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Address Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical 
Cooperation Program' which was released on March 31, 2009. 

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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

March 2009: 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: 

Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address Proliferation and Management 
Challenges in IAEA's Technical Cooperation Program: 

GAO-09-275: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-275, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the 
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

A key mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is 
promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through its Technical 
Cooperation (TC) program, which provides equipment, training, 
fellowships, and other services to its member states. The United States 
provides approximately 25 percent of the TC program’s annual budget. 
This report addresses the (1) extent to which the United States and 
IAEA have policies limiting member states’ participation in the TC 
program on the basis of nuclear proliferation and related concerns; (2) 
extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and monitor TC 
projects for proliferation concerns; and (3) any limitations and 
challenges in IAEA’s management of the TC program. To address these 
issues, GAO interviewed relevant officials at the Departments of State 
(State) and Energy (DOE) and IAEA; analyzed IAEA, DOE, and national 
laboratory data; and assessed State and IAEA policies toward the TC 
program. 

What GAO Found: 

Neither State nor IAEA seeks to systematically limit TC assistance to 
countries the United States has designated as state sponsors of 
terrorism—Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—even though under U.S. law these 
countries are subject to sanctions. Together, these four countries 
received more than $55 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 2007. 
In addition, TC funding has been provided to states that are not party 
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—India, 
Israel, and Pakistan—and neither the United States nor IAEA has sought 
to exclude these countries from participating in the TC program. 
Finally, IAEA member states are not required to complete comprehensive 
safeguards or additional protocol agreements with IAEA—which allow IAEA 
to monitor declared nuclear activities and detect clandestine nuclear 
programs—to be eligible for TC assistance, even though U.S. and IAEA 
officials have stressed the need for all countries to bring such 
arrangements into force as soon as possible. 

The proliferation concerns associated with the TC program are difficult 
for the United States to fully identify, assess, and resolve for 
several reasons. While State has implemented an interagency process to 
review proposed TC projects for proliferation risks, the effectiveness 
of these reviews is limited because IAEA does not provide the United 
States with sufficient or timely information on TC proposals. Of the 
1,565 TC proposals reviewed by DOE and the U.S. national laboratories 
for possible proliferation risks from 1998 through 2006, information 
for 1,519 proposals, or 97 percent, consisted of only project titles. 

IAEA faces several limitations and challenges in effectively managing 
the TC program. First, the TC program’s impact in meeting development 
and other needs of member states is unclear because IAEA has not 
updated and revised the program’s performance metrics since 2002. 
Second, the TC program is limited by financial constraints, including 
the failure of many member states to pay their full share of support to 
the program’s Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF). In 2007, the TCF 
experienced a shortfall of $3.5 million, or 4 percent, of the $80 
million total target budget, because 62 member states did not pay their 
full expected contributions, including 47 states that made no payment 
at all. Furthermore, IAEA has not developed a policy for determining 
when countries should be graduated from receiving TC assistance, 
including those defined by the UN as high-income countries. Finally, 
the TC program’s long-term viability is uncertain because of 
limitations in IAEA efforts to track how project results are sustained 
and because of shortcomings in strategies to develop new TC program 
partners and donors. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is asking Congress to consider requiring State to withhold a 
proportionate share of its contributions to the TCF for TC program 
assistance provided to U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism or 
to report to Congress on its rationale for not withholding a 
proportionate share of its TCF contribution for such countries. State 
opposed a proportionate withholding requirement. State agreed with the 
majority of GAO’s other recommendations. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-275]. For more 
information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

The United States and IAEA Do Not Systematically Limit or Prevent TC 
Assistance to Countries Posing Potential Terrorism and Proliferation 
Concerns: 

The United States Faces Difficulties in Identifying, Assessing, and 
Resolving TC Program Proliferation Concerns: 

Long-Term TC Program Effectiveness Is Limited by Outdated Program 
Metrics, Financial Resource Constraints, and Sustainability Concerns: 

Conclusions: 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: 2007 Technical Cooperation Assistance Recipient States and 
Territories: 

Appendix III: Numbers of Technical Cooperation Proposals Reviewed by 
U.S. National Laboratories, Categorized by Level of Proliferation Risk, 
by Year, 1998 through 2006: 

Appendix IV: 2007 Member State Contributions to the Technical 
Cooperation Fund: 

Appendix V: 2007 Technical Cooperation Disbursements, by Agency 
Program: 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: TC Assistance Disbursed to U.S.-designated State Sponsors of 
Terrorism, 1997 through 2007: 

Table 2: TC Assistance Disbursed to Countries Not Party to the NPT, 
1997 through 2007: 

Table 3: TC Assistance Received by States and Territories without IAEA 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements in Force, 2007: 

Table 4: TC Assistance Received by States and Territories without IAEA 
Additional Protocols in Force, 2007: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: TC Program Disbursements, by Technical Area, 2007: 

Abbreviations: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization: 

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency: 

LANL: Los Alamos National Laboratory: 

NPT: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 

ORNL: Oak Ridge National Laboratory: 

State: Department of State: 

TC: Technical Cooperation: 

TCF: Technical Cooperation Fund: 

UN: United Nations: 

U.S. Mission: U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna: 

WMD: weapons of mass destruction: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 5, 2009: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent 
international organization based in Vienna, Austria, that is affiliated 
with the United Nations (UN), has the dual mission of promoting the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and verifying that nuclear technologies 
and materials intended for peaceful purposes are not diverted to 
weapons development efforts. IAEA promotes peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy through its Technical Cooperation (TC) program, to support the 
development of nuclear power, applications in human health, food and 
agriculture, and nuclear safety, among other areas. All 145 IAEA member 
states are eligible for TC assistance; however, not all countries 
request assistance. The United States participates as a donor and is 
the largest financial contributor to the TC program, providing 
approximately 25 percent of its budget, or about $19.8 million, in 
2007. 

The TC program's mission is to help IAEA member states achieve their 
sustainable development priorities by furnishing them with relevant 
nuclear technologies and expertise. This mission is derived from 
Articles II and III of IAEA's statute. IAEA provides TC support to 
member states through individual projects, which may be implemented on 
a national, regional, or interregional basis. A few nonmember states 
receive assistance under some regional TC projects. 

The TC program also plays a role in facilitating Article IV of the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which affirms 
that all states party to the treaty have a right to participate in the 
exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological 
information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT also requires 
nonnuclear weapon state parties to the NPT (defined as those countries 
that had not manufactured and detonated a nuclear device before January 
1, 1967) to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material used in 
peaceful activities so that the agency can verify that their nuclear 
programs are not being used for weapons purposes.[Footnote 1] Most 
countries have concluded "comprehensive safeguards agreements" with 
IAEA, under which governments declare their nuclear materials and 
activities to IAEA. The agency then verifies and monitors these 
declarations. IAEA has sought to further strengthen its verification 
efforts through a complementary "additional protocol" to a country's 
comprehensive safeguards agreement. Under such protocols, states must 
provide IAEA with broader information and wider access rights on all 
aspects of their activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle.[Footnote 
2] 

In 2007, the TC program disbursed over $93 million in nuclear technical 
assistance to 122 countries and territories. TC projects have supported 
efforts to eradicate tsetse flies and other insect pests in certain 
regions, control communicable diseases in developing countries, and 
develop higher-yielding agricultural crops. As of June 2008, 1,290 TC 
projects were under way, with each project lasting, on average, 3 to 4 
years. A TC project typically has several components, including 
equipment procurement, provision of expert services, training, and 
fellowships. Each year, about 1,600 individuals around the world are 
granted fellowships by the TC program, allowing them to pursue 
specialized nuclear studies at universities, institutes, and other 
facilities outside their home countries.[Footnote 3] 

All TC projects are considered by the Technical Assistance and 
Cooperation Committee of IAEA's Board of Governors--the 35-member 
policy-making body for IAEA programs--before they are approved by the 
Board of Governors. This approval covers the entire life cycle of the 
project. The TC Department and other departments within IAEA's 
Secretariat begin working with the member states to develop project 
concepts and proposals approximately 1 year before the project is 
approved.[Footnote 4] 

Financing of TC projects is generally supported through the annual 
voluntary contributions of member states to IAEA's Technical 
Cooperation Fund (TCF).[Footnote 5] Each member state is expected to 
meet an annual financial pledge to the TCF, which is set as a 
percentage of the total fund's target budget. The U.S. target rate has 
been set at 25 percent, while many of the least developed countries are 
expected to contribute less than 1 percent of the TCF budget. 
Contributions to the TCF are fungible--that is, they are not designated 
for, and cannot be traced to, specific TC projects. 

In the United States, the two principal agencies involved in TC issues 
are the Departments of State (State) and Energy (DOE). U.S. funding to 
the TC program--including its contribution to the TCF, extrabudgetary 
funding for specific projects, and "in-kind" contributions[Footnote 6]-
-is provided from State's budget as part of the overall annual U.S. 
"voluntary contribution" to IAEA.[Footnote 7] In addition to providing 
funding to IAEA, State coordinates U.S. policy toward the TC program by 
working through the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in 
Vienna (U.S. Mission). 

We reviewed the TC program in 1997 and found that while the vast 
majority of TC projects did not involve the transfer of sensitive 
nuclear materials and technologies, nuclear assistance was provided to 
countries that posed a proliferation risk.[Footnote 8] Proliferation 
concerns about the TC program have persisted because of the assistance 
it has provided to certain countries and because nuclear equipment, 
technology, and expertise can be dual-use--capable of serving peaceful 
purposes, such as the production of medical isotopes, but also useful 
in contributing to nuclear weapons development. For example, in 2006, 
IAEA refused to support a TC proposal from Iran requesting assistance 
for a heavy water reactor near the town of Arak. Iran stated that the 
reactor was intended for the production of medical isotopes. The United 
States and other IAEA members objected due to concerns that the plant 
could serve as a source of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. 

In our 1997 report, we recommended that the Secretary of State direct 
the U.S. interagency group on IAEA technical assistance to 
systematically review all proposals for TC projects in countries of 
concern prior to their approval by IAEA to determine whether the 
projects are consistent with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals. In 
response, an interagency process was established, involving State, DOE, 
and the DOE national laboratories,[Footnote 9] to evaluate proposed and 
active TC projects for proliferation risks. State leads the reviews of 
TC project proposals and ongoing projects. DOE provides technical input 
to this process using the technical expertise of the national 
laboratories to assess the projects' proliferation risks and reports 
its findings to State. 

As agreed with your office, this report assesses the (1) extent to 
which the United States and IAEA have policies limiting member states' 
participation in the TC program on the basis of nuclear proliferation 
and related concerns; (2) extent to which the United States and IAEA 
evaluate and monitor TC projects for proliferation concerns; and (3) 
any limitations and challenges in IAEA's management of the TC program. 

The scope of our review covered the period from 1997 through 2007 
because our previous report on the TC program analyzed programmatic and 
financial data through 1996. To address these objectives, we 
interviewed key U.S. officials at State, DOE, and the U.S. Mission and 
analyzed documentation, such as cables, reports and analyses of the TC 
program, financial information, and statements and speeches by U.S. 
officials. We interviewed other individuals in the United States 
involved in TC program issues, including U.S. national laboratory 
representatives involved in conducting proliferation risk assessments 
of TC projects and proposals; Argonne National Laboratory staff who 
support State's oversight of the TC program and facilitate TC training 
and fellowship programs in the United States; and the U.S. 
representative to IAEA's Standing Advisory Group on Technical 
Assistance and Cooperation. 

We also interviewed officials at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, 
including representatives from the TC Department and other agency 
departments--specifically, the Departments of Management, Safeguards, 
and Nuclear Safety and Security. We obtained and analyzed documentation 
and data from IAEA, including annual reports, financial data, program 
guidance and strategy documents, auditor reports, and speeches and 
other statements pertaining to the TC program. We interviewed 
knowledgeable IAEA officials on the reliability of TC financial data 
and data on the numbers of TC projects and determined that the data 
were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

As initially agreed with your office, we intended to assess the extent 
to which TC projects have contributed to the safety and security of 
nuclear installations around the world. We developed a judgmental 
sample of TC projects to serve as the basis for our assessment and 
interviews with relevant IAEA officials. However, because IAEA did not 
provide us with an opportunity to interview relevant IAEA officials who 
oversee these projects, we were unable to sufficiently assess the 
contributions of the TC program in improving the worldwide safety and 
security of nuclear facilities. In addition, because IAEA restricted 
our access to information relating to reviews of TC projects by its 
Safeguards Department, we were unable to draw conclusions on the 
effectiveness of IAEA's internal review of TC projects for 
proliferation concerns. As agreed, we revised the objectives of our 
review accordingly. 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2007 to March 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides more 
detailed information on our scope and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

Neither State nor IAEA has sought to systematically limit or prevent TC 
assistance to countries that (1) have been identified as sponsors of 
terrorism, (2) are not parties to the NPT, and (3) have not completed 
comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements with IAEA. 
Specifically: 

* State officials told us that the United States does not 
systematically try to limit TC projects in Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and 
Syria--which the department lists as sponsors of terrorism. These four 
countries received more than $55 million in TC assistance from 1997 
through 2007. Moreover, IAEA officials told us that the agency does not 
seek to limit or condition TC assistance in countries such as Iran and 
Syria that have been found or suspected by IAEA of having violated 
their safeguards commitments and may be engaged in undeclared nuclear 
activities. Under U.S. law, however, State withholds a portion of its 
contributions, except for certain projects, to the TCF equal to the 
U.S. proportionate share of TC expenditures in Cuba. In the past, State 
has withheld a proportionate share of its TCF contribution for Iran, 
Libya, and the Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian 
Authority. Regarding Iran, State reported in 2007 that three TC 
projects in that country were directly related to the Iranian nuclear 
power plant at Bushehr. IAEA's Deputy Director General for the TC 
program told us that "there are no good countries and there are no bad 
countries" participating in the program and that it is more important 
for the program to engage as many countries as possible than to exclude 
some nations on the basis of political factors. 

* From 1997 through 2007, the TC program disbursed approximately $24.6 
million in assistance to India, Israel, and Pakistan, although these 
states are not party to the NPT. IAEA officials told us that NPT 
membership is not required for IAEA member states to receive TC 
assistance under the agency's statute. State officials told us that the 
United States does not attempt to systematically limit TC program 
support to countries that are not signatories to the NPT. 

* Nonnuclear weapon state members of IAEA are not required to complete 
comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements with IAEA to 
be eligible for TC assistance, even though U.S. and IAEA officials have 
stressed the need for all countries to bring such arrangements into 
force as soon as possible. We found that 17 states and territories 
without comprehensive safeguards agreements in force in 2007 received 
approximately $6.7 million in TC program assistance that year, while 62 
states and territories without an additional protocol in force in 2007 
received approximately $43.2 million in assistance that same year. 

The proliferation concerns associated with the TC program are difficult 
for the United States to fully identify, assess, and resolve for the 
following reasons: 

* Limited information on TC project proposals. State, DOE, and national 
laboratory officials told us that there is no formal mechanism for 
obtaining TC project information from IAEA during the proposal 
development phase. Of the 1,565 proposed TC projects DOE and the 
national laboratories reviewed for possible proliferation risks from 
1998 through 2006, information for 1,519 proposals, or 97 percent, 
consisted of only project titles. 

* Limited State documentation on how proliferation concerns of TC 
proposals were resolved. From 1998 through 2006, DOE and the national 
laboratories identified 43 of the 1,565 TC proposals they reviewed as 
having some degree of potential proliferation risk. IAEA approved 34 of 
these 43 proposals. However, we were unable to determine if State 
addressed DOE's and the national laboratories' concerns because--with 
the exception of one case--State could not document how it responded to 
these findings. State officials told us that as a result of a 2005 
reorganization of the department's arms control and nonproliferation 
bureaus, the office that monitors TC program issues has fewer staff to 
conduct IAEA oversight. 

* Shortcomings in U.S. policies and IAEA procedures related to TC 
program fellowships. State's Office of Multilateral Nuclear and 
Security Affairs lacks a formal policy and specific criteria to serve 
as the basis for approving or rejecting requests from TC fellows to 
study nuclear issues in the United States. In addition, we found 
shortcomings in the extent to which IAEA monitors the proliferation 
risks of TC fellowships. Specifically, IAEA does not systematically 
track individuals who have completed fellowships to determine whether 
they are still working on peaceful nuclear programs in their home 
country. 

We identified challenges limiting the TC program's long-term 
effectiveness in three areas: program performance metrics, financial 
resource constraints, and project and program sustainability. 
Specifically: 

* Inadequate program performance metrics. IAEA does not have adequate 
metrics for measuring the impact of the TC program. For example, IAEA 
officials told us that performance metrics developed in 2002 did not 
assess the impact of TC projects in meeting specific member state 
development and other needs, such as the number of additional cancer 
patients treated or the number of new nuclear security safety 
regulations promulgated. IAEA's internal auditor has also reported that 
the TC program lacks appropriate performance indicators. 

* Financial resource constraints. Many member states do not pay their 
full share of support to the TCF but nevertheless receive TC 
assistance, while some high-income countries also receive support from 
the TC program. The TCF experienced a shortfall in 2007 of $3.5 
million, or 4 percent, of the $80 million total target budget because 
62 member states did not pay their full contributions, including 47 
countries that made no payment at all. In addition, 13 member states 
that the UN has defined as high-income received TC assistance in 2007, 
but IAEA has not developed a policy or criteria for determining when 
such countries should be graduated from assistance. 

* TC project and program sustainability challenges. IAEA does not 
systematically review completed TC projects to determine or verify 
whether the host country is sustaining project activities and results. 
In addition, the TC program overall faces sustainability challenges 
because program funding is distributed across 18 different technical 
areas, making it difficult for IAEA to set clear program priorities and 
to maximize the impact of limited program resources. Finally, IAEA has 
developed outreach strategies to engage new potential partners and 
donors--primarily from international development organizations--to help 
sustain the TC program. However, this effort faces several limitations 
and shortcomings. 

We are asking Congress to consider directing State to withhold a share 
of future annual contributions to the TCF that is proportionate to the 
amount of funding provided from the fund for U.S.-designated state 
sponsors of terrorism and other countries of concern, as it currently 
does with Cuba and has done in the past with Iran, Libya, and the 
Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. We are 
also recommending that the Secretary of State, working with IAEA and 
other member states through the Board of Governors, explore a number of 
actions to address other proliferation and management concerns in the 
TC program, including (1) developing formal mechanisms for timely 
information sharing on TC project proposals between IAEA and the United 
States early in the project development phase; (2) strengthening 
mechanisms for collecting member state contributions to the TCF; and 
(3) establishing criteria and processes for graduating high-income 
countries from further TC program support. 

We provided a draft of this report to State and DOE for formal comment. 
We also provided IAEA with a detailed summary of the facts contained in 
the draft report. DOE and IAEA provided technical comments that we 
incorporated as appropriate. State agreed with 7 of our 10 
recommendations, neither agreed nor disagreed with the other three 
recommendations, and strongly opposed the matter for congressional 
consideration. State objected to the matter for congressional 
consideration for a number of reasons, stating that (1) it would be 
counterproductive to a separate recommendation we made encouraging all 
states to pay their full share to the TCF; (2) it would not stop TC 
projects in targeted countries because TCF funding is fungible; (3) 
Congress has exempted IAEA contributions from this type of 
proportionate withholding; (4) none of the TC projects in state 
sponsors of terrorism have been shown to have contributed to a weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) program; (5) there are adequate safeguards 
within IAEA to prevent TC projects from contributing to a WMD program; 
and (6) it would negatively impact the ability of the United States to 
achieve other critical objectives within IAEA. 

We do not believe the matter for congressional consideration is unique 
or unprecedented. Congress currently requires the withholding of a 
proportionate share of the U.S. contribution to the TCF for certain 
projects in Cuba, and has required withholding in the past for Iran, 
Libya, and the Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian 
Authority. However, in order to give Congress greater flexibility and 
more information, we have broadened the matter for congressional 
consideration to give Congress the option of requiring State to report 
on its rationale for not withholding a proportionate share of the U.S. 
contribution to the TCF for U.S.-designated state sponsors of 
terrorism. 

Notwithstanding our modification to the matter for congressional 
consideration, we still disagree with State's specific objections to it 
for the following reasons. First, we do not believe it is 
counterproductive to our other recommendation, which is geared toward 
strengthening mechanisms for collecting contributions to the TCF from 
member states that are receiving TC assistance, not from major donors 
such as the United States. Second, we believe that withholding a 
proportionate share of the U.S. contribution to the TCF for state 
sponsors of terrorism and other countries that the United States has 
sanctioned is a matter of fundamental principle and intended to foster 
a more consistent U.S. policy toward such nations. Third, while U.S. 
contributions to IAEA were exempted from the proportionate share 
withholding requirement in 1994, we note that the law was subsequently 
amended to require State to withhold a proportionate share of funding 
to IAEA for certain projects in Cuba and for all projects in Iran if 
State determines that such projects in Iran are inconsistent with U.S. 
nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals, will provide Iran with 
training or expertise relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, 
or are being used as a cover for the acquisition of sensitive nuclear 
technology. Fourth, given the limited information available on TC 
projects and the dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies and 
expertise, we do not believe State can assert with complete confidence 
that TC assistance has not advanced WMD programs in U.S.-designated 
state sponsors of terrorism. Fifth, we do not share State's confidence 
in IAEA's internal safeguards to prevent TC projects from contributing 
to weapons development, since IAEA's information restrictions prevented 
us from assessing the effectiveness of its TC project review system. 
Lastly, neither we nor State can determine how other states might react 
to an increase in the United States' proportionate withholding of 
funding to the TCF and how it would affect U.S. ability to achieve 
other objectives within the agency. 

Background: 

Overall policy direction for the TC program is set by IAEA's policy- 
making bodies--the General Conference and the Board of Governors. The 
United States is a permanent member of the Board of Governors, which 
typically meets 5 times per year. IAEA's Secretariat--led by a Director 
General and structured into six functional departments--is responsible 
for implementing policies established by the Board of Governors and the 
General Conference. The Department of Technical Cooperation, which is 
headed by a Deputy Director General, is structured primarily around 
four regional divisions: Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and 
Latin America and the Caribbean. The department also includes a 
Division of Programme Support and Coordination, which is responsible 
for developing TC program strategies, communications, and partnerships, 
and managing relevant information systems and TC financial resources. 
In addition, an external auditor and IAEA's Office of Internal 
Oversight Services conduct annual audits and reviews of the TC program. 

Several individuals are involved in the TC project team responsible for 
developing and overseeing the project. The team includes (1) a project 
officer within the TC Department; (2) a technical officer from each 
relevant IAEA department (such as the Department of Nuclear Sciences 
and Applications); and (3) a national liaison officer at the country 
level who represents the member state, serves as coordinator for TC 
projects in the host country, and acts as liaison with host country 
governments and institutes. 

Typically, the TC program develops and approves new projects on a 2- 
year cycle. The most recent set of new proposals were approved in fall 
2008.[Footnote 10] Member states begin submitting project proposal 
concepts to IAEA in September of the year prior to approval. IAEA 
officials screen concepts through the fall, and member states develop 
and refine their proposals through March of the approval year. By July, 
IAEA's Secretariat comes to a final agreement on TC project proposals 
that it will back for approval by the Technical Assistance and 
Cooperation Committee and the Board of Governors. The TC project 
proposals are discussed with member states in bilateral and regional 
group meetings during IAEA's General Conference, which is held in 
September; in November, the Technical Assistance and Cooperation 
Committee and the Board of Governors give final approval to the 
proposed TC projects. 

The United States and IAEA Do Not Systematically Limit or Prevent TC 
Assistance to Countries Posing Potential Terrorism and Proliferation 
Concerns: 

Neither the United States nor IAEA seeks to systematically limit or 
deny TC assistance to countries designated as state sponsors of 
terrorism, even though under U.S. law these countries are subject to 
sanctions. In addition, TC assistance has been provided to countries 
that are not party to the NPT, and neither the United States nor IAEA 
has sought to exclude these nations from TC assistance. Finally, while 
the United States has encouraged IAEA to condition TC assistance to 
countries according to their safeguards status, IAEA does not take this 
factor into account when allocating program funds. Appendix II provides 
more detailed information on the states and territories that received 
TC assistance in 2007. 

Four Countries Designated by the United States as State Sponsors of 
Terrorism Receive TC Assistance: 

Countries deemed by State as state sponsors of terrorism--meaning the 
Secretary of State has determined that the countries' governments have 
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism--have 
been provided nuclear equipment and other assistance through the TC 
program. The United States has designated four countries--Cuba, Iran, 
Sudan, and Syria--as state sponsors of terrorism, pursuant to several 
U.S. laws.[Footnote 11] According to our review of IAEA data and 
financial records, 111 TC projects were approved for these four 
countries from 1997 through 2007, and they received approximately $55.7 
million in TC assistance over that period. These projects ranged across 
a number of areas, from applying nuclear technologies to treat diseases 
and improve crop productivity to assisting nuclear power development. 
Table 1 shows the dollar amount of TC assistance each U.S.-designated 
state sponsor of terrorism received from 1997 through 2007. 

Table 1: TC Assistance Disbursed to U.S.-designated State Sponsors of 
Terrorism, 1997 through 2007: 

Dollars in thousands: 

U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba; 
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $13,740.8. 

U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism: Islamic Republic of Iran; 
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $15,571.7. 

U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism: Sudan; 
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $11,913.9. 

U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism: Syrian Arab Republic; 
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $14,469.0. 

U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism: Total; 
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $55,695.4. 

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

[End of table] 

According to State, the United States has applied several types of 
sanctions to these four countries, including restrictions on U.S. 
foreign assistance, a ban on defense exports and sales, certain 
controls over exports of dual-use items,[Footnote 12] and miscellaneous 
financial and other restrictions. These sanctions notwithstanding, 
direct U.S. nuclear trade with these countries involving the types of 
technologies provided by the TC program might not be permitted under 
U.S. adherence to other international nonproliferation controls. For 
instance, in a 2007 report to Congress, State concluded that three TC 
projects involving technology transfer for the operation and 
maintenance of the Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr could be 
subject to multilateral export controls if Iran were to procure such 
technology directly from suppliers. The State report noted, "under the 
Nonproliferation Principle of the NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group] 
[Footnote 13] Guidelines the United States and other responsible 
members of the NSG would deny such direct transfers." 

The United States has not sought to systematically exclude or limit the 
four U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism from TC assistance. 
State officials told us that the department would not recommend 
withholding U.S. funding to the TC program because of the support that 
IAEA provides to these four countries. They said that it is a long- 
standing department policy to pay the full share of U.S. support to the 
TC program because doing so helps maintain international political 
support for and participation in IAEA, including international support 
for safeguards. In addition, because TCF resources are fungible, State 
officials asserted that withholding U.S. contributions to the TCF to 
punish state sponsors of terrorism would have no practical impact on 
the TC funding these nations receive. A U.S. Mission official told us 
that once the United States provides its contribution to the TCF, it 
cedes control over how the funds are disbursed by IAEA. 

Several laws govern U.S. support to the TC program. One restriction 
under these laws prohibits U.S. funds contributed to IAEA from being 
used for projects in Cuba, except in certain circumstances. 
Accordingly, State withholds a portion of its voluntary contribution to 
the TCF equal to the U.S. proportionate share of the TC program's 
expenditures in Cuba.[Footnote 14] In the past, the United States also 
withheld a proportionate share of its TCF contribution for Iran, Libya, 
and Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. 
State also must report annually to Congress on all IAEA programs or 
projects in certain countries, including Burma (Myanmar), Cuba, Iran, 
North Korea, and Syria.[Footnote 15] 

IAEA officials told us that the TC program does not attempt to exclude 
countries on the basis of their status as U.S.-designated state 
sponsors of terrorism or other political considerations. Under the TC 
program's guiding principles, for example, the provision of TC 
assistance is not subject to any political, economic, military, or 
other conditions that are inconsistent with IAEA's statute. Moreover, 
according to the Deputy Director General for the TC program, requests 
for TC assistance are evaluated strictly on technical merits and the 
contributions of proposed projects to a nation's development 
priorities, subject to the conditions of the IAEA statute, IAEA guiding 
principles and operating rules pertaining to technical assistance, and 
any relevant decisions by the Board of Governors and the UN Security 
Council. This official added that the program seeks to include as many 
countries as possible and that "there are no good countries and there 
are no bad countries" participating in the program. In her view, 
denying or limiting participation of member states in the TC program 
was a matter for the Board of Governors to consider. 

Other IAEA officials told us that under the agency's statute, IAEA's 
Secretariat is powerless to limit or condition TC assistance to 
specific countries, even in cases where countries have been deemed by 
the Board of Governors to be violating their IAEA obligations or in 
cases where recipient countries were suspected of being engaged in 
undeclared, clandestine nuclear activities. For instance, the Board of 
Governors determined in September 2005 that Iran had breached its 
safeguards obligations and was not complying with IAEA's statute. 
However, TC projects in Iran were not restricted until February 2007 
following a UN Security Council resolution on Iran's nuclear 
activities.[Footnote 16] In addition, in 2008, IAEA's Director General 
stated it would be inappropriate to block approval of a TC project in 
Syria for a nuclear power plant feasibility study before IAEA verified 
claims concerning Syria's alleged construction of an undeclared nuclear 
reactor. According to State officials, several countries, including the 
United States, asserted that the approval of this project would be 
"wholly inappropriate" when Syria had not provided all of the 
cooperation required by IAEA to investigate these allegations. IAEA's 
Board of Governors ultimately approved the project in November 2008. 
The United States did not attempt to block approval of the project 
after receiving assurances that IAEA would monitor the project closely, 
report as appropriate, and ensure that any equipment provided under the 
project would be used only for the intended purposes. 

Finally, in addition to providing assistance to the four countries the 
United States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism, the TC 
program has also provided nuclear technology and expertise to other 
countries that the United States has sanctioned or taken other punitive 
actions against. Examples of such countries and the total amounts of TC 
assistance provided to them from 1997 through 2007 include the 
following: 

* Approximately $7.3 million for Burma, which is subject to targeted 
U.S. trade, financial, and other sanctions. The Secretaries of State 
and of Energy have declared jointly that the development of nuclear 
infrastructure of any kind in Burma would be inappropriate. TC projects 
have been approved for Burma to improve nuclear instrument repair and 
maintenance services, enhance pest control, and apply nondestructive 
testing techniques in construction projects. 

* Approximately $9.7 million for Belarus, which the United States has 
characterized as "a regime of repression in the heart of Europe" and 
against which the United States has imposed targeted financial 
sanctions and travel restrictions. TC support has been provided to 
assist Belarus in minimizing threats posed by radioactive waste at 
former military sites, establishing a center of competence on radiation 
oncology, and remediating areas affected by the Chernobyl accident. 

* Approximately $6.1 million for Venezuela, which, among other things, 
State has determined to be engaging in diplomacy designed to 
deliberately undermine U.S. interests, including deepening relations 
with Iran and publicly supporting Iran's nuclear program. IAEA has 
approved TC assistance for Venezuela to help it strengthen its 
technical capabilities in radiotherapy, nuclear medicine, and 
radiopharmaceutical services, and to more effectively apply nuclear 
techniques in managing water resources. 

Based on our review of recent project summaries, the TC assistance 
provided to these countries does not appear to involve support that 
could have direct weapons applications. However, as we discuss in the 
following section, given the dual-use nature of some nuclear technology 
and the absence of more complete information from IAEA, it is difficult 
for the United States to make firm judgments about the proliferation 
risks of TC proposals and projects. 

Non-NPT Countries Are Receiving TC Assistance: 

U.S. and IAEA officials have described the NPT as the cornerstone of 
the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a key legal 
barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation. However, states that are not 
party to the NPT--India, Israel, and Pakistan--received approximately 
$24.6 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 2007. India has not 
received TC assistance through national-level TC projects but has 
received TC support as a participant in regional TC projects. Israel 
and Pakistan have received support for 63 national-level projects, as 
well as for regional TC projects. For example, national TC projects in 
Israel and Pakistan have included assistance to control fruit flies and 
suppress other pests, enhance nuclear medicine practices and establish 
radiation physics courses, and improve nuclear safety. Table 2 shows 
the total amount of TC assistance provided to each of these countries 
from 1997 through 2007. 

Table 2: TC Assistance Disbursed to Countries Not Party to the NPT, 
1997 through 2007: 

Dollars in thousands: 

Non-NPT states: India; 
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $3,419.1. 

Non-NPT states: Israel; 
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $3,891.5. 

Non-NPT states: Pakistan; 
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $17,254.9. 

Non-NPT states: Total; 
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $24,565.5. 

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

[End of table] 

The TC program does not differentiate between states based on their NPT 
status. IAEA officials told us that creation of IAEA predates the entry 
into force of the NPT, and treaty membership is not obligatory for IAEA 
membership and receipt of TC assistance under the agency's statute. 
India, Israel, and Pakistan joined IAEA before the NPT entered into 
force. 

State officials told us that the United States does not seek to 
systematically limit TC program support to countries that are not 
signatories to the NPT. State officials also told us that, in 
accordance with statutory requirements, State must annually determine 
and report to Congress that Israel's right to participate in IAEA 
activities is not being denied. However in its annual funding pledge to 
IAEA, State asks that IAEA give preference to states that are party to 
the NPT in allocating the U.S. contribution to the TC program. 

IAEA Does Not Condition TC Assistance on the Basis of the Recipient 
Country's Safeguards Status: 

While U.S. and IAEA officials have stressed the need for all countries 
to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional 
protocols with IAEA as soon as possible, neither the United States nor 
IAEA has sought to limit TC funding to countries that have not 
implemented such agreements. Together, these safeguards measures allow 
IAEA to provide assurances that all declared nuclear material is being 
used for peaceful purposes and that a country has declared all of its 
nuclear material and activities. 

Nearly all states receiving TC assistance are nonnuclear weapon state 
parties to the NPT. Under Article IV of the NPT, all states party to 
the treaty have the right to participate in the exchange of equipment, 
materials, and scientific and technological information for the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. According to IAEA, Article III of the 
NPT also makes it mandatory for all nonnuclear-weapon states to 
conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the agency. These 
agreements are to be concluded by such states within 18 months of their 
accession to the treaty. The United States and IAEA have recognized an 
inherent linkage between nonnuclear weapon states' rights to access 
peaceful nuclear technology and their obligation to accept safeguards 
on their nuclear activities, although State officials told us that to 
limit TC funding to states that have not completed comprehensive 
safeguards agreements with IAEA could be seen as inconsistent with 
IAEA's statute. 

IAEA has not conditioned TC assistance provided to recipient states on 
the basis of their safeguards status. According to our analysis of IAEA 
records, 17 countries and territories that did not have comprehensive 
safeguards agreements in force with the agency at the end of 2007 
received approximately $6.7 million, or about 7 percent, of the $93.3 
million in TC assistance disbursed in 2007. This list includes three 
states and one nonstate territory that are not party to the NPT--India, 
Israel, Pakistan, and the Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the 
Palestinian Authority. The remaining 13 states have all been party to 
the NPT longer than 18 months--in most cases for more than 10 years-- 
meaning they have not fulfilled their NPT Article III obligation. Table 
3 shows the states and territories that did not have comprehensive 
safeguards agreements in effect in 2007 and the amounts of TC 
assistance they received that year. 

Table 3: TC Assistance Received by States and Territories without IAEA 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements in Force, 2007: 

Dollars in thousands: 

States and territories without IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements 
in force, 2007: 

Angola; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $495.5. 

Benin; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $371.6. 

Central African Republic; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $365.3. 

Chad; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $143.3. 

Eritrea; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $242.2. 

Gabon; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $159.1. 

India; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $252.8. 

Israel; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $251.6. 

Kenya; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,093.5. 

Islamic Republic of Mauritania; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $156.1. 

Montenegro; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $18.9. 

Mozambique; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $17.5. 

Pakistan; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $2,233.9. 

Qatar[A]; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $232.8. 

Saudi Arabia[B]; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $321.5. 

Sierra Leone; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $348.4. 

Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $26.3. 

Total; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $6,730.3. 

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

[A] Qatar brought a comprehensive safeguards agreement into force in 
January 2009. 

[B] Saudi Arabia brought a comprehensive safeguards agreement into 
force in January 2009. 

[End of table] 

In addition, we found that 62 states and territories without an 
additional protocol agreement in effect with IAEA received 
approximately $43.2 million, or approximately 46 percent, of TC 
assistance in 2007. Without additional protocols in force, IAEA has 
limited ability to detect clandestine nuclear programs, and its 
inspection efforts remain focused on verifying declared nuclear 
material, activities, and facilities.[Footnote 17] Both State and IAEA 
officials have asserted that the additional protocol should become the 
new universal safeguards standard. Table 4 lists the states and 
territories without additional protocols in effect as of the end of 
2007 and the amounts of TC assistance they received that year. 

Table 4: TC Assistance Received by States and Territories without IAEA 
Additional Protocols in Force, 2007: 

Dollars in thousands: 

States and territories without IAEA additional protocols in force, 
2007: 

Albania; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $784.1. 

Algeria; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,361.4. 

Angola; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $495.5. 

Argentina; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,543.2. 

Belarus; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $969.8. 

Belize; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $61.4. 

Benin; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $371.6. 

Bolivia; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $817.4. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $399.2. 

Brazil; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: v1,480.4. 

Brunei Darussalam; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $0.5. 

Burma (Myanmar); 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $670.4. 

Cambodia; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $0.9. 

Cameroon; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $412.3. 

Central African Republic; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $365.3. 

Chad; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $143.3. 

Colombia; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $778.0. 

Costa Rica; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $749.6. 

Côte d'Ivoire; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $253.8. 

Dominican Republic; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $256.9. 

Egypt; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,280.9. 

Eritrea; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $242.2. 

Ethiopia; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $2,187.5. 

Gabon; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $159.1. 

Gambia; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $3.5. 

Guatemala[A]; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $435.6. 

Honduras; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $394.5. 

India; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $252.8. 

Islamic Republic of Iran; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,000.0. 

Iraq; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $190.6. 

Israel; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $251.6. 

Kenya; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,093.5. 

Kyrgyzstan; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $542.6. 

Lebanon; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $502.3. 

Malaysia; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,012.8. 

Islamic Republic of Mauritania; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $156.1. 

Mexico; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $962.8. 

Republic of Moldova; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $905.4. 

Montenegro; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $18.9. 

Morocco; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $996.9. 

Mozambique; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $17.5. 

Namibia; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $421.1. 

Pakistan; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $2,233.9. 

Philippines; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,510.7. 

Qatar; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $232.8. 

Saudi Arabia; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $321.5. 

Senegal; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $983.9. 

Serbia; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $2,129.4. 

Sierra Leone; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $348.4. 

Singapore[B]; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $137.8. 

Sri Lanka; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $810.8. 

Sudan; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,148.1. 

Syrian Arab Republic; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,525.4. 

Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $26.3. 

Thailand; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,057.4. 

Tunisia; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $789.0. 

United Arab Emirates; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $158.7. 

Venezuela; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $681.3. 

Vietnam; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,770.8. 

Yemen; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,179.2. 

Zambia; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $618.3. 

Zimbabwe; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $571.0. 

Total; 
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $43,177.9. 

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

[A] Guatemala brought an additional protocol into force in May 2008. 

[B] Singapore brought an additional protocol into force in March 2008. 

[End of table] 

In its annual pledge of funding to the TC program, State asks that IAEA 
consider whether a recipient country has in force a comprehensive 
safeguards agreement and an additional protocol when it allocates TC 
funds. However, according to IAEA officials, IAEA's Secretariat is not 
in a position to take such considerations into account in the absence 
of a decision by its policy-making bodies. The Deputy Director General 
for the TC program, for example, told us that such guidelines would 
need to be developed by the Secretariat after consultation with and 
approval by the member states. IAEA officials stated that while IAEA's 
statute, TC program guidance, and TC program agreements with individual 
member states include project-and technology-specific safeguards 
conditions and peaceful use obligations, these documents do not require 
that member states have comprehensive safeguards agreements or 
additional protocols in force to receive assistance. 

The United States Faces Difficulties in Identifying, Assessing, and 
Resolving TC Program Proliferation Concerns: 

The proliferation concerns associated with the TC program are difficult 
for the United States to fully identify, assess, and resolve for 
several reasons. First, while State has implemented an interagency 
process to review proposed TC projects for proliferation risks, 
consistent with the recommendation in our 1997 report, the 
effectiveness of these reviews is limited because IAEA does not provide 
the United States with sufficient or timely information on TC 
proposals. Second, for TC proposals that DOE and the national 
laboratories have identified as having possible proliferation risks, 
State was unable to provide us with documentation explaining how those 
proliferation concerns were addressed. Finally, State lacks a formal 
policy that identifies countries from which the United States will not 
accept TC fellows, and IAEA does not systematically monitor former TC 
fellows to determine whether they still reside in their home country 
and are still involved in peaceful nuclear research related to their 
fellowship studies. 

The United States Does Not Comprehensively Evaluate TC Proposals for 
Proliferation Concerns because IAEA Does Not Provide Sufficient and 
Timely Information: 

DOE and the national laboratories began reviewing TC proposals for 
possible proliferation concerns and providing their findings to State 
as the result of a recommendation in our 1997 report on the TC program. 
[Footnote 18] However, this review process is deficient because DOE and 
the national laboratories receive limited information to conduct their 
proliferation assessments and have little time to complete them. 
According to State, DOE, and national laboratory officials, the United 
States has had difficulty in obtaining detailed information on proposed 
TC projects during the proposal development phase. The initial proposal 
development process is internal to IAEA's Secretariat and information 
is kept confidential between the recipient country and the agency and 
is not releasable to third parties, including the United States. 
According to State, DOE, and national laboratory officials, IAEA member 
state representatives, including U.S. Mission staff, do not have a 
formal mechanism to obtain information on project proposals while they 
are under development. 

DOE and national laboratory officials told us that they attempt to make 
the best possible determination of TC proposal proliferation risks on 
the basis of all available information. However, in the vast majority 
of cases, the information they receive on TC proposals is very limited, 
according to our analysis of DOE and national laboratory data. 
Specifically, we found that national laboratory officials received only 
the title of proposed projects for 97 percent--or for 1,519 of 1,565-- 
of proposed TC projects they reviewed from 1998 through 2006. For the 
remaining 3 percent, or 46 of the proposed projects, DOE and the 
national laboratories were able to obtain some additional information 
on the proposed projects. See appendix III for more specific 
information on the number of TC proposals reviewed by DOE and the 
national laboratories from 1998 through 2006. 

DOE and national laboratory officials told us that a TC project 
proposal title can occasionally raise proliferation concerns but that 
the title alone is generally insufficient to reliably assess 
proliferation risk. Moreover, proposal titles can be misleading and 
obscure more serious proliferation implications. For instance, the 2006 
TC proposal from Iran requesting assistance for the completion of the 
Arak heavy water research reactor--a type of reactor that could be a 
source of plutonium for nuclear weapons--was entitled "Strengthening 
Safety Capabilities for the Construction of a Research Reactor." Iran 
asserted that the reactor was intended for the production of medical 
isotopes, and the proposal was approved for funding by IAEA's 
Secretariat. However, as a result of objections by the United States 
and other nations, the Board of Governors ultimately did not approve 
this proposal. 

In addition to the limited information on TC proposals available to the 
national laboratories, the dual-use nature of some nuclear technology 
also complicates efforts to assess TC proposals for proliferation 
risks. IAEA applies safeguards to nuclear material, equipment, and 
facilities provided through the TC program in four "sensitive 
technological areas"--uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, 
heavy water production, and handling of plutonium and mixed uranium- 
plutonium fuel. These four areas relate to the production and handling 
of fissile material. However, according to DOE and national laboratory 
officials, these four sensitive areas do not address all technologies 
related to the production of fissile material. For example, 
"nonsensitive" technology associated with the design and operation of 
civilian, light water power reactors might prove useful to countries 
seeking to design and build a plutonium production reactor. TC projects 
providing such technology might therefore raise proliferation concerns. 
Other "nonsensitive" skills and expertise that states acquire through 
TC assistance might provide basic knowledge useful to weapons, such as 
radioactive materials handling, familiarity with chemical processes and 
properties of nuclear materials, and use of various instruments and 
control systems. 

Even in cases where more information on TC proposals was obtained, 
national laboratory officials told us that they still often lacked 
crucial details--such as equipment specifications--to reliably assess 
the proliferation risks. As an example, national laboratory officials 
told us that some TC proposals could include requests for procurement 
of "hot cells" to produce isotopes--a technology with dual-use 
implications.[Footnote 19] However, without specific technical details 
of the hot cell, it would not be possible to determine the potential 
proliferation risks associated with such a device. 

In addition, DOE and national laboratory officials told us that in 
recent years, they have received less information about proposed TC 
projects. Moreover, DOE and national laboratory officials told us that 
such information is arriving closer to the time when such projects must 
be approved by the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee and 
the Board of Governors. The lack of full and timely information on TC 
project proposals complicates efforts by the United States and other 
IAEA member states to make informed decisions about TC proposals, 
including whether they raise proliferation concerns. State, DOE, and 
national laboratory officials told us that it is preferable to raise 
potential proliferation concerns about TC proposals with IAEA officials 
early in the development cycle, when such project proposals can be 
modified more readily. 

In 2004, IAEA's Safeguards Department began reviewing TC projects for 
possible proliferation risks. This review process includes evaluating 
proliferation risks of TC project proposals and reviewing all 
procurement requests made to the agency under ongoing TC projects. 
However, IAEA officials told us that the results of the Safeguards 
Department reviews are confidential and are not shared with the United 
States or other governments. IAEA officials declined to provide us with 
certain basic information regarding the results of these reviews, 
including the total number of TC proposals that the Safeguards 
Department identified as having possible proliferation concerns. 

State Could Not Substantiate How It Addressed TC Proposals Identified 
by DOE as Having Possible Proliferation Risks: 

Under the interagency process for reviewing TC proposals for 
proliferation concerns, DOE and the national laboratories provide State 
with their assessments of the proposals. State, however, was unable to 
provide us with documentation describing the actions it took on the 
basis of DOE's and the national laboratories' findings or how, if at 
all, it raised their concerns with IAEA. According to DOE and the 
national laboratories' assessment of TC proposals from 1998 through 
2006, 43 of the 1,565 TC proposals reviewed had some degree of 
potential proliferation concern or required additional information to 
more clearly establish potential proliferation risk. The 43 project 
proposals for which the national laboratories raised potential concerns 
included, for example, projects to assist countries in various aspects 
of developing nuclear power reactors and research reactors, handling 
nuclear fuel, and using nuclear techniques in materials testing and 
other industrial practices. 

We found that IAEA approved at least 34 of these 43 proposals. Of the 
remaining 9 proposals, 4 were not approved internally by IAEA's 
Secretariat or--in the case of Iran's 2006 Arak heavy water reactor 
proposal--by the Board of Governors, and 5 proposals in 1998 were 
reviewed by ORNL in a classified assessment. We did not determine 
whether those 5 proposals were approved by IAEA. 

We requested information from State's Office of Multilateral Nuclear 
and Security Affairs describing how it responded to DOE's and the 
national laboratories' findings of potential proliferation concerns 
among the TC proposals they reviewed. However, with the exception of 
documentation pertaining to U.S. objections on the Iranian heavy water 
reactor proposal in 2006, State was unable to provide us with any 
records documenting policy discussions or actions it took to address 
concerns in other TC proposals highlighted by DOE and the national 
laboratories. As a result, it is unclear what actions, if any, State 
took to address potential proliferation concerns of specific TC 
proposals identified by DOE and the national laboratories. State 
officials told us that records substantiating discussions within State 
on the DOE and national laboratory findings existed but could not be 
retrieved from State's data and document management systems. 

State officials told us that a 2005 reorganization of the department's 
arms control and nonproliferation bureaus resulted in the loss of staff 
in the office overseeing IAEA issues, limiting its ability to 
effectively monitor TC program developments. Specifically, they said 
that prior to the 2005 reorganization, there were 14 full-time 
equivalent personnel working on IAEA-and NPT-related issues, but that 
this number was reduced to 5 full-time equivalent personnel due to the 
reassignment and retirement of personnel following the reorganization. 

U.S. Policies and IAEA Procedures for TC Program Fellowships Have 
Several Shortcomings: 

State has not developed a formal policy that identifies countries that 
would not be eligible to send TC fellows to the United States to study 
nuclear issues. In addition, IAEA does not have a systematic process in 
place to track and monitor former TC fellows to determine, for 
instance, whether they still reside in their home country and are still 
involved in peaceful nuclear research related to their fellowship 
studies. 

The United States accepts TC fellows and TC project participants from 
foreign countries. The acceptance process involves several steps. 
First, foreign nationals interested in a TC fellowship apply to IAEA's 
TC Department, which reviews the applications and decides which 
candidates to accept or reject. IAEA identifies fellows who would be 
appropriate to place in the United States for studies. For approved 
applications, IAEA then sends a formal request to the U.S. Mission 
asking that the applicants be permitted to study in the United States 
at a specific institute. 

The U.S. Mission forwards the applications to State's Office of 
Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs within the International 
Security and Nonproliferation Bureau and to the Argonne National 
Laboratory. The State office reviews and approves or rejects the 
applications, and shares them with other members of the U.S. 
interagency committee on IAEA TC issues. In addition, State officials 
told us that foreign nationals requesting TC fellowships at DOE 
facilities would be reviewed against requirements in DOE orders. The 
Argonne National Laboratory, under a contract with State, facilitates 
placement of fellows approved by State at the institutes proposed by 
IAEA or at alternative facilities. The applicants are notified by IAEA 
of their fellowship's acceptance by State and placement at institutes 
in the United States. 

Once the foreign candidates confirm their acceptance, IAEA instructs 
them to apply for a U.S. nonimmigrant visa. State's Bureau of Consular 
Affairs handles the adjudication of these visa applications, and in 
some cases, the consular officers will request a security advisory 
opinion, known as a Visas Mantis, if there are concerns that a visa 
applicant may engage in the illegal transfer of sensitive 
technology.[Footnote 20] According to State, the key role of the Visas 
Mantis process is to protect U.S. national security, particularly in 
combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their 
delivery systems, and conventional weapons.[Footnote 21] 

Data provided to us by State indicated that 1,022 TC program fellows 
have studied nuclear issues at universities and other organizations in 
the United States from 1997 through 2007. In our review of this data, 
we found that 23 of the 1,022 fellows were from countries that were not 
NPT member states, such as Israel and Pakistan, or were from U.S.- 
designated state sponsors of terrorism, such as Syria. The fields of 
study pursued by these fellows included entomology, soil and plant 
science, analytical nuclear physics, and nuclear medicine. 

We questioned State and Argonne National Laboratory officials to 
clarify the guidance and criteria State's Office of Multilateral 
Nuclear and Security Affairs uses to approve TC fellowship applicants 
for the study of nuclear issues in the United States. State officials 
told us that there is no formal policy or set of criteria they use to 
accept or reject TC fellowship requests on the basis of an applicant's 
country of origin. However, in response to our inquiry, State prepared 
a written description of the informal guidelines and preferences it 
uses to evaluate fellowship requests. According to this description, 
individuals from countries that have not signed the NPT are not 
eligible to pursue TC fellowships in the United States, although 
fellows from Israel and Pakistan were accepted by the United States as 
recently as 2002. Individuals from countries that have signed the NPT, 
however, may still "be excluded on the basis of such things as 
institutional affiliation or previous history or other political 
factors such as human rights concerns in such countries." 

The lack of a formal State policy or guidance on this matter has led to 
differing views among U.S. officials about the countries of origin from 
which State will approve TC fellows. For instance, Argonne National 
Laboratory officials told us that they believed State's policy was to 
exclude fellows from any country the United States had designated as a 
state sponsor of terrorism. However, the description prepared for us by 
State does not explicitly prohibit fellows from such countries. The 
most recent TC program fellow to study nuclear issues in the United 
States from one of the U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism-- 
Syria--was in 2001. 

In addition, the broad nature of the criteria to exclude fellows-- 
including "other political factors" in their home countries--could 
leave fellowship decisions open to State officials' subjective 
interpretation. For example, State officials told us that one country 
in Asia would no longer be permitted to send TC fellows to the United 
States because it is considered a wealthy, high-income nation, even 
though the description of the informal guidelines provided to us by 
State do not indicate that economic conditions in a TC fellow's home 
country are a basis for rejection. 

With regard to IAEA's management of TC fellows, the agency does not 
have a policy to exclude individuals from certain countries from 
participating in the TC fellowship program, including individuals from 
nations about which the United States has terrorism or proliferation 
concerns. For example, in 2007, IAEA approved 48 fellows and scientific 
visitors from Cuba, 12 from Iran, 36 from Syria, and 30 from Sudan. 
[Footnote 22] IAEA's data did not indicate the countries and institutes 
where these fellows and scientific visitors pursued their studies. 

We also found shortcomings in IAEA oversight of TC fellowships for 
potential proliferation concerns--specifically in detecting the 
possible involvement of former TC fellows in weapons-related research 
activities after they completed their studies abroad. IAEA officials 
told us that the agency does not have a systematic process for tracking 
the status, whereabouts, and activities of former TC fellows to 
determine, for example, if they remain involved in research related to 
their TC project, changed institutes, or have immigrated to other 
countries. 

In 2005, however, IAEA officials surveyed fellows from 2001 and 2002 to 
determine their current activities and their views on the quality and 
impact of the fellowship program. IAEA followed up with a more in-depth 
survey of a sample of former fellows from seven countries. IAEA 
officials told us that they hope to conduct more analysis of former TC 
fellows, primarily to facilitate networking between former fellows and 
establish lessons learned for improved implementation of the program, 
not to determine whether former TC fellows could be involved in nuclear 
weapons efforts. 

Long-Term TC Program Effectiveness Is Limited by Outdated Program 
Metrics, Financial Resource Constraints, and Sustainability Concerns: 

IAEA faces several limitations in effectively managing the TC program. 
Specifically, IAEA has not been able to accurately portray the TC 
program's achievements in meeting the development and other needs of 
member states in a meaningful way because it has not updated and 
revised the metrics for assessing program results. In addition, the 
program's impact is limited by financial resource constraints, 
including the failure of many member states to pay their full share of 
support to the TCF. Finally, the TC program's long-term effectiveness 
could be undermined by shortcomings in IAEA efforts to monitor how TC 
projects have been sustained and in recent efforts to sustain the TC 
program overall by reaching out to new partners and donors. 

IAEA Lacks Adequate Metrics to Fully Assess TC Program's Impact: 

The goal of the TC program is to help member states achieve their 
sustainable development needs through the peaceful application of 
nuclear energy. However, IAEA has not updated and revised TC program 
performance metrics so that it can more accurately track and assess the 
program's overall impact in meeting member states' needs. Under a 2002 
TC program strategy, IAEA established four strategic objectives and 12 
performance metrics to assess program performance between 2002 and 
2007. These four objectives were (1) establishing greater linkages 
between TC projects and national development plans and greater 
government commitment and support to projects; (2) expanding strategic 
partnerships to improve the TC program's visibility in resolving 
development problems; (3) increasing the level of funding for technical 
cooperation activities; and (4) strengthening the capacity of 
institutions in member states using nuclear technologies to become more 
technically and financially self-reliant. The 12 program performance 
metrics included having TC projects create an unspecified number of new 
partnerships with development organizations and having an increasing 
number of member states pay their full target share of funding to the 
TCF. 

IAEA officials declined to provide us with detailed information 
explaining how these performance indicators were established or data 
substantiating how they were met. However, according to the TC 
program's 2006 annual report summarizing the program's progress against 
each indicator, IAEA met or exceeded 6 of the 12 performance 
indicators, did not meet 1, could not measure 1, and did not provide 
any assessment information on the remaining 4 performance goals. 

The metrics developed for the program in 2002 are not meaningful 
indicators of program results and, therefore, do not provide sufficient 
information on the program's progress in meeting the sustainable 
development and related needs of member states. For example, the 
performance metric on member state contributions to the TCF conveys 
information on program management but does not measure fulfillment of 
member state needs, such as the number of additional cancer patients 
treated or the number of new nuclear safety regulations promulgated. 
Similarly, in its 2007 evaluation of TC activities, IAEA's internal 
auditor--the Office of Internal Oversight Services--found that the TC 
program lacks a robust, consistent process for assessing the 
effectiveness of TC projects, particularly after projects are 
completed. 

IAEA officials acknowledged these weaknesses in the 2002 metrics, 
recognized they were out of date, and said that they wanted to develop 
more effective results-based metrics. However, to date, the TC program 
has not developed new program objectives or performance measures. The 
officials noted that a new TC information technology system--the 
Program Cycle Management Framework--to plan, implement, monitor, and 
report on TC projects will eventually collect information to assess 
project results against specific goals and metrics. In addition, 
according to the 2009-2011 TC program guidelines, the program needs to 
operate under results-based management principles and emphasize the 
importance of having program objectives and outcomes be linked to 
performance metrics to help measure progress in achieving results in 
technical cooperation. 

IAEA officials told us that implementing a system of results-based 
metrics for the TC program faces challenges--particularly in obtaining 
reliable baseline information from member states about the scope of the 
problems or needs they hope to address by participating in the TC 
program. Without such information, they told us, IAEA cannot establish 
reliable long-term performance targets. For example, according to a 
2007 evaluation by IAEA's internal auditor, almost half of the project 
performance metrics in the sample of projects it reviewed were not 
supported with baseline information and half did not indicate target 
values. 

Many Member States Do Not Provide Financial Contributions to the TCF 
and Some High-Income Countries Receive TC Assistance: 

We found that the TC program faces financial constraints and 
limitations due to, among other things, shortfalls in member state 
payments to the TCF and high-income nations receiving TC support. IAEA 
officials told us that the TC program is underfunded, while IAEA's 
Director General has commented that program resources are insufficient 
to keep pace with country requests for support. Although the size of 
the TCF and overall level of funding paid by member states have 
increased in recent years,[Footnote 23] many countries that receive TC 
assistance still do not pay their full share of support to the TCF that 
IAEA expects them to contribute. Specifically, the TCF experienced a 
funding shortfall in 2007 of $3.5 million, or 4 percent, of the $80 
million total target budget because 62 member states did not pay their 
full contributions. Of these 62 countries, 47 states made no payment at 
all.[Footnote 24] Appendix IV lists member states and the amounts they 
contributed to the TCF in 2007. 

In addition, 13 member states that the UN defined as high-income 
countries in 2007--including Israel, Portugal, and Saudi Arabia-- 
received a total of approximately $3.8 million in assistance from the 
program, or 4 percent of the $93.3 million in total TC disbursements 
that year. Recognizing that the emphasis of the TC program is on 
providing nuclear assistance to developing countries, IAEA officials 
told us that it would be helpful if more developed countries shifted 
from TC recipients to donors, which could allow the program to provide 
greater support to developing countries. For example, they stated that 
some member states have helped ease budget pressures within the TC 
program by voluntarily reducing the assistance they receive and 
gradually becoming donors. However, IAEA has not sought to formulate 
guidelines or criteria for determining when countries should be 
graduated from further TC assistance, and IAEA officials have not 
reached a consensus on how to pursue this matter. According to the 
Deputy Director General for the TC program, IAEA does not seek to 
retire specific countries from TC support regardless of their financial 
or development status. Nevertheless, other IAEA officials told us that 
determining program graduation criteria is a good idea. Appendix II 
identifies the countries designated by the United Nations in 2007 as 
high-income and the amount of TCF assistance they received that year. 

In addition, IAEA officials told us that broader issues should be 
considered in graduating high-income or highly-developed countries from 
TC assistance. Specifically, IAEA officials said that developed nations 
with more experience on nuclear issues could play a helpful role in 
providing nuclear expertise to less-developed nations in the same 
region. According to IAEA officials, this could entail reducing 
national-level TC project support to developed member states while 
continuing to provide support to them through regional projects. These 
officials also asserted that graduating states is complicated because 
the benefits provided by TC assistance keep countries involved in IAEA, 
including the safeguards program. 

State and U.S. Mission officials told us that State does not have an 
official position on graduating member states from TC assistance. 
However, these officials said the idea merited consideration and 
suggested some countries whose economic wherewithal and level of 
nuclear development could justify graduation, including Brazil, China, 
Russia, and South Korea. 

IAEA Faces Challenges Sustaining the TC Program: 

IAEA efforts to sustain TC project results and the TC program overall 
face several significant limitations and challenges. First, at the 
project level, IAEA does not conduct systematic follow-up to verify 
that member states are sustaining the results and activities of 
completed TC projects. IAEA's goal in providing technical cooperation 
is to help countries become technically and financially self-reliant so 
that they do not require future IAEA assistance to sustain peaceful 
nuclear skills and technologies. The Deputy Director General of the TC 
program stated that achieving sustainability hinges on having member 
states commit adequate financial support, infrastructure, and personnel 
once the project is completed. 

IAEA officials told us that the program does assess sustainability 
potential of projects in the proposal development phase. As projects 
are being developed, IAEA uses a planning tool, known as a "country 
programme framework," to evaluate how TC project proposals contribute 
to the host country's national development priorities and to assess the 
host government's likely commitment to the project. However, we found 
that IAEA does not systematically review completed TC projects to 
verify whether the project results are being sustained by the recipient 
country, through government or other support. For example, the TC 
program does not conduct any assessments 2, 3, or 5 years past project 
completion, to see whether and how a country is maintaining established 
TC nuclear technologies and related skills. 

Second, IAEA faces challenges in sustaining the TC program over the 
long term because TC funding is distributed across 18 different 
technical areas--including nuclear power, nuclear security, food and 
agriculture, water resources, and human health--making it difficult for 
IAEA to set clear TC program priorities and to maximize the impact of 
limited program resources. Appendix V provides a complete list of all 
the technical areas to which TC program funding was allocated in 2007. 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of funds disbursed by project area. 

Figure 1: TC Program Disbursements, by Technical Area, 2007: 

[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart] 

Human health: 28.3%; 
Food and agriculture: 12.8%; 
Nuclear science: 8.2%. 
Management of radioactive waste: 7.7%. 
Radioisotope production and radiation technology: 7.5%; 
Radiation and transport safety: 7.3%; 
Safety of nuclear installations: 6%; 
Management of technical cooperation for development: 4.6%; 
Water resources: 4%; 
Nuclear power: 3.6%; 
Assessment and management of marine and terrestrial environments: 3.5%; 
Capacity building and nuclear knowledge maintenance for sustainable 
energy development: 2.4%; 
Nuclear security: 2.1%; 
Emergency preparedness: 1.2%; 
Other: 0.8%. 

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

Note: Percentages based on total 2007 TC disbursements of $93,316,600. 
The "Other" category represents four separate technical areas: nuclear 
fuel cycle and materials technologies; safeguards; public information 
and communication; and executive management, policy making and 
coordination. 

[End of figure] 

According to U.S. Mission officials, this allocation of TC funding 
across multiple technical areas and the absence of clear program 
priorities reduces overall program effectiveness. U.S. Mission 
officials told us that IAEA should work to consolidate these areas and 
identify four or five future TC program priorities. IAEA officials 
agreed, but told us that they have little flexibility to set TC program 
priorities because they must be responsive to member state needs which 
vary across countries and regions. Nevertheless, TC program officials 
said they are attempting to promote priority-setting at the project 
level--for example, by limiting the number of projects member states 
were permitted to submit in 2008, and by moving away from funding 
mature nuclear technologies that no longer require development or in 
which member states have acquired sufficient capability to sustain on 
their own. 

In addition, in 2007, IAEA initiated a fundamental review of the 
challenges and opportunities facing its programs to 2020 and beyond. As 
part of this review, IAEA's Secretariat identified priorities for the 
TC program and other IAEA programs. IAEA also convened a Commission of 
Eminent Persons to provide recommendations on the future role and 
activities of the agency, including the TC program. In its background 
report to the commission, IAEA identified future TC priorities in three 
main areas--disease prevention and control, food safety and security, 
and sustainable management of natural resources and ecosystems--with a 
lesser focus on a fourth area, industrial process management. However, 
IAEA officials told us that the restructuring of TC priorities and 
implementing other recommendations from this review would be contingent 
on the Board of Governors' approval. 

Finally, IAEA officials told us that meeting member states' future 
demands for TC assistance--especially as interest in nuclear power 
grows--will strain program resources and pose a fundamental long-term 
sustainability challenge. As a result, IAEA is developing outreach 
strategies and has created an outreach team to attract the support and 
involvement of donor organizations and new partners--such as the UN 
Development Program--in the TC program. However, this effort faces 
several limitations and shortcomings. 

The TC program outreach effort is narrowly focused on attracting donors 
and partners involved in international economic and social development. 
Although TC program guidance encourages private sector partnerships, 
IAEA officials told us that the new partner outreach effort will not 
extend to the private sector because they believed the level of effort 
to establish such partnerships would outweigh the expected benefits. 
Furthermore, while IAEA's internal auditors have reported on cases 
where member states successfully obtained private sector support to 
sustain TC projects--thus alleviating the need for further support from 
IAEA or the host government--IAEA officials told us that the TC program 
does not systematically assess TC proposals with respect to their 
commercial potential. IAEA officials told us that member states are not 
required to submit information in their TC proposals--such as a market 
analysis, a summary of business plans, or potential private sector 
investors in project activities--that IAEA could use to evaluate the 
long-term commercial prospects of a TC project. 

The TC program's strategy of focusing its outreach primarily on 
international development organizations carries risks because IAEA is 
not well recognized as a development organization within the broader 
development community. According to the Deputy Director General of the 
TC Department, the development community largely perceives IAEA as a 
nuclear enforcement body and its development contributions are 
overlooked or unknown. In addition, some of the previous partnerships 
the TC program has built with international development organizations 
have been called into question. For example, a 2007 independent 
evaluation of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
concluded that FAO's long-standing partnership with IAEA on the use of 
nuclear techniques in food and agriculture has ceased to yield a high 
return on investment and, therefore, recommended that FAO withdraw 
future funding from the joint FAO-IAEA unit. Furthermore, according to 
the U.S. representative to the Standing Advisory Group on Technical 
Assistance and Cooperation, the TC program faces difficulties in 
building relationships with development organizations at the project 
and country levels because it does not have a presence in the host 
countries to promote the program. For example, this representative told 
us that the national liaison officers--who serve as intermediaries on 
TC projects between IAEA and the host governments and collaborating 
institutes--tend to be technical specialists who do not understand 
their country's development needs, do not network with other 
development organizations, and are not involved in the governmental 
processes that set national development plans and priorities. 

Conclusions: 

The world today is dramatically different than when IAEA was created 
over 50 years ago. Therefore, certain IAEA policies related to the TC 
program, as well as the rights, expectations, and obligations of IAEA 
member states that are beneficiaries of the program, merit careful 
consideration and, as appropriate, re-examination. In our view, TC 
proposals should not be evaluated simply on their technical merits in 
isolation from political considerations concerning the countries making 
the requests, particularly since the assistance in question involves 
supplying nuclear equipment, training, and expertise, some of which is 
dual-use in nature. In that regard, we believe that State's policy of 
not encouraging IAEA to systematically limit TC projects in countries 
that are U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism communicates a 
mixed message on the acceptability of transferring nuclear technologies 
and expertise to countries the United States has deemed inherently 
dangerous. 

We recognize that the TC program provides IAEA member states that are 
developing countries with many benefits and that not every project 
funded by the program poses a proliferation risk. However, the United 
States does not have the necessary information available on a timely 
basis to make sound judgments about the proliferation risks of many of 
these projects, particularly in the project proposal development phase. 
A better system, with more complete and timely data provided by IAEA, 
would help ensure that projects are fully and appropriately vetted by 
U.S. agencies and those that pose a potential proliferation risk are 
identified early in the project development process. Until that 
happens, we will continue to have concerns about the potential 
proliferation risks posed by TC projects, particularly those linked to 
countries of concern. 

With greater transparency and earlier information from IAEA on TC 
project proposals, the United States government and other countries 
could raise and address proliferation concerns with IAEA's Secretariat 
before it endorses projects for approval by the Board of Governors. We 
are also concerned by IAEA's refusal to share information with the 
United States and other member states on findings from its internal 
proliferation reviews of TC projects. Furthermore, deficiencies in 
State's record-keeping on TC program matters is troubling because we 
could not determine what, if any, actions State took to address 
concerns identified by DOE and the national laboratories. 

Regarding TC fellowships, State has not established a formal policy 
governing the approval of TC fellows from foreign countries interested 
in studying nuclear issues in the United States. The absence of such a 
policy has allowed individuals from non-NPT countries and individuals 
from countries that are U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism who 
obtain visas to study in the United States and potentially acquire 
valuable information. We also believe IAEA should take steps to improve 
monitoring of individuals who have completed fellowships, to track 
their whereabouts and ongoing research, and to determine if the 
knowledge and information they obtained on TC projects is being applied 
to strictly peaceful purposes. 

Regarding our management concerns associated with the TC program, we 
believe that all member states receiving TC support should provide 
their full contribution to the TCF. We also question the need to 
provide TC assistance to high-income countries that have the apparent 
economic means to finance their nuclear research and development needs 
independently. In our view, IAEA could enhance the impact of its 
limited resources by developing and applying reasonable "means testing" 
criteria in future allocation of TC funding and consider ways in which 
high-income countries can be graduated from continued TC assistance. In 
addition, the metrics IAEA has used to track TC program performance do 
not provide the United States and other member states with sufficient 
information on the TC program's overall value. Development of more 
meaningful results-based performance measures could allow IAEA to more 
effectively demonstrate the TC program's impact. 

Finally, IAEA could enhance the impact of the TC program's limited 
resources by formally setting priorities for future TC funding, as well 
as identifying areas that are less urgent because of the availability 
of mature nuclear technologies and other donors. In terms of IAEA's 
outreach to potential new TC donors, we believe that the private sector 
could be a crucial partner in supporting the TC program generally and 
in sustaining the results of TC projects so that member states can 
become technically and financially less dependent on IAEA. In our view, 
IAEA should also assess TC proposals not only for technical feasibility 
and host government support, but also for potential private sector 
support to sustain project activities and results. 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

If Congress wishes to make known that the United States does not 
support IAEA's policy of permitting TC projects in countries that State 
has designated as state sponsors of terrorism, or other countries where 
other concerns persist, it could explicitly require--as it currently 
does with Cuba and has done in the past with Iran, Libya, and the 
Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority--that 
State withhold a proportionate share of the U.S. voluntary contribution 
to the TC program that is equivalent to the amounts of TCF funding that 
would otherwise be made available to these countries. Alternatively, if 
Congress wishes to obtain additional information before making this 
decision, it could require State to report to Congress explaining its 
rationale for not withholding a proportionate share of the U.S. 
contribution to the TCF for U.S.-designated state sponsors of 
terrorism. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To address the range of proliferation and management concerns related 
to the TC program, we recommend that the Secretary of State, working 
with IAEA and member states through the Board of Governors, explore 
undertaking the following eight actions: 

* Establish a formal mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely 
information sharing on TC project proposals between IAEA and the United 
States and other countries--including detailed information on the TC 
proposals themselves, as well as the results of IAEA's internal 
proliferation reviews of the proposals--so that proliferation and other 
concerns can be identified and addressed early in the project 
development cycle. 

* Promote a regular and systematic process for obtaining, retaining, 
and updating information on prior TC project fellows to better track 
where and how the knowledge and expertise they have obtained is being 
applied. 

* Strengthen the TC program's mechanisms for collecting member states' 
contributions to the TCF to include withholding from nonpaying states a 
percentage of TC assistance equivalent to the percentage of their 
target rate that they fail to contribute to the TCF. 

* Establish criteria for determining when member states, especially 
those defined as high-income countries, no longer need TC assistance in 
particular fields and when such states could be graduated from further 
TC support altogether. 

* Seek to implement new results-based performance metrics for the TC 
program that establish specific national, regional, and interregional 
social and economic needs and measure the collective impact of TC 
projects in meeting those objectives. 

* Focus the TC program on a more limited number of high-priority 
technical areas to maximize the impact of program resources. 

* Encourage the TC program to reach out to private sector entities as 
part of its new partner and donor development strategy. 

* Request member states to assess in their TC project proposals the 
prospects for commercialization of and private sector investment in the 
results of the projects. Such steps could include requiring information 
in the proposals on potential business plans, marketing strategies, and 
strategies for attracting commercial partners once IAEA support has 
concluded. 

Finally, to clarify and improve U.S. oversight of the TC program, we 
recommend that the Secretary of State undertake the following two 
actions: 

* Enhance record-keeping and formally document management actions 
regarding the discussion, action, and disposition of TC project 
proposals that DOE and the national laboratories identify as having 
potential proliferation concerns. 

* Issue formal guidance with well-defined criteria--such as countries 
designated by State as sponsors of terrorism or gross human rights 
violators--that State should use as the basis for approving or 
rejecting TC fellowship requests for nuclear studies in the United 
States. This guidance could include, among other things, a list of 
specific countries from which State would not approve TC fellows that 
could be updated and revised annually, or as other circumstances 
warrant. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to State and DOE for formal comment. 
We also provided IAEA with a detailed summary of facts contained in the 
draft report. State provided written comments on the draft report, 
which are presented in appendix VI. DOE and IAEA provided technical 
comments that we incorporated as appropriate. 

State strongly opposed the matter for congressional consideration to 
require State to withhold a proportionate share of the U.S. voluntary 
contribution to the TC program that is equivalent to the amounts of TCF 
funding that would otherwise be made available to U.S.-designated state 
sponsors of terrorism and or other countries of concern. State objected 
for a number of reasons, contending that (1) it would be 
counterproductive to a separate recommendation we made in the report 
encouraging all states to pay their full share to the TCF; (2) it would 
not stop TC projects in targeted countries because TCF funding is 
fungible; (3) Congress has exempted IAEA contributions from this type 
of proportionate withholding; (4) none of the TC projects in state 
sponsors of terrorism have been shown to have contributed to a WMD 
program; (5) there are adequate safeguards within IAEA's Secretariat to 
prevent TC projects from contributing to a WMD program; and (6) it 
would negatively impact the ability of the United States to achieve 
other critical objectives within IAEA. 

We do not believe the matter for congressional consideration is unique 
or unprecedented. As we noted in our report, U.S. law currently 
requires the withholding of a proportionate share of the U.S. 
contribution to the TCF for certain projects in Cuba, and has required 
withholding in the past for Iran, Libya, and the Territories Under the 
Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. However, in order to give 
Congress greater flexibility and more information, we have broadened 
the matter for congressional consideration to give Congress the option 
of requiring State to report on its rationale for not withholding a 
proportionate share of the U.S. contribution to the TCF for U.S.- 
designated state sponsors of terrorism. 

Notwithstanding our modification to the matter for congressional 
consideration, we still disagree with State's specific objections to it 
for the following reasons: 

* We do not believe the matter for congressional consideration is 
counterproductive to our recommendation to strengthen mechanisms for 
collecting member state contributions to the TCF. That recommendation 
is geared toward strengthening mechanisms for collecting contributions 
to the TCF from member states that are receiving TC assistance. The 
United States is the largest donor to the TC program, providing 
approximately 25 percent of the TCF annual budget, and is not a 
beneficiary of TC assistance. 

* While contributions to the TCF are fungible, we believe there is a 
fundamental principle at stake. As we described in our report, the 
United States has applied several types of sanctions limiting foreign 
assistance and trade to states it has designated as sponsors of 
terrorism and to other countries. To avoid the appearance of an 
inconsistent approach and to foster greater cohesion in U.S. policy 
toward such nations, we believe that it is fair for Congress to 
consider requiring State to withhold a share of the U.S. contribution 
to the TCF for program activities in countries that the United States 
chooses not to engage directly in trade, assistance, and other forms of 
cooperation. 

* We are aware that in 1994 U.S. contributions to IAEA were exempted 
from the law requiring State to withhold proportionate shares of 
funding to international organizations for programs in certain 
countries. However, we note that the IAEA exemption was enacted in 
1994. In our view, the proliferation concerns about some countries 
receiving TC assistance--such as Iran and Syria--have increased rather 
than diminished since that time. Furthermore, we note that since the 
enactment of the 1994 exemption, the law has been further amended to 
require State to withhold a proportionate share of funding to IAEA for 
certain projects in Cuba and for all projects in Iran if State 
determines that such projects in Iran are inconsistent with U.S. 
nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals, will provide Iran with 
training or expertise relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, 
or are being used as a cover for the acquisition of sensitive nuclear 
technology. 

* We do not believe that State can assert with confidence that TC 
projects have not contributed to WMD programs in state sponsors of 
terrorism. The absence of evidence showing that TC projects have 
assisted nuclear weapons development in U.S.-designated state sponsors 
of terrorism does not, in our view, constitute proof that such 
countries have not exploited TC assistance to advance possible weapons 
development skills and activities. Based on findings in our report-- 
including the limited information available to DOE and the national 
laboratories on TC projects and the inherent dual-use nature of some 
nuclear expertise and technology--we believe it is difficult to say 
with confidence that TC projects are not contributing indirectly to 
weapons-related knowledge and expertise in such countries. 

* We do not have the same level of confidence as State in the 
safeguards within IAEA's Secretariat to prevent TC projects from 
contributing to weapons development. As we stated in the report, we 
were unable to assess the effectiveness of IAEA's internal process for 
reviewing TC proposals and projects for proliferation concerns because 
IAEA's Secretariat declined to provide us with basic information and 
documentation regarding the results of its reviews. Furthermore, as 
described in the report, IAEA's Secretariat approved at least one TC 
project proposal--involving the Iranian heavy water reactor at Arak-- 
that State later objected to. 

* Finally, neither we nor State can conclude with certainty how other 
states might react to an increase in the United States' proportionate 
withholding of funding to the TCF and how this would affect U.S. 
ability to achieve other objectives within the agency. 

State agreed with 7 of our 10 recommendations to improve TC program 
management and oversight. It neither agreed nor disagreed with the 
three other recommendations that called on State, working with IAEA and 
member states through the Board of Governors, to explore (1) 
establishing a formal mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely 
information sharing on TC proposals between IAEA, the United States, 
and other countries; (2) strengthening TC program mechanisms for 
collecting member state contributions to the TCF, including withholding 
a percentage of TC assistance to recipient countries that fail to pay 
their target contribution; and (3) establishing criteria for 
determining when member states no longer require TC assistance and 
could be graduated from further TC support. 

Regarding the recommendation concerning the establishment of a formal 
mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely information sharing on 
TC project proposals between IAEA and the United States and other 
countries, State noted that it would be difficult to implement through 
IAEA's Board of Governors because TC proposals are considered 
confidential between IAEA and the recipient state. State commented that 
a more achievable goal could be to work with IAEA to ensure that it 
publishes a complete listing of project proposals earlier. Because TC 
projects can involve transfer of equipment, technology, and expertise 
that could potentially contribute to nuclear weapons development, we 
continue to believe that TC proposals demand the highest level of 
scrutiny, transparency, and information sharing. We question why 
details of TC proposals are considered confidential, and believe the 
United States and other major donors should have a full understanding 
of the proposals that they are being asked to support through their TCF 
contributions. Finally, as noted in the report, we found that the 
quantity of information about TC proposals currently available to DOE 
and the national laboratories is insufficient in many cases--especially 
in cases where DOE and the national laboratories obtained only lists of 
proposal titles--to make accurate determinations of potential 
proliferation risks. It is unclear whether State's suggestion to work 
with IAEA to publish the complete listing of proposed projects earlier 
would result in sufficient details being provided to DOE and the 
national laboratories to allow them to more reliably assess 
proliferation risks. 

On our recommendation to strengthen the mechanisms for collecting 
member state contributions to the TCF, State commented that the rate of 
payment to the TCF by member states has improved in recent years. 
However, as we noted in the report, many states receiving assistance 
are still not paying their full share of contributions to the TCF. We 
believe there is room for continued improvement and that mechanisms 
should continue to be strengthened toward that end. We believe the 
recommendation is sound and should be implemented. 

Finally, concerning the recommendation to establish criteria for 
determining when member states no longer require further TC assistance 
and could be graduated from further TC support, State observed that a 
proposal for graduating higher-income TC recipient states based on 
their per capita gross national product was put forward in 1997. State 
noted that one member state objected to graduating countries based 
solely on such criteria. We recognize the political and practical 
challenges of implementing a graduation strategy for member states 
receiving TC assistance. However, as noted in our report, both State 
and IAEA officials supported the principle of graduating countries that 
no longer require TC assistance. Moreover, our recommendation does not 
identify specific graduation criteria or specify that a member state's 
income ranking be the sole factor to serve as the basis for graduating 
a state from further TC support. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to interested congressional committees and Members of Congress, the 
Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Energy. In addition, this 
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix VII. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 
Gene Aloise: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To review the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Technical 
Cooperation (TC) program we assessed the (1) extent to which the United 
States and IAEA have policies limiting member states' participation in 
the TC program on the basis of nuclear proliferation and related 
concerns; (2) extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and 
monitor TC projects for proliferation concerns; and (3) limitations and 
challenges in IAEA's management of the TC program. We employed several 
methodologies to address these objectives. 

Our review of the TC program covered the years 1997 through 2007. We 
chose this period because our previous report on the TC program 
reported on TC programmatic and financial data through 1996. We 
interviewed key officials and analyzed documentation, such as cables, 
presentations, financial information, and reports and analyses of TC 
program issues from the Departments of State (State) and Energy (DOE). 
State officials also provided us with relevant IAEA documentation and 
information, such as copies of IAEA's annual "white books" identifying 
TC projects approved by IAEA, as well as information on specific TC 
projects from IAEA's "TC-PRIDE" database. We also interviewed officials 
in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office of International Programs 
who participate in U.S. interagency meetings on IAEA TC issues. In 
addition, we met with representatives from five national laboratories 
involved in the DOE Interdiction Technical Analysis Group, a 
multilaboratory team providing DOE with technical analysis of 
proliferation-related issues, including the TC program. We also visited 
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to obtain documentation and 
interview current and former ORNL staff involved in previous and 
ongoing assessments of TC proposals and active projects for potential 
proliferation concerns. In addition, we visited the Argonne National 
Laboratory to interview representatives who provide support and 
analytical services to State on TC issues, organize training seminars 
for foreign nationals involved in TC projects, and facilitate TC 
fellowships for foreign nationals to study nuclear issues in the United 
States. 

We also interviewed officials at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, 
including representatives from the TC Department and other IAEA 
departments, including the Departments of Management, Safeguards, and 
Nuclear Safety and Security; the Office of Internal Oversight Services; 
and the Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination. We 
reviewed and analyzed information provided by IAEA officials, including 
presentation slides, annual reports, internal and external auditor 
reports, and TC project brochures. We also reviewed speeches and other 
statements by IAEA officials on the TC program and related IAEA issues. 
IAEA officials provided us with data on the number of TC projects by 
year, country, and technical area, as well as financial information on 
the TC program over the past decade. We interviewed knowledgeable IAEA 
officials on the reliability of these data, including issues such as 
data entry, access, quality control procedures, and the accuracy and 
completeness of the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this review. 

Furthermore, we interviewed officials at the U.S. Mission to 
International Organizations in Vienna (U.S. Mission) regarding TC 
program policies and processes. We also met with officials from the 
Canadian Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna 
who work on IAEA issues to gain their perspectives on the TC program. 
We also conducted interviews with several nongovernmental experts who 
have monitored IAEA and developments in the TC program, and met with 
and obtained documentation from the U.S. representative to IAEA's 
Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation. 

We discussed U.S. and IAEA policies and criteria with State and IAEA 
officials on the extent to which countries are limited from receiving 
TC assistance because of proliferation and related concerns. We also 
reviewed (1) speeches, articles, and other statements made by IAEA 
officials; (2) annual State reports to Congress on IAEA assistance 
provided to some states that the United States has identified as 
countries of concern; (3) speeches and statements by U.S. officials; 
and (4) cables between State and the U.S. Mission outlining U.S. policy 
toward the TC program. We obtained and analyzed the lists of countries 
that (1) are designated by the United States as state sponsors of 
terrorism, (2) are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and (3) have comprehensive safeguards agreements 
and additional protocols in force with IAEA. We cross-referenced each 
of these lists against IAEA financial records to determine how much TC 
support has been provided to countries that the United States has 
listed as state sponsors of terrorism, are not party to the NPT, or do 
not have comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements in 
force with IAEA. 

To assess the extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and 
monitor TC projects for proliferation concerns, we interviewed State 
and DOE officials regarding their TC program review processes. We also 
interviewed representatives from five of the U.S. national laboratories 
involved in past and current evaluations of TC proposals and projects 
for proliferation concerns. Through DOE, we obtained and analyzed 
information from ORNL and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to 
determine the numbers of TC proposals the national laboratories 
reviewed each year between 1998 and 2006. We reviewed and verified 
these data with DOE and the national laboratory officials, and 
discussed and verified the proliferation risks DOE and the national 
laboratory officials identified in specific TC proposals. We used IAEA 
records of approved TC projects to determine whether TC proposals that 
the national laboratories had identified as having possible 
proliferation risks were approved by IAEA. Because of IAEA policies 
that restricted our access to data and related information on TC 
proposal and project reviews by IAEA's Safeguards Department, we were 
unable to assess the effectiveness of IAEA's internal review of TC 
proposals and projects for proliferation concerns. 

To determine the challenges and limitations in IAEA's management of the 
TC program, we interviewed officials from State, Argonne National 
Laboratory, and IAEA, as well as the U.S. representative to IAEA's 
Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation. We 
obtained and reviewed relevant IAEA documentation addressing TC program 
metrics, such as TC program guidance and strategy documents, IAEA 
internal audit reports, and meeting reports by IAEA's Technical 
Assistance and Cooperation Committee. To assess financial resource 
challenges facing the TC program, we analyzed financial data from TC 
program annual reports between 1997 and 2007--including annual budgets 
of the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF), annual contributions by member 
states to the TCF, and amounts of annual TC assistance provided to 
recipient countries and territories--to determine the level of funding 
countries contributed to the TCF and the amounts some countries 
received from the TC program over the past decade. We used the United 
Nation's (UN) annual Human Development Reports to determine country 
income classifications. For each country, we cross-referenced TC 
financial data against country income classifications to determine the 
amounts of funding countries designated by the UN as "high-income" 
contributed to and received from the TC program. Additionally, we 
reviewed TC program annual reports to determine the technical areas 
covered and funded by the program. 

As initially agreed with your office, we intended to assess the extent 
to which TC projects have contributed to the safety and security of 
nuclear installations around the world. Toward that end, using data 
provided by State from IAEA's TC-PRIDE database, identifying all TC 
projects funded in the nuclear security and safety fields since 1997, 
we developed a judgmental sample of 22 TC projects (17 national 
projects and 5 regional projects) to serve as the basis for our 
assessment and interviews with relevant IAEA officials. We selected 
this judgmental sample by focusing on projects completed since 2005. 
Using the data provided by State, we calculated the average cost of 
national-level nuclear security and safety projects completed since 
that time and selected the 17 projects that exceeded this average cost. 
The 5 regional projects in our judgmental sample were selected by 
identifying the highest budget project in each of the five TC program 
regions completed since 2005. We briefed IAEA officials on our project 
selection methodology, and they agreed that it was fair and unbiased. 
However, IAEA officials declined to make additional information 
available to us on these projects and did not provide us with an 
opportunity to interview relevant IAEA officials who oversaw these 
projects to discuss their impact and results. As a result of these 
restrictive policies, we were unable to sufficiently assess the TC 
program's contributions to improving the safety and security of nuclear 
facilities around the world. 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2007 to March 2009, 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: 2007 Technical Cooperation Assistance Recipient States and 
Territories: 

Dollars in thousands: 

Africa region: 

Country: Algeria; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,361.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Angola; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $495.5; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Benin; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $371.6; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Botswana; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $393.1; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Burkina Faso; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $567.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Cameroon; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $412.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Central African Republic; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: 365.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Chad; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $143.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Côte d'Ivoire; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $253.8; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $699.1; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Egypt; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,280.9; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Eritrea; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $242.2; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Ethiopia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $2,187.5; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Gabon; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $159.1; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Gambia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $3.5; 
IAEA member state?: No; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Ghana; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,184.1; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Kenya; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,093.5; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $894.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Madagascar; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $870.6; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Malawi; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $35.2; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Mali; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,021.9; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Islamic Republic of Mauritania; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $156.1; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Mauritius; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $368.9; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Morocco; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $996.9; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Mozambique; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $17.5; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Namibia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $421.1; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Niger; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $596.5; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Nigeria; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,527.0; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Senegal; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $983.9; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Seychelles; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $100.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Sierra Leone; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $348.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: South Africa; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,142.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Sudan; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,148.1; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: Yes; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Tunisia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $789.0; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Uganda; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $689.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: United Republic of Tanzania; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,925.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Zambia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $618.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Zimbabwe; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $571.0; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Subtotal, Africa; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $26,435.6. 

Asia and the Pacific region: 

Country: Afghanistan; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $111.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Bangladesh; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,130.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Brunei Darussalam; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $0.5; 
IAEA member state?: No; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: High. 

Country: Burma (Myanmar); 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $670.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Cambodia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $0.9; 
IAEA member state?: No; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: China; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $2,007.1; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: [A]; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: India; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $252.8; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: No; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Indonesia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,168.6; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Islamic Republic of Iran; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,000.0; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: Yes; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Iraq; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $190.6; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Israel; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $251.6; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: No; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: High. 

Country: Jordan; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $930.6; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Republic of Korea; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $636.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: High. 

Country: Kuwait; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $152.2; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: High. 

Country: Lebanon; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $502.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Malaysia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,012.8; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Marshall Islands; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $0.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Mongolia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $697.2; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Pakistan; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $2,233.9; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: No; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Philippines; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,510.7; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Qatar; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $232.8; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No[B]; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: High. 

Country: Saudi Arabia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $321.5; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No[C]; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: High. 

Country: Singapore; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $137.8; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No[D]; 
2007 UN income category: High. 

Country: Sri Lanka; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $810.8; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Syrian Arab Republic; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,525.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: Yes; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian 
Authority; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $26.3; 
IAEA member state?: No; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: No; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Thailand; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,057.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: United Arab Emirates; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $158.7; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: High. 

Country: Vietnam; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,770.8; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Yemen; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,179.2; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Subtotal, Asia and the Pacific; Total 2007 TC funding 
received: $21,681.3. 

Europe region: 

Country: Albania; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $784.1; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Armenia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,308.7; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Azerbaijan; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $312.1; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Belarus; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $969.8; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $399.2; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Bulgaria; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $898.7; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Croatia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,141.6; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Cyprus; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $140.5; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: High. 

Country: Czech Republic; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $564.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Estonia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $808.9; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Georgia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $811.5; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Greece; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $332.5; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: High. 

Country: Hungary; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $389.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Kazakhstan; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,303.1; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Kyrgyzstan; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $542.6; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Latvia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $247.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Lithuania; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $2,607.0; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Malta; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $405.7; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: High. 

Country: Montenegro; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $18.9; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Poland; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,553.8; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Portugal; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $504.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: High. 

Country: Republic of Moldova; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $905.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Romania; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,276.5; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Russian Federation; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $919.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: [A]; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Serbia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $2,129.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Slovakia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $628.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Slovenia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $481.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: High. 

Country: Tajikistan; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $855.9; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $642.0; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Turkey; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $466.7; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Ukraine; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $2,466.2; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Uzbekistan; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,015.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Subtotal, Europe; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $27,830.6. 

Latin America region: 

Country: Argentina; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,543.2; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Belize; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $61.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Bolivia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $817.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Brazil; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,480.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Chile; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,112.6; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Colombia; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $778.0; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Costa Rica; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $749.6; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Cuba; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,323.7; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: Yes; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Dominican Republic; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $256.9; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Ecuador; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $849.1; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: El Salvador; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $531.9; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Guatemala; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $435.6; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No[E]; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Haiti; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $450.1; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Low. 

Country: Honduras; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $394.5; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Jamaica; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $298.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Mexico; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $962.8; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Nicaragua; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,516.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Panama; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $549.4; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Paraguay; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $384.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Peru; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $670.8; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Uruguay; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $655.6; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: Yes; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Venezuela; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $681.3; 
IAEA member state?: Yes; 
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No; 
NPT state party?: Yes; 
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes; 
Additional protocol in force?: No; 
2007 UN income category: Middle. 

Country: Subtotal, Latin America; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $16,503.3. 

Interregional and global TC funding: 

Country: Interregional;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $24.3. 

Country: Global; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $842.6. 

Country: Subtotal, Interregional and Global; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $866.9. 

Country: Total; 
Total 2007 TC funding received: $93,317.7. 

Source: GAO analysis of State, IAEA, and UN data. 

[A] As nuclear-weapon states, China and Russia are not obligated under 
the NPT to accept comprehensive safeguards on their nuclear activities. 

[B] Qatar brought a comprehensive safeguards agreement into force in 
January 2009. 

[C] Saudi Arabia brought a comprehensive safeguards agreement into 
force in January 2009. 

[D] Singapore brought an additional protocol into force in March 2008. 

[E] Guatemala brought an additional protocol into force in May 2008. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Numbers of Technical Cooperation Proposals Reviewed by 
U.S. National Laboratories, Categorized by Level of Proliferation Risk, 
by Year, 1998 through 2006: 

National laboratory assessment of TC proposal proliferation risks: 

Review year: 1998; 
Lead reviewer: ORNL; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: No concern: 3; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Some concern but 
insufficient data to assess: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Low, minimal concern: 
0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Medium, moderate 
concern: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: High concern: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: No 
concern: 12; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Some 
concern but insufficient data to assess: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Low, 
minimal concern: 3; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Medium, 
moderate concern: 2; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: High 
concern: 0. 

Review year: 2000; 
Lead reviewer: ORNL; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: No concern: 270; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Some concern but 
insufficient data to assess: 2; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Low, minimal concern: 
0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Medium, moderate 
concern: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: High concern: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: No 
concern: 1; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Some 
concern but insufficient data to assess: 1; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Low, 
minimal concern: 6; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Medium, 
moderate concern: 1; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: High 
concern: 0. 

Review year: 2002; 
Lead reviewer: ORNL; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: No concern: 86; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Some concern but 
insufficient data to assess: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Low, minimal concern: 
0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Medium, moderate 
concern: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: High concern: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: No 
concern: 1; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Some 
concern but insufficient data to assess: 1; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Low, 
minimal concern: 1; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Medium, 
moderate concern: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: High 
concern: 0. 

Review year: 2004; 
Lead reviewer: ORNL; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: No concern: 478; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Some concern but 
insufficient data to assess: 1; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Low, minimal concern: 
0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Medium, moderate 
concern: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: High concern: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: No 
concern: 12; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Some 
concern but insufficient data to assess: 1; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Low, 
minimal concern: 2; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Medium, 
moderate concern: 1; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: High 
concern: 1. 

Review year: 2006; 
Lead reviewer: LANL; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: No concern: 659; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Some concern but 
insufficient data to assess: 20; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Low, minimal concern: 
0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Medium, moderate 
concern: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: High concern: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: No 
concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Some 
concern but insufficient data to assess: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Low, 
minimal concern: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Medium, 
moderate concern: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: High 
concern: 0. 

Review year: Total; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: No concern: 1,496; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Some concern but 
insufficient data to assess: 23; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Low, minimal concern: 
0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Medium, moderate 
concern: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: High concern: 0; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: No 
concern: 26; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Some 
concern but insufficient data to assess: 3; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Low, 
minimal concern: 12; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Medium, 
moderate concern: 4; 
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: High 
concern: 1. 

Source: GAO analysis of ORNL, LANL, and DOE data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: 2007 Member State Contributions to the Technical 
Cooperation Fund: 

In U.S. dollars: 

Member state: Holy See; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $2,632; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 329%. 

Member state: Iceland; 
TCF target share: $26,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $34,256; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 130. 

Member state: Canada; 
TCF target share: $2,171,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: $2,389,558; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 110. 

Member state: Lithuania; 
TCF target share: $18,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $19,500; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 106. 

Member state: Belgium; 
TCF target share: $824,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $860,215; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 104. 

Member state: United Republic of Tanzania; 
TCF target share: $4,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $5,000; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 104. 

Member state: Syrian Arab Republic; 
TCF target share: $29,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $30,000; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 101. 

Member state: Egypt; 
TCF target share: $92,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $92,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Liechtenstein; 
TCF target share: $4,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: $4,000; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Australia; 
TCF target share: $1,228,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $1,228,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Albania; 
TCF target share: $4,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: $4,000; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Austria; 
TCF target share: $663,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: $663,200; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Bangladesh; 
TCF target share: $8,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: $8,000; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: China; 
TCF target share: $1,584,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $1,584,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Cuba; 
TCF target share: $32,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $32,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Cyprus; 
TCF target share: $30,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $30,400; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Czech Republic; 
TCF target share: $140,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $140,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Denmark; 
TCF target share: $554,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $554,400; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Finland; 
TCF target share: $411,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: $411,200; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: France; 
TCF target share: $4,653,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $4,653,600; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Hungary; 
TCF target share: $96,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $96,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: India; 
TCF target share: $324,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $324,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Japan; 
TCF target share: $15,024,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $15,024,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Jordan; 
TCF target share: $8,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $8,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Malaysia; 
TCF target share: $156,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $156,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Netherlands; 
TCF target share: $1,304,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: $1,304,000; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Norway; 
TCF target share: $524,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: $524,000; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Pakistan; 
TCF target share: $42,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $42,400; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Poland; 
TCF target share: $356,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: $356,000; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Romania; 
TCF target share: $46,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $46,400; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Slovakia; 
TCF target share: $39,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: $39,200; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Slovenia; 
TCF target share: $63,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: $63,200; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: South Africa; 
TCF target share: $225,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $225,600; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Sweden; 
TCF target share: $770,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $770,400; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Switzerland; 
TCF target share: $924,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: $923,975; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Thailand; 
TCF target share: $160,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $160,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Tunisia; 
TCF target share: $24,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $24,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: United Kingdom; 
TCF target share: $4,728,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $4,728,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Vietnam; 
TCF target share: $16,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: $16,000; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Zimbabwe; 
TCF target share: $5,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $5,600; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Sri Lanka; 
TCF target share: $12,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $12,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Republic of Korea; 
TCF target share: $1,386,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $1,386,400; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Turkey; 
TCF target share: $287,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: $287,200; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Ireland; 
TCF target share: $270,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $270,400; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Spain; 
TCF target share: $1,944,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $1,944,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Bulgaria; 
TCF target share: $12,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $12,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Afghanistan; 
TCF target share: $1,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $1,600; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Armenia; 
TCF target share: $1,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $1,600; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Belarus; 
TCF target share: $13,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $13,600; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Cameroon; 
TCF target share: $6,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $6,400; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Croatia; 
TCF target share: $28,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $28,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Ecuador; 
TCF target share: $14,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $14,400; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Estonia; 
TCF target share: $9,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $9,600; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Ethiopia; 
TCF target share: $3,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: $3,200; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Germany; 
TCF target share: $6,684,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $6,684,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Greece; 
TCF target share: $408,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $408,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Haiti; 
TCF target share: $2,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $2,400; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Italy; 
TCF target share: $3,770,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $3,770,400; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Kazakhstan; 
TCF target share: $19,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: $19,200; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Kenya; 
TCF target share: $7,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: $7,200; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Kuwait; 
TCF target share: $124,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $124,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Luxembourg; 
TCF target share: $59,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: $59,200; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Mauritius; 
TCF target share: $8,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $8,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Mongolia; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Nicaragua; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Niger; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Singapore; 
TCF target share: $299,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: $299,200; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Uganda; 
TCF target share: $4,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $4,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Ukraine; 
TCF target share: $30,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $30,400; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: United Arab Emirates; 
TCF target share: $181,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $181,600; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Yemen; 
TCF target share: $4,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $4,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Zambia; 
TCF target share: $1,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $1,600; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Latvia; 
TCF target share: $11,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: $11,200; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Malta; 
TCF target share: $10,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $10,400; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Republic of Moldova; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Angola;
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Burkina Faso; 
TCF target share: $1,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $1,600; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Tajikistan; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Botswana; 
TCF target share: $9,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $9,600; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Kyrgyzstan; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Serbia; 
TCF target share: $14,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $14,400; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: Belize; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100. 

Member state: United States of America; 
TCF target share: $20,000,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: $19,775,000; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 99. 

Member state: Algeria; 
TCF target share: $58,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $58,000; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 99. 

Member state: Namibia; 
TCF target share: $4,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $4,650; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 97. 

Member state: Russian Federation; 
TCF target share: $848,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: $821,231; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 97. 

Member state: Burma (Myanmar); 
TCF target share: $8,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: $7,714; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 96. 

Member state: Indonesia; 
TCF target share: $109,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $104,458; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 95. 

Member state: Venezuela; 
TCF target share: $132,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: $118,800; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 90. 

Member state: Colombia; 
TCF target share: $119,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: $105,856; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 89. 

Member state: Chile; 
TCF target share: $172,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: $140,000; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 81. 

Member state: Portugal; 
TCF target share: $362,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: $289,662; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 80. 

Member state: Mexico; 
TCF target share: $1,453,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $1,109,294; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 76. 

Member state: Israel; 
TCF target share: $360,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: $140,000; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 39. 

Member state: Brazil; 
TCF target share: $1,175,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: $450,000; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 38. 

Member state: Argentina; 
TCF target share: $737,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $113,084; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 15. 

Member state: Philippines; 
TCF target share: $73,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: $5,000; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 7. 

Member state: Morocco; 
TCF target share: $36,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Nigeria; 
TCF target share: $32,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Paraguay; 
TCF target share: $9,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Sudan; 
TCF target share: $6,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Uruguay; 
TCF target share: $36,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Islamic Republic of Iran; 
TCF target share: $120,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Bolivia; 
TCF target share: $7,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
TCF target share: $2,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Costa Rica; 
TCF target share: $23,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Côte d'Ivoire; 
TCF target share: $8,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Democratic Republic of Congo; 
TCF target share: $2,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Dominican Republic; 
TCF target share: $27,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: El Salvador; 
TCF target share: $16,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Gabon; 
TCF target share: $7,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Georgia; 
TCF target share: $2,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Ghana; 
TCF target share: $3,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Guatemala; 
TCF target share: $23,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Iraq; 
TCF target share: $12,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Jamaica; 
TCF target share: $6,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Lebanon; 
TCF target share: $18,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Liberia; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; 
TCF target share: $101,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Madagascar; 
TCF target share: $2,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Mali; 
TCF target share: $1,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Marshall Islands; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Monaco; 
TCF target share: $2,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: New Zealand; 
TCF target share: $170,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Panama; 
TCF target share: $14,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Peru; 
TCF target share: $71,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Qatar; 
TCF target share: $49,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Saudi Arabia; 
TCF target share: $550,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Senegal; 
TCF target share: $4,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Sierra Leone; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; 
TCF target share: $4,800; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Uzbekistan; 
TCF target share: $10,400; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Benin; 
TCF target share: $1,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Central African Republic; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Azerbaijan; 
TCF target share: $4,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Eritrea; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Honduras; 
TCF target share: $4,000; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Seychelles; 
TCF target share: $1,600; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Islamic Republic of Mauritania; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Chad; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Montenegro; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Malawi; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Mozambique; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Palau; 
TCF target share: $800; 
Amount paid to TCF: 0; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0. 

Member state: Total; 
TCF target share: $80,003,200; 
Amount paid to TCF: $76,491,085; 
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 96%. 

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

[A] IAEA defines the percentage of target share paid as the "rate of 
attainment," a percentage arrived at by taking the total voluntary 
contributions paid to the TCF by member states for a particular year 
and dividing them by the TCF target for the same year. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: 2007 Technical Cooperation Disbursements, by Agency 
Program: 

In U.S. dollars: 

Program: Nuclear power; 
Disbursement amount: $3,346,800; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 3.6%. 

Program: Nuclear fuel cycle and materials technologies; 
Disbursement amount: $319,200; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 0.34. 

Program: Capacity building and nuclear knowledge maintenance for 
sustainable energy development; 
Disbursement amount: $2,273,900; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 2.4. 

Program: Nuclear science; 
Disbursement amount: $7,611,300; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 8.2. 

Program: Food and agriculture; 
Disbursement amount: $11,911,500; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 12.8. 

Program: Human health; 
Disbursement amount: $26,410,000; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 28.3. 

Program: Water resources; 
Disbursement amount: $3,718,300; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 4.0. 

Program: Assessment and management of marine and terrestrial 
environments; 
Disbursement amount: $3,310,900; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 3.5. 

Program: Radioisotope production and radiation technology; 
Disbursement amount: $6,991,000; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 7.5. 

Program: Safety of nuclear installations; 
Disbursement amount: $5,601,200; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 6.0. 

Program: Radiation and transport safety; Disbursement amount: 
6,830,100; Percentage of total TC disbursements: 7.3. 

Program: Management of radioactive waste; 
Disbursement amount: $7,177,000; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 7.7. 

Program: Nuclear security; 
Disbursement amount: $1,982,100; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 2.1. 

Program: Safeguards; 
Disbursement amount: $55,100; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 0.06. 

Program: Public information and communication; 
Disbursement amount: $2,400; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 0.003. 

Program: Management of technical cooperation for development; 
Disbursement amount: $4,291,300; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 4.6. 

Program: Executive management, policy-making and coordination; 
Disbursement amount: $405,500; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 0.43. 

Program: Emergency preparedness; Disbursement amount: 1,079,000; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 1.2. 

Program: Total; 
Disbursement amount: $93,316,600; 
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 100.0%. 

Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data. 

Note: Percentages might not add to 100 due to rounding. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

February 17, 2009: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Nuclear 
Nonproliferation: Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address 
Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical Cooperation 
Program," GAO Job Code 360915. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Stephen Adams, Physical Scientist, Bureau of International Security and 
Nonproliferation at (202) 647-3302. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 
James L. Millette: 

cc: 
GAO - Glen Levis: 
ISN - Eliot Kang (Acting): 
State/OIG - Mark Duda: 

[End of letter] 

Department Of State Comments On GAO Draft Report: 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address 
Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical Cooperation 
Program (GAO-09-275, GAO Code 360915): 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report 
"Nuclear Nonproliferation: Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address 
Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical Cooperation 
Program." 

Recommendation #1: 

Establish a formal mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely 
information sharing on TC project proposals between IAEA and the United 
States and other countries-including detailed information on the TC 
proposals themselves as well as the results of IAEA's internal 
proliferation reviews of the proposals-so that proliferation and other 
concerns can be identified and addressed early in the project 
development cycle. 

We appreciate the GAO's recommendation to establish a formal mechanism 
to facilitate greater and more timely information sharing on TC project 
proposals. We would welcome receiving detailed information on IAEA TC 
proposals and its internal proliferation reviews. The information 
sharing envisioned in this recommendation would occur without the 
recipient State's express approval. Such information, however, is 
viewed by the IAEA and the recipient state to be confidential. Any 
proposal to change this situation would need to be approved by the IAEA 
Board of Governors. We believe the political realities of the Board of 
Governors make it unlikely that such a proposal for formal information-
sharing would be adopted at this time. The recommendation would be 
viewed as inconsistent with the IAEA Statute by many Member States (and 
the IAEA Secretariat) and an unreasonable "micromanagement" of the 
IAEA's professional staff. A more achievable goal could be to work to 
ensure that the IAEA publishes its complete listing of projects earlier 
than has been the norm, e.g., two months prior to the meeting of the 
Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee meeting, instead of the 
customary two weeks. 

Recommendation #2: 

Promote a regular and systematic process for obtaining, retaining, and 
updating information on prior TC project fellows to better track where 
and how the knowledge and expertise they have obtained is being 
applied. 

We endorse the recommendation to promote a regular and systematic 
process for obtaining, retaining, and updating information on prior TC 
project fellows to better track where and how the knowledge and 
expertise they have obtained is being applied. We believe that, if the 
IAEA were to implement this recommendation fully, it would help 
highlight the value of IAEA Technical Cooperation and Assistance 
projects in individual member states, as well as provide a resource for 
future projects, and contribute to the improvement of the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the program. TC has also been working on 
implementing an In-Touch Platform -- a system to establish, maintain 
and intensify contacts between the IAEA and potential, current and 
former stakeholders in the TC program which include experts and 
trainees. The capability of this system could potentially be expanded 
to obtain, retain, and update information on prior TC project fellows. 
However, on average, there are over 1,500 TC fellows and over 2,000 
training course participants each year. Tracking such a large number of 
individuals regularly will require additional IAEA personnel and fiscal 
resources. 

Recommendation #3: 

Strengthen the TC program's mechanisms for collecting member states' 
contributions to the TCF to include withholding from non-paying states 
a percentage of TC assistance equivalent to the percentage of their 
target rate that they fail to contribute the TCF. 

The Department of State believes that this recommendation is intended 
to ensure that the recipient state is a true partner in the project and 
will help that state work toward sustainability. TC has already applied 
since 1995 the Due Account Mechanism. GOV/INF/2008/6 has shown the 
effectiveness of this mechanism. The rate of attainment has increased 
from 81.2% in 2001 to 95.7% in 2007. Some member states, however, that 
have not paid their contributions were the least developing countries 
(LDC) and we are concerned that withholding assistance to LDCs could 
negatively impact these countries. The Board will have to weigh 
carefully the questions relating to whether additional options such as 
this proposed recommendation can be applied efficiently and cost-
effectively since the current mechanism is considered to function 
reasonably well. 

Recommendation #4: 

Establish criteria for determining when member states, especially those 
defined as high-income countries, no longer need technical cooperation 
assistance in particular fields and when such states could be graduated 
from further TC support altogether. 

This recommendation, which would benefit LDCs, was also made by the 
Senior Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation (SAGTAC) 
at its meeting in November 1997. Specifically, SAGTAC recommended that 
higher income recipient Member States that reached a certain per capita 
GNP threshold should "graduate" and no longer be eligible for Technical 
Co-operation Fund (TCF) financed activities. At that time, one Member 
State representative on SAGTAC contended that it was premature to 
consider "graduation" solely on the basis of per capita GDP. Since all 
IAEA Member States, even those in the developed world, may receive IAEA 
assistance under the Statute, this recommendation would have to be 
implemented on a voluntary basis. 

Recommendation #5: 

Seek to implement new results-based performance metrics for the TC 
program that establish specific national, regional, and interregional 
social and economic needs and measure the collective impact of TC 
projects in meeting those objectives. 

At U.S. encouragement, TC has made significant progress over the last 
several years in implementing performance matrixes when planning, 
monitoring and evaluating projects. TC used the Programme Cycle 
Management Framework (PCMF) for the first time in 2006 to finalize the 
2007-2008 TC Program. The PCMF is an interactive on-line system for 
planning and managing national and regional TC projects, which 
facilitates real-time collaboration between all relevant parts of the 
Secretariat and the stakeholders in Member States. This has enabled the 
development of better screened, higher quality projects. As a web-based 
platform, the PCMF has made the planning process more participatory and 
more transparent. This system incorporates the results-based management 
approach/project framework matrix. The GAO recommendation could be 
considered as an additional, next step in this system. 

Recommendation #6: 
Focus the TC program on a more limited number of high priority 
technical areas to maximize the impact of program resources. 

The Department of State agrees with this recommendation, which appears 
to be consistent with "the bigger and fewer projects approach" to TC. 
In this vein, the Department of State recommends that the TC Strategy 
(2002 Review) should be revisited in accordance with the Report of the 
Commission of Eminent Persons on the Future of the Agency. 

Recommendation #7: 

Encourage the TC program to reach out to private sector entities as 
part of its new partner and donor development strategy. 

The Department of State agrees with this recommendation. The TC program 
has already engaged with private sectors (non-traditional partners) in 
recent years as part of its strategic partnerships and the IAEA's 
effort to look at its future requirements in the Report of the 
Commission of Eminent Persons on the Future of the Agency. 

Recommendation #8: 

Request member states to assess in their TC project proposals the 
prospects for commercialization of and private sector investment in the 
results of the projects. Such steps could include requiring information 
in the proposals on potential business plans, marketing strategies, and 
strategies for attracting commercial partners once IAEA support has 
concluded. 

The Department of State believes this is a good recommendation, but it 
could be difficult to include business plans and marketing strategies 
given the relatively small size of the average TC project, i.e., $150K 
for 2009-2011. We suggest that this proposal be pursued at the program 
area level. 

Recommendation #9: 

That the Secretary of State enhance record keeping and formally 
document management actions regarding the discussion, action, and 
disposition of TC project proposals that DOE and the national 
laboratories identify as having potential proliferation concerns. 

The Department of State endorses this recommendation and can establish 
a process consistent with the availability of necessary personnel and 
funds. 

Recommendation #10: 

That the Secretary of State issue formal guidance with well-defined 
criteria-such as countries designated by State as sponsors of terrorism 
or gross human rights violators-that State should use as basis for 
approving or rejecting TC fellowship requests for nuclear studies in 
the United States. This guidance could include, among other things, a 
list of specific countries from which State would not approve TC 
fellows which could be updated and revised annually, or as other 
circumstances warrant. 

The Department of State supports this recommendation. Guidance can be 
formalized which determines how decisions are made with respect to TC 
fellowship requests for nuclear studies in the United States from 
countries not party to the NPT, from countries that are on the list as 
state sponsors of terrorism, and from countries that are deemed gross 
human rights violators. 

GAO Recommendation to Congress: 

In addition to its recommendations that State explore undertaking a 
number of actions, including encouraging greater IAEA information 
sharing on TC projects, GAO is "considering asking Congress to consider 
requiring State to withhold a proportionate share of its contributions 
to the TCF for TC program assistance provided to U.S.-designated state 
sponsors of terrorism." The Department of State strongly opposes such a 
proposed recommendation to Congress for a number of reasons. First, 
this proposed recommendation is counterproductive to the GAO's own 
recommendation that states pay their full contribution to the TCF. The 
United States needs to set an example by paying its contribution in 
full and on time. Without this leverage, the U.S. will undermine its 
ability to persuade states with fewer financial resources to pay their 
share of the TCF. As GAO noted in the report, states failed to 
contribute about $3.5M of their share for the TCF during 2007. If the 
United States had been required to withhold a proportionate share of 
its contribution for TC programs for state sponsors of terrorism during 
2007, this would have increased the delinquency amount by approximately 
40 percent. Moreover, the GAO report found, inter alia, that the IAEA 
Technical Cooperation Fund is fungible; therefore, this proposed 
recommendation would not necessarily stop IAEA TC projects in the 
targeted countries but instead diminish overall TCF funding. By 
targeting the entire TCF, the U.S. will anger states in the developing 
world. The proposed recommendation would be, thus, difficult to explain 
as being targeted solely at state sponsors of terrorism, and not at the 
TCF itself. Finally, Congress has specifically exempted the IAEA 
contribution from this type of proportionate withholding, which is 
applied to other contributions for international organizations, which 
we believe reflects a Congressional recognition of the importance of 
the IAEA program. We note that none of the IAEA TC projects benefiting 
state sponsors of terrorism to date have been shown to have contributed 
to a WMD program. Indeed, a large percentage of TC programs are for 
projects related to human health and other purposes related to 
development. While we recognize we should not wait for the system to 
"fail," we believe that there are adequate safeguards within the 
Secretariat. Finally, if the United States were required to implement 
the GAO's proposed recommendation, we believe it would have a 
significant and demonstrable negative impact in the ability of the 
United States to achieve its critical objectives with regard to the 
investigation of nuclear noncompliance cases such as Iran and Syria and 
improvements that we seek to make to the IAEA's safeguards and nuclear 
security systems. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Glen Levis (Assistant 
Director), Eugene Gray, Simon Hirschfeld, and William Hoehn made key 
contributions to this report. Other technical assistance was provided 
by Jeffrey Phillips, Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, Jay Smale, and Jeanette 
Soares. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The five nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT--China, 
France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States--are not obligated under the treaty to accept safeguards, 
although each nation has completed voluntary agreements with IAEA that 
allow varying degrees of verification at specifically designated 
facilities. Other countries that have not joined the NPT--India, 
Israel, and Pakistan--also do not have comprehensive safeguards 
agreements with IAEA but do have limited safeguards arrangements with 
IAEA on some of their specific nuclear facilities and material 
stockpiles. 

[2] For more information, see GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has 
Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but 
Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-93] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 
2005). 

[3] TC fellowships in the United States may be funded entirely by the 
TC program (referred to as Type I fellowships) or from U.S. funds 
(referred to as Type II fellowships) to reduce or eliminate the cost to 
IAEA. In addition to fellowships, the TC program also supports 
"scientific visits," which are shorter-term scholarships awarded to 
senior scientists, heads of research groups, and directors of research 
centers, allowing them to visit foreign nuclear institutes, observe 
nuclear research, and make professional contacts with other nuclear 
scientists and experts. 

[4] The other IAEA departments are the Departments of Management, 
Nuclear Sciences and Applications, Safeguards, Nuclear Energy, and 
Nuclear Safety and Security. 

[5] A TC project may be funded in whole or in part from the TCF. 
Projects that IAEA approves but that cannot be supported by available 
TCF resources are referred to as "footnote a/" projects and can be 
supported through extrabudgetary funding provided by member states or 
international organizations. Extrabudgetary funding can be allocated 
directly to specific footnote a/projects. 

[6] In-kind is defined by IAEA as "gifts" of services, equipment and 
facilities made available to IAEA by member states or other donors, 
such as providing experts and training course lecturers, sponsoring 
training courses, donating equipment, and sponsoring certain types of 
fellowships. 

[7] The U.S. voluntary contribution to IAEA also supports other IAEA 
programs and activities, including safeguards, nuclear safety, and 
nuclear security. 

[8] See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Concerns With the 
International Atomic Energy Agency's Technical Cooperation Program, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-97-192] (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 16, 1997). 

[9] DOE manages the largest laboratory system of its kind in the world. 
Originally created to design and build atomic weapons, DOE's 22 
laboratories have expanded their missions to conduct research in many 
disciplines--from high-energy physics to advanced computing. 

[10] Occasionally, a small number of TC projects are approved out of 
cycle; for instance, three new TC projects were approved at the fall 
2007 meeting. In addition, in 2008, the TC program cycle shifted 
temporarily to a 3-year cycle, in which new projects were approved for 
2009 through 2011, in order to synchronize future TC cycles with the 
planning cycle of IAEA's "regular program." 

[11] On October 11, 2008, the United States rescinded North Korea's 
designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. However, North Korea 
withdrew its membership in IAEA in 1994 and has not received TC program 
assistance since then. 

[12] Dual-use refers to equipment or technology that can contribute 
both to nuclear energy and other peaceful nuclear applications or 
nuclear weapons development or production. 

[13] The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a group of nuclear supplier 
countries that seeks to contribute to the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons through the implementation of guidelines for nuclear exports 
and nuclear-related exports. 

[14] In March 1997, we reported on IAEA's technical assistance to Cuba. 
See GAO, Nuclear Safety: International Atomic Energy Agency's Technical 
Assistance for Cuba, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-97-72] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 
1997). 

[15] Between 2003 and 2008, State had two additional, nearly duplicate 
reporting obligations. First, it had to undertake a comprehensive 
annual review of the IAEA programs and projects in Burma, Cuba, Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria and submit it to Congress. Annual 
reviews of programs and projects in Iraq and Libya were only required 
until 2006 and 2008, respectively. Second, it had to submit to Congress 
a report detailing certain aspects of IAEA programs in Iran and 
describing IAEA programs and projects in the countries covered by the 
first reporting requirement. Both of these reports had to address 
inconsistencies between IAEA programs and projects and U.S. nuclear 
nonproliferation and safety goals in those countries. 

[16] In December 2006, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1737, 
sanctioning Iran, in part, for its failure to suspend its uranium 
enrichment activities. One of the resolution's provisions prohibited 
technical cooperation provided to Iran by IAEA that relates to 
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. Pursuant to this 
resolution, IAEA's Director General provided a report in February 2007 
identifying 22 TC projects in Iran that could not proceed or proceed 
only on a case-by-case basis, based on an evaluation of the projects' 
contributions to proliferation-sensitive activities. 

[17] As we noted in 2005, IAEA faced a number of challenges that 
hampered its ability to implement strengthened safeguards, including 
that almost two-thirds of NPT signatories had not brought additional 
protocols into force. See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has 
Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but 
Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-93](Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005). 

[18] For TC proposals approved between 1998 and 2004, the Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory (ORNL) was primarily responsible for conducting 
technical reviews of proposed TC projects for proliferation concerns. 
In the 2006 cycle, the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) led the 
technical reviews of TC proposals. For the 2008 review of TC proposals, 
DOE initiated a multilaboratory approach to assessing potential TC 
project proliferation concerns. 

[19] Hot cells are shielded containment boxes or rooms with remote 
handling equipment for examining and processing radioactive materials. 

[20] Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an applicant is 
rendered inadmissible if a consular officer knows or has reason to 
believe that the applicant seeks to enter the United States to violate 
any law prohibiting the export of goods, technology, or sensitive 
information from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(i)(II). 

[21] For further information on the visa adjudication process and Visas 
Mantis, see GAO, Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time 
Taken to Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-371] (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 25, 2004). 

[22] In data IAEA provided to us, the numbers of TC fellows and 
scientific visitors were not counted separately. 

[23] The size of the TCF increased from approximately $56.4 million in 
2003 to $76.5 million in 2007. The rate of total payment of member 
state contributions to the TCF rose from 75 percent of the overall TCF 
target in 2003 to 96 percent in 2007. 

[24] The United States contributes 99 percent of its TCF target amount 
on an annual basis because of the proportionate share of funding it 
withholds for TC projects in Cuba. 

[End of section] 

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