This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-07-368 
entitled 'Information Security: FBI Needs to Address Weaknesses in 
Critical Network' which was released on May 24, 2007. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

April 2007: 

Information Security: 

FBI Needs to Address Weaknesses in Critical Network: 

GAO-07-368: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-368, a report to F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., House 
of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) relies on a critical network 
to electronically communicate, capture, exchange, and access law 
enforcement and investigative information. Misuse or interruption of 
this critical network, or disclosure of the information traversing it, 
would impair FBIís ability to fulfill its missions. Effective 
information security controls are essential for ensuring that 
information technology resources and information are adequately 
protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, fraudulent use, 
disclosure, modification, or destruction. 

GAO was asked to assess information security controls for one of FBIís 
critical networks. To assess controls, GAO conducted a vulnerability 
assessment of the internal network and evaluated the bureauís 
information security program associated with the network operating 
environment. This report summarizes weaknesses in information security 
controls in one of FBIís critical networks. 

What GAO Found: 

Certain information security controls over the critical internal 
network reviewed were ineffective in protecting the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information and information resources. 
Specifically, FBI did not consistently (1) configure network devices 
and services to prevent unauthorized insider access and ensure system 
integrity; (2) identify and authenticate users to prevent unauthorized 
access; (3) enforce the principle of least privilege to ensure that 
authorized access was necessary and appropriate; (4) apply strong 
encryption techniques to protect sensitive data on its networks; (5) 
log, audit, or monitor security-related events; (6) protect the 
physical security of its network; and (7) patch key servers and 
workstations in a timely manner. Taken collectively, these weaknesses 
place sensitive information transmitted on the network at risk of 
unauthorized disclosure or modification, and could result in a 
disruption of service, increasing the bureauís vulnerability to insider 
threats. 

These weaknesses existed, in part, because FBI had not fully 
implemented key information security program activities for the 
critical network reviewed. FBI has developed an agencywide information 
security program, which includes an organization to monitor and protect 
the bureauís information systems from external attacks and insider 
misuse and to serve as the central focal point of contact for near-real-
time security monitoring. However, shortcomings exist with certain 
program elements for the network, including an outdated risk 
assessment, incomplete security plan, incomplete specialized security 
training, insufficient testing, untimely remediation of weaknesses, and 
inadequate service continuity planning. Without a fully implemented 
program, certain security controls will likely remain inadequate or 
inconsistently applied. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends several actions to fully implement an information 
security program. In a separate classified report, GAO makes 
recommendations to correct specific weaknesses. FBI agreed with many of 
the recommendations but disagreed with the characterization of risk to 
its information and noted that it has made significant strides in 
reducing risks. GAO believes that increased risk remains. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-368]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Gregory C. Wilshusen at 
(202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology: 

Certain Controls over FBI's Network Were Ineffective: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Comments from the Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Abbreviations: 

C&A: certification and accreditation: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

ESOC: Enterprise Security Operations Center: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

FISMA: Federal Information Security Management Act: 

NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology: 

OIG: Office of Inspector General: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 30, 2007: 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. 
House of Representatives: 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) relies on automated systems 
and networks to electronically communicate, capture, exchange, and 
access law enforcement and investigative information. As part of its 
ongoing efforts to improve information technology capabilities, the 
bureau deployed and began operating a network in April 2004 as part of 
its Trilogy modernization effort. Misuse or interruption of this 
network, or disclosure of the information traversing it, would impair 
FBI's ability to fulfill its missions. Prior to this network's 
deployment, misuse was illustrated by former agent Robert Hanssen, who 
exploited information security weaknesses at the bureau to track the 
FBI's most sensitive espionage investigations. 

In response to your request as Chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee for the 109th Congress, we assessed whether FBI has 
effectively implemented appropriate information security controls on a 
critical internal network, deployed as part of the Trilogy 
modernization effort, to protect the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of its law enforcement and investigative information. Such 
controls are essential for ensuring that information technology 
resources and information are adequately protected from inadvertent or 
deliberate misuse, fraudulent use, disclosure, modification, or 
destruction. 

This report summarizes shortcomings identified in information security 
controls on this critical internal network. It does not always contain 
specific examples of the weaknesses identified due to the sensitive 
nature of the information discussed. 

Results in Brief: 

Certain information security controls over the critical internal 
network were ineffective in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of law enforcement and investigative information. 
Specifically, FBI did not consistently (1) configure network devices 
and services securely to prevent unauthorized insider access; (2) 
identify and authenticate users to prevent unauthorized access; (3) 
enforce the principle of least privilege to ensure that authorized 
access was necessary and appropriate; (4) apply strong encryption 
techniques to protect sensitive data on its networks; (5) log, audit, 
or monitor security-related events; (6) protect the physical security 
of its network; and (7) patch key servers and workstations in a timely 
manner. Taken collectively, these weaknesses place sensitive 
information transmitted on the network at increased risk of 
unauthorized disclosure or modification, and could result in a 
disruption of service. 

These weaknesses existed, in part, because FBI had not fully 
implemented key information security program activities for the network 
reviewed. FBI has developed an agencywide information security program, 
which includes an organization to monitor and protect the bureau's 
information systems from external attacks and insider misuse and to 
serve as the central focal point of contact for near-real-time security 
monitoring. However, shortcomings exist with certain program elements 
for the network, including an outdated risk assessment, incomplete 
security plan, incomplete specialized security training, insufficient 
testing, untimely remediation of weaknesses, and inadequate service 
continuity planning. Also, although the bureau had documented 
information security policies and procedures, it lacked detailed 
standards that addressed some of the weaknesses identified. Without a 
fully implemented program, security controls will likely remain 
inadequate or inconsistently applied. 

We are making recommendations to the FBI Director to take several steps 
to fully implement key activities of the bureau's information security 
program for the network. These activities include updating assessments 
and plans to reflect the bureau's current operating environment, 
providing more comprehensive coverage of system tests and correcting 
weaknesses in a timely manner. In a separate classified report, we are 
making recommendations to address the specific control weaknesses 
identified. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the FBI Chief Information 
Officer concurred with many of our recommendations, but did not believe 
that the bureau had placed sensitive information at an unacceptable 
risk for unauthorized disclosure, modification, or insider threat 
exploitation. He cited significant strides in reducing risk since the 
Robert Hanssen espionage investigation. However, we believe that until 
weaknesses identified in network devices and services, identification 
and authentication, authorization, cryptography, audit and monitoring, 
physical security, and patch management are addressed, increased risk 
to FBI's critical network remains. Further, until the bureau fully and 
effectively implements certain information security program activities 
for the network, security controls will likely remain inadequate or 
inconsistently applied. 

Background: 

Information security is critical for any organization that depends on 
information systems and computer networks to carry out its mission or 
business. It is especially important for government agencies, where the 
public's trust is essential. The dramatic expansion in computer 
interconnectivity and the rapid increase in the use of the Internet are 
changing the way our government, the nation, and much of the world 
communicate and conduct business. Without proper safeguards, systems 
are vulnerable to individuals and groups with malicious intent who can 
intrude and use their access to obtain sensitive information, commit 
fraud, disrupt operations, or launch attacks against other computer 
systems and networks. These concerns are well founded for a number of 
reasons, including a dramatic increase in reports of security 
incidents, ease of obtaining and using hacking tools, a steady advance 
in the sophistication and effectiveness of attack technology, and dire 
warnings of new and more destructive attacks to come. 

Computer-supported federal operations are similarly at risk. Our 
previous reports, and those of agency inspectors general, describe 
persistent information security weaknesses that place a variety of 
federal operations at risk of disruption, fraud, or inappropriate 
disclosure of sensitive data. We have designated information security 
as a governmentwide high-risk area since 1997[Footnote 1]--a 
designation that remains today.[Footnote 2]  

Recognizing the importance of securing federal agencies' information 
systems, Congress enacted the Federal Information Security Management 
Act (FISMA)[Footnote 3] in December 2002 to strengthen the security of 
information and systems within federal agencies. FISMA requires each 
agency, using a risk-based approach to information security management, 
to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide information security 
program to provide information security for the information and systems 
that support the operations and assets of the agency--including those 
operated or maintained by contractors or others on behalf of the 
agency. 

FBI Operations: 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which is a component of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), has mission responsibilities that include 
investigating serious federal crimes, protecting the nation from 
foreign intelligence and terrorist threats, and assisting other law 
enforcement agencies. Over 12,000 special agents and 16,000 analysts 
and mission support personnel are located in the bureau's Washington, 
D.C., headquarters and in more than 70 offices in the United States and 
50 offices in foreign countries. 

Mission responsibilities at the bureau are divided among the following 
five major organizational components. 

* Administration: manages the bureau's personnel programs, budgetary 
and financial services, records, information resources, and information 
security. 

* National Security: integrates investigative and intelligence 
activities against current and emerging national security threats, and 
provides information and analysis for the national security and law 
enforcement communities. 

* Criminal Investigations: investigates serious federal crimes and 
probes federal statutory violations involving exploitation of the 
Internet and computer systems. 

* Law Enforcement Services: provides law enforcement information and 
forensic services to federal, state, local, and international agencies. 

* Office of the Chief Information Officer: develops the bureau's 
information technology strategic plan and operating budget and develops 
and maintains technology assets. 

The organizational components are further organized into subcomponents, 
such as divisions, offices, and other groups. 

The FBI Security Division, within the Administration component, and the 
Office of the Chief Information Officer collaborated to establish 
information security initiatives. One initiative included the 
establishment of the Enterprise Security Operations Center (ESOC), 
which monitors and protects FBI's systems from external attacks and 
insider misuse and ensures the availability, confidentiality, and 
nonrepudiation of FBI information. A second initiative was the 
deployment of a Public Key Infrastructure, which provided strong 
authentication of users' identification to applications. 

To execute its mission responsibilities, FBI relies extensively on 
information technology. The bureau operates and maintains hundreds of 
computerized systems, networks, databases, and applications. 
Recognizing the need to modernize its computer systems and networks, 
FBI proposed a major technology upgrade plan to Congress in September 
2000. The Information Technology Upgrade Project, which FBI 
subsequently renamed Trilogy, was FBI's largest automated information 
systems modernization initiative to date. Trilogy consisted of three 
parts: (1) the information presentation component to upgrade computer 
hardware and software, (2) the transportation network component to 
upgrade the communication network, and (3) the user application 
component to upgrade and consolidate the most important investigative 
applications. 

FBI completed the first two components--the information presentation 
and the transportation network--in April 2004, upgrading its 
information technology infrastructure with new desktop computers and 
deploying a wide area network to enhance electronic communication among 
offices and with other law enforcement organizations. The data 
traversing the network includes privacy act and sensitive investigative 
information. 

Previously Reported Information Security Weaknesses: 

FBI information system security weaknesses have been exploited by 
insiders in the past. The U.S. Secret Service, along with CERTģ 
Coordination Center,[Footnote 4] studied insider threats, and stated in 
a May 2005 report that "insiders pose a substantial threat by virtue of 
their knowledge of, and access to, employer systems and/or databases." 
The espionage of Robert Hanssen, a former FBI agent, illustrated how an 
insider can take advantage of inadequacies in the bureau's information 
system security controls. After discovery of Hanssen's espionage, in 
2001, the Attorney General commissioned an outside review of FBI's 
security program. The commission found significant deficiencies in 
bureau information security policies and practices, in areas such as 
certification and accreditation (C&A),[Footnote 5] physical security, 
security awareness training, access control, and auditing. The report 
stated that those deficiencies flow from a pervasive inattention to 
security, which had been at best a low priority. Additionally, shortly 
after Hanssen's arrest in 2001, the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence and the Attorney General requested that the DOJ Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) review FBI's performance in deterring, 
detecting, and investigating the espionage activities. The report 
pointed out that the agent exploited serious weaknesses in FBI's 
information security and made a specific recommendation on detecting 
improper computer usage and enforcing "need to know"--granting access 
only when it is an operational necessity. According to agency 
officials, the bureau is addressing this and other recommendations. 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology: 

The objective of our review was to determine whether the FBI has 
effectively implemented appropriate information security controls on a 
critical internal network, deployed as part of the Trilogy 
modernization effort, to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of its law enforcement and investigative information. 

To evaluate the effectiveness of the security controls over this 
critical network, we examined routers, network management servers, 
switches, firewalls, and controlled interfaces at FBI headquarters. Our 
evaluation was based on (1) our Federal Information System Controls 
Audit Manual,[Footnote 6] which provides guidance for reviewing 
information system controls that affect the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of computerized data; (2) previous reports from the 
DOJ OIG; and (3) the Federal Information Security Management Act, which 
establishes key elements that are required for an effective information 
security program. 

Specifically, we evaluated information system controls that are 
intended to: 

* limit, detect, and monitor access to sensitive network computing 
resources, thereby safeguarding them from misuse and protecting them 
from unauthorized disclosure and modification; 

* encrypt sensitive data on the network; 

* prevent the introduction of unauthorized changes to application or 
system software; 

* protect physical access to network resources; and: 

* ensure completion of appropriate background investigations of bureau 
personnel with privileged access on the network. 

In addition, we evaluated FBI's information security program as it 
related to the network operating environment. Such a program includes 
key activities such as assessing risk; developing and implementing 
policies, procedures, and security plans; providing security awareness 
and training; testing and evaluating control effectiveness; planning, 
implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial actions to address 
information security deficiencies; and ensuring continuity of 
operations. 

To evaluate these controls and activities, we identified and examined 
pertinent DOJ and FBI security policies and procedures. In addition, to 
determine whether network security controls were in place, adequately 
designed, and operating effectively, we conducted vulnerability 
assessments of the network's key servers, routers, and switches. These 
assessments included discussions with agency staff to gain an 
understanding of FBI's processes and controls. In order to take 
advantage of prior work in this area, we also held discussions with OIG 
staff and reviewed information security reports pertaining to FBI 
networks and information systems. 

We performed our review at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C., from 
March 2006 through December 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 

Certain Controls over FBI's Network Were Ineffective: 

Weaknesses existed in certain access controls and other controls 
intended to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
the law enforcement and investigative information transmitted by a 
critical internal network. Our review of the network revealed 
weaknesses in access controls and patch management. A key reason for 
these weaknesses was that, although FBI had developed an information 
security program, it had not effectively or fully implemented key 
activities of this program for the network. As a result, sensitive data 
traversing this network were vulnerable to unauthorized access, 
disclosure, and modification and these weaknesses could lead to 
disruptions in FBI operations. 

Access Controls: 

A basic management objective for any organization is to protect the 
resources that support its critical operations from unauthorized 
access. Organizations accomplish this objective by designing and 
implementing controls that are intended to prevent, limit, and detect 
unauthorized access to computing resources, programs, and information. 
Access controls include those related to network devices and services, 
user identification and authentication, authorization, cryptography, 
audit and monitoring of security-related events, and physical access to 
information resources. Inadequate controls diminish the reliability of 
computerized information and increase the risk of unauthorized 
disclosure, modification, and destruction of sensitive information, and 
of disruption of service. 

Specific examples associated with the weaknesses reported below are 
described in more detail in a classified version of this report. 

Network Devices and Services: 

Networks are collections of interconnected computer systems and devices 
that allow individuals to share resources, such as computer programs 
and information. Because sensitive programs and information are stored 
on or transmitted along networks, effectively securing networks is 
essential to protecting computing resources and data from unauthorized 
access, manipulation, and use. Organizations secure their networks, in 
part, by installing and configuring network devices that permit 
authorized network service requests, deny unauthorized requests, and 
limit the services that are available on the network. Devices used to 
secure networks include (1) firewalls that prevent unauthorized access 
to the network, (2) routers that filter and forward data along the 
network, (3) switches that forward information among segments of a 
network, and (4) servers that host applications and data. Network 
services consist of protocols for transmitting data between network 
devices. The National Security Agency (NSA) offers guidance for 
securely configuring devices and services. Insecurely configured 
network devices and services can make a system vulnerable to internal 
or external threats. Because networks often include both external and 
internal access points for electronic information assets, failure to 
secure these assets increases the risk of unauthorized access to 
sensitive information and systems, or disruption of service. 

FBI used various devices to secure its network; however, it did not 
consistently configure network devices and services to prevent 
unauthorized access to, and ensure the integrity of, the network. 

User Identification and Authentication: 

A computer system must be able to identify and authenticate different 
users so that activities on the system can be linked to specific 
individuals. When an organization assigns unique user accounts to 
specific users, the system needs to be able to distinguish one user 
from another--a process called identification. The system must also 
establish the validity of a user's claimed identity by requesting some 
kind of information, such as a password, that is known only by the 
user--a process known as authentication. DOJ policy requires that 
systems control and limit user access based on identification and 
authentication of the user, and that each user is authenticated before 
access is permitted. FBI policy addresses identification and 
authentication as the foundation for information system access control 
and for user accountability, with passwords being a means of 
authentication. 

FBI did not adequately control user identification and authentication 
to ensure that only authorized individuals were granted access to its 
network devices. As a result, increased risk of unauthorized access to 
servers and other network devices exists, particularly by insiders. 

Authorization: 

Authorization is the process of granting or denying access rights and 
privileges to a protected resource, such as a network, system, 
application, function, or file. A key component of granting or denying 
access rights is the concept of "least privilege." Least privilege is a 
basic principle for securing computer resources and data. It means that 
users are granted only those access rights and permissions that they 
need to perform their official duties. To restrict legitimate users' 
access to only those programs and files that they need in order to do 
their work, organizations establish access rights and permissions. 
"User rights" are allowable actions that can be assigned to users or to 
groups of users. File and directory permissions are rules that are 
associated with a particular file or directory and regulate which users 
can access it--and the extent of that access. To avoid unintentionally 
giving users unnecessary access to sensitive files and directories, an 
organization must give careful consideration to its assignment of 
rights and permissions. DOJ policy requires that each individual be 
granted access to information only when such access is an operational 
necessity, sometimes referred to as "need to know." Also, the policy 
requires that system security features have the technical ability to 
restrict the user's access to only that information which is necessary 
for operations. Further, FBI policy defines least privilege as 
determining the minimum set of privileges required to perform job 
functions, and restricting the user to those privileges and nothing 
more. 

FBI granted rights and permissions to network devices that allowed more 
access to these devices than users needed to perform their jobs. As a 
result, increased risk exists that users could perform inappropriate 
activities. 

Cryptography: 

Cryptography underlies many of the mechanisms used to enforce the 
confidentiality and integrity of critical and sensitive information. 
Encryption--one type of cryptography--is the process of converting 
readable or plaintext information into unreadable or ciphertext 
information using a special value known as a key and a mathematical 
process known as an algorithm. The strength of a key and an algorithm 
is determined by their length and complexity--the longer and more 
complex they are, the stronger they are. FBI policy requires that 
passwords be encrypted before being transmitted over the network. It 
also requires that sensitive and classified information be safeguarded 
such that it is accessible to only those individuals with a "need to 
know." 

FBI did not always safeguard sensitive data using encryption. As a 
result, sensitive information may be disclosed to unauthorized 
individuals who do not have a legitimate need for the information. 

Audit and Monitoring of Security Relevant Events: 

To establish individual accountability, monitor compliance with 
security policies, and investigate security violations, it is crucial 
to determine what, when, and by whom specific actions have been taken 
on a system. Organizations accomplish this by implementing system or 
security software that provides an audit trail that they can use to 
determine the source of a transaction or attempted transaction and to 
monitor users' activities. The way in which organizations configure 
system or security software determines the nature and extent of 
information that the audit trails can provide. DOJ policy requires that 
audit records, including all system transactions, be subject to 
recording and routine review for inappropriate or illegal activity, and 
that audit trails should be sufficient in detail to facilitate 
reconstruction of events if compromise or malfunction occurs. Further, 
FBI policy requires that audit trails be monitored and reviewed for 
suspicious activity. 

FBI established the Enterprise Security Operations Center (ESOC) to 
monitor and protect the bureau's information systems from external 
attacks and insider misuse, and to serve as the central point of 
contact for near real-time security monitoring. 

Although ESOC had established audit and monitoring capabilities, it did 
not always effectively audit and monitor security-relevant system 
activity on the network reviewed. As a result, increased risk exists 
that suspicious activities may not be detected. 

Physical Security: 

Physical security controls are important for protecting computer 
facilities and resources from espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. 
These controls restrict physical access to computer resources, usually 
by limiting access to the buildings and rooms in which the resources 
are housed and by periodically reviewing the access granted, in order 
to ensure that access continues to be appropriate. DOJ physical 
security policy requires that physical access to facilities where 
information is stored, processed, or transmitted be restricted to 
cleared and authorized personnel. 

FBI did not always effectively implement physical controls. For 
example, in some instances, personnel did not follow physical security 
policies and procedures for areas containing sensitive information, 
creating the potential for unauthorized individuals gaining access to 
these resources and data. 

Other Information Security Controls: 

In addition to access controls, other important security controls 
should be in place to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of an organization's information and systems. These 
controls include techniques designed to ensure the implementation of 
secure configurations on network devices and the timely completion of 
background investigations for personnel with access to information 
systems. 

Patch Management: 

To protect an organization's information, it is important to ensure 
that only authorized applications and programs are placed in operation. 
This process consists of instituting policies, procedures, and 
techniques to help ensure that all programs and program modifications 
are properly authorized, tested, and approved. Patch management is an 
important element in mitigating the risks associated with software 
vulnerabilities. Up-to-date patch installation could help mitigate 
vulnerabilities associated with flaws in software code that could be 
exploited to cause significant damage--including the loss of control of 
entire systems--thereby enabling malicious individuals to read, modify, 
or delete sensitive information or disrupt operations. FBI policy 
recognizes the need to establish management controls to ensure timely 
and effective implementation of security patches and software upgrades. 
It also specifies that critical patches be evaluated within 24 hours 
and installed immediately after being tested, with moderate level of 
criticality considered within 10 days and installed immediately after 
testing, and with low level of criticality considered within 10 days 
and installed with the next standard build of the system. 

The bureau's patch management for the network was ineffective. ESOC 
evaluated and provided patches to operations staff for installation on 
systems; however, patches were not installed in a timely manner and 
legacy devices contained obsolete software. 

FBI has recognized deficiencies in its patch management process and has 
identified missing elements needed to implement a more effective patch 
management process. Also, according to agency officials, the bureau 
plans to eventually remove legacy devices containing obsolete software 
from the network. However, until FBI implements an effective patch 
management program, it is unable to assure the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of devices on its network. 

Background Investigations: 

According to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A- 
130,[Footnote 7] it has long been recognized that the greatest harm to 
computing resources has been done by authorized individuals engaged in 
improper activities--whether intentionally or accidentally. Personnel 
controls (such as screening individuals in positions of trust) 
supplement technical, operational, and management controls, 
particularly where the risk and magnitude of potential harm is high. 
Background screenings (or investigations) help an organization to 
determine whether a particular individual is suitable for a given 
position by attempting to ascertain the person's trustworthiness and 
appropriateness for the position. The exact type and rigor of screening 
that takes place depends on the sensitivity of the position and 
applicable regulations by which the agency is bound. FBI policy 
requires that employees and contractors with access to the network have 
a top secret clearance, and that individuals with a top secret 
clearance undergo periodic reinvestigation every 5 years. 

FBI generally complied with background investigation requirements. Of 
the 44 individuals reviewed, 41 had current background investigations 
that had been completed within the last 5 years. Three individuals' 
investigations were more than 5 years old by a few months, and re- 
investigations were in process at the time of our review. 

Information Security Program: 

Weaknesses in access controls and patch management existed, in part, 
because FBI had not yet effectively or fully implemented key security 
activities associated with its agencywide information security program 
for the critical internal network reviewed. Although FBI has developed 
an information security program, shortcomings exist with certain key 
elements. 

FISMA[Footnote 8] requires agencies to implement an agencywide 
information security program that includes: 

* periodic assessments of the risk and the magnitude of harm that could 
result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, or destruction of information and information systems; 

* policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) 
cost-effectively reduce risks, (3) ensure that information security is 
addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure 
compliance with applicable requirements; 

* plans for providing adequate information security for networks, 
facilities, and systems; 

* security awareness training to inform personnel--including 
contractors and other users of information systems--of information 
security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency 
policies and procedures; 

* at least annual testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of 
information security policies, procedures, and practices relating to 
management, operational, and technical controls of every major 
information system that is identified in the agencies' inventories; 

* a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting 
remedial action to address any deficiencies in their information 
security policies, procedures, or practices; and: 

* plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for 
information systems that support the operations and assets of the 
agency. 

However, FBI did not fully or effectively implement many of these 
activities for the critical internal network reviewed. 

Risk Assessments: 

Identifying and assessing information security risks are essential 
steps in determining what controls are required. Moreover, by 
increasing awareness of risks, these assessments can generate support 
for the policies and controls that are adopted in order to help ensure 
that these policies and controls operate as intended. Further, OMB 
Circular A-130, appendix III, prescribes, as does FBI policy, that risk 
be reassessed when significant changes are made to computerized 
systems--or at least every 3 years. The bureau's Certification & 
Accreditation Handbook incorporates a risk management process by 
requiring documentation in a risk management matrix throughout the 
lifecycle of a system. This matrix is to address such topics as 
threats, vulnerabilities, impact of a particular threat exploiting a 
particular vulnerability, existing or recommended countermeasures to 
mitigate the risk, business impact of implementing the countermeasures, 
and a schedule for implementing the recommended countermeasures. 

The risk assessment for the network was outdated and incomplete. In 
2004, as part of its C&A process, FBI assessed risk for the network and 
documented threats and vulnerabilities in a risk management matrix, 
which addressed many of the weaknesses described in this report. 
However, the bureau had not updated the matrix to reflect significant 
changes, such as additional connectivity, in the network operating 
environment. In addition, FBI did not have a comprehensive inventory-- 
an enterprisewide view--that reflected the current operating 
environment, including new connections as well as interfaces with 
legacy systems; as such, although individual risk assessments may have 
existed for these connections or legacy systems, the bureau may not be 
able to determine how any risks associated with them affect the overall 
network. Further, the existing matrix did not address business impact 
or schedule. Inadequately assessing risk can lead to implementing 
inadequate or inappropriate security controls that might not address 
the system's true risk; it also can lead to costly efforts to 
subsequently implement effective controls. Also, other organizations 
connected to the bureau depended on a risk assessment that was outdated 
and incomplete.[Footnote 9] 

Policies and Procedures: 

Another key task in developing an effective information security 
program is to establish and implement risk-based policies, procedures, 
and technical standards that govern security over an agency's computing 
environment. If properly implemented, policies and procedures should 
help reduce the risk that could come from unauthorized access or 
disruption of services. Technical configuration standards provide 
consistent implementing guidance for each computing environment. 
Because security policies and procedures are the primary mechanisms by 
which management communicates its views and requirements, it is 
important that policies and procedures be established and documented. 

FBI has developed and documented high-level information security 
guidance, but specific guidance did not always exist for the network 
environment. The bureau's Security Policy Manual and Certification & 
Accreditation Handbook provided guidance on topics such as security 
officer roles and responsibilities, personnel security, badges, 
identification and authentication, and system certification 
requirements. However, although technical configuration standards 
existed for topics such as Windows configuration, other detailed 
standards did not always exist. Without effectively developing, 
documenting, and implementing policies, procedures and standards, the 
bureau has less assurance that its systems and information are 
protected from unauthorized access. 

Security Plans: 

The objective of system security planning is to improve the protection 
of information technology resources. A system security plan is intended 
to provide a complete and up-to-date overview of a system's security 
requirements and describe the controls that are in place or planned to 
meet those requirements. FISMA requires that agency information 
security programs include subordinate plans for providing adequate 
information security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of 
information systems, as appropriate. OMB Circular A-130 specifies that 
agencies develop and implement system security plans for major 
applications and for general support systems and that these plans 
address policies and procedures for providing management, operational, 
and technical controls. The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) recommends that security plans include, among other 
topics, existing or planned security controls, the individual 
responsible for the security of the system, description of the system 
and its interconnected environment, and rules of behavior. FBI policy 
requires that system security plans be developed as part of its C&A 
process. 

FBI had documented a system security plan for the network, but it was 
incomplete and not up to date. The network security plan included many 
elements required by NIST, such as the description of individuals 
responsible for security and rules of behavior. Although the plan 
addressed management, operational, and certain technical controls, 
other specific technical controls, such as for communication 
protection, were not included. Further, the plan did not reflect the 
current operating environment because it did not completely address 
system interconnectivity. As a result, FBI and other agencies that 
connect to the network cannot ensure that appropriate controls are in 
place to protect their systems and critical information. 

Security Awareness Training: 

Another FISMA requirement for an information security program is that 
it promote awareness and provide required training for users so that 
they can understand the system security risks and their role in 
implementing related policies and controls to mitigate those risks. 
Computer intrusions and security breakdowns often occur because 
computer users fail to take appropriate security measures. For this 
reason, it is vital that employees and contractors who use computer 
resources in their day-to-day operations be made aware of the 
importance and sensitivity of the information they handle, as well as 
their roles and responsibilities, and what they need to do to protect 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of that information. 
FISMA mandates that all federal employees and contractors who use 
agency information systems be provided with periodic training in 
information security awareness and accepted information security 
practice. DOJ policy requires all personnel who manage, operate, 
develop, or use automated data processing and telecommunications to 
take security training and refresher training at least annually. 
Additionally, FISMA requires agency chief information officers to 
ensure that personnel with significant information security 
responsibilities receive specialized training. 

FBI provided security awareness to most, but not all, employees and 
contractors; however, not all individuals with security 
responsibilities completed the specialized training. The bureau had 
implemented a security awareness training program that included 
computer-based training and a database to track completion. In fiscal 
year 2006, 41 of 44 individuals reviewed completed the training. 
Additionally, FBI had implemented a specialized security training 
program that identified a number of roles with significant security 
responsibilities. Each role had a required computer-based specialized 
training curriculum, and FBI tracked users' progress and completion of 
courses. However, for fiscal year 2006, only 17 of 44 individuals 
reviewed had completed the required specialized training for their 
role; 11 of 44 individuals had not completed any specialized training; 
the remainder had completed some but not all of the training. FBI 
officials explained that the specialized training program was new in 
fiscal year 2006 and that they had initial problems identifying 
individuals with significant information security responsibilities 
along with obtaining an appropriate number of licenses for the 
training. Until FBI fully implements an effective security awareness 
and training program, it is at increased risk that individuals could 
accidentally or intentionally allow unauthorized access to sensitive 
information. 

Tests and Evaluations of Control Effectiveness: 

Another key element of an information security program is testing and 
evaluating system controls to ensure they are appropriate, effective, 
and comply with policies. An effective program of ongoing tests and 
evaluations can be used to identify and correct information security 
weaknesses. This type of oversight demonstrates management's commitment 
to the security program, reminds employees of their roles and 
responsibilities, and identifies and mitigates areas of noncompliance 
and ineffectiveness. Although control tests may encourage compliance 
with security policies, the full benefits of testing are not achieved 
unless the test results are analyzed by security specialists and 
business managers and used as a means of identifying new problem areas, 
reassessing the appropriateness of existing controls, and identifying 
the need for new controls. FISMA requires that agencies test and 
evaluate the information security controls of their systems and that 
the frequency of such tests be based on risk, but occur no less than 
annually. Similarly, the FBI Certification & Accreditation Handbook 
requires periodic testing to ensure that the accredited system has 
maintained its documented configuration baseline and to identify new 
vulnerabilities that may be inherent in the system and not previously 
identified. 

Although FBI had various initiatives under way to test and evaluate its 
network, the tests were not comprehensive. The network had undergone 
certification testing as part of FBI's C&A process, and ESOC conducts 
periodic system scans to detect vulnerabilities on its network. 
However, the bureau, as noted earlier, did not appropriately consider 
risks associated with the current operating environment. Further, the 
scans conducted by the monitoring group were limited in capabilities 
since the group had not been given administrative access to conduct 
these tests. As a result, certain vulnerabilities were not detected. 
Without appropriate tests and evaluations, the agency has limited 
assurance that policies and controls are appropriate and working as 
intended. Additionally, increased risk exists that undetected 
vulnerabilities could be exploited to allow unauthorized access to 
sensitive information. 

Remedial Actions: 

Remedial action plans, also known as plans of actions and milestones, 
can assist agencies in identifying, assessing, prioritizing, and 
monitoring progress in correcting security weaknesses in information 
systems. According to OMB Circular A-123, agencies should take timely 
and effective action to correct deficiencies that they have identified 
through a variety of information sources. To accomplish this, remedial 
action plans should be developed and progress tracked for each 
deficiency. FBI's Certification & Accreditation Handbook requires that 
plans of actions and milestones serve as a management tool to address 
corrective actions associated with system deficiencies and any new 
vulnerabilities. 

FBI did not address remedial actions in a timely manner. For example, 
the plan of actions and milestones for the network included 15 
unresolved weaknesses that were over 2 years old. Eight of these 
outstanding weaknesses were categorized as "high vulnerability" or 
"very high vulnerability" weaknesses. Without an effective remediation 
program, identified vulnerabilities may not be resolved in a timely 
manner, thereby allowing continuing opportunities for unauthorized 
individuals to exploit these weaknesses to gain access to sensitive 
information and systems. 

Continuity of Operations: 

Service continuity controls can enable systems to be recovered quickly 
and effectively following a service disruption or disaster. Such 
controls include plans and procedures designed to protect information 
resources and minimize the risk of unplanned interruptions, along with 
a plan to recover critical operations should interruptions occur. These 
controls should be designed to ensure that when unexpected events 
occur, key operations continue without interruption or are promptly 
resumed, and critical and sensitive data are protected. They should 
also be tested annually or as significant changes are made. It is 
important that these plans be clearly documented, communicated to 
potentially affected staff, tested, and updated to reflect current 
operations. FBI policy requires documented procedures to ensure the 
continuity of essential functions under all circumstances. In addition, 
the policy requires regularly scheduled testing of contingency plans. 

FBI had not implemented comprehensive continuity of operations plans 
and procedures for the internal network. Although the bureau had a 2004 
contingency plan that reflected the planned Trilogy network 
environment, the plan did not reflect the current internal network 
operating environment. FBI also had a contingency plan for its data 
center, but this plan did not cover the network. Further, there were 
neither documented test plans nor test results indicating continuity of 
operations testing had been performed specifically for the network. 
According to FBI officials, redundancy has been implemented in the 
internal network to ensure high availability. Officials also stated 
that recovery of the internal network has already been exercised in 
many real-life situations. However, until the bureau completes actions 
to address these weaknesses, it is at risk of not being able to recover 
from certain service disruptions to the internal network in a timely 
manner. 

Conclusions: 

Ineffective controls threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of the sensitive law enforcement and investigative 
information transmitted by the critical internal network. Certain 
information security control weaknesses existed in network devices and 
services, identification and authentication, authorization, 
cryptography, audit and monitoring, physical security, and patch 
management. The bureau's lack of a comprehensive inventory of the 
current network operating environment--an enterprisewide view-- 
compounds the effect of these weaknesses. FBI developed an agency-wide 
information security program; however, key activities associated with 
this program had not been fully implemented for the network. Until FBI 
ensures that the information security program associated with the 
network is fully implemented, there is limited assurance that its 
sensitive data will be adequately protected against unauthorized 
disclosure or modification or that network services will not be 
interrupted. These weaknesses leave the bureau vulnerable to insider 
threats. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the FBI Director take the following eight actions to 
fully implement information security program activities for the 
critical internal network reviewed. 

* Develop a comprehensive inventory of the current network operating 
environment. 

* Update the network's risk assessment to reflect the current operating 
environment and ensure that the assessment includes elements required 
by the FBI Certification & Accreditation Handbook. 

* Develop technical standards that include guidance for addressing the 
access control weaknesses identified. 

* Update the network security plan to ensure that it reflects the 
current operating environment and includes sections required by the FBI 
Certification & Accreditation Handbook. 

* Ensure that all network users receive security awareness training and 
that all users with significant security responsibilities receive 
specialized training as defined by their role. 

* Provide comprehensive coverage of system testing and scans. 

* Correct identified weaknesses in a timely manner. 

* Develop a continuity of operations plan that addresses the current 
network environment, and periodically test the plan. 

To help strengthen information security controls over the network, we 
are recommending in a separate classified report that the FBI Director 
take action to address specific weaknesses associated with network 
devices and services, identification and authentication, authorization, 
cryptography, audit and monitoring, physical security, and patch 
management. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In providing written comments (reprinted in app. I) on a draft of the 
report, the FBI Chief Information Officer concurred with many of our 
recommendations to address the weaknesses identified, and noted some 
instances where weaknesses have already been addressed. However, he 
took exception to the report's assertion that the collective result of 
the weaknesses presents an increased risk to FBI information. The 
bureau does not believe that it has placed sensitive information at an 
unacceptable risk for unauthorized disclosure, modification, or insider 
threat exploitation. We believe that until weaknesses identified in 
network devices and services, identification and authentication, 
authorization, cryptography, audit and monitoring, physical security 
and patch management are addressed, increased risk to FBI's critical 
network remains. Further, as noted in our conclusion, the lack of a 
comprehensive inventory of the current network operating environment-- 
an enterprisewide view--compounds the effect of these weaknesses. 

He also stated that FBI has made significant strides in reducing risk 
since the Robert Hanssen espionage investigation. For example, 
according to the Chief Information Officer, since its inception in 
2002, the bureau's Information Assurance section has taken FBI from an 
agency wherein only 8 percent of information systems were accredited to 
maintaining 100 percent accreditation of its major systems. Further, he 
stated that the bureau has increased its monitoring capabilities and 
established a comprehensive vulnerability assessment program. As stated 
in our report, we acknowledged that FBI has developed an agencywide 
information security program. However, shortcomings existed in how the 
bureau implemented certain elements of the program for the network. For 
example, the network risk assessment associated with the accreditation 
process was outdated and incomplete. Other shortcomings included an 
incomplete security plan, incomplete specialized training, insufficient 
testing, untimely remediation of weaknesses and inadequate service 
continuity planning. Although positive efforts have been made, until 
FBI fully and effectively implements key activities of the information 
security program associated with its network, security controls will 
likely remain inadequate or inconsistently applied, and the bureau will 
have limited assurance that sensitive data will be adequately protected 
against unauthorized disclosure or modification, or that network 
services will not be interrupted. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to 
congressional committees with jurisdiction over FBI and executive 
branch agencies' information security programs, the Attorney General, 
the FBI Director, the DOJ Inspector General, and other interested 
parties. We also will make copies available to others on request. In 
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web 
site at www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 
contact Gregory C. Wilshusen at (202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov or 
Keith A. Rhodes at (202) 512-6412 or rhodesk@gao.gov. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report 
are listed in appendix II. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Gregory C. Wilshusen: 
Director, Information Security Issues: 

Signed by: 

Keith A. Rhodes: 
Chief Technologist: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Comments from the Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

U.S. Department of Justice: 
Federal Bureau of Investigation: 
Washington, D. C. 20535-0001: 

March 13, 2007: 

Mr. Gregory C. Wilshusen: 
Director, Information Security Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Wilshusen: 

Re: FBI Response To GAO'S Draft Report, "Information Security, FBI 
Needs To Address Weaknesses In Critical Network," GAO-07-368: 

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report entitled "Information 
Security, FBI Needs to Address Weaknesses in Critical Network" 
(hereafter referred to as "the Report"). The Report has been reviewed 
by various components of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
including the Security Division and the Office of the Chief Information 
Officer (OLIO). This letter constitutes the formal FBI response. 

Based on our review of the Report, the FBI concurs with many of the 
GAO's technical recommendations and the programmatic recommendation to 
continue the implementation of information security activities in order 
to fully establish a comprehensive Information Assurance Program. 
However; the FBI takes exception with the GAO's conclusion that the 
collective result of the information security weaknesses identified by 
the GAO present an increased risk to FBI information. The FBI does not 
agree that it has placed sensitive information at an unacceptable risk 
for unauthorized disclosure, modification, or insider threat 
exploitation. In fact, since the Robert Hanssen Espionage Investigation 
and the implementation of the Trilogy modernization effort, the FBI has 
made significant strides in reducing these risks by establishing 
policy, processes and procedures to ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of law enforcement, investigative and 
intelligence information. 

In April 2002, the FBI Security Division established the Information 
Assurance Section (IAS). The mission of the IAS is to protect the FBI's 
digital information through practical, effective, innovative security 
solutions. The IAS acts under the joint authority of the Assistant 
Director Security Division and the FBI CIO and provides in-depth risk 
assessments of the technical, operational and management controls of 
the FBI's information environment. Since its inception, the IAS has 
taken the FBI from an agency wherein only 8% of information systems 
were accredited to maintaining 100. accreditation of its major 
information systems as required by the Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA). In April 2006, after an in-depth evaluation of 
the FBI Certification and Accreditation (C&A) Program, the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) awarded the FBI Director the authority to 
accredit most complex security systems. 

In October 2003, the FBI established an initial monitoring capability 
when the Enterprise Security Operations Center (ESOC) received an 
Interim Authority To Operate (IATU) on the FBI's Top Secret Enclave. In 
October 2004, the ESOC charter to conduct insider threat detection was 
approved by the Director. Additionally, ESOC received a full Approval 
To Operate (ATO) on all three FBI information technology enclaves thus 
expanding its monitoring capabilities and establishing a comprehensive 
vulnerability assessment program. Furthermore the ESOC has established 
sophisticated capabilities to support FBI internal investigations by 
working closely with the Counterintelligence and Criminal Divisions. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to respond to the Report. Should 
you or your staff have questions regarding our response, please feel 
free to contact me or any of my staff. 

Mr. Dean Hall: 
Deputy CIO: 
Office of the Chief Information Officer: 
202- 324-2307: 

Mr. Charles Fred Newberry, Jr. 
Section Chief: 
Information Assurance Section: 
Security Division: 
202-383-9606: 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Zalmal Azmi: 
Information officer: 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Gregory C. Wilshusen, (202) 512-6244 or wilshuseng@gao.gov Keith A. 
Rhodes, (202) 512-6412 or rhodesk@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the persons named above, Edward Alexander Jr., Michael 
Derr, Steve Gosewehr, Jeffrey Knott, Duc Ngo, Eugene Stevens, and 
William Thompson made key contributions to this report. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, High-Risk Series: Information Management and Technology, GAO/ 
HR-97-9 (Washington, D.C.: February 1997). 

[2] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: 
January 2007). 

[3] Title III, E-Government Act of 2002, P.L. 107-347 (Dec. 17, 2002). 

[4] CERT Coordination Center is a center of Internet security expertise 
located at the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded 
research and development center operated by Carnegie Mellon University. 

[5] Certification is the comprehensive evaluation of the management, 
operational, and technical security controls in an information system 
to determine the effectiveness of these controls and identify existing 
vulnerabilities. Accreditation is the official management decision to 
authorize operation of an information system. Authorization explicitly 
accepts the risk remaining after the implementation of an agreed-upon 
set of security controls. 

[6] GAO, Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual, Volume I- 
Financial Statements Audits, GAO/AIMD-12.19.6 (Washington, D.C.: 
January 1999). 

[7] Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-130, Appendix III, 
Security of Federal Automated Information Resources (Nov. 28, 2000). 

[8] FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an 
agencywide information security program to provide information security 
for the information and systems that support the operations and assets 
of the agency, using a risk-based approach to information security 
management. 

[9] In an Interconnection Security Agreement, documenting whenever a 
direct connection is made between two or more information systems that 
are owned and operated by other authorities/organizations, each 
organization is required to provide and update the C&A approval for the 
interface systems. Reciprocal acceptance of these documents is expected 
and any questions or concerns documented and addressed. 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 
newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. 
To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, 
go to www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to Updates." 

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street NW, Room LM 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 TDD: (202) 512-2537 Fax: (202) 
512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 
Washington, D.C. 20548: