This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-771 
entitled 'Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning 
and Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European 
Sites' which was released on August 6, 2009. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

August 2009: 

Ballistic Missile Defense: 

Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Information on Construction and 
Support Costs for Proposed European Sites: 

GAO-09-771: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-771, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) estimated in 2008 that the potential 
costs of fielding ballistic missile defenses in Europe would be more 
than $4 billion through 2015. Planned ballistic missile defenses in 
Europe are intended to defend the United States, its deployed forces, 
and its allies against ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East. 
They are expected to include a missile interceptor site in Poland, a 
radar site in the Czech Republic, and a mobile radar system in a still-
to-be-determined European location. 

GAO was asked to evaluate the Department of Defenseís (DOD) plans for 
missile defense sites in Europe and address to what extent DOD has (1) 
planned for the sitesí implementation and (2) estimated military 
construction and long-term operations and support costs. Accordingly, 
GAO reviewed key legislation; examined policy and guidance from MDA, 
the Army, the Air Force, and the Army Corps of Engineers; analyzed 
budget documents and cost estimates; and visited sites in Poland and 
the Czech Republic. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD has begun planning for the construction and implementation of the 
European missile defense sites, including coordinating with 
international partners and U.S. stakeholders; however, several 
challenges affecting DODís implementation of ballistic missile defenses 
in Europe remain. First, neither Poland nor the Czech Republic has 
ratified key bilateral agreements with the United States, limiting DODí
s ability to finalize key details of the sites, such as how security 
will be provided. Second, DODís efforts to establish the roles and 
responsibilities of key U.S. stakeholders for the European sites remain 
incomplete because MDA and the services have not yet made important 
determinations, such as establishing the criteria that must be met 
before the transfer of the European missile defense sites from MDA to 
the Army and Air Force. Since 2002, MDA has been directed by DOD to 
begin planning for the transfer of missile defense elements, including 
the direction to coordinate with the services on resources and 
personnel needed to provide an effective transition of responsibility. 
Without clear definitions of the roles that MDA and the services will 
be responsible for and agreement on criteria for transfer, DOD will 
continue to face uncertainties in determining how the European 
Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be 
sustained over the long term. 

DODís cost estimates for military construction and operations and 
support have limitations and do not provide Congress complete 
information on the true costs of ballistic missile defenses in Europe. 
Key principles for cost estimating state that complete cost estimates 
are important in preparing budget submissions and for assessing the 
long-term affordability of a program. Further, according to DOD 
military construction regulations, the Army Corps of Engineers 
typically certifies that key construction design milestones have been 
met and verifies military construction cost estimates before the 
estimates are submitted as budget requests. However, DODís original 
military construction estimates in the fiscal year 2009 budget did not 
include all costs, primarily because MDA submitted the estimates before 
accomplishing key design milestones and without a review by the Army 
Corps of Engineers. Consequently, DODís projected military construction 
costs for the interceptor and radar sites could potentially increase 
from DODís original $837 million estimate to over $1 billion. DOD 
operations and support cost estimates are also incomplete because they 
do not include projected costs for base operations that will be managed 
by the Army and Air Force. Key cost factors that will affect these 
estimates, such as how security will be provided at the sites, remain 
undefined. In addition, MDA and the services have not yet agreed on how 
the operations and support costs for the interceptor and radar sites 
will be funded over the long term. As a result, Congress does not have 
accurate information on the full investment required for ballistic 
missile defenses in Europe. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that DOD clarify roles and responsibilities, refine 
military construction cost estimates, and define who is responsible for 
operations and support costs for the European sites. DOD generally 
agreed, stating that steps are being taken to address these issues, but 
that operations and support cost estimates will not be completed in 
time for the 2011 budget. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-771] or key 
components. For more information, contact John Pendleton at 404-679-
1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOD Has Made Progress in Planning for Ballistic Missile Defenses in 
Europe with International Partners and Key U.S. Stakeholders, but 
Challenges Remain: 

DOD's Military Construction and Operations and Support Cost Estimates 
for Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe Have Limitations and Do Not 
Provide Congress Complete Information: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Status of Key Bilateral Agreements: 

Table 2: Status of Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and Annexes: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Proposed Site for Interceptor Field at Redzikowo Air Base in 
Poland: 

Abbreviations: 

BMDS: Ballistic Missile Defense System: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

MDA: Missile Defense Agency: 

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

August 6, 2009: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tim Johnson: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related 
Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
United States Senate: 

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) was created in 2002 in order to 
develop ballistic missile defenses comprising land-, air-, and sea- 
based elements--such as missiles and radars--working together as an 
integrated system and intended to intercept ballistic missiles in all 
phases of flight. MDA has spent almost $56 billion since 2002 on 
developing and fielding an initial ballistic missile defense capability 
and is on course to spend about $50 billion more over the next 5 years. 
As part of this system, MDA plans to field a missile interceptor site 
in Poland designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles launched 
from the Middle East, a radar site in the Czech Republic capable of 
tracking incoming missiles and guiding interceptors to their targets, 
and a mobile radar system to be strategically placed in a still-to-be- 
determined European location to provide additional warning of potential 
ballistic missile threats. While MDA has taken the lead in developing 
the sites thus far, the Army has been designated the lead military 
service to operate and support the European Interceptor Site in Poland 
and the mobile radar system, and the Air Force has been designated lead 
military service for the European Midcourse Radar Site in the Czech 
Republic. MDA estimated in 2008 that the potential costs of the planned 
ballistic missile defenses in Europe through 2013 would be more than $4 
billion--approximately $837 million for military construction; $612 
million for operations and support at the sites; and $2.6 billion for 
development, testing, and procurement costs. 

Although the Department of Defense (DOD) is moving forward with 
planning and site analysis for the ballistic missile defense sites in 
Europe, the new administration indicated in 2009 that it is reviewing 
U.S. national policy on missile defense and has not yet stated its 
plans for the future of ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Some 
critics of the proposed ballistic missile defenses in Europe argue that 
testing of the system to date has been insufficient to verify that it 
will function as intended. In light of those concerns, Congress has 
placed limitations on the use of funds for the acquisition or 
deployment of missiles at a European site until the Secretary of 
Defense certifies that the proposed interceptors have demonstrated a 
high probability of working in an operationally effective manner and 
the ability to accomplish the mission.[Footnote 1] Further, the 
deployment of the ballistic missile defense sites in Europe has been 
the subject of debate in the parliaments of both Poland and the Czech 
Republic, and the Russian government has adamantly protested U.S. plans 
in those countries. However, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) has indicated its support for ballistic missile defenses in 
Europe and is pursuing ways to link its own missile defense efforts 
with those of the United States. 

We have previously reported on a number of challenges facing DOD as it 
develops and fields ballistic missile defenses. For instance, we 
recently testified that to meet President Bush's goal of putting in 
place an initial set of ballistic missile defense capabilities 
beginning in 2004, the Secretary of Defense granted MDA a significant 
amount of funding and decision-making flexibility, exempting the agency 
from many traditional DOD requirements for weapon system development, 
acquisition, and oversight. Although this exemption allowed MDA to 
quickly develop an initial ballistic missile defense capability, this 
approach has also resulted in several management challenges.[Footnote 
2] For example, MDA has not yet provided baselines necessary to measure 
its progress on cost, schedule, and testing. Further, some of MDA's 
production and fielding decisions have gotten ahead of its testing 
schedule, raising concerns about system efficacy.[Footnote 3] Finally, 
DOD's plans for long-term operations and support are incomplete, making 
the transition and transfer of the ballistic missile defense elements 
from MDA to the services difficult.[Footnote 4] 

In requesting this review, you expressed interest in the completeness 
of DOD's plans for the ballistic missile defense sites in Europe, 
including questions about whether MDA's initial $4 billion estimate for 
the planned European capabilities includes the full costs associated 
with construction and operations and support of the sites. In this 
context, you asked GAO to evaluate DOD's plans for the ballistic 
missile defense sites in Europe and address to what extent DOD has (1) 
planned for the initial implementation of ballistic missile defenses in 
Europe, to include coordination with key international partners and 
U.S. stakeholders, and (2) estimated total military construction and 
long-term operations and support costs for ballistic missile defenses 
in Europe. 

For both objectives, we reviewed key legislation related to ballistic 
missile defenses in Europe, DOD policy and guidance on military 
construction and estimating costs, and DOD's overall approach for 
preparing to support ballistic missile defense. To determine to what 
extent DOD has planned for the initial implementation of ballistic 
missile defenses in Europe, we conducted site visits in Poland and the 
Czech Republic; met with DOD, State Department, and host nation 
officials to discuss the efforts under way to plan for the sites; and 
examined key documents, including agreements with the host nations, 
memorandums of agreement between key U.S. stakeholders, and MDA, Army, 
Air Force, and Army Corps of Engineers documents for planning and site 
preparation. We evaluated the collaboration efforts among the agencies 
to determine whether DOD, Army, Air Force, and State Department 
officials followed key practices that can help agencies enhance and 
sustain their collaborative efforts.[Footnote 5] To determine the 
extent to which DOD has estimated total costs for ballistic missile 
defenses in Europe, we examined budget documents, including DOD's 
fiscal year 2009 Future Years Defense Program (including budget data 
for fiscal years 2008-2013), MDA's fiscal year 2009 military 
construction cost estimates, MDA's fiscal year 2010 budget submission, 
and the Army's projected military construction cost estimates, and 
reviewed key principles for developing accurate and reliable cost 
estimates.[Footnote 6] We also discussed the cost estimates with MDA, 
the Army, the Air Force, and the Army Corps of Engineers-Headquarters 
and Europe District to determine the completeness of the military 
construction and operations and support costs. We discussed the results 
of our analyses on these objectives with DOD and State Department 
officials. Our scope and methodology is discussed in more detail in 
appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 to August 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

DOD has begun planning for the construction, implementation, and 
operations and support for the European missile defense sites, 
including coordinating with international partners and U.S. 
stakeholders; however, several challenges remain that are affecting 
DOD's plans for ballistic missile defenses in Europe. First, neither 
Poland nor the Czech Republic has ratified the bilateral Ballistic 
Missile Defense Agreements and bilateral supplementary agreements to 
the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. The ratification votes remain 
delayed, in part, because of a desire on the part of both the Polish 
and Czech parliaments to wait for an indication from the new U.S. 
administration on its policy toward ballistic missile defenses in 
Europe. As long as these agreements remain unratified, DOD's ability to 
finalize key details about how the sites will operate, such as whether 
security will be provided by the host nation, will be limited. Second, 
DOD's efforts to establish the roles and responsibilities of key U.S. 
stakeholders for the European sites remain incomplete because MDA and 
the services have not yet made important determinations, such as 
establishing the criteria that must be met before the transfer of 
specific European missile defense sites to the services. MDA has been 
directed by DOD since 2002 to begin planning for the transfer of 
missile defense elements, including the direction to coordinate with 
the services on resources and personnel needed in order to deliver an 
effective transition of responsibility. In addition, our prior work 
assessing interagency collaboration has shown that agreed-upon roles 
and responsibilities that clarify who will do what, organize joint and 
individual efforts, and facilitate decision making are important to 
agencies' capability to enhance and sustain their collaborative 
efforts. While the Army has been designated lead service for the 
European Interceptor Site and the Air Force has been designated lead 
service for the European Midcourse Radar Site, the specific 
responsibilities related to these roles remain undefined. Roles and 
responsibilities for these missile defense elements are to be 
established in Overarching Memorandums of Agreement between the 
services and MDA and annexes to those agreements specific to each 
missile defense element, but these important agreements remain 
incomplete because MDA and the services have not yet made important 
determinations, such as establishing the criteria that must be met 
before the transfer of specific European missile defense sites to the 
services. Without establishing specific roles and responsibilities for 
the sites and defining key criteria that will guide the transfer of the 
elements from MDA to the Army and Air Force, uncertainty will persist 
about how the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse 
Radar Site will be sustained over the long term. The delay in 
ratification creates an opportunity for DOD and MDA to address some of 
the planning challenges DOD faces for the European sites. We are 
therefore recommending that MDA, the Army, and the Air Force use this 
time to finalize the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement that detail 
the specific roles and responsibilities for the European sites and 
clearly define the criteria that must be met before the transfer of 
those sites from MDA to the Army and Air Force. 

Although DOD has provided congressional decision makers with some 
information on the military construction and operations and support 
costs for the European Interceptor Site and European Midcourse Radar 
Site, DOD's estimates have limitations and do not provide Congress 
complete information on those costs. Key principles for cost estimating 
state that complete cost estimates are important in preparing budget 
submissions and for assessing the long-term affordability of a program. 
MDA's initial cost estimates for total military construction and 
operations and support costs for ballistic missile defenses in Europe 
have significant limitations. 

* DOD's original estimate to construct both sites did not include all 
costs. The $837 million estimate did not fully account for the cost of 
power and utilities at the sites, among other things. This was 
primarily because MDA submitted the estimates for its 2009 budget 
before accomplishing key design milestones and without a review by the 
Army Corps of Engineers. According to DOD military construction 
regulations, the Army Corps of Engineers, as construction agent, 
typically certifies that key construction design milestones have been 
met and verifies military construction cost estimates before the 
estimates are submitted as budget requests. Additionally, DOD's initial 
military construction cost estimates did not include any Army or Air 
Force base operating support facilities costs, such as housing, or 
account for possible currency fluctuations. Consequently, DOD's 
projected military construction costs for the European Interceptor Site 
and the European Midcourse Radar Site are expected to increase 
significantly from DOD's original $837 million estimate in the fiscal 
year 2009 budget. In May 2009, an Army Corps of Engineers official 
estimated that military construction costs for the sites could 
potentially increase to over $1 billion. Despite the expected increase 
in military construction costs, DOD has not provided Congress updated 
military construction estimates since the initial estimates were 
submitted in February 2008 with the fiscal year 2009 budget request. As 
a result of these limitations in the initial estimates, DOD and 
congressional decision makers do not have accurate information on the 
full military construction investment required for ballistic missile 
defenses in Europe. 

* Total operations and support costs are also uncertain. DOD estimated 
operations and support costs totaling $612 million for the European 
Interceptor Site and European Midcourse Radar Site in its fiscal years 
2008-2013 Future Years Defense Program. However, these estimates are 
incomplete because DOD's operations and support cost estimates, for 
example, do not include estimates for base operations managed by the 
Army and Air Force. Although MDA and the Army and Air Force have 
initiated the development of total operations and support cost 
estimates, key cost factors that will affect these estimates, such as 
how security will be provided at the sites, remain undefined. 
Furthermore, MDA and the Army and Air Force have not yet agreed on how 
the operations and support costs for the European Interceptor Site and 
the European Midcourse Radar Site will be funded over the elements' 
life cycles or who will pay for these costs. This has been a persistent 
issue that is important to address as these costs are typically over 70 
percent of a system's total lifetime cost. 

Without credible and complete military construction and operations and 
support cost estimates, DOD and congressional decision makers will have 
difficulty making funding decisions and assessing the affordability of 
ballistic missile defense plans over the program's life cycle. To 
provide military construction costs for ballistic missile defenses in 
Europe that are based on the best available data, we are recommending 
that MDA, in coordination with the Army and Air Force, provide Congress 
annually, in alignment with the budget, updated military construction 
cost estimates for the European Interceptor Site and the European 
Midcourse Radar Site that among other things reflect the data gathered 
from all site design efforts since project initiation and account for 
all projected military construction costs for the sites, including Army 
and Air Force base support facility requirements. To provide for more 
complete military construction estimates for future ballistic missile 
defense sites, such as the still-to-be-determined European site for the 
mobile radar system, we recommend that MDA follow DOD military 
construction regulations by utilizing the Army Corps of Engineers to 
complete required site design and analysis work and verify all military 
construction cost estimates before submitting cost estimates to 
Congress. We further recommend that MDA and the Army and Air Force 
complete life cycle operations and support cost estimates for the 
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site and 
clearly define who is responsible for funding these operations and 
support costs over the elements' life cycles. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three 
and partially concurred with two recommendations. DOD concurred with 
our recommendation for MDA and the Army and Air Force to finalize 
Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and element-specific annexes. DOD 
also concurred with both of our recommendations to improve military 
construction cost estimates for ballistic missile defense sites. DOD 
partially concurred with our two recommendations to improve fiscal 
stewardship of DOD's operations and support resources. In general, DOD 
stated that it is taking steps to address the issues we identified in 
the report, but that life cycle operations and support cost estimates 
would not be complete in time for the fiscal year 2011 budget 
submission. By implementing our recommendations to improve planning and 
information on construction and support costs for the proposed European 
sites, DOD would be better positioned to prepare for the near-and long- 
term sustainment of the sites and congressional decision makers would 
have enhanced ability to evaluate the investment required to implement 
ballistic missile defenses in Europe. The department's comments are 
reprinted in appendix II. 

Background: 

When MDA was given the mission to develop a global integrated Ballistic 
Missile Defense System (BMDS), DOD's intention was for MDA to develop 
missile defense elements, such as the proposed interceptor and radar 
sites in Europe, and then transfer the elements to the lead services 
designated to operate and support them. We have previously reported 
that the transition process may, for some missile defense elements, end 
at a point that DOD calls transfer--which is the reassignment of the 
MDA program office responsibilities to a service.[Footnote 7] According 
to MDA and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics officials, not all BMDS elements will 
ultimately transfer; the decision to transfer them will be made on a 
case-by-case basis and the conditions under which this may happen will 
be identified in agreements between MDA and the services for each 
element. 

In September 2008, we reported that DOD has taken some initial steps to 
plan for long-term operations and support of ballistic missile defense 
elements, but planning efforts to date are incomplete because of 
difficulties in transitioning and transferring responsibilities from 
MDA to the services and in establishing operations and support cost 
estimates.[Footnote 8] We noted that DOD has established limited 
operations and support cost estimates for ballistic missile defense 
elements in its Future Years Defense Program, DOD's 6-year spending 
plan; however, the estimates do not fully reflect the total life cycle 
cost of the BMDS. As a result, we reported that the operations and 
support costs that had been developed were not transparent to DOD 
senior leadership and congressional decision makers and recommended 
that DOD establish a standard process for long-term support planning 
for the BMDS and a requirement to estimate BMDS operations and support 
costs. 

DOD Has Made Progress in Planning for Ballistic Missile Defenses in 
Europe with International Partners and Key U.S. Stakeholders, but 
Challenges Remain: 

DOD has begun planning for the construction and implementation of the 
European missile defense sites; however, challenges affecting DOD's 
implementation of ballistic missile defenses in Europe remain. First, 
neither Poland nor the Czech Republic has ratified key bilateral 
agreements with the United States, limiting DOD's ability to finalize 
key details of the sites, such as how security will be provided. 
Second, DOD's efforts to establish the roles and responsibilities of 
key U.S. stakeholders for the European sites remain incomplete. Without 
clear definitions of the roles that MDA and the services will be 
responsible for and agreement on criteria for transfer, DOD will 
continue to face uncertainties in determining how the European 
Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be 
sustained over the long term. 

DOD Has Made Progress in Planning for European Missile Defenses: 

DOD has made progress in planning for the construction, implementation, 
and operations and support for the European missile defense sites. In 
2002, the President signed National Security Presidential Directive 23 
that called for missile defense capabilities to protect the United 
States, its deployed forces, and its allies.[Footnote 9] As part of 
that direction, MDA considered several European sites where it could 
base a missile defense capability to provide additional U.S. protection 
and could provide a regional defense for its European allies against a 
missile launch from Iran. DOD approached both Poland and the Czech 
Republic about basing elements of its proposed European missile defense 
system, and MDA briefed the President about the potential capability in 
2003. Both U.S. and Polish officials told us that Poland was a likely 
host site because many of the trajectories from Iran went through 
Poland. In May 2006, the Czech government sent a formal letter to the 
United States to request that the United States consider placing 
missile defense assets in the Czech Republic. DOD has completed site 
selection and begun site design for the European Interceptor Site in 
Poland and the European Midcourse Radar Site in the Czech Republic. 

European Interceptor Site: 

The proposed European Interceptor Site is located outside of Slupsk, 
Poland, near the Baltic Sea. The site is planned to consist of 10 two- 
stage, silo-based interceptors--modified versions of the three-stage 
interceptors located at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg, 
California. The site is designed to protect the U.S. homeland and U.S. 
allies from incoming ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East. 
The initial MDA estimate indicated that the site would be operational 
by 2013, and the Army is the lead service that will be tasked with 
operating and supporting the interceptor site once it becomes 
operational. Site analysis is under way at the European Interceptor 
Site, but no physical site preparation or construction has begun. The 
photograph in figure 1 was taken at the site in February 2009 and shows 
the area where the planned interceptor field will be located. 

Figure 1: Proposed Site for Interceptor Field at Redzikowo Air Base in 
Poland: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

European Midcourse Radar Site: 

The proposed European Midcourse Radar Site is located at the Brdy 
military training area, approximately 90 kilometers southwest of 
Prague, Czech Republic. This land-based X-band radar will provide 
ballistic missile tracking data to the European Interceptor Site as 
well as the greater BMDS. The radar proposed for deployment to the 
Czech Republic is currently located at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall 
Islands. The radar will undergo an upgrade before its installation in 
the Czech Republic. The Air Force is the lead service that will be 
tasked with operating and supporting the radar site once it becomes 
operational, which MDA initially estimated would occur in 2013. Site 
analysis is under way at the European Midcourse Radar Site, but no 
physical site preparation or construction has begun. 

Mobile Forward-Based Radar: 

As part of ballistic missile defenses in Europe, DOD is considering the 
placement of an AN/TPY-2 mobile forward-based radar at another site in 
Europe in addition to the European Interceptor Site and the European 
Midcourse Radar Site. The transportable, land-based X-band radar is 
being considered in order to provide additional warning of ballistic 
missile launches from a location that is closer to Iran. The site for 
this radar has not yet been proposed, and at this time, negotiations 
with potential host nations have not been authorized. 

DOD Has Begun Negotiations and Planning with International Partners and 
U.S. Stakeholders: 

The State Department and DOD have negotiated the key bilateral 
Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements necessary to move forward on the 
European interceptor and radar sites. In 2008, the United States, 
Poland, and the Czech Republic signed bilateral Ballistic Missile 
Defense Agreements that formally approved the basing of the European 
Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site, and both 
agreements are now waiting for ratification by the Polish and Czech 
parliaments. The Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements are the first of 
several necessary agreements expected to govern the fielding of 
ballistic missile defenses in each country. The Ballistic Missile 
Defense Agreements establish the rights and obligations of the United 
States, Poland, and the Czech Republic specific to each site and 
provide general guidelines on personnel, construction, and land use, 
among other things. 

A second key set of agreements, supplementary arrangements to the NATO 
Status of Forces Agreement, are expected to govern ballistic missile 
defense at both sites. The overall NATO Status of Forces Agreement was 
created soon after the NATO alliance was established in 1949 and sets 
the general status of forces for member nations as they operate in each 
others' territories. The supplementary Status of Forces Agreement adds 
mission-specific matters addressed only broadly in the NATO Status of 
Forces Agreement, such as the legal status of U.S. civilian and 
military personnel working at each site. The Czech Republic and the 
United States have negotiated a supplementary Status of Forces 
Agreement, and it is now waiting for ratification by the Czech 
parliament. However, the supplementary Status of Forces Agreement with 
Poland had not been completely negotiated as of June 2009. After the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements and supplementary Status of Forces 
Agreements are ratified by each host nation's parliament, implementing 
arrangements will be negotiated. The implementing arrangements will 
serve as the executing documents for both of these agreements and 
address the day-to-day working relationship between the countries on a 
range of issues, including security. 

NATO's overall role in European ballistic missile defense is still 
under consideration. Although NATO has not been party to the bilateral 
negotiations between DOD and the host nations, DOD and NATO have worked 
together to begin addressing interoperability of the U.S. BMDS and 
NATO's Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system. NATO 
has also taken recent steps to show support for the European 
Interceptor Site and European Midcourse Radar Site. For example, NATO's 
2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration recognized that ballistic missile 
proliferation poses an increasing threat to NATO, and recognized that 
the European missile defense sites would provide a "substantial 
contribution" to NATO's protection. NATO stated that it is exploring 
ways to link U.S. missile defense assets with current NATO missile 
defense efforts. 

DOD has also made progress in coordinating with key U.S. stakeholders 
and by establishing the Army Corps of Engineers-Europe District as the 
construction agent for both sites. DOD has established lead services 
for both the interceptors and the radar and the Army and Air Force have 
identified which command will be specifically tasked to lead each 
ballistic missile element. The Army's Space and Missile Defense Command 
has been assigned as the lead command for the European Interceptor Site 
and the Air Force Space Command is the lead command for the European 
Midcourse Radar Site. As lead services, both the Army and Air Force 
have conducted planning sessions and negotiation of roles and 
relationships with MDA. For example, MDA and the Army and Air Force are 
establishing roles and responsibilities for the long-term operations 
and support of the European sites through negotiation of Overarching 
Memorandums of Agreement and ballistic missile defense element-specific 
annexes to the overarching agreements. However, with the exception of 
the Overarching Memorandum of Agreement between MDA and the Army, 
completed in January 2009, these agreements are not yet complete. 

In addition, the Army Corps of Engineers-Europe District is the 
construction agent for both the European Interceptor Site and the 
European Midcourse Radar Site. As such, the Corps is responsible for 
issuing and commissioning site preparation and construction contracts 
for the sites. The Corps will manage the contracts to ensure that the 
sites are developed and constructed to meet MDA and service facility 
requirements. However, no contracts can be issued or site preparation 
commissioned until the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreements and 
supplementary Status of Forces Agreements with the host nations are 
signed and ratified. For the Czech Republic, construction may begin 
after ratification of agreements between the United States and the 
Czech Republic; however, for Poland, construction may begin only after 
ratification of the agreements by both countries. MDA officials told us 
that since Poland and the Czech Republic did not ratify their 
respective agreements by spring 2009, both sites will experience 
construction delays based on target construction completion dates of 
the first quarter of fiscal year 2013 for the radar site and the second 
quarter of fiscal year 2013 for the interceptor site. 

Delayed Ratification of Key Agreements with Host Nations and Incomplete 
Agreements between MDA and the Services Present Challenges to DOD's 
Planning and Implementation of Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe: 

While DOD has made progress with key international partners and U.S. 
stakeholders on the planning and implementation of missile defenses in 
Europe, several challenges affect DOD's ability to carry out its plans 
for the ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Neither Poland nor the 
Czech Republic has ratified either its overall Ballistic Missile 
Defense Agreement or a supplementary Status of Forces Agreement. The 
lack of ratified agreements limits DOD's ability to negotiate specific 
details, such as security, that are expected to be formalized in 
implementing arrangements to each overall agreement. Table 1 shows the 
status of these key documents. 

Table 1: Status of Key Bilateral Agreements: 

Key agreements: Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement complete? 
European Interceptor Site (Poland): Yes; 
European Midcourse Radar Site (Czech Republic): Yes. 

Key agreements: Supplementary Status of Forces Agreement complete? 
European Interceptor Site (Poland): Negotiations ongoing; 
European Midcourse Radar Site (Czech Republic): Yes. 

Key agreements: Agreements ratified? 
European Interceptor Site (Poland): No; 
European Midcourse Radar Site (Czech Republic): No. 

Key agreements: Implementing arrangements complete? 
European Interceptor Site (Poland): To be negotiated after 
ratification[A]; 
European Midcourse Radar Site (Czech Republic): To be negotiated after 
ratification. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] The United States and Poland are currently negotiating a land use 
implementing arrangement before ratifying the agreements, per the 
European Interceptor Site Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement. 

[End of table] 

U.S. and Polish officials also told us that the ratification process in 
Poland is on hold until the supplementary Status of Forces Agreement is 
negotiated and the new administration establishes its policy toward 
ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Additionally, U.S. officials 
indicated that the ratification process is also on hold in the Czech 
Republic pending the new administration's policy. While DOD's $7.8 
billion fiscal year 2010 budget proposal for missile defense reflects 
an increased emphasis on bolstering near-term capabilities to respond 
to specific theater threats, as opposed to an overall long-term global 
ballistic missile defense capability, DOD officials have stated that 
the European missile defense capability in particular will be 
reevaluated as part of DOD's Quadrennial Defense Review, which is 
expected to be completed in early 2010. 

In the interim, the lack of negotiated and ratified agreements affects 
many aspects of DOD's ability to plan for the sites, ranging from the 
services' ability to plan for the numbers of personnel that will be 
required to the types of support infrastructure that will be needed for 
the personnel. For example, the exact numbers of security personnel 
needed at each site will not be finalized until the implementing 
arrangements are complete and decisions are made regarding the extent 
to which the Polish and Czech governments will contribute security 
personnel to the sites. In addition, U.S. European Command is leading 
meetings, working groups, and consultations on land use considerations 
in Poland, but the specific topics included in the land use 
implementing arrangement cannot be finalized until Poland and the 
United States have agreed on the contents of the bilateral 
supplementary Status of Forces Agreement. 

Moreover, Congress has placed restrictions on DOD's ability to fund 
procurement, site activation, military construction, and deployment of 
a missile defense system at the sites until the agreements have been 
ratified. Both the 2008 and 2009 National Defense Authorization Acts 
prohibit DOD from funding such activities at the radar site until the 
Czech parliament ratifies and the Prime Minister approves the missile 
defense and supplementary status of forces agreements. However, in 
Poland such activities can begin only after ratification and approval 
of agreements by both countries. Once DOD is able to begin, 
construction of both European sites is expected to take approximately 3 
years to complete. Completion of the sites' weapon systems 
installation, integration, and testing will continue after completion 
of construction. 

Finally, DOD's efforts to finalize roles and responsibilities for the 
European sites remain incomplete because MDA and the services have not 
yet made important determinations, such as establishing the criteria 
that must be met before the transfer of specific European missile 
defense sites to the services. MDA has been directed by DOD since 2002 
to begin planning for the transfer of missile defense elements, 
including the direction to coordinate with the services on resources 
and personnel needed to deliver an effective transition of 
responsibility. In addition, our prior work assessing interagency 
collaboration has shown that agreed-upon roles and responsibilities 
that clarify who will do what, organize joint and individual efforts, 
and facilitate decision making are important to agencies' abilities to 
enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts. While the Army was 
designated lead service for the European Interceptor Site in October 
2006 and the Air Force was designated lead service for the European 
Midcourse Radar Site in August 2007, the specific responsibilities 
related to these roles remain undefined. MDA and the services have 
begun to establish these roles and responsibilities through Overarching 
Memorandums of Agreement, with the purpose to outline the general 
delineation of responsibilities for the ballistic missile defense 
development and ongoing operations and support, as each element 
transitions and transfers from MDA to the services. While the Army and 
MDA completed their Overarching Memorandum of Agreement in January 
2009, negotiations between the Air Force and MDA on their Overarching 
Memorandum of Agreement are ongoing. 

In addition, the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement are expected to 
include element-specific annexes for each of the ballistic missile 
defense elements, including the European Midcourse Radar Site and the 
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, which will include details on the 
European Interceptor Site. The annexes are expected to specifically 
state the criteria that must be met by MDA before the elements transfer 
to the Army and the Air Force and detail specific roles and 
responsibilities for each organization. Further, the annexes will 
indicate the extent to which MDA will retain control of a missile 
defense element's materiel development and the services will assume 
control of the remaining supporting responsibilities, such as doctrine, 
organization, training, leader development, personnel, and facilities. 
However, MDA and the Army and Air Force are still negotiating the 
annexes for the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense and the European 
Midcourse Radar Site and it is unclear when these annexes will be 
complete. As a result, the roles and responsibilities specific to the 
European sites remain undefined because MDA and the services have not 
yet agreed to the terms of transfer that are to be established in these 
annexes. Table 2 shows the status of the Overarching Memorandums of 
Agreement and element-specific annexes being negotiated between MDA and 
the Army and Air Force. 

Table 2: Status of Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and Annexes: 

Key agreement: Overarching Memorandum of Agreement; 
MDA/Army: Signed by MDA and Secretary of the Army in January 2009; 
MDA/Air Force: Negotiations ongoing. 

Key agreement: Element-specific annex; 
MDA/Army: Negotiations ongoing for Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 
Annex, to include details on the European Interceptor Site; 
MDA/Air Force: Negotiations ongoing for European Midcourse Radar Site 
Annex. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

Until specific roles and responsibilities for the sites are established 
and key criteria that will guide the transfer of the elements from MDA 
to the Army and Air Force are defined, uncertainty will persist in how 
the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site 
will be sustained over the long term. The delay in ratification creates 
an opportunity for DOD and MDA to address some of the planning 
challenges DOD faces for the European sites. 

DOD's Military Construction and Operations and Support Cost Estimates 
for Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe Have Limitations and Do Not 
Provide Congress Complete Information: 

DOD's initial cost estimates for total military construction and 
operations and support costs for ballistic missile defenses in Europe 
had significant limitations. First, DOD's fiscal year 2009 military 
construction estimates did not fully account for all costs at the 
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site and 
consequently could increase significantly. Second, DOD's operations and 
support cost estimates are not complete and it is unclear how these 
costs will be funded over the elements' life cycles. Without full 
information on total military construction and operations and support 
costs for the European missile defense sites, DOD and congressional 
decision makers do not have a sound basis on which to evaluate the 
investment required to implement plans for ballistic missile defenses 
in Europe. 

DOD's Fiscal Year 2009 Military Construction Cost Estimates Do Not 
Include All Costs: 

DOD's initial military construction cost estimates for ballistic 
missile defenses in Europe have significant limitations and restrict 
Congress's ability to evaluate the investment required to implement 
plans for ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Key principles for cost 
estimating state that complete cost estimates are important in 
preparing budget submissions and for assessing the long-term 
affordability of a program.[Footnote 10] However, DOD's fiscal year 
2009 estimates, the first military construction estimates for ballistic 
missile defenses in Europe, did not fully account for all costs at the 
sites. MDA initially submitted military construction cost estimates for 
the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site to 
Congress in February 2008 for inclusion in DOD's fiscal year 2009 
budget. MDA projected that a total of $837.5 million would be required 
to complete site preparation and construction activities at the sites--
$661.4 million for the interceptor site in Poland and $176.1 million 
for the radar site in the Czech Republic. However, the initial 
estimates did not include all costs primarily because MDA developed and 
submitted the military construction estimate to Congress before key 
site design work had been completed and without an Army Corps of 
Engineers review of the estimate. MDA stated that its approach was 
based on initial congressional authorization to field ballistic missile 
defense capabilities with research, development, testing, and 
evaluation funds; however, the fiscal year 2008 National Defense 
Authorization Act required that MDA begin using military construction 
funds for ballistic missile defense site construction for the fiscal 
year 2009 budget. 

Military construction regulations stipulate that a military 
construction program should reach the 35 percent design phase, a key 
construction design milestone, and that the Army Corps of Engineers 
should review the military construction estimates before they are 
submitted to Congress.[Footnote 11] However, MDA, asserting that it had 
statutory authority enacted by Congress to field initial ballistic 
missile defense capabilities with research, development, testing, and 
evaluation funds, developed and submitted its fiscal year 2009 military 
construction estimates without following traditional military 
construction requirements. MDA officials told us that MDA, in an effort 
to meet budget and construction timelines, developed and submitted its 
initial military construction estimates to Congress without completing 
key site design work. Army Corps of Engineers officials--although not 
involved in the development of the initial fiscal year 2009 military 
construction estimates--reaffirmed that the initial estimates were done 
without completing key site design work and that MDA based its 
estimates on assumptions and previous design experience from Fort 
Greely and other overseas operations, such as Shariki, Japan, rather 
than design data from the European sites, and did not have complete and 
accurate information about the sites when it submitted its estimates to 
Congress for the 2009 budget. For example, the initial figures 
overestimated the availability of local resources at both sites, such 
as local power supply, water and wastewater treatment facilities, and 
emergency support services. Army Corps of Engineers officials said that 
the Corps did not have the opportunity to provide input to or 
independently review MDA's initial military construction estimates 
before they were submitted, as would typically be required under DOD 
military construction regulations. MDA's initial military construction 
estimates were submitted in February 2008, but the Corps did not begin 
providing input to the design for the European Midcourse Radar Site and 
the European Interceptor Site until after it was issued design 
directives for the sites in September and October 2008, respectively. 
An Army Corps of Engineers official told us that the Corps has since 
made significant input to MDA's military construction estimates and has 
worked with MDA to refine the cost estimates based on updated data. 
However, an Army Corps of Engineers official stated that had the Corps 
been involved in the early planning and development of the military 
construction cost estimates for the sites, given its experience and 
prior work in Eastern Europe, the Corps may have been able to influence 
the initial military construction estimates. According to this 
official, the Corps would have likely recommended that more studies of 
the sites be performed, and subsequently, more actual data from the 
site studies would have been used to influence the estimates before 
they were submitted to Congress for the fiscal year 2009 budget. 

Additionally, DOD's initial military construction estimates for the 
interceptor and radar sites do not include Army and Air Force base 
operating support costs, such as military personnel housing. The Army, 
as the lead service designated to operate the European Interceptor 
Site, has begun planning for base operating support facilities and 
estimates that it will need $88 million in military construction funds 
to build the facilities that it requires for the Army personnel who are 
expected to be at the site. However, the Army's estimated facility and 
personnel requirements are based on assumptions that may change. For 
example, the estimate assumes that Poland, the host nation, will 
contribute military personnel for security at the interceptor site, 
even though the United States and Poland have not yet agreed on 
Poland's security personnel contribution. The implementing arrangements 
to be negotiated between the United States and Poland will determine 
the number of security personnel that Poland will contribute to the 
site, and this, in turn, will drive the Army's personnel and facility 
requirements at the site. Until these implementing arrangements are 
negotiated and Army personnel determinations are finalized, Army base 
support construction estimates for the interceptor site will be based 
on assumed host nation contributions for security and the total Army 
military construction requirements at the European Interceptor Site 
will not be confirmed. 

Conversely, the Air Force, as the lead service for the European 
Midcourse Radar Site, has not yet developed any military construction 
estimates for base support facilities at the site. Air Force officials 
have acknowledged that the Air Force will require, at a minimum, dining 
facilities; some form of military housing; and morale, welfare, and 
recreation services at the radar site to support Air Force personnel, 
but the Air Force has not yet determined its total base support 
facility requirements because Air Force personnel requirements are not 
finalized. The Air Force is anticipating that the Czech Republic will 
contribute personnel to assist the United States in providing security 
at the site, but it is unclear how many personnel the Czech government 
will provide. The implementing arrangements that will be negotiated 
between the United States and the Czech Republic are expected to 
determine the number of security personnel that the Czech Republic will 
contribute to the site, which will drive the Air Force's personnel and 
facility requirements at the site. Accordingly, the total Air Force 
military construction requirements at the European Midcourse Radar Site 
will not be confirmed until the implementing arrangements are 
negotiated and the Air Force personnel concept is finalized. Until that 
point, a DOD official stated that any Air Force base support 
construction estimates for the radar site will be based on assumed host 
nation contributions for security. As a result, DOD's current military 
construction cost estimates for base support facilities at the European 
missile defense sites should be considered preliminary. 

Another military construction cost that has not been included in the 
initial estimates is the cost to protect the European Midcourse Radar 
Site against a possible high-altitude electromagnetic pulse event. The 
Air Force believes that protection of the radar against a high-altitude 
electromagnetic pulse event is important to ensuring survivability of 
the site and has included it as part of its required criteria for 
transfer. However, Air Force officials told us that MDA is not planning 
to protect the site against this type of event and has not accounted 
for those costs in its military construction estimates for the site. 
MDA and the Air Force have not reached agreement on whether the site 
will include these protective measures and, if so, who will pay for 
them. Air Force officials told us that the costs to protect the site 
could increase the total military construction cost for the radar 
mission facilities by 10 to 20 percent if the protective steps are 
included in the design phase and construction of the radar. If the 
protective action is done after the radar site has been constructed, 
the cost could be much higher. 

Further, MDA did not account for foreign currency fluctuations in its 
estimates. Unfavorable currency exchange rate fluctuations could 
increase the total cost of construction as military construction funds 
will be obligated in U.S. dollars and site preparation and construction 
contracts will be awarded in euros. Although it is possible that 
currency fluctuations could occur in DOD's favor, an Army Corps of 
Engineers official estimated that an additional 20 percent of the total 
military construction cost estimate should be set aside for possible 
currency fluctuations. Without accounting for possible changes in the 
exchange rate, DOD risks exceeding its budgeted military construction 
funds if currency rates fluctuate unfavorably. 

As a result of the above limitations, DOD's projected military 
construction costs for the European Interceptor Site and the European 
Midcourse Radar Site are expected to increase significantly from DOD's 
original $837.5 million estimate in the fiscal year 2009 budget. In May 
2009, an Army Corps of Engineers official told us that after analyzing 
design data, the Corps recommended that MDA increase its military 
construction estimates for the European sites to almost $1.2 billion-- 
$803 million for the European Interceptor Site and $369 million for the 
European Midcourse Radar Site. Whether MDA will accept this 
recommendation and the extent to which total military construction cost 
estimates at the European sites will increase remains unclear. Despite 
the expected increase in projected military construction costs, MDA has 
not provided Congress updated military construction estimates since the 
initial estimates were submitted for the fiscal year 2009 budget in 
February 2008. Without complete information on the total military 
construction costs for the European missile defense sites, DOD and 
congressional decision makers do not have a sound basis on which to 
evaluate the investment required to implement plans for ballistic 
missile defenses in Europe or the extent to which those plans could 
divert resources from other national security priorities. 

MDA was appropriated $151.1 million in military construction funds for 
fiscal year 2009--$42.6 million for the European Interceptor Site and 
$108.5 million for the European Midcourse Radar Site. However, MDA will 
likely be unable to obligate any of these appropriated funds in fiscal 
year 2009 for site activation or military construction activities at 
the interceptor and radar sites as key bilateral agreements have not 
been ratified by the Polish and Czech parliaments. Moreover, the future 
of the sites is pending the outcome of the ongoing DOD review of plans 
for ballistic missile defense. According to MDA officials, MDA plans to 
request DOD and congressional authority to reprogram $50 million to $80 
million of the $151 million to use for planning and design efforts at 
the European missile defense sites, but as of June 2009, no formal 
action had been taken.[Footnote 12] However, MDA plans to retain the 
residual military construction funds--an estimated $70 million to $100 
million--to preserve DOD's options for potential construction at those 
sites as the schedule for construction is determined. 

DOD's Operations and Support Cost Estimates for Ballistic Missile 
Defenses in Europe Are Not Complete, and It Is Unclear How These Costs 
Will Be Funded over the Long Term: 

DOD's operations and support cost estimates for ballistic missile 
defenses in Europe are not complete because they do not include 
operations and support costs for base operations managed by the Army 
and Air Force. While MDA has estimated the operations and support costs 
it will need for the interceptors and radar--an estimated $612 million 
in the 2008-2013 Future Years Defense Program--this estimate does not 
include funds that the services may require to provide basing and 
support of the sites, such as facilities support, housing costs, and 
administration. Additionally, MDA and the Army and Air Force have not 
yet determined the full extent of these operations and support costs. 
Although MDA and the Army and Air Force have initiated the development 
of total operations and support cost estimates for the interceptor and 
radar sites, these estimates are not yet complete as key cost factors 
that will affect those estimates remain undefined. For example, the 
total number and distribution of U.S. military personnel, civilian 
contractors, and host nation-contributed military personnel that will 
be required to operate, support, and secure the sites will drive total 
operations and support costs, but has not yet been determined. These 
determinations depend on the number of personnel that Poland and the 
Czech Republic will contribute for security at the sites, to be 
negotiated as part of the implementing arrangements. Without complete 
information on the true costs of operating and supporting the European 
sites, the usefulness of information regarding those sites in DOD's 
Future Years Defense Program for congressional decision makers will be 
limited. 

Moreover, MDA and the Army and Air Force have not yet agreed on how the 
operations and support costs for the European Interceptor Site and the 
European Midcourse Radar Site will be funded over the elements' life 
cycles or who will pay for these costs. As we have previously reported, 
operations and support costs are typically over 70 percent of a 
system's total lifetime cost.[Footnote 13] Therefore, the future costs 
to operate and support the European sites over their lifetimes could 
reach billions of dollars. In September 2008, we reported that MDA and 
the services had not yet agreed on which organization(s) will be 
responsible for funding operations and support costs for the European 
Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site after fiscal 
year 2013 and over the elements' life cycles.[Footnote 14] Although MDA 
and the Army have agreed on the overarching terms and conditions for 
the transition and transfer of elements from MDA to the Army, this 
agreement does not provide specific details on how operations and 
support costs will be funded following transfer of the European 
Interceptor Site. For the European Midcourse Radar Site, the Air Force 
and MDA are drafting an agreement that will establish, among other 
things, which organization(s) will have funding responsibilities for 
the radar, but it is unclear when this agreement will be complete. 

As part of DOD's ballistic missile defense life cycle management 
process established in September 2008, DOD intends to pay for ballistic 
missile defense costs, including operations and support costs, other 
than those already agreed to be paid by the services, through 
defensewide accounts. In theory, these defensewide accounts would allow 
all ballistic missile defense costs to be clearly identified and would 
alleviate the pressure on the services' budgets to fund operations and 
support for ballistic missile defense programs. However, MDA and the 
services have not yet determined the amount and duration of funding for 
the individual ballistic missile defense elements, such as the European 
Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site, that will come 
from the defensewide accounts and there are disagreements about what 
costs should be covered by these accounts. For example, according to 
Air Force officials, the Air Force position is that the defensewide 
accounts should cover all costs for the radar over its life cycle, 
whereas MDA officials told us that all Army and Air Force base 
operating support requirements related to the missile defense sites in 
Europe should be paid for by the services. Until MDA and the Army and 
Air Force determine which organization(s) will be responsible for 
funding European missile defense operations over the life cycles of 
those elements, these costs will not be reflected in the Future Years 
Defense Program. As a result, DOD and congressional decision makers 
will have difficulty assessing the affordability of the plans for 
missile defenses in Europe over time and uncertainty will persist 
regarding how these elements will be supported over the long term. 

Conclusions: 

DOD has made progress in planning for the implementation of the 
proposed ballistic missile defense sites in Europe. However, the future 
of the sites is currently unclear and largely depends on the outcome of 
DOD's ongoing review of the ballistic missile defense program. This 
has, in turn, limited the willingness of Poland and the Czech Republic 
to complete and ratify necessary agreements with the United States. The 
delays in ratification of key agreements with Poland and the Czech 
Republic, however, create an opportunity to consider how MDA and the 
Army and Air Force should collaborate in the implementation of 
ballistic missile defenses in Europe and the future operations of the 
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site. An 
opportunity now exists to more clearly define roles and 
responsibilities for the sites as well as establish key criteria that 
will guide the transition and transfer of the elements from MDA to the 
Army and Air Force. Planning for transition and transfer of the 
ballistic missile defense elements from MDA to the military services 
has been a persistent challenge that has hindered DOD's ability to plan 
for the long-term support of the system. Without agreement on how the 
elements will transfer and clear definitions of the roles that MDA and 
the services will be responsible for, DOD will continue to face 
difficulties in determining how the European Interceptor Site and the 
European Midcourse Radar Site will be sustained in the near and long 
term. 

These sites will require a significant investment, but DOD has not yet 
provided Congress with an updated estimate of the costs for European 
ballistic missile defenses, restricting its ability to prepare for and 
weigh the trade-offs of a proposal that will likely cost billions of 
dollars over the long term. To date, MDA has not assessed the full 
costs of the sites, to include not only mission-related costs incurred 
by MDA over the long term, but also some base operating support costs 
that may be borne by the services. Given the program's limited 
information on costs to date, potential increases in military 
construction costs, and other uncertainty surrounding future costs, 
such as the extent of host nation contributions to security, as the new 
administration considers its position on missile defenses full 
information on the true cost of the European missile defense sites is 
increasingly important for decision makers as they evaluate policy 
options. It is therefore critical that congressional decision makers 
are regularly provided complete cost information with which to evaluate 
budget requests in the near term and future to determine whether 
fielding plans are affordable over the long term. Until DOD develops 
accurate, realistic, and complete cost estimates for military 
construction and operations and support for ballistic missile defenses 
in Europe, the credibility of its budget submissions will continue to 
be a concern. Moreover, until MDA and the Army and Air Force reach 
agreement on how missile defense operations and support costs for the 
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be 
funded over the long term, DOD risks that the services may not be 
financially prepared to operate and support these elements. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five 
actions: 

* To improve planning for the long-term support of the ballistic 
missile defense sites in Europe, direct MDA, the Army, and the Air 
Force to finalize the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and element- 
specific annexes that detail the specific roles and responsibilities 
for the European sites and define the criteria that must be met before 
the transfer of those sites from MDA to the Army and Air Force. 

* To provide for military construction cost estimates for ballistic 
missile defenses in Europe that are based on the best available data, 
direct MDA, in coordination with the Army and Air Force, to provide 
Congress annually, in alignment with the budget, updated military 
construction cost estimates for the European Interceptor Site and the 
European Midcourse Radar Site that reflect the data gathered from all 
site design efforts since project initiation; have been independently 
reviewed and verified by the Army Corps of Engineers; account for all 
military construction costs for the sites, including Army and Air Force 
base support facility requirements, recognizing that certain 
assumptions about host nation contributions will have to be made; and 
include costs for possible currency fluctuations. 

* To provide for more complete military construction estimates for 
future ballistic missile defense sites, such as the still-to-be- 
determined European site for the mobile radar system, direct MDA to 
follow military construction regulations by utilizing the Army Corps of 
Engineers to complete required site design and analysis and verify 
military construction cost estimates before submitting cost estimates 
to Congress. 

* To improve fiscal stewardship of DOD resources for ballistic missile 
defense, direct MDA and the Army and Air Force, in time for the fiscal 
year 2011 budget submission, to: 

- complete life cycle operations and support cost estimates for the 
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site and: 

- clearly define who is responsible for funding these operations and 
support costs over the elements' life cycles. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with three 
and partially concurred with two of our recommended actions. The 
department's comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided 
technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that MDA, the Army, and the Air 
Force finalize the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and element- 
specific annexes that detail the specific roles and responsibilities 
for the European sites and define the criteria that must be met before 
the transfer of those sites from MDA to the Army and Air Force. In its 
comments, DOD stated that the element-specific Army annexes are in 
coordination for estimated completion in calendar year 2009 and the Air 
Force Overarching Memorandum of Agreement is expected to be signed by 
the end of calendar year 2009. We believe these are positive steps. As 
noted in our report, we believe that an opportunity exists for DOD to 
clearly define roles and responsibilities for the sites as well as 
establish key criteria that will guide the transition and transfer of 
the elements from MDA to the Army and Air Force. Since the element- 
specific annexes are expected to specifically state the criteria that 
must be met by MDA before the elements transfer to the Army and the Air 
Force and detail specific roles and responsibilities for each 
organization, it is important for DOD to meet its estimated dates to 
finalize the Army annexes and complete the MDA-Air Force Overarching 
Memorandum of Agreement, and further, to negotiate Air Force element- 
specific annexes to ensure that the crucial details that will guide the 
long-term support of the European sites are clearly defined. Until MDA 
and the Army and Air Force reach agreement on how these elements will 
transfer, DOD will continue to face difficulties in determining how the 
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be 
sustained in the near and long term. 

DOD concurred with both of our recommendations to improve military 
construction cost estimates for ballistic missile defense sites. DOD 
concurred with our recommendation that MDA provide Congress annually 
updated military construction cost estimates for the European 
Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site. DOD stated that 
the BMDS Life Cycle Management Process and the associated BMDS 
Portfolio provide an opportunity for MDA, the Army, and the Air Force 
to integrate military construction cost estimates. DOD noted that the 
BMDS military construction projects and associated estimates will 
continue to be coordinated with the Army Corps of Engineers for 
certification, independent cost estimating, and reviews for scope 
completeness and technical sufficiency. Furthermore, DOD stated that 
Army and Air Force base support facility requirements will be planned, 
programmed, budgeted, and executed by the services and will not be 
included in MDA's BMDS Portfolio. Rather, DOD stated that the budgets 
for these sites will be collated and provided by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense from the coordinated requirements submitted by 
MDA, the Army, and the Air Force. However, until the BMDS Life Cycle 
Management Process and the BMDS Portfolio are fully implemented, it is 
unclear whether they will facilitate improved military construction 
estimates for the European sites. Further, DOD did not set a date by 
which it would annually provide Congress updated military construction 
estimates for the sites. Our report explains the importance of 
providing complete BMDS military construction cost information to 
congressional and DOD decision makers on a regular basis, which is the 
impetus for this recommendation. Also, DOD concurred with our 
recommendation that for future ballistic missile defense sites, MDA 
follow military construction regulations by utilizing the Army Corps of 
Engineers to complete required site design and analysis and verify 
military construction estimates before submitting cost estimates to 
Congress. In its comments, DOD stated that it is MDA's policy to follow 
appropriate regulations in execution of design and construction of BMDS 
sites and that MDA recognizes the Army Corps of Engineers as the DOD 
military construction agent for these projects, will follow military 
construction policy, and will remain responsive to DOD direction in 
deploying BMDS assets. 

DOD partially concurred with our two recommendations to improve fiscal 
stewardship of DOD's operations and support resources. DOD partially 
concurred with our recommendation that MDA and the Army and Air Force 
complete life cycle operations and support cost estimates for the 
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site in time 
for the fiscal year 2011 budget submission. In its comments, DOD stated 
that MDA will not be able to complete these cost estimates before the 
fiscal year 2011 budget submission, but that MDA will include available 
information on life cycle operations and support cost estimates in the 
fiscal year 2012 submission. DOD noted that information needed to 
complete a life cycle cost analysis will not be available until host 
nation ratifications are signed, site design is complete, and 
administration policy is set. While we understand the limitations that 
DOD faces in developing complete operations and support cost estimates 
before all of the details of the sites have been finalized, we continue 
to believe that it is crucially important for congressional decision 
makers to have the most up-to-date information on the long-term costs 
of the sites in order to assess the affordability of the proposed 
ballistic missile defenses in Europe. We continue to believe the 
recommendation is valid for MDA, the Army, and the Air Force to provide 
estimates of all known operations and support costs for the sites in 
the 2011 budget. DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation 
that MDA and the Army and Air Force clearly define who is responsible 
for funding operations and support costs over the elements' life cycles 
in time for the fiscal year 2011 budget submission. DOD noted that MDA 
will continue to work with the Army and Air Force to define 
responsibility for future operations and support cost funding, and 
reiterated that the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement between the 
lead services and MDA, which define responsibility for life cycle 
costs, have not yet been finalized. Determining responsibility for the 
long-term operations and support costs of the BMDS elements has been a 
persistent challenge for DOD and until MDA and the Army and Air Force 
determine which organization(s) will be responsible for funding 
European missile defense operations over the life cycles of those 
elements, these costs will not be fully reflected in DOD's Future Years 
Defense Program and DOD risks that the services may not be financially 
prepared to operate and support these elements. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 
Director, Missile Defense Agency; the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and other interested parties. 
The report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, 
please contact me at (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this 
report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

John H. Pendleton: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
planned for the initial implementation of ballistic missile defenses in 
Europe, including coordination with key international partners and U.S. 
stakeholders, we conducted site visits, reviewed key documentation, and 
interviewed relevant DOD, State Department, and host nation officials. 
During this review, we focused on the European Interceptor Site in 
Poland, the European Midcourse Radar Site in the Czech Republic, and 
the planned mobile forward-based radar to be fielded in a still-to-be- 
determined location. We conducted site visits and toured the base 
located outside of Slupsk, Poland, that is the proposed European 
Interceptor Site and the Brdy military training area, which is the 
proposed location of the European Radar Site. We met with DOD, State 
Department, and host nation officials to discuss the efforts under way 
to plan for the sites and examined key documents, including ballistic 
missile defense agreements with the host nations, memorandums of 
agreement between key U.S. stakeholders, and Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA), Army, Air Force, and Army Corps of Engineers documents for 
planning and site preparation. Using GAO key principles for management, 
we evaluated the collaboration efforts among the agencies to determine 
whether DOD, Army, Air Force, and State Department officials followed 
key practices that can help agencies enhance and sustain their 
collaborative efforts to determine what aspects of planning may be 
missing that would hinder the implementation of ballistic missile 
defenses in Europe.[Footnote 15] For both objectives, we reviewed key 
legislation related to ballistic missile defenses in Europe[Footnote 
16] and DOD's overall approach for preparing to support ballistic 
missile defense. 

During our review of the ballistic missile defenses in Europe, GAO 
contacted agency officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense; 
the State Department; the Joint Staff; U.S. Strategic Command; U.S. 
Northern Command; U.S. European Command; U.S. Army Europe; U.S. Air 
Force Europe; MDA; the Department of the Army; Army Space and Missile 
Defense Command; the Department of the Air Force; Air Force Space 
Command; U.S. Embassy Warsaw; U.S. Embassy Prague; the U.S. Mission to 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the European Interceptor Site 
in Poland; and the European Midcourse Radar Site in the Czech Republic. 

To assess whether DOD has estimated the total costs, including military 
construction and long-term support costs for the ballistic missile 
defenses in Europe, we examined budget documents, including DOD's 
fiscal year 2009 Future Years Defense Program (including budget data 
for fiscal years 2008-2013), MDA's fiscal year 2009 military 
construction cost estimates, and the Army's military construction cost 
estimates. We reviewed DOD policies related to estimating military 
construction costs and key principles for cost estimating as well as 
our best practices for developing and managing capital program costs. 
[Footnote 17] We interviewed DOD officials to determine how the cost 
estimates were developed. We discussed the status of military 
construction cost estimates with officials from MDA, the Army, and the 
Army Corps of Engineers-Europe District. We also interviewed Air Force 
officials to determine whether military construction cost estimates had 
been developed for the radar site. In addition, to determine whether 
DOD has estimated long-term operations and support costs for ballistic 
missile defenses in Europe, we assessed key documents, such as the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Life Cycle Management Process memo and the 
Army's Ballistic Missile Defense System Overarching Memorandum of 
Agreement with MDA, to determine the extent to which MDA and the Army 
have agreed to fund operations and support costs for ballistic missile 
defenses in Europe and confirmed our understanding with MDA and the 
Army. We interviewed Air Force officials to determine whether long-term 
operations and support cost estimates had been developed and the extent 
to which MDA and the Air Force have agreed to fund operations and 
support costs for ballistic missile defenses in Europe. We discussed 
our findings with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; MDA; the Army; and 
the Air Force. 

We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 to August 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Undersecretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

July 27, 2009: 

Mr. John H. Pendleton: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U. S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Pendleton: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report GAO-09-771, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to 
Improve Planning and Information on Construction and Support Costs for 
Proposed European Sites," dated June 23, 2009 (GAO Code 351279).
The DoD concurs with three of the draft report's recommendations and 
partially concurs with one. The rationale for the DoD's position is 
enclosed. 

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. Technical 
comments were provided separately for your consideration. Should you 
have any questions, please contact Mr. David Crim, Strategic Warfare 
Office, (703) 697-5385, david.crim@osd.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

David G. Ahern: 
Director: 
Portfolio Systems Acquisition: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated June 23, 2009: 
GAO-09-771 (GAO Code 351279): 

"Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed To Improve Planning And 
Information On Construction And Support Costs For Proposed European 
Sites" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that to improve planning for the 
long-term support of the ballistic missile defense sites in Europe, the 
Secretary of Defense direct the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Army, 
and Air Force to finalize the Overarching Memorandums of Agreement and 
element specific annexes that detail the specific roles and 
responsibilities for the European sites and define the criteria that 
must be met before the transfer of those sites from MDA to the Army and 
Air Force. 

DoD Response: Concur. The Army Overarching Memorandum of Agreement 
(OMOA) was signed on January 23, 2009, by the Secretary of the Army and 
January 28, 2009, by the Director, MDA. Specific Army annexes are in 
coordination for estimated completion in CY 2009. The Foreign Military 
Sales annex to the OMOA is complete. We anticipate the Air Force OMOA 
to be signed by end of CY 2009. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that to provide military 
construction cost estimates for ballistic missile defenses in Europe 
that are based on the best available data, the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), in coordination with the Army 
and Air Force, to provide Congress annually, in alignment with the 
budget, updated military construction cost estimates for the European 
Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site that reflect the 
data gathered from all site design efforts since project initiation; 
have been independently reviewed and verified by the Army Corps of 
Engineers; account for all military construction costs for the sites, 
including Army and Air Force base support facility requirements, 
recognizing that certain assumptions about host nation contributions 
will have to be made; and include costs for possible currency 
fluctuations. 

DoD Response: Concur. The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Life 
Cycle Management Process and the associated BMDS Portfolio provide an 
opportunity for the MDA, the Army and the Air Force to integrate 
military construction cost estimates (including assumptions about host 
nation contributions and currency fluctuation). The estimates for 
Military Construction (MILCON) efforts that are/will be planned, 
programmed, budgeted and executed by MDA incorporate all construction 
requirements with consideration of all aspects of the GAO 
recommendation. These MILCON projects and associated estimates will 
continue to be coordinated with the Army Corps of Engineers for 
certification, independent costs estimating and reviews for scope 
completeness/technical sufficiency, with intended discussion at an 
upcoming Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB). MDA also continues to 
involve the Army and Air Force in planning for these efforts. That 
military construction to be planned, programmed, budgeted and executed 
by the Services (base support facility requirements) will not be 
included in the MDA BMDS Portfolio. Rather, the comprehensive, 
integrated, and aligned budgets for these sites will be collated and 
provided by OSD from the coordinated requirements submitted by the MDA, 
Army, and Air Force. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that to provide for more complete 
military construction estimates for future ballistic missile defense 
sites, such as the still-to-be-determined European site for the mobile 
radar system, the Secretary of Defense direct the Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA) to follow military construction regulations by utilizing 
the Army Corps of Engineers to complete required site design and 
analysis and verify military construction cost estimates before 
submitting cost estimates to Congress. 

DoD Response: Concur. It is the MDA policy to rigorously follow 
appropriate regulations in execution of design and construction of 
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) sites. The MDA recognizes the 
Army Corps of Engineers as the DoD Military Construction (MILCON) agent 
for these projects and is executing accordingly. MDA will follow MILCON 
policy and remain responsive to Departmental direction in deploying 
BMDS assets. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that to improve fiscal stewardship 
of DoD resources for ballistic missile defense, the Secretary of 
Defense direct the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Army, and Air 
Force, in time for the FY 2011 budget submission, to: 

* complete life cycle operations and support cost estimates for the 
European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site, and; 

* clearly define who is responsible for funding these operations and 
support cost over the elements' life cycles. 

DoD Response:
Part A. Partially Concur. MDA will include available information on 
life cycle operations and support cost estimates in the FY 2012 budget 
submission. The information needed to complete a life cycle cost 
analysis will not be available until Host Nation Ratifications are 
signed, site design is complete and Administration policy has been set. 
MDA will not be able to complete these cost estimates prior to the FY 
2011 budget submission. 

Part B. Partially Concur. MDA will submit a budget request for FY 2011 
that includes available information on current operations and support 
costs. MDA will continue to work with the Army and Air Force to define 
responsibility for future operations and support cost funding. 
Currently, the relationship between the lead service and MDA is being 
defined. The memoranda of agreement between the lead services and MDA, 
which define responsibility for life cycle costs, have not yet been 
finalized. Furthermore, implementing arrangements between the U.S. and 
the host nation will further define life cycle costs and those 
agreements will not be defined until after ratification. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

John H. Pendleton, (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Marie A. Mak, Assistant 
Director; Pat L Bohan; Tara Copp Connolly; Susan C. Ditto; and Kasea L. 
Hamar made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When Considering 
Changes to Missile Defense Agency's Roles and Missions. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-466T]. Washington, D.C.: March 26, 
2009. 

Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense 
Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than Planned. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338]. Washington, D.C.: 
March 13, 2009. 

GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing 
and Managing Capital Program Costs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. Washington, D.C.: March 2009. 

Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost Estimates 
for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068]. Washington, D.C.: September 
25, 2008. 

Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve the Process for 
Identifying and Addressing Combatant Command Priorities. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-740]. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 
2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Progress Made in Fielding Missile Defense, but 
Program Is Short of Meeting Goals. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-448]. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 
2008. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency's Flexibility Reduces 
Transparency of Program Cost. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-799T]. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 
2007. 

Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting 
Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-430]. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 
2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Needs a Better Balance between 
Flexibility and Accountability. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-727T]. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 
2007. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates 
Results but Delivers Less at a Higher Cost. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-387]. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 
2007. 

Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and 
Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-473]. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 
2006. 

Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability 
but Falls Short of Original Goals. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-327]. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 
2006. 

Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for 
Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-817]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 6, 2005. 

Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify 
New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-962R]. Washington, D.C.: 
August 4, 2005. 

Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify 
New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-540]. Washington, D.C.: 
June 30, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 
2004. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-243]. Washington, 
D.C.: March 31, 2005. 

Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency of 
DOD's Projected Resource Needs. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-514]. Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2004. 

Missile Defense: Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and 
Accountability. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-409]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 23, 2004. 

Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing 
Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-254]. Washington, D.C.: February 26, 
2004. 

Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for 
Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-600]. Washington, D.C.: August 21, 
2003. 

Missile Defense: Alternate Approaches to Space Tracking and 
Surveillance System Need to Be Considered. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-597]. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 
2003. 

Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Practices Are Being Adopted, but Risks 
Remain. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-441]. 
Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003. 

Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed to Reduce Risks 
in Developing Airborne Laser. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-631]. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 
2002. 

Missile Defense: Review of Results and Limitations of an Early National 
Missile Defense Flight Test. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-124]. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 
2002. 

Missile Defense: Cost Increases Call for Analysis of How Many New 
Patriot Missiles to Buy. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-153]. Washington, D.C.: June 
29, 2000. 

Missile Defense: Schedule for Navy Theater Wide Program Should Be 
Revised to Reduce Risk. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-121]. Washington, D.C.: May 
31, 2000. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-181, ß 226 (2008), and Duncan Hunter National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, ß 233 
(2008). 

[2] GAO, Defense Management: Key Challenges Should be Addressed When 
Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency's Roles and Missions, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-466T] (Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 26, 2009). 

[3] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile 
Defense Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than 
Planned, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-338] 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2009). 

[4] GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost 
Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068] (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 25, 2008). 

[5] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). 

[6] Key principles for developing accurate and reliable cost estimates 
are drawn from DOD guidance and our Cost Estimating and Assessment 
Guide. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost 
Analysis Improvement Group, Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide 
(Washington, D.C., May 1992 and October 2007), and GAO, GAO Cost 
Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 
Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 

[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068]. 

[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068]. 

[9] The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 23, 
National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense (Dec. 16, 2002). 

[10] Key principles for developing accurate and reliable cost estimates 
are drawn from DOD guidance and our Cost Estimating and Assessment 
Guide. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost 
Analysis Improvement Group, Operating and Support Cost-Estimating 
Guide, and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. 

[11] Under DOD military construction regulations, the Army Corps of 
Engineers serves as the Army's construction agent and is typically 
required to review military construction estimates after a military 
construction program reaches the 35 percent design phase and before the 
estimates are submitted to Congress. The Army is assigned as the 
construction agent for most of Europe, including Poland and Czech 
Republic. DOD Directive 4270.5, Military Construction, para. 3.2; 
4.4.1, enc. 1 (Feb. 12, 2005). Further, the DOD Financial Management 
Regulation requires the design of all construction projects be at least 
35 percent complete, or alternatively that a parametric cost estimate 
based on a 15 percent complete design be completed before submission to 
Congress. DOD 7000.14-R, Military Construction/Family Housing 
Appropriations, vol. 2B, ch. 6, para. 060301.B.2 (July 2008). 

[12] According to officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Comptroller, in order to reprogram appropriated military construction 
funds for planning and design efforts, the MDA Executive Director must 
first send a formal request letter to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense to reprogram the military construction funds to planning and 
design funds. After the request letter is received, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense notifies the Office of Management and Budget and 
the request is reviewed. If the request is approved by the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget, 
appropriate congressional committees must also approve the request to 
reprogram the military construction funds to planning and design funds. 

[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068]. 

[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1068]. 

[15] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). 

[16] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-181, ß 226 (2008); Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, ß 233 (2008); and 
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, Div. E, Title I (2008). 

[17] DOD Directive 4270.5, Military Construction (Washington, D.C., 
Feb. 12, 2005); Army Regulation 420-1, Facilities Engineering: Army 
Facilities Management (Washington, D.C., Feb. 12, 2008); Unified 
Facilities Criteria 3-700-01A, Programming Cost Estimates for Military 
Construction (Washington, D.C., Mar. 1, 2005); Unified Facilities 
Criteria 3-700-02A, Construction Cost Estimates (Washington, D.C., Mar. 
1, 2005); Unified Facilities Criteria 3-701-07, DOD Facilities Pricing 
Guide (Washington, D.C., July 2, 2007); and GAO, GAO Cost Estimating 
and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing 
Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAOís actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAOís Web site, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: