluate operational concepts and 
refine requirements. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Navy plans to purchase 18 ships and 13 mission packages between 
fiscal years 2011 and 2015, but developmental delays in key mission 
package systems mean the Navy will acquire significant numbers of 
seaframes before mission packages are proven. GAO has reported since 
2007 on challenges developing systems constituting LCS mission 
packages and integrating them with their host platforms. These 
challenges have delayed the planned delivery of baseline capability by 
several years. Until mission package performance is proven, the Navy 
risks investing in a fleet of ships that does not deliver its promised 
capability and is largely constrained to self-defense as opposed to 
mission-related tasks. 

Program Office Comments: 

The Navy stated that recent testing has been comprehensive, 
operationally relevant, and successful. According to the Navy, the SUW 
mission package supported early deployment of LCS 1, providing a 
counter-illicit trafficking capability. Further, the Navy stated that 
from program inception, the acquisition strategy for mission package 
has employed an incremental approach and remained stable, fielding 
systems as they achieve the required level of maturity. According to 
the Navy, those few systems experiencing issues (NLOS-LS and RMS) are 
either being replaced with alternative systems or are targets of 
increased focus and attention. According to the Navy, the results have 
been positive in all cases. In addition, the Navy provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

LHA Replacement Amphibious Assault Ship: 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Navy. 

The Navy's LHA 6 will replace the LHA 1 Tarawa-class amphibious 
assault ships. The LHA 6 is a modified variant of the fielded LHD 8 
amphibious assault ship and will feature enhanced aviation 
capabilities and is designed to support all Marine aviation assets in 
the Expeditionary Strike Group. LHA 6 construction began in December 
2008. It is currently scheduled to be delivered in April 2013. The LHA 
6 ship class includes three ships. We assessed LHA 6 and made 
observations on LHA 7 and LHA 8. 

Concept: 
Program start (7/01); 

System development: 
Contract award (6/07). 

Production: 
Construction start (12/08); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Ship delivery (4/13); 
Initial capability (10/14). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $48.8 million:
Procurement: $2,866.3 million:
Total funding: $2,916.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 1: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 1/2006: $217.6; 
Latest 12/2009: $286.0; 
Percent change: 31.4. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 1/2006: $2,915.4; 
Latest 12/2009: $6,100.0; 
Percent change: 109.2. 

Total program cost: 
As of 1/2006: $3,133.0; 
Latest 12/2009: $6,387.3; 
Percent change: 103.9. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 1/2006: $3,133.034; 
Latest 12/2009: $3,193.635; 
Percent change: 1.9. 

Total quantities: 
As of 1/2006: 1; 
Latest 12/2009: 2; 
Percent change: 100.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 1/2006: 146; 
Latest 12/2009: 159; 
Percent change: 8.9. 

Research and development costs include the LHA 6, LHA 7, and LHA 8. 
Procurement costs only include the LHA 6 and LHA 7. 

[End of table] 

The LHA 6 began construction in December 2008 with mature 
technologies, but a design that was only 65 percent complete. Almost 
all detailed design drawings have now been released. In July 2009, the 
Secretary of the Navy certified that the LHA 6 program was ready to 
commence full shipbuilding construction activities. As of September 
2010, the program office reported it had conducted unit readiness 
reviews for all of the ship's 216 assembly units, and the shipbuilder 
had started fabrication on 215 units. The LHA 6 program may incur cost 
growth due to the need for postdelivery rework of the ship's deck to 
cope with the intense, hot downwash from the Joint Strike Fighter. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Contract award: 6/07; 
Lead ship fabrication: 12/08; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

LHA 6 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All LHA critical technologies were mature by the time the program 
awarded its construction contract in June 2007. DOD and the Navy 
concluded in 2005 that all LHA 6 components and technologies were 
fully mature and will have been installed on other ships prior to LHA 
6 delivery. Although not considered critical technologies, the program 
has identified six key subsystems needed to achieve the LHA 6's full 
capabilities. Five of these are mature, installed on numerous Navy 
ships, and do not require modification for the LHA 6. The sixth, the 
Joint Precision Approach and Landing System, a Global Positioning 
System-based aircraft landing system, is still in development. While 
this system is necessary to realize the LHA 6's full capabilities, it 
is not required to meet its operational requirements. The program 
office has also previously identified the machinery control system as 
a potential risk. The shipbuilder expected to commence integrated 
testing of the machinery control system for LHA 6 in January 2011 in 
the land based test equipment. 

Design Stability: 

The LHA 6 began construction in December 2008 with only 65 percent of 
its design complete. Almost all detailed design drawings have now been 
released. The LHA 7 design will be very close to the LHA 6. Design 
changes will be limited. These changes include a new firefighting 
system and radar and command, control, communications, computers, and 
intelligence updates. Design changes may be more significant on the 
LHA 8 if the Navy includes a well deck on the ship. All LHA ships 
except LHA 6 and LHA 7 have a well deck. Officials report that 
reintroducing the well deck would affect aviation capabilities such as 
fuel storage space. The Navy will determine the final configuration, 
capabilities, and cost for the LHA 8 after trade studies are completed 
in fiscal year 2011. Program officials reported that decisions on the 
LHA 8 design and the potential increase in funding needed to execute 
them have not yet been determined. 

Production Maturity: 

In July 2009, the Secretary of the Navy certified that the LHA 6 
program was ready to commence full shipbuilding construction 
activities. As of September 2010, the program office reported it had 
conducted unit-level readiness reviews for all of the ship's 216 
assembly units and the shipbuilder had started fabrication on 215 
units. 

Other Program Issues: 

The LHA 6 is likely to experience further cost growth. Costly 
postdelivery rework of the ship's deck may be necessary to cope with 
the downwash from the Joint Strike Fighter. The heat from these 
aircraft could warp the LHA 6 deck or damage deck equipment. The Navy 
will conduct at-sea testing on USS WASP to determine if and how the 
LHA 6 and other Joint Strike Fighter-capable ships will need to modify 
their flight decks. The program office does not expect the Navy to 
finalize a solution to this issue prior to LHA 6 ship delivery. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
program manager is continually monitoring shipyard performance and is 
working closely with the shipbuilder to identify mitigation 
strategies. The Navy also provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform: 

Illustration: Source: Computer Sciences Corp. 

The Navy's Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) is one of four classes of 
ships in the Maritime Propositioning Force (Future)--MPF(F)--squadron 
that supports seabasing. The MLP is designed to facilitate at-sea 
vehicle and cargo transfer in low-threat environments to support 
operations ashore. In 2010, the Navy restructured the MPF(F) program, 
which includes a lower-cost variant of the MLP based largely on a 
commercial oil tanker. The Navy plans to award the construction 
contract for the first of three MLP vessels in early 2011. 

Concept: 
Program start (6/08); 
GAO review (11/10). 

System development: 
Design/construction approval (3/11). 

Production: 
Lead-ship fabrication (7/11); 
Lead-ship delivery (9/13); 
Initial operating capability (3/15). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics/NASSCO:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $24.2 million:
Procurement: $1,307.0 million:
Total funding: $1,331.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 3: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 12/2009: $93.7; 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 12/2009: $1,426.1; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 12/2009: $1,519.9; 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 12/2009: $506.622; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities: 
As of: NA; 
Latest 12/2009: 3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of: NA; 
Latest 12/2009: 81; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The MLP program will award its detailed design and construction 
contract with three of its four current critical technologies mature. 
The remaining technology, operations with MLP and its supporting 
vessels, is nearing maturity. It is not expected to be mature before 
construction begins because it requires a complete or near complete 
MLP to be tested at-sea. The program is currently testing the 
technology using small-scale models. As part of the MPF(F) 
restructuring, the MLP program replaced most of its critical 
technologies. The redesigned MLP is largely based on a commercial oil 
tanker. The new design offers less capability, but reduces the 
program's cost and schedule. According to program officials, 
leveraging the design of a commercial oil tanker will allow them to 
have a higher level of design maturity and a lower level of 
technological risk prior to the start of construction. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

GAO review; 11/10; 
Contract award: 3/11; 
Lead ship fabrication: 7/11 (not assessed). 

[End of figure] 

MPF(F)/MLP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The MLP program will award its detailed design and construction 
contract with three of its current critical technologies mature and 
one nearing maturity. As a result of the MPF(F) restructure, the MLP 
adopted a new design and lowered the number of critical technologies 
from five to four, reducing MLP capabilities as well as costs. The 
technologies are designed to assist in the transfer of cargo between 
the MLP and other ships. The three technologies that have reached 
maturity--skin-to-skin vehicle transfer with the Large, Medium Speed 
Roll-on/Roll-off vessel, vehicle transfer with the Joint High Speed 
Vessel (JHSV), and the Landing Craft Air Cushion interface--were 
tested at-sea using surrogate platforms. Program officials reported 
that the vehicle transfer technologies--which use ramps to connect MLP 
to the large cargo vessel or the JHSV at-sea while in motion--were 
tested as recently as March 2010. Vehicle transfers with the JHSV are 
currently limited to operations in calm waters. The landing craft 
interface was tested at sea in March 2010 by loading landing craft at 
different speeds and approaches in varying sea states onto a surrogate 
MLP. While on the MLP, landing craft may receive cargo, undergo 
limited maintenance, and refuel. The last technology--landing craft 
operations with MLP and larger cargo vessel connected--requires the 
simultaneous interaction of two of the other technologies. Program 
officials do not expect this technology to reach maturity before 
construction as it requires a complete or near complete MLP for at-sea 
testing. Program officials said it is currently being tested using 
small scale models. 

Design Maturity: 

The MLP has undergone significant design changes due to the MPF(F) 
program restructure and budget reductions. The new MLP design will 
offer less cargo, personnel, and aviation capacity, but at a lower 
cost. The design is based on the Alaska-class crude oil carrier with 
modifications that allow the MLP to raise and lower itself into the 
water so that landing craft can float on and off. Program officials 
reported that the MLP will leverage approximately 60 percent of the 
commercial design. They also reported 81 percent of preliminary design 
drawings are complete and the three-dimensional design is underway. 
The largest changes will be to the central portion of the ship, which 
will be modified to store supplies and vehicles, as well as the 
equipment needed for the landing craft interface. In the future, the 
MLP may be able to accommodate float-on modules to provide additional 
capabilities. 

Other Program Issues: 

Due to resource constraints, the Navy has restructured MPF squadrons 
by deferring the construction of new Large, Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-
off vessels, redesignating two classes of ships out of the MPF(F), and 
reducing the capabilities and costs of the MLP. Additionally, the 
MPF(F) concept of operations has changed from assembling cargo on-
board the MLP to assembling it onshore. 

Program Office Comments: 

According to the MLP program, it is working with the Office of Naval 
Research and the Technology Readiness Assessment office to reassess 
MLP critical technologies. The program anticipates that this 
assessment will state that MLP has no critical technologies. The 
program has also identified a series of production-readiness criteria 
in the request for proposal for the construction contract, including 
having certain American Bureau of Shipbuilding drawings 100 percent 
complete, the three dimensional model by zone 90 percent complete, the 
model by block 65 percent complete, and work package kits 5 percent 
complete. According to the program, these criteria and the program's 
detailed plan for completing all design artifacts to support 
production will ensure the design is sufficiently mature for 
construction. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has also 
validated all changes in MLP capabilities. The program office also 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS): 

Illustration: Source: © 2008 Lockheed Martin. 

The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to 
provide a worldwide, multiservice population of mobile and fixed-site 
terminal users with an increase in narrowband communications capacity 
and improved availability for small terminals. MUOS will replace the 
Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On (UFO) satellite system currently 
in operation and provide interoperability with legacy terminals. MUOS 
consists of a network of satellites and an integrated ground network. 
We assessed both the space and ground segments. 

Concept: 
Program start (9/02). 

System development: 
Development start (9/04); 
Design review (3/07). 

Production: 
Production decision (2/08). 
GAO review (11/10); 
On-orbit capability (3/12); 
Full capability (9/15). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $875.2 million:
Procurement: $1,561.2 million:
Total funding: $2,436.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 2: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 9/2004: $3,593.8; 
Latest 6/2010: $4,151.8; 
Percent change: 15.5. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 9/2004: $2,990.2; 
Latest 6/2010: $2,613.3; 
Percent change: -12.6. 

Total program cost: 
As of 9/2004: $6,622.0; 
Latest 6/2010: $6,830.2; 
Percent change: 3.1. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 9/2004: $1,103.658; 
Latest 6/2010: $1,138.361; 
Percent change: 3.1. 

Total quantities: 
As of 9/2004: 6; 
Latest 6/2010: 6; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 9/2004: 90; 
Latest 6/2010: 112; 
Percent change: 24.4. 

[End of table] 

The latest cost data do not reflect the current cost of the program, 
and a new acquisition program baseline has not yet been approved. 

All MUOS critical technologies are mature and all design drawings have 
been released; however, design flaws discovered late in production 
continue to pose cost and schedule risks for the program. After a 2009 
review of the program found that the MUOS schedule was optimistic and 
its budget was inadequate, the program developed more realistic cost 
and schedule baselines. The new cost baseline has not yet been 
approved. The current estimate for the first satellite to begin on- 
orbit operations is March 2012--24 months later than planned when the 
program began development. The delivery of MUOS capabilities is time- 
critical due to the operational failures of two UFO satellites. The 
MUOS program has taken several steps to address any potential 
capability gap that could occur prior to the first MUOS satellite 
beginning on-orbit operations. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 9/04; 
DOD design review: 3/07; 
Production decision: 2/08; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

MUOS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the program office, all eight MUOS critical technologies 
are mature and have been demonstrated in at least a realistic 
environment. 

Design Maturity: 

According to the program office, the MUOS design is stable and the 
design flaws discovered late in production have largely been resolved. 
However, design issues with UHF reflectors continue to pose cost and 
schedule risks for the program. Specifically, the UHF reflectors have 
been redesigned to mitigate signal interference and structural 
hardware bonding issues. According to the program, the late delivery 
of the UHF reflectors--which are on the program critical path for the 
first MUOS satellite launch--is the program's top challenge. The 
hinges that connect the solar panels and booms in the solar array wing 
assembly are also causing unwanted signal interference. 

According to the program, it has mitigated the schedule effects of 
these design issues by proceeding in September 2010 with system-level 
vibration testing, which approximates the level of vibration 
experienced during launch, prior to incorporating all of the planned 
designed modifications for the reflectors and solar panels. According 
to DOD, system-level vibration testing has been completed and the risk 
associated with the nonflight components are being mitigated by 
conducting component-level vibration testing on these parts prior to 
their reinstallation on the spacecraft. According to the program, the 
reflectors and solar panels are going through rework and test in 
parallel with system-level thermal vacuum testing and are to be 
available for reinstallation on the spacecraft after system-level 
testing. 

Production Maturity: 

According to the program office, the production maturity of the first 
MUOS satellite is high. We could not assess production maturity 
because the program does not collect statistical process control data 
on its critical manufacturing processes. According to the program 
office, the space segment does collect, track, and analyze data on 
manufacturing process defects. While manufacturing defects have 
contributed to cost growth and schedule delays on the program, the 
number of defects has decreased slightly over time as the maturity of 
the manufacturing process has increased. 

Other Program Issues: 

The importance of the first MUOS launch increased due to the 
unexpected failures of two UFO satellites. Based on the current health 
of on-orbit satellites, UHF communication capabilities are currently 
predicted to provide the required availability level until the first 
MUOS satellite begins on-orbit operations--currently planned for March 
2012. However, the MUOS program is addressing the potential for a 
capability gap by activating dual digital receiver unit operations on 
a UFO satellite, examining the potential of purchasing or leasing UHF 
satellite communications services on a commercial satellite, and 
exploring the feasibility of expanded digital receiver unit operations 
on the legacy payloads of the MUOS satellites. 

In 2009, a Navy-initiated review of the MUOS program found that while 
it was technically sound, its schedule was optimistic and its budget 
was inadequate. As a result, the program developed new cost and 
schedule baselines. The acquisition program baseline has been under 
revision since December 2009, but has not yet been approved. The prime 
contract cost baseline for the MUOS program was renegotiated in 
February 2010. According to the program, the prime contract cost 
baseline, which includes $162 million in engineering change proposals, 
has increased about 61 percent since contract award in September 2004. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT): 

Illustration: Source: © 2008 Raytheon Company. 

The Navy's NMT is the next-generation maritime military satellite 
communications terminal. It will be installed in existing ships, 
submarines, and shore sites. NMT is designed to work with the Air 
Force's Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite system to 
enhance protected and survivable satellite communications to naval 
forces. Its multiband capabilities will also enable communications 
over existing military satellite communication systems, such as 
Milstar, Wideband Global SATCOM, and the Defense Satellite 
Communications System. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start (10/03); 
Design review (5/08). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (7/10); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Initial capability (9/12); 
Full capability (9/15). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: San Diego, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $57.2 million:
Procurement: $1,081.3 million:
Total funding: $1,138.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 254: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 12/2006: $687.0; 
Latest 10/2010: $660.9; 
Percent change: -3.8. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 12/2006: $1,599.8; 
Latest 10/2010: $1,143.7; 
Percent change: -28.5. 

Total program cost: 
As of 12/2006: $2,286.8; 
Latest 10/2010: $1,804.7; 
Percent change: -21.1. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 12/2006: $6.867; 
Latest 10/2010: $5.936; 
Percent change: -13.6. 

Total quantities: 
As of 12/2006: 333; 
Latest 10/2010: 304; 
Percent change: -8.7. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 12/2006: 107; 
Latest 10/2010: 107; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

The NMT program entered production in July 2010 with mature critical 
technologies and a stable design, but without demonstrating its 
critical manufacturing processes are in statistical control--a key 
step for ensuring these processes are repeatable, sustainable, and 
capable of consistently producing quality parts. The NMT program began 
to produce production-representative engineering development models in 
May 2008. According to the NMT program, it used these models to mature 
and baseline its manufacturing processes. The program also plans to 
complete a manufacturing readiness assessment during fiscal year 2011 
to support a full-rate production decision in fiscal year 2012. The 
NMT program is dependent on AEHF satellites to test its full range of 
capabilities. The first AEHF satellite was launched in August 2010, 
but a propulsion issue has delayed it from reaching its planned orbit. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 10/03; 
DOD design review: 5/08; 
Production decision: 7/10; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

NMT Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The NMT program's two critical technologies--a multiband antenna feed 
and monolithic microwave integrated circuit power amplifiers for Q-
band and Ka-band communication frequencies--are mature. Both of these 
technologies have been demonstrated in fully capable, production- 
representative engineering development models. 

Design Maturity: 

The NMT's design is stable. The program has released all of its 
expected design drawings and placed the design under configuration 
control. At its May 2008 design review, program officials reported 
that about 70 percent of the expected drawings were releasable to 
manufacturing. 

Production Maturity: 

The NMT program office entered production in July 2010 without 
demonstrating that its manufacturing processes were in statistical 
control--a key step for ensuring these processes are repeatable, 
sustainable, and capable of consistently producing high-quality parts. 
During a June 2008 technology readiness assessment, the program 
identified three critical manufacturing processes related to the Q-
band and Ka-band monolithic microwave integrated circuits and the Q/Ka 
radome. The NMT program began to produce production-representative 
engineering development models in May 2008. According to the NMT 
program, it used its production run of 33 engineering development 
models to mature and baseline its manufacturing processes. This will 
allow the program to begin tracking statistical process control data. 
A manufacturing readiness level assessment is scheduled to occur 
during fiscal year 2011 to support a full-rate production decision 
review in fiscal year 2012. 

Other Program Issues: 

The NMT program is dependent on AEHF satellites to test its full range 
of capabilities. The first AEHF satellite was launched in August 2010; 
however, a faulty satellite propulsion system will delay the satellite 
from reaching its planned orbit by about 7 to 9 months. Delays with 
AEHF capability directly affect the ability of the NMT program to test 
the new higher data rate communications capability. However, NMT 
officials stated that the new higher data rate can be tested with one 
AEHF satellite, should the Air Force configure it in that fashion. 
Additional AEHF satellites provide more coverage and program officials 
noted that initial operational capability can be achieved with two 
installed systems that have successfully completed system operational 
verification test. In addition, the NMT program can provide value to 
the fleet when it is fielded by accessing existing satellite 
communication systems such as the Defense Satellite Communications 
System, Milstar, Wideband Global SATCOM, Interim Polar, and UFO 
satellite constellations. 

The NMT program's software lines of code have significantly increased 
since development start to accommodate software communications 
architecture requirements. Currently, software integration testing is 
over 80 percent complete with over 95 percent of the defects resolved. 
According to NMT program officials, the NMT program is containing most 
of the defects that it finds within phase, which is a good indicator 
because it is more efficient to correct problems within the phase in 
which they occur. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
NMT program has successfully entered the production phase and 
continues to successfully progress to provide deployed naval 
commanders with assured access to secure, protected, command and 
control and communication capabilities to support the exchange of 
warfighter-critical information. It will support the Navy's net-
centric FORCEnet architecture and act as an enabler for transforming 
operational capability available to the warfighter. The Navy also 
provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

P-8A Poseidon: 

Photograph: Source: U.S. Navy. 

The Navy's P-8A Poseidon is a Boeing 737 commercial derivative that 
will replace the P-3C Orion. Its primary roles are antisubmarine 
warfare; antisurface warfare; and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance. The P-8A is a part of a family of systems that share 
the integrated maritime patrol mission and support the Navy's maritime 
warfighting capability. The program plans to field capabilities in 
three increments. We assessed increment one. 

Concept: 
Program start (3/00). 

System development: 
Development start (5/04); 
Design review (6/07). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (8/10); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Full-rate decision (4/13); 
Initial capability (7/13); 
Last procurement (2019). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Boeing:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,857.7 million:
Procurement: $21,751.5 million:
Total funding: $24,327.4 million:
Procurement quantity: 111: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 5/2004: $7,420.2; 
Latest 11/2010: $7,795.0; 
Percent change: 5.1. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 5/2004: $23,020.1; 
Latest 11/2010: $23,738.8; 
Percent change: 3.1. 

Total program cost: 
As of 5/2004: $30,575.9; 
Latest 11/2010: $32,352.6; 
Percent change: 5.8. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 5/2004: $265.877; 
Latest 11/2010: $265.186; 
Percent change: -0.3. 

Total quantities: 
As of 5/2004: 115; 
Latest 11/2010: 122; 
Percent change: 6.1. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 5/2004: 160; 
Latest 11/2010: 160; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

The P-8A entered production in August 2010 with mature technologies 
and a stable design. The program completed a production readiness 
review in January 2010 and demonstrated its airframe manufacturing 
processes on a commercial line prior to the production decision. 
However, several parts of the P-8A, including the sonobouy launcher, 
auxiliary fuel tanks, and a new fuel tank safety system, have 
manufacturing readiness levels that are lower than recommended for the 
start of production. The airframe on the P-8A program has been 
designated as a commercial item. The Defense Contract Audit Agency has 
expressed concern about the designation because of the extent of the 
modifications being made to the aircraft. In addition, according to 
the program office, the Defense Contract Management Agency has cited 
limited access to commercial production facilities as a concern. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 5/04; 
DOD design review: 6/07; 
Production decision: 8/10; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

P-8A Program: 

Technology and Design Maturity: 

The P-8A entered production in August 2010 with mature technologies 
and a stable design. An independent technology readiness assessment of 
the program was conducted in December 2009 to support the production 
decision. The assessment identified one current critical technology, 
the hydro-carbon sensor, and rated it mature. The sensor has been 
tested in ground-based applications, but has not been demonstrated in 
an aircraft. While the ESM digital receiver was considered a critical 
technology during development, program officials stated that this 
technology was no longer identified as such because it is mature and 
has been demonstrated on the E/A-18G. However, no formal ESM flight 
testing has been conducted on the P-8A. According to the program 
office, another formerly identified critical technology, the sonobouy 
launcher, is scheduled to begin testing in a realistic environment in 
fiscal year 2011. 

Production Maturity: 

The critical manufacturing processes for the P-8A airframe are proven, 
but manufacturing readiness levels are lower than recommended for the 
start of production. The P-8A program completed a production readiness 
review in January 2010 and demonstrated its critical airframe 
manufacturing processes on a commercial line prior to its August 2010 
production decision. The airframe is being procured as a commercial 
item and has stable production processes that support production rates 
in excess of 32 airframes per month. However, several parts of the P- 
8A, including the sonobouy launcher, auxiliary fuel tanks, and new 
fuel tank safety system are currently assessed at manufacturing 
readiness levels that are lower than those recommended for the start 
of production. 

Other Program Issues: 

The P-8A airframe has been designated as a commercial item. As a 
result, the contractor is not required to submit cost or pricing data 
to the government. According to the Navy, it weighed the assumed cost 
and benefits before making the commercial item designation. The 
Defense Contract Audit Agency has expressed concern about the 
designation because of the extent of the modifications being made to 
the aircraft, which include an estimated $460 million in nonrecurring 
engineering. In addition, according to the program office, both the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Contract Management 
Agency (DCMA) have expressed concerns about the limited access to 
production facilities and limited surveillance of aircraft parts 
afforded by the commercial item designation. 

Prior to entering production, an operational assessment of the P-8A 
found that the system demonstrated the expected level of maturity or 
exceeded all test thresholds. The assessment was conducted in the 
program's Weapon System Integration Laboratory (WSIL) and not with an 
operationally representative aircraft. The Navy operational testers 
stated that conducting the operational assessment in the WSIL proved 
to be useful in determining and evaluating the preliminary risks in 
the development of the P-8A system, but that characterizing system 
risks based on this data alone represented a major limitation. 
According to the Navy testers, subsequent flight tests conducted in 
June 2010 have been successful with only minor issues observed. 
Initial operational test and evaluation will begin in 2012. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that 
since the P-8A was competitively awarded and more than one offer was 
received, it did not ask for certified cost or pricing data for the 
system development and demonstration contract with Boeing Defense, 
Space and Security (BDS). The Navy further explained that as the 
airframe is purchased as an interdivisional commercial item, DCMA does 
not have independent access to inspect it in Boeing Commercial 
Airplanes' (BCA) facilities. However, the DCMA and the Navy may 
accompany BDS during BCA selected quality reviews. These events are 
typical and customary for any customer of BCA. Inspections apply to 
the aircraft once it reaches the BDS facilities where DCMA can inspect 
any part of the end product. The Navy also provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Combined Aggregate 
Program (CAP) Fire Unit: 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Army. 

The Army's PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program 
transitions the PATRIOT missile system to MEADS. MEADS is intended to 
provide low-to-medium-altitude air and missile defense to counter, 
defeat, or destroy tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or 
other air-breathing threats. MEADS is being developed by the United 
States, Germany, and Italy. We assessed the MEADS fire unit, which 
includes launchers, radars, a battle management component, and 
reloaders. We did not assess the PATRIOT missile. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/development start (8/04); 
Critical design review (8/10); 
GAO review (11/10). 

Production: 
Full-rate decision (11/12); 
Initial capability (9/17). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: MEADS International:
Program office: Huntsville, AL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $2,820.2 million:
Procurement: $13,693.0 million:
Total funding: $16,513.2 million:
Procurement quantity: 48: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 8/2004: $5,229.5; 
Latest 12/2009: $4,820.3; 
Percent change: -7.8. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 8/2004: $13,847.8; 
Latest 12/2009: $13,693.0; 
Percent change: -1.1. 

Total program cost: 
As of 8/2004: $19,077.3; 
Latest 12/2009: $18,513.3; 
Percent change: -3.0. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 8/2004: $397.444; 
Latest 12/2009: $385.694; 
Percent change: -3.0. 

Total quantities: 
As of 8/2004: 48; 
Latest 12/2009: 48; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 8/2004: 157; 
Latest 12/2009: 157; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

The cost, schedule, quantity, and funding data are for the MEADS fire 
unit. 

The MEADS program completed a system-level critical design review in 
August 2010 with its technologies mature and design stable. The MEADS 
member nations held a program review in October 2010, according to 
officials, to decide whether or not to continue with the program and 
whether or not to modify the system to use a unified battle management 
control system being developed by the Army's Integrated Air and 
Missile Defense program. If the Army and member nations decide to use 
the new unified battle management control system, the MEADS program 
will require increased time and funding to develop, field, and 
integrate this system into the existing fire unit software and 
hardware. The MEADS program is expected to be rebaselined following 
the program review if the decision is made to continue it. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 8/04; 
DOD design review: 8/10; 
GAO review; 11/10; 
Production decision: 11/12. 

[End of figure] 

PATRIOT/MEADS CAP Fire Unit Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All five of the MEADS critical technologies--launcher electronics, 
multifunction fire control radar exciter, multifunction fire control 
radar transmit/receive module, slip ring, and spray cooling system--
are mature. 

Design Maturity: 

The MEADS program completed its system-level critical design review in 
August 2010 and its design is stable. At critical design review the 
program had released 93 percent of the total expected design drawings 
across the five major end items. The MEADS battle management, command, 
control, communications, computer, and intelligence (BMC4I) software 
and hardware was the only major end item with less than 90 percent of 
its drawings released. Only 76 percent of BMC4I drawings were 
releasable by the design review because, according to program 
officials, one of the international partners came in with a late 
request to change the collapsible roof design to a fixed roof. As of 
December 2010, the program has released 98 percent of the expected 
drawings for the BMC4I and 98 percent across the five major end items. 

Other Program Issues: 

The MEADS member nations held a program review in October 2010, 
according to officials, to decide whether or not to continue with the 
program and if so, which battle management system to use--the current 
MEADS BMC4I tactical operations center or the Army's Integrated Air 
and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS). This program 
decision was postponed until December 2010. The Army plans to use IBCS 
to control and manage sensors and weapons, such as PATRIOT and the 
Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor 
System, and support the engagement of air and missile threats. 
However, the MEADS BMC4I is further along in its development than the 
IBCS, which entered system development in December 2009. As a result, 
the MEADS program would require increased time and funding to develop, 
field, and integrate the IBCS into the existing fire unit software and 
hardware, if the decision is made to use it. 

The MEADS program is expected to be rebaselined following the program 
review. MEADS officials expect the program's design and development 
phase to be extended by 18 months due in part to issues with BMC4I and 
sensor requirements and an underestimation of the sensor development 
effort that delayed the program's critical design review. Program 
officials stated that the increased cost associated with the schedule 
extension is expected to be shared among the three member nations. 
Details regarding the schedule extension and its effect on the program 
were not available as negotiations had not begun among the member 
nations. According to the program's Selected Acquisition Report, the 
MEADS contract was expected to be amended in the first quarter of 
fiscal year 2011 to incorporate any programmatic changes. 

The MEADS program is at risk of not meeting several technical 
performance measures, including assembly, disassembly, and emplacement 
times, especially in extreme temperatures. According to officials, the 
Army has approved a request for relief for several system performance 
specifications related to the transportability of various components 
on C-130 aircraft as well as CH-47 and CH-53 helicopters. The MEADS 
program faces other transportability challenges as well because the 
vehicles used to move the system do not meet all NATO road 
requirements. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, program officials noted 
that the MEADS program is over 6 years into development, that 
fabrication is well underway, and that initial major end-item 
deliveries would begin in December 2010. They stated that integration 
and testing activities are planned to start during calendar year 2011. 
While the United States is still planning to use the IBCS, the 
international partners are not, and a program decision is still 
anticipated by the end of December 2010. Program officials concluded 
that requirements satisfaction, software maturity, and cost growth 
continue to be concerns. The program also provided technical comments, 
which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System: 

Photograph: Source: U.S. Air Force. 

The Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper is a multirole, medium-to-high-altitude 
endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system capable of flying at higher 
speeds and higher altitudes than its predecessor, the MQ-1 Predator A. 
The Reaper is designed to provide a ground-attack capability to find, 
fix, track, target, engage, and assess small ground mobile or fixed 
targets. Each system consists of four aircraft, a ground control 
station, and a satellite communications suite. We assessed increment 
1, which consists of two configurations, Block 1 and Block 5. 

Concept: 
Program start (1/02). 

System development: 
Development start (2/04). 

Production: 
Block 1 low-rate decision (2/08); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Required assets available (12/10; 
Initial capability (3/11); 
Block 5 low-rate decision (3/11); 
Block 5 full-rate production decision (3/13). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc:
Program office: Wright-Patterson AFB, OH:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $448.2 million:
Procurement: $7,980.0 million:
Total funding: $8,534.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 288: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 2/2008: $413.9; 
Latest 6/2010: $806.2; 
Percent change: 94.8. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 2/2008: $2,080.2; 
Latest 6/2010: $10,171.9; 
Percent change: 389.0. 

Total program cost: 
As of 2/2008: $2,597.9; 
Latest 6/2010: $11,131.8; 
Percent change: 328.5. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 2/2008: $24.742; 
Latest 6/2010: $28.470; 
Percent change: 15.1. 

Total quantities: 
As of 2/2008: 105; 
Latest 6/2010: 391; 
Percent change: 272.4. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 2/2008: 79; 
Latest 6/2010: 82; 
Percent change: 3.8. 

[End of table] 

These costs are for Increment 1 of the Reaper program. 

The Block 1 Reaper is in production with critical technologies that 
are mature and a design that is stable. We did not assess its 
production maturity. The MQ-9 program plans to make numerous 
enhancements in Block 5, including system power increases, modernized 
crew stations, and improvements to the primary data link. The program 
office judged these improvements to be technologically mature, but 
they still must be integrated and tested on the MQ-9 system. Total 
aircraft quantities have increased more than 500 percent since fiscal 
year 2007 and the program is incorporating several urgent operational 
needs from the warfighter. Although the Reaper's initial operational 
testing was completed in August 2008, full-up testing of two key 
performance parameters was delayed to November 2012 during Block 5 
testing. The Air Force plans to begin development of Increment 2 in 
late fiscal year 2012. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 2/04; 
DOD design review: 2/09; 
Production decision: 2/08; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

Reaper Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The Reaper's Block 1 critical technologies are mature. The Air Force 
has identified numerous technology enhancements for Block 5 that are 
expected to improve the capability of existing onboard subsystems and 
ground control stations. These enhancements include power increases, 
radar and ground control station upgrades, a secure data link, and 
heavyweight landing gear. The program office judged these improvements 
to be technologically mature, but they still must be successfully 
integrated and tested on the MQ-9 system. For example, the encryption 
of the data using the primary data link increases the time to transmit 
data. These transmission delays could result in hard landings, which 
may damage the aircraft. The program office is currently evaluating a 
range of hardware and software solutions to this problem and plans to 
test them operationally in November 2012. The program plans to undergo 
a Block 5 technology readiness assessment in support of its low-rate 
production decision by March 2011. 

Design Maturity: 

According to the program office, the Block 1 Reaper design is stable 
and all engineering drawings have been released. The MQ-9 program 
plans to conduct a formal critical design review on the Block 5 
configuration in December 2010. At that time, it expects to know the 
number of additional drawings needed for this configuration. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess production maturity because the MQ-9 program does 
not use statistical process controls. The program uses other quality 
control measures such as scrap, rework, and repair to track product 
quality. The program is in production and contracted for 103 aircraft. 
The contractor has a continuous improvement program that includes 
manufacturing process goals, which are updated as they are met. The 
Air Force has also conducted several manufacturing reviews of the 
contractor's facilities and determined that the production capacity is 
sufficient to meet the expected demand. 

Other Program Issues: 

Since its inception, the MQ-9 program has followed a concurrent 
development and production strategy in order to respond to urgent 
operational needs. Total aircraft quantities have increased by over 
500 percent since fiscal year 2007 and the system's performance 
requirements have continued to change. In addition to the Block 5 
capability upgrade, the program is also incorporating several urgent 
operational requirements from the warfighter, such as data link 
encryption, wide area/high resolution surveillance, and a capability 
to detect dismounted soldiers. Meeting these demands has put a stress 
on the program's resources. A recent systems engineering review noted 
that the contractor's resources have been overburdened by the need to 
balance software development, support ongoing operations, and enhance 
system capability. It also found that the Reaper program lacks 
sufficient software metrics to allow proper developmental resource and 
schedule planning. 

The Block 1 Reaper completed initial operational testing in August 
2008. Testers found that it was effective in the killer role, but 
problems associated with radar and the network prevented them from 
evaluating the hunter and net-ready capability. To enable testers to 
fully evaluate the hunter capability, the Air Force is upgrading the 
radar's ground moving target indicator and target recognition/ 
classification capability, and integrating the radar into the crew 
station. Full-up testing of these capabilities was delayed and will be 
completed during the Block 5 initial operational testing, scheduled 
for November 2012. 

The Air Force plans to begin development of increment 2 of the MQ-9 
Reaper in late fiscal year 2012. This increment will include the small 
diameter bomb, an automatic take-off and landing capability, a deicing 
system, and national airspace certification. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Ship to Shore Connector (SSC): 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Navy. 

The Navy's Ship to Shore Connector is expected to provide transport of 
personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and cargo from ships to the 
shore. SSC is the replacement for the Landing Craft, Air Cushion 
(LCAC), which is facing the end of its service life. The SSC will 
deploy in existing and planned Navy well deck amphibious ships and 
will be used for assault and nonassault operations. It is expected to 
operate independent of tides, water depth, underwater obstacles, ice, 
mud, or beach conditions. 

Concept: 
Program start (5/09); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Preliminary design review (3/11); 

System development: 
Development start (3QFY11); 
Contract award--design/construction (TBD). 

Production: 
Lead ship fabrication start (TBD); 
Initial capability (TBD). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: TBD:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: TBD:
Procurement: TBD:
Total funding: TBD:
Procurement quantity: TBD: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of: NA; $435.7; 
Latest 8/2010: 
Percent change: NA. 

Procurement cost: 
As of: NA; $3,885.8;
Latest 8/2010: 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost: 
As of: NA; $4,343.7; 
Latest 8/2010: 
Percent change: NA. 

Program unit cost: 
As of: NA; $59.503; 
Latest 8/2010: 
Percent change: NA. 

Total quantities: 
As of: NA; 73; 
Latest 8/2010: 
Percent change: NA. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of: NA; 
Latest 8/2010: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The SSC program plans to award the detail design and construction 
contract for the lead ship in fiscal year 2011 with all five potential 
critical technologies nearing maturity or mature. According to the 
program office, the SSC will be the first government-led Navy ship 
design in 14 years. Aligned with goals from Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics' 
efficiency initiative, the Navy is focused on balancing costs with 
capabilities during the technology development phase in order to 
formulate requirements that are technically achievable within known 
fiscal constraints. The Under Secretary has also emphasized 
affordability and encouraged programs to make tradeoffs in order to 
stay within the established costs for the program. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

GAO review: 11/10; 
Contract award: TBD; 
Lead ship fabrication: TBD (not assessed). 

[End of figure] 

SSC Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The SSC program expects all five potential critical technologies to be 
mature or nearing maturity by the time the detail design and 
construction contract for the lead ship is awarded. The program has 
identified five critical technologies--the aluminum buoyancy box, gas 
turbines, fire suppression system, composite shaft, and composite lift 
fan. According to the program office, some components of these 
technologies are already in use in the Navy fleet. For instance, 
several potential SSC candidate engines are used in the aircraft 
industry today. According to program officials, there are risks 
associated with readying them for ships. The aluminum chosen is the 
same alloy that is in use on the second Littoral Combat Ship, and 
composites are used throughout the Navy fleet, including on the LCACs. 
The Navy plans to release the request for proposal for the detail 
design and construction of the SSC in the first quarter of 2011. 

Other Program Issues: 

According to Navy officials, the SSC is the first government-led Navy 
ship design in 14 years. The Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has emphasized affordability and 
encouraged programs in the technology development phase to make 
tradeoffs in order to stay within the established costs for the 
program. Accordingly, the Navy is focusing on producing a design that 
reduces maintenance costs and balances performance requirements 
against life-cycle costs. The SSC is expected to have greater lift, a 
lower fuel consumption rate, and less expected maintenance than the 
LCAC. The Navy plans to achieve this through a series of design 
changes, including the extensive use of composite materials, a simpler 
and more efficient drive train, and more powerful, fuel-efficient 
engines. In validating the SSC's key performance parameters in June 
2010, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) required the 
program to return to the JROC if costs exceed 10 percent of the 
approved program baseline. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
JROC validated the SSC requirements that have defined the SSC 
technical design parameters within the technology development phase. 
The Navy noted that the program is considered low risk, technically 
sound, and is postured for events leading up to development start, 
program initiation, and release of a request for proposal for detail 
design and construction and entry into the engineering and 
manufacturing development phase. The Navy also provided technical 
comments that were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II: 

Illustration: Source: © 2010 Raytheon Company. 

The Air Force's Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) Increment II is planned to 
provide attack capability to moving or stationary mobile targets in 
adverse weather from standoff range. It combines radar, infrared, and 
semi-active laser sensors in a multi-mode seeker to acquire, track, 
and engage targets. It uses a weapons data link from host aircraft as 
well as GPS and an inertial navigation system to achieve accuracy. SDB 
II will integrate with the F-15E and the Navy and Marine Corps Joint 
Strike Fighter, and with other aircraft, such as the F-22A. 

Concept: 
Program start (5/06). 

System development: 
Development start (7/10); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Critical design review (1/11). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (1/13); 
Initial capability F-15E (7/16); 
Initial capability F-35B/C (6/18); 
Last procurement (9/23). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon:
Program office: Eglin AFB, FL:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,071.0 million:
Procurement: $3,009.1 million:
Total funding: $4,080.1 million:
Procurement quantity: 17,000: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 10/2010: $1,618.8; 
Latest 10/2010: $1,618.8; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 10/2010: $3,009.1; 
Latest 10/2010: $3,009.1; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total program cost: 
As of 10/2010: $4,627.9; 
Latest 10/2010: $4,627.9; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 10/2010: $.270; 
Latest 10/2010: $.270; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total quantities: 
As of 10/2010: 17,163; 
Latest 10/2010: 17,163; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 10/2010: 72; 
Latest 10/2010: 72; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

[End of table] 

The SDB II program entered system development in July 2010 with all 
four of its critical technologies nearing maturity. In an April 2010 
technology readiness assessment, each technology was found to need 
additional development to demonstrate the required level of maturity 
for operational use. While some of the SDB II technologies are being 
utilized in other systems, they are being applied in new ways on this 
program. In addition, the integration of those technologies into the 
constrained SDB II design is a risk for the current development 
schedule. Further, the program already faces funding shortfalls. When 
the program was approved to enter development, it was granted a waiver 
from the requirement to provide full funding. The funding shortfall 
was estimated to be about 22 percent of the required funding over the 
life of the program. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 7/10; 
GAO review; 11/10; 
DOD design review: 1/11 (not assessed); 
Production decision: 1/13 (not assessed). 

[End of figure] 

SDB II Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The SDB II program entered system development in July 2010 with all 
four of its critical technologies nearing maturity. In April 2010, an 
independent technology readiness assessment found that the SDB II data 
link, payload (warhead), seeker, and target classifier had been 
demonstrated in a relevant environment. The assessment team based 
their conclusions on modeling and simulation, as well as captive 
flight, static and dynamic warhead, and other testing methods. Each 
technology was found to need additional development to demonstrate the 
required level of maturity for operational use. In addition, while 
each of these technologies has been fielded in one or more weapon 
systems, they are being applied in new ways on this program and must 
be integrated into the constrained SDB II design. The data link is a 
new application of an existing technology and will require a 
tremendous leap forward in packaging. The payload (warhead) will be 
used in a way on SDB II that is beyond its current demonstrated 
capability, and fuze development has been and continues to be a 
problem. The seeker combines proven sensor technologies, but in a 
smaller design. The target classifier is a new technology in a weapon 
system context. Finally, Joint Strike Fighter integration issues 
represent a substantial risk for the program and the Navy because the 
aircraft may not be available for environmental and integration 
testing until after the SDB II has completed its initial development. 
The environments of the Joint Strike Fighter may cause a re-design of 
a portion of the weapon or limitations in the weapon's employment. 

Design Maturity: 

The SDB II program held its critical design review in January 2011. We 
could not assess SDB II design maturity because data on design 
drawings were not available. As an entrance criteria for holding the 
design review, the program had planned to determine if 95 percent of 
the system's drawings were completed and under configuration control. 
Program officials stated that it appeared the design as presented is 
capable of achieving the desired requirements for the system. If the 
program's post-critical design review assessment is successful, the 
contractor will be cleared to start building hardware for the SDB II 
program. 

Other Program Issues: 

In July 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics approved the SDB II to enter engineering and 
manufacturing development. The program will use a fixed-price 
incentive contract for this phase of the program. The Under Secretary 
also approved an aggressive procurement schedule in an effort to 
promote affordability and productivity. However, the acquisition 
decision memo that outlined these decisions stated that it will be a 
challenge to execute this strategy because of DOD's track record of 
procuring weapons at less than economically beneficial rates due to 
budget pressures. In addition, the program already faces funding 
shortfalls. When the program was approved to enter development, it was 
granted a waiver from the requirement to provide full funding. The 
program is not currently funded to the Air Force's cost estimate or 
its current acquisition program baseline. The shortfall was estimated 
to be about 22 percent of the required funding over the life of the 
program. 

Program Office Comments: 

The program office offered technical comments, which were incorporated 
as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program: 

Illustration: Source: © 2007 Lockheed Martin Corporation. 

The Air Force's SBIRS High satellite system is being developed to 
replace the Defense Support Program and perform a range of missile 
warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace 
awareness missions. SBIRS High consists of four satellites in 
geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) plus two replenishment satellites, 
two sensors on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO) plus 
two replenishment sensors, and fixed and mobile ground stations. We 
assessed the space segment and made observations about the ground 
segment. 

Concept: 
Program start (2/95). 

System development: 
Development start (10/96). 

Production: 
Design review/production decision (8/01); 
First sensor delivery (8/04); 
Second sensor delivery (9/05); 
GAO review (11/10); 
First satellite launch (4/11); 
Second satellite launch (4/12). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Corporation:
Program office: El Segundo, CA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,844.4 million:
Procurement: $3,085.6 million:
Total funding: $4,954.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 3: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 10/1996: $4,304.5; 
Latest 12/2009: $10,626.7; 
Percent change: 146.9. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 10/1996: $0.0; 
Latest 12/2009: $5,065.3; 
Percent change: NA. 

Total program cost: 
As of 10/1996: $4,520.6; 
Latest 12/2009: $15,938.5; 
Percent change: 252.6. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 10/1996: $904.111; 
Latest 12/2009: $2,656.409; 
Percent change: 193.8. 

Total quantities: 
As of 10/1996: 5; 
Latest 12/2009: 6; 
Percent change: 20.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 10/1996: 86; 
Latest 12/2009: TBD; 
Percent change: NA. 

[End of table] 

The 1996 data show no procurement cost as the Air Force planned to use 
research and development funds to buy all five satellites. The cost of 
the HEO replenishment sensors is not included in either column. 

According to the program office, SBIRS High critical technologies are 
mature, its design is stable, and its manufacturing processes have 
been proven; however, continued difficulties with flight software 
development could add to the program's cost overruns and schedule 
delays. According to the program office, significant progress has been 
made on flight software testing. However, various subsystem-and system-
level qualification testing remains and the Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA) has reported that the effort required to 
finalize the flight software is likely to further delay the launch 
date of the first GEO satellite. The program office's best-case 
estimate is that the first GEO satellite will launch in April 2011--4 
months later than previously estimated and roughly 9 years later than 
originally planned. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 10/96; 
DOD design review: NA; 
Design review/production decision: 8/01; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

SBIRS High Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the SBIRS High program office, all three critical 
technologies--thermal management, onboard processing, and the infrared 
sensor--are mature. 

Design Maturity: 

The SBIRS High hardware design appears stable. According to the 
program office, over 99 percent of the total expected design drawings 
are releasable. Functional testing of the first GEO spacecraft in 2009 
revealed solder fractures on some hardware components, which 
contributed to satellite delivery delays. The program disassembled and 
tested these components and determined that redesign was unnecessary 
and they were suitable for use as-is. 

Hosted HEO sensors are currently on-orbit, and program officials 
report that they are operational. The program plans to buy 
replenishment sensors that will differ only slightly in design. 
According to the program office, the design changes will address parts 
obsolescence and electromagnetic interference issues that affected the 
original sensors. Those interference issues led the program to issue 
waivers to accept the original sensors for operational use, even 
though they did not meet all the program's specifications. 
Replenishment sensors are scheduled for delivery to the host for 
integration in fiscal years 2012 and 2015. 

Production Maturity: 

According to the program office, the manufacturing processes for SBIRS 
High are proven since the first and second GEO satellites and the 
first two HEO sensors have been built. 

Other Program Issues: 

The estimated cost of the program continues to grow, and its schedule 
is at risk for further delays. DCMA projects nearly $600 million in 
cost overruns at contract completion, more than twice the amount 
reported last year. Additional contract cost increases and schedule 
delays are expected due in part to the continued underestimation of 
the effort required to finalize and test the flight software. The 
program office is working to rebaseline the SBIRS High contract cost 
and schedule estimates for the sixth time; it will then revise its 
acquisition program baseline to more realistic cost and schedule goals. 

Developing the complex flight software subsystem designed to monitor 
the health and status of the spacecraft has already caused multiple 
delays, and DCMA has reported that the remaining software effort will 
likely further delay the launch date of the first GEO satellite. 
According to the program office, significant progress has been made on 
flight software testing, but various subsystem-and system-level 
qualification testing remains. For example, the fault management 
system, which has caused delays in the past, was scheduled to undergo 
testing in late 2010 to determine whether the system will perform as 
expected. According to DCMA, these tests had to be completed by the 
end of 2010 for the program to have a realistic chance of launching 
the first GEO satellite in April 2011--the program office's best-case 
estimate. 

According to program officials, the development of the SBIRS High 
ground system is on track, and the system will be available to process 
the data generated from the first GEO satellite when it reaches its 
orbit. If the first GEO satellite launches in April 2011, program 
officials expect that satellite data will be certified for use in 
missile warning operations by November 2012. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that the first GEO satellite successfully completed all integration 
testing. In mid-December 2010, the final system-level test was 
completed, and installation began of components, such as solar array 
wing assemblies and a deployable light shade. Flight software run-for- 
record activities for the first GEO satellite are expected to be 
completed in February, supporting the start of launch processing in 
March. Independent review teams verified that an April 2011 launch is 
achievable. Ground software required for launch has been verified. The 
follow-on production contract procures the third and fourth GEO 
satellites completing the original SBIRS constellation, plus two HEO 
replenishment payloads; it was definitized in June 2010, and values 
roughly $3 billion. The program office also provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM): 

Illustration: Source: Raytheon Missile Systems. 

The Navy's Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) is a surface-to-air missile 
launched from Aegis destroyers and cruisers to provide ship self- 
defense, fleet area defense, and theater air defense. Combining legacy 
Standard Missile (SM) and Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile 
(AMRAAM) hardware and technology, SM-6 will allow for over-the-horizon 
engagement, improved capability at extended ranges, and capability to 
receive in-flight updates from Aegis ships. SM-6 Block 1 is in 
production. Follow-on blocks will be developed to meet future threats. 

Concept: 
Program start (6/04). 

System development: 
Development start (3/06). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (8/09); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Initial capability (9/11); 
Full-rate decision (12/11). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Raytheon Missile Systems:
Program office: Arlington, VA:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $72.4 million:
Procurement: $4,940.0 million:
Total funding: $5,012.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 1,170: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 7/2004: $1,057.9; 
Latest 7/2010: $972.0; 
Percent change: -8.1. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 7/2004: $4,558.1; 
Latest 7/2010: $5,160.9; 
Percent change: 13.2. 

Total program cost: 
As of 7/2004: $5,616.0; 
Latest 7/2010: $6,132.8; 
Percent change: 9.2. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 7/2004: $4.680; 
Latest 7/2010: $5.111; 
Percent change: 9.2. 

Total quantities: 
As of 7/2004: 1,200; 
Latest 7/2010: 1,200; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 7/2004: 75; 
Latest 7/2010: 87; 
Percent change: 16.0. 

[End of table] 

The SM-6 program's concurrent testing and production strategy puts the 
program at increased risk of cost growth and schedule delays. The 
program is in low-rate production with 30 missiles under contract and 
deliveries expected to begin in March 2011. However, the program has 
not completed developmental testing to prove that the design meets 
performance and reliability requirements, and the risk of design 
changes remains. Recent test failures have increased the risk that 
unexpected design changes could result in costly rework for the 30 
missiles already under contract and schedule delays. To receive 
approval to enter full-rate production, the program must successfully 
complete flight testing, demonstrate reliability, and achieve 
production maturity. Full testing of SM-6 capabilities will not occur 
until after full-rate production is well underway. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 6/04; 
DOD design review: 3/06; 
Production decision: 8/09; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

SM-6 Program: 

Technology and Design Maturity: 

According to the program office, all SM-6 critical technologies were 
mature and its design was stable by its August 2009 production 
decision; however, the program has not completed developmental testing 
to prove that the design will meet performance and reliability 
requirements. Until developmental testing is completed, the risk of 
design changes remains. Land-based developmental testing was 
successfully completed in 2009. However, sea-based developmental 
testing was suspended in May 2010 after two test failures. According 
to program officials, the failures did not result in hardware design 
changes and developmental testing is scheduled to resume in January 
2011. According to an official from DOD's Office of the Director, 
Operational Test and Evaluation, the program's limited number of 
developmental test flights leaves little margin for error. 

Production Maturity: 

The SM-6 is in low-rate production with 30 missiles under contract and 
deliveries expected in March 2011. We could not assess production 
maturity because the program did not provide statistical process 
control data. However, prior to production start, the program 
demonstrated a maturity level sufficient to proceed with low-rate 
production. To obtain approval to begin full-rate production, the 
program must achieve production maturity, successfully conclude at-sea 
developmental and operational flight testing, and demonstrate 
reliability. However, the program and DOD's Director of Operational 
Test and Evaluation have not yet agreed to the flight reliability 
metrics and failure definitions that will be used to assess the 
program. 

Other Program Issues: 

The SM-6 program's concurrent testing and production strategy puts the 
program at increased risk of cost growth and schedule delays if 
unexpected design changes are required as a result of testing. In 
2009, the program obtained approval from the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to begin low-rate 
initial production of up to 19 missiles before completing 
developmental testing. To minimize the risks inherent in this 
approach, the Under Secretary required the program to complete 
developmental testing and obtain approval prior to awarding subsequent 
contracts. Despite the test failures that led to the suspension of at-
sea developmental testing in May 2010, the Under Secretary approved 
low-rate production of an additional 11 missiles and the procurement 
of long-lead materials for the remaining 59 low-rate missiles. 

SM-6 capabilities will not be fully tested until after full-rate 
production is well underway. SM-6 is a key pillar of the Naval 
Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air System--a system of systems 
designed to extend the battle space over the horizon. A developmental 
version of the integrated fire control capability was demonstrated in 
2009; however, it is not scheduled to be demonstrated at-sea until 
fiscal year 2014. The program plans to have three of four full-rate 
production lots under contract by that time. According to the program 
office, the Office of the Secretary of Defense decided the SM-6 should 
be fielded in advance of the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air 
System to address the Navy's critical shortage of extended range 
missiles. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the SM-6 program office 
disagreed with the GAO assertions that the program's concurrent 
testing and production strategy puts the program at risk of cost 
growth and schedule delays; that the program has not completed testing 
to prove that the design meets performance requirements; and that 
recent test failures increase the risk of design changes. According to 
the program office, the program successfully completed reliability 
demonstration testing and has begun high-accelerated-life testing. In 
addition, the SM-6 hardware is very mature, and the risk of design 
changes is minimal. Officials added that full testing of SM-6 using 
the legacy interface will be completed prior to the full-rate 
production decision and that flight testing using the integrated fire 
control interface will take place prior to delivery of the first full-
rate production missiles. 

GAO Response: 

Our reviews of DOD weapon systems confirm that fully configured, 
integrated, production-representative prototypes should be tested 
before committing to production. The benefits of testing are maximized 
when the developmental tests are completed prior to a production 
decision because making design changes after production begins can be 
both costly and inefficient. 

[End of section] 

Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV): 

Photograph: Source: © 2006 Northrop-Grumman Corporation. 

The Navy's VTUAV will provide real-time imagery and data to support 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements. A VTUAV 
system is composed of up to three air vehicles with associated 
sensors, two ground control stations, one recovery system, and spares 
and support equipment. The air vehicle launches and recovers 
vertically, and operates from ships and land. The VTUAV is being 
designed as a modular, reconfigurable system that supports various 
operations, including surface, antisubmarine, and mine warfare. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program start (1/00); 
Design review (11/05); 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (5/07); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Operational testing (9/11); 
Initial capability (9/11); 
Full-rate decision (2/12). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman:
Program office: Patuxent River, MD:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $19.1 million:
Procurement: $1,660.2 million:
Total funding: $1,680.3 million:
Procurement quantity: 156: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 12/2006: $589.1; 
Latest 7/2010: $664.8; 
Percent change: 12.8. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 12/2006: $1,657.7; 
Latest 7/2010: $1,881.3; 
Percent change: 13.5. 

Total program cost: 
As of 12/2006: $2,576.3; 
Latest 7/2010: $2,547.2; 
Percent change: -1.1. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 12/2006: $14.555; 
Latest 7/2010: $14.555; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Total quantities: 
As of 12/2006: 177; 
Latest 7/2010: 175; 
Percent change: -1.1. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 12/2006: 104; 
Latest 7/2010: 141; 
Percent change: 35.6. 

[End of table] 

The VTUAV is in production, but the program may be at risk for further 
cost increases and schedule delays as a result of concurrent testing 
and production. The VTUAV program delayed the start of operational 
test and evaluation by 2 years to September 2011, due to system 
reliability and software maturity issues that were discovered during 
developmental flight testing. During an August 2010 flight test, the 
operator lost contact with the aircraft, resulting in it entering 
restricted air space. As a result, the program made changes to the 
software. In order to keep suppliers producing at a minimum rate until 
operational test and evaluation is complete, the program increased its 
low-rate production quantities from 9 to 15. The program plans to 
achieve initial operational capability in September 2011 and full-rate 
production in February 2012--almost 2 years later than previously 
planned. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 1/00; 
DOD design review: 11/05; 
Production decision: 5/07; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

VTUAV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The VTUAV relies on common, mature technologies. 

Design Maturity: 

The VTUAV design is still changing as a result of ongoing testing. The 
program had released all its expected drawings by its May 2007 
production decision, but it subsequently made design changes and added 
drawings to address problems discovered during developmental testing. 
As of January 2011, 100 percent of the program's total expected design 
drawings have been released. However, the program is still making 
changes to the design as a result of concurrent testing and 
production. The program anticipates 20 changes in the aircraft's 
design, requiring 60 additional design drawings. The formal evaluation 
of the system's operational suitability and effectiveness was not 
completed as anticipated until April 2010. During an assessment of the 
system on the USS McInerney and subsequent developmental flight tests, 
the program discovered system reliability and software maturity 
issues, including a weak communications link and false alarms related 
to the unmanned system's status. More specifically, during an August 
2010 developmental flight test, the operator lost contact with the 
aircraft, causing it to enter restricted air space. An investigation 
determined the root cause to be a software design flaw and the program 
has since made changes to the software. The VTUAV program also delayed 
the start of operational test and evaluation by 2 years to September 
2011. The program now plans to achieve initial operational capability 
in September 2011 and full-rate production in February 2012--almost 2 
years later than previously planned. 

Production Maturity: 

The VTUAV was originally designed as a modified commercial off-the- 
shelf item. We could not assess production maturity because the 
program did not require the prime contractor or its supplier base to 
identify key product characteristics--the first step to implementing 
production process controls. The program reports that one VTUAV 
supplier uses statistical process controls to measure elements of 
blade manufacturing. In addition, the program plans to develop 
production metrics based on critical safety items and safety of flight 
inspection criteria to support the full-rate production decision. The 
program increased its low-rate production quantities from 9 to 15, in 
order to keep suppliers producing at a minimum rate until operational 
test and evaluation is complete. 

Other Program Issues: 

The VTUAV program is currently considering a variety of future 
capabilities that could be added to the system, including a surface 
search radar, a signals intelligence package, an enhanced data and 
communications relay, and weapons. The program office had funding in 
place in fiscal year 2010 to integrate a surface search radar, but 
that funding was used to sustain the program when it experienced cost 
overruns resulting from software issues discovered during 
developmental testing. Other planned capabilities are currently 
unfunded. Work on these capabilities will be implemented as 
subprograms. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that 
the VTUAV program has made significant progress in the last year. 
VTUAV conducted integration testing on the USS Freedom in November 
2010, is deployed on the USS Halyburton, is being deployed to 
Afghanistan as part of the Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance Task Force, and has been selected by Office of the 
Secretary of Defense as the interim solution for a classified, 
maritime-based, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance urgent 
need requirement. 

VTUAV experienced a delay in the start of operational evaluation and 
continues to make incremental strides to satisfy the full capability 
production document requirements. Software changes to correct problems 
discovered during developmental testing have accounted for the 
majority of this schedule delay as any newly discovered software 
anomaly will delay flight testing until a new software build is 
released. The operational evaluation completion date is driven by ship 
availability, and the USS Halyburton is not available until late 
summer 2011. The Navy also provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774): 

Photograph: Source: U.S. Navy. 

The Navy's Virginia class attack submarine is designed to combat enemy 
submarines and ships, fire cruise missiles, and provide improved 
surveillance and special operations support to enhance littoral 
warfare. The Navy awarded a Block III construction contract in 2008 
and has begun construction on the first two hulls. In total, 7 ships 
have been delivered and 11 more are under contract. The Navy is 
introducing one new technology to improve system performance. We 
assessed this technology and made observations on design and 
production issues. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Development start--SSN 774 (6/95); 
Development start--AESR (12/08). 

Production: 
Full-rate production decision (9/10); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Production decision--AESR (3/11); 
2 per year production begins (2011); 
Block IV contract awarded (2013). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Electric Boat Corporation:
Program office: Washington, DC:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $709.7 million:
Procurement: $40,375.8 million:
Total funding: $41,085.5 million:
Procurement quantity: 18: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 6/1995: $4,436.5; 
Latest 9/2010: $7,076.9;
Percent change: 59.5. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 6/1995: $55,113.7; 
Latest 9/2010: $76,492.6; 
Percent change: 38.8. 

Total program cost: 
As of 6/1995: $59,550.2; 
Latest 9/2010: $83,569.4; 
Percent change: 40.3. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 6/1995: $1,985.005; 
Latest 9/2010: $2,785.648; 
Percent change: 40.3. 

Total quantities: 
As of 6/1995: 30; 
Latest 9/2010: 30; 
Percent change: 0.0. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 6/1995: 134; 
Latest 9/2010: 151; 
Percent change: 12.7. 

[End of table] 

The Virginia class submarine program was approved to enter full-rate 
production in September 2010. Construction of the first two Block III 
submarines has begun, and production of the first hull featuring 
several affordability-based design changes is underway. The Navy is 
also working to address quality control and reliability concerns. The 
Navy will begin buying two submarines per year in fiscal year 2011. It 
expects to realize its goal of reducing costs to $2.0 billion (in 
fiscal year 2005 dollars) per ship by fiscal year 2012 ship 
procurement and hopes to further decrease the time required to build 
each ship. The Navy has decided not to pursue two planned technology 
insertions for the Virginia class, but it is still developing advanced 
electromagnetic signature reduction (AESR) technology that will be 
introduced onto existing and new submarines. AESR will begin testing 
in 2011. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: NA; 
DOD design review: NA; 
Production decision: NA; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

SSN 774 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The Navy has decided not to pursue two planned technology insertions 
for the Virginia class, but it is still developing advanced 
electromagnetic signature reduction (AESR) technology that will be 
introduced onto existing and new submarines. The Navy plans to install 
AESR--software that monitors and optimizes the submarine's signature-- 
on ships starting with SSN 782. The software will be installed on 
earlier ships over time. According to the Navy, AESR prototype testing 
slipped by more than a year due to non-AESR-related schedule delays, 
and is scheduled to begin on SSN 778 in September 2011. The Navy 
decided not to incorporate a conformal acoustic velocity sensor wide 
aperture array on the ship after it found it would significantly 
increase, not decrease, life-cycle costs and complicate maintenance. 
The Navy is still evaluating more affordable sail designs, but 
according to officials, the larger, flexible payload sail is no longer 
being considered because the communications requirements that drove 
the need for more space have been eliminated. 

Prior to the program's full-rate production decision, the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council approved a change to three Virginia 
class key performance parameters. According to the Navy, they 
determined that the original requirements were unrealistic and would 
not be worth the cost needed to achieve them. The change will not 
affect operations. 

Design and Production Maturity: 

The program was approved to enter full-rate production in September 
2010. The Navy will begin buying two ships per year in fiscal year 
2011. The Navy expects to achieve its goal of reducing costs to $2.0 
billion (in fiscal year 2005 dollars) per ship by fiscal year 2012 
ship procurement and hopes to reduce the time required to build each 
ship to about 60 months. Navy officials said construction of SSN 784--
the first hull incorporating significant cost-reducing design changes--
has been underway for approximately 2 years and is progressing well. 
The Navy expects the first few hulls with this new design to take 
longer to build, but expects to get back on schedule by the middle of 
Block III. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Navy is working to address quality control and reliability 
concerns. In November 2009, the Director, Defense Research and 
Engineering (DDR&E), highlighted several design and reliability- 
related deficiencies the program needed to address, but concluded they 
did not preclude the program from moving forward into full-rate 
production. These deficiencies, which included multiple subsystem 
failures, multiple "fail to sail" issues, and test aborts, were also 
cited by the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, as examples of 
the pervasive reliability problems that affect DOD systems. DDR&E also 
noted that the program did not have a reliability measurement or 
growth program--a best practice. Navy officials told us that plans are 
in place to mitigate each of these issues. For example, according to 
the Navy, subsystem problems are being addressed with the vendors and 
shipyards through changes to installation techniques, engineering 
changes or redesigns, and evaluations of alternative technologies. 
Navy officials also told us fail to sail events are not unexpected 
early in a program and that the Virginia class submarine has not 
experienced any fail to sail events while deployed. According to Navy 
and DDR&E officials, problems with a special hull treatment separating 
from the hull have also been mitigated by changing surface preparation 
techniques and redesigning coating molds. Delivered hulls will have 
the coating restored as needed, and more significant restoration can 
occur during scheduled dry-dockings. According to Navy officials, this 
issue is not unique to the Virginia class and has not resulted in any 
operational deficiencies. Navy officials said the shipbuilder has also 
addressed the torpedo-room manufacturing quality issues that were 
identified in 2009. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2: 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Army. 

WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone 
communications network. WIN-T connects Army units with higher levels 
of command and provides the Army's tactical portion of the Global 
Information Grid. WIN-T was restructured following a March 2007 Nunn- 
McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical threshold, and will be 
fielded in four increments. The second increment will provide the Army 
with an initial networking on-the-move capability. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/development start (6/07); 
Design review (2/08). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (2/10); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Full-rate decision (8/12); 
Initial capability (5/13). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems Corp.
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, NJ:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $39.4 million:
Procurement: $3,868.6 million:
Total funding: $3,908.0 million:
Procurement quantity: 1,856: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 10/2007: $235.0; 
Latest 12/2009: $268.5; 
Percent change: 14.3. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 10/2007: $3,418.3; 
Latest 12/2009: $4,469.9; 
Percent change: 30.8. 

Total program cost: 
As of 10/2007: $3,653.3; 
Latest 12/2009: $4,738.4; 
Percent change: 29.7. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 10/2007: $1.930; 
Latest 12/2009: $2.138; 
Percent change: 10.8. 

Total quantities: 
As of 10/2007: 1,893; 
Latest 12/2009: 2,216; 
Percent change: 17.1. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 10/2007: 50; 
Latest 12/2009: 65; 
Percent change: 30.0. 

[End of table] 

WIN-T Increment 2 entered production in February 2010 with all 15 of 
its critical technologies mature. However, the program is currently 
addressing significant performance and reliability shortfalls that 
were revealed in a March 2009 limited user test. The test results 
showed that WIN-T Increment 2 did not meet its operational reliability 
requirements. DOD's Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 
recommended that the Army improve performance and training to address 
these deficiencies and ensure success during initial operational test, 
which is scheduled for early fiscal year 2012. We could not assess 
production maturity. According to the Army, WIN-T is primarily an 
information technology integration effort that relies on commercially 
available products. Performance is measured through a series of test 
events to demonstrate performance at increasing levels of system 
integration. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 6/07 (not assessed); 
DOD design review: 2/08 
Production decision: 2/10; 
GAO review; 11/10. 

[End of figure] 

WIN-T Increment 2 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All 15 WIN-T Increment 2 critical technologies were mature by its 
February 2010 production decision. In September 2009, the Army 
completed a technology readiness assessment to support a low-rate 
initial production decision. An independent review team reviewed this 
technology readiness assessment and the body of evidence used to 
support it and concluded that all 15 critical technologies were 
mature. In November 2009, the Director, Defense Research and 
Engineering, concurred with the independent review team's assessment, 
noting that tests conducted by the Army show that each of WIN-T 
Increment 2's critical technologies have been demonstrated in a 
realistic environment. 

Design Maturity: 

We could not assess the design maturity of WIN-T Increment 2 because 
the program office does not track the number of releasable drawings. 
According to the program office, WIN-T is primarily an information 
technology integration effort that relies on commercially available 
products. Performance is measured through a series of component, 
subsystem, configuration item, and network level test events designed 
to demonstrate performance at increasing levels of system integration. 
Design stability is measured through a problem tracking report system. 
Problem tracking report trends are reported and tracked on a weekly 
basis by the program office. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess the production maturity of the WIN-T Increment 2. 
According to the program office, WIN-T is primarily an information 
technology integration effort that relies on commercially available 
products. 

Other Program Issues: 

During a March 2009 limited user test, WIN-T Increment 2 failed to 
demonstrate the ability to support mobile operations as well as the 
required capabilities in forested terrain. WIN-T Increment 2 
operational effectiveness was degraded because the program's concept 
of operations, organizational structure, and manning were not adequate 
to operate and troubleshoot the network. Further, the test concluded 
that the WIN-T Increment 2 did not meet its operational reliability 
requirements because three critical components demonstrated poor 
reliability. In a January 2010 operational assessment of this limited 
user test, DOD's Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), 
recommended that the Army take certain actions to address these 
deficiencies to ensure success at the WIN-T Increment 2 initial 
operational test scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year 2012. 
DOT&E recommended that the Army improve the performance of the 
Increment 2 waveforms, provide greater training to soldiers, refine 
its tactics and manning levels for Increment 2, and aggressively 
pursue a reliability growth program for WIN-T Increment 2 components. 
According to the program office, it is working to address these 
concerns and respond to these recommendations before the start of the 
program's operational test. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army addressed (1) 
the development of a failure mode closure plan, (2) risk reduction 
events, and (3) production qualification testing for WIN-T Increment 
2. With regard to the failure mode closure plan, the Army noted that, 
as directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the 
program office has identified, provided corrections for, tested, and 
resolved all 37 of WIN-T Increment 2's identified failure modes 
identified from the limited user test. The Army also noted that a 
series of OSD-witnessed closure events and formal reports have been 
completed. With regard to risk reduction, the Army explained that, as 
directed by OSD, the program office designed, executed, and performed 
analysis illustrating successful support for seven critical technical 
performance parameters, including mobile throughput and scalability. 
With regard to production qualification testing, the Army noted that 
the program office has two production qualification test events 
scheduled in fiscal year 2012 to further validate system readiness 
prior to the initial operational test. The Army also provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 3: 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Army. 

WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone 
communications network. WIN-T connects Army units with higher levels 
of command and provides the Army's tactical portion of the Global 
Information Grid. WIN-T was restructured following a March 2007 Nunn- 
McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical threshold, and will be 
fielded in four increments. The third increment will provide the Army 
a full networking on-the-move capability. 

Concept: 

System development: 
Program/development start (7/03); 
GAO review (11/10); 
Design review (4/13). 

Production: 
Low-rate decision (3/15); 
Full-rate decision (7/18); 
Initial capability (2/19). 

Program Essentials:
Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems Corp.
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, NJ:
Funding needed to complete:
R&D: $1,046.9 million:
Procurement: $11,476.8 million:
Total funding: $12,523.7 million:
Procurement quantity: 3,168: 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions): 

Research and development cost: 
As of 5/2009: $2,647.4; 
Latest 10/2010: $2,189.2; 
Percent change: -17.3. 

Procurement cost: 
As of 5/2009: $13,477.9; 
Latest 10/2010: $11,476.8; 
Percent change: -14.8. 

Total program cost: 
As of 5/2009: $16,125.3; 
Latest 10/2010: $13,666.0; 
Percent change: -15.3. 

Program unit cost: 
As of 5/2009: $4.631; 
Latest 10/2010: $4.261; 
Percent change: -8.0. 

Total quantities: 
As of 5/2009: 3,482; 
Latest 10/2010: 3,207; 
Percent change: -7.9. 

Acquisition cycle time (months): 
As of 5/2009: 165; 
Latest 10/2010: 187; 
Percent change: 13.3. 

[End of table] 

The WIN-T Increment 3 program will not fully mature its critical 
technologies until its planned March 2015 production decision. Three 
of the program's 20 critical technologies are currently mature and 15 
are nearing maturity. Of the two remaining technologies, one was rated 
as nearing maturity by an independent review team; but, the Director, 
Defense Research and Engineering, concluded that the technology's 
ambiguous requirements made it difficult to state whether it had been 
adequately demonstrated. The other technology--a cryptographic device 
whose development is being managed by the National Security Agency--
has not been formally rated. The Army recently developed a revised WIN-
T Increment 3 acquisition program baseline to account for changes due 
to the cancellation of the Future Combat System program. 

Attainment of Product Knowledge: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Development start: 7/03 (not assessed); 
GAO review; 11/10; 
DOD design review: 4/13; 
Production decision: 3/15 (not assessed); 

[End of figure] 

WIN-T Increment 3 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The WIN-T Increment 3 program will not fully mature its critical 
technologies until its planned March 2015 production decision. An 
April 2009 review of the Army's technology readiness assessment for 
WIN-T Increment 3 by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering 
(DDR&E), concluded that, of the program's 20 critical technologies, 3 
were mature and 15 were nearing maturity. 

Of the two remaining technologies, the Quality of Service Edge Device 
(QED) was rated as nearing maturity in the Army's assessment; however, 
DDR&E concluded that this technology had ambiguous requirements that 
made it difficult to state whether it had been adequately 
demonstrated. DDR&E noted that while the Army had demonstrated that 
the QED technology met requirements under most conditions, in one 
stressing scenario, it did not. DDR&E representatives believe that it 
is unlikely that any network can meet this requirement in all 
environments. Since the QED technology was shown to be robust and 
capable of meeting its requirement in most scenarios, DDR&E 
recommended that the Army clarify the user's requirements for this 
technology by the next design review. According to a program office 
official, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command has revisited user 
requirements for this critical technology; however, a new rating for 
this technology will not be formalized until the program's design 
review, currently scheduled for February 2014. 

The other remaining technology--High Assurance Internet Protocol 
Encryptor (HAIPE) version 3.X--was not available to be rated at the 
time of DDR&E's review in April 2009. HAIPE is a device that encrypts 
and encapsulates Internet protocol packets so that they can be 
securely transported over a network of a different security 
classification. Version 1.3.5 of HAIPE is mature; however, according 
to the WIN-T program office, its use in WIN-T Increment 3 would result 
in a less efficient network design. DDR&E has notified the Army that 
the maturity of the HAIPE version 3.X technology should be established 
to DDR&E's satisfaction before it is transitioned into WIN-T Increment 
3. The National Security Agency (NSA) manages the HAIPE program, and 
is responsible for certifying that vendors' HAIPE products comply with 
the HAIPE interoperability specification. According to an NSA 
representative, NSA has informally assessed HAIPE 3.X and believes it 
is mature. However, NSA has not been tasked by the Army or DDR&E with 
providing a formal assessment of HAIPE 3.X's technology maturity. As a 
result, our assessment and presentation of WIN-T's Increment 3's 
technology maturity excludes this critical technology. 

Design Maturity: 

We could not assess the design stability of the WIN-T Increment 3 
because the program office does not track the number of releasable 
drawings. According to the program office, this metric is not 
meaningful because WIN-T is not a manufacturing effort, but rather an 
integration effort. Performance is measured through a series of 
component, subsystem, configuration item, and network level test 
events designed to demonstrate performance at increasing levels of 
system integration. Design stability is measured through a problem 
tracking report system. Problem track report trends are reported and 
tracked on a weekly basis by the program office. 

Other Program Issues: 

In May 2009, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics approved a revised acquisition program 
baseline for the WIN-T Increment 3 program. However, this new baseline 
was developed prior to the Secretary of Defense's recommended 
cancellation of the Future Combat System (FCS) program, which was 
closely related to WIN-T Increment 3. As a result, the Under Secretary 
restricted the Army from obligating or expending WIN-T Increment 3 
funds associated directly with FCS and directed that a new cost 
estimate and acquisition program baseline be completed and approved. 
In October 2010, the Under Secretary approved a revised acquisition 
program baseline for WIN-T Increment 3, based on an independent cost 
estimate prepared by the Director, Cost Assessment and Program 
Evaluation (CAPE), that reflects the restructured program. 

Program Office Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR): 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Navy. 

The Navy's Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) will be a next- 
generation radar system designed to provide ballistic missile defense, 
air defense, and surface warfare capabilities. AMDR will consist of an 
S-band radar for ballistic missile defense and air defense, X-band 
radar for horizon search, and a radar suite controller that controls 
and integrates the two radars. AMDR will initially support DDG 51 
Flight III. The Navy expects AMDR to provide the foundation for a 
scalable radar architecture to defeat advanced threats. 

Current Status: 

The AMDR program entered technology development in September 2010 and 
is one of the first programs to incorporate affordability cost targets 
as part of the acquisition strategy. In addition, in September 2010, 
the Navy awarded three fixed-price incentive fee contracts to Northrop 
Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon for S-band radar and radar 
suite controller technology development. The contractors will build 
and test prototypes to demonstrate the critical technologies during a 
2-year technology development period. The Navy then plans to conduct a 
limited competition among the technology development contractors for 
engineering and manufacturing development. According to the program's 
technology development strategy, the X-band radar technology is mature 
and the Navy plans to acquire it through full and open competition. 
The Navy will provide it as government-furnished equipment to the S-
band and radar suite controller contractor to manage the integration 
during engineering and manufacturing development. Additional software 
development will be required to integrate the two radars. 

To support the decision to enter technology development, the Navy 
conducted an early evaluation of technology maturity and identified 
six candidate critical technologies--four hardware-related and two 
software-related. According to program officials, digital beamforming--
necessary for AMDR's simultaneous air defense and ballistic missile 
defense mission--will likely take the longest time in development to 
mature. Program officials stated that while this technology is 
currently in use on existing radars, it has not been demonstrated on a 
large-aperture radar. The Navy is coordinating with the Air Force's 
Space Fence program on the S-band radar's technology development. The 
Navy estimates that AMDR will be available for delivery to a shipyard 
in fiscal year 2019. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: $15,668.8 million; 
Research and development: $2,257.6 million; 
Procurement: $13,382.9 million; 
Quantities: 24. 

Next Major Program Event: Preliminary design review, July 2012: 

Program Office Comments: The AMDR program office concurred with this 
assessment and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

B-2 Defensive Management System (DMS) Modernization: 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Air Force. 

The Air Force's B-2 DMS modernization is expected to upgrade the 1980s-
era analog defensive management system to a digital capability. The 
modernization effort is intended to improve the frequency coverage and 
sensitivity of the electronic warfare suite, as well as update pilot 
displays and inflight replanning capability for avoiding unanticipated 
air defense threats. It is also expected to improve reliability and 
maintainability for the system. According to program officials, the 
current DMS is a major readiness driver for the aircraft. 

Current Status: 

In June 2010, the B-2 DMS program received its material development 
decision and entered the material solution analysis phase. As part of 
this phase, the program will conduct an analysis of alternatives. 
According to program officials, the analysis of alternatives will 
consider three options: (1) a minimum upgrade (only critical 
electronic parts of current DMS); (2) a fully modernized DMS; and (3) 
an incremental DMS upgrade. Upon completion of the analysis of 
alternatives, the program anticipates entering the technology 
development phase in March 2011. The program tentatively plans to 
enter engineering and manufacturing development in 2013 after it 
completes its preliminary design review, and projects an initial 
operational capability for the B-2 DMS around fiscal year 2020. 

A primary focus for the B-2 DMS program in technology development will 
be the low-observable antennas for the B-2's leading edges. Overall, 
the program office has identified six critical technologies. According 
to the program office, five of the critical technologies are nearing 
maturity or are mature and have been demonstrated in a relevant or 
realistic environment. The low-observable antennas for the B-2 leading 
edges are the least mature. The primary risk with the technology's 
development will be achieving the desired performance while still 
meeting the low-observable requirements of the aircraft. During the 
technology development phase, the program does not plan to develop 
prototypes of the full B-2 DMS, but instead plans to develop prototype 
antenna subsystems, which is the area it believes contains the most 
technological risk. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,505.8 million; 
Research and development: $937.1 million; 
Procurement: $568.7 million; 
Quantities: 20. 

Note: This is an initial draft cost estimate developed by the program 
office. A formal baseline cost estimate is expected for the milestone 
A decision scheduled for March 2011. 

Next Major Program Event: Technology development start (milestone A), 
March 2011: 

Program Office Comments: The program was provided a draft of this 
assessment and had no comments. 

[End of section] 

B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability, Increment 2: 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Air Force. 

The Air Force's B-2 EHF SATCOM is a satellite communication system 
designed to upgrade the aircraft's ultra high frequency system to 
ensure continued secure, survivable communication. The system has 
three increments, with each expected to be its own program. Increment 
2 is designed to provide connectivity by adding low-observable 
antennas and radomes to the aircraft. It also includes separate, 
nonintegrated Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-
T) and related hardware. 

Current Status: 

The B-2 EHF Increment 2 program is in technology development. In March 
2008, the program began a component advanced development effort that 
includes systems engineering, requirements analysis, technology 
maturation, and preliminary design activities. The program plans to 
enter engineering and manufacturing development in fiscal year 2013--3 
years later than originally planned. 

The B-2 EHF Increment 2 program has attempted to make decisions that 
balance requirements with technical solutions; however, antenna 
technology maturation and FAB-T availability still pose risks. For 
example, as a result of a recent trade study, the program's key 
performance parameters were revised to reflect what is achievable and 
technically feasible. In addition, the Air Force changed the antenna 
location and technology to an active electronically scanned array 
(AESA) to lower risk. These decisions are expected to mitigate 
integration risks, but technology maturation risks still exist. The 
program expects its critical technologies to be nearing maturity by 
development start, but current technology readiness levels for AESA 
are relatively low and the program does not have a fallback antenna 
technology option should the AESA technology not mature as expected. 
An Air Force review also raised concerns that the decision to pursue 
AESA technologies exclusively may have precluded the use of lower 
risk, more affordable and mature technologies. In addition to these 
challenges, the availability of FAB-T hardware, which enables voice 
and data satellite communication, has significantly delayed the 
program. Due in part to the FAB-T delays, the B-2 EHF Increment 2 will 
not begin production by the current U.S. Strategic Command need date 
in fiscal year 2016. The program's initial operational capability is 
expected in March 2020. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,796.7 million; 
Research and development: $1,331.2 million; 
Procurement: $464.5 million; 
Quantities: 20. 

Next Major Program Event: Engineering and manufacturing development 
start, March 2013: 

Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment, 
the program office noted that a 2008 trade study validated program 
risk areas related to the antenna's technology and planned location on 
the B-2. This study concluded that changing the antenna's technology 
to an electrical antenna would considerably reduce risk, allowing 
relocation and, as a result, precluded negative effects on the B-2's 
structure and radar cross section. The Air Force also provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

BMDS: Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB): 

Photograph: Source: Missile Defense Agency. 

MDA's ALTB, formerly the Airborne Laser program, is being developed as 
an advanced platform for the Department of Defense's directed energy 
research program. The ALTB platform includes two solid state lasers 
and a high-energy laser housed aboard a modified Boeing 747-aircraft. 
The ALTB will transition to a national test platform over the next 4 
years. 

Current Status: 

Until recently, MDA's Airborne Laser program was developing a 
prototype system to negate enemy missiles during the boost phase of 
flight. However, after spending more than $5 billion on its 
development, DOD designated it as a test bed to demonstrate the 
potential of using directed energy as a viable technology against 
ballistic missiles. In February 2010, MDA demonstrated that the ALTB 
could successfully destroy a short-range threat-representative 
ballistic missile during the boost phase. According to the Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), the demonstration utilized a 
realistic target and was the most operationally relevant test of the 
Airborne Laser to-date. However, DOT&E also noted that despite the 
realism of the target missile, the test was not operationally 
realistic because a key component of the ALTB's detection and tracking 
system was removed because it exhibited technical issues during 
earlier ground and flight testing. MDA conducted its second major 
flight test of the ALTB in early September 2010 against a short-range 
ballistic missile in the boost phase, but failed to destroy the 
target. The ATLB successfully detected and tracked the target, but 
corrupted beam control software steered the high-energy laser slightly 
off center. The ALTB safety system detected this shift and shut down 
the high-energy laser. MDA conducted a third flight test in October 
2010 against a solid-fuel missile. However, while the system seems to 
have successfully acquired and tracked the plume or rocket exhaust of 
the target, it never transitioned to active tracking. As a result, the 
laser was not fired. The laser incorrectly reported that it was not 
ready and the safety default aborted the engagement. 

Total Program Funding: NA: 

Next Major Program Event: NA: 

Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment, 
the ALTB program acknowledged DOT&E's comments but noted that the test 
bed is focused on scientific learning rather than proof of operational 
capability. According to the program, MDA is collaborating with the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense to establish experiments that 
maximize benefits for DOD directed-energy programs. In fiscal year 
2010, the ALTB conducted 40 flight experiments, including engagements 
of eight boosted targets. The ALTB also destroyed a solid-fuel metal- 
body target missile prior to its first major flight test. In May 2010, 
ALTB successfully engaged a diagnostic target missile at twice the 
range of the February experiments--a key risk-reduction event for 
future experiments. MDA continues to support directed energy as a 
hedge against the ever-changing threat environment. 

[End of section] 

BMDS: Flexible Target Family (FTF): 

Illustration: Source: Missile Defense Agency. 

MDA's Flexible Target Family was designed to be a family of short-, 
medium-, and long-range targets with common components for ground-, 
air-, and sea-launch capabilities. MDA is currently producing a 
groundlaunched, intermediate-range target, the LV-2, for BMDS flight 
tests. It is also developing a second target in this family, the 52- 
inch extended medium range ballistic missile target (eMRBM). 

Current Status: 

The LV-2 has been successfully tested and is in production. MDA flew 
the first LV-2 target vehicle in January 2010. During this test, the 
program was able to demonstrate all the critical technologies 
necessary for the LV-2 in the current BMDS test plan. These 
technologies had not been flight tested in the necessary form, fit, 
and function before production began. There are currently five 
additional LV-2 target missiles in various stages of production, all 
in the same configuration. In order to assess production risks, the 
contractor is collecting data on labor hours and scrap, rework, and 
defect rates and has reported that these measures are tracking as 
expected. MDA had originally planned to produce at least one 
alternative configuration of the LV-2 that used a shrouded reentry 
vehicle, but the mission requiring this technology was dropped from 
the agency's test plan. MDA officials said they could purchase 
additional LV-2 targets, but no additional ones are currently under 
contract. The second LV-2 flight test was scheduled for the first 
quarter of fiscal year 2011. 

MDA is not planning to conduct a risk-reduction flight for the second 
Flexible Target Family vehicle, the 52-inch eMRBM, because of budget 
constraints. This target uses more than 90 percent of the same ground 
and flight software, and 72 percent of the same components as the LV-
2. However, these components must be incorporated into a new, smaller 
structure, which could pose an integration risk. MDA plans to use the 
first two eMRBMs in a BMDS operational test in 2012. In April 2010, 
MDA began acquiring the first three eMRBMs, and in September 2010 
increased the quantity from three to five. MDA expects to complete 
negotiations and definitize the contract in July 2011. 

Total Funding for LV-2 (Fiscal years 2005 to 2013): 
Research and development $622.2 million; 
Quantities: 6. 

Next Major Program Event: Third LV-2 flight test, third quarter fiscal 
year 2011: 

Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment, 
MDA provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA): 

Photograph: Source: L-3 Communications. 

The Air Force's C-27J is a commercially available, multifunctional 
small-to-medium-size cargo aircraft. It is designed to help meet time- 
sensitive and mission critical transport requirements, and to augment 
the Air Force's intratheater lift inventory. Its mission also includes 
casualty evacuation, airdrop, troop transport, aerial sustainment, and 
homeland security. The aircraft is capable of carrying up-armored High 
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles and heavy, dense loads such as 
aircraft engines and ammunition. 

Current Status: 

The C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft program has been in production since 
June 2007. The sixth aircraft was delivered in November 2010. The 
program completed the transition from an Army-led joint program to an 
Air Force program in October 2010. Current plans are to procure 38 
aircraft and assign them to Air National Guard bases. The Air Force 
Air Mobility Command and the National Guard Bureau have identified the 
first six locations to receive C-27J aircraft as Mansfield, Ohio; 
Baltimore, Maryland; Meridian, Mississippi; Battle Creek, Michigan; 
Fargo, North Dakota; and Bradley, Connecticut. The C-27J program 
office has established a foreign military sales section which has 
received requests for information about pricing and availability from 
a number of countries. However, as of July 2010, no foreign military 
sales cases had been initiated. 

The C-27J program was to achieve initial operational capability in 
August 2010, but due to delays in multi-service operational test and 
evaluation, as well as delays in receiving certification from the 
Federal Aviation Administration, initial capability is now anticipated 
for January 2011. In June 2010 the Air Force received authorization 
from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics to expand the low-rate initial production procurement (LRIP) 
by up to 8 aircraft, to a total of 21. This does not affect the total 
quantities. Program officials explained that the firm fixed-price 
contract for the C-27J is based on prices established according to the 
number of aircraft purchased in a given period. By expanding the 
maximum number of LRIP aircraft, the program was able to order 8 
aircraft in the latest ordering period at the currently agreed upon 
price rather than waiting for the next ordering period. According to 
program officials, this helped save an estimated $19 million and avoid 
a significant break in production. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,966.3 million; 
Research and development: $118.3 million; 
Procurement: $1,773.2 million; 
Quantities: 38. 

Next Major Program Event: Full-rate production decision, February 2011: 

Program Office Comments: The program office was provided a draft of 
this assessment and did not offer any comments. 

[End of section] 

DDG 51 Destroyer: 

Photograph: Source: U.S. Navy. 

The Navy's DDG 51 destroyer is a multimission surface ship designed to 
operate against air, surface, and subsurface threats. The Navy started 
buying DDG 51 destroyers in 1985 and expects to have 62 destroyers in 
service by 2012. In 2008, the Navy announced it would continue the 
program and plans to buy nine more ships over the next 5 years. The 
Navy then expects to start buying a new version of the ship--Flight 
III--in fiscal year 2016. Initial plans for Flight III include an 
increased emphasis on ballistic missile defense. 

Current Status: 

In 2008, the Navy announced its plan to restart the DDG 51 Flight IIA 
production line. The Navy anticipates that construction of DDG 113--
the first ship in the restart program--will begin in fiscal year 2012 
after an approximate 4-year gap in new DDG 51 starts. While program 
officials do not currently anticipate utilizing any new technologies 
or changing the Flight IIA design, the Navy could decide to use a 
hybrid electric drive designed to reduce fuel consumption on both new 
and existing DDG 51 destroyers, as well as in future designs, if it 
proves to be successful. The system is currently a prototype. The Navy 
is also working to address any industrial base issues that result from 
the production gap. For example, officials stated that before the Navy 
decided to restart DDG 51 production, the existing contractor for DDG 
51 main reduction gears sold its production line. The Navy conducted a 
full and open competition and will now provide the gears as government-
furnished equipment. 

According to the program officials, a new air and missile defense 
radar will be the major technology effort for Flight III. The radar is 
being developed through a separate program office. According to the 
DDG 51 program, improving power generation on Flight III will be 
important to accommodate the expected increase in power and cooling 
requirements for this radar. The radar could also pose a risk for 
Flight III construction. The Navy estimates that it will not be 
available for delivery to a shipyard until fiscal year 2019--2 years 
prior to ship delivery according to the Navy. Officials stated that a 
decision has not been made to determine where the DDG 51 program will 
start in DOD's milestone review process for the development and 
acquisition of the Flight III changes. 

Estimated Total Program Cost (fiscal years 2010-2015): $16,926.5 
million; 
Research and development: $140.8 million; 
Procurement: $16,785.7 million; 
Quantities: 9. 

Next Major Program Event: DDG 113 construction start, fiscal year 2012: 

Program Office Comments: The program office provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS): 

Illustration: Source: Northrop Grumman. 

DOD's Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS) is a next-generation 
polar-orbiting environmental satellite system with primary coverage in 
the early morning orbit. The system will incorporate data from the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)/National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Joint Polar Satellite 
System (JPSS) in the afternoon and from the European Meteorological 
Operational (MetOp) satellite in mid-morning. 

Current Status: 

In February 2010, the Executive Office of the President announced that 
the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS) program was being restructured because of long-standing cost, 
schedule, and performance issues and management deficiencies. DOD and 
NOAA/NASA were directed to proceed with separately-managed 
acquisitions--DWSS for DOD and JPSS for NOAA/NASA. Currently, DOD 
obtains weather data through Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 
(DMSP) satellites. The Air Force launched a DMSP satellite in 2009 and 
has two remaining satellites, which it plans to launch as needed. To 
ensure continued coverage, the Air Force plans to have DWSS satellites 
available for launch in 2018 and 2021. 

To reduce developmental risks and lower acquisition costs, the Air 
Force expects to leverage to the maximum extent the technology and 
investments made in the NPOESS program. The DWSS satellite bus is a 
modified NPOESS bus, but reduced in size and weight to meet DOD 
mission requirements. DWSS plans to use the visible infrared imager 
radiometer suite (VIIRS) sensor planned for NPOESS, as well as the 
ground control system based on the NPOESS design. The Air Force is 
evaluating microwave sensor alternatives, focusing on affordability 
while still providing DMSP-comparable microwave capability. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: TBD; 
Research and development: TBD; 
Procurement: NA; 
Quantities: 2. 

Next Major Program Event: Materiel development decision, February 2011: 

Program Office Comments: Program officials stated they are working on 
restructuring the NPOESS prime contract to facilitate transition of 
civil NOAA/NASA work while focusing on DOD mission needs. Also, DOD 
and NOAA/NASA are working to complete a memorandum of agreement on 
sharing common elements at the VIIRS contractor and DOD plans to 
acquire duplicate test sets and ground support equipment to minimize 
single supplier issues. 

[End of section] 

Enhanced Polar System (EPS): 

Illustration: Source: LinQuest Corporation. 

The Air Force's Enhanced Polar System (EPS) will provide next- 
generation protected extremely high frequency (EHF) satellite 
communications in the polar region above 65 degrees northern latitude. 
EPS will replace the current Interim Polar System and serve as a polar 
adjunct to the Advanced EHF (AEHF) system. EPS consists of two EHF 
payloads hosted on classified satellites. A gateway will connect 
modified AEHF communications terminals to other communication systems 
utilizing an extension of the AEHF mission control segment. 

Current Status: 

The EPS program is preparing to enter system development. It was 
initiated in fiscal year 2006 to fill the gap left by the cancellation 
of the Advanced Polar System. In December 2007, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics directed the program 
to bypass concept development and proceed to a system development 
decision in order to synchronize the program's schedule with the host 
satellite production timeline. Since then, the Air Force has 
determined that the EPS program would require additional payload 
engineering and changes to the gateway, and the program's entry into 
system development has been delayed from February 2010 to the third 
quarter of fiscal year 2011. In addition, the program's projected cost 
could significantly increase. According to program officials, the EPS 
program did not have an opportunity to develop a complete and thorough 
cost estimate because it was directed to proceed directly to a system 
development decision. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request 
included about $1 billion for the program through fiscal year 2015; 
however, program officials stated that the new cost estimate might 
require double this amount. Before the EPS program can enter system 
development, the milestone decision authority will have to certify 
that this funding is available. 

According to the program office, EPS critical technologies are mature. 
Although the program does not plan to conduct prototyping prior to the 
start of development, program officials noted the EPS has conducted 
prototyping in the payload, ground, gateway, and terminal segments as 
part of the technology development phase of the program. According to 
DOD acquisition policy, the technology development strategy for each 
major defense acquisition program shall provide for prototypes of the 
system or, if a system prototype is not feasible, for prototypes of 
critical subsystems before it gets approval to enter the engineering 
and manufacturing development phase. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,490.7 million; 
Research and development: $1,395.4 million; 
Procurement: $79.7 million; 
Quantities: 2. 

Next Major Program Event: System development decision, third quarter 
of fiscal year 2011: 

Program Office Comments: The EPS program office provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

F-22A Raptor: 

Photograph: Source: U.S. Air Force. 

The Air Force's F-22A Raptor is the only fifth-generation operational 
air-to-air and air-to-ground fighter/attack aircraft. This aircraft 
integrates stealth, supercruise, and advanced avionics, 
maneuverability, and weapons in one platform. The Air Force 
established the F-22A modernization and improvement program in 2003 to 
add enhanced air-to-ground, information warfare, reconnaissance, and 
other capabilities and improve the reliability and maintainability of 
the aircraft. 

Current Status: 

In April 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced that F-22A 
production would end at 187 aircraft, and as of September 2010, the 
Air Force had accepted delivery of 160 aircraft. According to the 
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, the F-22A could have 
difficulty meeting operational suitability requirements relating to 
low-observable maintainability when the system reaches full maturity. 
Air Force officials reported that the low-observable materials are 
difficult to manage and maintain, requiring nearly twice the number of 
maintenance personnel as anticipated. 

The Air Force is upgrading the F-22A fleet in four increments. The 
first increment has been fielded. The second increment--Increment 3.1-
-will begin follow-on operational test and evaluation in January 2011. 
These increments add enhanced air-to-air and air-to-ground; 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and synthetic aperture 
radar capabilities. The third increment--Increment 3.2--has been 
divided into two phases. The first will deliver electronic protection, 
combat identification, and Link 16 communication upgrades beginning in 
2014. The second phase will begin fielding AIM-9X and AIM-120D 
capabilities, and additional electronic protection upgrades beginning 
in 2016. The multifunction advanced datalink, planned to provide 
interoperability with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, was removed from 
Increment 3.2 after costs increased significantly over initial 
estimates and the program was unable to secure fiscal year 2010 
funding. Increment 3.3 will enable compliance with air traffic 
management standards, but the additional content for this increment 
has not yet been determined. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: $77,392.8 million; 
Research and development: $39,171.7 million; 
Procurement: $37,560.5 million; 
Quantities: 188. 

Next Major Program Event: Final aircraft delivery, February 2012: 

Program Office Comments: The Air Force acknowledged challenges 
associated with maintaining a fifth-generation low-observable system, 
and said there are currently more than 10 ongoing efforts under the 
reliability and maintainability maturation program to increase 
maintainability and material durability. The Air Force also stated 
that the majority of repairs to the low observable system resulted 
from having to perform other maintenance activities, rather than to 
address problems with the low observable system itself. According to 
the service, all operational units have reported mission capable rates 
for the low-observable system of about 90 percent, since January 2009. 
The Air Force also provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

H-1 Upgrades (UH-1Y/AH-1Z): 

Photograph: Source: U.S. Navy. 

The Navy's H-1 Upgrades Program converts the AH-1W attack helicopter 
and the UH-1N utility helicopter to the AH1-Z and UH-1Y 
configurations, respectively. The mission of the AH-1Z attack 
helicopter is to provide rotary-wing fire support and reconnaissance 
capabilities in day/night and adverse weather conditions. The mission 
of the UH-1Y utility helicopter is to provide command, control, and 
assault support under the same conditions. 

Current Status: 

The UH-1Y and AH-1Z configurations are in production. DOD approved 
full-rate production for the UH-1Y in September 2008. The program 
received approval to enter full-rate production for the AH-1Z in 
November 2010. The Navy completed operational testing and evaluation 
for the AH-1Z in June 2010. The evaluation report, issued in September 
2010, concluded that the AH-1Z is operationally effective and 
suitable, and recommended the aircraft for introduction in the fleet. 
The report also highlighted concerns with logistics supportability and 
recommended this deficiency be corrected prior to the first AH-1Z 
operational deployment. 

In July 2010, the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation 
issued a directive changing the composition of H-1 program 
procurements from 123 UH-1Ys and 226 AH-1Zs to 160 UH-1Ys and 189 AH-
1Zs. The Deputy Commandant cited increased demand for utility 
helicopters in support of combat operations and the increase in combat 
power of the AH-1Z compared to the AH-1W as support for the directive. 
As of November 2010, there were 98 H-1 upgrades under contract, and 46 
aircraft--34 UH-1Ys and 12 AH-1Zs--had been delivered to the fleet. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: $11,866.5 million; 
Research and development: $1,855.3 million; 
Procurement: $10,011.2 million; 
Quantities: 4 (Research and Development), 349 (Procurement). 

Next Major Program Event: Initial operational capability, AH-1Z, 
second quarter fiscal year 2011: 

Program Office Comments: The Navy provided technical comments, which 
were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): 

Photograph: Source: Department of Defense. 

The Army and Marine Corps' Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is a family of 
vehicles focused on balancing personnel protection, payload, and 
performance. JLTV is expected to reduce life-cycle costs through 
commonality at the subassembly and component level. The JLTV is 
expected to provide defensive measures for troops while in transport, 
increase payload capability, improve the logistics footprint, and 
reduce soldier workload associated with system operation and field 
maintenance activities. 

Current Status: 

In December 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics directed the Army to begin a 27-month 
technology development phase for the JLTV program with the goal of 
reducing risks prior to and shortening the length of system 
development. Prior to entering engineering and manufacturing 
development, the JLTV program will develop prototypes, demonstrate 
critical technologies in a relevant environment, and conduct a 
preliminary design review, as required by DOD policy. In October 2008, 
the Army awarded three technology development contracts. The three 
contractors delivered prototype vehicles in May 2010. Testing on the 
prototypes has begun and is expected to last about a year. At the 
conclusion of technology development, the Army plans to hold a full 
and open competition and award two engineering and manufacturing 
development contracts. One of these two contractors will be selected 
for production. 

The JLTV's acquisition costs have not been determined, but based on 
evolving user requirements the JLTV average unit manufacturing cost is 
estimated at $356,000. This cost does not include contractor general 
and administrative cost, contractor profit, or government-furnished 
equipment. The program has a demanding set of projected requirements 
and tradeoffs may be necessary. Among the program's key challenges is 
whether the vehicle can provide the performance and reliability 
required within the weight limits for helicopter transport. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: $53,523.3 million; 
Research and development: $1,082.2 million; 
Procurement: $52,298.3; 
Quantities: 60,383. 

Next Major Program Event: Engineering and manufacturing development 
start, January 2012: 

Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment, 
the program office stated that JLTV provides a design that supports 
mobility, reliability, and maintainability within weight limits to 
ensure transportability to and from the battlefield. The program 
office also noted that JLTV uses scalable armor solutions to meet 
requirements for added protection while maintaining load carrying 
capacity. 

[End of section] 

KC-X Program: 

Photograph: Source: U.S. Air Force. Note: Photo is of the KC-135 
Stratotanker, the aircraft the KC-X will replace. 

The Air Force's KC-X program is the first of three phases in the 
recapitalization of the KC-135 aerial refueling tanker fleet. The KC-X 
acquisition strategy calls for the procurement of 179 commercial 
derivative aircraft tankers at an expected cost of around $35 billion. 
The KC-X is planned to provide sustained aerial refueling capability 
to facilitate global attack, air-bridge, deployment, sustainment, 
employment, redeployment, homeland defense, theater support, and 
specialized national defense missions. 

Current Status: 

The KC-135 recapitalization effort is the Air Force's highest 
acquisition priority. It is expected to involve the procurement of 
about 600 aircraft over a 40-year period with a cost that could exceed 
$100 billion. The first phase of this recapitalization--the KC-X 
program--is in source selection. According to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, the Air Force plans to award a fixed-price 
incentive fee contract for the engineering and manufacturing 
development phase of the KC-X program in early fiscal year 2011. The 
request for proposal for this contract requires all critical 
technologies to be at a technology readiness level 6--demonstrated in 
a relevant environment--or higher. According to its current 
acquisition strategy, the primary technical risk for the KC-X program 
is the integration of military hardware and software on a commercial 
platform. The Air Force plans to begin procurement of four aircraft 
for development and testing purposes in fiscal year 2011. 

The Air Force has experienced numerous delays in awarding a 
development contract. In February 2008, the Air Force awarded a 
development contract to Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic 
Defense and Space Company. However, the contract award was the subject 
of a bid protest that was sustained by GAO. As a result, in October 
2008, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to 
terminate the contract and conduct a new competition. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: TBD; 
Research and development: TBD; 
Procurement: TBD; 
Quantities: 179. 

Next Major Program Event: Engineering and manufacturing development 
start, early fiscal year 2011: 

Program Office Comments: The Office of the Director of Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy provided technical comments on a 
draft of this assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS): 

Illustration: Source: Northrop Grumman. 

Until it was significantly restructured in February 2010, NPOESS was a 
triagency program with the Department of Commerce (National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration), DOD (Air Force), and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) designed to merge civil 
and defense weather satellite programs to reduce costs, provide global 
weather and climate coverage, and improve capabilities above current 
fielded systems. 

Current Status: 

In February 2010, the Executive Office of the President announced that 
the NPOESS program was being restructured because of long-standing 
cost, schedule, and performance issues and management deficiencies. As 
part of the restructuring, DOD, NOAA, and NASA were directed to 
proceed with separately-managed acquisitions--the Defense Weather 
Satellite System (DWSS) and the civilian Joint Polar Satellite System 
(JPSS). DOD, NOAA, and NASA will still be responsible for meeting 
NPOESS weather and climate observational requirements in their 
assigned orbits. DOD will be responsible for collecting weather and 
climate data during the early morning orbit. NOAA and NASA will be 
responsible for collecting weather and climate data during the 
afternoon orbit. These agencies are expected to share data from a 
common ground system to be managed by NOAA and NASA. 

According to the Executive Office of the President, the JPSS will 
consist of platforms based on the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) 
satellite. NOAA is currently developing its plan for the JPSS and is 
considering options such as developing a smaller satellite than the 
one planned for NPOESS and removing sensors that were planned for the 
NPOESS satellites. NOAA will have to manage a series of challenges 
during the transition from NPOESS to JPSS, including the resolution of 
existing contracts and intellectual property issues and the loss of 
skilled workers. NOAA also has to address risks related to the 
readiness of ground systems to support the planned October 2011 NPP 
satellite launch and the instrument readiness to support a JPSS launch 
in 2014. 

DOD is in the early stages of planning its approach for the DWSS 
program. See page 138 for more information about the status of the 
program. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: According to program officials, the 
estimated total program cost for NPOESS was about $5.3 billion when 
last reported in fiscal year 2010. 

Next Major Program Event: NA: 

Program Office Comments: We did not request comments on this 
assessment because the NPOESS program office was disbanded before we 
completed our review. 

[End of section] 

Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Aircraft Carrier Demonstration (UCAS- 
D): 

Illustration: Source: Northrop Grumman. 

The Navy's UCAS-D program plans to demonstrate and mature technologies 
that could be used on a future unmanned, long-range, low-observable 
carrier-based aircraft with an autonomous air-refueling capability, 
which would provide greater standoff capability, expanded payload and 
launch options, and increased naval reach and persistence. Following 
completion of the demonstration and technology maturation effort, the 
Navy will decide whether to initiate a formal acquisition program. 

Current Status: 

The Navy UCAS-D program is a demonstration program. The program plans 
to demonstrate carrier operations, including autonomous aerial 
refueling, of a low-observable unmanned combat air system and mature 
both aircraft and other critical technologies needed to operate and 
integrate the aircraft with the ship. These efforts are intended to 
support an acquisition decision for a potential Navy UCAS major 
defense acquisition program, which could enter the acquisition process 
at either the technology demonstration or engineering and 
manufacturing development phase. In August 2007, the Navy awarded a 
cost-plus incentive fee contract to Northrop Grumman for the design, 
development, integration, test, and demonstration of two unmanned 
combat air systems. The contractor has completed the first air vehicle 
and is currently building the second air vehicle. First flight is 
scheduled for December 2010, and according to program officials, the 
demonstration effort--excluding the autonomous aerial refueling 
capability--is scheduled to be completed by 2013. The refueling 
capability is not scheduled to be demonstrated until summer 2014 and 
all technology maturation and demonstration efforts are to be 
completed by 2015. 

While the prime contractor's estimated costs have grown by over $200 
million to $813 million, according to the program manager, there is 
sufficient funding in the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request 
to complete the demonstration program. The cost of the prime contract 
has grown, in part, because the contractor originally proposed 
completing the demonstration sooner than 2013 and the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense added an autonomous aerial refueling 
demonstration to the program in 2008. Although the Navy officials 
initially agreed to the accelerated schedule, it was subsequently 
determined that the technology involved was more complex than 
originally anticipated. After a 2010 review by the Navy, the program's 
cost and schedule estimates were revised to reflect the Navy's 
original 2013 program completion date as well as the addition of the 
autonomous aerial refueling capability. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,562.1 million; 
Quantities: 2. 

Next Major Program Event: First flight, December 2010: 

Program Office Comments: The Navy UCAS-D program office provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Nett Warrior Increment I: 

Photograph: Source: U.S. Army. 

The Army's Nett Warrior program is an integrated ground soldier system 
designed to provide embedded training and increased situational 
awareness, lethality, mobility, survivability, and sustainability 
during combat operations. There are three increments planned. 
Increment I will focus on developing the situational awareness system 
used initially with Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The program is a 
descendant of the Land Warrior program, which was terminated due to 
cost concerns and funding constraints. 

Current Status: 

The Nett Warrior program was approved to enter technology development 
in February 2009 and plans to proceed directly to production in fiscal 
year 2011. The Army has awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts to 
General Dynamics, Raytheon, and Rockwell Collins for prototypes, which 
include a hands-free display, headset, computer, navigation equipment, 
antennas, and cables. These prototype designs have undergone 
developmental testing and are currently being evaluated in a limited 
user test. The Army has identified five critical technologies for Nett 
Warrior Increment I--energy/power management subsystem, antenna, 
navigation, user controller, and voice intelligibility. These 
technologies are currently nearing maturity and, pursuant to a program 
acquisition decision memorandum, they must be demonstrated in an 
operational environment prior to exiting technology development. Based 
on the results of the limited user test, conducted at Ft. Riley, 
Kansas, and a technology readiness assessment of the program by the 
Director, Defense Research and Engineering, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics will make a decision 
on whether the program will proceed to engineering and manufacturing 
development or directly to production and deployment as planned. While 
it is not designated as a critical technology, the fully networked 
capability of the Nett Warrior Increment I will not be achieved until 
the Joint Tactical Radio System is incorporated after full-rate 
production. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: $1,669.4 million; 
Research and development: $179.8 million; 
Procurement: $1,489.6 million; 
Quantities: 20,430. 

Next Major Program Event: Low-rate initial production decision, fiscal 
year 2011: 

Program Office Comments: The program office provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Ohio-Class Replacement (OR)/Sea Based Strategic Deterrent: 

Illustration: Source: General Dynamics Electric Boat. 

The Navy's Ohio-class Replacement (OR)/Sea Based Strategic Deterrent 
will replace the current fleet of Ohio-class ballistic missile 
submarines (SSBN) as they begin to retire in 2027. The Navy began 
research and development in 2008, in order to avoid a gap in sea-based 
nuclear deterrence between the Ohio class's retirement and the 
production of a replacement. The Navy is working with the United 
Kingdom to develop a Common Missile Compartment (CMC) for use on the 
Ohio-class replacement and the United Kingdom's replacement for the 
Vanguard SSBN. 

Current Status: 

The OR program was scheduled to enter technology development in 
December 2010. The Navy's fiscal year 2011 long range shipbuilding 
plan includes 12 OR SSBNs and projects that the program will receive 
authorization to begin construction on the lead ship in fiscal year 
2019. The high expected cost of the OR has been an early focus of the 
program. Both DOD and Navy officials have stated the cost of the 
program could dominate Navy shipbuilding budgets in the 2020 to 2030 
time frame. The size and number of missile tubes is one of a number of 
cost drivers. The OR's analysis of alternatives, which was approved by 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense's office of Cost Analysis and 
Program Evaluation in December 2009, discussed the size and number of 
missile tubes; however, a final decision is still pending. According 
to the program office, Northrop Grumman, Babcock Integrated 
Technologies, Electric Boat Corporation, and BAE Systems Marine have 
been awarded contracts for assembly of prototype missile tubes. 

The main focus of OR research and development to date has been the 
CMC. The United Kingdom has provided $329 million for this effort 
since fiscal year 2008. During fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the Navy 
had allocated about $183 million for the design and prototyping of the 
missile compartment. According to Navy officials, the program's other 
areas of emphasis include developing stealth technologies, ensuring a 
balanced ship design and the production readiness of the missile tube 
manufacturing base, and strengthening government system engineering 
personnel. 

Overall, the Navy has received $510.3 million for the OR program over 
fiscal years 2009 and 2010. The President's budget request for fiscal 
year 2011 included an additional $672.3 million. These numbers include 
funding for OR and propulsion plant development. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: TBD: 

Next Major Program Event: Engineering and manufacturing development 
start, fiscal year 2015: 

Program Office Comments: The OR program generally concurred with this 
assessment. The program stated that over the past year, it has focused 
on containing nonrecurring engineering and construction costs by 
incorporating innovations to ship design and construction 
methodologies and practices as well as lessons learned from the 
Virginia-class program's design and construction. The program office 
also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Space Fence: 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Air Force. 

The Air Force's Space Fence will be a new system of ground-based 
radars to replace the aging Air Force Space Surveillance System. It 
will use higher radio frequencies to detect and track smaller Earth-
orbiting objects. The system will consist of up to two geographically 
dispersed radars (notionally located in Australia, Ascension Island, 
or Kwajalein Atoll) to help ensure effective space surveillance 
coverage. The system's enhanced capabilities are expected to 
significantly increase the number of orbiting objects detected and 
tracked. 

Current Status: 

The Space Fence program began technology development in March 2009. In 
June 2009, the Air Force awarded three $30 million firm fixed-price 
contracts to Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. The 
Northrop Grumman contract was subsequently terminated after a 
reduction in program funding. The program is currently focused on 
making cost, schedule, and performance tradeoffs to ensure its 
affordability. The Air Force next plans to conduct a full and open 
competition and award up to two contracts for a maximum of $214 
million to continue technology development. The contracts will go 
through the preliminary design review, which is planned for January 
2012, followed by another full and open competition leading to a 
single, final development and production contract in July 2012. The 
first Space Fence radar site is scheduled to provide initial 
operational capability by the end of fiscal year 2015, with the final 
site providing full capability by 2020. 

The program office identified five critical technologies and expects 
them to be nearing maturity by the preliminary design review. Mature 
backup technologies exist; however, all have potentially higher 
acquisition or operating costs associated with them, or both. 
According to the program office, using these backups could make the 
program unaffordable. 

According to the program office, a separate program for the 
development of a new space command and control system poses a risk for 
Space Fence. This new system, which will process Space Fence data, 
needs to be available when the Space Fence is fielded because the 
amount of data it will generate exceeds existing command and control 
system performance limits. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: $2,717.6 million; 
Research and development: $1,682.2 million; 
Procurement: $1,035.4 million; 
Quantities: 1 (Research and Development), 1 (Procurement). 

Next Major Program Event: Final development and production start, July 
2012: 

Program Office Comments: The program office stated that changes to the 
acquisition strategy increase competition, induce further contractor 
design and cost realism, and reduce program risk to deliver the first 
system capability by September 2015. The preliminary design review is 
expected to occur 6 months prior to the planned June 2012 milestone B, 
allowing for a more informed decision at final contract award. The 
program office also provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Stryker Modernization (SMOD): 

Photograph: Source: U.S. Army. 

The Army's Stryker family of vehicles is a group of deployable, 
wheeled, armored vehicles. The Stryker upgrade program, commonly known 
as Stryker Modernization, is a technological overhaul of targeted 
components designed to improve the vehicle's survivability, mobility, 
lethality, and networking capabilities. The system enhancements, which 
will be applied to all 10 Stryker variants, will enable the vehicles 
to remain in operation through 2050. The program will comprise two 
increments. We made observations on increment one. 

Current Status: 

The Army is planning a materiel development decision (MDD) for the 
Stryker Modernization program, which will determine where it will 
enter the acquisition process. The program is the outgrowth of a 
modernization concept that was briefed at a Stryker configuration 
steering board meeting in August 2009. According to the Stryker 
program, the modernization program is necessary to address space, 
weight, and power constraints that could affect the vehicles' ability 
to meet current and future warfighting needs. Before moving forward 
with the program, the Army had to await the outcome of two events. In 
March 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics directed the Army to provide a complete overview of 
Stryker Modernization efforts, including an evaluation of how Stryker 
Modernization activities fit into the Army strategy for meeting future 
ground combat vehicle requirements. In addition, the Army must 
complete its combat vehicle portfolio review. 

The first increment of the Stryker Modernization program will consist 
of two phases. According to program officials, phase 1 will focus on 
the common characteristics of all 10 variants, such as the chassis and 
drive train, spare parts, and test equipment. Phase 2 will focus on 
enhancing characteristics unique to each of the variants, such as fire 
support and medical evacuation. The Army has identified three critical 
technologies for phase 1--semiactive suspension, survivability 
improvements, and power generation. According to the program, all 
three technologies will be demonstrated in a relevant or realistic 
environment before the program enters engineering and manufacturing 
development. The program also plans to select, through competition, 
three contractors to develop prototypes of key subsystems prior to 
this phase. Additional critical technologies may be identified for 
phase 2. The Stryker Modernization strategy will be determined by Army 
senior leaders and then that strategy will be recommended to the 
defense acquisition executive at the program's MDD for his approval. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: $2,179.8 million; 
Research and development: $1,190.0 million; 
Procurement: $989.8 million; 
Quantities: 35 (Research and Development), 664 (Procurement). 

Next Major Program Event: Materiel development decision, TBD: 

Program Office Comments: In commenting on a draft of this assessment, 
the Army provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR): 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Air Force. 

The Air Force's 3DELRR will be the long-range, ground-based sensor for 
detecting, identifying, tracking, and reporting aircraft and missiles 
for the Joint Forces Air Component Commander. It will provide real-
time data and support a range of expeditionary operations in all types 
of weather and terrain. It is being acquired to replace the Air 
Force's AN/TPS-75 radar systems. The Marine Corps is considering 
3DELRR as a potential replacement to the AN/TPS-59 to support the 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force Commander. 

Current Status: 

The 3DELRR program was approved to enter the technology development 
phase in May 2009. The Air Force has awarded firm fixed-price 
contracts for the development of system-level prototypes. The program 
expects to demonstrate the capability of each of the prototypes by the 
end of the first quarter of fiscal year 2011. The program plans to 
conduct a full and open competition and award a single cost plus 
incentive fee contract for program definition and risk reduction 
before seeking approval to enter engineering and manufacturing 
development in the third quarter of fiscal year 2013. Initial 
operational capability for the radar is targeted for approximately 
2019. 

The 3DELRR program is focused on reducing technical risk before 
beginning system development. The program has identified six critical 
technologies. The program's technology development strategy calls for 
these technologies to be nearing maturity and demonstrated in a 
relevant environment by the start of system development. The program 
also expects to complete a preliminary design review prior to 
development start and a critical design review early in the 
engineering and manufacturing development phase. 

According to the program office, the primary risks going forward are 
securing adequate funding and accurately capturing the user's 
requirements. Additional near-term funding is necessary to execute the 
current acquisition strategy. In the event of a program budget 
shortfall, the program office would have to examine alternatives 
including revising the acquisition strategy, conducting requirements 
tradeoffs, and extending the delivery schedule. Further, if the 
program's requirements document does not accurately represent user 
requirements, then the system design could require changes late in the 
acquisition process. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: $2,092.4 million; 
Research and development: $743.3 million; 
Procurement: $1,349.1 million (Air Force only); 
Quantities: 35 (Air Force only). 

Next Major Program Event: Program definition and risk reduction 
contract award, second quarter fiscal year 2012: 

Program Office Comments: The program office concurred with the 
assessment and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (Osprey): 

Illustration: Source: U.S. Marine Corps. 

The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft developed for use by the 
Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy. The Marine Corps and Air Force 
Special Operations Command have completed multiple deployments of the 
MV-22 and CV-22, respectively, in Iraq, Africa, Afghanistan, South 
America, and in support of the humanitarian efforts in Haiti. As of 
December 2010, there were 125 V-22s in service. The program is 
currently focused on improving readiness, decreasing ownership cost, 
and preparing for a second multi-year procurement contract. 

Current Status: 

The V-22 has been deployed and is supporting combat operations; 
however, the aircraft has experienced reliability and readiness issues 
that have resulted in high maintenance and operating costs. Since 
2009, the program has undertaken several initiatives to understand and 
reduce operations and maintenance costs after it became apparent the 
MV-22 was exceeding its budgeted cost per flight hour. The program 
developed a new cost model to increase the quality and accuracy of 
cost per flight hour estimates and established a team to identify cost 
savings opportunities. According to the Marine Corps, it is also 
working with industry to increase the durability of key components 
that affect readiness and operating costs. One of the program's top 
priorities is the ice protection system. A June 2010 Air Force 
accident report on a March 2009 CV-22 engine failure concluded that it 
was caused by a part from the central deice distributor (an ice 
protection system component) shaking loose and falling into the 
engine. The report stated that this part had a history of structural 
issues related in part to its design. The program office has addressed 
the risks identified in the report by instituting an inspection of 
this component at the 35 hour interval and installing a more durable 
version of the part on aircraft in production. According to the 
program office, all CV-22s and deployed MV-22s have been retrofitted 
with the hardware fix and retrofit kits are available for the 
remaining fleet. In April 2010, a CV-22 crashed on an infiltration 
mission in support of ground forces in Afghanistan. In August 2010, 
the Air Force Accident Investigation Board reported that there were 10 
substantially contributing factors to the accident and that they fell 
into four categories: mission execution, environmental conditions, 
human factors, and aircraft performance. We were unable to follow-up 
on how these factors are being addressed during our assessment. The V-
22 program is in the fourth year of its first multiyear procurement 
contract. The program will request authority to enter, and is planning 
and budgeting for, a second multiyear procurement contract to begin in 
fiscal year 2013. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: $56,061.1 million; 
Research and development: $13,114.7 million; 
Procurement: $42,829.3 million; 
Quantities: 458 aircraft. 

Program Office Comments: In its comments on a draft of this 
assessment, the program office stated that the V-22 has met all 
operational tasking and the Marines and Air Force are exceptionally 
satisfied with the V-22's "game changing" capabilities. It also 
emphasized the aircraft's exceptional survivability and the numerous 
improvements that have been made to it in the last decade. Eight 
Marine and two Air Force Osprey squadrons are operational. The program 
projects reaching 100,000 flight hours in early 2011. Production is 
fully mature with aircraft deliveries on or ahead of schedule. The 
program's overall strategy is an effective and affordable globally 
deployed Osprey fleet. 

[End of section] 

Presidential Helicopter (VXX): 

Photograph: Source: U.S. Navy. 

The Navy's VXX program is expected to develop and field a replacement 
for the current fleet of VH-3D and VH-60N helicopters that provide 
transportation for the President, Vice President, heads of state, and 
others as directed. The program was initiated after the VH-71 
presidential helicopter replacement program was terminated in June 
2009 due to excessive cost growth and schedule delays. The Navy is 
also taking steps to extend the service life of its existing fleet of 
VH-3D and VH-60N helicopters until a new helicopter can be fielded. 

Current Status: 

In March 2010, the VXX program held a materiel development decision 
review. The Navy expects to complete an analysis of alternatives by 
the second quarter of fiscal year 2011 and enter technology 
development by the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. According to 
program officials, the new program will complete a four-phase systems 
engineering and design review process before beginning system 
development. 

In June 2009, DOD terminated the VH-71 program due to excessive cost 
growth, schedule delays, and technical risk. From its inception, 
program officials had acknowledged that the program carried 
substantial risk due to an aggressive schedule directed by the White 
House. Program officials further attribute the program's problems to a 
misunderstanding between the government and contractors over 
requirements--a problem exacerbated by a highly compressed development 
schedule, a lack of sufficient predevelopment systems engineering and 
design work, and the eventual reengineering of entire subsystems 
needed to mitigate aircraft performance and weight issues. Prior to 
termination, five pilot production VH-71s were built and delivered and 
10 percent of the planned 1,460 flight hour test program was completed. 

As a result of the VH-71 termination, the Navy has to extend the 
service life of its fleet of VH-3D and VH-60N helicopters. Current 
projections indicate these helicopters can operate until 2017; 
however, the Navy is studying whether the fleet's life can be extended 
to 2023 or later until the VXX is fielded. 

Estimated Total Program Cost: TBD; 
Quantities: TBD. 

Next Major Program Event: Technology development start, third quarter 
fiscal year 2011: 

Program Office Comments: The program office concurred with this 
assessment. 

[End of section] 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The 
comments are reprinted in appendix VI. DOD also provided technical 
comments, which we addressed in the report, as appropriate. 

In its comments, DOD stated that it did not find GAO's methods for 
calculating cost growth useful for management purposes. Specifically, 
DOD takes exception to the part of our analysis that aggregates data 
on the cost growth that has accumulated from a program's first full 
cost estimate, which is typically tied to the start of development-- 
milestone B--to the current year. DOD considers our methodology to be 
flawed and the resulting information to be misleading because it does 
not delineate cost growth experienced in the past, cost growth 
associated with capability upgrades, and cost growth associated with 
quantity increases. DOD requested that those metrics be removed from 
the report. In addition, DOD commented that the four different cost 
growth metrics presented in the report make it difficult for readers 
to gain an understanding of program performance. 

Given the magnitude and complexity of major weapon system 
acquisitions, we believe no single metric adequately captures all of 
the dynamics of cost changes. Measuring cost increases from the formal 
start of a program to the present is one of several important metrics 
because it conveys the magnitude of the task at hand and provides a 
context for management. Further, milestone B is recognized as a key 
point for establishing accountability for weapon system programs, as 
evidenced by the importance of milestone B cost estimates in reporting 
Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breaches to Congress and the statutory 
certification requirements a program must meet, which include 
developing a reasonable cost estimate, to proceed beyond this point. 
Therefore, we retained this as one of several metrics used to measure 
program performance in this report. With regard to DOD's comment about 
cost growth associated with capability upgrades, we believe that a key 
tenet of a knowledge-based acquisition approach is to set realistic 
capability requirements at the outset of a program and to avoid 
changing them in order to achieve cost and schedule predictability. 

We used several other metrics to make distinctions between older and 
more recent cost increases and increases stemming from a lack of 
knowledge or poor program management versus simple quantity increases. 
For example, we designed our cost analysis to focus primarily on 
program performance over the last 2 years, which allows us to evaluate 
DOD's management of its major defense acquisition programs since key 
acquisition reforms were put into place by Congress and DOD. To ensure 
the focus remains on this 2-year analysis, we made changes to table 2 
in the final report in response to DOD's comments. Our analysis also 
explicitly accounts for cost increases associated with changes in 
weapon system quantities including cases such as the DDG 51 and the 
MRAP. Similarly, we present analysis of the often-overlooked and hard- 
to-quantify phenomenon of reducing quantities or capabilities, or 
both, to offset cost increases. 

DOD also commented on a set of program performance metrics that were 
discussed by DOD, OMB, and GAO in 2008, as a mechanism for evaluating 
DOD's progress in addressing the issues discussed in GAO's Weapon 
Systems Acquisition High-Risk area. DOD believes that these metrics 
still do not adequately capture cost growth that results solely from 
poor estimating and poor execution as opposed to other sources 
including changes in inventory goals and changes in requirements or 
capabilities. We agree that these metrics do not quantify the cost 
growth attributable to each of those factors; however, DOD 
specifically requested that we use these metrics to assess the 
performance of its major defense acquisition program portfolio and its 
policies in its comments on our 2009 and 2010 annual assessments of 
weapon programs. We will continue to work with DOD to develop a set of 
metrics to better measure its progress in addressing its long-standing 
weapon system acquisition issues. Finally, DOD stated that it is 
undertaking a series of actions to obtain greater efficiency and 
productivity in defense spending. We support DOD's efforts to get 
better value from defense spending and look forward to including the 
results of these efforts in future reports. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget. In addition, the report will be made 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. Staff members making key contributions to this 
report are listed in appendix VII. 

Signed by: 

Michael J. Sullivan: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

This report contains observations on the performance of the Department 
of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year 2010 major defense acquisition program 
portfolio. To develop these observations, we obtained and analyzed 
data from Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) and other information in 
the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval Purview 
system, referred to as DAMIR.[Footnote 29] We refer to programs with 
SARs dated December 2009 as the 2010 portfolio. We converted cost 
information to fiscal year 2011 dollars using conversion factors from 
the DOD Comptroller's National Defense Budget Estimates for Fiscal 
Year 2011 (table 5-9). Data for the total planned investment of major 
defense acquisition programs were obtained from DAMIR, which we 
aggregated for all programs using fiscal year 2011 dollars. However, 
the data do not include the full costs of acquiring Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA) programs. 

We also collected and analyzed data on the composition of DOD's major 
defense acquisition program portfolio. To determine changes in that 
portfolio, we compared the programs that issued SARs in December 2009 
with the list of programs that issued SARs in December 2007. To assess 
the cost effect of changes to the major defense acquisition portfolio, 
we calculated the estimated total acquisition cost for the 13 programs 
exiting the portfolio and for the 15 programs entering the portfolio. 

To compare the cost of major defense acquisition programs over 2 
years, 5 years, and from baseline estimates, we collected data from 
December 2009, December 2007, and December 2004 SARs; acquisition 
program baselines; and program offices. We retrieved data that showed 
cost estimates for research, development, test, and evaluation; 
procurement; and total acquisition for 98 major defense acquisition 
programs in the 2010 portfolio. We divided some SAR programs into 
smaller elements, because DOD reports performance data on them 
separately. We analyzed the data to determine the change in research 
and development, procurement, and total acquisition costs from the 
first full estimate, generally development start, with the current 
estimate. For a few programs that did not have a development estimate, 
we compared the current estimate to the production estimate. Also, for 
a few shipbuilding programs that had a full planning estimate, we 
compared the current estimate to the planning estimate. For programs 
that began as non-major defense acquisition programs, the first full 
estimate used by GAO as a baseline may be different than the original 
baseline contained in DOD SARs. When comparable cost and schedule data 
were not available for programs, we excluded them from the analysis. 
To calculate cost growth incurred over the past 2 years, from 2008 to 
2010, we calculated the difference between the December 2007 and 
December 2009 SARs for programs older than 2 years. For programs less 
than 2 years old, we calculated the difference between December 2009 
and first full estimates. We converted all dollar figures to fiscal 
year 2011 constant dollars. We took a similar approach for calculating 
cost growth incurred from 2005 to 2010. We also obtained schedule 
information and calculated the time since program start, or program 
age; cycle time from program start to initial operational capability; 
delay in obtaining initial operational capability; and the delay in 
initial capability as a percentage of total cycle time. Finally, we 
extracted data on quantities and program acquisition unit cost and 
compared the current unit cost to the baseline unit cost to determine 
whether programs' unit cost has increased or decreased from the 
baseline estimate. For three software programs with no quantities, we 
assigned each program a quantity of one. For two programs, F-22 and 
DDG 51, we then calculated the effect on DOD's buying power from each 
program by multiplying the change in program acquisition unit cost by 
the current planned quantities. 

To calculate the amount of procurement cost growth attributable to 
quantity increases, we isolated the change in procurement costs and 
the change in procurement quantities for programs over the past 2 
years. For those programs with change in procurement quantities, we 
calculated the amount attributable to quantity changes as the change 
in quantity multiplied by the average procurement unit cost for the 
program 2 years ago. 

To evaluate program performance according to DOD, OMB, and GAO- 
developed metrics, we calculated how many programs had less than a 4 
percent increase in total acquisition cost over the past 2 years, less 
than a 10 percent increase over the past 5 years, and less than a 15 
percent increase from initial estimates using data from December 2009, 
December 2007, and December 2004 SARs; acquisition program baselines; 
and program offices. For programs that began as non-major defense 
acquisition programs, the first full estimate used by GAO as a 
baseline may be different than the original baseline contained in DOD 
SARs. We also identified 10 of the highest cost programs from the 
December 2009 SARs and calculated changes in total costs and program 
acquisition unit cost over the past 2 years. We excluded MDA's 
Ballistic Missile Defense System from this analysis, because the 
program does not report baseline estimates or quantity information in 
its annual SAR. 

To calculate the amount of cost growth incurred before and after 
production start, we identified 56 programs with December 2009 SARs 
that had production cost estimates. To determine the average age of 
these programs, we calculated the time between program start and 
December 2009 for each program. To analyze the cost growth before and 
after production, we compared development cost estimates, production 
cost estimates, and December 2009 cost estimates for both research and 
development and procurement costs and determined the difference 
between each estimate for each program. We then calculated the percent 
change between development and production estimates, and between 
production and current estimates for both development and procurement 
costs. Finally, we calculated the average percent change for each 
program from development to production and from production to current 
estimates to determine the average percent cost growth incurred before 
and after production. 

Through discussions with DOD officials responsible for the database 
and confirming selected data with program offices, we determined that 
the SAR data and the information retrieved from DAMIR were 
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

Analysis of Selected DOD Programs Using Knowledge-Based Criteria: 

In total, this report presents information on 71 weapon programs. A 
table listing these programs is found in appendix VII. Out of these 
programs, 49 are captured in a two-page format discussing technology, 
design, and manufacturing knowledge obtained and other program issues. 
The remaining 22 programs are described in a one-page format that 
describes their current status. We chose these programs based on their 
estimated cost, stage in the acquisition process, and congressional 
interest. To obtain cost, schedule, technology, design, and 
manufacturing information, we asked 49 programs to complete a data- 
collection instrument and received responses from all these programs. 
In addition, to collect information from major defense acquisition 
programs and components of these programs on other program factors 
such as requirements changes, configuration steering board activities, 
software development, and program office staffing, we asked 44 
programs to complete a second electronic questionnaire and received 
responses from all these programs from June to November 2010. To 
collect data from pre-major defense acquisition programs including 
cost and schedule estimates, technology maturity, and planned 
implementation of acquisition reforms, we distributed a separate 
electronic questionnaire to 54 programs categorized as pre-major 
defense acquisition programs as of July 2010. Both questionnaires were 
sent by e-mail in an attached Microsoft Word form that respondents 
could return electronically. We received responses from June to 
November 2010. During the course of our review, we dropped 37 programs 
from this analysis, including 19 that were no longer slated to become 
major defense acquisition programs, 11 that had not yet begun the 
technology development phase, and 7 that had become major defense 
acquisition programs or were spinoffs of major defense acquisition 
programs. In addition, three programs did not return the 
questionnaire. Therefore, our assessment of planned major defense 
acquisition programs consists of 14 programs nearing system 
development start. To ensure the reliability of the data collected 
through our questionnaires, we took a number of steps to reduce 
measurement error, nonresponse error, and respondent bias. These steps 
included conducting two pretests of each questionnaire by phone prior 
to distribution to ensure that our questions were clear, unbiased, and 
consistently interpreted; reviewing responses to identify obvious 
errors or inconsistencies; conducting follow-up to clarify responses 
when needed; and verifying the accuracy of a sample of keypunched 
questionnaires. 

Our analysis of how well programs are adhering to a knowledge-based 
acquisition approach focuses on a subset of 40 major defense 
acquisition programs from DOD's fiscal year 2010 portfolio that were 
in development or the early stages of production as of June 2010. The 
31 programs that are not included in this analysis either do not have 
acquisition milestones that line up with development start, critical 
design review, and production start or lack key data on technology, 
design, and production necessary to assess them against our knowledge- 
based acquisition criteria at this point in time.[Footnote 30] 

To assess the cost and schedule outcomes for the 40 programs to-date, 
we identified programs with cost, schedule, and quantity data at the 
first full estimate, generally milestone B--development start--and the 
estimate from the December 2009 SAR. Of the programs in our 
assessment, 39 had relevant data on research and development costs, 38 
had relevant data on procurement costs, and 34 had data on schedules 
for delivering initial capabilities. The remaining programs, not 
included in this analysis, did not have comparable data. We summed the 
first full estimate and the current estimate of both research and 
development costs and procurement costs for the programs and 
calculated the percentage change between the estimates. The schedule 
assessment is calculated two ways--as the average of the change in 
months between the first and current estimates for the planned or 
actual delivery of initial operational capability and as the average 
change in months divided by the first estimate of acquisition cycle 
time. 

To assess knowledge attainment of programs at critical decision points 
(system development start, critical design review, and production 
start), we collected data about their knowledge levels at each point. 
The data were collected from 40 program offices as of November 2010. 
Additional information on product knowledge is found in the product 
knowledge assessment section of this appendix. We did not validate the 
data provided by the program offices, but reviewed the data and 
performed various checks to determine that they were reliable enough 
for our purposes. Where we discovered discrepancies, we clarified the 
data accordingly. Programs in our assessment were in various stages of 
the acquisition cycle, and not all of the programs provided knowledge 
information for each point. Programs were not included in our 
assessments if relevant decision or knowledge point data were not 
available. In addition, because knowledge points differ for 
shipbuilding programs, we exclude them from our assessment of certain 
knowledge-based practices. In particular, we focused on the 17 
programs that entered these key acquisition points since 2009 and 
evaluated their adherence to knowledge-based practices. For each 
decision point, we summarized knowledge attainment for the number of 
programs with data that achieved that knowledge point. Twenty-six 
nonship programs provided data on technology maturity at development 
start, 1 of which began development since 2009; 29 nonship programs 
provided data on design stability at their critical design review, 9 
of which held this review since 2009; and 4 programs provided data on 
production processes in control at production start, 1 of which began 
production since 2009. Our analysis of knowledge attained at each key 
point also includes other factors that we have previously identified 
as being key to a knowledge-based acquisition approach, including 
holding system design reviews early in development, planning for 
manufacturing, testing an integrated prototype prior to the design 
review, using a reliability growth curve, and testing a production-
representative prototype prior to making a production decision. See 
appendix IV for a list of these practices. 

For our analysis of requirements changes, we obtained and analyzed 
information from 39 programs about the number and effect of 
requirements changes since development start. Using this information, 
we compared the average percent change in research and development 
cost and delay in delivery of an initial operational capability 
between programs that had an added or enhanced key performance 
parameter; a reduced, deferred, or deleted key performance parameter; 
or stable key performance parameters. We also compared the age of 
programs that had stable or unstable requirements. 

For our analysis of software development, we obtained and analyzed 
information from 25 programs related to the number of software lines 
of code expected in the final system at development start and 
currently, and from 21 programs that collect data on the percentages 
of software defects contained in-phase and in subsequent phases. We 
also collected data from 40 programs on whether they collected earned 
value management data for software development. We calculated whether 
the percentage growth in total lines of code correlated with the 
percentage growth in research and development costs, as well as 
whether the growth in software correlated with percentage delay in 
achieving initial operational capabilities. We also compared the total 
lines of code expected currently with whether programs are collecting 
earned value management data for software development. Finally we 
compared the percentage growth in software lines of code with program 
age. 

For our analysis of program staffing, we analyzed information related 
to program office staffing from 44 programs, including 40 major 
defense acquisition programs and 4 MDA elements, on the number of 
military personnel, civilian government employees, support 
contractors, and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers and 
university-affiliated employees working in the following functions: 
program management, business-related functions, contracting, 
engineering, administrative support, and other functions. We compared 
this information with data collected in prior years. We also collected 
information on whether programs had been authorized all positions 
requested, whether they had filled those positions, reasons for not 
filling positions, and whether they were using support contractors to 
make up for shortfalls in government personnel or capabilities. 

To determine how DOD has begun to implement acquisition reforms, we 
obtained and analyzed the revised DOD 5000.02 acquisition instruction, 
the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, and the Directive- 
Type Memorandum 09-027 implementing the Act. We analyzed data from the 
survey sent to planned major defense acquisition programs in our 
assessment to determine how they were implementing requirements for 
holding a preliminary design review; developing prototypes; maturing 
critical technologies; and considering tradeoffs among cost, schedule, 
and performance objectives before development start. We also collected 
information on whether these programs are planning to incorporate 
competition into their acquisition strategies.[Footnote 31] To 
determine how programs were implementing the requirement to hold 
configuration steering boards, we analyzed data from the survey sent 
to major defense acquisition programs. 

We relied on GAO's body of work examining DOD acquisition issues over 
the years. In recent years, we have issued reports that identified 
systemic problems with major weapon systems acquisitions and we have 
made recommendations to DOD on ways to improve how it acquires major 
weapon systems. These reports cover contracting, program management, 
acquisition policy, cost estimating, budgeting, and requirements 
development. We have also issued many detailed reports evaluating 
specific weapon systems, such as aircraft programs, ships, 
communication systems, satellites, missile defense systems, and future 
combat systems. We also used information from numerous GAO products 
that examine how commercial best practices can improve outcomes for 
DOD programs. This work has shown that valuable lessons can be learned 
from the commercial sector and can be applied to the development of 
weapon systems. 

System Profile Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment: 

Over the past several years, DOD has revised policies governing weapon 
system acquisitions and changed the terminology used for major 
acquisition events. To make DOD's acquisition terminology more 
consistent across the 71 program assessments, we standardized the 
terminology for key program events. For most individual programs in 
our assessment, "development start" refers to the initiation of an 
acquisition program as well as the start of engineering and 
manufacturing development. This coincides with DOD's milestone B. A 
few programs in our assessment (mostly programs that began before 
2001) have a separate "program start" date, which begins a pre-system 
development phase for program definition and risk-reduction 
activities. This "program start" date generally coincides with DOD's 
former terminology for milestone I, followed by a "development start" 
date, either DOD's former milestone II or current milestone B 
depending on when the program began system development. The 
"production decision" generally refers to the decision to enter the 
production and deployment phase, typically with low-rate initial 
production. The "initial capability" refers to the initial operational 
capability--sometimes called first unit equipped of required asset 
availability. For shipbuilding programs, the schedule of key program 
events in relation to acquisition milestones varies for each program. 
Our work on shipbuilding best practices has identified the detailed 
design and construction contract award and the start of lead ship 
fabrication as the points in the acquisition process roughly 
equivalent to development start and design review for other programs. 
For MDA programs that do not follow the standard DOD acquisition model 
but instead develop systems' capabilities incrementally, we identify 
the key technology development efforts that lead to an initial 
capability. 

For each program we assessed in a two-page format, we present cost, 
schedule, and quantity data at the program's first full estimate, 
generally milestone B, and an estimate from the program office 
reflecting 2010 data where it was available. To assess the cost, 
schedule, and quantity changes of each program, we reviewed DOD's SARs 
or obtained data directly from the program offices. In general, we 
compared the latest available SAR information with a baseline for each 
program. For programs that have started product development--those 
that are beyond milestone II or B--we compared the latest available 
SAR to the development estimate from the first SAR issued after the 
program was approved to enter development, or for the planning 
estimate if we had a full estimate. For systems not included in the 
SARs, we attempted to obtain comparable baseline and current data from 
the individual program offices. For MDA systems, for which a baseline 
was not available, we do not present a comparison. For the other 
programs assessed in a one-page format, we present the latest 
available estimate of cost and quantity from the program office. 

For each program we assessed, all cost information is presented in 
fiscal year 2011 dollars using Office of the Secretary of Defense- 
approved deflators to eliminate the effects of inflation. We have 
depicted only the program's main elements of acquisition cost--
research and development and procurement. However, the total program 
cost also includes military construction and acquisition operation and 
maintenance costs. Because of rounding and these additional costs, in 
some situations, total cost may not match the exact sum of the 
research and development and procurement costs. The program unit costs 
are calculated by dividing the total program cost by the total 
quantities planned. In some instances, the data were not applicable, 
and we annotate this by using the term "not applicable (NA)." The 
quantities listed refer to total quantities, including both 
procurement and development quantities. 

The schedule assessment for each program is based on acquisition cycle 
time, defined as the number of months between program start and the 
achievement of initial operational capability or an equivalent 
fielding date. In some instances the data were not yet available, and 
we annotate this by using the term "to be determinded (TBD)" or "NA." 

The information presented on the "funding needed to complete" is from 
fiscal year 2011 through completion and, unless otherwise noted, draws 
on information from SARs or on data from the program office. In some 
instances, the data were not available, and we annotate this by the 
term "TBD" or "NA." The quantities listed refer only to procurement 
quantities. Satellite programs, in particular, produce a large 
percentage of their total operations units as development quantities, 
which are not included in the quantity figure. 

The intent of these comparisons is to provide an aggregate, or 
overall, picture of a program's history. These assessments represent 
the sum of the federal government's actions on a program, not just 
those of the program manager and the contractor. DOD does a number of 
detailed analyses of changes that attempt to link specific changes 
with triggering events or causes. Our analysis does not attempt to 
make such detailed distinctions. 

Product Knowledge Data on Individual Two-Page Assessments: 

In our past work examining weapon acquisition issues and best 
practices for product development, we have found that leading 
commercial firms pursue an acquisition approach that is anchored in 
knowledge, whereby high levels of product knowledge are demonstrated 
by critical points in the acquisition process. On the basis of this 
work, we have identified three key knowledge points during the 
acquisition cycle--development start; design review, which occurs 
during engineering and manufacturing development; and production 
start--at which programs need to demonstrate critical levels of 
knowledge to proceed. To assess the product development knowledge of 
each program at these key points, we submitted a data-collection 
instrument to 49 program offices. We received responses from all 49 
programs; however, not every program had responses to each element of 
the data-collection instrument. The results are graphically depicted 
in each two-page assessment. We also reviewed pertinent program 
documentation and discussed the information presented on the data-
collection instrument with program officials as necessary. 

To assess technology maturity, we asked program officials to apply a 
tool, referred to as Technology Readiness Levels (TRL), for our 
analysis. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration originally 
developed TRLs, and the Army and Air Force science and technology 
research organizations use them to determine when technologies are 
ready to be handed off from science and technology managers to product 
developers. TRLs are measured on a scale from 1 to 9, beginning with 
paper studies of a technology's feasibility and culminating with a 
technology fully integrated into a completed product. See appendix V 
for TRL definitions. Our best practices work has shown that a 
technology readiness level of 7--demonstration of a technology in a 
realistic environment--is the level of technology maturity that 
constitutes a low risk for starting a product development program. 
[Footnote 32] For shipbuilding programs, we have recommended that this 
level of maturity be achieved by the contract award for detailed 
design and construction.[Footnote 33] In our assessment, the 
technologies that have reached TRL 7, a prototype demonstrated in a 
realistic environment, are referred to as mature or fully mature. 
Those technologies that have reached TRL 6, a prototype demonstrated 
in a relevant environment, are referred to as approaching or nearing 
maturity and are assessed at attaining 50 percent of the desired level 
of knowledge. Satellite technologies that have achieved TRL 6 are 
assessed as fully mature due to the difficulty of demonstrating 
maturity in a realistic environment--space. 

In most cases, we did not validate the program offices' selection of 
critical technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level 
of maturity. We sought to clarify the TRLs in those cases where 
information existed that raised concerns. If we were to conduct a 
detailed review, we might adjust the critical technologies assessed, 
their readiness levels demonstrated, or both. It was not always 
possible to reconstruct the technological maturity of a weapon system 
at key decision points after the passage of many years. Where 
practicable, we compared technology assessments provided by the 
program office to assessments conducted by officials from the Office 
of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering. 

To assess design stability, we asked program officials to provide the 
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for 
completion by the design review, the production decision, and as of 
our current assessment.[Footnote 34] In most cases, we did not verify 
or validate the percentage of engineering drawings provided by the 
program office. We clarified the percentage of drawings completed in 
those cases where information that raised concerns existed. Completed 
drawings were defined as the number of drawings released or deemed 
releasable to manufacturing that can be considered the "build to" 
drawings. For shipbuilding programs, we asked program officials to 
provide the percentage of the 3D product model that had been completed 
by the start of lead ship fabrication, and as of our current 
assessment.[Footnote 35] 

To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify 
the number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available, 
to quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those 
processes.[Footnote 36] In most cases, we did not verify or validate 
the information provided by the program office. We clarified the 
number of critical manufacturing processes and the percentage of 
statistical process control where information existed that raised 
concerns. We used a standard called the Process Capability Index, a 
process performance measurement that quantifies how closely a process 
is running to its specification limits. The index can be translated 
into an expected product defect rate, and we have found it to be a 
best practice. We sought other data, such as scrap and rework trends 
in those cases where quantifiable statistical control data were 
unavailable. We do not assess production maturity for shipbuilding 
programs. 

Although the knowledge points provide excellent indicators of 
potential risks, by themselves they do not cover all elements of risk 
that a program encounters during development, such as funding 
instability. Our detailed reviews on individual systems normally 
provide a more comprehensive assessment of risk elements. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 to March 2011, in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Changes in DOD's 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs over Time: 

Table 4 shows the change in research and development costs, 
procurement costs, total acquisition cost, and average delay in 
delivering initial operational capability for the Department of 
Defense's (DOD) 2010 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs. 
The table presents changes that have occurred on these programs in the 
last 2 years, the last 5 years, and since their first full cost and 
schedule estimates. 

Table 4: Changes in DOD's 2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs over Time: 

Fiscal year 2011 dollars in billions. 

Increase in total research and development cost; 
Last 2 years: (2008 to 2010): $15 billion; 5 percent; 
Last 5 years: (2005 to 2010): $29 billion; 10 percent; 
Since first full estimate: (Baseline to 2010): $102 billion; 47 
percent. 

Increase in total procurement cost; 
Last 2 years: (2008 to 2010): $121 billion; 11 percent; 
Last 5 years: (2005 to 2010): $186 billion; 18 percent; 
Since first full estimate: (Baseline to 2010): $287 billion; 31 
percent. 

Increase in total acquisition cost; 
Last 2 years: (2008 to 2010): $135 billion; 9 percent; 
Last 5 years: (2005 to 2010): $217 billion; 16 percent; 
Since first full estimate: (Baseline to 2010): $402 billion; 35 
percent. 

Average delay in delivering initial capabilities; 
Last 2 years: (2008 to 2010): 5 months; 8 percent; 
Last 5 years: (2005 to 2010): 9 months; 13 percent; 
Since first full estimate: (Baseline to 2010): 22 months; 30 percent. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: Data were obtained from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports. In 
a few cases data were obtained directly from program offices. Not all 
programs had comparable cost and schedule data and these programs were 
excluded from the analysis where appropriate. Portfolio performance 
data do not include costs of developing Missile Defense Agency 
elements. Total acquisition cost includes research and development, 
procurement, acquisition operation and maintenance, and system- 
specific military construction costs. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Current and Baseline Cost Estimates for DOD's 2010 
Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs: 

Table 5 contains the current and baseline total acquisition cost 
estimates (in fiscal year 2011 dollars) for each program or element in 
the Department of Defense's (DOD) 2010 major defense acquisition 
program portfolio. We excluded elements of the Missile Defense 
Agency's Ballistic Missile Defense System because comparable current 
and baseline cost estimates were not available. For each program we 
show the percent change in total acquisition cost from the program 
baseline, as well as over the past 2 years and 5 years. 

Table 5: Current Cost Estimates and Baseline Cost Estimates for DOD's 
2010 Portfolio of Major Defense Acquisition Programs: 

Fiscal year 2011 dollars in millions. 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite; 
Current total acquisition cost: $12,920; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $6,277; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 105.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 61.3; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 87.1. 

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System 
(ATIRCM/CMWS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $4,701; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,362; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 39.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -4.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -1.6. 

AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM); 
Current total acquisition cost: $1,825; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,577; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 15.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 8.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 11.2. 

AH-64D Longbow Apache; 
Current total acquisition cost: $14,507; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $6,041; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 140.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 15.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 38.9. 

AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM); 
Current total acquisition cost: $23,900; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $10,767; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 122.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 30.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 41.7. 

AIM-9X/Air-to-Air Missile; 
Current total acquisition cost: $3,589; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,096; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 15.9; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 7.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 16.2. 

Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP)-Baseline; 
Current total acquisition cost: $546; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $342; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 59.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): NA; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): NA. 

Apache Block III (AB3); 
Current total acquisition cost: $10,577; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $7,135; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 48.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 35.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 48.2. 

Army Integrated Air & Missile Defense (Army IAMD); 
Current total acquisition cost: $4,954; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $4,954; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 0.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 0.0. 

B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability, Increment 1; 
Current total acquisition cost: $619; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $699; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -11.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -8.3; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -11.6. 

B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP); 
Current total acquisition cost: $1,305; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,319; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -1.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 3.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 2.8. 

Black Hawk (UH-60M); 
Current total acquisition cost: $21,936; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $12,779; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 71.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 3.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 16.3. 

Block IV Tomahawk (Tactical Tomahawk); 
Current total acquisition cost: $6,845; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,085; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 228.3; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 49.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 50.9. 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems (BFVS) A3 Upgrade; 
Current total acquisition cost: $9,670; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $4,119; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 134.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -5.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 200.4. 

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $13,032; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $12,657; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 3.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 3.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 3.0. 

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP); 
Current total acquisition cost: $6,053; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $4,071; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 48.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 9.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 33.3. 

C-130J Hercules; 
Current total acquisition cost: $15,327; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $935; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 1,539.3; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 22.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 117.4. 

C-17A Globemaster III; 
Current total acquisition cost: $82,347; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $52,769; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 56.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 9.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 13.9. 

C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA); 
Current total acquisition cost: $1,966; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,854; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -49.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -49.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -49.0. 

C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP); 
Current total acquisition cost: $1,320; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,087; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 21.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -11.9; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 38.3. 

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP); 
Current total acquisition cost: $7,348; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $10,744; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -31.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -29.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -30.4. 

CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F); 
Current total acquisition cost: $13,530; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,172; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 326.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 4.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 13.5. 

CH-53K--Heavy Lift Replacement; 
Current total acquisition cost: $21,902; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $16,311; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 34.3; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 33.9; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 34.3. 

Chemical Demilitarization-Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives 
(Chem Demil-ACWA); 
Current total acquisition cost: $7,935; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,596; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 205.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 8.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 73.0. 

Chemical Demilitarization-Chemical Materials Agency (Chem Demil-CMA); 
Current total acquisition cost: $28,362; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $15,260; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 85.9; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -4.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 0.1. 

Cobra Judy Replacement (CJR); 
Current total acquisition cost: $1,797; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,607; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 11.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 5.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 12.4. 

Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC); 
Current total acquisition cost: $5,063; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,897; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 74.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 1.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -0.1. 

CVN 21 Future Aircraft Carrier; 
Current total acquisition cost: $34,186; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $35,048; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -2.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 12.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 2.9. 

CVN-68 Class/Carrier Replacement Program (CVN 77); 
Current total acquisition cost: $6,873; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $5,948; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 15.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -0.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -3.5. 

DDG 1000 Destroyer; 
Current total acquisition cost: $19,810; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $34,284; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -42.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -29.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 120.6. 

DDG 51 Destroyer; 
Current total acquisition cost: $94,344; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $14,960; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 530.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 21.9; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 20.8. 

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE); 
Current total acquisition cost: $17,831; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $14,535; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 22.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 12.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 21.0. 

EA-18G Growler; 
Current total acquisition cost: $11,601; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $8,843; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 31.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 32.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 32.3. 

EA-6B Improved Capability (ICAP) III; 
Current total acquisition cost: $1,187; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,170; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 1.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 1.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 1.4. 

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile; 
Current total acquisition cost: $2,437; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $4,706; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -48.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 3.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 10.3. 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV); 
Current total acquisition cost: $14,044; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $9,019; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 55.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 14.6. 

Gray Eagle; 
Current total acquisition cost: $4,978; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,000; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 397.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 108.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 397.7. 

F/A-18E/F Super Hornet; 
Current total acquisition cost: $54,625; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $80,513; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -32.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 3.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 7.7. 

F-22 Raptor; 
Current total acquisition cost: $77,393; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $89,901; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -13.9; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 2.9; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 6.8. 

F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter); 
Current total acquisition cost: $283,674; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $210,558; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 34.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 13.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 23.9. 

Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T); 
Current total acquisition cost: $3,930; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,141; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 25.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 11.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 25.1. 

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV); 
Current total acquisition cost: $21,301; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $10,292; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 107.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 19.6. 

Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2); 
Current total acquisition cost: $4,113; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,785; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 47.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 13.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 102.3. 

Global Broadcast Service (GBS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $1,118; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $567; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 97.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 22.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 28.0. 

Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B); 
Current total acquisition cost: $13,576; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $5,312; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 155.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 37.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 92.7. 

Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $5,767; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,742; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 231.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 3.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -53.8. 

H-1 Upgrades (UH-1Y/AH-1Z); 
Current total acquisition cost: $11,866; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,572; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 232.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 37.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 47.3. 

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $2,126; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $4,297; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -50.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -52.3. 

Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT); 
Current total acquisition cost: $3,077; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,184; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -3.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -3.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -3.4. 

Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) Block 4; 
Current total acquisition cost: $692; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $684; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 1.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 1.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 1.2. 

Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures (IDECM) Blocks 2/3; 
Current total acquisition cost: $1,531; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,461; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 4.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 4.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 4.8. 

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM); 
Current total acquisition cost: $7,201; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,282; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 215.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 23.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 50.5. 

Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM); 
Current total acquisition cost: $6,377; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,367; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 89.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 8.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 3.0. 

Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV); 
Current total acquisition cost: $3,669; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,583; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 2.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 2.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 2.4. 

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System 
(JLENS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $7,378; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $6,567; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 12.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 7.9; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 12.4. 

Joint Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP); 
Current total acquisition cost: $36,375; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $22,792; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 59.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 59.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 59.6. 

Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $971; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $997; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -2.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -2.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -2.6. 

Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $5,815; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,670; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 58.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -0.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 2.5. 

Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) Baseline; 
Current total acquisition cost: $2,205; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,813; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -21.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -0.6. 

Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) Unitary; 
Current total acquisition cost: $3,125; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $5,015; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -37.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 17.9; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 9.8. 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radios (GMR); 
Current total acquisition cost: $15,868; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $17,165; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -7.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -6.3; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -11.8. 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form 
Fit (HMS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $4,786; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $9,889; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -51.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 55.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -51.6. 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Network Enterprise Domain (NED); 
Current total acquisition cost: $1,995; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $966; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 106.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -3.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 43.1. 

Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System (AMF 
JTRS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $8,212; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $8,033; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 2.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 2.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 2.2. 

Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM); 
Current total acquisition cost: $454; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $397; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 14.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 14.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 14.4. 

Lewis and Clark Class (T-AKE) Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ship; 
Current total acquisition cost: $6,586; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $5,205; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 26.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 16.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 35.7. 

LHA Replacement Amphibious Assault Ship; 
Current total acquisition cost: $6,387; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,133; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 103.9; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 90.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 103.9. 

Light Utility Helicopter (LUH), UH-72A Lakota; 
Current total acquisition cost: $1,969; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,784; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 10.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -0.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 10.4. 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $3,865; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,353; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 185.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 29.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 165.9. 

LPD 17 Amphibious Transport Dock; 
Current total acquisition cost: $18,361; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $11,539; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 59.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 24.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 39.3. 

MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopter; 
Current total acquisition cost: $14,340; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $5,453; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 163.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 16.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 23.5. 

MH-60S Fleet Combat Support Helicopter; 
Current total acquisition cost: $8,318; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,456; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 140.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 2.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 1.4. 

Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP); 
Current total acquisition cost: $2,913; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,775; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 5.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 1.1. 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $6,830; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $6,622; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 3.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 4.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 14.6. 

Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $2,939; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,284; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 129.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 9.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 21.0. 

Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP); 
Current total acquisition cost: $1,363; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,770; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -23.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -18.7. 

National Airspace System (NAS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $1,597; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $855; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 86.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -1.2. 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $6,309; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $6,584; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -4.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -43.3; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -13.9. 

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA; 
Current total acquisition cost: $4,141; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,883; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 6.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 6.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 6.6. 

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) Space & Control; 
Current total acquisition cost: $7,361; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $6,125; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 20.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 1.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 0.0. 

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) User Equipment; 
Current total acquisition cost: $2,165; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $974; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 122.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -1.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 49.6. 

Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT); 
Current total acquisition cost: $2,005; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,287; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -12.3; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -12.3. 

P-8A Poseidon; 
Current total acquisition cost: $32,361; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $30,576; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 5.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 7.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 7.1. 

PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3); 
Current total acquisition cost: $10,768; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $5,136; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 109.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 8.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 7.2. 

PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Combined Aggregate 
Program (CAP) Fire Unit; 
Current total acquisition cost: $18,513; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $19,077; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -3.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 1.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -0.4. 

PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Combined Aggregate 
Program (CAP) Missile; 
Current total acquisition cost: $7,677; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $7,179; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 6.9; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 10.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 9.2. 

Predator--Unmanned Aircraft System; 
Current total acquisition cost: $3,581; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,579; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 0.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 0.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 0.1. 

Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System; 
Current total acquisition cost: $11,132; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,598; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 328.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 328.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 328.5. 

Remote Minehunting System (RMS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $1,275; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,420; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -10.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -15.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -10.2. 

Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile-UGM 133A Trident II (D-5) Missile; 
Current total acquisition cost: $51,410; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $50,942; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 0.9; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 1.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 4.4. 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program; 
Current total acquisition cost: $15,938; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $4,521; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 252.6; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 27.9; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 48.6. 

Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Block 10; 
Current total acquisition cost: $922; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $859; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 7.3; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 7.3; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 7.3. 

Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM); 
Current total acquisition cost: $6,133; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $5,616; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 9.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 13.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 12.0. 

Stryker Family of Vehicles (Stryker); 
Current total acquisition cost: $16,153; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $7,914; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 104.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -1.8; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 42.7. 

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (Osprey); 
Current total acquisition cost: $56,061; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $39,501; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 41.9; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -1.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 3.3. 

Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV); 
Current total acquisition cost: $2,469; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $2,576; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -4.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 20.9; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -4.2. 

Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774); 
Current total acquisition cost: $82,193; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $59,550; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 38.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -1.2; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -7.8. 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2; 
Current total acquisition cost: $4,738; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $3,653; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 29.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 29.7; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 29.7. 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 3; 
Current total acquisition cost: $13,552; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $16,125; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -16.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -16.0; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -16.0. 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Increment I; 
Current total acquisition cost: $4,006; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $4,027; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): -0.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): -0.5; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): -0.5. 

Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS); 
Current total acquisition cost: $3,561; 
Baseline total acquisition cost: $1,175; 
Change in total acquisition cost from baseline (%): 203.1; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 2 years (%): 68.4; 
Change in total acquisition cost within the past 5 years (%): 75.6. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: Data were obtained from DOD's SARs, acquisition program 
baselines, and, in some cases, program offices. NA indicates data were 
not available to make the assessment. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Knowledge-Based Acquisition Practices: 

GAO's prior work on best product development practices found that 
successful programs take steps to gather knowledge that confirms that 
their technologies are mature, their designs stable, and their 
production processes are in control. Successful product developers 
ensure a high level of knowledge is achieved at key junctures in 
development. We characterize these junctures as knowledge points. The 
Related GAO Products section of this report includes references to the 
body of work that helped us identify these practices and apply them as 
criteria in weapon system reviews. The following summarizes these 
knowledge points and associated key practices. 

Knowledge Point 1: Technologies, time, funding, and other resources 
match customer needs. Decision to invest in product development: 

* Demonstrate technologies to a high readiness level--technology 
readiness level 7--to ensure technologies will work in an operational 
environment. 

* Ensure that requirements for product increment are informed by 
preliminary design review using systems engineering process (such as 
prototyping of preliminary design). 

* Establish cost and schedule estimates for product on the basis of 
knowledge from preliminary design using system engineering tools (such 
as prototyping of preliminary design). 

* Constrain development phase (5 to 6 years or less) for incremental 
development. 

* Ensure development phase fully funded (programmed in anticipation of 
milestone). 

* Align program manager tenure to complete development phase. 

* Contract strategy that separates system integration and system 
demonstration activities. 

* Conduct independent cost estimate. 

* Conduct independent program assessment. 

* Conduct major milestone decision review for development start. 

Knowledge Point 2: Design is stable and performs as expected. Decision 
to start building and testing production-representative prototypes: 

* Complete system critical design review. 

* Complete 90 percent of engineering design drawing packages. 

* Complete subsystem and system design reviews. 

* Demonstrate with system-level integrated prototype that design meets 
requirements. 

* Complete the failure modes and effects analysis. 

* Identify key system characteristics. 

* Identify critical manufacturing processes. 

* Establish reliability targets and growth plan on the basis of 
demonstrated reliability rates of components and subsystems. 

* Conduct independent cost estimate. 

* Conduct independent program assessment. 

* Conduct major milestone decision review to enter system 
demonstration. 

Knowledge Point 3: Production meets cost, schedule and quality 
targets. Decision to produce first units for customer: 

* Demonstrate manufacturing processes. 

* Build and test production-representative prototypes to demonstrate 
product in intended environment. 

* Test production-representative prototypes to achieve reliability 
goal. 

* Collect statistical process control data. 

* Demonstrate that critical processes are capable and in statistical 
control. 

* Conduct independent cost estimate. 

* Conduct independent program assessment. 

* Conduct major milestone decision review to begin production. 

[End of table] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Technology readiness level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported; 
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and development. 
Examples might include paper studies of a technology's basic 
properties; 
Hardware/software: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration environment: None. 

Technology readiness level: 2. Technology concept and/or application 
formulated; 
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, 
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative 
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption. 
Examples are still limited to paper studies; 
Hardware/software: None (paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration environment: None. 

Technology readiness level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of concept; 
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This 
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically 
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the 
technology. Examples include components that are not yet integrated or 
representative; 
Hardware/software: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale 
individual components (pieces of subsystem); 
Demonstration environment: Lab. 

Technology readiness level: 4. Component and/or breadboard validation 
in laboratory environment; 
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to 
establish that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low 
fidelity" compared to the eventual system. Examples include 
integration of "ad hoc" hardware in a laboratory; 
Hardware/software: Low-fidelity breadboard. Integration of nonscale 
components to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or 
form or fit but representative of technically feasible approach 
suitable for flight articles; 
Demonstration environment: Lab. 

Technology readiness level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation 
in relevant environment; 
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases 
significantly. The basic technological components are integrated with 
reasonably realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be 
tested in a simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" 
laboratory integration of components; 
Hardware/software: High-fidelity breadboard. Functionally equivalent 
but not necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc). 
Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of 
several components with reasonably realistic support 
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality; 
Demonstration environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not 
form and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate 
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies. 

Technology readiness level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment; 
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated 
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity 
laboratory environment or in simulated realistic environment; 
Hardware/software: Prototype. Should be very close to form, fit and 
function. Probably includes the integration of many new components and 
realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full 
functionality of the subsystem; 
Demonstration environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or limited/ 
restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment. 
Integration of technology is well defined. 

Technology readiness level: 7. System prototype demonstration in a 
realistic environment; 
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system. 
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of 
an actual system prototype in a realistic environment, such as in an 
aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in 
a test bed aircraft; 
Hardware/software: Prototype. Should be form, fit and function 
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to 
demonstrate full functionality of subsystem; 
Demonstration environment: Flight demonstration in representative 
realistic environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator 
aircraft. Technology is well substantiated with test data. 

Technology readiness level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight 
qualified" through test and demonstration; 
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and 
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents 
the end of true system development. Examples include developmental 
test and evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to 
determine if it meets design specifications; 
Hardware/software: Flight-qualified hardware; 
Demonstration environment: Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) in 
the actual system application. 

Technology readiness level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through 
successful mission operations; 
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form 
and under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational 
test and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last 
"bug fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include 
using the system under operational mission conditions; 
Hardware/software: Actual system in final form; 
Demonstration environment: Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) in 
operational mission conditions. 

Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

March 11, 2011: 

Mr. Michael J. Sullivan: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Sullivan: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GAO-11-233SP, "Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected 
Weapon Programs," dated January 31, 2011 (GAO Code 120920). 

While the Department recognizes that program cost growth is a long-
standing and unacceptable tendency, it does not find GAO's methods of 
calculating cost growth useful for management purposes. Although the 
Draft Report includes the cost and schedule growth metrics developed 
cooperatively among DoD, GAO, and OMB, we are concerned that GAO 
continues to publish performance metrics using its traditional 
methodology of measuring total program cost growth from Milestone B to 
the current year. This methodology has serious flaws that AT&L 
continues to highlight - cost growth that occurred in the 1990s, 
capability upgrades, and quantity increases are all summed
together, producing misleading information. Some examples of 
questionable calculation: in the Draft Report: 

*	The DDG-51 ship program grew in both quantity and capability since 
2008, adding 9 ships with more robust missile defense. The Draft 
Report includes a program cost growth of almost $17B, making DDG-51 
appear to be one of the worst performing programs in the Department. 
Yet the quantity increase DoD reports (the 9 ships) accounts for most 
of this growth, along with some growth for additional capability to 
improve air and anti-missile defense and improve land attack. DoD 
considers this program to be very successful. 

* The Joint Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle is also 
listed in the Draft Report as showing significant cost growth; in 
fact, GAO reports it as the third largest contributor to cost growth 
over the last two years. Yet the Joint MRAP program is one of the 
Department's major acquisition success stories from the conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. During this time, the demand for the MRAP 
continued to rise, and in 2007 Secretary Gates declared it the DoD's 
highest priority acquisition program. This resulted in a quantity 
increase of over 7,000 units and is the sole driver behind GAO's cost 
growth calculation for the MRAP. The program remained efficient, 
successfully managing the additional quantity and several capability 
upgrades, and even experiencing a small decrease in unit costs. 

The fact that these "traditional metrics" have been highlighted in 
Table 2 and discussed in detail throughout the text is disappointing. 
In addition, the Draft Report now gives up to four different cost 
growth metrics for each program, making it extremely difficult for 
readers to gain a factual understanding of program performance. The
Department again requests that all of GAO's "traditional metrics" be 
removed from the Report. 

The Draft Report does make an effort to include metrics discussed in 
2008 with DoD, OMB, and GAO and we appreciate this. However, these 
metrics still do not adequately capture cost growth that results 
solely from poor estimating and poor execution as opposed to other 
sources including changes in inventory goals and changes in 
requirements or capabilities. We again offer to work with GAO to 
develop better metrics of cost growth associated with poor estimating 
and program execution using unit cost, adjusted for quantity and/or 
capability changes unassociated with these problems. Our goal would be 
to use the same data and metrics so that all of us better understand 
the underlying information being reported for all programs. 

To address cost growth where it is real and unacceptable in an era of 
constrained budgets, the Department is pursuing an Efficiency 
Initiative to manage defense dollars in a manner that is, to quote 
Secretary Gates at his May 8, 2010 speech at the Eisenhower Library, 
"respectful of the American taxpayer at a time of economic and fiscal 
distress." Secretary Carter issued "Better Buying Power" guidance in 
September 2010, directing the acquisition workforce to undertake 23 
principal actions, organized in five areas, to obtain greater 
efficiency and productivity in defense spending. 

There is every reason to believe the efficiencies we are seeking can 
be realized. It has taken years for excessive costs and unproductive 
overhead to creep into our business practices, but over the coming 
years we can work them out again. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. 

Technical comments are provided as an enclosure to this letter. My 
point of contact for this effort is Ms. Anne Twist, 703-614-5420. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Dr.	Nancy	L. Spruill: 
Director, Acquisition Resources & Analysis: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or s [Hyperlink, 
sullivanm@gao.gov] ullivanm@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

Principal contributors to this report were Ronald E. Schwenn, 
Assistant Director; Raj C. Chitikila; Deanna R. Laufer; Alan D. Rozzi; 
and Wendy P. Smythe. Other key contributors included David B. Best, 
Maricela Cherveny, Bruce D. Fairbairn, Arthur Gallegos, William R. 
Graveline, Kristine R. Hassinger, Michael J. Hesse, Meredith A. 
Kimmett, C. James Madar, Stephen P. Marchesani, Jean L. McSween, 
Kenneth E. Patton, Charles W. Perdue, W. Kendal Roberts, Rae Ann H. 
Sapp, Roxanna T. Sun, Robert S. Swierczek, Bruce H. Thomas, and Karen 
S. Zuckerstein. 

The following were responsible for individual programs: 

System: Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellite; 
Primary staff: Bradley L. Terry. 

System: AGM-88 Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM); 
Primary staff: Kathryn M. Edelman, Grant M. Sutton. 

System: Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR); 
Primary staff: Molly W. Traci. 

System: Apache Block III (AB3); 
Primary staff: Helena Brink. 

System: Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (Army IAMD); 
Primary staff: Carol T. Mebane, Ryan D. Stott. 

System: B-2 Defensive Management System (DMS) Modernization; 
Primary staff: Matthew P. Lea, Sean D. Merrill. 

System: B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability, 
Increment 1; 
Primary staff: Sean D. Merrill, Don M. Springman. 

System: B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) SATCOM Capability, 
Increment 2; 
Primary staff: Don M. Springman, Sean D. Merrill. 

System: BMDS: Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB); 
Primary staff: LaTonya D. Miller. 

System: BMDS: Flexible Target Family (FTF); 
Primary staff: Ivy G. Hubler, Teague A. Lyons. 

System: BMDS: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD); 
Primary staff: Steven B. Stern, Rebecca Guerrero. 

System: BMDS: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); 
Primary staff: Meredith A. Kimmett, Brian A. Tittle. 

System: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft 
System (UAS); 
Primary staff: W. William Russell, Jodi G. Munson. 

System: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP); 
Primary staff: Lauren M. Heft, Kathy Hubbell. 

System: C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA); 
Primary staff: Andrew H. Redd. 

System: C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP); 
Primary staff: Cheryl K. Andrew, Megan L. Hill. 

System: CH-53K - Heavy Lift Replacement; 
Primary staff: Marvin E. Bonner, Robert K. Miller. 

System: CVN 21 Future Aircraft Carrier; 
Primary staff: W. Kendal Roberts, Robert P. Bullock. 

System: DDG 1000 Destroyer; 
Primary staff: Deanna R. Laufer, W. Kendal Roberts. 

System: DDG 51 Destroyer; 
Primary staff: Molly W. Traci. 

System: Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS); 
Primary staff: Maricela Cherveny. 

System: E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE); 
Primary staff: Jeffrey L. Hartnett, Teague A. Lyons. 

System: Enhanced Polar System (EPS); 
Primary staff: Bradley L. Terry. 

System: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile; 
Primary staff: Wendy P. Smythe. 

System: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV); 
Primary staff: Jerry W. Clark, MacKenzie H. Cooper. 

System: F-22A Raptor; 
Primary staff: Andrew H. Redd, Michael W. Aiken. 

System: F-35 Lightning II (Joint Strike Fighter); 
Primary staff: Charlie Shivers, LeAnna Parkey. 

System: Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T); 
Primary staff: Scott Purdy, Alexandra K. Dew. 

System: Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B); 
Primary staff: Laura Jezewski, Travis J. Masters. 

System: Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA; 
Primary staff: Laura T. Holliday, Laura Hook, Sigrid McGinty. 

System: GPS III OCX Ground Control Segment; 
Primary staff: Arturo Holguin, Jr. 

System: Gray Eagle; 
Primary staff: Tana M. Davis. 

System: H-1 Upgrades (UH-1Y/AH-1Z); 
Primary staff: Stephen V. Marchesani. 

System: Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT); 
Primary staff: Marcus C. Ferguson, Tana M. Davis. 

System: Intelligent Munitions System-Scorpion; 
Primary staff: Wendy P. Smythe, John S. Warren. 

System: Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM); 
Primary staff: Carrie W. Rogers. 

System: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM); 
Primary staff: John W. Crawford, Michael J. Hesse. 

System: Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV); 
Primary staff: J. Kristopher Keener, Erin E. Preston. 

System: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted 
Sensor System (JLENS); 
Primary staff: John M. Ortiz. 

System: Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV); 
Primary staff: Danny G. Owens, Dayna L. Foster. 

System: Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS); 
Primary staff: W. Kendal Roberts. 

System: Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio 
System (AMF JTRS); 
Primary staff: Paul G. Williams. 

System: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Ground Mobile Radios (GMR); 
Primary staff: Nathan A. Tranquilli, Ridge C. Bowman. 

System: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack, and 
Small Form Fit (HMS); 
Primary staff: Nathan A. Tranquilli, Ridge C. Bowman. 

System: KC-X Program; 
Primary staff: Wendell K. Hudson, Mary Jo Lewnard. 

System: LHA Replacement Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA 6); 
Primary staff: Celina F. Davidson. 

System: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS); 
Primary staff: John P. Dell'Osso, Christopher R. Durbin. 

System: Littoral Combat Ship-Mission Modules; 
Primary staff: Gwyneth B. Woolwine, Jeremy Hawk, Christopher R. Durbin. 

System: Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)/Mobile Landing Platform; 
Primary staff: Erin E. Preston, J. Kristopher Keener. 

System: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS); 
Primary staff: Richard Y. Horiuchi. 

System: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environment Satellite 
System (NPOESS); 
Primary staff: Suzanne Sterling. 

System: Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT); 
Primary staff: Lisa P. Gardner. 

System: Navy Unmanned Combat Air System Aircraft Carrier Demonstration 
(UCAS-D); 
Primary staff: Julie C. Hadley, Travis J. Masters. 

System: Nett Warrior Increment 1; 
Primary staff: William C. Allbritton. 

System: Ohio-Class Replacement (OR)/Sea Based Strategic Deterrent; 
Primary staff: Alan D. Rozzi, C. James Madar. 

System: P-8A Poseidon; 
Primary staff: Heather L. Miller, Jacob L. Beier. 

System: PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Combined 
Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit; 
Primary staff: Ryan D. Stott, Carol T. Mebane. 

System: Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System; 
Primary staff: Rae Ann H. Sapp. 

System: Ship to Shore Connector (SSC); 
Primary staff: Meghan Hardy, Kelly Bradley. 

System: Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), Increment II; 
Primary staff: Michael J. Hesse. 

System: Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Program; 
Primary staff: Claire Buck. 

System: Space Fence; 
Primary staff: Peter E. Zwanzig. 

System: Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM); 
Primary staff: Angie Nichols-Friedman, Deanna R. Laufer. 

System: Stryker Modernization (SMOD); 
Primary staff: Andrea M. Bivens, Wendy P. Smythe. 

System: Three Dimensional Expeditionary Long Range Radar (3DELRR); 
Primary staff: Anne McDonough-Hughes, Amy Moran Lowe. 

System: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (Osprey); 
Primary staff: Bonita P. Oden, Jerry W. Clark. 

System: Presidential Helicopter (VXX); 
Primary staff: J. Andrew Walker, Michael W. Aiken. 

System: Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(VTUAV); 
Primary staff: Leigh Ann Nally. 

System: Virginia Class Submarine (SSN 774); 
Primary staff: C. James Madar, Alan D. Rozzi. 

System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2; 
Primary staff: James P. Tallon. 

System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 3; 
Primary staff: James P. Tallon. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Defense Acquisitions: Observations on Weapon Program Performance and 
Acquisition Reforms. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-
706T]. Washington, D.C: May 19, 2010. 

Defense Acquisitions: Strong Leadership Is Key to Planning and 
Executing Stable Weapon Programs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-522]. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2010. 

Best Practices: DOD Can Achieve Better Outcomes by Standardizing the 
Way Manufacturing Risks Are Managed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-439]. Washington, D.C: April 22, 
2010. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 30, 2010. 

Defense Acquisitions: Many Analyses of Alternatives Have Not Provided 
a Robust Assessment of Weapon System Options. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-665]. Washington, D.C.: September 
24, 2009. 

Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate 
Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-322]. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 
2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Charting a Course for Lasting Reform. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-663T. Washington, D.C.: 
April 30, 2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD's Weapon Programs 
Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-543T]. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 
2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Must Balance Its Needs with Available 
Resources and Follow an Incremental Approach to Acquiring Weapon 
Systems. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-431T]. 
Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2009. 

GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 
2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Perspectives on Potential Changes to Department 
of Defense Acquisition Management Framework. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-295R]. Washington, D.C.: February 
27, 2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Requirements Determination Process Has Not 
Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1060]. Washington, D.C.: September 
25, 2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could Improve 
Major Weapon System Program Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619]. Washington, D.C.: July 2, 
2008. 

Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed 
to Improve DOD's Acquisition Environment and Weapon System Quality. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-294]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 1, 2008. 

Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon 
System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-388]. Washington, D.C.: 
March 30, 2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience Cost 
and Schedule Problems under DOD's Revised Policy. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-368]. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 
2006. 

Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers 
Needed to Improve Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-110]. Washington, D.C.: November 
30, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to 
Improve DOD's Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-393]. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 
2004. 

Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon 
Systems' Total Ownership Costs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-57]. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 
2003. 

Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early 
Improves Acquisition Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-701]. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 
2002. 

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to 
Better Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-288]. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 
2001. 

Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better 
Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-199]. Washington, D.C.: July 
31, 2000. 

Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can 
Improve Weapon System Outcomes. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-162]. Washington, D.C.: July 
30, 1999. 

Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires 
Changes in DOD's Environment. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-56]. Washington, D.C.: 
February 24, 1998. 

Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer 
Improvements for DOD. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-96-162]. Washington, D.C.: 
August 26, 1996. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 
2011). 

[2] See Explanatory Statement, 154 Cong. Rec. H 9427, 9526 (daily ed., 
Sept. 24, 2008), to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 
Fiscal Year 2009, contained in Division C of the Consolidated 
Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329. 

[3] Major defense acquisition programs are those identified by DOD 
that require eventual total research, development, test, and 
evaluation (RDT&E) expenditures, including all planned increments, of 
more than $365 million, or procurement expenditures, including all 
planned increments, of more than $2.19 billion, in fiscal year 2000 
constant dollars. 

[4] All dollar figures are in fiscal year 2011 constant dollars unless 
otherwise noted. 

[5] The 13 programs that have left the portfolio include the Advanced 
Deployable System (AN/WQR-3), Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, Defense 
Integrated Military Human Resources System, Extended Range Munition, 
Future Combat System, Advanced Anti-Tank Weapon System-Medium 
(Javelin), Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program, Mission 
Planning System, Small Diameter Bomb Increment 1, Ship Self Defense 
System, Ohio Class SSGN Conversion, T-45TS Naval Undergraduate Jet 
Flight Training System (Goshawk), and Presidential Helicopter 
Replacement (VH-71) Program. 

[6] The 15 programs that have entered the portfolio include the 
Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload-Baseline, Army Integrated Air 
and Missile Defense, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned 
Aircraft System, C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft, EA-6B Improved Capability 
III, Gray Eagle Unmanned Aircraft System, Global Positioning System 
IIIA, Increment 1 Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Integrated 
Defensive Electronic Countermeasures, Joint High Speed Vessel, Joint 
Precision Approach and Landing System, Airborne and Maritime/Fixed 
Station Joint Tactical Radio System, Predator Unmanned Aircraft 
System, Reaper Unmanned Aircraft System, and Warfighter Information 
Network-Tactical Increment 3. Not all of these programs are new 
starts. Several began as acquisition category II programs before 
growing in cost. 

[7] We chose a 2-year period instead of a 1-year period because DOD 
did not issue annual, comprehensive Selected Acquisition Reports in 
December 2008. 

[8] DOD, OMB, and GAO agreed upon outcome metrics designed to evaluate 
program performance by measuring acquisition cost growth over the last 
year, the last 5 years, and since their original program estimate. 

[9] Appendix II includes 5-year and baseline estimate comparisons for 
the overall 2010 portfolio. 

[10] Programs that increased quantities had $87 billion in cost growth 
attributable to those increased purchases and programs that reduced 
quantities had $22 billion in cost decreases attributable to those 
reduced purchases. To calculate the portion of the procurement cost 
growth attributable to quantity changes, we compared a program's 
average procurement unit cost from December 2007 with its average 
procurement unit cost from December 2009. When quantities changed, we 
multiplied the change by the previous average procurement unit cost to 
determine the cost growth due to these quantity changes. See appendix 
I for additional information on our scope and methodology. 

[11] GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Recapitalization Goals Are Not Supported 
by Knowledge-Based F-22A and JSF Business Cases, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-487T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 
2006); Defense Acquisitions: Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High Program 
Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule Overruns, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-48] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 
2003); and Defense Acquisitions: Space System Acquisition Risks and 
Keys to Addressing Them, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-776R] (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 
2006). 

[12] These metrics are designed to capture total cost growth 
performance over 1-year and 5-year periods and from the original 
program estimate. We modified these metrics to measure a 2-year 
comparison since cost data were not available to make a 1-year 
comparison. 

[13] The original estimates we used are primarily programs' cost 
estimates at development start. These may differ from DOD baseline 
estimates used for Nunn-McCurdy cost growth purposes, which can be 
reset after a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical threshold. 

[14] Program acquisition unit cost is the total cost for development, 
procurement, acquisition operation and maintenance, and system- 
specific military construction for the acquisition program divided by 
the number of items to be produced. DOD's 2010 portfolio includes 98 
programs with SARs; however, DOD's SAR summary tables break down 
several of these programs into smaller elements. We did not include 
the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) Ballistic Missile Defense System 
because comparable cost and schedule data were not available, or the 
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, 
because quantities were reduced to zero. 

[15] We calculated the effect on DOD's buying power from a program by 
multiplying the change in the program acquisition unit cost by the 
current planned quantities. 

[16] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon 
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2009). 

[17] In addition to data from 40 major defense acquisition programs, 
our analysis of program staffing includes data from four MDA elements. 

[18] We reported last year that 49 percent of program office staff 
were government personnel. The program offices we collected data from 
differ year to year. However, in both years, we focused on programs 
that were in development or the early stages of production. 

[19] GAO, Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development 
Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-162] (Washington, D.C.: July 
30, 1999); Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will 
Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-288] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 
2001); Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge 
Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-701] (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 
2002); Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could 
Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619] (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 
2008); Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points 
Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-322] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 13, 2009); Best Practices: DOD Can Achieve Better Outcomes by 
Standardizing the Way Manufacturing Risks Are Managed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-439] (Washington, D.C: Apr. 22, 
2010). 

[20] Not all programs provided information for every knowledge point 
or had reached all of the knowledge points--development start, design 
review, and production start. Because knowledge points differ for 
shipbuilding programs, we exclude them from our assessment of certain 
knowledge-based practices. Appendix IV contains a list of knowledge-
based practices at each of the three knowledge points. 

[21] According to DOD policy, in order to be considered mature enough 
to use in product development, technology shall have been demonstrated 
in a relevant environment or, preferably, in an operational 
environment. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of 
the Defense Acquisition System, enc. 2, para. 5.d.(4) (Dec. 8, 2008). 
In addition, a major defense acquisition program may not receive 
milestone B approval until the milestone decision authority certifies 
that the technology in the program has been demonstrated in a relevant 
environment. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-163, ß 801 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. ß 
2366b(a)(3)(D)). 

[22] Demonstration in a relevant environment is Technology Readiness 
Level (TRL) 6. Demonstration in a realistic environment is TRL 7. See 
appendix V for a detailed description of TRLs. 

[23] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP]. A major 
defense acquisition program may not receive milestone B approval until 
the program has held a preliminary design review and the milestone 
decision authority has conducted a formal postpreliminary design 
review assessment and certified on the basis of such assessment that 
the program demonstrates a high likelihood of accomplishing its 
intended mission. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, Pub. 
L. No. 111-23, ß 205(a)(3) (codified at 10 U.S.C. ß 2366b(a)(2)). IAMD 
received a waiver from this requirement. 

[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-619]. 

[25] DOD policy states that the knowledge required for a major defense 
acquisition program to proceed beyond low-rate initial production 
shall include demonstrated control of the manufacturing process and 
acceptable reliability, the collection of statistical process control 
data, and demonstrated control and capability of critical processes. 
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System, enc. 2, para. 7.c.(2) (Dec. 8, 2008). Since we 
focus on the low-rate production decision, we did not specifically 
assess compliance with this requirement. 

[26] We refer to DOD's designated pre-major defense acquisition 
programs (pre-MDAPs) as planned programs throughout this report. 

[27] The Common Vertical Lift Support Platform program does not plan 
to hold a preliminary design review because the program is planning to 
enter the acquisition cycle at production start. 

[28] According to DOD acquisition policy, the technology development 
strategy for a major defense acquisition program shall provide for 
prototypes of the system or, if a system prototype is not feasible, 
for prototypes of critical subsystems before the program gets approval 
to enter development. Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027--
Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, 
attachment 1, para. 4 (Dec. 4, 2009). 

[29] DAMIR Purview is an executive information system operated by the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics/Acquisition Resources and Analysis. 

[30] The 31 programs in our assessment that are not covered in this 
analysis include: 18 planned major defense acquisition programs, 4 MDA 
elements, 4 programs that are well into production, 1 component within 
a major defense acquisition program, 1 program that is based on a 
commercially-derived aircraft, 2 programs that were canceled, and 1 
technology development program. 

[31] The DOD and statutory requirement is that the acquisition 
strategy for each major defense acquisition program include measures 
to ensure competition, or the option of competition, throughout the 
life cycle of the program. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-23, ß 202; Under Secretary of Defense, 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 
09-027--Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 
2009, attachment 1, para. 2 (Dec. 4, 2009). The survey question with 
respect to this requirement read "Does the acquisition strategy call 
for competition post-Milestone B." When programs answered "no" to the 
question, GAO interpreted that answer to mean that the program is not 
planning to incorporate into the acquisition strategy competition, or 
the option of competition, after development start. 

[32] GAO, Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development 
Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-162] (Washington, D.C.: July 
30, 1999); Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will 
Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-288] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 
2001). 

[33] GAO, Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at Key Points 
Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy Shipbuilding, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-322] (Washington, D.C.: 
May 13, 2009). 

[34] GAO, Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge 
Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-701] (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 
2002). 

[35] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-322]. 

[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-701]. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAOís actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAOís Web site, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: