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Civil Support Missions May Depend on DOD's Implementation of the 2008 
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2008.

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Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

April 2008: 

Homeland Security: 

Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support Missions May Depend 
on DOD's Implementation of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act: 

GAO-08-311: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-311, a report to the Ranking Member, Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The high use of National Guard (Guard) forces for overseas missions has 
raised questions about its ability to support civil authorities in the 
event of a catastrophic incident. GAO was asked to assess two 
alternatives for providing funding and authority specifically for the 
Guard’s civil support missions. Congress subsequently enacted a new 
approach for the Guard’s civil support needs, which GAO also included 
in this assessment. GAO determined: (1) the extent to which planning to 
identify the Guard’s civil support requirements has been undertaken, 
(2) the current funding approach for the Guard’s civil support 
capabilities and how three approaches—modeled after the U.S. Special 
Operations Command (SOCOM), the Coast Guard, and that in the 2008 
National Defense Authorization Act—could be applied to the Guard; (3) 
guiding principles to consider when developing and implementing funding 
alternatives, and (4) the extent to which the existing and alternative 
approaches are consistent with these principles. GAO synthesized 
guiding principles for military and civil support effectiveness from 
the literature and discussed alternatives with defense and homeland 
security analysts. 

What GAO Found: 

Comprehensive planning has not been undertaken, by the states or 
federal agencies, to identify the Guard’s requirements for responding 
to large-scale, multistate civil support missions, such as Hurricane 
Katrina, because responsibilities for conducting this planning have 
been unclear. While such events are likely to be state-led, federal 
funds are likely to be used to fund the Guard’s response. The 
efficiency and effectiveness of response efforts can be facilitated by 
planning that assigns responsibilities, develops requirements, 
identifies gaps, and prioritizes investments. The 2008 National Defense 
Authorization Act addresses planning responsibilities to some extent by 
directing the Department of Defense (DOD) to (1) plan for the Guard’s 
response to natural disasters and acts of terrorism and (2) plan for 
and fund the unique capabilities DOD needs to provide during civil 
support missions. 

Most of the Guard’s capabilities have been funded through DOD 
appropriations to equip, staff, and train for its warfighting missions. 
The states rely on these capabilities for civil support missions when 
available. However, alternative funding approaches could provide 
specific funding for the Guard’s civil support role. Under a SOCOM-like 
approach, the National Guard Bureau could be given funding and 
authority to provide Guard forces with unique civil support 
capabilities not already funded by DOD. Under a Coast Guard–like 
approach, DOD would fund the Guard’s warfighting needs, but the 
Department of Homeland Security could identify needs for and fund the 
Guard’s civil support–unique capabilities. The 2008 National Defense 
Authorization Act directed DOD to develop a funding request for certain 
capabilities DOD needs to provide civil support. 

GAO identified seven guiding principles that can be used in assessing 
the extent to which funding alternatives would support the Guard’s dual 
roles. These include (1) maintain warfighting capability; (2) maintain 
civilian control; (3) involve key stakeholders; (4) promote interagency 
planning; (5) promote economy and efficiency; (6) support coherent 
budget formulation; and (7) provide accountability and transparency. 

The current approach and two of the alternatives address some of the 
principles, but none incorporates all of them. For example, the current 
approach maintains warfighting integration; but it does not provide 
specific funding for civil support needs or encourage integration of 
Guard forces with stakeholders outside DOD. The SOCOM and Coast 
Guard–like models would provide processes for identifying and funding 
civil support requirements, but neither would promote interagency 
planning and collaboration. The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act 
addresses all of the principles, at least in part, but it is unclear 
the extent to which DOD’s implementation will yield results that are 
fully consistent with the guiding principles until implemented. For 
example, it is unclear the extent to which DOD will consider the input 
of the external stakeholders or fund civil support capabilities the 
Guard needs for state-led but federally funded missions. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD report to Congress on the steps taken to 
include the guiding principles in its implementation of the 2008 NDAA. 
DOD generally agreed with GAO’s recommendations. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-311]. For more 
information, contact Janet A. St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or 
stlaurentj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Key Stakeholders Have Not Undertaken Comprehensive Planning to Identify 
the National Guard's Requirements for State-Led but Federally Funded 
Civil Support Missions: 

Current National Guard Funding Approach Emphasizes Warfighting Needs, 
but Alternative Approaches Could Also Address Civil Support Needs: 

Guiding Principles Form a Basis for Assessing Funding Alternatives for 
the National Guard's Civil Support Capabilities: 

Current Approach and Two Alternatives Do Not Fully Incorporate the 
Guiding Principles, while the 2008 NDAA Partially Addresses All the 
Principles: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Comparison of National Guard State and Federal Roles: 

Table 2: Comparison of Key Roles and Responsibilities under the Current 
Approach, Alternative Approaches, and Provisions of the 2008 NDAA for 
Funding the National Guard's Civil Support Capabilities: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: GAO's Assessment of Extent to Which the Current Approach, 
Alternative Approaches, and the Provisions of the 2008 NDAA Include 
Guiding Principles: 

Abbreviations: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

Goldwater-Nichols: Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act 
Reorganization Act of 1986: 

2008 NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal: 

Year 2008: 

SOCOM: Special Operations Command: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 16, 2008: 

The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Davis: 

The National Guard holds a unique dual status in that it performs 
federal missions under the command of the President and state missions 
under the command of the state's Governor. The continuing high pace of 
overseas deployment of National Guard units combined with the 
challenging nature of domestic missions for which it must be prepared 
has led to questions about whether the National Guard has the 
capabilities--the personnel, training, and equipment--it will need to 
respond to large-scale, multistate events and how any capabilities 
required solely for its domestic missions should be funded. Currently, 
the vast majority of the National Guard's personnel, training, and 
equipment is provided for its federal warfighting mission with funding 
appropriated to the Department of Defense (DOD). State National Guards 
can use the capabilities provided by DOD--such as transportation, 
engineering, medical, and communications units and equipment--when 
available to respond to domestic emergencies while operating under the 
command of the Governors and generally paid for with state funding. 
However, under certain circumstances such as large-scale, multistate 
events, homeland security-related activities, or federally declared 
disasters, federal funding has been provided for missions carried out 
by the state National Guards. 

We have previously reported that the continued heavy use of the 
National Guard for overseas missions has decreased the National Guard's 
capabilities that are available for domestic missions in support of 
civilian authorities (also known as civil support). In 2004, we 
recommended that DOD define the full range of the National Guard's 
homeland missions, including those led by DOD and those conducted in 
support of civilian authorities; and identify the National Guard's 
capabilities to perform these missions; any shortfalls in personnel, 
training, and equipment; and the required funding to address the 
shortfall.[Footnote 1] We also noted in our 2007 report that without a 
process to identify requirements for the capabilities the National 
Guard would need to respond effectively to these types of events, it 
was not possible to determine whether the National Guard had the 
capabilities it needed and how efforts could be coordinated most 
effectively with local, state, and federal organizations that share 
responsibility for emergency response.[Footnote 2] We further reported 
the concerns of state officials that although the National Guard units 
in their states could respond to routine incidents, such as forest 
fires and hurricanes, the states might not have the National Guard 
capabilities needed to respond to large-scale multistate events. Also 
in our 2007 report on the National Guard's equipment requirements and 
readiness, we noted that the National Guard Bureau, which acts as the 
channel of communication between the Secretaries of the Army and the 
Air Force and the state Governors on National Guard issues, is 
positioned to facilitate planning for multistate events. However, DOD 
disagreed with our recommendation that the National Guard Bureau should 
have this role, stating that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Homeland Defense has this responsibility. In our report on the 
military's response to the consequences of Hurricane Katrina, we noted 
that a significant shortfall in DOD's pre-Katrina planning was that it 
did not fully address the division of tasks between National Guard 
resources under the Governors' control and federal resources under 
presidential control. In addition, we have also performed a body of 
work examining U.S. Northern Command's planning for homeland defense 
and civil support missions. A list of related GAO products is included 
at the end of this report. 

You asked us to assess whether the current approach[Footnote 3] to 
funding the National Guard's capabilities adequately addresses its 
expected civil support role in the post-September 11, 2001, security 
environment and examine two funding alternatives modeled after those 
used to fund the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the U.S. 
Coast Guard. In January 2008, Congress enacted legislation--the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008[Footnote 4] 
(2008 NDAA)--that established a funding approach for certain civil 
support needs and that may address some of the problems we have 
previously identified with planning and funding for the National 
Guard's civil support role. As a result, we also examined the 
provisions in the 2008 NDAA. Specifically, our objectives were to 
determine: (1) the extent to which planning to identify requirements 
for the National Guard's role in civil support missions has been 
undertaken; (2) the funding approach currently used for the National 
Guard's civil support capabilities and how the two alternative funding 
approaches--modeled after SOCOM and the Coast Guard--and the new 
approach established in the 2008 NDAA could be applied to the National 
Guard; (3) guiding principles that should be considered when 
developing, assessing, and implementing funding alternatives, and (4) 
the extent to which the current, alternative, and newly established 
approaches are consistent with these principles. 

To determine the extent to which planning to identify requirements for 
the National Guard's civil support missions has been undertaken and how 
the current funding approach is structured, we reviewed prior GAO work 
and DOD and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy documents, and 
interviewed DOD, National Guard, and DHS officials. To determine how 
alternative funding approaches could be applied to the National Guard, 
we reviewed documents and met with officials responsible for 
identifying requirements, allocating resources, and acquiring 
capabilities for SOCOM and the Coast Guard. Additionally, we developed 
approaches for how similar roles and responsibilities could be applied 
to the National Guard to fund its civil support capabilities, and 
refined the alternative approaches through discussions with government 
officials and defense and homeland security analysts. Furthermore, we 
reviewed the 2008 NDAA and the conference report that accompanied it to 
identify the roles and responsibilities set forth in the act for 
planning for and funding the National Guard's civil support 
capabilities. To determine the principles that should guide efforts to 
develop, assess, and implement funding alternatives, we performed 
content analysis on prior GAO work examining the National Guard, 
emergency preparedness, and best practices for creating a focus on 
results, and reviewed principles synthesized from these reports with 
government officials and defense and homeland security analysts. To 
determine the extent to which the current and alternative approaches 
are consistent with the guiding principles, we assessed the current 
National Guard funding approach and the alternatives modeled after 
SOCOM and Coast Guard against the guiding principles, and reviewed our 
assessment with government officials and defense and homeland security 
analysts. In addition, we used professional judgment to assess the 
provisions in the 2008 NDAA for planning for and funding the National 
Guard's civil support capabilities against the guiding principles. 

Because the act was passed late in our review, we did not discuss its 
provisions with the government officials and defense and homeland 
security analysts. We determined that the data used were sufficiently 
reliable for our objectives. We conducted our review from February 2007 
to April 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. The scope and methodology used in our review are described 
in further detail in appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

Federal agencies with homeland security and civil support 
responsibilities have not undertaken comprehensive planning to identify 
the National Guard's requirements for responding to large-scale, 
multistate missions. Planning that assigns responsibilities, develops 
requirements, identifies capability gaps, and prioritizes investments 
can facilitate effective and efficient response to unexpected events. 
Planning for natural and man-made large-scale incidents is a shared 
state and federal responsibility, according to the 2007 National 
Strategy for Homeland Security. Despite the importance of this 
planning, prior to the 2008 NDAA, federal statutes had not clearly 
assigned responsibilities for conducting this comprehensive planning. 
In the absence of explicit statutory direction, this comprehensive 
planning has not been included as part of the other planning conducted 
by the states, DHS, and DOD, for several reasons. First, DHS, as the 
lead federal agency for homeland security, works with states, 
localities, and other federal agencies to conduct national emergency 
planning at a broad, strategic level, but it does not conduct detailed 
operational planning to identify the National Guard's requirements 
because it assumes that such planning is the responsibility of either 
the states or DOD. Second, states plan for smaller-scale emergencies 
involving the National Guard's activities likely to take place within 
their borders, but not for large-scale, multistate events. Third, DOD 
does not engage in planning to identify the resources required for the 
National Guard's civil support missions because it assumes most of 
those needs can be met with its warfighting capabilities and that 
planning to identify requirements for state-led missions is the states' 
responsibility. The 2008 NDAA addresses planning for natural disasters 
and terrorist events to some extent. This new law directs the Secretary 
of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and 
others, to prepare two versions of a plan for coordinating the use of 
the National Guard and active duty forces when responding to natural 
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters identified 
in the national planning scenarios. One version is required to set out 
a response using only members of the National Guard and the other 
version is required to set out a response using both the National Guard 
and the regular components of the armed forces. In addition, the plans 
are to include an identification of the training and equipment needed 
by both the National Guard and active duty forces to provide military 
assistance to civil authorities and for other domestic operations to 
respond to hazards identified in the national planning scenarios. 

The current funding approach for the National Guard's civil support 
capabilities assumes its warfighting capabilities will be adequate for 
its civil support missions while the two alternative funding approaches 
modeled after SOCOM and the Coast Guard, and the approach established 
by the 2008 NDAA, focus on providing specific funding for the unique 
capabilities needed for the National Guard's civil support missions. 
Under the current approach, DOD funds only the National Guard's 
warfighting capabilities, which are available to the states for civil 
support missions when they are not in use for federal warfighting 
missions. In contrast, under an alternative approach modeled after 
SOCOM, the National Guard Bureau could be provided authority to 
organize, train, equip and fund National Guard forces for unique 
personnel, training, and equipment requirements needed for the National 
Guard's civil support missions while the Departments of the Army and 
Air Force would continue to fund the National Guard's warfighting 
requirements. Under a second alternative modeled after the Coast Guard, 
DOD would continue to provide funding to the National Guard to support 
its warfighting capabilities, but the National Guard Bureau would 
receive direct funding transfers from DHS for unique personnel, 
training, and equipment requirements DHS identifies as needed for the 
National Guard's federally funded civil support missions. Finally, the 
2008 NDAA established a third approach for funding certain civil 
support capabilities. The act directs the Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to determine the 
"military-unique capabilities" DOD needs to provide to support civil 
authorities in an incident of national significance or a catastrophic 
incident and to develop and implement a plan to fund these capabilities 
as well as any additional capabilities determined by the Secretary to 
be necessary to support the use of the active and reserve components-- 
which includes the National Guard--for homeland defense missions, 
domestic emergency responses, and providing military support to civil 
authorities. The act defines "military-unique capabilities" as those 
capabilities identified by the Secretary of Defense that cannot be 
provided by other federal, state, or local civilian agencies and that 
are essential to provide support to civil authorities in an incident of 
national significance or a catastrophic incident. In addition, the act 
requires DOD to provide quarterly reporting on the readiness of the 
National Guard to perform tasks required to support the national 
response plan for support to civil authorities.[Footnote 5] 

We identified seven guiding principles that can be used to develop, 
assess, and implement alternatives for funding the National Guard so it 
can be prepared to effectively fulfill both its civil support and 
warfighting roles. We synthesized these principles based on our 
previous work examining National Guard and emergency preparedness 
issues, principles for creating a focus on results and enhancing and 
sustaining collaboration among federal agencies, and policies and 
practices contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols Act).[Footnote 6] Our 
discussions with government officials and defense and homeland security 
analysts confirmed that these principles are important to the National 
Guard's effectiveness and can be used in assessing alternative funding 
approaches. Specifically, these guiding principles are: 

1. maintaining the National Guard's warfighting capability, readiness, 
and integration with DOD for its role as a federal reserve of the Army 
and Air Force; 

2. maintaining or strengthening civilian control of the military, which 
is a foundational principle of American democracy; 

3. involving responsible stakeholders and aligning with national plans 
and strategies affecting the National Guard's civil support mission so 
that stakeholders have clear missions, reach agreement on their goals, 
and can measure performance; 

4. promoting interagency planning, collaboration, and coordination with 
the National Guard's federal, state, and local partners in the civil 
support role to strengthen emergency preparedness and response; 

5. supporting the formulation of coherent budgets for the National 
Guard that are supported by a rigorous analytical process to assess 
requirements, identify gaps, and set investment priorities for the 
civil support role; 

6. providing accountability and transparency to Congress for federal 
investments in the National Guard's civil support capabilities, which 
are essential for holding agencies accountable for results and for 
targeting resources to the highest priorities; and: 

7. promoting economy and efficiency, which are essential elements of 
good government, particularly as the nation faces long-term fiscal 
challenges. 

These guiding principles can be used in assessing the extent to which 
funding alternatives and their implementation would support the 
National Guard's dual roles. 

Neither the current approach to funding the National Guard's civil 
support capabilities nor alternatives modeled after SOCOM or the Coast 
Guard systematically include all of the guiding principles. However, 
the 2008 NDAA approach addresses all the principles to some extent. Our 
assessment shows that the current approach is not consistent with the 
principles because it does not involve key stakeholders so as to 
encourage alignment with national plans and strategies, encourage 
interagency planning to identify requirements, or formulate budgets for 
the National Guard's civil support roles. Similarly, although both of 
the alternatives modeled after SOCOM and the Coast Guard would maintain 
the National Guard's warfighting capability, readiness, and integration 
with DOD, neither is fully consistent with some of the other guiding 
principles. For example, the approach modeled after SOCOM would not 
explicitly require involvement of key stakeholders outside DOD, such as 
DHS, to ensure alignment with national plans and strategies for 
homeland security or promote integration and interoperability with 
civilian partners. Likewise, while the approach modeled after the Coast 
Guard's relationship with the Navy would involve both DHS and DOD 
stakeholders, DHS would not necessarily have to consult with DOD or 
National Guard stakeholders to identify the most economical or 
efficient way to meet requirements. The approach contained in the 2008 
NDAA includes provisions requiring the involvement of key stakeholders, 
the formulation of budget requests for some civil support needs, and 
readiness reporting that partially address all of the guiding 
principles, but until DOD implements the act's provisions, it is too 
early to assess whether it will result in an approach that is fully 
consistent with the guiding principles. For example, it is not clear to 
what extent DOD will decide to fund additional capabilities and how 
that will affect the National Guard's readiness for providing civil 
support during large-scale incidents. Until DOD begins to implement the 
new authorities and reports to Congress on the steps it has taken to 
include the guiding principles, Congress may not have complete 
information to use in its oversight of the National Guard's 
preparedness for its dual roles. 

To assist Congress in its oversight efforts, we are recommending that 
the Secretary of Defense include information in materials accompanying 
its fiscal year 2010 budget request on the steps the department has 
taken to incorporate the guiding principles in its implementation of 
the provisions contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2008. Specifically, we are recommending that DOD include 
information on (1) the analytical process used to formulate the 
department's funding request for the capabilities needed to support 
civil authorities in an incident of national significance or a 
catastrophic incident and (2) its assessment of the extent to which 
DOD's civil support investment priorities are consistent with DHS's 
risk-management framework and DHS efforts to promote standards for 
integration and interoperability among emergency responders. DOD 
generally agreed with our recommendations. DOD agreed to provide 
information on the analytical process used to formulate DOD's civil 
support funding request with the 2010 budget submission. However, in 
its comments DOD noted that an assessment of how DOD civil support 
investment priorities are consistent with DHS's risk-management 
framework can be provided to the extent that DHS has articulated its 
risk-management framework and DOD agrees with that framework. 

Background: 

In its civil support roles, the National Guard works with multiple 
state and federal agencies that have responsibilities for different 
aspects of homeland security. DOD is responsible for planning for the 
National Guard's federal missions conducted under the command and 
control of the President. The Army and Air Force are responsible for 
organizing, training, and equipping the Army National Guard and the Air 
National Guard, respectively, for federal missions. Within the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs supervises DOD's 
homeland activities, including the execution of domestic military 
missions and military support to U.S. civil authorities, and develops 
policies, conducts analysis, provides advice, and makes recommendations 
for these activities to the Under Secretary for Policy and the 
Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
Defense and Americas Security Affairs is also responsible for 
coordinating with DHS. The U.S. Northern Command is the unified 
military command responsible for planning, organizing, and executing 
DOD's homeland defense and federal military support to civil 
authorities' missions within the continental United States, Alaska, and 
territorial waters. 

The National Guard is unique in that it performs federal missions under 
the command and control of the President and state missions under the 
command and control of the Governors. In some circumstances, National 
Guard activities that are under state control can be federally 
funded.[Footnote 7] Since September 11, 2001, the President has 
authorized federal funding for several National Guard missions 
conducted under the command of the Governors, such as providing 
security at the nation's airports in the immediate aftermath of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, assisting the Gulf Coast in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and providing security along the 
southwest border in 2006. Table 1 compares the command 
responsibilities, authorities under which the National Guard may 
undertake activities, and missions of the National Guard's state and 
federal roles. 

Table 1: Comparison of National Guard State and Federal Roles: 

Command and control entity: 
State role: State-funded: Governor; 
State role: Federally-funded: Governor; 
Federal role: Federally-funded: President. 

Mobilization authorities used: 
State role: State-funded: In accordance with state law; 
State role: Federally-funded: Title 32 (32 U.S.C 502(f)); 
Federal role: Federally-funded: Various Title 10 authorities. 

Where deployed: 
State role: State-funded: In accordance with state law; 
State role: Federally-funded: United States; 
Federal role: Federally-funded: Worldwide. 

Mission types: 
State role: State-funded: In accordance with state law; 
State role: Federally-funded: Training and other federally authorized 
missions; 
Federal role: Federally-funded: Overseas training and as assigned after 
mobilization. 

Examples of missions conducted in the United States: 
State role: State-funded: Forest fires, floods, civil disturbances; 
State role: Federally-funded: Post-9/11 airport security, Hurricane 
Katrina, southwest border security; 
Federal role: Federally-funded: Air sovereignty, missile defense, 
guarding DOD infrastructure. 

Support law enforcement activities: 
State role: State-funded: Yes; 
State role: Federally-funded: Yes; 
Federal role: Federally-funded: As limited by Posse Comitatus[A]. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[A] The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. §1385, as applied by DOD, 
prohibits the direct use of federal military troops for domestic 
civilian law enforcement except where authorized by the Constitution or 
an act of Congress. This act applies to the Army National Guard of the 
United States and the Air National Guard of the United States, which 
are reserve components of the armed forces under 10 U.S.C. §10101. 

[End of table] 

The 2008 NDAA enhanced the functions of the National Guard Bureau. 
[Footnote 8] Under the act, the bureau, which had previously been a 
joint bureau of the Army and the Air Force, became a joint activity of 
DOD, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau became a principal 
advisor to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff on matters involving nonfederalized National Guard 
forces. In addition the act specifies that the bureau will assist the 
Secretary of Defense in facilitating and coordinating with other 
federal agencies, the Adjutants General of the states, the U.S. Joint 
Forces Command and the U.S. Northern Command for the use of National 
Guard personnel and resources for operations conducted under Title 32 
or in support of state missions. In addition to these enhanced 
functions, the National Guard Bureau also remains responsible for the 
administration of the National Guard, including participating with Army 
and Air Force staff in developing and coordinating policies, programs, 
and plans affecting Army National Guard and Air National Guard 
personnel, and it serves as the channel of communication on all matters 
pertaining to the National Guard between the Army and the Air Force and 
the states. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau has overall 
responsibility for the National Guard's military support to civil 
authorities programs. During civil support missions, the National Guard 
Bureau provides policy guidance and facilitates National Guard 
assistance to the Adjutants General who lead National Guard forces 
within the states. 

At the federal level, the President's Homeland Security Council and DHS 
both have responsibilities that could affect the National Guard's civil 
support role. To assist in integrating state and federal responses to 
domestic emergencies, the Homeland Security Council developed 15 
national planning scenarios in 2004 whose purpose was to form the basis 
for identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of 
emergencies. The scenarios focus on the consequences that federal, 
state, and local first responders may have to address and are intended 
to illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic 
emergencies for which the nation needs to be prepared and include a 
wide range of terrorist attacks involving nuclear, biological, and 
chemical agents, as well as catastrophic natural disasters, such as an 
earthquake or hurricane. DHS, which was established in 2002[Footnote 9] 
to reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, is the lead federal 
agency responsible for preventing, preparing for, and responding to a 
wide range of major domestic disasters and other emergencies. The 
President has designated DHS and its Secretary as the lead federal 
representative responsible for domestic incident management and 
coordination of all-hazards preparedness. In 2008, DHS issued its 
National Response Framework, which provides a framework for federal, 
state, and local agencies to use in planning for emergencies and 
establishes standardized doctrine, terminology, processes, and an 
integrated system for federal response activities. 

DHS is also responsible for developing a risk-management framework to 
guide investments in emergency response capabilities as well as 
improving interoperable public safety communications and identifying 
requirements and allocating resources to promote integration and 
interoperability among responders. For example, DHS, through its state 
grants program, provides funding to states to support and improve their 
state and local emergency response capabilities. States may use DHS 
federal grants to purchase equipment for the National Guard's use in 
civil support missions conducted in state status. 

States are responsible for preparing and maintaining emergency plans 
for the employment of the National Guard in response to civil 
disturbances; natural, man-made, or technological disasters; and other 
potential emergencies within their borders, such as wildfires and 
floods. In responding to such events, states generally have relied on 
the personnel, training, and equipment that DOD has provided to their 
National Guard units for their federal missions. The response to large- 
scale, multistate events may involve a combination of state and local 
civilian authorities; National Guard forces from across the nation 
responding under mutual assistance agreements[Footnote 10] operating in 
state status; federal civilian agencies, and federal military forces 
operating under the command of the President. 

Key Stakeholders Have Not Undertaken Comprehensive Planning to Identify 
the National Guard's Requirements for State-Led but Federally Funded 
Civil Support Missions: 

Key stakeholders with homeland security or civil support missions, 
including DOD, DHS, and the states, have not undertaken comprehensive 
planning to identify the National Guard's requirements for responding 
efficiently and effectively to large-scale, multistate civil support 
missions, which are likely to be state-led but federally funded. 
Planning has not been undertaken because key stakeholders have assumed 
that the National Guard's civil support needs could be met with the 
equipment DOD provides for its federal missions and that planning for 
state-led missions is the states' responsibility--even for missions 
that are likely to be federally funded. Since our last report, DHS, the 
National Guard Bureau, and the Homeland Security Council, have taken 
steps to facilitate planning for some of the events in the national 
planning scenarios, but these efforts do not include the detailed 
operational planning needed to identify the specific capabilities the 
National Guard requires and they are not part of DOD processes to 
develop budgets and direct funding to identified needs. The 2008 NDAA 
addresses the need for planning to some extent by directing the 
Secretary of Defense to (1) identify the training and equipment needed 
for both the National Guard and active duty forces to provide military 
assistance to civil authorities and respond to hazards identified in 
the national planning scenarios as part of the Secretary's plan for 
coordinating the use of the National Guard and active duty forces when 
responding to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made 
disasters, and (2) identify, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, the military-unique capabilities DOD needs to 
provide when supporting civil authorities during a catastrophic 
incident or incident of national significance. 

Neither the States nor the Federal Government Have Conducted Planning 
to Identify the National Guard's Requirements for State-Led but 
Federally Funded Civil Support Missions: 

Neither the states nor the federal government have conducted the 
comprehensive planning needed to identify the National Guard's 
requirements for responding to large-scale, multistate civil support 
missions, which are likely to be state-led but federally funded. DOD, 
DHS, and National Guard documents, as well as our prior work on 
Hurricane Katrina, indicate that comprehensive pre-event planning that 
is coordinated and integrated to take into account the roles of federal 
and state responders, including the National Guard, is a key step in 
facilitating an effective, efficient, and well-coordinated response to 
unexpected domestic emergencies. In addition, planning that assigns 
responsibilities, develops requirements, identifies capability gaps, 
and prioritizes investments is consistent with the policy for enhancing 
military effectiveness as well as other practices contained in the 
Goldwater-Nichols reforms.[Footnote 11] Furthermore, according to the 
2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security, planning for natural and 
manmade catastrophic incidents is a shared state and federal 
responsibility. Moreover, use of federal funding for National Guard 
activities that are state-led creates a federal interest in ensuring 
that National Guard forces are prepared to respond efficiently and 
effectively. 

Despite its importance to an effective and efficient response to civil 
support missions, the comprehensive planning needed to determine the 
personnel, equipment, and training that the National Guard would need 
has not been undertaken. Previously, federal statutes have not assigned 
clear responsibility for conducting the planning to identify these 
requirements. Under federal law, the Secretaries of the Army and Air 
Force are responsible for training and equipping the National Guard for 
its federal missions conducted under the command and control of the 
President.[Footnote 12] However, DOD is not required to specifically 
plan for the National Guard's use in state-led civil support missions 
that are in the federal interest. Similarly, the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 states that DHS's primary mission includes acting as a focal 
point regarding natural and man-made crises and emergency planning; 
[Footnote 13] however, DHS is not explicitly directed to conduct 
detailed operational-level planning to identify the National Guard's 
requirements for civil support missions that are in the federal 
interest. 

In the absence of explicit statutory direction, states, DHS, and DOD 
have not conducted comprehensive planning for a variety of reasons. 
First, although states routinely undertake planning for the National 
Guard's role in responding to emergencies within their borders, such as 
hurricanes and forest fires, they do not plan for the National Guard's 
role in large-scale, multistate events because, as previously 
reported,[Footnote 14] they have limited planning resources and lack a 
formal mechanism to facilitate planning across state borders. Second, 
while DHS, as the lead federal agency for homeland security, works with 
federal agencies, states, and localities to conduct national emergency 
planning, it does not conduct detailed operational planning that 
identifies specific requirements for the National Guard because it 
considers this planning to be the responsibility of either the states 
or DOD. Finally, DOD does not specifically plan to identify the 
resources required for the National Guard's civil support missions 
because DOD assumes that most of those needs can be met with the 
National Guard's warfighting capabilities and that planning to identify 
requirements for state-led missions is the states' responsibility--even 
when missions are federally funded. 

The Homeland Security Council, DHS, and the National Guard Bureau Have 
Taken Steps to Facilitate Planning, but Efforts Do Not Include the 
Detailed Planning Needed: 

Since the time of our last report, the Homeland Security Council, DHS, 
and the National Guard Bureau, have taken steps to facilitate planning 
for some of the events in the national planning scenarios but these 
efforts do not include the detailed operational planning needed to 
identify the specific capabilities the National Guard requires and are 
not part of DOD's process to develop budgets and direct funding towards 
identified needs.[Footnote 15] For example, the National Guard Bureau 
has a liaison assigned to DHS that provides advice on the National 
Guard's emergency response capabilities. In addition, the Homeland 
Security Council directed the establishment of a planning team[Footnote 
16] comprised of stakeholders from various federal agencies, including 
DOD and the National Guard Bureau, to provide national strategy 
guidance and develop concept plans on how to respond to each of the 15 
national planning scenarios.[Footnote 17] However, according to DHS and 
planning team officials, this team does not conduct detailed 
operational level planning to identify specific capabilities needed for 
the type of nationwide National Guard effort such as occurred during 
the response to Hurricane Katrina or that might occur in response to 
the types of large-scale, multistate events contained in the national 
planning scenarios. DHS and planning team officials explained that DHS 
coordination plans consider National Guard forces to be either a part 
of the state response effort or the federal DOD response effort and 
that the states or DOD would conduct this detailed planning. DHS's role 
is to provide guidance and recommendations for states and federal 
agencies to consider and it does not have authority to direct the 
states or other federal agencies to perform specific emergency response 
duties.[Footnote 18] In addition in December 2007, the Homeland 
Security Council issued Annex I to Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 8. This annex is intended to further enhance the preparedness 
of the United States by formally establishing a standard and 
comprehensive approach to national planning among federal agencies with 
a role in homeland security. However, until federal agencies with 
homeland security responsibilities implement this approach, it is not 
clear the extent to which this guidance will result in detailed 
planning to identify the specific capabilities the National Guard would 
need to respond to large-scale, multistate events contained in the 
national planning scenarios. 

According to National Guard Bureau officials, the bureau has also 
initiated some efforts to facilitate planning. For example, the bureau 
has developed sample plans for some of the events in the national 
planning scenarios that the bureau considers to be the most likely to 
occur or the most dangerous. The National Guard Bureau plans to provide 
the sample plans to the states, which can tailor them to fit their 
particular needs. However, National Guard Bureau officials explained 
that the sample plans do not cover all 15 scenarios or identify 
specific requirements for personnel, training, and equipment the 
National Guard would need for a nationwide response, and they are not 
considered as needs that must be included in DOD's process for 
formulating its budget. 

2008 NDAA Assigns DOD Responsibility for Planning to Identify Certain 
National Guard Civil Support Needs: 

The 2008 NDAA directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau, and other DOD officials to prepare two versions of a plan for 
coordinating the use of the members of the National Guard and active 
duty forces when responding to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, 
and man-made disasters identified in the national planning 
scenarios.[Footnote 19] One version is required to set forth a response 
using only members of the National Guard and the other version is to 
set out a response using both members of the National Guard and active 
duty forces. In addition, to assist the Secretary of Defense in 
preparing the plan, the National Guard Bureau is directed to provide 
the Secretary with information gathered from Governors, Adjutants 
General of the states, and other state civil authorities responsible 
for homeland preparation and response to natural disasters. This plan 
is to include an identification of the training and equipment needed 
for both the National Guard and active duty forces to provide military 
assistance to civil authorities and for other domestic operations when 
responding to hazards identified in the national planning scenarios. 
However, until DOD implements the provisions of the 2008 NDAA, it is 
unclear the extent to which DOD will plan and identify requirements for 
the National Guard's capabilities needed to respond efficiently and 
effectively to the large-scale, multistate events that are state-led 
but federally funded. 

Current National Guard Funding Approach Emphasizes Warfighting Needs, 
but Alternative Approaches Could Also Address Civil Support Needs: 

Under the current approach, DOD generally uses its appropriations to 
fund the National Guard's warfighting capabilities, although the 
equipment may be used for civil support missions when it is available. 
Alternatives to the current funding approach modeled after the special 
authorities and funding provided to SOCOM and to the Coast Guard would 
provide funding to prepare the National Guard for large-scale civil 
support missions without altering DOD's approach to funding its 
warfighting needs. Finally, the 2008 NDAA established a new approach 
for planning for and funding some of DOD's--which includes the National 
Guard's--unique civil support needs while retaining DOD's approach to 
funding warfighting needs. Table 2 below shows how the key roles and 
responsibilities for building civil support-unique capabilities in the 
federal interest would differ among the National Guard's current 
approach, the approaches modeled after SOCOM and the Coast Guard, and 
the approach in the 2008 NDAA. 

Table 2: Comparison of Key Roles and Responsibilities under the Current 
Approach, Alternative Approaches, and Provisions of the 2008 NDAA for 
Funding the National Guard's Civil Support Capabilities: 

Role/responsibility: Civilian oversight; 
Current approach: DOD; 
Approach modeled after SOCOM: DOD; 
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: DHS; 
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: DOD. 

Role/responsibility: Identify civil support-unique requirements; 
Current approach: Civil support requirements not identified; 
Approach modeled after SOCOM: National Guard Bureau; 
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: DHS; 
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: DOD in consultation with DHS[A]. 

Role/responsibility: Formulate budget and allocate resources for civil 
support-unique requirements; 
Current approach: No budget for civil support; resources for 
warfighting missions/capabilities only[B]; 
Approach modeled after SOCOM: National Guard Bureau; 
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: DHS; 
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: DOD[C]. 

Role/responsibility: Acquisition of civil support-unique capabilities; 
Current approach: Prohibited unless authorized by the Secretary of 
Defense; 
Approach modeled after SOCOM: National Guard Bureau; 
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: DHS; 
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: DOD. 

Source: GAO. 

Note: Under all the alternatives, DOD would continue to develop 
requirements, formulate and allocate budgets, and have acquisition 
authority for warfighting needs. 

[A] The act requires the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, to determine military unique 
capabilities. The act defines "military-unique capabilities" as those 
capabilities that, in the view of the Secretary of Defense, cannot be 
provided by other federal, state, or local civilian agencies and that 
are essential to provide support to civil authorities in an incident of 
national significance or a catastrophic incident. 

[B] Except for civil support missions specifically authorized by 
statute such as counterdrug and civil support teams. 

[C] The Secretary of Defense shall include in the plan for funding 
capabilities, any additional capabilities determined by the Secretary 
to be necessary to support the use of the active and reserve components 
for homeland defense missions, domestic emergency responses, and 
providing military support to civil authorities. 

[End of table] 

DOD Appropriations Fund the National Guard's Capabilities for 
Warfighting Missions, but the Current Approach Does Not Fund Unique 
Capabilities for Civil Support Missions: 

Under the current approach, Congress funds the National Guard through 
DOD's annual appropriation to provide the capabilities--such as 
personnel, training, and equipment--required for the National Guard's 
federal warfighting mission; however, federal funds have not typically 
been provided to DOD specifically for the National Guard's civil 
support missions unless directed by statute. Instead, DOD planning has 
generally assumed that if the National Guard is prepared for its 
warfighting role it is prepared to respond to a disaster or emergency 
at home. Federal funding through DOD comprises more than 90 percent of 
the National Guard's total funding, although states fund state-unique 
equipment requirements--such as vehicles or radios--for their state 
National Guard missions. Moreover, with the exception of two 
statutorily established missions--the weapons of mass destruction civil 
support teams and the counterdrug program[Footnote 20]--DOD does not 
generally identify requirements for, formulate budgets and allocate 
resources for, or acquire the personnel, training, and equipment needed 
to support the National Guard's civil support missions that are likely 
to be federally funded. Consistent with this strategy, DOD's current 
policy[Footnote 21] prohibits, unless specifically authorized by the 
Secretary of Defense, procuring or maintaining any supplies, materiel, 
or equipment exclusively for providing military support to civil 
authorities. 

SOCOM Receives Funding from DOD Appropriations and Has Authority to 
Identify Requirements, Allocate Resources, and Acquire Capabilities for 
Its Missions: 

SOCOM is a unified combatant command within DOD that receives funding 
from DOD appropriations and has statutory authority[Footnote 22] to 
validate and prioritize its unique requirements, allocate resources, 
and acquire unique capabilities for its missions.[Footnote 23] SOCOM 
organizes, trains, equips, and deploys combat-ready special operations 
forces to regional combatant commands, subject to DOD approval and 
civilian oversight.[Footnote 24] SOCOM's funding goes toward ongoing 
operational activities; force enhancements; training; general support; 
advanced research, development, test, and evaluation planning and 
design; and headquarters management. However, the Services provide 
SOCOM with military personnel, base operating support, and equipment 
not unique to the special operations mission. Furthermore, SOCOM has 
statutory authority to develop and acquire special operations-peculiar 
equipment and to acquire material, supplies, and services for its 
unique needs. To execute its authorities, SOCOM has developed a 
strategic planning process for identifying and validating its 
requirements for special operations-peculiar items, assigning 
priorities, and allocating resources among its requirements. SOCOM 
formulates its budget documentation, which identifies the items 
required for its missions and allocates resources that remain within 
its overall funding limits, and submits its budget to DOD for approval. 
Additionally, any significant issues related to SOCOM's readiness 
measures and status of its resources are reported to Congress on a 
quarterly basis. While SOCOM's acquisition workforce manages and 
acquires items for many small programs, it seeks to leverage existing 
service acquisition processes whenever possible by relying on the 
services to help manage larger programs. This approach provides SOCOM 
the means to leverage resources and expertise that may not reside at 
SOCOM, such as program management, engineering and technical services, 
testing and evaluation support, and logistical support. For example, a 
large program such as the Advanced SEAL Delivery System is funded by 
SOCOM and executed by the Navy Acquisition Decision Authority. 

An Alternative Approach to Funding the National Guard's Civil Support- 
Unique Capabilities Modeled after SOCOM: 

We examined the special authorities and funding approach used by SOCOM 
to organize, train, equip, and deploy special operations forces to 
develop an alternative funding approach that could be used to fund 
National Guard unique requirements for civil support missions. Under 
this approach the National Guard Bureau, although not a combatant 
command like SOCOM, could be provided authority and funding to 
organize, train, and equip National Guard forces with the unique 
capabilities for large-scale, multistate civil support missions that 
are expected to be federally funded--such as the events depicted in the 
national planning scenarios. In this alternative approach, the National 
Guard Bureau could also be provided the statutory authority to identify 
requirements, formulate budgets, allocate resources, and acquire 
capabilities for civil support missions, subject to DOD civilian 
oversight and approval. Furthermore, to provide civilian oversight on 
the National Guard Bureau's civil support role, an Office of the 
Secretary of Defense-level office could be assigned responsibility for 
oversight similar to the oversight role the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense performs for SOCOM. The National Guard would maintain its 
existing command and control relationships for civil support 
operations. 

Under this approach, the National Guard Bureau would receive funding 
directly from DOD defensewide appropriations for civil support 
capabilities--such as equipment, materiel, supplies, training, and 
services--that are unique to the National Guard's federally funded 
civil support missions. Current funding arrangements for the National 
Guard's warfighting mission would remain the same, and DOD would 
continue to pay for warfighting capabilities, including dual-use 
capabilities required for the National Guard's civil support mission. 
Furthermore, the National Guard Bureau would need to establish 
memorandums of understanding with the Army and the Air Force to clearly 
define what dual-use warfighting capabilities would be provided to the 
National Guard by the Army and Air Force, and what capabilities are 
unique to the civil support mission, similar to the agreements SOCOM 
has with the services. 

Under this approach, the National Guard Bureau would be required to 
develop a rigorous analytical process to develop, identify, and 
prioritize the National Guard's civil support-unique requirements, 
similar to the strategic planning process developed by SOCOM. The 
National Guard Bureau would also be required to develop a resource 
allocation process to address its civil support-unique requirements 
that includes planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes 
designed to develop a budget request for civil support-unique 
capabilities. Additionally, the National Guard Bureau would be required 
to begin tracking and reporting on its performance through the 
collection and reporting of readiness data that provides information on 
the status of its personnel, training, and equipment for its civil 
support missions that are likely to be federally funded and its 
readiness to carry out these missions. Furthermore, the National Guard 
Bureau would develop an acquisition workforce to develop, acquire, and 
manage its civil support-unique capabilities while retaining the 
ability to leverage existing service acquisition capabilities when it 
is appropriate to do so. 

The Coast Guard Receives Funding from DHS and DOD Appropriations and 
Has Authority to Identify Requirements, Allocate Resources, and Acquire 
Capabilities for Its DHS-Funded Missions: 

The Coast Guard is a multimission, maritime military service within DHS 
that receives funding from DHS and DOD, and has authority to identify 
its unique requirements, allocate resources, and acquire unique 
capabilities for its missions funded by DHS. The Coast Guard performs a 
range of missions to meet multiple national goals, including law 
enforcement, national defense, mobility, maritime safety, environmental 
protection, and humanitarian response.[Footnote 25] Moreover, the Coast 
Guard is also part of the armed forces and can operate as a specialized 
service under the Navy in time of war or when directed by the 
President.[Footnote 26] The Coast Guard and Navy have entered into 
formal agreements to further define specific mission sets and clarify 
the roles the Coast Guard is expected to perform when working for or 
with the Navy.[Footnote 27] 

The Coast Guard's statutory role as both a federal maritime agency and 
a branch of the military allows the agency to receive funding from both 
DHS and DOD. The Coast Guard receives more than 98 percent of its 
funding through the annual DHS appropriation. Because of the Coast 
Guard's need to work closely with the Navy and the possibility that it 
may be brought under the military's control as part of the armed 
forces, the Navy also provides equipment and funding to the Coast Guard 
to keep it prepared and integrated with the Navy for national and 
maritime defense missions such as maritime intercept operations, and 
deployed port operations security and defense. Although the Navy is not 
expressly required by law to provide funding to the Coast Guard, the 
Navy provides funding from its appropriations because it is in the 
Navy's interest that the Coast Guard's systems are compatible with the 
Navy's systems when the Coast Guard is performing national defense 
missions in support of the Navy. For example, the Coast Guard receives 
funding from the Navy to purchase and maintain equipment, such as self- 
defense systems or communication systems, needed to ensure the Coast 
Guard is prepared to carry out assigned naval warfare tasks and 
missions alongside Navy units. 

For the Coast Guard, the source of the funding, either DHS or the Navy, 
determines which agency conducts the planning, requirements 
identification, and resource allocation for its missions. In accordance 
with DHS planning, programming, and budgeting guidance and approval, 
the Coast Guard is responsible for identifying and prioritizing 
requirements for its maritime defense missions and for formulating 
budgets and allocating resources using the funds provided through the 
DHS appropriation. The Navy is responsible for identifying and 
prioritizing requirements for the Coast Guard's national defense 
missions, and the Navy is also responsible for formulating budgets and 
allocating resources for the capabilities it provides to the Coast 
Guard. While DHS has oversight authority over Coast Guard acquisitions 
funded out of DHS's appropriations, the Navy has oversight authority 
over the acquisition programs it funds and provides to the Coast Guard. 

An Alternative Approach to Funding the National Guard's Civil Support- 
Unique Capabilities Modeled after the Coast Guard: 

We adapted the special authorities and funding approach used by the 
Coast Guard to develop an alternative approach that could provide 
funding to prepare the National Guard for large-scale civil support 
missions. Under an alternative approach modeled after the Coast Guard, 
DHS would have authority and would provide funding to the National 
Guard Bureau to organize, train, and equip the National Guard with 
unique capabilities for civil support missions. The National Guard 
would maintain its existing command and control relationship for civil 
support operations. The National Guard's dual status as a federal 
military reserve under the command and control of the President and as 
a state militia under the command and control of the state Governors 
would not change. Under this approach, DHS would be responsible for 
identifying unique requirements for the National Guard's civil support 
missions that are expected to be federally funded. DHS also would be 
responsible for formulating budgets for, allocating resources for, and 
acquiring any related civil support-unique capabilities--such as 
personnel, training, maintenance, and equipment items. In addition, DHS 
would provide civilian oversight for these civil support policy and 
resource decisions. Similar to the Navy's relationship with the Coast 
Guard, DHS would not be required by law to provide funding to the 
National Guard for its civil support missions, but rather would do so 
under Secretary-level agreements between DOD and DHS, if and when it is 
determined that it would be mutually beneficial to do so. Moreover, DHS 
would be tasked to work with the National Guard and DOD to establish 
standards for federal interagency integration and interoperability for 
civil support missions, similar to current agreements between the Coast 
Guard and Navy for warfighting missions. 

Under this approach, DHS would provide the National Guard with funding 
for its civil support-unique capabilities directly from the DHS 
appropriation. DOD would continue to provide funding for the National 
Guard's warfighting missions through its annual appropriation, 
including dual-use capabilities required for the National Guard's civil 
support mission. For example, the National Guard would still receive 
DOD appropriations for military personnel, operation and maintenance, 
and military construction. Furthermore, DOD, through the Army and Air 
Force, would remain responsible for continuing to develop, identify, 
and prioritize requirements for and organizing, training, and equipping 
the National Guard for the federal warfighting mission. DOD also would 
maintain responsibility for formulating budgets, allocating resources, 
acquiring capabilities, and exercising civilian oversight over 
capabilities needed for the National Guard's warfighting mission. 

The 2008 NDAA Approach to Funding the National Guard's Civil Support- 
Unique Capabilities: 

The 2008 NDAA includes provisions that may fund certain National Guard 
civil support capabilities, depending on how it is implemented by 
DOD.[Footnote 28] This approach requires the Secretary of Defense to 
(1) prepare and submit to Congress a plan for coordinating the use of 
National Guard and active duty forces when responding to natural 
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters as 
identified in the national planning scenarios; (2) develop in the plan 
two versions of the response to the scenarios--one using only members 
of the National Guard and the other using both members of the National 
Guard and members of the regular components of the armed forces; and 
(3) to include in the plan, among other things, an identification of 
the training and equipment needed for both National Guard personnel and 
active duty forces to provide military assistance to civil authorities 
and for other domestic operations to respond to hazards identified in 
the national planning scenarios. While preparing this plan, DOD is to 
consult with, among others, DHS and the Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau and receive information the National Guard Bureau gathers from 
Governors, Adjutants General, and other state civil authorities 
responsible for preparing for and responding to disasters. 
Additionally, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau will serve as a 
principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on matters involving the nonfederalized 
National Guard forces. 

The 2008 NDAA also requires the Secretary of Defense to determine 
certain necessary civil support capabilities and develop and implement 
a plan to fund them.[Footnote 29] Specifically, the Secretary of 
Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, is to 
identify the military-unique capabilities that DOD needs to provide to 
support civil authorities during catastrophic incidents or incidents of 
national significance.[Footnote 30] In addition, the 2008 NDAA directs 
DOD to plan, over at least a 5-year time frame, how to fund and 
resource these military-unique capabilities as well as any other 
capabilities the Secretary of Defense determines to be necessary to 
support the use of the active components and the reserve components of 
the armed forces for homeland defense missions, domestic emergency 
responses, and providing military support to civil authorities, and 
request the funds in its budget materials to implement this 
plan.[Footnote 31] The 2008 NDAA does not change DOD's civilian 
oversight over policy or resource decisions affecting the National 
Guard. 

Another provision in the 2008 NDAA addresses reporting on the National 
Guard's readiness for emergencies and major disasters.[Footnote 32] 
First, the Secretary of Defense is to include in the annual report on 
National Guard and reserve component equipment an assessment of the 
extent to which the National Guard has the equipment required[Footnote 
33] to respond to an emergency or major disaster. The assessment is to 
identify shortfalls, if any, in equipment provided to the National 
Guard by DOD that is likely to affect the ability of the National Guard 
to carry out these responsibilities as well as an evaluation of the 
effect of any such shortfalls; and an identification of the 
requirements and investment strategies needed to reduce or eliminate 
equipment shortfalls--if any exist. Second, the Secretary of Defense is 
to begin including an assessment of the National Guard's readiness to 
perform tasks required to support the National Response Plan for 
support to civil authorities to Congress in its quarterly reports on 
personnel and unit readiness. The Secretary is also required to make 
any information from this assessment that is relevant to the National 
Guard of a particular state available to that state's Governor and to 
ensure that each Governor has the opportunity to provide an independent 
evaluation of that state's National Guard to be included with the 
Secretary's assessment. Finally, the Secretary of Defense is required 
to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on actions 
taken to implement the amendments in this section as part of the budget 
justification materials for fiscal years 2009 and 2010. This report is 
required to include a description of the mechanisms to be used by the 
Secretary for assessing the personnel, equipment, and training 
readiness of the National Guard, including standards and measures that 
will be applied and mechanisms for sharing information on such matters 
with the Governors of the states. 

Guiding Principles Form a Basis for Assessing Funding Alternatives for 
the National Guard's Civil Support Capabilities: 

Guiding principles for creating a focus on results can form a basis for 
efforts to develop, assess, and implement funding alternatives for the 
National Guard's civil support capabilities. We identified seven 
guiding principles to use in assessing whether funding alternatives 
include the principles essential for the National Guard to be prepared 
to effectively fulfill its dual roles in the new security environment. 
We synthesized these principles from a review of GAO's prior work 
examining key principles for creating a focus on results, National 
Guard management challenges, and emergency preparedness issues. In 
addition, we also examined policies and practices contained in the 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. 
Specifically, funding alternatives can be examined to determine whether 
they: (1) maintain warfighting capability, readiness, and integration 
with DOD; (2) maintain or strengthen civilian control of the military; 
(3) involve responsible stakeholders; (4) promote improved interagency 
planning; (5) support the formulation of coherent budgets; (6) provide 
accountability and transparency; and (7) promote economy and 
efficiency. We also held discussions with government officials and 
defense and homeland security analysts to confirm that we identified 
the principles that are important to use in evaluating funding 
alternatives. 

Maintain Warfighting Capability, Readiness, and Integration with DOD: 

The first key principle that should guide efforts to develop, assess, 
and implement funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil 
support capabilities is to maintain the National Guard's warfighting 
capabilities, readiness, and integration with DOD for its federal 
warfighting role.[Footnote 34] The continuing importance of the 
National Guard's federal warfighting missions makes it important that 
alternatives for funding the National Guard's civil support 
capabilities not detract from the National Guard's federal warfighting 
capabilities, readiness, or its ability to integrate with its active 
component counterparts when performing a federal mission. Since 2001, 
more than 213,000 National Guard members, representing almost 46 
percent of the National Guard, have been mobilized to support the 
federal mission, with more than 55,000 mobilized more than once. 
[Footnote 35] In addition to maintaining the National Guard's ability 
to perform its statutorily required role as a federal reserve, this 
principle is also consistent with creating a focus on results. 
Specifically, we have previously reported that leading organizations 
are able to respond effectively to multiple priorities[Footnote 36] and 
that agencies often face a variety of interests whose competing demands 
continually force policymakers and managers to balance quality, cost, 
stakeholder concerns, and other principles. Similarly, the National 
Guard needs to maintain readiness for its warfighting mission, which 
competes with its need to maintain readiness for its domestic civil 
support mission. Alternative funding approaches for the National 
Guard's domestic civil support needs can be examined for the degree to 
which they strike a balance in maintaining readiness for both its 
federal warfighting mission and its domestic civil support mission. 

Maintain or Strengthen Civilian Control of the Military: 

The second key principle that should guide efforts to develop, assess, 
and implement funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil 
support capabilities is to maintain or strengthen civilian control of 
the military. Maintaining or strengthening civilian control of the 
military is a foundational principle of American democracy reflected in 
the constitution and is also a policy stated in the Goldwater-Nichols 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act. There are two general 
categories of civilian control: (1) command and control of forces for 
military operations, and (2) control over administrative matters such 
as the allocation of resources. The potential for sizable National 
Guard forces to conduct military operations in the United States 
highlights the need for civilian leadership to be in control of such 
military forces. In addition, the potential cost of building and 
maintaining civil support capabilities could be significant and should 
be subject to civilian oversight to ensure effective and efficient use 
of resources. Alternative funding approaches for the National Guard's 
civil support capabilities can be examined to determine whether they 
will maintain or strengthen civilian control over military operations 
as well as resource allocation decisions. 

Involve Responsible Stakeholders to Ensure Alignment with National 
Plans and Strategies: 

A third key principle that should guide efforts to develop, assess, and 
implement funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil support 
capabilities is to involve responsible stakeholders to ensure alignment 
with national plans and strategies. In performing its civil support 
missions, the National Guard works with multiple federal and state 
stakeholders that have responsibilities for different aspects of 
emergency preparedness, such as the DHS, which has responsibility for 
developing national plans and strategies. Substantive involvement of 
these stakeholders in identifying requirements and operational 
responsibilities is needed to ensure a coordinated response and 
facilitate targeting of resources to meet critical needs. In our prior 
work, we have found that successful organizations base their strategic 
planning, to a large extent, on the interest and expectations of their 
stakeholders.[Footnote 37] Stakeholder involvement is important to help 
agencies ensure that their efforts and resources are targeted at the 
highest priorities. At the federal level, stakeholders in the National 
Guard's civil support missions include DHS--which is responsible for 
developing national guidance for emergency preparedness, identifying 
required capabilities for the national planning scenarios, and 
developing a risk-management framework to guide investments--and DOD, 
which executes domestic military missions and military support to U.S. 
civil authorities. Funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil 
support needs can be examined to determine whether they involve 
stakeholders with responsibility for developing plans and strategies 
affecting the National Guard's civil support missions, such as the 
states, DHS, and DOD. 

Promote Improved Interagency Planning for Emergency Preparedness and 
Response: 

A fourth key principle that should guide efforts to develop, assess, 
and implement funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil 
support capabilities is to promote improved interagency planning for 
emergency preparedness and response. Interagency planning to identify 
what capabilities the National Guard will be expected to provide is 
critical to providing an efficient and effective response because the 
National Guard's response to large-scale, multistate events may involve 
a combination of state and local civilian authorities, National Guard 
forces from across the nation operating in state status with federal 
funding, federal civilian agencies such as the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, and federal military forces operating under the 
command of DOD and the President. To identify the National Guard's 
required capabilities for civil support missions, its plans must be 
integrated with other responders' plans and account for the 
contributions expected to be made by civil authorities as well as 
federal military forces. Specifically, funding alternatives can be 
evaluated to determine to what extent they will promote interagency 
planning to define the following planning elements: 

* the National Guard's role in the interagency division of labor for 
emergency preparedness and response; 

* the tasks the National Guard will be expected to lead or provide to 
support other agencies; 

* the risk-management framework that will guide strategies and 
investments in the National Guard's civil support capabilities; 

* who will establish standards for the National Guard's equipment, 
skills, and capabilities for the civil support mission; 

* how will readiness for the National Guard's civil support role be 
measured; 

* what costs for building and maintaining the National Guard's civil 
support capabilities should be borne by federal, state, and local 
governments or the private sector; and: 

* the role of the National Guard Bureau and other multistate entities 
likely to be involved in identifying requirements and funding 
capabilities. 

Support the Formulation of Coherent Budgets Based on Rigorous 
Requirements Analysis, Identified Capability Gaps, and Investment 
Priorities: 

A fifth principle that should guide efforts to develop, assess, and 
implement funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil support 
capabilities is to support the formulation of coherent budgets that are 
based on rigorous requirements analysis, identified capability gaps, 
and investment priorities for the National Guard's civil support 
mission. Having coherent budgets that are based on a rigorous analysis 
of requirements that identifies gaps and investment and readiness 
priorities for the National Guard's civil support capabilities would 
provide assurance that resources are aligned with priorities and 
capabilities are sustainable and affordable. The formulation of budgets 
that are linked to strategic plans, identification of capability gaps, 
and prioritization of investments are practices consistent with the 
policy of creating a more efficient use of resources as stated in the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act.[Footnote 38] The funding alternatives can be 
examined to determine whether they support the formulation of a 
coherent budget for the National Guard's civil support-unique needs 
that are in the federal interest. Specifically, alternatives can be 
evaluated to determine whether they will produce fully justified 
budgets that program resources to meet identified requirements for the 
National Guard's civil support mission that were developed using a 
rigorous analytical process to assess requirements, identify gaps, and 
set investment and readiness priorities for the National Guard's civil 
support capabilities. 

Provide Accountability and Transparency to Congress for Investments and 
Performance: 

A sixth principle that should guide efforts to develop, assess, and 
implement funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil support 
capabilities is to provide accountability and transparency to Congress 
for investments in the National Guard's civil support capabilities and 
the performance achieved in the form of civil support readiness. An 
important aspect of accountability is to report program cost 
information for investments in the National Guard's civil support- 
unique capabilities and information about the performance achieved in 
the form of civil support readiness. This reporting would provide the 
transparency needed for Congressional oversight by enabling decision 
makers to link expenditures of resources to outcomes and investments 
made in the National Guard's civil support capabilities--such as its 
personnel, training, and equipment--and the outcomes achieved from the 
funding provided, such as the civil support readiness levels. Funding 
alternatives can be evaluated to determine whether they require 
reporting to Congress on investments made in the National Guard's civil 
support capabilities--such as its personnel, training, and equipment-- 
and the outcomes achieved from the funding provided, such as the 
National Guard's civil support readiness levels. 

Promote Economy and Efficiency: 

The seventh principle that should guide efforts to develop, assess, and 
implement funding alternatives for the National Guard's civil support 
capabilities is to promote economy and efficiency in building and 
maintaining the National Guard's civil support capabilities. A funding 
approach should emphasize increasing interoperability; pursuing joint 
solutions; eliminating unnecessary duplication in other federal, state, 
and local programs; promoting economies of scale; and ensuring that 
capabilities are only situated in the National Guard if that is the 
best federal solution to a requirement. This principle is consistent 
with one of the stated policies of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which is 
to provide for a more efficient use of defense resources. The funding 
alternatives for the National Guard's civil support missions can be 
evaluated to determine the extent to which they incorporate these 
principles for achieving economy and efficiency. 

Current Approach and Two Alternatives Do Not Fully Incorporate the 
Guiding Principles, while the 2008 NDAA Partially Addresses All the 
Principles: 

The current approach to funding the National Guard's civil support 
capabilities and the SOCOM and Coast Guard alternatives do not 
incorporate all of the guiding principles we identified; the 2008 NDAA 
approach partially addresses all the principles but how DOD implements 
the provisions will determine whether the new approach will yield 
results that are fully consistent with the principles. Our assessment 
shows that while the current approach promotes economy and efficiency 
by relying on existing warfighting equipment, it does not (1) involve 
responsible stakeholders to align with national plans and strategies, 
(2) promote integration and interoperability with civilian emergency 
responders, or (3) formulate a coherent budget for the National Guard's 
civil support needs that is based on a rigorous requirements analysis, 
identified capability gaps, and established investment priorities. The 
alternatives modeled after SOCOM and the Coast Guard would maintain the 
National Guard's warfighting capability, readiness, and integration 
with DOD, but neither is fully consistent with the guiding principles 
and each could pose implementation issues. While the approach contained 
in the 2008 NDAA has elements that address each of the principles, it 
is unclear whether DOD will implement the approach in a manner that is 
fully consistent with the principles. 

The extent to which the current approach and the three funding 
alternatives incorporate the guiding principles varies. Figure 1 
summarizes our assessment of the extent to which the current approach, 
the alternatives modeled after SOCOM and the Coast Guard, and the 
provisions of the 2008 NDAA include the guiding principles we 
identified as essential for the National Guard to fulfill both its 
federal warfighting and civil support roles effectively. 

Figure 1: GAO's Assessment of Extent to Which the Current Approach, 
Alternative Approaches, and the Provisions of the 2008 NDAA Include 
Guiding Principles: 

[See PDF for image] 

The following data is depicted in the figure: 

Guiding principle (approach promotes): Warfighting readiness, and 
integration with DOD; 
Current approach: Incorporates the principle to a large extent; 
Approach modeled after SOCOM: Incorporates the principle to a large 
extent; 
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: Incorporates the principle to a 
large extent; 
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: Incorporates the principle to a large 
extent. 

Guiding principle (approach promotes): Civilian control of the 
military; 
Current approach: Incorporates the principle to a large extent; 
Approach modeled after SOCOM: Incorporates the principle to a large 
extent; 
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: Incorporates the principle to a 
large extent; 
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: Incorporates the principle to a large 
extent. 

Guiding principle (approach promotes): Federal stakeholder involvement 
to encourage alignment with national plans and strategies; 
Current approach: Incorporates the principle to a little or no extent; 
Approach modeled after SOCOM: Incorporates the principle to a little or 
no extent; 
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: Incorporates the principle to a 
large extent; 
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: Incorporates the principle to a large 
extent. 

Guiding principle (approach promotes): Interagency planning, 
collaboration and coordination with federal, state, and local partners; 
Current approach: Incorporates the principle to a little or no extent; 
Approach modeled after SOCOM: Incorporates the principle to a little or 
no extent; 
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: Incorporates the principle to 
some extent; 
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: Incorporates the principle to some extent. 

Guiding principle (approach promotes): Formulation of coherent budgets 
for the National Guard’s civil support requirements; 
Current approach: Incorporates the principle to a little or no extent; 
Approach modeled after SOCOM: Incorporates the principle to a large 
extent. 
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: Unclear; 
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: Incorporates the principle to some extent. 

Guiding principle (approach promotes): Accountability and transparency 
to Congress; 
Current approach: Incorporates the principle to a little or no extent; 
Approach modeled after SOCOM: Incorporates the principle to a large 
extent. 
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: Unclear; 
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: Incorporates the principle to some extent. 

Guiding principle (approach promotes): Economy and efficiency: 
Current approach: Incorporates the principle to some extent; 
Approach modeled after SOCOM:Incorporates the principle to some extent; 
Approach modeled after the Coast Guard: Incorporates the principle to 
some extent; 
Approach in the 2008 NDAA: Incorporates the principle to a large 
extent. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

[End of figure] 

Current Funding Approach Does Not Fully Include All Guiding Principles: 

The current approach addresses the guiding principles of maintaining 
warfighting readiness and civilian control, but it does not fully 
include the other five principles that are necessary for the National 
Guard to be effective in its civil support role. The current approach 
maintains the National Guard's warfighting capabilities, readiness, and 
integration with DOD for the National Guard's federal warfighting 
mission within available resources. DOD's planning assumption that if 
the National Guard is prepared for its warfighting role, it is prepared 
to respond to a disaster or emergency at home, focuses the department's 
resources on its top priority--the federal warfighting mission. Because 
it focuses on its warfighting missions, DOD has not developed 
requirements for the National Guard's civil support roles and DOD 
policy prohibits, unless specifically authorized by the Secretary of 
Defense, procuring items solely for the military assistance to civil 
authorities role. Furthermore, the current approach addresses the 
guiding principle of maintaining civilian command and control over 
military operations, which are provided by either Governors or the 
President, and over resource decisions, which are provided by the 
Secretaries of Defense, of the Army, and of the Air Force. These 
officials are charged with overseeing matters related to the National 
Guard, such as generating warfighting requirements, allocating 
resources, and managing acquisition processes for the federal 
warfighting mission. 

However, the current approach does not incorporate five guiding 
principles that are important to providing the National Guard with 
capabilities it needs for its civil support missions. First, the 
current approach does not involve key stakeholders to promote alignment 
with national plans and strategies because its does not involve DHS, 
which has lead responsibility for developing the National Response 
Framework as well as setting investment priorities to build response 
capabilities, and promoting standards for integration and 
interoperability among emergency responders for the types of domestic 
missions to which the National Guard will be responding and providing 
support. Second, the current approach does not promote interagency 
planning for the National Guard's role in state-led but federally 
funded civil support missions. Neither DOD, DHS, nor the states are 
comprehensively planning for the National Guard's role in large-scale, 
multistate missions such as Hurricane Katrina that are likely to be 
federally funded. Under the current approach, interagency planning for 
the National Guard's role in state-led but federally funded civil 
support missions does not take place because the legal authorities did 
not assign clear responsibility for conducting planning for those 
missions in which there is a shared state and federal interest. As a 
result, important planning considerations remain undefined such as (1) 
how tasks will be divided among interagency partners; (2) which tasks 
the National Guard will lead and support; and (3) what level of risk 
should guide strategic investments. Additionally, there is no explicit 
requirement that the National Guard's civil support capabilities be 
consistent with DHS efforts to promote integration and interoperability 
standards among emergency responders. Third, under the current 
approach, the formulation of coherent budgets that are supported by a 
rigorous requirements analysis, identified capability gaps, and 
investment priorities for the National Guard's federally funded civil 
support role does not take place. DOD's approach is for National Guard 
forces to respond to civil support missions with the warfighting 
capabilities they have on hand and not to specifically allocate 
resources to build and maintain capabilities for the civil support 
mission. Fourth, the current approach does not provide accountability 
and transparency to Congress for investments in the National Guard's 
civil support capability and outcomes resulting from that investment. 
As we reported in January 2007, DOD has taken some steps to measure the 
National Guard's domestic preparedness, but currently there are no 
readiness standards and measures for the National Guard's domestic 
civil support missions.[Footnote 39] As a result, the extent to which 
National Guard units are prepared to undertake potentially challenging 
and important civil support missions, such as those contained in the 
national planning scenarios, remains unknown. Finally, while the 
current approach promotes economy by relying on existing warfighting 
equipment, it may not promote efficiency or effectiveness in civil 
support operations because it does not systematically generate 
requirements, identify capability gaps, or set investment priorities 
for civil support missions that are likely to be federally funded. 

Approach Modeled after SOCOM Includes Some but Not All Guiding 
Principles and Could Pose Implementation Issues: 

The alternative approach modeled after SOCOM for funding the National 
Guard's civil support capabilities includes four of the seven guiding 
principles, but it is not fully consistent with the other three guiding 
principles and could pose implementation issues. First, the SOCOM 
approach would maintain the National Guard's warfighting capability, 
readiness, and integration with DOD within available resources because 
DOD and the services would retain responsibility for these tasks. 
Second, the approach would provide civilian oversight over the National 
Guard's efforts to establish requirements, allocate resources, and 
acquire civil support-peculiar capabilities through oversight by the 
Secretary of Defense similar to the oversight the Secretary provides 
for SOCOM. Third, the approach would support the formulation of 
coherent budgets because the National Guard would implement a strategic 
planning process to generate requirements for its civil support 
missions that is similar to the strategic planning process SOCOM uses 
to generate budgets for its unique capabilities. This process would 
enable the National Guard to assesses its civil support requirements, 
identify any gaps, and set readiness and investment priorities. Fourth, 
the approach modeled after SOCOM would provide accountability and 
transparency to Congress for investments in the National Guard's unique 
civil support capabilities and the resulting readiness produced with 
this investment because it would produce fully justified budget 
exhibits and readiness reports to Congress. 

However, the approach modeled after SOCOM did not fully include three 
of the guiding principles. While the approach modeled after SOCOM 
promotes economy and efficiency through the use of the strategic 
planning and acquisition processes, it does not include provisions to 
prevent duplicating civil support capabilities in the National Guard 
that can or should be provided by other federal or state responders. 
While the approach would seek to balance the National Guard's resources 
between short-and long-term needs and look for procurement solutions 
that are joint, standardized, and interoperable with the DOD, it would 
not systematically promote economy and efficiency because it does not 
involve civilian stakeholders, such as DHS, in identifying 
requirements. The involvement of these stakeholders could prevent 
duplicating capabilities provided by other state and local responders 
in the National Guard and ensure that situating the capability in the 
National Guard is the most efficient and effective solution. In 
addition, the approach modeled after SOCOM also is not consistent with 
the principle of involving responsible stakeholders in that it would 
not systematically involve non-DOD stakeholders, such as DHS and the 
states, to ensure the National Guard's efforts are consistent with 
national plans and strategies, its capabilities are integrated and 
interoperable with civilian responders, or that it is consistent with 
national investment priorities for homeland security. 

Government officials and defense and homeland security analysts with 
whom we spoke pointed out several lessons learned from implementing 
SOCOM's authorities that could be useful when considering such a model 
for the National Guard's civil support requirements: 

* The SOCOM experience demonstrated that the responsibility for 
providing resources for dual-use capabilities needs to be clearly 
defined. Officials stated that agreements between SOCOM and the 
services have been invaluable in ensuring service support for common 
items especially during times when the services are facing budget 
pressures. The National Guard would need to establish similar 
memorandums of understanding with the Army and the Air Force in order 
to clearly define what dual use equipment and training the services 
intend to provide to the National Guard. 

* Developing a strategic planning process to produce fully justified 
budgets takes time. Although SOCOM was established in 1987, the command 
did not submit fully supported budget documents until 1991. 

* Determining the correct size of the acquisition workforce is 
important. If the National Guard Bureau is assigned responsibilities 
similar to those of SOCOM, it may need more personnel or personnel with 
different skills. The National Guard would need to conduct a manpower 
study similar to the study currently being conducted by SOCOM to 
determine the appropriate number and mix of personnel for its 
workforce. 

* To promote economy and efficiency, the National Guard should leverage 
the personnel and expertise that the services can provide wherever 
feasible. For example, the National Guard could avoid costs by relying 
on the services, which have existing expertise in areas such as program 
management, engineering and technical services, testing and evaluation 
support, and logistical support that could be useful for building the 
National Guard's civil support capabilities. 

The approach modeled after SOCOM could be modified to incorporate more 
of the guiding principles. In particular, the approach could be 
constructed to promote alignment with national plans and strategies-- 
such as the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National 
Response Framework--interagency planning, and integration and 
interoperability among civilian responders by requiring systematic 
involvement of stakeholders such as DHS and the states. 

Approach Modeled after the Coast Guard Includes Some but Not All 
Guiding Principles and Could Pose Implementation Issues: 

The funding approach for the National Guard's civil support 
capabilities modeled after the Coast Guard's relationship with the Navy 
includes three of the seven guiding principles, but it only partially 
addresses the other four guiding principles and could pose 
implementation issues. First, this approach would maintain the National 
Guard's warfighting capability, readiness, and integration with DOD 
within available resources because DOD and the services would retain 
responsibility for these tasks. Second, the approach would also 
maintain or strengthen civilian control over the National Guard because 
it would not change the operational command and control of the National 
Guard or DOD's civilian oversight over administrative resource 
decisions to develop its warfighting capabilities. In addition, under 
this alternative approach, DHS would be able to provide civilian 
oversight for efforts to establish requirements, allocate resources, 
and acquire civil support-unique capabilities for the National Guard. 
Third, the approach would involve responsible stakeholders and align 
with national plans and strategies because DHS would be responsible for 
identifying civil support requirements for the National Guard that are 
in the federal interest. Since DHS has the responsibility for working 
with federal, state, and local responders to identify needs and gaps, 
DHS would be able to identify roles and responsibilities for the 
National Guard that are needed to respond to the national planning 
scenarios that are also consistent with the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security and the National Response Framework. Additionally, 
the Coast Guard approach would promote integration and interoperability 
with civilian responders because DHS has responsibility for promoting 
standards for integration and interoperability for organizations with 
homeland security missions. Under this approach, DHS's funding 
transfers to the National Guard could address the personnel, training, 
and equipment needs of state National Guard units to better communicate 
with other federal, state, and local emergency response authorities 
across jurisdictional lines during a large-scale, multistate event. 
[Footnote 40] 

However, this approach modeled after the Coast Guard does not fully 
include four of the guiding principles. First, this approach would 
partially address the guiding principle of promoting interagency 
planning, collaboration and coordination. Although DOD and DHS would 
engage in strategic planning for catastrophic natural disasters and 
terrorist events with states and federal agencies, the approach would 
not require DOD or DHS to conduct operational planning to identify 
specific capabilities the National Guard would need to fulfill its 
civil support missions. Second, it is not clear whether the approach 
would support the formulation of coherent budgets for the National 
Guard that use rigorous, analytical processes to assess requirements, 
identify gaps, and set investment priorities for the civil support role 
because the approach does not require DHS to develop a specific budget 
for the National Guard's civil support-unique needs. Third, it is 
unclear whether the approach would provide accountability and 
transparency to Congress for investments DHS makes in the National 
Guard's civil support-unique needs because the approach would rely on 
voluntary reporting and may not produce budget justification reports 
for Congress explaining how the funds would be used towards the 
National Guard's civil support mission or report on domestic readiness 
levels achieved with the provided funds. In addition, DOD has yet to 
fully define its process and measures for assessing the National 
Guard's domestic readiness, and DHS is still in the process of 
developing its own agencywide readiness system. As a result, it is 
unclear how DOD's efforts to measure the National Guard's readiness for 
its domestic civil support missions would be integrated into DHS's 
larger effort to measure national preparedness. Finally, the approach 
modeled after the Coast Guard does not fully incorporate the principle 
of promoting economy and efficiency. The approach encourages economy by 
creating an incentive for DHS to provide funding to situate 
capabilities in the National Guard only if they determine it is the 
most effective and efficient solution to a civil support capability gap 
that is in the federal interest. However, the approach does not fully 
promote efficiency because it does not require DHS to consult with DOD 
or the National Guard Bureau or obtain their advice and expertise on 
how to best leverage existing DOD and National Guard capabilities that 
could be used for civil support missions and make the best use of 
existing federal investments in the National Guard. 

Government officials and defense and homeland security analysts with 
whom we spoke pointed out some potential issues that could arise in 
implementing the funding approach modeled after the Coast Guard: 

* DHS's existing processes to determine requirements are not yet fully 
developed and may not be able to fully perform the type of detailed 
planning needed to identify specific personnel, training, and equipment 
requirements for the National Guard for several years. 

* This approach would establish the National Guard as a new competitor 
for DHS's emergency preparedness funds, and this competition would have 
an effect on both the National Guard and other DHS agencies. For 
example, under this approach DHS might reallocate resources intended 
for the National Guard to other departmental priorities, such as border 
security, transportation security, and immigration and customs 
enforcement.[Footnote 41] Conversely, DHS funding for the National 
Guard could reduce funds available for other DHS agencies and for the 
DHS grant program to build state and local preparedness. 

The funding alternative modeled after the Coast Guard could be modified 
to include more of the guiding principles by requiring the National 
Guard Bureau to be involved in generating the National Guard's civil 
support requirements. The National Guard Bureau could advise DHS on how 
to leverage the existing federal investment in the National Guard's 
warfighting capability to achieve greater economy as well as to improve 
interagency planning for the National Guard's role in domestic 
missions. In addition, involving the National Guard Bureau in 
determining its civil support requirements could also provide valuable 
military planning expertise to DHS as it begins to develop a 
requirements process for the domestic emergency preparedness mission. 
Furthermore, although the approach modeled after the Coast Guard 
assumes that DHS would not be required by law to fund the National 
Guard, the Congress could modify the approach to require DHS to fund 
the National Guard's civil support capabilities and produce fully 
justified budgets for the National Guard's civil support mission 
requirements. 

Approach in the 2008 NDAA Addresses All of the Guiding Principles in 
Part, but Cannot Be Fully Assessed Until DOD Implements Its Provisions: 

The approach established by the provisions in the 2008 NDAA addresses, 
at least in part, all the guiding principles we identified as essential 
for the National Guard to be prepared to effectively fulfill its dual 
roles, but it is unclear whether DOD's implementation of the act's 
provisions will yield results that are fully consistent with the 
guiding principles.[Footnote 42] First, this approach maintains 
civilian control over the National Guard because it does not include 
any changes to operational command and control of National Guard forces 
during domestic civil support missions. In addition, the approach 
maintains civilian administrative control over resource decisions 
because it gives the Secretary of Defense responsibility for generating 
requirements and allocating resources for DOD's--which includes the 
National Guard's--civil support requirements. 

Second, the approach promotes the involvement of responsible 
stakeholders by including provisions to involve state, National Guard 
Bureau, and DHS officials in planning to identify the capabilities the 
National Guard will need for its civil support missions. According to 
the 2008 NDAA provisions, the President shall establish a Council of 
Governors to advise the Secretary of Defense on matters related the 
National Guard and civil support missions.[Footnote 43] The act also 
directs the Secretary to consult with the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and others as DOD 
plans for coordinating both the National Guard and members of the armed 
forces when responding to natural disasters, acts of terrorism and 
other man-made disasters as identified in the national planning 
scenarios. In addition, DOD is directed to consult with DHS as it 
determines its civil support requirements, and develop and implement a 
plan and budget request for the military-unique capabilities DOD--which 
includes the National Guard--needs to support civil authorities in an 
incident of national significance or a catastrophic incident. However, 
it is unclear whether DOD's implementation of the act's provisions will 
yield results that are fully consistent with the guiding principles. 
For example, it is unclear whether DOD's consultations with DHS will 
result in the alignment of DOD's planned investment priorities for the 
National Guard's civil support capabilities, if any, with DHS's risk- 
management framework for emergency preparedness and response. 
Similarly, it is unclear whether the extent of coordination and 
consultation between DOD and DHS will be sufficient to promote the goal 
of integration and interoperability within the civilian responder 
community. 

Third, the 2008 NDAA includes provisions that partially promote 
accountability and transparency over investments in the National 
Guard's civil support needs because it directs DOD to include, in its 
annual budget submission, funding requests for military-unique 
capabilities DOD needs to be able to provide to support civil 
authorities. The approach also includes additional reporting 
requirements that will aid Congress in its oversight role. 
Specifically, DOD is to report annually[Footnote 44] on: whether the 
National Guard has any equipment shortfalls likely to affect its 
ability to perform its responsibilities[Footnote 45] in an emergency or 
major disaster, the effect of any shortfalls on the National Guard's 
capacity to respond, and DOD's requirements and investment strategies 
to reduce or eliminate shortfalls. In addition, DOD is required to 
include reports on the National Guard's readiness to perform tasks 
required to support civil authorities during events envisioned by the 
National Response Plan in its quarterly reports on personnel and unit 
readiness.[Footnote 46] However, until DOD implements these provisions, 
it is not clear to what extent DOD's readiness reporting will address 
the National Guard's readiness for large-scale, multistate missions 
that are state-led but federally funded. 

Fourth, the approach creates incentives to promote economy and 
efficiency in several ways. The approach seeks to avoid duplicating 
capabilities of other responders by requiring DOD to identify military- 
unique capabilities that cannot be provided by other federal, state, or 
local civilian agencies. Additionally, the approach seeks to ensure 
these requirements are in the federal interest by requiring DOD to 
determine whether they are essential for providing civil support in an 
incident of national significance or catastrophic incident--support 
that is likely to be federally funded. Furthermore, the approach 
creates an incentive for DOD to rely on dual-use solutions that 
maximize the use of warfighting capabilities because it requires DOD to 
fund military-unique capabilities out of its budget. Lastly, by making 
DOD responsible for determining requirements, the approach would 
promote economy and efficiency overall by leveraging DOD's existing 
processes that seek to evaluate options for providing needed 
capabilities, such as implementing changes to its organization or 
training or considering the need to acquire new items. 

However, DOD's implementation will determine the extent to which the 
approach yields results that are consistent with the guiding 
principles. First, until DOD's implementation occurs, it is not clear 
the extent to which the National Guard's warfighting capability, 
readiness, and integration with DOD will be maintained. DOD, which has 
primary responsibility for the warfighting mission, is in charge of 
implementing the new provisions to identify requirements and fund 
DOD's--which includes the National Guard's--military-unique 
capabilities for civil support. However, at this time, it is unclear 
what the nature and extent of the military unique requirements will be 
and the extent to which DOD will be able to rely on dual-use forces and 
equipment to fulfill them. To the extent that DOD identifies 
requirements for military-unique capabilities that can not be filled 
with its existing warfighting capabilities, there is potential for 
these new civil support-unique requirements to compete with DOD's 
warfighting priorities, and it is unclear how DOD will balance these 
priorities while maintaining the National Guard's preparedness for both 
missions. Second, until DOD implements the new approach, it is not 
clear whether the approach in the 2008 NDAA will result in the 
formulation of coherent budgets for the National Guard's civil support 
requirements. While the NDAA directs DOD to include funding requests 
for certain civil support capabilities in the annual budget submission, 
it does not require DOD to develop a specific budget for the National 
Guard's civil support requirements in state-led but federally funded 
missions. In addition, it is not clear how DOD will involve the 
National Guard, even though the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has 
been designated as a principal advisor on matters involving 
nonfederalized National Guard forces, in determining military-unique 
civil support requirements and funding priorities. Third, several 
provisions of the approach promote interagency planning, collaboration, 
and coordination by requiring DOD to consult with DHS and by providing 
a mechanism through the Council of Governors to provide advice to the 
federal stakeholders about the National Guard and its civil support 
missions. However, until DOD implements these provisions, the extent to 
which DOD will consider the input its interagency partners provide and 
align its efforts to build the National Guard's capabilities with 
national plans, strategies, and integration standards for the National 
Guard's civil support missions will remain unclear. 

Conclusions: 

Planning and funding for the National Guard's civil support missions 
has traditionally been considered a state responsibility, although the 
states have relied on the warfighting capabilities provided to the 
National Guard by DOD to perform these missions. However, since 
September 11, 2001, the National Guard has played a key role in 
responding to catastrophic natural disasters and homeland security- 
related events of national significance, demonstrating the shared 
interest of the states and federal government in preparing the National 
Guard to conduct these civil support missions as efficiently and 
effectively as possible. The absence of rigorous planning to determine 
the personnel, training, and equipment the National Guard would need to 
respond to events that are likely to be state-led but federally funded 
means that the nation does not know the extent to which the National 
Guard is adequately prepared for its crucial role. Until DOD completes 
the planning and develops a funding request for civil support 
capabilities as required by the 2008 NDAA, it is not clear to what 
extent its plan and funding request will provide the National Guard 
with the capabilities it requires for its role in state-led but 
federally funded missions. This could place the nation at risk of 
having a key part of its safety net less prepared than it should be in 
the event of a terrorist attack or catastrophe affecting the American 
people at home. 

While the funding approach for the National Guard's civil support needs 
contained in the 2008 NDAA addresses to some extent all of the guiding 
principles we identified as important to preparing the National Guard 
for its dual roles, it is not clear how DOD will implement some of its 
provisions. Specifically, until the Secretary of Defense assesses DOD's 
civil support requirements, determines the capabilities it needs to 
provide, if any, and develops and implements a plan to provide these 
capabilities, the National Guard may not be adequately prepared for its 
critical civil support role. An effective and efficient National Guard 
that is fully prepared to respond to civil support missions may reduce 
the demand for federal forces, which are currently in high demand for 
overseas missions. Furthermore, in the absence of an assessment of how 
DOD's planned investment priorities for its civil support capabilities 
align with DHS's risk-management framework for emergency preparedness 
and response and its standards for integration and interoperability, 
DOD may be unable to make the best use of existing federal investments 
in the National Guard. Integration of the National Guard's capabilities 
with those of civil authorities as well as federal military forces is 
critical to providing an efficient and effective response. Finally, 
without input, advice, and expertise from state and federal 
stakeholders such as DHS and the National Guard Bureau, DOD may be 
unable to leverage existing DOD and National Guard capabilities that 
could be used for civil support missions efficiently and effectively. 
DOD's involvement of these stakeholders can help DOD ensure that its 
efforts and resources are targeted at the highest priorities, while 
helping the department balance its competing demands against available 
resources. Since DOD has not yet begun implementing the 2008 NDAA, it 
is too early to determine whether the 2008 NDAA will yield results 
fully consistent with the guiding principles. Until an approach is 
implemented that is consistent with the guiding principles, the 
National Guard may not be prepared to effectively and efficiently 
fulfill its dual state and federal roles. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To assist congressional oversight, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense include information in materials accompanying its fiscal year 
2010 budget submission on the steps the department has taken to 
incorporate the guiding principles in its implementation of the 
provisions contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2008. Specifically, DOD should include information on: 

(1) the analytical process used to formulate the department's funding 
request for the capabilities needed to support civil authorities in an 
incident of national significance or a catastrophic incident including 
how it identified requirements, assessed capability gaps, and set 
investment priorities; and: 

(2) its assessment of the extent to which DOD's civil support 
investment priorities are consistent with DHS's risk-management 
framework for emergency preparedness and response and DHS efforts to 
promote standards for integration and interoperability among civilian 
responders. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written 
comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in their 
entirety in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments which we 
have included as appropriate. In general, DOD agreed with our 
recommendations. It agreed to provide information on the analytical 
process used to formulate DOD's civil support funding request with the 
2010 budget submission. However, in its comments, DOD noted that an 
assessment of how DOD civil support investment priorities are 
consistent with DHS's risk-management framework can be provided to the 
extent that DHS has articulated its risk-management framework and DOD 
agrees with that framework. DHS reviewed the draft and did not provide 
comments. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 
days from its date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to 
interested congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the 
Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies 
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO website at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 
512-4402. Contact points for our offices of Congressional Relations and 
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Major 
contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Janet A. St. Laurent: 
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To conduct our work, we analyzed data, reviewed documentation, and 
interviewed officials from the Department of Defense's (DOD) Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas 
Security Affairs, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, U.S. Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM), the National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard, 
the Air National Guard, and the State Adjutants General of Oregon and 
Washington. In addition we analyzed data, reviewed documentation and 
interviewed officials from the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) 
Military Advisor's Office, Office of Operations Coordination, and 
Office of the Chief Financial Officer and the Coast Guard's Office of 
Cutter Forces and the Directorate for Planning, Resources, and 
Procurement. We also consulted with defense and homeland security 
analysts at the Center for American Progress, the Center for a New 
American Security, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
the Heritage Foundation, the National Emergency Management Association, 
and the National Governors Association. 

To identify the extent to which key federal stakeholders have 
undertaken planning to determine the capabilities the National Guard 
needs for its state-led but federally funded civil support role, we 
reviewed our prior work examining National Guard domestic equipment 
requirements and readiness, catastrophic disaster response, and the 
military response to Hurricane Katrina. To determine the extent of DOD 
planning for the National Guard's role in large-scale multistate events 
that are state-led but federally funded, we reviewed DOD strategy, 
policy, and planning documents including DOD's Strategy for Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support; DOD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to 
Civil Authorities; and The Illustrative Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support Multi-Service Force Deployment, Civil Support Annex, Volume I. 
In addition, we reviewed reports and hearing transcripts of the 
Commission on National Guard and Reserves. To determine the extent of 
DHS planning for the National Guard's role in large-scale multistate 
events that are federally funded, we reviewed key strategy and planning 
documents including the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
the DHS National Response Framework, the Homeland Security Council's 
National Planning Scenarios, and the DHS Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 
Report. To determine the extent of state planning for the National 
Guard's role in large-scale multistate events that are federally 
funded, we reviewed our prior work examining National Guard domestic 
equipment requirements and readiness, National Guard Regulations, such 
as NGR 500-1 Military Support to Civil Authorities, and interviewed 
officials responsible for reviewing state National Guard plans at the 
National Guard Bureau. In addition, we reviewed laws and legislative 
histories governing the National Guard and its civil support role and 
discussed these with the DOD General Counsel and the National Guard 
Bureau Office of the Judge Advocate. 

To determine the funding approach currently used for the National 
Guard's civil support capabilities and how the alternative funding 
approaches--modeled after SOCOM and the Coast Guard--could be applied 
to the National Guard, we reviewed documents, interviewed government 
officials and defense and homeland security analysts listed above, and 
analyzed information on National Guard, SOCOM, and Coast Guard roles 
and responsibilities for identifying capability requirements, 
allocating resources, and acquiring capabilities. We analyzed 
information on the two SOCOM and Coast Guard models and developed 
proposals for how similar roles and responsibilities for identifying 
requirements, allocating resources, and acquiring capabilities could be 
applied to the National Guard to build the National Guard's civil 
support capabilities that are in the federal interest. In addition, we 
reviewed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 to 
identify the roles and responsibilities set forth in the act for 
planning and funding for the National Guard's civil support 
capabilities. 

To determine what guiding principles should be considered when 
developing, assessing, and implementing alternatives for the National 
Guard's capabilities for its state-led but federally funded civil 
support missions, we consulted internal GAO stakeholders, performed 
content analysis of GAO guidance and prior work examining best 
practices in enhancing and sustaining collaboration among federal 
agencies, achieving results-oriented government, and internal controls. 
In addition, we reviewed key findings from our recent work examining 
National Guard and emergency preparedness issues. We then synthesized 
the findings of these reports and guidance to develop seven guiding 
principles relevant to the audit objectives. We discussed and refined 
these guiding principles based on our discussions with government 
officials and defense and homeland security analysts. We used 
professional judgment and audit liaison assistance to identify 
government officials from DOD and DHS with knowledge of National Guard 
civil support issues. We identified the government officials and 
defense and homeland security analysts with expertise on the National 
Guard, Coast Guard, Special Operations, and homeland security by 
researching defense and homeland security databases, conducting Web 
searches, and reviewing published writings to identify individuals with 
background relevant to the audit objectives. We used a standard set of 
questions to interview each of the government officials and defense and 
homeland security analysts to ensure we consistently discussed the 
seven guiding principles, the current National Guard funding approach, 
and the alternatives modeled after those used by SOCOM and the Coast 
Guard. 

We then assessed the current National Guard funding approach, the two 
alternatives modeled after the SOCOM and the Coast Guard, and the 
provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008 against the guiding principles we developed. To refine our 
analysis, we consulted with the government officials and defense and 
homeland security analysts identified above using a standard set of 
questions to obtain their opinions on the extent to which the current 
approach and the proposed alternatives are consistent with the guiding 
principles for creating a focus on results. Because the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 became public law late 
in our review, we used our professional judgment to assess the act's 
provisions and did not consult with government officials and defense 
and homeland security analysts on our assessment. 

We conducted our review from February 2007 to April 2008 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Reserve Affairs: 
1500 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-1500: 

April 2, 2008: 

Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent: 
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Laurent: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, GAO-08-311, "Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard 
Readiness for Civil Support Missions May Depend on DoD's Implementation 
of the Provisions of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act," 
dated March 4, 2008 (GAO Code 350938). 

DoD appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the draft 
report. The Department partially concurs with the recommendation. 
Detailed comments are attached. For further questions please contact 
the primary action officer within DoD for this report, LTC John 
Fortune. He can be reached at (703) 693-2229. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: [Illegible] for: 

T. F. Hall: 

Attachment: As stated: 

GAO Draft Report - Dated March 4, 2008: 
GAO Code 350938/GAO-08-311: 

"Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support 
Missions May Depend on DoD's Implementation of the Provisions of the 
2008 National Defense Authorization Act" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendation: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
include information in materials accompanying its FY 2010 budget 
submission on the steps the Department has taken to incorporate the 
guiding principles in its implementation of the provisions contained in 
the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2008. Specifically, DoD 
should include information on: 

(1) the analytical process used to formulate the Department's funding 
request for the capabilities needed to support civil authorities in an 
incident of national significance or catastrophic incidents including 
how it identified requirements, assessed capability gaps, and set 
investment priorities; and; 

(2) its assessment of the extent to which DoD's civil support 
investment priorities are consistent with Department of Homeland 
Security's risk management framework for emergency preparedness and 
response and Department of Homeland Security efforts to promote 
standards for integration and interoperability among civilian 
responders. 

DOD Response: Overall, the Department partially concurs with the 
recommendation. 

Concur with Part 1. The information can be provided with the 2010 
budget submission to describe formulation of the budget request for 
civil support. 

Partially Concur with Part 2. An assessment of how DoD Civil Support 
investment priorities are consistent with the Department of Homeland 
Security's risk management can be provided to the extent that the 
Department of Homeland Security has articulated their risk management 
framework, and to the extent DoD agrees with that framework. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Janet A. St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the person named above, Margaret Morgan, Assistant 
Director; Renee Brown; Eugene Gray; Nicole Harms; Shvetal Khanna; 
Stephanie Moriarty; Jay Smale; John Van Schaik; and Suzanne Wren made 
major contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

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96-118]. Washington, D.C.: June 1996. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National 
Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-21] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 
10, 2004), 30. 

[2] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard 
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-60] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 
26, 2007). 

[3] For the purposes of this report, the term "current approach" refers 
to the funding approach DOD used before the enactment of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. 

[4] Pub. L. No. 110-181 (2008). 

[5] Section 351 of the 2008 NDAA amended 10 U.S.C. § 482 by adding this 
requirement. 

[6] Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-433, §3 (1986). 

[7] National Guard members train for their federal missions under state 
control with federal funding. Federal laws also authorize federal 
funding for some other state-controlled missions, such as the National 
Guard's counterdrug support operations and weapons of mass destruction 
civil support teams. 

[8] Pub. L. No. 110-181, §§1811, 1812, and 1813 (2008). 

[9] The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §101 
(2002). 

[10] The states have entered into mutual assistance agreements, such as 
the Emergency Management Assistance Compact to provide cross-border 
assistance, including National Guard forces, when an event exceeds a 
state's capacity to respond. 

[11] Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, §3 (1986). 

[12] 10 U.S.C. §§ 3013, 3062, 8013 and 8062. 

[13] Pub. L. No. 107-296, §101 (2002). 

[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-60]. 

[15] The national planning scenarios are: Nuclear detonation, 
biological attack, biological disease outbreak/pandemic flu, the 
plague, chemical attack--blister agent, chemical attack--toxic 
industrial chemicals, chemical attack--nerve agent, chemical attack-- 
chlorine tank explosion, major hurricane, major earthquake, 
radiological attack--radiological dispersal device, explosives attack-
-bombing using improvised explosive device, biological attack--food 
contamination, biological attack--foreign animal disease, and cyber 
attack. 

[16] This Incident Management Planning Team, established in 2006 in 
response to recommendations made in The Federal Response to Hurricane 
Katrina Lessons Learned report, provides contingency and crisis-action 
incident-management planning in support of the DHS national-level 
domestic incident-management responsibilities. 

[17] According to DHS's National Preparedness Guidance, the planning 
scenarios illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, 
catastrophic emergency events for which the nation needs to be 
prepared. 

[18] Responsibilities for implementing the national preparedness goals 
fall to each federal, state, and local entity with a role in homeland 
security preparedness. 

[19] Pub. L. No. 110-181, §1814 (2008). 

[20] The weapons of mass destruction civil support teams involve 
members of the National Guard serving full-time and performing duties 
in support of emergency preparedness programs to prepare for or to 
respond to any emergency involving the use of a weapon of mass 
destruction or a threatened or actual terrorist attack in the United 
States that results, or could result in a catastrophic loss of life or 
property. 10 U.S.C. § 12310(c). The counterdrug program involves using 
National Guard personnel in drug interdiction and counter-drug law 
enforcement activities, including drug demand reduction activities, 
authorized by the law of states and requested by state Governors. (32 
U.S.C. § 112.) 

[21] DOD Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (Jan. 
15, 1993). 

[22] 10 U.S.C. § 167. 

[23] SOCOM's special operations forces perform several tasks, which 
include strategic reconnaissance, direct action, unconventional 
warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, humanitarian 
assistance, theater search and rescue, psychological operations, and 
civil affairs operations. 

[24] The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low 
Intensity Conflict provides "the overall supervision, including 
oversight of policy and resources, of special operations activities and 
low intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense," and is 
the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on these 
activities. 

[25] The Coast Guard has 11 mission areas: Search and Rescue; Marine 
Safety; Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Illegal Drug 
Interdiction; Undocumented Migrant Interdiction; Defense Readiness; 
Other Law Enforcement; Marine Environmental Protection; Living Marine 
Resources; Aids to Navigation; and Ice Operations. For purposes of 
congressional oversight, Congress has designated five of these areas-- 
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Drug Interdiction; Migrant 
Interdiction; Defense Readiness; and Other Law Enforcement--as homeland 
security missions in 6 U.S.C. §468. 

[26] 14 U.S.C. § 1, 3. 

[27] The formal agreements include, for example, the 2004 memorandum of 
agreement between DOD and DHS for the inclusion of the U.S. Coast Guard 
in support of maritime homeland defense and the 2006 memorandum of 
agreement between DOD and DHS for DOD support to the United States 
Coast Guard for maritime homeland security. 

[28] Pub. L. No. 110-181 §1814 (2008). 

[29] Pub. L. No. 110-181 §1815 (2008). 

[30] The act defines "military-unique capabilities" as those 
capabilities that, in the view of the Secretary of Defense, cannot be 
provided by other federal, state, or local civilian agencies and that 
are essential to provide support to civil authorities in an incident of 
national significance or a catastrophic incident. 

[31] Pub. L. No. 110-181 §1815 (2008). 

[33] Pub. L. No. 110-181 §351 (2008), which amends 10 U.S.C. §10541(b) 
and 10 U.S.C. §482. 

[34] The Secretary is to assess the extent to which the National Guard 
possesses the equipment to perform the responsibilities under 10 U.S.C. 
§§331, 332, 333, 12304(b) and 12406 in response to an emergency or 
major disaster as such terms are defined in 42 U.S.C. §5122, the Robert 
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Act. 

[34] Capabilities are defined as trained personnel and their associated 
equipment that are capable of achieving a desired military outcome. 
Readiness is achieved through the application of resources such as 
personnel, training, and equipment over time. Integration refers to the 
ability of forces to effectively operate together. 

[35] Defense Science Board, Final Report of the Defense Science Board 
Task Force on Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve 
in the Global War on Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 
September 2007), p. 8. 

[36] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government 
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June 1996), p. 25. 

[37] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/GGD-96-118], p. 
14. 

[38] Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, §§ 3,153 (1986). 

[39] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-60]. 

[40] In a catastrophic event, effective interoperable communications 
among responders is vastly more complicated than an event that is 
limited to a single jurisdiction or immediately adjacent jurisdictions 
because, as happened after Hurricane Katrina, the response involves 
civilian and military responders from the federal government as well as 
responders from various state and local governments who provide help 
under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact among states. 

[41] DHS funding could be directed to other departmental priorities 
among the components, such as: the Directorate of Science and 
Technology, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the Transportation 
Security Administration, United States Customs and Border Protection, 
and United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 

[42] We did not consult with government officials and defense and 
homeland security analysts about our assessment of its provisions 
because the 2008 NDAA became a public law late in our review. 

[43] Pub. L. No. 110-181 §1822 (2008). 

[44] Section 351 of the 2008 NDAA amended 10 U.S.C. §10541(b) by adding 
these reporting requirements to the requirements for DOD's annual 
report on the National Guard and reserve component. 

[45] The Secretary is to assess the extent to which the National Guard 
possesses the equipment to perform the responsibilities under 10 U.S.C. 
§§331, 332, 333, 12304(b) and 12406 in response to an emergency or 
major disaster as such terms are defined in 42 U.S.C. §5122, the Robert 
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Act. 

[46] Section 351 of the 2008 NDAA amended 10 U.S.C. § 482 by adding 
this requirement. Since the act was written, DHS has published a new 
National Response Framework which replaces the National Response Plan. 

[End of section] 

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