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Challenge DOD's Response to Domestic Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Incidents' which was 
released on October 7, 2009. 

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

October 2009: 

Homeland Defense: 

Planning, Resourcing, and Training Issues Challenge DOD's Response to 
Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield 
Explosive Incidents: 

GAO-10-123: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-123, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

DOD plays a support role in managing Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents, 
including providing capabilities to save lives, alleviate hardship or 
suffering, and minimize property damage. This report addresses the 
extent to which (1) DODís CBRNE consequence management plans and 
capabilities are integrated with other federal plans; (2) DOD has 
planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE consequence 
management assistance; (3) DODís CBRNE Consequence Management Response 
Forces (CCMRF) are prepared for their mission; and (4) DOD has CCMRF 
funding plans that are linked to requirements for specialized CBRNE 
capabilities. GAO reviewed DODís plans for CBRNE consequence management 
and documents from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA. 
GAO also met with officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Homeland Defense, U.S Northern Command, the military services, the 
National Guard Bureau, and some CCMRF units. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD has its own CBRNE consequence management plans but has not 
integrated them with other federal plans because those federal entities 
have not completed all elements of the Integrated Planning System 
mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007. The system is to 
develop and link planning documents at the federal, state, and local 
levels. While the systemís framework is established, the CBRNE concept 
and strategic plans that provide further guidance are incomplete. DOD 
has had operational plans in place and revises these plans regularly. 
However, until the Integrated Planning System and its associated plans 
are complete, DODís plans and those of other federal and state entities 
will not be integrated, and it will remain unclear whether DODís CCMRF 
will address potential gaps in capabilities. We previously recommended 
and DHS agreed that FEMA should develop a program management plan and 
schedule to complete the planning system. 

With a goal to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous, catastrophic 
CBRNE incidents, DOD has plans to provide needed capabilities, but its 
response times may not meet incident requirements, it may lack 
sufficient capacity in some capabilities, and it faces challenges to 
its strategy for sourcing all three CCMRFs with available units. 
Without assigned units and plans that integrate the active and reserve 
portions of CCMRF, and agreements between DOD and the states on 
availability of National Guard units and the duty status in which they 
would respond to an incident requiring federal forces, DODís ability to 
train and deploy forces in a timely manner is at risk. 

DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the 
readiness of units assigned to the first CCMRF, increasing both 
individual and collective training focused on the mission and 
identifying the mission as high priority. However, the CCMRF has not 
conducted realistic full force field training to confirm unitsí 
readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly. Competing demands 
of overseas missions may distract from a unitís focus on the domestic 
mission, and some CCMRF units rotate more frequently than stated goals. 
These training and force rotation problems have prevented DOD from 
providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to 
build cohesiveness. 

DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and 
equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to 
identify all requirements have not been completed, and funding 
responsibilities are spread across the department and are not subject 
to central oversight. When the CCMRF mission priority increased in the 
spring of 2008, more funding was provided. However, units did not have 
dedicated funding and thus purchased equipment with funding also used 
for other missions. DOD lacks visibility over total funding 
requirements. Without an overarching approach to requirements and 
funding and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements 
have been identified and funded, DODís ability to ensure that its 
forces are prepared to carry out this high-priority mission remains 
challenged. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is making recommendations to DOD to improve the link between DOD 
and other federal plans, match capabilities with requirements, increase 
readiness, and improve oversight of CCMRF funding and resourcing. DOD 
agreed or partially agreed with the recommendations and cited ongoing 
or planned actions to implement them. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-123] or key 
components. For more information, contact Davi D'Agostino at (202) 512-
5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOD Has Its Own CBRNE Consequence Management Plans in Place but is 
Unable to Fully Integrate Them with Other Federal Plans, Which Are 
Incomplete: 

DOD's Planned Response to CBRNE Incidents May Be Insufficient: 

DOD Has Taken Actions to Improve CCMRF Readiness, but Training Gaps and 
Conflicting Priorities May Degrade Performance: 

CCMRF Requirements Have Not Been Fully Developed, and Funding and 
Oversight Are Decentralized: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Fifteen National Planning Scenarios Grouped into Eight 
Scenario Sets: 

Table 2: Status of Development for CBRNE-Related Plans Called for under 
HSPD-8 Annex 1, Utilizing the Integrated Planning System (as of July 
2009): 

Table 3: Estimate of Potential Lifesaving Decontamination Requirements 
Compared with Likely Capabilities for a 10 Kiloton Nuclear Detonation 
in a Major Metropolitan City In the First 72 Hours after Incident: 

Table 4: Selected CBRNE Individual Training Tasks: 

Table 5: CCMRF Mission Costs and Funding Sources: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Organizations under Federal 
and State Control: 

Figure 2: Approximate Response Time Frames for Military CBRNE 
Consequence Management: 

Abbreviations: 

CBIRF: Chemical Biological Incident, Response Force: 

CBRNE: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 
explosive: 

CCMRF: CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

HSPD: Homeland Security Presidential Directive: 

NORTHCOM: U.S. Northern Command: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

October 7, 2009: 

Congressional Requesters: 

The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security highlighted the 
continuing threat posed to the United States by the potential use of 
weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organizations.[Footnote 1] In 
addition to efforts focused on preventing such attacks, the strategy 
highlights the need for a comprehensive capability to mitigate the 
consequences of an attack involving weapons of mass destruction. Such a 
capability is also a key pillar of the National Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction.[Footnote 2] The Department of Defense 
(DOD) characterizes weapons of mass destruction in terms of chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) 
materials. Incidents involving CBRNE could range in magnitude, from 
such things as accidents like chemical spills that likely could be 
addressed by local responders to catastrophic incidents such as 
terrorist attacks involving nuclear material that could result in 
extraordinary levels of casualties and property damage. 

A catastrophic CBRNE-related incident occurring within the United 
States would require a unified, national response, including action by 
DOD. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for 
coordinating federal disaster response planning, with the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) serving as the primary federal 
agency under DHS for coordinating federal assistance in response to an 
incident. DOD would act in support of the primary federal agency. In 
addition to establishing CBRNE response units in the National Guard, 
including the Civil Support Teams and CBRNE Enhanced Response Force 
Packages, DOD is establishing CBRNE Consequence Management Response 
Forces (CCMRF). A CCMRF is roughly a brigade-sized force (approximately 
4,500 troops) that provides federal military assistance when a CBRNE 
incident exceeds local and state capabilities. DOD relies on its 
existing force structure, which it refers to as "dual-capability 
forces," to support the domestic CBRNE consequence management mission 
as well as overseas missions. 

In May 2006, we reported that the National Guard Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Civil Support Teams were generally organized and prepared 
for their mission, and we highlighted management challenges that needed 
to be addressed.[Footnote 3] In response to your request that we assess 
DOD's federal role in CBRNE consequence management efforts, we 
initiated a review focusing on federal military planning and 
preparedness efforts and CCMRF. Our objectives for this report address 
the extent to which (1) DOD's plans and capabilities are integrated 
with other federal government plans to address capability requirements, 
(2) DOD has planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE 
consequence management assistance, (3) DOD's CCMRF are prepared to 
perform their mission, and (4) DOD has funding plans for CCMRF that are 
linked to requirements for specialized CBRNE capabilities. As agreed 
with your offices, we will conduct a review of the operational 
effectiveness of the National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force 
Packages (commonly referred to as CERFP) as a follow-on effort. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for CBRNE consequence 
management operations and has integrated its plans with other federal 
government plans, we reviewed and compared current DOD operational-and 
tactical-level plans for civil support and CBRNE consequence management 
with existing FEMA and DHS planning efforts. We also met with officials 
of DHS, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense, and U.S Northern Command (NORTHCOM). We reviewed our prior 
reports and worked with other GAO staff currently examining the overall 
domestic homeland security planning integration process. To determine 
how prepared CCMRF is to perform the mission, we compared existing DOD 
policy and practices on readiness with the current process used to 
prepare CCMRF units and report mission readiness. We also met with U.S. 
Joint Forces Command and U.S. Army Forces Command--which are 
responsible for providing ready forces to the combatant commands--to 
discuss the manpower sourcing process followed for CCMRF. We obtained 
readiness reports for CCMRF units from U.S. Northern Command and from 
judgmentally selected units that were part of task force operations-- 
which contain most of the specialized capabilities. To determine CCMRF 
funding planning and the linkage of funding to mission requirements, we 
met with Army and U.S. Northern Command officials to obtain guidance on 
the topic and to discuss mission requirements, funding needs, and 
sources. We compared funding sources to known CBRNE consequence 
management requirements and highlighted areas where funding was not 
identified for key activities or areas relevant to unit preparedness. 
We also met with the National Guard Bureau to discuss their current 
capabilities, identified shortfalls, and approach to mitigating any 
identified shortfalls. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to October 2009 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

DOD has its own operational plans for CBRNE consequence management but 
is unable to fully integrate them with other federal government plans 
because other federal departments and agencies have not completed all 
elements of the Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential 
directive in December 2007. The Integrated Planning System is intended 
to provide a framework to link the family of related U.S. preparedness 
planning documents at the federal, regional, state, and local levels 
and is to include strategic guidance statements, strategic plans, 
concepts of operations, and operations plans related to the 15 National 
Planning Scenarios.[Footnote 4] The Integrated Planning System's 
framework is in place. However, many federal plans that would link with 
DOD's plans are incomplete. DOD and NORTHCOM have had operational plans 
in place and continue to review and revise these plans as part of DOD's 
well-established joint planning process. However, until all federal 
plans are complete and specific national guidance is issued, DOD plans 
and those of other federal and state entities will not be integrated, 
and it will remain unclear whether DOD's CCMRF will address potential 
gaps in capabilities. While there are a number of efforts to develop 
capability assessments at local, state, and federal levels, these 
efforts are not yet sufficiently mature to provide DOD with complete 
data to shape its CBRNE response. Additionally, DHS and FEMA face 
challenges in obtaining complete and consistent data from the states. 
We previously recommended and DHS agreed that FEMA should develop a 
program management plan and schedule for completing the Integrated 
Planning System process. We are recommending that in the absence of 
completed and integrated plans, DOD work with DHS, FEMA, and other 
interagency partners to agree on (1) interim goals, objectives, and 
assumptions for DOD's role in responding to one or more simultaneously 
occurring CBRNE incidents in the United States and (2) the specific 
types and quantities of capabilities DOD is expected to contribute and 
the time frames in which those capabilities are to be provided. 

DOD has plans for providing the needed capabilities for CBRNE 
consequence management, but its response may be insufficient because 
(1) its planned time frames for responding may not meet incident 
requirements, (2) the quantity of some key capabilities included in 
CCMRF may be inadequate, and (3) challenges remain in force structure 
plans and sourcing CCMRF. First, DOD's goal is to source three CCMRFs 
and be able to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous CBRNE incidents. 
Its plans call for the first force to be capable of providing 
consequence management support within 48-96 hours of being notified of 
a CBRNE incident. However, multiple DOD estimates for some of the more 
catastrophic scenarios, such as a nuclear detonation, suggest that 
planned response times may not meet incident requirements. Second, even 
after its arrival, DOD's planned force has limited quantities of some 
needed life-saving capabilities, such as medical and decontamination 
assets that can contribute to meeting incident requirements. DOD 
recognizes it may need additional units to augment this force, but 
specific units that would be needed to augment CCMRF have not been 
identified. Unless these units are identified in advance and trained 
for the mission, they may be unable to deploy rapidly. Finally, the 
demands of overseas military operations and DOD's approach to aligning 
units to the command responsible for carrying out CBRNE operations 
present challenges for training, assembling, and deploying CCMRFs. 
Whereas DOD originally intended CCMRFs to be composed entirely of 
federal active military forces, it now plans to form the second and 
third CCMRFs primarily with National Guard and Army Reserve units due 
to the unavailability of sufficient number of active forces to meet 
requirements. DOD and the governors are developing agreements to 
address how to ensure that National Guard units will be available to 
meet the federal requirements of CCMRF, but those agreements are not 
all in place. DOD also recently reversed its previous decision and will 
only place CCMRF units under NORTHCOM's direct authority in the event 
of an incident or for specified training events, rather than assigning 
them to NORTHCOM throughout the period that units are on the mission. 
As a result, NORTHCOM will have less direct authority to control 
domestic deployment availability, manage day-to-day training, and 
monitor the readiness of the units responsible for carrying out the 
CBRNE mission. The combination of these factors place DOD's ability to 
organize, train, and deploy adequate forces to assist civil authorities 
in the event of one or more major CBRNE incidents at risk. We are 
recommending that (1) DOD align plans for all CCMRFs with stated 
objectives, to include the extent to which existing CCMRF capabilities 
contribute to identified response requirements and mission goals and 
(2) DOD work with the state governors through the adjutants general and 
the National Guard Bureau to create a long-term plan for sourcing CCMRF 
and ensure that the agreements being established between DOD and state 
governors include specific terms on National Guard force availability 
and duty and response status. 

In the last year, DOD has taken a number of actions to improve the 
readiness of units that were assigned to the first CCMRF, including 
increased training and priority for additional personnel and equipment. 
Nevertheless, our review showed that CCMRF could be limited in its 
ability to successfully conduct consequence management operations 
because (1) it does not conduct realistic full-force field training to 
confirm units' readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly, 
and (2) conflicting priorities between the CCMRF mission and overseas 
deployments affect some units' mission preparation and unit cohesion. 
First, before designated units assume the CBRNE mission, they must be 
certified that they are trained to perform that mission, but there is 
no requirement to provide these units with a full-force tactical field 
training exercise or to demonstrate that they will be able to meet the 
required response times once they are assigned to the mission. Although 
units generally conduct this type of training prior to an overseas 
deployment and some elements of CCMRF have participated in field 
exercises, these exercises often did not include some critical units or 
were conducted several months after units had already been certified. 
Without requirements to provide field training for the full CCMRF that 
include an assessment of the ability to deploy on no-notice, as may be 
the case for an actual CBRNE incident, DOD cannot be assured that 
individual units that do not normally operate together will be able to 
operate as a unified force. In addition, the shift away from assigning 
CCMRF units directly to NORTHCOM exacerbates this problem, since the 
NORTHCOM commander will have less direct oversight of the training and 
readiness of the forces he will command in a CBRNE incident. Second, 
while DOD has identified CCMRF as a high priority, competing demands 
associated with follow-on overseas missions may distract from a unit's 
focus on the domestic mission. For example, Army units are frequently 
given the CCMRF mission when they return from an overseas deployment. 
Because these units are in the "reset" or reconstitution phase of the 
Army force generation model, they often lack personnel and equipment. 
Other critical CCMRF units have been unable to meet the first CCMRF's 
rotation goal, that is, remain on the mission for at least 12 months. 
As a result, the replacement units that have finished out these 
rotations have missed important joint training opportunities. These 
training and force rotation problems have prevented DOD from providing 
the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build 
cohesiveness. We are recommending that DOD (1) include in the CCMRF 
training program requirements to ensure that the entire CCMRF conducts 
a joint field training exercise as part of its mission validation and 
that the entire CCMRF conduct at least one no-notice deployment 
readiness exercise annually and (2) determine the time needed by units 
to perform the necessary pre-mission CCMRF training and examine 
sourcing options that would ensure that units have adequate time to 
train prior to mission assumption. 

DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and 
equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to 
identify total program requirements have not been completed, and its 
approach to providing program funding has been fragmented and is not 
subject to central oversight. In the spring of 2008, sourcing priority 
for the CCMRF mission increased substantially within the department, 
and more funding was provided. For example, NORTHCOM plans more than 
$33 million for two major exercises in its fiscal year 2010 training 
program, and the Army Reserve has planned over $37 million for fiscal 
years 2009 and 2010 to fund additional full-time personnel and training 
days that have been authorized to support the CCMRF mission. However, 
the initial CCMRF established on October 1, 2008, did not have fully 
defined funding requirements or the necessary dedicated resources to 
effectively carry out the CCMRF mission in an integrated and consistent 
manner. Moreover, other important requirements for this mission, such 
as essential equipment requirements for unique nonstandard equipment, 
have not been fully identified and funded. DOD officials told us they 
are in the process of developing these requirements and hope to have 
them for the next rotation that begins in October 2009. While the 
military services have not always budgeted funds specifically for the 
CCMRF mission, units have purchased mission equipment with funding from 
other sources that may not be available in the future. Moreover, units 
also fund their CCMRF-related training activities from their operations 
and maintenance accounts, which are developed without considering the 
CCMRF mission. As a result, unit officials sometimes reallocate funding 
initially intended for other purposes to meet the CCMRF mission. 
Because DOD has assigned funding responsibilities across the department 
and much of the funding is being provided from existing operations and 
maintenance accounts, DOD lacks visibility across the department for 
the total funding requirements for this mission. Without an overarching 
approach and funding strategy for linking requirements to funding and a 
centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been 
identified and fully funded, DOD's ability to ensure in advance that 
its forces are prepared to carry out this high-priority mission 
efficiently and effectively could be challenged. We are recommending 
that DOD (1) determine the total requirements for CCMRF, including 
unique nonstandard equipment requirements, and develop a plan on how 
those requirements will be filled and (2) develop an overall funding 
strategy for establishing, fielding, and exercising CCMRF and designate 
a single focal point for coordinating this strategy. 

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report and provided 
technical comments, which we incorporated into the final report as 
appropriate. DOD agreed or partially agreed with all our 
recommendations and described actions it is taking or plans to take to 
implement them. A summary of DOD's comments and a summary of our 
response to these comments follow the Recommendations for Executive 
Action section of this report. DOD's written comments are reprinted in 
appendix II. DHS also reviewed a draft of this report and provided 
technical comments, which we incorporated into the final report as 
appropriate. 

Background: 

DOD plays a support role in CBRNE consequence management, including 
providing those capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship 
or suffering, and minimize property damage caused by the incident. DOD 
generally provides defense support of civil authorities only when (1) 
state, local, and other federal resources are overwhelmed or unique 
military capabilities are required; (2) assistance is requested by the 
primary federal agency; or (3) NORTHCOM is directed to do so by the 
President or the Secretary of Defense.[Footnote 5] DOD has designated 
NORTHCOM[Footnote 6] to lead the federal military[Footnote 7] portion 
of such a support operation in direct support of another federal 
agency--most often FEMA. DOD could be the lead federal agency for CBRNE 
consequence management or any other civil support mission only if so 
designated by the President.[Footnote 8] To be effective, NORTHCOM's 
efforts must support a wide range of federal departments and agencies--
including FEMA and the Departments of Health and Human Services and 
Justice--in order to support 50 states, the District of Columbia, six 
territories, and hundreds of city and county governments. 

The National Response Framework establishes the principles that guide 
all response partners in preparing for and providing a unified national 
response to disasters. [Footnote 9] Under the Framework, disaster 
response is tiered; local governments and agencies typically respond 
immediately following an incident. When additional resources are 
required, states may provide assistance with their own resources or may 
request assistance from other states through interstate mutual 
agreements or the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.[Footnote 10] 
Localities and states usually respond within the first several hours of 
a major incident. The federal government provides assistance to states 
if they require additional capabilities and they request assistance. In 
the event of a catastrophic incident, such as one involving CBRNE, the 
framework also calls for federal response partners to anticipate the 
need for their capabilities before their assistance is requested. The 
framework lists 15 emergency support functions and designates federal 
lead agencies in areas such as search and rescue, public health and 
medical services, and transportation. DOD is a supporting agency for 
all 15 emergency support functions but is also one of the primary 
agencies for search and rescue and public works and engineering. 
[Footnote 11] Additional tools to guide response efforts are provided 
by The National Preparedness Guidelines, including National Planning 
Scenarios, Target Capability Lists and Universal Target Lists, and 
national priorities. 

The federal government has a wide array of capabilities and resources 
that can be made available to assist state and local agencies in 
responding to incidents. NORTHCOM would command the federalized DOD 
capabilities and coordinate the efforts of state controlled DOD 
capabilities. Figure 1 shows the organizational structure of key DOD 
CBRNE Consequence Management Organizations under federal and state 
control. 

Figure 1: DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Organizations under Federal 
and State Control: 

[Refer to PDF for image: organizational chart] 

Top level: President of the United States: 

Second level, reporting to President of the United States: Secretary of 
Defense: 

Third level, reporting to Secretary of Defense: 
NORTHCOM: 
National Guard Bureau (NORTHCOM provides coordination); 
* State Adjutant Generals (NORTHCOM provides coordination); 
* Joint Force Headquarters-State (NORTHCOM provides coordination); 
* State Task Forces (NORTHCOM provides coordination). 

Fourth level, reporting to NORTHCOM: 
Fleet Forces Command/Joint Force Maritime Component Commander; 
Marine Forces North; 
Air Forces North/Joint Force Air Component Commander; 
Army North/Joint Forces Land Component Commander: 
* Joint Task Force Civil Support (also associated with Joint Force 
Headquarters-State); 
* Task Force Headquarters (also associated with State Task Forces); 
- Task Force Operations coordination (Units designated for the CCMRF 
would come under one of these task forces); 
- Task Force Medical coordination (Units designated for the CCMRF would 
come under one of these task forces); 
- Task Force Aviation coordination (Units designated for the CCMRF 
would come under one of these task forces). 

Source: GAO analysis of NORTHCOM information. 

[End of figure] 

In framing its role in providing CBRNE consequence management 
assistance, DOD has set its standard of preparedness as the ability to 
prepare for and mitigate the effects of multiple, near-simultaneous 
CBRNE events.[Footnote 12] DOD has significant capabilities that could 
be used to augment a federal CBRNE response and also contributes to the 
organization, training, and equipping of several state-controlled 
military units focused on consequence management, including the 
following. 

* The National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. 
These 22-person units are composed of full time National Guard 
personnel and are located in each state and territory.[Footnote 13] 
Their mission is to assist civil authorities in responding to actual or 
suspected CBRNE incidents by identifying agents and substances, 
assessing consequences, advising civil authorities on response 
measures, and assisting with requests for additional support. The teams 
are under the control of the governors of their respective states and 
territories unless they are activated for federal service, at which 
time they would come under the control of DOD. 

* The National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages. Each of 
these larger force packages (about 200 soldiers) is composed of 
personnel from numerous existing National Guard units; these personnel 
remain in the same status as most National Guard personnel and must be 
mobilized for duty. Their mission is to provide follow-on assistance in 
such areas as casualty search and extraction; patient decontamination; 
and emergency medical triage, treatment, and stabilization. There are 
currently 17 authorized response force packages, including at least one 
in each of the 10 FEMA regions of the country. Like the Civil Support 
Teams, the force packages are intended to be part of the state response 
to an incident and therefore remain under the control of the respective 
governors. States that do not have this capability can access these 
force packages through preestablished agreements. In rare instances, 
the force packages can also be federalized and placed under DOD 
authority. 

* The DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF). These 
forces, when fully established, are intended to be three brigade-sized 
forces (approximately 4,500) that provide federal military assistance 
when a CBRNE incident exceeds local and state capabilities, including 
the National Guard forces described previously. The CCMRFs are 
comprised of many individual units that are of different types and 
sizes (for example, platoons, companies, battalions, and brigades), 
from multiple military services and DOD agencies, from the active, 
reserve, and National Guard, and are geographically dispersed 
throughout the United States. The response force is intended to provide 
assistance in such areas as command and control, technical search and 
rescue, explosive ordnance disposal, aviation evacuation, medical 
response, and CBRNE detection and decontamination. DOD's stated 
requirement is to have three of these forces. An important element of 
the first CCMRF is the unique capabilities provided by the Chemical 
Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), which is a U.S. Marine 
Corps unit consisting of about 400 personnel that assist local, state, 
or federal agencies and designated combatant commanders in the conduct 
of CBRNE consequence management operations. CBIRF maintains 
capabilities for agent detection and identification, casualty search, 
rescue, personnel decontamination, and emergency medical care and 
stabilization of contaminated personnel. Plans call for CBIRF to 
respond as part of the lead element for the first of three CCMRFs. DOD 
originally intended for all three to be comprised strictly of active 
duty military units. However, DOD's current plan is to have the first 
force, established October 1, 2008, be comprised predominately of 
active duty military units. The second and third response forces, which 
are scheduled to be fielded on October 1, 2009, and October 1, 2010, 
respectively, are expected to be comprised mostly of National Guard and 
Army Reserve units. DOD is currently working with the states and the 
National Guard Bureau on incorporating these units into the structure 
of the response forces. 

Figure 2 shows the approximate time frames for response to a CBRNE 
incident involving the forces discussed above. 

Figure 2: Approximate Response Time Frames for Military CBRNE 
Consequence Management: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

CBRNE Incident: 
National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams Response (12-24 hours); 
National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (48 hours); 
DOD CCMRF (48-96 hours). 

Source: GAO analysis of NORTHCOM information. 

[End of figure] 

With the exception of key specialized capabilities, such as the 
National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, DOD 
relies on its "dual-capability forces" to provide all other CBRNE 
consequence management capabilities in addition to existing overseas 
missions. The CCMRFs--the only force listed above that is not under the 
control of state governors and adjutants general--is composed of forces 
that will come under the operational control of NORTHCOM in the event 
of an incident. The force is organized for a CBRNE incident under three 
task forces: 

* Task Force Operations, which is to coordinate with local emergency 
responders; conduct decontamination operations; survey, monitor, and 
mark incident sites; provide security for DOD forces; and command and 
control of DOD general support operations, mortuary affairs, and 
transportation. 

* Task Force Medical, which is to provide triage and treatment, 
definitive care, medical logistics, hospital augmentation, 
epidemiological support, agent technical support, stress management, 
preventative medicine, veterinary support, and prophylaxis and 
immunization (primarily in support of CCMRF personnel). 

* Task Force Aviation, which is to provide medical evacuation, medical 
lift capability, air transport personnel, air transport supplies, 
search and rescue, and limited aircraft maintenance. 

The Joint Task Force Civil Support is the command element that provides 
command and control for the first CCMRF. Joint Task Force Civil Support 
is a subordinate command of U.S. Army North (also the Joint Force Land 
Component Commander), which is the Army component command of NORTHCOM. 
Joint Task Force Civil Support is a permanent standing task force that 
has been in existence since 1999 and plans and integrates DOD support 
to the designated lead federal agency for domestic CBRNE consequence 
management operations. When directed by the NORTHCOM Commander, Joint 
Task Force Civil Support will deploy to the incident site, establish 
command and control of the first CCMRF or other designated DOD forces, 
and direct military consequence management operations in support of 
civil authorities. Additional command and control organizations are 
being established for the second and third CCMRFs. 

DOD Has Its Own CBRNE Consequence Management Plans in Place but is 
Unable to Fully Integrate Them with Other Federal Plans, Which Are 
Incomplete: 

DOD has operational plans for CBRNE consequence management. However, 
DOD has not integrated its plans with other federal government plans 
because the concept and strategic plans associated with the Integrated 
Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007 
have not been completed. 

DOD Has Developed Plans for CBRNE Consequence Management: 

Unlike most federal agencies, DOD has had CBRNE consequence management 
operational plans for over 10 years. DOD, NORTHCOM, and its components 
have prepared individual plans that address CBRNE consequence 
management following DOD's well-established joint operation planning 
process.[Footnote 14] This process establishes objectives, assesses 
threats, identifies capabilities needed to achieve the objectives in a 
given environment, and ensures that capabilities (and the military 
forces to deliver those capabilities) are distributed to ensure mission 
success. Joint operation planning also includes assessing and 
monitoring the readiness of those units providing the capabilities for 
the missions they are assigned. DOD and NORTHCOM routinely review and 
update their plans as part of DOD's joint planning system. For example, 
the most recent NORTHCOM CBRNE consequence management plan was 
completed in October 2008. DOD and NORTHCOM have also developed such 
planning documents as execute orders that are key to linking immediate 
action to those plans, as well as scenario-based playbooks to guide the 
planning, operations, and command and control of military forces for 
CBRNE efforts. 

Governmentwide Integrated Planning System Is under Development but Not 
Yet Complete: 

DHS is leading a governmentwide effort to develop an Integrated 
Planning System that would link the plans of all federal agencies 
involved in incident response, including DOD's; however, this effort is 
not yet complete.[Footnote 15] While much in the way of federal 
guidance has been developed, to be most effective, policy documents 
must be operationalized by further detailing roles and responsibilities 
for each entity that may be involved in responding to high-risk or 
catastrophic incidents. 

In December 2007, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1, 
mandated that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with 
the heads of other federal agencies with roles in homeland security, 
develop an Integrated Planning System to provide common processes for 
all of the entities developing response plans.[Footnote 16] The 
Integrated Planning System is intended to provide a framework to link 
the family of related U.S. preparedness planning documents at the 
federal, regional, state, and local levels that are called for in the 
directive, such as strategic plans, concepts of operations plans, and 
operations plans related to the 15 National Planning Scenarios. DHS has 
grouped the 15 national planning scenarios on which preparedness plans 
are to be based into 8 scenario sets, of which 5 are CBRNE-related. 
Each of the scenarios, listed in table 1, includes a description, 
assumptions, and likely effects, so that entities at all levels can use 
them to guide planning.[Footnote 17] 

Table 1: Fifteen National Planning Scenarios Grouped into Eight 
Scenario Sets: 

Scenario set: 
1. Explosives Attack--Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device; 
National planning scenarios: Scenario 12: Explosives Attack--Bombing 
Using Improvised; Explosive Device. 

Scenario set: 
2. Nuclear Attack; 
National planning scenarios: Scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation--Improvised 
Nuclear Device. 

Scenario set: 
3. Radiological Attack--Radiological Dispersal Device; 
National planning scenarios: Scenario 11: Radiological Attack-- 
Radiological Dispersal Device. 

Scenario set: 
4. Biological Attack--with annexes for different pathogens; 
National planning scenarios: Scenario 2: Biological Attack--Aerosol 
Anthrax; Scenario 4: Biological Attack--Plague; Scenario 13: Biological 
Attack--Food Contamination; Scenario 14: Biological Attack--Foreign 
Animal Disease. 

Scenario set: 
5. Chemical Attack--with annexes for different agents; 
National planning scenarios: Scenario 5: Chemical Attack--Blister 
Agent; Scenario 6: Chemical Attack--Toxic Industrial Chemicals; 
Scenario 7: Chemical Attack--Nerve Agent; Scenario 8: Chemical Attack--
Chlorine Tank Explosion. 

Scenario set: 
6. Natural Disaster--with annexes for different disasters; 
National planning scenarios: Scenario 9: Natural Disaster--Major 
Earthquake; Scenario 10: Natural Disaster--Major Hurricane. 

Scenario set: 
7. Cyber Attack; 
National planning scenarios: Scenario 15: Cyber Attack. 

Scenario set: 
8. Pandemic Influenza; 
National planning scenarios: Scenario 3: Biological Disease Outbreak--
Pandemic Influenza. 

Source: DHS. 

[End of table] 

The directive required that the Integrated Planning System be submitted 
to the President for approval within 2 months of the directive's 
issuance in December 2007. As we have reported, the Integrated Planning 
System was approved in January 2009 by former President Bush, but is 
currently under review by the new administration, and no time frame for 
its publication has been announced.[Footnote 18] The approval of the 
CBRNE plans required under the directive (see table 2 below) would be a 
step toward unifying and integrating the nation's planning efforts. For 
example, for each National Planning Scenario, a strategic guidance 
statement is intended to establish the nation's strategic priorities 
and national objectives and to describe an envisioned end-state. 
Strategic guidance statements will have corresponding strategic plans, 
which are intended to define roles, authorities, responsibilities, and 
mission-essential tasks. Under each strategic plan, a concept of 
operations plan will be developed, and federal agencies are further 
required to develop operations plans to execute their roles and 
responsibilities under the concept of operations plan. 

As of July 2009, strategic guidance statements have been approved for 
all five CBRNE-related scenario sets. Four of the five required 
strategic plans have also been completed. The remaining strategic plan 
(chemical attack) was begun in June 2009 upon the approval of the 
strategic guidance statement for that scenario. One of the five 
required overall federal concept plans--that for terrorist use of 
explosives attack--has been completed. Table 2 shows the status of 
federal CBRNE strategy and plans called for under Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8 Annex 1. 

Table 2: Status of Development for CBRNE-Related Plans Called for under 
HSPD-8 Annex 1, Utilizing the Integrated Planning System (as of July 
2009): 

Planning scenario: Terrorist Use of Explosives Attack; 
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic 
guidance statement status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, 
August 2008; 
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic plan 
status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, November 2008; 
FEMA: Overall federal concept plan status: Approved by Secretary of 
Homeland Security, May 2009; 
Federal departments and agencies: Agency operational plans status: DOD 
has approved plans. Other agencies started January 2009. 

Planning scenario: Improvised Nuclear Device Attack; 
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic 
guidance statement status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, 
September 2008; 
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic plan 
status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, January 2009; 
FEMA: Overall federal concept plan status: Under development; 
interagency review/adjudication; 
Federal departments and agencies: Agency operational plans status: DOD 
has approved plans. Other agencies awaiting development; due 120 days 
after Concept Plan. 

Planning scenario: Biological Attack; 
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic 
guidance statement status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, 
January 2009; 
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic plan 
status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, July 2009; 
FEMA: Overall federal concept plan status: Under development; 
interagency review/adjudication; due 180 days after Strategic Plan; 
Federal departments and agencies: Agency operational plans status: DOD 
has approved plans. Other agencies awaiting development; due 120 days 
after Concept Plan. 

Planning scenario: Radiological Dispersion Device Attack; 
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic 
guidance statement status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, 
January 2009; 
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic plan 
status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, July 2009; 
FEMA: Overall federal concept plan status: Awaiting development; due 
180 days after Strategic Plan; 
Federal departments and agencies: Agency operational plans status: DOD 
has approved plans. Other agencies awaiting development; due 120 days 
after Concept Plan. 

Planning scenario: Chemical Attack; 
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic 
guidance statement status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, 
June 2009; 
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team: Strategic plan 
status: Under development; started in June 2009; 
FEMA: Overall federal concept plan status: Awaiting development; due 
180 days after Strategic Plan; 
Federal departments and agencies: Agency operational plans status: DOD 
has approved plans. Other agencies awaiting development; due 120 days 
after Concept Plan. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS data. 

[End of table] 

DOD's plans and those of other federal and state entities cannot be 
fully integrated until the supporting strategic and concept plans are 
completed. As we have previously reported, apart from the sequential 
timelines required in HSPD-8 Annex 1, FEMA and DHS have no schedule or 
project plan for completing the guidance and plans. We have recommended 
and DHS generally agreed that FEMA should develop a program management 
plan in coordination with other federal entities to ensure completion 
of key national preparedness policies and plans called for in such 
sources as presidential directives and that the plan should, among 
other things, define roles and responsibilities and planning processes, 
as well as identify a schedule for completion.[Footnote 19] 

Current Capability Assessments at Local, State, and Federal Levels May 
Provide Insufficient Data for DOD to Shape Its Response to CBRNE 
Incidents: 

A number of efforts to develop capability assessments are under way at 
local, state, and federal levels, but these efforts may not yet be 
sufficiently mature to provide DOD with complete data that it can use 
to shape its response plans for CBRNE-related incidents. For example, 
in fiscal year 2007, FEMA developed its Gap Analysis Program, which 
focuses on seven general capabilities that are often needed in the 
aftermath of a hurricane. These are: evacuation, medical needs, debris 
removal, commodity distribution, sheltering, interim housing, and fuel 
availability. While these capabilities would be needed for most 
scenarios, including CBRNE-related scenarios, the Gap Analysis Program 
does not identify unique capabilities needed for CBRNE incidents, such 
as decontamination assets or detection assets. In 2008, FEMA expanded 
the program to include not only hurricane-prone states, but all states 
and all hazards. However, FEMA officials stated that neither their 
questionnaires--which were used to query states about potential gaps in 
their capabilities--nor any of their other guidance specified how 
states should identify requirements unique to a CBRNE-related incident. 

FEMA also collects capability data by other means. However, none of 
these efforts--either individually or in the aggregate--has provided a 
comprehensive capability assessment. The Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) requires that FEMA 
report to Congress on federal preparedness, in part by collecting 
information on state capability levels; states receiving DHS federal 
preparedness assistance must provide preparedness reports. FEMA also 
requires these reports in order for states to qualify for its grant 
funds.[Footnote 20] States, territories, and the District of Columbia 
completed and submitted their first state preparedness reports to FEMA 
in the spring of 2008 and have also submitted reports in the spring of 
2009. However, as we have previously reported,[Footnote 21] the state 
capability data that FEMA has collected do not provide a comprehensive 
picture of national capability gaps, because they are incomplete and 
the states do not use common metrics to assess their capabilities. FEMA 
officials stated that in order to provide the comprehensive capability- 
based assessment that Congress requires, the next National Preparedness 
Report, which as of September 2009 is being drafting and reviewed, will 
apply one, comprehensive, capability based analytical framework to meet 
a series of preparedness reporting requirements. FEMA anticipates that 
through this effort, it will be able to gain a more complete picture of 
national preparedness. 

As noted in DHS's January 2009 Federal Preparedness Report, several key 
components of the national preparedness system are still works in 
progress, and not all data required for the federal government to 
assess its preparedness are available. As DHS also states in its 
report, standards for reporting operational readiness are not fully 
developed, and DHS does not possess the authority to compel the 
submission of data from other federal homeland security partners. 
Moreover, according to DOD and FEMA, even to the extent that states 
have capability data available, their sensitivity about disclosing data 
that highlight the state's capability gaps has limited the degree to 
which they share these data with DOD or with entities responsible for 
developing DOD's plans and related capabilities. DOD officials stated 
that in the absence of a comprehensive capability assessment, they 
continue to work with FEMA and continue to build relationships with 
individual states to collect data on their capabilities. 

DOD's Planned Response to CBRNE Incidents May Be Insufficient: 

DOD has had plans to provide CBRNE consequence management support to 
civil authorities since before 9/11 and in the last few years has set 
higher goals in the expectation of being able to provide expanded 
capabilities through its three CCMRFs. However, its ability to respond 
effectively may be compromised because (1) its planned response times 
may not meet the requirements of a particular incident, (2) it may lack 
sufficient capacity in some key capabilities, and (3) it faces 
challenges in adhering to its strategy for sourcing CCMRFs with 
available units. 

DOD's Planned Response Times May Be Too Long: 

In 2005, DOD established a standard for itself that called for the 
ability to respond to multiple, simultaneous catastrophic incidents, 
[Footnote 22] and it initiated efforts to create three CCMRFs. For the 
first 3 years, DOD did not regularly assign units to the CCMRF mission, 
and this decreased DOD's ability to actually field any of the CCMRFs 
within the timelines it had established. In October 2008 DOD sourced 
the first CCMRF, primarily with active force units. A second CCMRF, 
comprised primarily of reserve units, will assume the mission in 
October 2009 and a third in October 2010. In the absence of national 
guidance suggesting what level of response capability DOD should have 
available within a specified time frame, DOD's plans use a phased 
deployment to allow the first CCMRF to be able to provide consequence 
management support to civilian authorities within 48-96 hours of being 
notified of a CBRNE incident.[Footnote 23] The earlier phases of the 
deployment will provide the lifesaving capabilities. However, multiple 
DOD estimates for some of the more catastrophic scenarios, such as a 
nuclear detonation, have identified significant gaps between the time 
certain life saving and other capabilities would be needed and DOD's 
planned response times. For example, victims of a nuclear attack would 
require decontamination, which medical experts have established must be 
provided as soon as possible after exposure. If DOD adheres to its 
planned response times in such a scenario, the capabilities of early 
responders such as local police and fire departments would likely be 
overwhelmed before DOD arrived at the incident site. NORTHCOM's 
assessment[Footnote 24] and other DOD estimates demonstrated that, for 
a number of capabilities, DOD's response would not be timely. Table 3 
shows one estimate of the potential shortfall in decontamination 
capabilities that could result. 

Table 3: Estimate of Potential Lifesaving Decontamination Requirements 
Compared with Likely Capabilities for a 10 Kiloton Nuclear Detonation 
in a Major Metropolitan City In the First 72 Hours after Incident: 

Source of decontamination capability: Local; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 14,460; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 14,640; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 14,640. 

Source of decontamination capability: State; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 1,350; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 5,400; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 10,800. 

Source of decontamination capability: CCMRF Package 1; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 1,350; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 5,400; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 5,400. 

Source of decontamination capability: CCMRF Package 2; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 0; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 0; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 2,880. 

Source of decontamination capability: Self decontamination; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 8,000; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 8,000; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 8,000. 

Source of decontamination capability: Other federal decontamination 
capabilities; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 270; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 1,080; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 1,080. 

Source of decontamination capability: Total decontamination 
capabilities by time frame; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 25,610; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 34,520; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 42,800. 

Source of decontamination capability: Total decontamination 
requirement; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 138,000; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 112,390; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 77,870. 

Source of decontamination capability: Unmet decontamination 
requirement; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): First 24 hours: 112,390; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 24-48 hours: 77,870; 
Estimated capability by time frame (persons): 48-72 hours: 35,070. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

[End of table] 

DOD has also identified several other areas where it may not be able to 
provide the needed capabilities as quickly as required. These areas 
included CBRNE search and rescue, transportation, mass care support, 
and mortuary affairs. 

DOD's efforts to determine the types and quantities of capabilities 
that will likely be needed to augment local, state, and federal 
response forces are based on general requirements and tasks spelled out 
in federal guidance such as the National Response Framework and the 
National Preparedness Guidelines. For example, CCMRF planning documents 
indicate that the DHS Universal Task List, which is described in the 
Guidelines, includes over 1,600 tasks that need to be performed in 
order for entities to be prepared to address the National Planning 
Scenarios. However, the task list is not prescriptive in determining 
which agency should do which tasks, how they should be done, or when 
they might be needed. Additionally, the Target Capability List, which 
is a companion document to the Guidelines, contains 37 key 
capabilities. As they relate to the CCMRF, key response capabilities 
include emergency triage and prehospital treatment, weapons of mass 
destruction and hazardous materials response and decontamination, and 
medical surge. The NORTHCOM capability-based assessment suggests that 
without a national, risk-based determination of DOD's share of the 
federal capability requirements, DOD will be unable to determine 
whether its planned response times should be adjusted. 

DOD's Planned Force May Lack Sufficient Capacity in Some Key 
Capabilities Needed for Catastrophic Incidents: 

In addition to timeliness issues, DOD's planned force has limited 
quantities of some of the needed life saving capabilities, such as 
medical and decontamination services. For example, some nuclear 
detonation scenarios project that hundreds of thousands could be 
killed, injured, displaced, contaminated, or in need of medical care. 
CCMRF would be able to provide only a small portion of the necessary 
capability. Although a CCMRF is estimated, under optimal circumstances, 
to be capable of decontaminating several thousand people per day, some 
estimates project that the gap between needed decontamination 
capabilities and what local, state, and other entities could provide 
would be tens of thousands. DOD recognizes that it may need additional 
units to augment CCMRF, and it has made some tentative estimates. For 
example, DOD plans anticipate that in the case of a blister agent 
event, an additional medical package would be needed beyond what is in 
included in CCMRF. For a nerve agent incident, plans anticipate that an 
additional mortuary affairs package would be needed. For a chlorine 
tank explosion, additional packages for both medical and mortuary 
affairs would be needed, beyond those that are included in CCMRF. 

However, DOD has not designated specific units to augment CCMRF. Unless 
these units are identified in advance and trained for the mission, they 
may be unable to deploy rapidly. By not aligning CCMRF objectives with 
the projected need for response capabilities and clearly delineating 
national expectations for timely response, neither DOD nor other 
entities involved in incident response can be certain that the CCMRFs 
will be able to respond adequately to mitigate the consequences of a 
catastrophic CBRNE incident. 

DOD Faces Challenges in Adhering to Its Strategy for Sourcing CCMRFS 
with Available Units: 

In sourcing its three CCMRFs, DOD has encountered challenges in 
implementing an approach that could enhance unit availability and 
training and readiness oversight for forces that are not assigned to 
NORTHCOM. DOD originally intended all three CCMRFs to be comprised 
entirely of federal active military forces, but the two follow-on 
CCMRFs will be sourced with large numbers of National Guard and Army 
Reserve units. The demands of ongoing overseas operations have led DOD 
to draw more and more heavily on Guard and Reserve forces to fulfill 
civil support functions. Because National Guard units have 
responsibilities in their respective states, a competition for 
resources issue may arise between DOD and the states. For example, 
while governors may need the same capabilities within the state or to 
support mutual assistance agreements with other states as would be 
needed to support a CCMRF, there is no clear understanding between the 
governors and DOD to ensure that these units will be available promptly 
if they are needed for a federal mission without being federalized. 
Moreover, elements from a single unit can be spread over many states, 
further complicating the task of coordinating between DOD and each of 
the states. For example, one Army National Guard aviation company 
belonging to one of the CCMRFs has elements in Arkansas, Florida, and 
Alabama. Three different states would be required to make these 
elements available to form the company. The potential rapid deployment 
mission of CCMRF makes it imperative that specific agreements be 
reached. However, the agreements that have been reached to date are 
general in nature and do not specify how states are to ensure that 
Guard units will be available for a CCMRF deployment. 

Similar issues arise with the Army Reserve. The training demands of the 
CCMRF mission have caused DOD to authorize additional training days, 
but according to Army Reserve officials, reservists cannot be compelled 
to attend training events beyond their annual training requirement. 
They stated that, as a result, units must rely on the voluntary 
participation of their personnel for training beyond the requirement, 
which reduces their assurance that these personnel will be available 
for other necessary CCMRF training. For example, one reserve company 
was unable to fulfill all aspects of its mission requirements because 
of low participation at a training event. Unit officials stated that 
some of the unit's members had school or work obligations that 
conflicted with this training. Moreover, reserve unit officials stated 
that, unlike with active unit officials, they cannot restrict the 
personal travel of unit members to ensure that they will be available 
if they are needed to support an unexpected federal CBRNE incident 
response. These challenges to sourcing the CCMRFs increase the risk 
that DOD's ability to effectively respond to one or more major domestic 
CBRNE incidents will be compromised. That risk can be mitigated by 
plans that integrate the Active and Reserve Component portions of the 
CCMRFs and agreements between DOD and the states on the availability of 
National Guard units and the duty status under which they would respond 
to a major incident requiring federal forces. 

DOD's decision to change its approach to how NORTHCOM will routinely 
interact with units designated for CCMRF will present additional 
challenges. In 2008, DOD's sourcing approach was to assign the first 
CCMRF (primarily active forces) to NORTHCOM and allocate the remaining 
two CCMRFs (mix of Guard and Army Reserve) to NORTHCOM.[Footnote 25] 
Beginning in October 2009, DOD will allocate the units from all three 
CCMRFs to NORTHCOM, rather than assigning them to the NORTHCOM 
commander outright. As a result, despite the fact that NORTHCOM's 
commander is responsible for commanding the federal military domestic 
CBRNE response in the continental United States, NORTHCOM will have no 
CBRNE forces under its direct control. There are advantages to 
assigning forces directly to NORTHCOM. For example, the command would 
have direct authority over the units' day-to-day activities, including 
training and exercise schedules, and would be better able to monitor 
readiness. Additionally, there would be fewer administrative steps 
required for the NORTHCOM commander to activate and deploy CCMRF units 
in the event of an incident. This would be crucial for deploying the 
critical initial response elements of the overall force. Under DOD's 
current allocation approach, NORTHCOM would have authority over units 
while they are participating in scheduled NORTHCOM training events, but 
would have to coordinate with multiple commands to enable participation 
from these units. Current guidance states that other commands should 
make their units available for scheduled NORTHCOM exercises "to the 
greatest extent possible." However, NORTHCOM cannot always be assured 
that units will be available for these exercises. In addition, NORTHCOM 
remains uncertain about the extent to which it will have oversight of 
CCMRF units' day-to-day training activities and be able to confirm that 
these units are ready to perform their mission even when they are under 
the authority of another command. 

DOD Has Taken Actions to Improve CCMRF Readiness, but Training Gaps and 
Conflicting Priorities May Degrade Performance: 

DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the 
readiness of the first fielded CCMRF. However, DOD faces challenges in 
providing the training necessary to ensure readiness for the full 
CCMRF. We found that CCMRF may be limited in its ability to 
successfully conduct consequence management operations because (1) it 
does not conduct realistic full-force field training to confirm its 
readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly and (2) 
conflicting priorities between the CBRNE mission and overseas 
deployments affect some units' mission preparation and unit cohesion. 

DOD Has Taken Actions to Improve CCMRF Readiness: 

The initial assignment of CCMRF to NORTHCOM in October 2008, and the 
increased priority DOD has placed on the CBRNE consequence management 
mission, have resulted in a number of improvements in the preparation 
of the units that comprise the first fielded CCMRF. The Army, in 
coordination with NORTHCOM and its subordinate commands, has 
established guidance for both individual and collective training-- 
including joint mission essential task lists--for units designated for 
CCMRF. Therefore, for the first time, identified units have been 
conducting both individual and collective training focused on the CBRNE 
mission. For example, at the individual level, soldiers were required 
to be proficient in a number of skills, including skills related to 
operating in a CBRNE environment. Individual soldiers were also 
required to take online courses on operating in a domestic environment 
supporting civil authorities. Table 4 shows examples of some CBRNE- 
related training tasks that individuals should be able to perform 
before assuming the CBRNE mission as part of CCMRF. 

Table 4: Selected CBRNE Individual Training Tasks: 

* Be able to protect yourself from CBRN injury/contamination with the 
chemical-protective suit ensemble. 

* Decontaminate yourself and individual equipment using chemical 
decontaminating kits. 

* Perform first aid for nerve agent injury. 

* React to nuclear hazard/attack. 

* React to chemical or biological hazard/attack. 

* Be able to protect yourself from chemical and biological 
contamination using your assigned protective mask. 

* Detect chemical agents using chemical detector paper. 

Source: U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). 

[End of table] 

Also, key leaders such as brigade task force headquarters personnel and 
battalion commanders are required to participate in a number of command 
and control training events to gain an understanding of how to organize 
and conduct operations in a complex interagency environment under 
catastrophic disaster conditions. For example, commanders are required 
to attend resident Defense Support to Civil Authorities courses and to 
participate in a number of command and control training events, to 
ensure that unit leaders are familiar with DHS's National Planning 
Scenarios and with operating in a civil support role. These training 
events that leaders participate in include tabletop exercises--which 
provide participants opportunities to simulate interagency planning, 
discuss simulated scenarios, and assess plans and procedures for CBRNE 
consequence management--as well as command-post exercises. In order to 
confirm CCMRF's readiness prior to mission assumption, U.S. Army North 
conducted a command-post mission rehearsal exercise that included key 
leaders from each of CCMRF's three task forces--Operations, Medical, 
and Aviation. The goal of this exercise is to give the participants 
experience in organizing and conducting operations in a complex 
interagency environment in support of civil authorities under 
catastrophic disaster conditions. The leadership simulates the full 
participation of units through modeling. Under U.S. Army North's 
current training guidance, this exercise validates CCMRF's pre-mission 
readiness. 

In addition, units are training on and reporting their proficiency to 
perform CCMRF Joint Mission Essential Tasks. We had previously reported 
that, in 2007, NORTHCOM had developed a list of joint mission-essential 
tasks--including the major tasks that units are required to perform to 
respond to potential domestic CBRNE incidents.[Footnote 26] These 
include both tasks that units typically perform as part of their 
wartime missions and some tasks that would be emphasized during or be 
unique to a domestic CBRNE incident. For example, among other mission- 
essential tasks, the Task Force Operations element of each CCMRF: 

* commands and controls subordinate units; 

* conducts nuclear, chemical, and biological route, zone, area, and 
point reconnaissance; 

* conducts agent detection, casualty search, technical rescue, hot zone 
extraction, personnel decontamination, and time-critical medical care 
and stabilization; 

* conducts CBRNE incident response force operations; 

* assesses tactical and operational situation; 

* identifies nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards; and: 

* conducts mortuary affairs operations. 

Further, we previously reported that NORTHCOM and Joint Task Force 
Civil Support officials had difficulties tracking the readiness of 
units that were identified for the CBRNE consequence management 
mission, because so few of the units were actually filled with the 
necessary personnel and equipment.[Footnote 27] However, the increased 
priority given to CCMRF in the spring of 2008 has led to designated 
units receiving personnel and equipment ahead of many other units that 
are not designated for CCMRF. Consequently, most units that assumed the 
mission in October 2008 reported that they were prepared to perform the 
mission and had been provided by their respective military service with 
the personnel and equipment they needed to meet established guidance. 

Lack of Sufficient Field Training Affects CCMRFs' Ability to Perform 
Effectively: 

Although individual units were certified as ready prior to assuming the 
CBRNE mission in October 2008, it is unclear whether the full CCMRF can 
effectively perform CBRNE consequence management operations throughout 
the 1-year mission to which it is assigned, because the readiness of 
the full CCMRF is not confirmed through a realistic field training 
exercise before the force assumes the mission, nor have its rapid 
deployment capabilities been fully assessed. Before individual units 
designated for CCMRF assume the CBRNE mission, the military services 
are required to certify that these units are trained to perform that 
mission. However, there is currently no requirement for all of the 
units that comprise CCMRF to participate together in a realistic full- 
force field training exercise that could confirm that the full CCMRF 
can perform its required tasks in an integrated manner before it takes 
on the CBRNE consequence management mission. While other brigade-sized 
units typically conduct this type of training prior to an overseas 
deployment, and NORTHCOM and U.S. Army North[Footnote 28] (in its role 
as Joint Force Land Component Commander) training officials have 
discussed the desirability of such an exercise, the first fielded CCMRF 
has not had the opportunity to have the entire force train together; 
only a subset of CCMRF units have trained together in field exercises. 
Further, these exercises were conducted several months after these 
units had assumed the CCMRF mission and had already been certified as 
trained to perform it. 

Joint military guidance describes training as a key element of 
readiness, which is defined in two parts--unit level and joint level 
readiness. However, current DOD and NORTHCOM CCMRF guidance does not 
require the full CCMRF to conduct a joint field exercise to confirm its 
readiness prior to assuming the mission. Rather, DOD guidance requires 
that NORTHCOM annually confirm that the designated headquarters 
organizations can deploy operationally and employ their respective 
CCMRF elements. While DOD's guidance further requires that supported 
combatant commands, such as NORTHCOM, confirm unit readiness and the 
ability to activate, deploy, employ, and command and control CCMRF 
assets effectively, it does not specifically require that the full 
CCMRF conduct a field training exercise to confirm readiness before 
units assume the mission, as is the case with other missions such as 
overseas deployments. Such training is a particularly important matter 
for CCMRF, since this force does not exist as a standing unit that 
typically operates together. Moreover, training officials at Joint Task 
Force Civil Support, Army North, and NORTHCOM have cited the 
desirability of such exercises, which could allow the full CCMRF to 
demonstrate its ability to operate in an integrated manner in a 
tactical environment. According to Joint Task Force training officials, 
full-force field exercises could strengthen unit integration and 
facilitate units' gaining familiarity with the different capabilities 
comprising CCMRF. However, as previously stated, NORTHCOM confirms the 
readiness of each CCMRF through a command-post exercise directed by 
U.S. Army North, as the designated Joint Force Land Component 
Commander, and these exercises do not include all of the personnel from 
each unit. For example, less than 20 percent of CCMRF participated in 
the 2008 mission readiness exercise that was used to confirm readiness. 

While NORTHCOM's October 2008 mission execution order did not contain a 
requirement for full-force pre-mission field training, it did include a 
requirement for CCMRFs to conduct a full field training exercise during 
the mission period--that is, after the units have already assumed the 
mission. However, no full-force CCMRF training exercise was conducted 
during fiscal year 2009. Rather, subsets of CCMRF have conducted field 
exercises, but these exercises usually did not include all of the key 
units with which they might work during an incident. For example, 
members of the First Brigade Combat Team of the Third Infantry Division 
conducted search and extraction exercises with the Marine Corps's 
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) in November 2008. 
No other units from Task Force Operations participated in this training 
exercise. In addition, CBIRF participated in a number of other field 
training exercises, and Army Reserve chemical companies--including 
companies not designated for CCMRF--also participated in field training 
events for tasks such as mass decontamination. 

Further, in January 2009, officials from Task Force Operations--one of 
the three CCMRF task forces--and the Joint Task Force-Civil Support 
proposed that a field training exercise be conducted in March 2009 at a 
training site in Florida. The exercise was approved by U.S. Army North 
and NORTHCOM, and plans were put in place to include other units from 
CCMRF. The exercise was successful in getting participation from about 
1,500 personnel of the approximately 4,500 --about a third of the 
personnel that comprise the full CCMRF, including 1,200 from Task Force 
Operations. A Joint Task Force-Civil Support training official stated 
that 2 months was an extremely short time frame in which to coordinate 
exercise participation and that with such a short time frame not all 
potential participants would be available. For example, the Army 
Reserve chemical company that would provide decontamination and 
reconnaissance resources was unable to attend the field training 
exercise because, company officials stated, the unit was not notified 
in time to program funding to attend the exercise and did not have 
enough lead time for some of its soldiers to arrange leave from their 
civilian employment. Their participation would have addressed a 
previous recommendation from U.S. Army North that the chemical company 
should conduct training in a realistic CBRNE environment with other 
CCMRF units such as a medical support company and the Marine Corps 
CBIRF, in part to observe other military units with similar technical 
support capabilities and to obtain a better understanding of the 
sequence of events in a joint collective training exercise. Absent a 
directive for CCMRF to conduct a full-force exercise prior to units 
assuming the mission, there is increased risk that units may have to 
respond in support of an incident without prior experience or training 
that simulated such conditions. 

NORTHCOM is taking steps to train the full CCMRF through field 
exercises in the future, but this training is not planned to take place 
until at least several months after CCMRF assumes responsibility for 
the CBRNE mission. For example, in March 2009, NORTHCOM provided 
additional training guidance that has led to NORTHCOM and U.S. Army 
North developing plans for all future CCMRFs to conduct field training 
exercises beginning in fiscal year 2010. However, units will already 
have been on the mission for at least 2 months--and as many as 8 
months--before these exercises take place. 

In addition to the importance of confirming the proficiency of the 
entire CCMRF for conducting its mission, DOD has stated that its forces 
must be available in a timely and reliable manner and must be able to 
deploy rapidly. To accomplish this, units must demonstrate that they 
will be able to meet the required CCMRF response times once they assume 
the mission. However, neither NORTHCOM nor Army North has yet conducted 
deployment readiness exercises for the full CCMRF, and it is not clear 
if its plans for future CCMRFs will include such exercises. Officials 
from various units that comprise the first CCMRF have expressed 
concerns about being able to deploy rapidly from their home stations. 
For example, Task Force Operations headquarters officials stated that 
one of their primary challenges in conducting the CCMRF mission is 
deploying rapidly from their home stations; these units are accustomed 
to deploying overseas on established schedules and do not have 
experience deploying on short notice. Deployment readiness exercises 
are important because they test units' ability to ascertain how quickly 
personnel can be notified and assembled, equipment prepared and loaded 
to fit in potential transportation modes such as trucks and airplanes, 
and both staff and equipment moved to the designated point of 
departure. DOD has provided general guidance that supported commands, 
such as NORTHCOM, should confirm the ability of CCMRF units to activate 
and deploy. In addition, NORTHCOM has established guidance that directs 
U.S. Army North (as the Joint Force Land Component Commander) to 
conduct deployment readiness exercises when they are initiated by 
NORTHCOM. These deployment exercises could be conducted to test all 
processes and procedures needed for deployment or to test only those 
process and procedures that do not involve unit movement. Moreover, the 
NORTHCOM guidance does not specify whether these exercises should be 
conducted with or without prior notice. U.S. Army North guidance 
includes a requirement for two deployment exercises per year to confirm 
the ability of CCMRF and Joint Task Force Civil Support to deploy 
within time frames established by NORTHCOM. However, training officials 
at both Joint Task Force headquarters and U.S. Army North said that 
there have been no deployment readiness exercises for the full CCMRF or 
for any of the CCMRF force packages. A Joint Task Force Civil Support 
training official added that a no-notice readiness exercise was being 
considered by NORTHCOM and U.S. Army North to test alert notification 
and the deployment processes and procedures of the full CCMRF, but 
officials were uncertain when such a deployment exercise would take 
place. Training officials also expressed concern that it could become 
more difficult in the future to have no-notice exercises when units 
from all three CCMRFs are no longer under the direct authority of 
NORTHCOM. 

As was the case with field training exercises, individual units have 
separately conducted deployment readiness exercises that involved all 
phases of deployment preparation, including movement of personnel and 
equipment. However, in these exercises, deployment was planned well in 
advance. For example, staff from units in Task Force Operations that 
incorporated a deployment exercise prior to conducting a March 2009 
field exercise had up to 45 days to plan for the exercise. However, 
many anticipated CBRNE incidents can occur without notice. With no 
program in place to test the ability of all units in CCMRF to meet 
specified response times on short notice, NORTHCOM and DOD will 
continue to be unable to verify the ability of CCMRF units to deploy. 

Units' Preparation for the CCMRF Mission and Efforts to Achieve Unit 
Cohesion Are Affected by Other Missions: 

The demands that other missions are placing on the Army also may put 
the effectiveness of the CCMRF's mission at risk. DOD has identified 
CCMRF as a high-priority mission; however, the Army has at times 
designated units for CCMRF when they have just returned from overseas 
missions. When units first return from overseas, they are in the 
"reset" phase of the Army Force Generation process, over the course of 
which they progress through three sequential readiness pools. The reset 
phase is typically when units reconstitute by repairing equipment, 
receiving new equipment, and assigning new personnel, and begin 
training to achieve the capabilities necessary to enter the ready force 
pool. Because these units are at the beginning of their reset phase, 
they often lack personnel and equipment. Although the Army attempts to 
accelerate the fill of personnel and equipment to these units, some 
units may not receive their personnel and equipment in sufficient time 
to allow them to meet all of the requirements of the CBRNE consequence 
management mission before they assume it. In contrast, units are 
deployed for overseas missions only when they have progressed to the 
"ready" or "available" phase of the cycle. In most cases, units 
reported having received the necessary personnel and equipment before 
the October mission assumption date, but their personnel had not always 
completed all of the CCMRF-related training before the assumption date. 

Army Forces Command officials acknowledged that a number of units were 
still receiving personnel and equipment while preparing for the 
mission. For example, several units, while stating they were prepared 
to perform the mission, still had key personnel that needed training 
related to performing the CCMRF mission. In one instance, a medical 
company that assumed the mission on October 1, 2008, did not complete 
its post-deployment reconstitution until October 31, 2008. While the 
company's assigned personnel had completed the required training at the 
time of mission assumption, newly assigned personnel did not receive 
the required training until November 2008. Another medical unit had 
significant personnel turnover in July 2008 and stated that the 
turnover affected its ability to conduct all CCMRF-related training 
before its mission assumption date. Army Forces Command officials said 
that its units are designated for CCMRF while in the reset phase 
because there are not enough units in the available force pool to 
sufficiently source CCMRF in addition to meeting other combatant 
command requirements for overseas deployments. Moreover, many CCMRF 
units will be deployed overseas after they have completed their CCMRF 
rotations, and anticipating future deployment may distract them from 
their CCMRF training. For example, officials from the Task Force 
Operations headquarters said that they had conducted a number of field 
exercises at the brigade and battalion levels at the beginning of these 
units' CCMRF rotations. In contrast, CCMRF sustainment training in the 
latter half of the year was conducted by telephone because the units 
were focused on their upcoming overseas missions and were unavailable 
for field training. 

Moreover, unit cohesiveness and training proficiency have been affected 
by the frequent turnover in units that were assigned to the first 
fielded CCMRF in fiscal year 2009. While the goal has been to have 
units assigned for at least 12 months and to have standard start and 
end dates for each rotation,[Footnote 29] several critical units have 
been unable to complete their full 1-year rotation in the fiscal year 
2009 CCMRF, and other units will not be assigned on the same rotation 
schedule for fiscal year 2010. For example, the brigade headquarters 
for the aviation task force has changed three times, and the brigade 
headquarters for the medical task force rotated out of the CBRNE 
consequence management mission after only 6 months. 

The pace of this turnover affects the ability of units and personnel to 
both conduct initial training and sustain training. For example, the 
medical brigade originally assigned to CCMRF participated in the 
mission rehearsal exercise conducted in September 2008. The assignment 
of a second medical brigade in February 2009 required the Joint Task 
Force Civil Support to alter the focus of a planned command-post 
exercise from rehearsing its processes and procedures and those of 
subordinate task forces staff to confirming the readiness of Task Force 
Medical, which was preparing to assume the mission in March 2009. Also, 
while elements from the Aviation Task Force headquarters participated 
in the same 2009 exercise, the Aviation Task Force currently assigned 
to CCMRF did not participate in the field exercise because it had not 
yet assumed the mission. Officials from another unit cited a challenge 
associated with the frequent higher-level headquarters and other unit 
rotations. These officials stated that the frequency of these rotations 
means that units have to continuously dedicate both time and people to 
learning the requirements of higher headquarters and adjacent units and 
that turnover in headquarters leadership could cause the unit to change 
its tactics, techniques, and procedures. The frequent rotations of 
units could also result in the need for more frequent exercises, since 
not all CCMRF units have had the opportunity to train with the full 
CCMRF as an integrated force. DOD officials have acknowledged that 
providing aviation and medical capabilities to the CCMRFs will continue 
to be a challenge, due to the high demand for these capabilities for 
other missions. 

These training and force rotation issues have prevented DOD from 
providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to 
build cohesiveness. Because key leaders from units of the entire force 
attend a mission rehearsal exercise prior to mission assumption, the 
replacement of these units after only a few months negated much of the 
value that was gained from these three task forces working together and 
deprived the replacement task force leaders of having the same 
opportunity. 

CCMRF Requirements Have Not Been Fully Developed, and Funding and 
Oversight Are Decentralized: 

DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and 
equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to 
identify total program requirements have not been completed, and its 
approach to providing program funding has been fragmented because 
funding responsibilities for CCMRF-related costs are dispersed 
throughout DOD and are not subject to central oversight. 

CCMRF Mission Requirements Have Not Been Fully Developed: 

The units initially designated for the CCMRF mission did not have fully 
developed funding and equipment requirements. In addition, the recent 
NORTHCOM Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based 
Assessment report highlighted a number of systemic capability gaps that 
need to be addressed and may generate additional funding requirements. 
[Footnote 30] Moreover, other important requirements for this mission 
have not been identified and funded. The Joint Forces Land Component 
Commander (U.S. Army North) and the Joint Task Force Civil Support 
[Footnote 31] are responsible for developing and approving service-
specific equipment unique to the CCMRF's Joint Mission Essential Tasks. 
However, to date, mission-essential equipment requirements have not 
been fully developed. While some equipment requirement lists have been 
developed and are being reviewed by NORTHCOM, equipping officials said 
that lists have not been developed for nonstandard equipment that units 
may need in order to support civil authorities in a CBRNE environment. 
As a result, some units in fiscal year 2009 have determined 
requirements based on their own independent mission analyses. Unit 
officials stated that filling some of the needs they identified--such 
as the need for nonstandard communications equipment that is compatible 
with civilian equipment--was difficult because the units lacked a 
documented requirement for their planned acquisition. In addition, the 
review process did not always include the command organizations that 
are responsible for the mission. Thus, decisions on what to buy and in 
what quantity were not consistently vetted to ensure standardization in 
equipping various units. U.S. Army North officials stated that they 
were in the process of developing mission-essential equipment lists and 
hope to have them completed in time for the next rotation, which begins 
in October 2009. 

DOD's Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support recognized the 
importance of proper funding and budget oversight for the CBRNE 
consequence management mission and noted that the mission's funding is 
not accounted consistently. However, provision of funding for the 
mission is fragmented and is not monitored centrally within the 
department. While CCMRF is a joint mission, funding guidance leaves the 
funding responsibilities for most requirements to the respective 
military departments or defense agencies. For example, it is up to the 
military departments to determine day-to-day funding requirements and 
fund unit training. Moreover, DOD has not created an integrated, fully 
dedicated, and consistent approach and funding strategy across the 
department, instead dispersing responsibility for funding CCMRF among 
the military services, NORTHCOM, and other entities. For example, while 
NORTHCOM funds predominately joint mission training for the current 
force, the day-to-day funding for CCMRF-assigned units and individual 
mission training continue to comes from the services. However, the 
services are also simultaneously scheduling and funding the training 
required to meet the units' wartime mission requirements for which they 
are responsible after the CCMRF mission ends. Table 5 shows funding 
responsibilities for some CCMRF activities. 

Table 5: CCMRF Mission Costs and Funding Sources: 

CCMRF funding events: Day-to-day operational costs; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
DOD components: [Check]. 

CCMRF funding events: Individual participation in educational events; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
DOD components: [Check]. 

CCMRF funding events: Deployment Readiness Exercise; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
DOD components: [Check]. 

CCMRF funding events: Command-Post Exercise Execution; 
Northern Command: [Check]; 
DOD components: [Empty]. 

CCMRF funding events: Command-Post Exercise travel expenses; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
DOD components: [Check]. 

CCMRF funding events: Base support installation or training area costs; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
DOD components: [Check]. 

CCMRF funding events: Field Training Exercise Execution; 
Northern Command: [Check]; 
DOD components: [Empty]. 

CCMRF funding events: Field Training Exercise Travel Duty expenses; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
DOD components: [Check]. 

CCMRF funding events: Other exercise costs (reconstitution or 
replenishment of expended supplies); 
Northern Command: [Check]; 
DOD components: [Empty]. 

CCMRF funding events: Specialized and other CCMRF equipment; 
Northern Command: [Empty]; 
DOD components: [Check]. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

Starting in fiscal year 2010, NORTHCOM expects to fund training for two 
CCMRFs, including mission rehearsal, mission readiness, command post, 
and field training exercises. However, unit training not directed by 
NORTHCOM is not funded centrally and must be funded by the military 
services. This fragmentation in funding responsibilities is normal in 
DOD, but the lack of a coordinated plan that allows visibility over all 
CCMRF-related funding increases the risk that NORTHCOM would be unaware 
of whether individual units have the necessary resources to effectively 
conduct the pre-mission training they need. DOD's guidance does not 
identify a single organization to provide oversight of total program 
requirements and available resources. We have previously reported that 
adequate oversight, including program direction and visibility of all 
costs and individual program efforts, provides stronger assurance to 
DOD that it is making the most effective use of departmentwide 
resources to meet mission needs.[Footnote 32] Without this kind of 
funding strategy and oversight, DOD cannot develop a complete 
understanding of mission activities, priorities, and shortfalls or 
identify resource redundancies and gaps. 

Extent of Dedicated Funds for Some CCMRF Training Affects Mission: 

In the spring of 2008, sourcing priority for the CCMRF mission 
increased substantially within the department, and funding was provided 
for specific aspects of the mission. For example, NORTHCOM's training 
program includes more than $33 million to design, plan, and manage 
exercises as well as funds for participant costs for CCMRFs for fiscal 
year 2010. The Army Reserve planned funds of more than $37 million for 
fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to support additional full-time personnel 
and training days that have been authorized to support the CCMRF 
mission. In addition, while the military services have not planned 
funds for equipment specifically for the CCMRF mission, some 
nonstandard equipment has been purchased with other remaining funds. In 
other cases, purchase requests for certain equipment were denied by 
administrative parent commands because, unit officials believed, the 
equipment was considered noncritical by reviewing officials. Moreover, 
units must fund their CCMRF training activities from their operations 
and maintenance accounts, which were developed and approved months 
before units knew they would be assigned to CCMRF. According to unit 
officials, many units were not provided with additional funds for the 
CCMRF mission. As a result, these units sometimes have funds allocated 
from other sources to meet identified requirements for the CCMRF 
mission. Also according to these officials, while the lack of planned 
funds for CCMRF has been mitigated to some extent by the mission's high-
priority level, they have found it necessary to curtail or cancel some 
desirable training because funding was unavailable. Army officials told 
us that if funding shortfalls develop because units lack sufficient 
funds to conduct both CCMRF and follow-on mission training, units can 
request additional funds from the Army. However, unless units assess 
their total funding requirement for CCMRF and their other designated 
mission and receive funding based on both missions, CCMRF units may be 
at risk of not having enough funding to conduct all of their CCMRF 
training. This, in turn, puts units at risk of not being fully prepared 
if they are needed to respond to an incident. 

DOD lacks visibility across the department over the total funding 
requirements for this mission because it has no funding strategy for 
meeting CBRNE mission requirements. The services, in the absence of 
funding dedicated to the CBRNE mission, have been using existing 
operations and maintenance accounts to meet mission requirements. 
Without an overarching approach to developing requirements and a 
funding strategy for meeting these requirements, DOD's ability to carry 
out this high-priority homeland security mission efficiently and 
effectively is at risk. 

Conclusions: 

Our nation faces a continuing threat of the potential use of weapons of 
mass destruction by terrorist organizations, and the federal government 
recognizes the need for a comprehensive capability to mitigate the 
consequences of such an attack. A domestic, catastrophic CBRNE-related 
incident would require a unified, whole government, national response. 
DOD plays a crucial role in support of civil authorities for CBRNE 
consequence management and under certain circumstances might even be 
designated as the lead federal agency for such an incident. To provide 
timely and effective support when local and state capabilities are no 
longer adequate, it is crucial that DOD be able to integrate its plans 
with those of other federal agencies involved in disaster response. 
Until all CBRNE plans that are being developed under the Integrated 
Planning System are complete, it will be difficult for DOD to know 
whether its considerable body of operational plans will adequately 
address anticipated gaps in the capabilities needed to respond to 
multiple, near-simultaneous, CBRNE incidents. DOD will also need to 
overcome challenges related to sourcing its CBRNE Consequence 
Management Response Forces, including issues regarding coordinating 
with states about the availability and deployment status of National 
Guard units, integrating Guard and Reserve units with active duty 
forces, and ensuring that forces charged with dual missions are 
properly trained to function effectively when called on for consequence 
management response. 

Because each of the CCMRFs are comprised of units that are 
geographically dispersed, from both the Active and Reserve Components, 
and from all of the military services, it must have opportunities to 
train as a complete force before assuming the mission and to 
demonstrate its capability to successfully conduct the mission, 
including the ability to deploy rapidly. For the mission to succeed, it 
is critical to ensure that each unit can meet its designated response 
time. Because DOD has not developed complete and approved requirements 
for the CCMRF mission and fully defined and monitored funding 
responsibilities, it lacks full visibility across the department for 
this mission. Without an overarching approach to develop full and 
complete mission requirements, an approach and mechanisms in place to 
fully support those requirements, and a centralized focal point to 
ensure that all requirements have been identified and fully funded, 
DOD's ability to carry out this high-priority homeland security mission 
efficiently and effectively could be in jeopardy. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

In the absence of completed plans under the Integrated Planning System 
or other specific guidance on DOD's expected contribution to the 
federal response to a domestic CBRNE-related incident, we recommend 
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs to work with DHS, 
FEMA, and other interagency partners to agree on: 

* interim goals, objectives, and planning assumptions for DOD's role in 
responding to one or more simultaneously occurring CBRNE incidents in 
the United States; and: 

* the specific types and quantities of capabilities that DOD is 
expected to contribute and the time frames in which those capabilities 
are to be provided. 

In order to ensure that DOD's plans are consistent with stated program 
goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander 
of NORTHCOM and the military services to: 

* align plans for all parts of CCMRF, including specialized and general-
purpose units, with stated objectives for CCMRF, and include in their 
planning efforts the extent to which existing CCMRF capabilities 
contribute to identified response requirements and stated CCMRF mission 
goals; and: 

* work with the state governors through the states' Adjutants General 
and the National Guard Bureau to create a long-term plan for sourcing 
CCMRF and ensure that the agreements being established between DOD and 
state governors include specific terms on National Guard force 
availability and duty and response status. 

In order to increase the assurance that CCMRF can effectively provide 
CBRNE consequence management in support of civil authorities, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of 
NORTHCOM--in coordination with the military services--to include in the 
CCMRF training program requirements that: 

* the entire CCMRF conduct a joint field training exercise as part of 
its mission validation, and: 

* the entire CCMRF conduct at least one no-notice deployment readiness 
exercise annually. 

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of 
NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, the Joint Forces Command and the Service 
Secretaries to: 

* determine the time needed by units to perform the necessary pre-
mission CCMRF training, and: 

* examine sourcing options that would ensure that units had adequate 
time to train prior to mission assumption once they had all required 
personnel and equipment. 

In order to provide a departmentwide understanding of requirements, 
priorities, and resource shortfalls and to identify potential 
redundancies and gaps in CCMRF resourcing, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Commander of NORTHCOM, 
the Secretaries of the military services, the National Guard Bureau, 
and the heads of participating defense agencies: 

* determine the total requirements for CCMRF, including unique, 
nonstandard equipment requirements for each type of unit that comprises 
CCMRF, and develop a plan on how those requirements will be filled; 

* develop an overall funding strategy for establishing, fielding, and 
exercising CCMRF and designate a single focal point for coordinating 
this strategy. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In comments on a draft of this report,[Footnote 33] DOD generally 
agreed with the intent of our recommendations and discussed steps it is 
taking or plans to take to address these recommendations. DOD also 
provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report 
where appropriate. DHS also reviewed a draft of this report and 
provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report 
where appropriate. 

In response to our recommendation that DOD work with DHS, FEMA, and 
other interagency partners to agree on interim goals, objectives, and 
planning assumptions for DOD's role in responding to CBRNE incidents in 
the United States, DOD agreed and stated that in addition to its 
routine planning activities, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs emphasizes 
the need for the kind of planning we discuss in the report and our 
recommendation. DOD stated that it recently convened an advisory panel 
to evaluate and, as appropriate, make recommendations on modifying DOD 
authorities, capabilities, plans and programs, and policies to assist 
civil authorities in preventing or responding to CBRNE incidents. DOD 
stressed that this panel is authorized to coordinate directly with any 
department or agency the panel considers necessary to carry out its 
duties. We believe the panel DOD described will be a suitable mechanism 
for coordinating with DHS, FEMA, or any other relevant federal agency 
in addressing the substance of our recommendation. 

DOD also agreed with our recommendation that DOD work with DHS, FEMA, 
and other interagency partners to agree on the specific types and 
quantities of capabilities that DOD is expected to contribute and the 
time frames in which those capabilities are to be provided. DOD 
reiterated that the panel discussed above will assist in addressing the 
recommendation. Additionally, DOD highlighted a number of ongoing 
efforts within the department (such as the Quadrennial Defense Review), 
and efforts being coordinated with DHS, FEMA, and other interagency 
partners (such as the Task Force for Emergency Readiness) to more fully 
understand the capabilities that may be required of DOD in the event of 
a CBRNE incident. DOD stressed and we agree that realistic, detailed, 
and coordinated planning at the federal, state, and local levels is 
essential to resolving the uncertainty over just what specific CBRNE 
consequence management capabilities DOD should be preparing to provide 
in the event of an incident. We believe that if consistently pursued 
and coordinated, the ongoing efforts DOD described should help address 
this recommendation and greatly assist overall federal, state, and 
local planning and preparedness for responding to CBRNE incidents. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that it align plans for all parts of 
the CCMRFs, including the specialized and general purpose units, with 
stated objectives for the CCMRF to include the extent to which existing 
CCMRF capabilities contribute to identified response requirements and 
stated CCMRF mission goals. DOD stated that it would continue to 
evaluate changes to the CCMRF's roles, missions, and requirements and 
make the necessary adjustments to the units' missions and goals. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that it work with the state 
governors through the states' adjutants general and the National Guard 
Bureau to create a long-term plan for sourcing the CCMRFs and ensure 
that the agreements being established between DOD and state governors 
include specific terms on National Guard force availability and duty 
and response status. DOD stated that the Secretary of Defense has 
directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a long- 
term total force sourcing plan for the CCMRFs and to ensure that as 
they are fielded, the CCMRFs remain appropriately sourced. DOD stated 
that it continues to work with the Departments of the Army and Air 
Force, and the National Guard Bureau along with states' adjutants 
general, to address resourcing and readiness matters. We believe DOD's 
approach to developing a long-term CCMRF sourcing plan will help build 
stability into its preparedness efforts. We continue to believe that 
negotiating and coordinating clear agreements between DOD and the 
states on the availability and duty status of National Guard units 
designated as part of CCMRF is critical to the overall DOD CCMRF 
capability. If the specific availability and duty status of these units 
is consistently pursued and coordinated, DOD's efforts vis-ŗ-vis the 
states should help in this regard. 

In response to our recommendation that the Commander of NORTHCOM--in 
coordination with the military services--include in the CCMRF training 
program requirements that the entire CCMRF conduct a joint field 
training exercise as part of its mission validation, DOD agreed but 
cautioned that the availability of funds to conduct full force 
exercises was a critical factor in fully addressing the recommendation. 
We agree that field exercises for each of the CCMRFs requires 
considerable logistical effort and associated costs. However, 
establishing a requirement for the entire CCMRF to exercise would allow 
DOD to evaluate the relative priority of the domestic CBRNE consequence 
management mission against other requirements and would allow DOD to 
evaluate potential risk if full funding is not available. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that NORTHCOM--in coordination with 
the military services--include in the CCMRF training program 
requirements that the entire CCMRF conduct at least one no-notice 
deployment readiness exercise annually. DOD stated that NORTHCOM has a 
field training exercise requirement in its proposed CCMRF training plan 
and that the command is working with the services and U.S. 
Transportation Command to determine the transportation requirements: 

associated with a no-notice exercise for CCMRF. We agree that these 
efforts should help NORTHCOM and DOD continue to develop the CCMRF 
exercise plan. We continue to believe that given the rapid response 
requirement of the mission, the geographic dispersion of CCMRF units 
(Active, Reserve, or National Guard), and the fact that these units do 
not work together routinely underscore the importance of no-notice 
deployment readiness exercises. 

In response to our recommendation that DOD determine the time needed by 
units to perform the necessary pre-mission CCMRF training, DOD agreed 
and stated that it is developing guidance that will direct force 
providers to facilitate NORTHCOM access to allocated CCMRF units 180 
days prior to mission assumption to synchronize CBRNE training and 
exercises. We continue to believe that allocating CCMRF units to 
NORTHCOM rather than assigning them curtails the commander of 
NORTHCOM's ability to ensure adequate CCMRF training and monitor 
readiness. However, we believe that if consistently implemented, the 
guidance DOD describes will help DOD ensure that CCMRF units and their 
parent commands can adequately plan for critical training. 

In response to our recommendation that DOD examine sourcing options for 
the CCMRF that would ensure that units had adequate time to train prior 
to mission assumption once they had all required personnel and 
equipment, DOD partially agreed. DOD stated that the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff has responsibility for sourcing the CCMRFs and 
that the services and the National Guard Bureau support the Joint Staff 
in this responsibility. DOD stated that it is preparing guidance that 
will task components to allocate properly equipped, manned, and trained 
forces to NORTHCOM to accomplish the CCMRF mission. We believe that if 
consistently implemented such guidance will help DOD components and 
commands better plan for and conduct the necessary CCMRF training. 
However, we believe that DOD should continue to assess the sourcing and 
timing of CCMRF unit assignments with respect to force rotations to 
DOD's vital commitments overseas. Because the domestic CBRNE 
consequence management mission is so different from DOD's warfighting 
missions, it is all the more important to account for adequate time to 
train for it. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that DOD determine the 
total requirements for the CCMRF, including unique, nonstandard 
equipment requirements for each type of unit that comprises the CCMRF, 

and develop a plan on how those requirements will be filled. DOD stated 
that NORTHCOM and the services are working on a Joint Mission-Essential 
Equipment List that defines CCMRF equipment requirements and that 
NORTHCOM is working with the Army on procurement, storage, and 
management of personal protective equipment for CCMRF units. We believe 
that to the extent these efforts address standard and nonstandard 
equipment needed by units designated for CCMRF, they should help DOD 
provide more stable CCMRF equipment planning and reduce the uncertainty 
of unit commanders about what equipment is needed but not clearly 
identified in existing equipment lists. In addition, as we have 
previously stated, we believe that DOD must identify all requirements 
for CCMRF to provide decision makers with complete visibility over the 
status of filling CCMRF requirements and to highlight potential risks. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that DOD develop an 
overall funding strategy for establishing, fielding, and exercising the 
CCMRF and designate a single focal point for coordinating this 
strategy. DOD stated that it has developed a CCMRF funding strategy and 
that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 
Americas' Security Affairs is the appropriate focal point for 
coordinating the funding strategy for DOD assistance to civil 
authorities in response to a CBRNE incident. DOD stated that the 
assistant secretary will examine, in coordination with the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, secretaries of the military services, and 
appropriate defense agency, what additional steps should be taken to 
streamline coordination of the CCMRF funding strategy. DOD added that 
as the employer of the CCMRF during an actual incident, NORTHCOM also 
plays a significant role. While we do not believe DOD's existing 
funding efforts constitute a complete CCMRF funding strategy, 
particularly in light of all requirements not having been defined, we 
agree that the steps DOD describes in further developing or refining 
its funding strategy should help address the recommendation and better 
assist DOD to plan for and oversee CCMRF preparedness. 

DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix II. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, 
Secretary of Homeland Security, and other interested parties. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site 
[hyperlink, at http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contacts points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Jeff Miller: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Mac Thornberry: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
planned for and structured its force to provide chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence 
management assistance, we met with DOD officials and reviewed DOD's 
plans to determine sourcing requirements for the CBRNE Consequence 
Management Response Force (CCMRF). We reviewed the DOD, Northern 
Command, Army North, Joint Task Force Civil Support, Army Forces 
Command, and Army Reserve Command execution orders to determine the 
requirements for the number of CCMRFs, planned response time frames, 
force composition, sourcing, training, and readiness. We also reviewed 
concept and operations plans for CBRNE. We discussed DOD's plans for 
providing units to CCMRF with officials from the Joint Forces Command, 
Army Forces Command, Northern Command, Army North, Joint Task Force 
Civil Support, U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the National Guard 
Bureau. To determine DOD's approved incremental sourcing of the three 
CCMRFs, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security 
Affairs and the Joint Staff to assess the CCMRF sourcing requirements 
in structuring the force. We discussed with officials from the U.S. 
Army Reserve Command, Joint Forces Command, Army Forces Command, and 
Army North the sourcing requirements for CCMRF technical support forces 
(which perform in the contaminated or hot zone) and general support 
force to determine how units are selected for CCMRF and to obtain 
perspectives on sourcing challenges. We also reviewed documentation and 
interviewed National Guard Bureau officials to determine its unit 
sourcing plans for future CCMRFs. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for CBRNE consequence 
management operations and integrated plans with other federal 
government plans, we met with officials from the Department of Homeland 
Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and the Joint Task 
Force Civil Support. For example, we met with the Department of 
Homeland Security officials to discuss the interagency process used to 
support planning for responding to a domestic incident. Additionally, 
we met with Northern Command, Army North, and Joint Task Force Civil 
Support to discuss their plans for supporting federal CBRNE consequence 
management efforts and to discuss how their plans are integrated with 
those of federal agencies that DOD will support and reviewed plans, 
playbooks, and briefing documents that described DOD's responsibilities 
related to provided capabilities in support of others in response to a 
CBRNE event. Further, we reviewed Joint Task Civil Support playbooks 
relevant to each of the Department of Homeland Security's National 
Planning Scenarios to determine the extent to which DOD has planned for 
CBRNE consequence management operations. We reviewed relevant reports 
and documents that govern the national response to disasters. We 
discussed with Department of Homeland Security and Federal Emergency 
Management Agency official their efforts to establish roles and 
responsibilities in response to a CBRNE event. We also reviewed our 
prior work on national preparedness to determine the status of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) efforts to complete and 
integrate plans.[Footnote 34] We also reviewed the Department of 
Homeland Security's National Response Framework, National Preparedness 
Guidelines, and Target Capabilities List to assess DOD's and other 
federal departments' roles and responsibilities in providing support to 
civil authorities in response to a CBRNE event. 

To determine how prepared the CCMRF is to perform the CBRNE consequence 
management mission, we compared existing DOD readiness policies and 
practices to the practices for preparing CCMRF units and plans for 
assessing and reporting mission readiness. We discussed these issues 
with officials from the U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Army Forces 
Command, U.S. Army Reserve Command, the Joint Staff, U.S. Northern 
Command, and U.S. Army North. Further, we discussed the assignment of 
forces and readiness reporting with officials at the U.S. Joint Forces 
Command to assess the CCMRF sourcing priority requirements and the 
readiness reporting guidance for designated units assigned to the CCMRF 
mission. We also discussed with these officials their plans for 
training and assessing the readiness of units designated for CCMRF to 
determine CCMRF training and readiness certification and validation 
requirements. In determining the requirements, we reviewed pre-mission 
training, exercise, and validation guidance that was used to assess 
unit readiness. We also reviewed training requirements and spoke with 
officials to determine individual and unit mission-essential tasks 
identified for CCMRF. We also reviewed our prior work on U.S. Northern 
Command planning efforts for homeland defense and civil support 
[Footnote 35] to assess mission-essential tasks previously reported for 
units assigned to the CCMRF mission. Additionally, we reviewed the 
Defense Science Board's report, Unconventional Operational Concepts and 
the Homeland[Footnote 36] to obtain their assessment of training and 
readiness of military units for the domestic homeland security mission 
and recommendations for providing realistic training and exercises. 
Further, we reviewed our prior work on the Army's overall training 
strategy to determine how it is supported by the Army Force Generation 
Model[Footnote 37] and to determine the effect of overseas deployments 
on the preparation for units designated for CCMRF. 

We reviewed readiness briefings and mission readiness exercise lessons- 
learned reports to determine pre-mission assumption validation 
requirement challenges for task force units. To determine criteria for 
training and readiness of designated units for the CCMRF mission, we 
reviewed orders and plans that discussed individual, leader, and unit 
training requirements and discussed those issues with Joint Staff, 
Northern Command, Army North, Army Forces Command, and Army Reserve 
Command officials. We also discussed with CCRMF unit officials the 
guidance and resources that they were provided to prepare for the 
mission to determine preparation challenges. These units were 
judgmentally selected. While we cannot generalize the results of these 
discussions to all units, they were selected to provide a cross section 
of units from different services, from both the active and reserve 
forces, and from units that will provide either specialized CBRNE 
capabilities or general support capabilities. 

To determine CCMRF fund planning and the linkage to mission 
requirements, we met with officials from Northern Command, Army North, 
Army Forces Command, and the Army Reserve Command to discuss mission 
funding requirements and funding sources. We also reviewed guidance and 
funding plans to determine efforts to develop CCMRF-unique requirements 
and to identify the status of funding plans for meeting requirements. 
We met with the National Guard Bureau to discuss their current 
capabilities, identified shortfalls, and their approach to mitigate any 
identifiable shortfalls. Further, we reviewed program-identified 
funding shortfalls to determine the impact of planning, coordination, 
and execution of homeland defense training and readiness exercises. We 
discussed with unit officials the funding guidance that their units 
were provided to meet the CCMRF mission and obtained their perspectives 
on the extent to which additional specialized equipment beyond the 
units' standard equipment would be needed to perform the CCMRF mission. 
We also discussed funding requirements with officials from the 
Department of the Army to determine long-term funding plans for units 
designated for the CCMRF mission. We also met with U.S. Army Reserve 
Command officials to determine equipment and training costs for general 
support and commercial-off-the-shelf equipment costs for technical 
support units for the CCMRF mission. 

In addressing our objectives, we reviewed plans and related documents, 
obtained information, and interviewed officials at the following 
locations: 

* United States Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado: 

* Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia: 

* The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. 

* The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. 

* Joint Task Force Civil Support, Ft. Monroe, Virginia: 

* U.S. Army North, Ft. Sam Houston, Texas: 

* Army Forces Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia: 

* Army Reserve Command, Ft. McPherson, Georgia: 

* National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia: 

* Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. 

* Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C. 

We conducted our review from February 2008 to October 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Agency comments were made on GAO-09-928. This report number was 
subsequently changed to GAO-10-123. 

Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Homeland Defense And Americas Security Affairs: 
2600 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-2600: 

September 18, 2009: 

Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. D'Agostino: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO 09-928, "Homeland Defense: Planning, Resourcing, and 
Training Issues Challenge DoD's Response to Domestic Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Incidents." 
dated August 20, 2009 (GAO Code 351150). DoD concurs with seven 
recommendations, and partially concurs with three recommendations. Our 
response to the recommendations is enclosed. 

Our point of contact for this action is Thomas LaCrosse, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' 
Security Affairs (DASD (HD&ASA)), (703) 697-5822 or 
tom.lacrosse@osd.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Paul N. Stockton: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated August 20, 2009: 
GAO-09-928 (GAO Code 351150): 

"Homeland Defense: Planning, Resourcing, and Training Issues
Challenge DoD's Response to Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Incidents" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the DoD officials he deems appropriate to work with the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), and other interagency partners to agree on interim 
goals, objectives, and planning assumptions for DoD's role in 
responding to one or more simultaneously occurring chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) 
incidents in the United States. 

DOD Response: Concur. The National Preparedness Guidelines and Annex 1 
to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) establish an 
overarching framework and comprehensive risk-based approach to national 
planning, including planning for domestic CBRNE incidents. Under these 
mandates, DoD actively participates in the Integrated Planning System 
(IPS) to develop interagency CBRNE terrorism prevention and response 
plans. Planning improves effectiveness by clearly defining required 
capabilities, shortening the time required to gain control of an 
incident, and facilitating the rapid exchange of information about a 
situation) In addition to its routine planning activities, the office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 
Americas' Security Affairs has consistently emphasized the need for 
detailed, operationally executable interagency planning in order to 
conduct informed analyses of the capabilities required in response to a 
catastrophic CBRNE incident, such as those outlined in the 15 National 
Planning Scenarios ó 12 of which are CBRNE related. 

DoD recently convened the advisory panel required by section 1082 of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. This panel 
will evaluate and, as appropriate, make recommendations on modifying 
DoD authorities, capabilities, plans and programs, and policies to 
assist civil authorities in preventing and responding to CBRNE 
incidents. Additionally, the panel is authorized to secure directly 
from DHS, the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, the 
Department of Health and Human Services, and any other department or 
agency of the Federal Government information that the panel considers 
necessary for the panel to carry out its duties. 

Of note, section 2313 of Title 50, U.S. Code, assigns responsibility 
for coordinating DoD assistance to Federal, State, and local officials 
in preventing and responding to CBRNE threats to the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security 
Affairs. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the DoD officials he deems appropriate to work with DHS, FEMA, 
and other interagency partners to agree on the specific types and 
quantities of capabilities that DoD is expected to contribute and the 
timeframes in which those capabilities are to be provided. 

DOD Response: Concur. See response to Recommendation 1. DoD has been 
working with DHS, FEMA, and others through the IPS, implementation of 
section 1815 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008, the Task Force for Emergency Readiness (TFER), the Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR), and other efforts to determine the demand for DoD 
capabilities to assist civil authorities in a CBRNE incident. In the 
absence of a complete definition of Federal, State, and local 
capabilities and their needs for DoD assistance, DoD planners have 
prepared several assumptions about necessary capabilities and 
capacities based on a wealth of experience and local partners. Until 
DOD and its USG partners have greater visibility into national 
capabilities, DoD's planning approach has been to ensure it has a 
significant designated capacity to fulfill each of the required 
capabilities and then draw on contingency sourcing from the Total Force 
to meet the additional response requirements of a domestic incident, 
while balancing the ongoing requirements of military preparedness to 
execute DoD's primary mission worldwide. Efforts underway with IPS, 
section 1815, TFER, and the QDR should eventually give DoD a much 
better understanding of the "demand signal" from its Federal, State, 
and local partners. 

Realistic, detailed, and coordinated planning at the Federal, State, 
and local levels is essential to resolving this uncertainty by 
identifying needed resources, eliminating organizational, 
jurisdictional, and operational seams and gaps, and ensuring a unity of 
effort in future responses. 

Of note, section 2313 of Title 50, U.S. Code, assigns responsibility 
for coordinating DoD assistance to Federal, State, and local officials 
in preventing and responding to CBRNE threats to the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security 
Affairs.
Attachment 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the military services to 
align plans for all parts of the CBRNE Consequence Management Response 
Forces (CCMRFs), including the specialized and general purpose units, 
with stated objectives for the CCMRF, to include the extent to which 
existing CCMRF capabilities contribute to identified response 
requirements and stated CCMRF mission goals. 

DOD Response: Concur. As part of DOD's continuing effort to optimize 
its capabilities in regards to CBRNE Consequence Management, it will 
continue to evaluate any changes to the CCMRFs' roles, missions, and 
requirements and make the necessary adjustments to the units' missions 
and goals. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct USNORTHCOM and the military services to work with the state 
governors through the states' adjutants general and the National Guard 
Bureau to create a long-term plan for sourcing the CCMRFs and ensure 
that the agreements being established between DoD and state governors 
include specific terms on National Guard force availability and duty 
and response status. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Secretary of Defense has already directed the 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop the long-term Total Force 
sourcing plan for the CCMRFs. In addition, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, via the Global Force Management Process, ensures that, when 
fielded, the CCMRF continue to remain appropriately resourced.
In cases where National Guard units and personnel constitute elements 
of the CCMRFs, DoD has worked, through Departments of the Army and the 
Air Force and the National Guard Bureau, with the Adjutants General of 
the States to address resourcing and readiness matters. This 
cooperative approach will continue when the CCMRFs are fully 
operationally capable to ensure appropriate sustainment. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Commander of USNORTHCOM ó in coordination with the military 
services ó to include in the CCMRF training program requirements that 
the entire CCMRF conducts a joint field training exercise as part of 
its mission validation. 

DOD Response: Concur, subject to the availability of funds. An FY2007 
USNORTHCOM cost estimate for deploying a partial CCMRF for a field 
training exercise exceeded $30 million. According to current DoD plans, 
there will be three operational CCMRFs by October 1, 2010. Field 
training exercises for each of the three CCMRFs would be expensive due 
to the requirement to bring together forces from multiple locations in 
the United States. 

Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Commander of USNORTHCOM ó in coordination with the military 
services ó to include in the CCMRF training program requirements that 
the entire CCMRF conducts at least one no-notice deployment readiness 
exercise annually. 

DOD Response: Concur. USNORTHCOM has already included a requirement for 
a field training exercise in its proposed CCMRF training plan. In 
addition to a planned field training exercise, USNORTHCOM is working 
closely with the Services and US Transportation Command to determine 
the transportation requirements associated with a no-notice exercise 
for CCMRF 10-1, their impact on ongoing operations and their cost, 
which will further inform development of the CCMRF exercise plan. 

Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Commander USNORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, and the Service 
secretaries to determine the time needed by units to perform the 
necessary pre-mission CCMRF training. 

DOD Response: Concur. Guidance is being finalized that will direct 
force providers to facilitate USNORTHCOM access to allocated CCMRF 
units and headquarters 180 days prior to mission assumption in order to 
synchronize and coordinate participation in a CBNRE training exercise, 
confirmation command post exercise, and confirmation field training 
exercise. In accordance with DoD Directive 5105.77, National Guard 
Bureau, the National Guard Bureau will also contribute to these 
determinations 

Recommendation 8: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct USNORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, and the Service secretaries to 
examine sourcing options that would ensure that units had adequate time 
to train prior to mission assumption once they had all required 
personnel and equipment. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The Secretary of Defense has assigned 
the responsibility for sourcing the CCMRFs to the Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. USNORTHCOM, the Military Services, and NGB support the 
Joint Staff in the execution of this responsibility. Guidance is being 
finalized that will task components to allocate properly equipped, 
manned, and trained forces to USNORTHCOM to accomplish the CCMRF 
mission. 

Recommendation 9: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in 
coordination with Secretaries of the military services, the National 
Guard Bureau, and the heads of participating Defense Agencies determine 
the total requirements for the CCMRF, including unique nonstandard 
equipment requirements for each type of unit that comprises the CCMRF, 
and develop a plan on how those requirements will be filled. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The Secretary of Defense is advised by 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the Military 
Services, USNORTHCOM, NGB, and Defense Agencies on capability 
requirements. USNORTHCOM and the Military Departments are staffing a 
Joint Mission Essential Equipment List that defines CCMRF equipment 
requirements. USNORTHCOM is also working with the Department of the 
Army on procurement, storage, and management of Personal Protective 
Equipment sustainment stocks for the CCMRF units. 

Recommendation 10: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense, in 
coordination with secretaries of the military services, the National 
Guard Bureau, and the heads of participating Defense Agencies develop 
an overall funding strategy for establishing, fielding, and exercising 
the CCMRF and designate a single point for coordinating this strategy. 

DOD Response: Partially concur, The Secretary of Defense is advised by 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the Military 
Services, USNORTHCOM, NGB, and Defense Agencies on capability 
requirements. DoD has developed an overall funding strategy for 
fielding, sustaining, and employing the CCMRFs. In accordance with 
Public Law 109-163 of the FY 06 National Defense Authorization Act, the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' 
Security Affairs is responsible for the coordination of the DOD 
assistance to Federal, State, and local officials in responding to 
threats involving nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical weapons, 
or high-yield explosives or related materials or technologies, 
including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling, and 
disposing of nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical weapons, and 
high-yield explosives and related materials and technologies. 
Consistent with the statutory role of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs, OASD 
(HD&ASA) will examine in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the Military Services and appropriate 
Defense Agencies what additional steps are to be taken to further 
streamline coordination of the CCMRF funding strategy. As the force 
employer, USNORTHCOM also plays a significant role. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Joseph Kirschbaum, Assistant 
Director; Rodell Anderson; Sandra Burrell; David Fox; Joanne Landesman; 
Greg Marchand; Robert Poetta; and Jason Porter made key contributions 
to this report. 

Related GAO Products: 

Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise Program, 
but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be Improved. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-849]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 9, 2009. 

National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete 
and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369]. Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2009. 

Emergency Management: Observations on DHS' Preparedness for 
Catastrophic Disasters. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-868T]. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 
2008. 

National Response Framework: FEMA Needs Policies and Procedures to 
Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in the Revision Process. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-768]. Washington, D.C.: 
June 11, 2008. 

Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern 
Command's Coordination with States and the National Guards Bureau, but 
Gaps Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-252]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008. 

Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to 
Address force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251]. Washington, D.C.: 
April 16, 2008. 

Continuity of Operations: Selected Agencies Tested Various Capabilities 
during 2006 Governmentwide Exercise. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-105]. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 
2007. 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Action to Address 
Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion Centers. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1241T]. Washington, 
D.C.: September 27, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for 
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related 
Recommendations and Legislation. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1142T]. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 
2007. 

Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands' Preparedness Efforts Could 
Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk 
Mitigation. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-696]. 
Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-395T]. Washington, D.C.: 
March 9, 2007. 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-903]. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 
2006. 

Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support 
Teams' M9ission and Address Management Challenges. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-498]. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 
2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-643]. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 
2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 
Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-643]. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 
2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-442T]. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 
2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 
Associated with major Emergency Incidents. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-467T]. Washington, D.C.: February 
23, 2006. 

GAO'S Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-365R]. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 
2006. 

Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All- 
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-652]. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 
2005. 

Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport 
Exercises Needs Further Attention. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-170]. Washington, D.C.: January 14, 
2005. 

Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental Cooperation 
Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable Communications. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-740]. Washington, D.C.: 
July 20, 2004. 

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for 
Domestic Military Missions. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-670]. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 
2003. 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-822]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 20, 2001. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2007). 

[2] White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2002). 

[3] GAO, Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil 
Support Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-498] (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 
2006). 

[4] The 15 National Planning Scenarios have been grouped in 8 scenario 
sets of similar characteristics. For example, the 4 National Planning 
Scenarios related to chemical incidents have been grouped together. 
Concept and operation plans are being developed for the 8 scenario 
sets. 

[5] DHS, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2008), and 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 14, 2007). 

[6] United States Northern Command, established in 2002, has the dual 
mission of homeland defense and support of civil authorities. NORTHCOM 
leads efforts in its area of responsibility which includes the 
continental United States and Alaska. The United States Pacific Command 
leads DOD's civil support efforts in Hawaii and other U.S. Pacific 
territories. 

[7] This does not include U.S. Coast Guard forces, which are under DHS, 
or the National Guard, which, unless federalized by the President, 
would remain under the authority of the respective state and territory 
governors. 

[8] Under DOD's immediate response provision, local commanders are 
authorized to take the necessary actions to respond to local civil 
authorities without higher headquarter approval when a civil emergency 
may require immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering, or 
mitigate property damage. 

[9] DHS, National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2008). The 
National Response Framework--previously known as the National Response 
Plan--is the plan that guides how federal, state, local, and tribal 
governments, along with nongovernmental and private sector entities, 
will collectively respond to and recover from all hazards, including 
catastrophic disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina. 

[10] Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a mutual aid agreement 
among member states and is administered by the National Emergency 
Management Association. States affected by disasters have increasingly 
relied on the compact as a means to access resources from other states, 
including emergency managers, National Guard assets, and first 
responders. GAO, Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing 
EMAC's Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should Improve 
National Disaster Response, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-854] (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 
2007). 

[11] The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is the DOD agent responsible for 
public works and engineering. 

[12] U.S. Northern Command, Department of Defense Homeland Defense and 
Civil Support Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0 (Oct. 2007), p. 43. 

[13] California has two Civil Support Teams. New York and Florida are 
each currently establishing a second team. 

[14] One of the primary joint doctrine documents that lays out DOD 
guidance for joint operation planning is Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 
Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Dec. 26, 2006). 

[15] The full National Response Framework is also not yet completed. 
Partner guides, incident annexes for terrorism and cyber incidents, and 
the incident annex supplement for catastrophic disasters remain 
incomplete. 

[16] White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1, 
National Planning (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2007). 

[17] The 15 National Planning Scenarios have been grouped in 8 scenario 
sets of similar characteristics. For example, the 4 National Planning 
Scenarios related to chemical incidents have been grouped together. 
Concept and operation plans are being developed for the 8 scenario 
sets. 

[18] GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to 
Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369] (Washington, D.C.: 
Apr. 30, 2009). 

[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369]. 

[20] The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 
(2006). Section 652 of the Post-Katrina Act requires that FEMA submit a 
federal preparedness report to Congress in October 2007 and annually 
thereafter. Section 652 also requires the submission of annual state 
preparedness reports to FEMA, beginning January 2008, by recipients of 
DHS preparedness assistance, including states, territories, or the 
District of Columbia. 6 U.S.C. ß 752(a), (c); see also 6 U.S.C. ßß 
101(15), 701(11) for the definition of a "state." 

[21] GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to 
Complete and Integrate, Planning, Exercise and Assessment Efforts, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369] (Washington, D.C.: 
Apr. 30, 2009). 

[22] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support (Washington, D.C.: June 2005), p. 3. DOD has since refined that 
standard to "prepare for and mitigate the effects of multiple, near- 
simultaneous CBRNE events." U.S. Northern Command, Department of 
Defense Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept, 
Version 2.0 (Oct. 2007), p. 43. 

[23] This assumes the CCMRF is tasked to deploy immediately after an 
incident occurs. 

[24] U.S. Northern Command, Homeland Defense and Civil Support 
Capabilities Based Assessment (Colorado Springs, CO: Mar. 2009). 

[25] Assigned forces are under the direct command of their unified 
command, such as NORTHCOM. Allocated forces are transferred from their 
assigned unified command to another command for employment for a 
specific period of time. 

[26] GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but 
Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other 
Issues, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008). 

[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251]. 

[28] U.S. Army North is the designated Joint Force Land Component 
Commander for domestic civil support operations NORTHCOM would command. 

[29] The standard CCMRF rotation for the first CCMRF, which is 
predominately active units, is from October 1 to September 30. 

[30] U.S. Northern Command, Homeland Defense and Civil Support 
Capabilities Based Assessment (Colorado Springs, CO: Mar. 2009). 

[31] U.S. Army North and Joint Task Force Civil Support are subordinate 
commands of NORTHCOM. 

[32] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Improve Program Management, 
Policy, and Testing to Enhance Ability to Field Operationally Useful 
Non-lethal Weapons, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-344] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 2009), p. 35. 

[33] At the time of DOD's review, this report was numbered GAO-09-928. 
Subsequently, the report number was changed to [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-123]. 

[34] GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to 
Complete and Integrate, Planning, Exercise and Assessment Efforts, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369] (Washington, D.C.: 
Apr. 30, 2009). 

[35] GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but 
Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other 
Issues, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251] 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008). 

[36] Defense Science Board, Unconventional Operational Concepts and the 
Homeland, Report on the 2007 Summer Study on Challenges to Military 
Operations in Support of U.S. Interests (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2009). 

[37] GAO, Military Training: Actions Needed to More Fully Develop the 
Army's Strategy for Training Modular Brigades and Address 
Implementation Challenges, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-936] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 
2007). 

[38] Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 
January 2008, page 28. 

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