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entitled 'Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address 
Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors 
Supporting Deployed Forces' which was released on December 19, 2006. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

December 2006: 

Military Operations: 

High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-standing Problems with 
Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces: 

GAO-07-145: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-145, a report to congressional committees 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Prior GAO reports have identified problems with the Department of 
Defenseís (DOD) management and oversight of contractors supporting 
deployed forces. GAO issued its first comprehensive report examining 
these problems in June 2003. Because of the broad congressional 
interest in U.S. military operations in Iraq and DODís increasing use 
of contractors to support U.S. forces in Iraq, GAO initiated this 
follow-on review under the Comptroller Generalís statutory authority. 
Specifically, GAOís objective was to determine the extent to which DOD 
has improved its management and oversight of contractors supporting 
deployed forces since our 2003 report. GAO reviewed DOD policies and 
interviewed military and contractor officials both at deployed 
locations and in the United States. 

What GAO Found: 

DOD continues to face long-standing problems that hinder its management 
and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. DOD has taken some 
steps to improve its guidance on the use of contractors to support 
deployed forces, addressing some of the problems GAO has raised since 
the mid-1990s. However, while the Office of the Secretary of Defense is 
responsible for monitoring and managing the implementation of this 
guidance, it has not allocated the organizational resources and 
accountability to focus on issues regarding contractor support to 
deployed forces. Also, while DODís new guidance is a noteworthy step, a 
number of problems we have previously reported on continue to pose 
difficulties for military personnel in deployed locations. For example: 

* DOD continues to have limited visibility over contractors because 
information on the number of contractors at deployed locations or the 
services they provide is not aggregated by any organization within DOD 
or its components. As a result, senior leaders and military commanders 
cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which they rely on 
contractors to support their operations. For example, when Multi-
National Force-Iraq began to develop a base consolidation plan, 
officials were unable to determine how many contractors were deployed 
to bases in Iraq. They therefore ran the risk of over-building or under-
building the capacity of the consolidated bases. 

* DOD continues to not have adequate contractor oversight personnel at 
deployed locations, precluding its ability to obtain reasonable 
assurance that contractors are meeting contract requirements 
efficiently and effectively at each location where work is being 
performed. While a lack of adequate contract oversight personnel is a 
DOD-wide problem, lacking adequate personnel in more demanding 
contracting environments in deployed locations presents unique 
difficulties. 

* Despite facing many of the same difficulties managing and overseeing 
contractors in Iraq that it faced in previous military operations, we 
found no organization within DOD or its components responsible for 
developing procedures to systematically collect and share its 
institutional knowledge using contractors to support deployed forces. 
As a result, as new units deploy to Iraq, they run the risk of 
repeating past mistakes and being unable to build on the efficiencies 
others have developed during past operations that involved contractor 
support. 

* Military personnel continue to receive limited or no training on the 
use of contractors as part of their pre-deployment training or 
professional military education. The lack of training hinders the 
ability of military commanders to adequately plan for the use of 
contractor support and inhibits the ability of contract oversight 
personnel to manage and oversee contractors in deployed locations. 
Despite DODís concurrence with our previous recommendations to improve 
such training, we found no standard to ensure information about 
contractor support is incorporated in pre-deployment training. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense appoint a focal point 
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, at a sufficiently senior level and with the 
appropriate resources, dedicated to leading DOD efforts to improve the 
management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces. DOD 
agreed with our recommendation. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-145]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact William M. Solis at (202) 
512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

While DOD Has Made Some Noteworthy Improvements, Long-standing Problems 
Continue to Hinder DOD's Management and Oversight of Contractors at 
Deployed Locations: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Related GAO Products: 

Table: 

Table 1: Key Contract Management Roles and Responsibilities: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Contracts for Select Services in Iraq Are Awarded by Many 
Different DOD Agencies: 

Figure 2: Previous GAO Recommendations Highlighting the Need for Better 
Training on the Use of Contractor Support to Deployed Forces: 

Abbreviations: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

LOGCAP: Logistics Civil Augmentation Program: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

December 18, 2006: 

Congressional Committees: 

The U.S. military has long used contractors to provide supplies and 
services to deployed U.S. forces. However, the scale of contractor 
support the Department of Defense (DOD) relies on today in locations 
such as Iraq and elsewhere throughout Southwest Asia has increased 
considerably from what DOD relied on during previous military 
operations, such as Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and in the 
Balkans. Moreover, DOD's reliance on contractors continues to grow. The 
Army alone estimates that almost 60,000 contractor employees currently 
support ongoing military operations in Southwest Asia. By way of 
contrast, an estimated 9,200 contractor personnel supported military 
operations in the 1991 Gulf War.[Footnote 1] Similarly, the spending on 
contractors supporting deployed forces is significant. For example, 
spending on DOD's single largest contract supporting U.S. forces in 
Southwest Asia--the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP)--was about $15.4 billion between 2001 and 2004.[Footnote 2] 
Today, contractors provide deployed U.S. forces with communication 
services; interpreters who accompany military patrols; base operations 
support (e.g., food and housing); weapons systems maintenance; 
intelligence analysis; and a variety of other support. Many of these 
contractors live and work side by side with their military counterparts 
and share many of the same risks and hardships. 

Since 1997, we have reported on DOD's management and training 
shortcomings related to its use of contractor support to deployed 
forces.[Footnote 3] In June 2003, we issued our first comprehensive 
review of DOD's management and oversight of contractor support to 
deployed forces, focusing our efforts in the Balkans and Southwest 
Asia.[Footnote 4] We reported that (1) DOD used contractors for a wide 
range of services; (2) DOD and the services had not identified 
essential services provided by contractors or developed backup plans 
for those services; and (3) guidance and contract language and 
oversight varied within DOD and the services, creating challenges that 
might hinder the efficient use of contractors. We made several 
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to improve DOD's guidance, 
training, and contractor visibility at all levels of command, 
recommendations that DOD broadly agreed with. Moreover, we have 
established that clear policies, procedures, criteria, and management 
oversight are needed to help agencies use resources effectively and 
efficiently to meet organizational and program objectives.[Footnote 5] 
However, our audit work on related subjects since 2003 indicated that 
DOD continued to face difficulties regarding its use of contractors to 
support deployed forces. 

Because of continued congressional interest in DOD's use of contractors 
to support deployed forces, we prepared this report under the 
Comptroller General's statutory authority to conduct evaluations on his 
own initiative. Specifically, our objective was to determine the extent 
to which DOD has improved its management and oversight of contractors 
supporting deployed forces since our last comprehensive review of this 
issue in 2003. We focused our efforts in Iraq and elsewhere in 
Southwest Asia. 

To address our objective, we met with and obtained documentation from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and service 
headquarters officials to review changes to key DOD and service 
guidance and obtain a comprehensive understanding of their efforts in 
addressing the issues raised in our 2003 report. We visited select DOD 
components based on their responsibilities for contract management, 
such as the Defense Contract Management Agency, and various service 
commands in the United States, including the Army Materiel Command, to 
discuss their roles in managing and overseeing contractors in deployed 
locations. We also interviewed staff officers from six combat units 
that had been deployed to Iraq between 2003 and 2006 to discuss their 
experiences with contractors at deployed locations. We traveled to Iraq 
and Kuwait to meet with deployed combat units, installation commanders, 
headquarters personnel, and other military personnel responsible for 
contracting and contract management at deployed locations. In addition, 
we met with 26 U.S. and foreign contractors providing a variety of 
services to DOD at deployed locations to discuss their perspectives on 
contracting and contract management issues. We conducted our review 
from August 2005 through October 2006 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Details on our scope and 
methodology are contained in appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

Although DOD has taken action to improve its guidance on the use of 
contractors to support deployed forces since our 2003 report, a number 
of long-standing problems continue to hinder DOD's management and 
oversight of contractors at deployed locations. Steps DOD has taken 
include amending its acquisition regulations to add standardized 
deployment language for contracts that may require contractors to 
accompany U.S. forces deployed outside the United States and, in 
October 2005, issuing the first DOD-wide instruction on the use of 
contractors to support deployed forces, which addresses some of the 
problems we have previously raised. However, we have concerns that DOD 
components are not implementing this instruction. For example, while 
the instruction assigns responsibility for monitoring and managing its 
implementation to the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, there is no focal point within 
this office responsible for issues regarding contractor support to 
deployed forces. According to officials within the office, given the 
multiple issues they are responsible for, implementing the instruction 
or taking other steps to improve DOD's management and oversight of 
contractors supporting deployed forces is a lower priority. Ultimately, 
while DOD's new guidance is a good first step towards improving the 
department's management and oversight of contractors, the department 
continues to face problems, including: 

* Limited visibility over contractors and contractor activity: While 
DOD policy since 1990 has recognized the importance of having 
visibility over the number of contractors providing essential services 
to U.S. forces and the services they provide, DOD continues to lack the 
capability to provide senior leaders and military commanders with 
information on the totality of contractor support to deployed forces. 
Having this information is important in order for military commanders 
to incorporate contractor support into their planning efforts. For 
example, senior military commanders in Iraq told us that when they 
began to develop a base consolidation plan for Iraq they had no source 
to draw upon to determine how many contractor employees were located on 
each installation. As a result, they ran the risk of overbuilding or 
underbuilding the capacity of the consolidated bases. Similarly, 
commanders need visibility over the number of contractor employees 
residing on an installation in order to make informed decisions 
regarding base operations support (e.g., food and housing) and force 
protection. Having limited visibility can also unnecessarily increase 
contracting costs to the government. For example, according to an Army 
Materiel Command official, the Army estimates that because of their 
limited visibility over contractors at deployed locations and the 
government services they are entitled to, about $43 million is lost 
every year on free meals being provided to contractor employees who are 
also receiving a per diem allowance for food. DOD's October 2005 
instruction requires the department to maintain by-name accountability 
of contractors deploying with the force. The Army has taken steps to 
develop a database that could provide this accountability for all DOD 
components and help military commanders incorporate contractor support 
into their planning efforts. However, at the time of our review, this 
database was still in development, and officials involved with this 
effort told us that greater involvement by the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, which is responsible for designating a database to provide 
this accountability, will be needed to direct all DOD components to use 
this database and resolve some additional institutional obstacles. 

* Lack of adequate contract oversight personnel: Although having the 
right people with the right skills to oversee contractor performance is 
critical to ensure the efficient and effective use of contractors, most 
contract oversight personnel we met with told us DOD does not have 
adequate personnel at deployed locations. Having too few contract 
oversight personnel precludes DOD from being able to obtain reasonable 
assurance that contractors are meeting their contract requirements at 
every location where the work is being performed. For example, a 
Defense Contract Management Agency official responsible for overseeing 
portions of the Army's LOGCAP contract at 27 installations in Iraq told 
us he was unable to visit all of these locations during his 6-month 
tour in Iraq. As a result, he could not effectively monitor the 
contractor's performance at those sites. As we have previously 
reported, when contract oversight personnel are able to review the 
types and levels of services provided by contractors for both economy 
and efficiency, savings can be realized. Without adequate contract 
oversight personnel, DOD is at risk of being unable to identify and 
correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner. Prior GAO 
reports make clear that having too few contract oversight personnel is 
a DOD-wide problem affecting the department's management and oversight 
of contractors both in the United States and at deployed locations. 
However, the more demanding contracting environment at deployed 
locations creates unique difficulties for contract oversight personnel. 

* Limited collection and sharing of institutional knowledge: DOD has 
made few efforts to leverage its institutional knowledge and 
experiences using contractors to support deployed forces, despite 
facing many of the same difficulties managing contractors in Iraq that 
it faced in previous military operations. As early as 1997, we 
recommended that DOD incorporate lessons learned from previous and 
ongoing operations into its planning and preparation for the use of 
contractor support to deployed forces. However, we found no 
organization within DOD or its components responsible for developing 
procedures to capture lessons learned on the use of contractor support 
at deployed locations. Our review of lessons learned that were 
collected by DOD components, as well as discussions with DOD officials 
and military units deployed to Iraq, found that lessons learned on the 
use of contractor support at deployed locations were not routinely 
gathered and shared. For example, we found that a guidebook on the use 
of a logistical support contract almost identical to LOGCAP, which was 
developed by U.S. Army, Europe for the Balkans, was not made available 
to military commanders in Iraq until 2006. As a result, commanders in 
Iraq were unable to take advantage of an important tool to increase 
their familiarity with LOGCAP and build on efficiencies the Army had 
previously identified. 

* Limited or no information on contractor support in pre-deployment 
training: We have pointed out the need for better pre-deployment 
training of military commanders and contract oversight personnel on the 
use of contractor support in several of our earlier reports, and DOD 
has agreed with our recommendations addressing this need. However, we 
found little evidence that improvements have been made to include more 
information on the use of contractors in pre-deployment training. 
Several military commanders told us they were unaware of the types of 
services they would be relying on until after they deployed to Iraq. As 
a result, they were unable to adequately plan for the use of contractor 
support. Similarly, several commanders of combat units told us that 
their pre-deployment training did provide them with information on the 
extent to which they would have to provide personnel to escort 
contractor personnel. As a result, these commanders could not 
incorporate this requirement into their planning efforts and were 
surprised by the substantial portion of their personnel they were 
required to allocate as escorts; personnel they had expected to be 
available to perform other functions. Limited or no pre-deployment 
training on the use of contractor support can also lead to confusion 
regarding roles and responsibilities military commanders have in 
overseeing contractors at a deployed location. We found several 
instances where military commanders attempted to direct or ran the risk 
of directing a contractor to perform work outside the scope of the 
contract, despite the fact commanders are not authorized to do so, 
which can result in increased costs to the government. In addition, 
limited or no information on the use of contractors in pre-deployment 
training can inhibit the ability of contract oversight personnel to 
execute their responsibilities. For example, the contracting officer's 
representative for a linguist support contract told us his pre- 
deployment training did not adequately prepare him for his 
responsibilities to review invoices submitted by the contractor. We 
found no DOD or service guidance, policy, or doctrine establishing 
standards to ensure that military units incorporate information about 
contractor support to deployed forces in their pre-deployment training. 
Nevertheless, several officials told us that DOD and its components 
need to include information on contractor support into their pre- 
deployment training, including mission rehearsal exercises, and that 
the use of contractors at deployed locations should also be integrated 
into professional military education. 

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense appoint a focal point 
within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, at a sufficiently senior level and with the 
appropriate resources, dedicated to leading DOD's efforts to improve 
contract management and oversight at deployed locations. The entity 
that functions as this focal point would be responsible for, among 
other things, improving visibility over contractor support at deployed 
locations and developing standards to improve the pre-deployment 
training of military commanders and contract oversight personnel on 
issues related to contractor support to deployed forces. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 
recommendation. DOD stated in their comments that they had created the 
office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program 
Support) on October 1, 2006 to serve as the office of primary 
responsibility for issues related to contractor support. However, it is 
not clear that this office would serve as the focal point dedicated to 
leading DOD's efforts to improve contract management and oversight. DOD 
also provided several technical comments that we considered and 
incorporated where appropriate. 

Background: 

Since the early 1990s, DOD has increasingly relied on contractors to 
meet many of its logistical and operational support needs during combat 
operations, peacekeeping missions, and humanitarian assistance 
missions, ranging from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and 
operations in the Balkans (e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo) to Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Factors that have contributed to this increase include reductions 
in the size of the military, an increase in the number of operations 
and missions undertaken, and DOD's use of increasingly sophisticated 
weapons systems. Depending on the service being provided by 
contractors, contractor employees may be U.S. citizens, host country 
nationals,[Footnote 6] or third country nationals.[Footnote 7] 
Contracts supporting weapons systems, for example, often restrict 
employment to U.S. citizens, while contracts providing base operations 
support frequently employ host country or third country nationals. 

Contracts supporting deployed forces typically fall into three broad 
categories--theater support, external support, and systems support. 
Theater support contracts are normally awarded by contracting agencies 
associated with the regional combatant command, for example, the U.S. 
Central Command or service component commands, such as the U.S. Army 
Central Command, or by contracting offices at deployed locations such 
as in Iraq. Contracts can be for recurring services--such as equipment 
rental or repair, minor construction, security, and intelligence 
services--or for the one-time delivery of goods and services at the 
deployed location. External support contracts are awarded by commands 
external to the combatant command or component commands, such as the 
Defense Logistics Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Under 
external support contracts, contractors are generally expected to 
provide services at the deployed location. LOGCAP is an example of an 
external support contract. Finally, systems support contracts provide 
logistics support to maintain and operate weapons and other systems. 
These types of contracts are most often awarded by the commands 
responsible for building and buying the weapons or other systems. 

The individual services and a wide array of DOD and non-DOD agencies 
can award contracts to support deployed forces.[Footnote 8] Within a 
service or agency, numerous contracting officers, with varying degrees 
of knowledge about how contractors and the military operate in deployed 
locations, can award contracts that support deployed forces. According 
to DOD estimates, in 2005 several hundred contractor firms provided 
U.S. forces with a wide range of services at deployed locations. Figure 
1 illustrates the broad array of contractor services being provided in 
Iraq and the DOD agency that awarded each contract. 

Figure 1: Contracts for Select Services in Iraq Are Awarded by Many 
Different DOD Agencies: 

[See PDF for image] 

Sources: GAO and Map Resources. 

[End of figure] 

The customer (e.g., a military unit) for these contractor-provided 
services is responsible for identifying and validating requirements to 
be addressed by the contractor as well as evaluating the contractor's 
performance and ensuring that contractor-provided services are used in 
an economical and efficient manner. In addition, DOD has established 
specific policies on how contracts, including those that support 
deployed forces, should be administered and managed. Oversight of 
contracts ultimately rests with the contracting officer who has the 
responsibility for ensuring that contractors meet the requirements set 
forth in the contract. However, most contracting officers are not 
located at the deployed location. As a result, contracting officers 
appoint contract oversight personnel who represent the contracting 
officer at the deployed location and are responsible for monitoring 
contractor performance. How contracts and contractors are monitored at 
a deployed location is largely a function of the size and scope of the 
contract. Contracting officers for large-scale and high-value contracts 
such as LOGCAP have opted to have personnel from the Defense Contract 
Management Agency monitor a contractor's performance and management 
systems to ensure that the cost, product performance, and delivery 
schedules comply with the terms and conditions of the contract. Defense 
Contract Management Agency officials delegate daily oversight 
responsibilities to individuals drawn from units receiving support from 
these contractors to act as contracting officer's representatives for 
specific services being provided. For smaller contracts, contracting 
officers usually directly appoint contracting officer's representatives 
or contracting officer's technical representatives to monitor 
contractor performance at the deployed location. These individuals are 
typically drawn from units receiving contractor- provided services, are 
not normally contracting specialists, and serve as contract monitors as 
an additional duty. They cannot direct the contractor by making 
commitments or changes that affect price, quality, quantity, delivery, 
or other terms and conditions of the contract. Instead, they act as the 
eyes and ears of the contracting officer and serve as the liaison 
between the contractor and the contracting officer. Table 1 provides 
additional information on the contract management roles and 
responsibilities of key DOD personnel. 

Table 1: Key Contract Management Roles and Responsibilities: 

Contracting officer: 
* Interpret the contract; 
* Obligate the government for work under the contract; 
* Delegate contract management responsibilities to deployed personnel 
who monitor contractor performance; 
* Ensure that the contractor corrects cited deficiencies. 

Contracting officer's representative: 
* Provide daily contract oversight; 
* Evaluate quality assurance; 
* Monitor contract performance; 
* Evaluate technical performance. 

Customers: 
* Develop requirements; 
* Write statements of work; 
* Obtain funding; 
* Provide contracting officer's representatives to monitor contract 
performance. 

Defense contract management agency: 
* Appoint contracting officer's representatives for LOGCAP; 
* Review and approve purchase requisitions; 
* Monitor government property; 
* Evaluate quality assurance; 
* Monitor contract performance; 
* Evaluate technical performance. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

While DOD Has Made Some Noteworthy Improvements, Long-standing Problems 
Continue to Hinder DOD's Management and Oversight of Contractors at 
Deployed Locations: 

A number of long-standing problems continue to hinder DOD's management 
and oversight of contractors at deployed locations. Although DOD has 
issued departmentwide guidance on the use of contractors to support 
deployed forces and some DOD components have taken some actions to 
improve management and oversight of contractors, there is no DOD-wide 
effort in place to resolve these long-standing problems. These problems 
include a lack of visibility over the totality of contractor support at 
deployed locations; a lack of adequate contract oversight personnel; 
the failure to collect and share institutional knowledge on the use of 
contractors at deployed locations; and limited or no training of 
military personnel on the use of contractors as part of their pre- 
deployment training or professional military education. 

DOD Has Taken Some Noteworthy Steps to Improve Its Policy and Guidance 
on the Use of Contractors to Support Deployed Forces, but Lack of High- 
Level Action Hinders Implementation: 

In June 2003, we recommended that DOD take steps to improve its 
guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed U.S. forces. Our 
report noted the lack of standardized deployment language in contracts 
that support or may support deployed U.S. forces. Since then, in June 
2005, DOD amended its acquisition regulations, the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement, by providing DOD-wide policy and a 
contract clause to address situations that may require contractors to 
accompany U.S. forces deployed outside the United States. Our 2003 
report also noted a lack of DOD-wide guidance regarding DOD's use of 
and responsibilities to contractors supporting deployed forces. Since 
then, DOD has taken steps to improve its guidance by issuing the first 
DOD-wide instruction on contractor support to deployed forces.[Footnote 
9] Specifically, in October 2005, DOD issued DOD Instruction 3020.41, 
entitled Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed 
Forces, which states, among other things, that it is DOD policy to: 

* coordinate any proposed contractor logistic support arrangements that 
may affect Combatant Commanders' operational plans and operations 
orders with the affected geographic Combatant Commands, 

* ensure contracts clearly and accurately specify the terms and 
conditions under which the contractor is to perform and describe the 
specific support relationship between the contractor and DOD, and: 

* maintain by-name accountability of contractors deploying with the 
force and contract capability information in a joint database.[Footnote 
10] 

DOD Instruction 3020.41 provides guidance on a wide range of contractor 
support issues. For example, the instruction provides guidance on when 
contractors can be used to provide security for DOD assets, when 
medical support can be provided to contractors, and commanders' 
responsibilities for providing force protection and security to 
contractors. In addition, the instruction references a number of 
existing policies and guidance that may affect DOD's responsibilities 
to contractors supporting U.S. forces at a deployed location. However, 
the instruction does not address a number of problems we have raised in 
previous reports. For example, although the instruction addresses the 
need for visibility over contractors, it does not address the need to 
provide adequate contract oversight personnel, to collect and share 
institutional knowledge on the use of contractors at deployed 
locations, or to provide pre-deployment training on the use of 
contractor support. 

While issuance of DOD Instruction 3020.41 represents a noteworthy 
improvement to DOD's guidance on the use of contractor support to 
deployed forces, we found little evidence that DOD components are 
implementing the guidance. Moreover, Congress has concerns over 
implementation of the instruction as evidenced by a provision in the 
Conference Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2007 requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit to 
Congress a report on the department's efforts to implement the 
instruction.[Footnote 11] DOD Instruction 3020.41 assigns 
responsibility for monitoring and managing the implementation of the 
instruction to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 
Materiel Readiness (within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). However, the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness is 
responsible for several policy areas including supply chain management 
and transportation policy. A number of assistant deputy under 
secretaries serve as functional experts responsible for these areas. 
For example, the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Transportation Policy) serves as the principal advisor for 
establishing policies and providing guidance to DOD components for 
efficient and effective use of DOD and commercial transportation 
resources. However, no similar individual is responsible primarily for 
issues regarding contractor support to deployed forces, including 
implementation of the instruction. According to senior officials within 
the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 
Material Readiness, given the multiple issues the office is responsible 
for, addressing contractor support to deployed forces issues is a lower 
priority. 

Consequently, at the time of our review we found that few measures had 
been taken by the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Material Readiness to ensure that DOD components were 
complying with DOD Instruction 3020.41. For example, a senior official 
with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence told 
us that the office was not aware of its responsibility under the 
instruction to develop and implement, as required, procedures for 
counterintelligence and security screenings of contractors, until our 
inquiry regarding their compliance with that requirement. Similarly, a 
senior Joint Staff official involved in the issuance of DOD Instruction 
3020.41 expressed concerns that only some of the senior officials who 
needed to know about the instruction had been made aware that it was 
issued. 

Instead, we found that working groups of subject matter experts within 
the Joint Staff and the services have begun to address the 
instruction's requirements. For example, in May 2006 a working group 
began to draft a new joint publication that provides guidance on 
meeting the requirements of DOD Instruction 3020.41, as well as 
addresses other contractor support issues. As another example, 
beginning in April 2006 the Joint Staff Directorate of Logistics 
organized a joint contingency contract management working group 
consisting of representatives from each of the military services, the 
Joint Staff, and various DOD components that meets periodically to 
discuss issues related to implementing the instruction's requirement to 
maintain by-name accountability of contractor personnel supporting 
deployed forces. However, joint contingency contract management working 
group officials told us they have no formal charter designating their 
responsibilities and that they therefore lack the authority to direct 
DOD components to implement the instruction's requirements. 

Working group officials told us they are limited in how much they can 
accomplish without more direct involvement by senior officials within 
the Joint Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. For example, they told us that 
they will likely need someone at the general officer level to act as an 
advocate for their ongoing efforts to implement the instruction's 
requirements and address other contractor support issues. Moreover, a 
number of senior officials, including a general officer responsible for 
logistics for Multi-National Force-Iraq and a senior official from the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics, told us that a focused effort within the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense is needed to coordinate efforts to improve DOD's 
management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed forces. 

We have previously reported on the benefits of establishing a single 
point of focus at a sufficiently senior level to coordinate and 
integrate various DOD efforts to address concerns with antiterrorism 
and the transformation of military capabilities.[Footnote 12] For 
example, DOD recognized the need for a single DOD entity to implement 
and improve the department's antiterrorism guidance. In 1996, following 
the Khobar Towers bombing, the Downing task force investigated the 
incident and made recommendations on how to prevent or minimize the 
damage of future attacks. One of the central conclusions of the Downing 
task force was that DOD needed a stronger centralized approach to 
antiterrorism. To implement this approach, the task force said, a 
single DOD entity should be designated as responsible for 
antiterrorism. Further, this entity, among other things, should develop 
and issue physical security standards, inspect compliance with these 
standards, manage resources on both a routine and emergency basis, and 
assist field commanders with antiterrorism matters. The task force 
found in its review that the lack of a single DOD entity responsible 
for antiterrorism had had an adverse impact on the posture of forces in 
the field. In response to the task force's recommendation, the 
Secretary of Defense established an office within the Joint Staff to 
act as the focal point for antiterrorism. Among other things, this 
office has: 

* improved antiterrorism guidance, 

* established antiterrorism training standards for all levels of 
command, and: 

* instituted outreach programs to collect and distribute antiterrorism 
lessons learned. 

Limited Visibility over All Contractor Support Continues to Hinder 
DOD's Management and Oversight of Contractors at Deployed Locations: 

Although DOD has long recognized the importance of having visibility 
over all contractor support at deployed locations, the department 
continues to be able to provide senior leaders and military commanders 
with only limited visibility over those contractors. This limited 
visibility continues to hinder the management and oversight of 
contractors in deployed locations, including Iraq. In the absence of 
DOD-wide efforts to address these issues, some DOD components at 
deployed locations and in the United States have taken their own steps 
to improve visibility. 

DOD Continues to be Unable to Provide Military Commanders at Deployed 
Locations and Senior Leaders with Visibility over All Contractor 
Support: 

DOD continues to lack the ability to provide military commanders and 
senior leaders with visibility over all contractor support at deployed 
locations, including the range of services being provided to U.S. 
forces and the number of contractor personnel at deployed locations. 
Although most of the contract oversight personnel we met with had 
visibility over the individual contracts for which they were directly 
responsible, including the number and location of contractor personnel, 
this information was not aggregated by DOD and was not provided to 
commanders at higher levels. Many officials responsible for managing 
and overseeing contractors that support deployed forces at various 
levels of command in Iraq told us there was no office, database, or 
other source that could provide them consolidated information on all 
contractor support at a deployed location. The following are examples 
of what commanders in Iraq told us: 

* senior commanders within Multi-National Force-Iraq and Multi-National 
Corps-Iraq[Footnote 13] told us they had no source to go to that could 
provide them with a comprehensive summary of contractor services 
currently being provided U.S. forces in Iraq; 

* the base commander of Logistical Support Area Anaconda, a major 
logistics hub in Iraq with about 10,000 contractor personnel, told us 
he only had limited visibility of the number of contractors at his 
installation and the support they were providing; and: 

* a battalion commander from a Stryker brigade told us he was unable to 
determine the number of contractor-provided interpreters available to 
support his unit. 

Moreover, we found that major commands and higher headquarters do not 
maintain a source of information that could provide improved visibility 
over all contractors at deployed locations, as illustrated by the 
following examples: 

* the Army Materiel Command and Air Force Materiel Command were unable 
to readily provide us with comprehensive information on the number of 
contractors they were using at deployed locations or the services those 
contractors were providing to U.S. forces, 

* contracting officials at U.S. Central Command told us that they do 
not maintain centralized information on the contractor support within 
their area of operation, and: 

* Air Force headquarters officials determined the Air Force had about 
500 civilians deployed to Iraq but could not readily identify how many 
of these individuals were contractor personnel as opposed to DOD 
civilians. 

DOD has long recognized the importance of providing visibility over 
contractors supporting deployed forces. As discussed in our 2003 
report, DOD has required since 1990 that DOD components maintain 
visibility over contractors providing essential services to U.S. forces 
and the services they provide. However, in 2003 we reported that DOD 
components were not meeting this requirement and that they lacked 
visibility over all contractor support to forces deployed to the 
Balkans and Southwest Asia. Further, a 2004 Joint Staff review of 
contract management at deployed locations found commanders continued to 
have insufficient visibility over contractors operating in deployed 
locations and recommended that DOD provide the combatant commander the 
capability to maintain visibility over contractor personnel and 
contract capabilities. In addition, DOD has been unable to provide 
Congress with information on the totality of contractor support in 
Iraq, including numbers of contractors and the costs of the services 
they provide. 

Limited Visibility Continues to Hinder DOD's Management and Oversight 
of Contractors in Iraq: 

Limited visibility over contractor support poses a variety of problems 
for military commanders and senior leaders responsible for contract 
management and oversight in deployed locations such as Iraq. With 
limited visibility over contractors, military commanders and other 
senior leaders cannot develop a complete picture of the extent to which 
they rely on contractors as an asset to support their operations. 
Further, they cannot build this reliance on contractors into their 
assessments of risks associated with the potential loss of essential 
services provided by contractors, an issue we discussed extensively in 
our 2003 report. 

We spoke with several senior military leaders in Iraq who told us their 
lack of visibility over contractor support in Iraq hindered their 
ability to incorporate contractors into their planning efforts. For 
example, a general officer responsible for logistics for Multi-National 
Force-Iraq told us that acquiring visibility over all contractor 
support in Iraq was a top priority because Multi-National Force-Iraq 
did not have the information needed to include the presence of 
contractors in its planning activities. A number of Multi-National 
Force-Iraq officials told us that when they began to develop plans to 
consolidate forward operating bases in Iraq, they discovered that while 
they could determine the number and type of military units on those 
bases, they had no means of obtaining similar information about 
contractors, including the number of contractor personnel on each base 
and the support the military was providing them. According to a senior 
Multi-National Force-Iraq official, without this information, Multi- 
National Force-Iraq ran the risk of overbuilding or underbuilding the 
capacity of the consolidated bases to accommodate the number of 
individuals expected to be stationed there. Because Multi-National 
Force-Iraq lacked a source to draw upon for information regarding the 
extent of contractor support in Iraq, Multi-National Force-Iraq issued 
a fragmentary order[Footnote 14] in April 2006 to base commanders in 
Iraq to conduct a census of contractors residing on the installations. 
However, at the time of our review, this effort had only yielded 
partial results which an Army official familiar with the census effort 
told us would not meet the initial goals of the fragmentary order. 

Limited visibility over contractors and the services they provide at a 
deployed location can also hinder military commanders' abilities to 
fully understand the impact that their decisions can have on their 
installations. For example, when commanders make decisions to restrict 
access of host country nationals to an installation, this can result in 
the loss of some contractor-provided services, such as construction or 
the delivery of supplies that may be dependent upon the use of host 
country nationals. Similarly, one of the more frequent concerns 
contractors in Kuwait and Iraq related to us was the impact that base 
commanders' decisions to change policies regarding badging requirements 
and other base access procedures had on their ability to provide 
services to those bases.[Footnote 15] 

Decisions affecting such functions as force protection and base 
operations support also rely on commanders having an accurate picture 
of the contractor assets they have in their area of operations and an 
understanding of the number of contractor personnel they have to 
support. As we reported in 2003, military commanders require visibility 
over contractor support at deployed locations because they are 
responsible for all the people in their area of operations, including 
contractor personnel. Given the security situation in Iraq, knowledge 
of who is on their installation helps commanders account for all 
individuals in the event of a mortar attack or other hostile action. 
For example, Army officials assisting the movement of contractors into 
and out of Iraq described to us the difficulties DOD faced determining 
the identity of a contractor who was taken hostage and then killed by 
the insurgency in Iraq. We also met with several military commanders 
who told us that a lack of visibility over contractors on their 
installations complicated their efforts to provide contractors with 
support such as food and housing. Several officials told us they 
regularly had contractor personnel unexpectedly show up in Iraq and 
request support, but were unable to verify what DOD-provided support 
those contractor personnel were entitled to. As a result, DOD and its 
components may be providing unauthorized support to contractors. For 
example, at one of the joint contingency contract management working 
group sessions GAO attended, an Army Materiel Command official noted 
that the Army estimates that it loses about $43 million every year 
providing free meals to contractor employees who are also receiving a 
per diem allowance for food. 

Some Steps Have Been Taken to Address the Issue of Visibility: 

In spite of DOD's continued lack of capability to provide commanders 
with the information they need regarding the extent of contractor 
support at a deployed location, we found that some steps have been 
taken to provide commanders with improved visibility over the contracts 
they were directly responsible for. For example: 

* In early 2006, the commanding general of Multi-National Force-Iraq 
ordered his major subordinate commands in Iraq to provide a head count 
of non-DOD civilians on their installations, including contractor 
personnel for contracts exceeding $5 million per year. The information, 
captured in a database managed by Multi-National Force-Iraq, was needed 
to provide the general with a current count of all tenant organizations 
operating from the various forward operating bases in Iraq. 

* Multi-National Corps-Iraq started a similar effort in February 2006 
to provide the commanding general with detailed contract management 
information on recurring services contracts such as for the maintenance 
of certain aircraft, communications support, and power generation. 

* Also in 2006, the corps support command at Logistical Support Area 
Anaconda created a database to track recurring services contracts that 
support the installation. 

While these individual efforts improved visibility over a specific set 
of contractors, we found that no organization within DOD or its 
components has attempted to consolidate these individual sources of 
information that could help improve its visibility over all contractor 
support in Iraq. Several DOD officials in Iraq familiar with the 
individual efforts described above told us that while a number of 
databases have been created to capture information on contractors in 
theater, the information is not aggregated at a higher level because no 
one is responsible for consolidating this information. In most cases, 
these efforts were initiated by individual commanders and there is no 
assurance that they would continue when new units with new commanders 
deployed to replace them in the future. 

Individual contractors we spoke with had excellent visibility over the 
number and location of their employees at specific deployed locations. 
For example, the contractors could readily provide us with information 
on the number of employees they had in Iraq in support of deployed U.S. 
forces and the specific installation to which those contractors were 
deployed. This information was typically reported on a daily or weekly 
basis from the contractor in Iraq to their corporate headquarters in 
the United States or elsewhere, as well as to the U.S. government 
agency that had awarded the contract. However, we found this 
information was not centrally collected. As discussed previously, there 
are several hundred contractor firms that support deployed forces, 
including in Iraq, and contracts are awarded by numerous contracting 
offices both within DOD and from other U.S. government agencies. With 
such a large and diverse pool of contractors at deployed locations, it 
is impractical for individual commanders to obtain this information 
from contractors on their own. For example, several military officials 
involved in efforts to improve visibility over contractors in Iraq told 
us that while they were generally able to obtain information from 
contractors with large numbers of employees, such as the LOGCAP 
contractor, it was extremely difficult to identify as well as collect 
information from all the numerous smaller contractors, who sometimes 
consisted of only one or two individuals. 

As discussed above, in October 2005 DOD issued DOD Instruction 3020.41, 
which included a requirement that DOD develop or designate a joint 
database to maintain by-name accountability of contractors deploying 
with the force and a summary of the services or capabilities they 
provide. Currently, no such DOD-wide database exists. However, Army 
Materiel Command and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology have taken the initiative to 
develop a database that could provide improved visibility over all 
contractors supporting U.S. forces in deployed locations and enable 
military commanders to incorporate contractor support into their 
planning efforts.[Footnote 16] According to Army officials, this 
database is intended to collect information not only on the overall 
number of contractors supporting forces in a deployed location but also 
on the organization or system they are supporting and other contract 
information that could be used by commanders to better manage 
contractors at deployed locations. The Army's goal is to require that 
all contractors supporting deployed forces use this database, and in 
turn, create the central source of information to provide commanders 
with visibility over all contractor support at deployed locations. 
However, as of the time of our review, the Army was still in the 
process of implementing the database, and it is uncertain when the 
process will be completed. For example, we found that only a few 
contractors were using the database, and Army officials acknowledged it 
does not currently capture all contractors providing support at 
deployed locations. According to Army and Joint Staff officials 
familiar with these efforts, it is likely that DOD will designate this 
database as the joint database for contractor visibility as required by 
DOD Instruction 3020.41. However, a number of issues must first be 
resolved. For example, efforts are still underway to get all the 
services to agree to enter their data into this database. Further, 
there is disagreement within the Army staff regarding whether the 
Deputy Chief of Staff responsible for logistics or personnel has 
responsibility for the contractor visibility database. Several 
officials we met with who are involved with these efforts told us that 
while the Army Materiel Command has made significant progress in 
developing the database, ultimate resolution of these issues will 
require action by the Office of the Secretary of Defense because the 
Army Materiel Command lacks the necessary directive authority to 
resolve them on its own. 

DOD Still Does Not Have Adequate Contract Oversight Personnel in Place 
to Oversee and Manage Contractors Supporting U.S. Forces in Deployed 
Locations: 

Having the right people with the right skills to oversee contractor 
performance is critical to ensuring that DOD receives the best value 
for the billions of dollars spent each year on contractor-provided 
services supporting forces deployed to Iraq and elsewhere. However, 
inadequate numbers of personnel to oversee and manage contracts that 
support deployed U.S. forces is another long-standing problem that 
continues to hinder DOD's management and oversight of contractors in 
Iraq. In 2004, we reported that DOD did not always have enough contract 
oversight personnel in place to manage and oversee its logistics 
support contracts such as LOGCAP. In addition, in 2005 we reported in 
our High-Risk Series that inadequate staffing contributed to contract 
management challenges in Iraq.[Footnote 17] While we could find no DOD 
guidelines on the appropriate number of personnel needed to oversee and 
manage DOD contracts at a deployed location, several contract oversight 
personnel told us DOD does not have adequate personnel at deployed 
locations to effectively oversee and manage contractors, as illustrated 
by the following examples: 

* An Army Contracting Agency official told us that due to a downsizing 
of its overall contracting force and the need to balance that force 
among multiple competing needs, the Army is struggling to find the 
capacity and expertise to provide the contracting support needed in 
Iraq. 

* An official with the LOGCAP Program Office told us that, as the 
United States was preparing to commence Operation Iraqi Freedom in 
2003, the office did not prepare to hire additional budget analysts and 
legal personnel in anticipation of an increased use of LOGCAP services. 
According to the official, had adequate staffing been in place early 
on, the Army could have realized substantial savings through more 
effective reviews of the increasing volume of LOGCAP requirements. 

* Officials responsible for contracting with Multi-National Force-Iraq 
told us they did not have enough contract oversight personnel and 
quality assurance representatives to allow Multi-National Force-Iraq to 
award more sustainment contracts for base operations support in Iraq. 

* The contracting officer's representative for a contract providing 
linguist support in Iraq told us that he had only one part-time 
assistant, limiting his ability to manage and oversee the contractor 
personnel for whom he was responsible. As he observed, he had a 
battalion's worth of people with a battalion's worth of problems but 
lacked the equivalent of a battalion's staff to deal with those 
problems. 

We also found a number of organizational and personnel policies of 
various DOD agencies responsible for contract management and oversight 
contributed to inadequate numbers of personnel to oversee and manage 
contracts that support deployed forces. The following are some 
examples: 

* A 2004 Joint Staff review of the Defense Contract Management Agency's 
responsiveness and readiness to support deployed forces in the event of 
war found that the agency had not programmed adequate resources to 
support current and future contingency contract requirements, 
compromising its readiness to execute its mission. The review further 
found that Defense Contract Management Agency manpower shortages were 
aggravated by internal policies that limit the availability of 
personnel to execute those missions. 

* During its 2003 deployment to Iraq, a unit with the 4th Infantry 
Division reported that the divisional contracting structure did not 
adequately support the large volume of transactions that were needed in 
an austere environment. For example, the unit reported problems with 
the quality of services provided by host country nationals, which were 
exacerbated by a lack of contracting officer's representatives to 
properly oversee the performance of contracting terms. 

* An official with the Army Contracting Agency, Southwest Asia told us 
that as of January 2006 the agency had only 18 of the 33 staff it was 
authorized and that this number of personnel was not enough to support 
the agency's mission. In contrast, he told us that other commands, such 
as Army Contracting Agency, Korea, were authorized more than 130 staff 
even though they were responsible for significantly fewer obligated 
funds. 

Without adequate contract oversight personnel in place to monitor its 
many contracts in deployed locations such as Iraq, DOD may not be able 
to obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are meeting their 
contract requirements efficiently and effectively at each location. For 
example, a Defense Contract Management Agency official responsible for 
overseeing the LOGCAP contractor's performance at 27 installations in 
Iraq told us he was unable to personally visit all 27 locations himself 
during his 6-month tour in Iraq. As a result, he was unable to 
determine the extent to which the contractor was meeting the contract's 
requirements at each of those 27 sites. Moreover, he only had one 
quality assurance representative to assist him. The official told us 
that in order to properly oversee this contract, he should have had at 
least three quality assurance representatives assisting him. The 
contracting officer's representative for an intelligence support 
contract in Iraq told us he was also unable to visit all of the 
locations that he was responsible for overseeing. At the locations he 
did visit he was able to work with the contractor to improve its 
efficiency. However, because he was not able to visit all of the 
locations at which the contractor provided services in Iraq he was 
unable to duplicate those efficiencies at all of the locations in Iraq 
where the contractor provided support. As we previously reported in 
2000 and 2004, when contract oversight personnel are able to review the 
types and levels of services provided by contractors for both economy 
and efficiency, savings can be realized. Conversely, without adequate 
contract oversight personnel in place to manage and oversee 
contractors, DOD continues to be at risk of being unable to identify 
and correct poor contractor performance in a timely manner. 

The inability of contract oversight personnel to visit all locations 
they are responsible for can also create problems for units that are 
facing difficulties resolving contractor performance issues at those 
locations. For example, officials from a brigade support battalion told 
us they had several concerns with the performance of a contractor that 
provided maintenance for the brigade's mine-clearing equipment. These 
concerns included delays in obtaining spare parts and a disagreement 
over the contractor's obligation to provide support in more austere 
locations in Iraq. According to the officials, their efforts to resolve 
these problems in a timely manner were hindered because the contracting 
officer's representative was located in Baghdad while the unit was 
stationed in western Iraq. In other instances, some contract oversight 
personnel may not even reside within the theater of operations. For 
example, we found the Defense Contract Management Agency's legal 
personnel responsible for LOGCAP in Iraq were stationed in Germany, 
while other LOGCAP contract oversight personnel were stationed in the 
United States. According to a senior Defense Contract Management Agency 
official in Iraq, relying on support from contract oversight personnel 
outside the theater of operations may not meet the needs of military 
commanders in Iraq who are operating under the demands and higher 
operational tempo of a contingency operation in a deployed location. 

Although the problems discussed above concern contract management and 
oversight at deployed locations, the lack of adequate contract 
oversight personnel is a DOD-wide problem, not limited to deployed 
locations. We first designated DOD contract management as a high-risk 
area in 1992, and it remains so today due, in part, to concerns over 
the adequacy of the department's acquisition workforce, including 
contract oversight personnel. We subsequently reported that although 
DOD had made progress in laying a foundation for reshaping its 
acquisition workforce, it did not yet have a comprehensive strategic 
workforce plan needed to guide its efforts. Yet having too few contract 
oversight personnel presents unique difficulties at deployed locations 
given the more demanding contracting environment compared to the United 
States. For example, the deputy commander of a corps support command 
told us that contracting officer's representatives have more 
responsibilities at deployed locations than in the United States. 
Similarly, several officials responsible for contract management and 
oversight told us that the operational tempo for contract oversight 
personnel is significantly higher at deployed locations than in the 
United States. 

DOD Is Not Systematically Collecting or Sharing Institutional Knowledge 
on the Use of Contractors to Support Deployed Forces: 

Despite the fact the DOD and its components face many of the same types 
of difficulties working with contractors in Iraq that they faced in 
prior military operations, DOD still does not systematically ensure 
that institutional knowledge gained from prior experience is shared 
with military personnel at deployed locations. We have previously 
reported that DOD could benefit from systematically collecting and 
sharing its institutional knowledge across a wide range of issues to 
help ensure that it is factored into planning, work processes, and 
other activities.[Footnote 18] With respect to DOD's use of contractors 
to support deployed forces, in 1997 we recommended that DOD incorporate 
lessons learned from the Bosnia peacekeeping mission and other 
operations in the Balkans to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the Army's LOGCAP contract--a recommendation DOD agreed with. 
Similarly, in 2004 we recommended that DOD implement a departmentwide 
lessons-learned program to capture the experience of military units and 
others that have used logistics support contracts--a recommendation DOD 
also agreed with. 

In its responses to the recommendations made in our 1997 and 2004 
reports, DOD stated it would investigate how best to establish 
procedures to capture lessons learned on the use of contracts to 
support deployed forces and would make this information available DOD- 
wide. However as of 2006, DOD still had not established any procedures 
to systematically collect and share DOD's lessons learned on the use of 
contracts to support deployed forces. Moreover, we found no 
organization within DOD or its components responsible for developing 
those procedures. By way of comparison, we have previously reported 
that when DOD created a Joint Staff office responsible for acting as a 
focal point for the department's antiterrorism efforts, that office was 
able to develop outreach programs to collect and share antiterrorism 
lessons learned and best practices.[Footnote 19] 

While some DOD organizations such as the Joint Forces Command's Joint 
Center for Operational Analysis and the Army's Center for Army Lessons 
Learned are responsible for collecting lessons learned from recent 
military operations, we found that neither organization was actively 
collecting lessons learned on the use of contractor support in Iraq. 
Similarly, Army guidance requires that customers receiving services 
under LOGCAP collect and share lessons learned, as 
appropriate.[Footnote 20] However, we found no procedures in place to 
ensure units follow this guidance. Further, our review of historical 
records and after-action reports from military units that deployed to 
Iraq found that while units made some observations on the use of 
contractor support, DOD had done little to collect those lessons 
learned or make them available to other units that were preparing to 
deploy.[Footnote 21] Moreover, in some instances, officials from units 
we met with told us that their current procedures actually preclude the 
collection and sharing of institutional knowledge, such as lessons 
learned. For example, officials with the 3rd Infantry Division, as well 
as a corps support group that deployed to Iraq, told us that their 
computers were wiped clean and the information archived before they 
redeployed to the United States, which hindered opportunities for 
sharing lessons learned with incoming units. 

When lessons learned are not collected and shared, DOD and its 
components run the risk of repeating past mistakes and being unable to 
build on the efficiencies and effectiveness others have developed 
during past operations that involved contractor support. For example, 
the deputy commander of a corps support command responsible for much of 
the contractor-provided logistics support in Iraq told us that without 
ensuring that lessons learned are shared as units rotate into and out 
of Iraq, each new unit essentially starts at ground zero, creating a 
number of difficulties until they familiarize themselves with their 
roles and responsibilities. Similarly, lessons learned using logistics 
support contracts in the Balkans were not easily accessible to military 
commanders and other individuals responsible for contract oversight and 
management in Iraq, an issue we also identified in 2004. For example, 
during our visit to Iraq we found that a guidebook developed by U.S. 
Army, Europe on the use of a logistical support contract almost 
identical to LOGCAP for operations in the Balkans was not made 
available to military commanders in Iraq until mid-2006. According to 
one official, U.S. Army Central Command was aware of this guidebook in 
Iraq as early as late 2003; however, the guidebook was not made 
available to commanders in Iraq until 2006. According to the official, 
if the guidebook had been made available sooner to commanders in Iraq 
it could have helped better familiarize them with the LOGCAP contract 
and build on efficiencies U.S. Army, Europe had identified. Similarly, 
U.S. Army, Europe included contract familiarization with its logistical 
support contractor in mission rehearsal exercises of units preparing to 
deploy to the Balkans. However, we found no similar effort had been 
made to include familiarization with LOGCAP in the mission rehearsal 
exercises of units preparing to deploy to Iraq. 

Failure to share other kinds of institutional knowledge on the use of 
contractor support to deployed forces can also impact military 
operations or result in confusion between the military and contractors. 
Several officials we met with from combat units that deployed to Iraq 
as well as contractors supporting U.S. forces in Southwest Asia told us 
that redeploying units do not always share important information with 
new units that are rotating into theater, including information on 
contractors providing support to U.S. forces at the deployed location. 
Such information could include the number of contractors and the 
services they provide a unit or installation, existing base access 
procedures, and other policies and procedures that have been developed 
over time. In addition, representatives from several contractor firms 
we met with told us that there can be confusion when new units rotate 
into Iraq regarding such things as the procedures contractors should 
follow to access an installation or in dealing with contractors. In 
some instances, such confusion can place either contractors or the 
military at risk. For example, a contractor providing transportation 
services in Iraq told us that a unit responsible for providing convoy 
security that had just deployed to Iraq had not been informed of the 
existing procedures for responding to incidents involving the 
contractor. The existing procedures required the unit to remain with 
the contractor until its equipment could be recovered. However, 
following an actual incident in which a vehicle rolled over, there was 
confusion between the contractor and the unit as to what the required 
actions were. 

Military Commanders and Contract Oversight Personnel Continue to 
Receive Limited or No Information on Contractor Support in their Pre- 
Deployment Training: 

DOD does not routinely incorporate information about contractor support 
to deployed forces in its pre-deployment training of military 
personnel, despite the long-standing recognition of the need to provide 
such information. Military commanders continue to deploy with limited 
or no pre-deployment training on the contractor support they will rely 
on or on their roles and responsibilities with regard to managing those 
contractors. Similarly, contract oversight personnel typically deploy 
without prior training on their contract management and oversight 
responsibilities and are often only assigned those responsibilities 
once arriving at a deployed location. Many DOD and service officials at 
various levels of command told us that ultimately the key to better 
preparing military personnel to effectively work with contractors in a 
deployed location is to integrate information on the use of contractors 
into DOD's institutional training activities. 

Several GAO Reports Have Discussed, and DOD Has Acknowledged, the Need 
to Provide Better Pre-deployment Training on Contractor Support to 
Deployed Forces: 

We have been discussing the need for better pre-deployment training on 
the use of contractors to support deployed forces since the mid-1990s. 
Specifically, we reported that better training was needed because 
military commanders are responsible for incorporating the use of 
contractor support while planning operations. In addition, as a 
customer for contractor-provided services, military commanders are 
responsible for identifying and validating requirements to be addressed 
by the contractor as well as evaluating the contractor's performance 
and ensuring the contract is used in an economical and efficient 
manner. Further, better training was needed for contract oversight 
personnel, including contracting officer's representatives, because 
they monitor the contractor's performance for the contracting officer 
and act as the interface between military commanders and contractors. 

Accordingly, we have made several recommendations that DOD improve its 
training. Some of our prior recommendations highlighted the need for 
improved training of military personnel on the use of contractor 
support at deployed locations, while others focused on training 
regarding specific contracts, such as LOGCAP. In each instance, DOD 
concurred with our recommendation. Figure 2 shows the recommendations 
we have made since 1997. 

Figure 2: Previous GAO Recommendations Highlighting the Need for Better 
Training on the Use of Contractor Support to Deployed Forces: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, according to DOD policy, personnel should receive timely 
and effective training to ensure they have the knowledge and other 
tools necessary to accomplish their missions. For example, a March 2006 
instruction on joint training policy issued by the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in part that DOD components are to ensure 
their personnel and organizations are trained to meet combatant 
commanders' requirements prior to deploying for operations. It further 
identified management of contractors supporting deployed forces as a 
training issue to be focused on. Nevertheless, we continue to find 
little evidence that improvements have been made in terms of how DOD 
and its components train military commanders and contract oversight 
personnel on the use of contractors to support deployed forces prior to 
their deployment. 

Military Commanders Continue to Receive Limited or No Pre-deployment 
Training to Plan For and Manage Contractors at Deployed Locations: 

As we have previously reported, limited or no pre-deployment training 
on the use of contractor support can cause a variety of problems for 
military commanders in a deployed location. With limited or no pre- 
deployment training on the extent of contractor support to deployed 
forces, military commanders may not be able to adequately plan for the 
use of those contractors in a deployed location. Several military 
commanders--including the major general responsible for logistics for 
Multi-National Force-Iraq, the deputy commander of a corps support 
command, a base commander, and commanders of combat units deployed to 
Iraq--told us that their pre-deployment training did not provide them 
with sufficient information regarding the extent of contractor support 
they would be relying on in Iraq. Although some of these officials were 
aware of large contracts such as LOGCAP, almost all of them told us 
they were surprised by the large number of contractors they dealt with 
in Iraq and the variety of services that contractors provided. As a 
result, they could not incorporate the use of contractors into their 
planning efforts until after they arrived in Iraq and acquired a more 
complete understanding of the broad range of services provided by 
contractors. Similarly, several commanders of combat units that 
deployed to Iraq told us their pre-deployment training included limited 
or no information on the contractor-provided services they would be 
relying on or the extent to which they would have to provide personnel 
to escort contractor personnel. They were therefore unable to integrate 
the need to provide on-base escorts for third country and host country 
nationals, convoy security, and other force protection support to 
contractors into their planning efforts. As a result, the commanders 
were surprised by the substantial portion of their personnel they had 
to allocate to fulfill these missions; personnel they had expected to 
be available to perform other functions. 

Limited or no pre-deployment training for military commanders on the 
use of contractor support to deployed forces can also result in 
confusion regarding their roles and responsibilities in managing and 
overseeing contractors. As discussed above, military commanders are 
responsible for incorporating the use of contractor support in their 
operations planning and, in some instances, for evaluating a 
contractor's performance. However, many officials responsible for 
contract management and oversight in Iraq told us military commanders 
who deployed to Iraq received little or no training on the use of 
contractors prior to their deployment, leading to confusion over their 
roles and responsibilities. For example: 

* Staff officers with the 3rd Infantry Division told us they believed 
the division was poorly trained to integrate and work with contractors 
prior to its deployment. According to these officers, this inadequate 
training resulted in confusion among the officers over the command and 
control of contractors. 

* Army Field Support Command officials told us many commanders voiced 
concerns that they did not want to work with contractors and did not 
want contractors in their area of operations. According to the 
officials, these commanders did not understand the extent of contractor 
support in Iraq and how to integrate LOGCAP support into their own 
planning efforts. The officials attributed this confusion to a lack of 
pre-deployment training on the services LOGCAP provided, how it was 
used, and commanders' roles and responsibilities in managing and 
overseeing the LOGCAP contractor. 

* Several Defense Contract Management Agency officials told us that 
although they were only responsible for managing and overseeing the 
LOGCAP contractor, military commanders came to them for all contracting 
questions because they had not been trained on how to work with 
contractors and did not realize that different contractors have 
different contract managers. 

In addition, some contractors told us how crucial it was that 
commanders receive training in their roles and responsibilities 
regarding contractors prior to their deployment because, although they 
do not have the authority to, commanders sometimes direct contractors 
to perform activities that may be outside the scope of work of the 
contract. We found some instances where a lack of training raised 
concerns over the potential for military commanders to direct 
contractors to perform work outside the scope of the contract. For 
example, one contractor told us he was instructed by a military 
commander to release equipment the contractor was maintaining even 
though this action was not within the scope of the contract. The issue 
ultimately had to be resolved by the contracting officer. As another 
example, a battalion commander deployed to Iraq told us that although 
he was pleased with the performance of the contractors supporting him, 
he did not know what was required of the contractor under the contract. 
Without this information, he ran the risk of directing the contractor 
to perform work beyond what was called for in the contract. As Army 
guidance makes clear, when military commanders try to direct 
contractors to perform activities outside the scope of the contract, 
this can cause the government to incur additional charges because 
modifications would need to be made to the contract and, in some cases, 
the direction may potentially result in a violation of competition 
requirements.[Footnote 22] 

We found that many military commanders we spoke with had little or no 
prior exposure to contractor support issues in deployed locations, 
exacerbating the problems discussed above. Many of the commanders we 
met with from combat units deployed to Iraq told us this was their 
first experience working with contractors and that they had had little 
or no prior training or exposure to contract management. According to 
officials responsible for contract management and oversight in Iraq as 
well as several contactor representatives we met with, it can take 
newly deployed personnel, including military commanders, several weeks 
to develop the knowledge needed to effectively work with contractors in 
a deployed location. For complex contracts such as LOGCAP, these 
officials told us that it can take substantially longer than that. This 
can result in gaps in oversight as newly deployed personnel familiarize 
themselves with their roles and responsibilities in managing and 
overseeing contracts. 

Contract Oversight Personnel Continue to Receive Limited or No Pre- 
deployment Training to Effectively Monitor Contractor Performance: 

We also found that contract oversight personnel such as contracting 
officer's representatives continue to receive limited or no pre- 
deployment training regarding their roles and responsibilities in 
monitoring contractor performance. Although DOD has created an online 
training course for contracting officer's representatives, very few of 
the contracting officer's representatives we met with had taken the 
course prior to deploying to Iraq. In most cases, individuals deployed 
without knowing that they would be assigned the role of a contracting 
officer's representative until after they arrived at the deployed 
location, precluding their ability to take the course. Moreover, some 
of the individuals who took the course once deployed expressed concerns 
that the training did not provide them with the knowledge and other 
tools they needed to effective monitor contractor performance. Other 
officials told us it was difficult to set aside the time necessary to 
complete the training once they arrived in Iraq. DOD's acquisition 
regulations require that contracting officer's representatives be 
qualified through training and experience commensurate with the 
responsibilities delegated to them. However, as was the case with 
military commanders, we found that many of the contract oversight 
personnel we spoke with had little or no exposure to contractor support 
issues prior to their deployment, which exacerbated the problems they 
faced given the limited pre-deployment training. 

We found several instances where the failure to identify and train 
contract oversight personnel prior to their deployment hindered the 
ability of those individuals to effectively manage and oversee 
contractors in Iraq, in some cases negatively affecting unit morale or 
military operations. The following are examples of what we found: 

* The contracting officer's representative for a major contract 
providing intelligence support to U.S. forces in Iraq had not been 
informed of his responsibilities in managing and overseeing this 
contract prior to his deployment. As a result, he received no training 
on his contract oversight responsibilities prior to deploying. 
Moreover, he had no previous experience working with contractors. The 
official told us that he found little value in DOD's online training 
course and believed this training did not adequately prepare him to 
execute his contract oversight responsibilities, such as reviewing 
invoices submitted by the contractor. 

* According to officials from a corps support group deployed to Iraq, 
the group deployed with 95 Army cooks even though their meals were to 
be provided by LOGCAP. However, prior to deploying, the unit had 
neither identified nor trained any personnel to serve as contracting 
officer's representatives for the LOGCAP contract. According to unit 
officials, they experienced numerous problems with regard to the 
quality of food services provided by LOGCAP, which impacted unit 
morale, until individuals from the unit were assigned as contracting 
officer's representatives to work with the contractor to improve the 
quality of its services. 

* According to officials with the Army's Intelligence and Security 
Command, quality assurance representatives responsible for assessing 
the performance of a linguist support contractor did not speak Arabic. 
As a result, it was unclear how they could assess the proficiency of 
the linguists. Some units that used interpreters under this contract 
told us they experienced cases where they discovered that their 
interpreters were not correctly translating conversations. 

* Intelligence officials with a Stryker brigade told us a lack of 
contractor management training hindered their ability to resolve 
staffing issues with a contractor conducting background screenings of 
third country nationals and host country nationals. Shortages of 
contractor-provided screeners forced the brigade to use their own 
intelligence personnel to conduct these screenings. As a result, those 
personnel were not available to carry out their primary intelligence- 
gathering responsibilities. 

The frequent rotations of contract oversight personnel, who can deploy 
for as little as 3-4 months, can also hinder DOD's management and 
oversight of contractors in a deployed location. Several contractors 
told us the frequent rotation of contracting officer's representatives 
was frustrating because the contractors continually had to adjust to 
the varying extent of knowledge those personnel had regarding the 
contractor support they were responsible for. Moreover, several 
contractors told us that frequent rotations meant that by the time 
contract oversight personnel had familiarized themselves with their 
responsibilities they were preparing the leave the country. If these 
personnel were replaced by individuals who were not familiar with the 
contract or had not received training in their roles and 
responsibilities, problems could occur. For example, a contractor 
providing food services in Iraq told us that while the contract 
specified a 21-day menu rotation, some of the newly deployed 
contracting officer's representatives assigned to monitor the contract 
directed the contractor to modify the menu rotation, which affected the 
contractor's inventory of food stores and ran the risk of directing the 
contractor to perform work outside the scope of the contract. 

Many contractors told us that a consistent level of pre-deployment 
training would help to ensure some continuity as individuals rotate 
into and out of deployed locations. In addition, several contractors, 
as well as military officials responsible for contract management and 
oversight, told us that the length of deployment for contracting 
officer's representatives is too short and that by the time individuals 
have acquired the knowledge to effectively monitor a contract, they are 
preparing to redeploy. For example, senior Defense Contract Management 
Agency officials told us that the current 6-month deployments of 
contract oversight personnel monitoring the LOGCAP contract in Iraq 
were too short to make the most efficient use of personnel who had 
developed the expertise to effectively manage that contract. As a 
result, senior Defense Contract Management Agency officials told us 
they are considering extending the length of deployment for their 
contract oversight personnel assigned to monitor the LOGCAP contract 
from 6 months to 1 year. 

We found that contract oversight personnel who had received training in 
their roles and responsibilities prior to their deployment appeared 
better prepared to manage and oversee contractors once they arrived at 
a deployed location. For example, the program office for the Army's C- 
12 aircraft maintenance contract developed a 3-day training course that 
all contracting officer's representatives for this contract are 
required to take prior to deploying. This training provides contracting 
officer's representatives with information regarding recurring 
reporting requirements, processes that should be followed to resolve 
disputes with the contractor, and the variety of technical and 
administrative requirements these individuals should be familiar with 
to monitor the contractor's performance. Officials familiar with this 
training course told us that they found the course to be very helpful 
in providing contracting officer's representatives with the knowledge 
and tools necessary to effectively execute their responsibilities. As a 
result, the program office developed a similar course for another of 
its aviation maintenance contracts. Similarly, Defense Contract 
Management Agency officials responsible for overseeing LOGCAP told us 
they are developing a standardized process for evaluating the 
contractor's performance in Iraq, which includes ensuring units 
deploying to Iraq identify and train contract oversight personnel for 
the LOGCAP contract. 

Officials Believe Integrating Information on the Use of Contractors 
into DOD's Institutional Training Activities Could Improve the 
Management and Oversight of Contractors: 

Our review of DOD and service guidance, policies, and doctrine found no 
existing criteria or standards to ensure that all military units 
incorporate information regarding contractor support to deployed forces 
in their pre-deployment training. According to a official with the 
Army's Training and Doctrine Command, while some steps have been taken 
to create elective courses on issues related to contractor support to 
deployed forces, it is important that all DOD components incorporate 
this information into their existing institutional training so that 
military personnel who may interact with contractors at deployed 
locations have a basic awareness of contractor support issues prior to 
deploying. Moreover, most of the military commanders and officials 
responsible for contract management and oversight we met with in 
deployed locations told us that better training on the use of 
contractors to support deployed forces should be incorporated into how 
DOD prepares its personnel to deploy. Some officials believed that 
additional training should address the specific roles and 
responsibilities of military personnel responsible for managing and 
overseeing contractors in deployed locations. For example, the base 
commander of Logistical Support Area Anaconda told us there should be a 
weeklong pre-deployment course for all base commanders specific to 
contractor support to deployed forces. Similarly, the commander of a 
unit operating Army C-12 aircraft stated that the contracting officer's 
representative training developed by the program office, as discussed 
above, should not only be required for all contract oversight personnel 
but also for military commanders of units operating the aircraft. 

Other officials believed that their pre-deployment preparations, such 
as mission rehearsal exercises, should incorporate the role that 
contractors have in supporting U.S. forces in a deployed location. 
However, we found that most units we met with did not incorporate the 
role of contractor support into their mission rehearsal exercises. 
Moreover, we found no existing DOD requirement that mission rehearsal 
exercises should include such information, even for key contracts such 
as LOGCAP. Several officials told us that including contractors in 
these exercises could enable military commanders to better plan and 
prepare for the use of contractor support prior to deploying. For 
example, when a Stryker brigade held its training exercise prior to 
deploying to Iraq, the brigade commander was surprised at the number of 
contractors embedded with the brigade. Initially, he wanted to bar all 
civilians from the exercise because he did not realize how extensively 
the brigade relied on contractor support. By including contractors in 
the exercise, their critical role was made clear early on and the 
brigade's commanders were better positioned to understand their 
contract management roles and responsibilities prior to deploying to 
Iraq. In addition, officials responsible for the LOGCAP contract told 
us they were undertaking efforts to include basic information on how to 
work with LOGCAP into the mission rehearsal exercises of units 
deploying to Iraq. 

Many officials we met with in the United States and at deployed 
locations told us that ultimately the issue of better preparing 
military commanders and contract oversight personnel for their contract 
management and oversight roles at deployed locations lies with 
including training on the use of contractors as part of professional 
military education. Professional military education is designed to 
provide officers with the necessary skills and knowledge to function 
effectively and to assume additional responsibilities. However, several 
officials told us that the need to educate military personnel on the 
use of contractors is something the military has not yet embraced. As 
corps support command officials observed, the military does a good job 
training logisticians to be infantrymen, but does not require 
infantrymen to have any familiarity with contracting or the roles and 
responsibilities they may have in working with contractors at a 
deployed location. 

Conclusions: 

DOD's reliance on contractor support to deployed forces has grown 
significantly since the 1991 Gulf War and this reliance continues to 
grow. In Iraq and other deployed locations, contractors provide 
billions of dollars worth of services each year and play a role in most 
aspects of military operations--from traditional support roles such as 
feeding soldiers and maintaining equipment to providing interpreters 
who accompany soldiers on patrols and augmenting intelligence analysis. 
The magnitude and importance of contractor support demands that DOD 
ensure military personnel have the guidance, resources, and training to 
effectively monitor contractor performance at deployed locations. In 
prior reports, we made a number of recommendations aimed at 
strengthening DOD's management and oversight of contractor support at 
deployed locations, and the department has agreed to implement many of 
those recommendations. However, DOD has failed to implement some of our 
key recommendations, in part because it has not yet institutionally 
embraced the need to change the way it prepares military personnel to 
work with contractors in deployed locations. While we found no 
contractor performance problems that led to mission failure, problems 
with management and oversight of contractors have negatively impacted 
military operations and unit morale and hindered DOD's ability to 
obtain reasonable assurance that contractors are effectively meeting 
their contract requirements in the most cost-efficient manner. 

The difficulties DOD faces regarding contractor support to deployed 
forces are exacerbated by the fragmented nature of contracting, with 
multiple agencies in multiple locations able to award and manage 
contracts that may all provide services to a particular military unit 
or installation. However, DOD's actions to date have largely been 
driven by individual efforts to resolve particular issues at particular 
moments. A lack of clear accountability and authority within the 
department to coordinate these actions has hindered DOD's ability to 
systematically address its difficulties regarding contractor support-- 
difficulties that currently affect military commanders in Iraq and 
other deployed locations and will likely affect commanders in future 
operations unless DOD institutionally addresses the problems we have 
identified. When faced with similar challenges regarding the 
department's antiterrorism efforts, DOD designated an office within the 
Joint Staff to serve as a single focal point to coordinate its efforts, 
which helped improve its protection of military forces stationed 
overseas. Moreover, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has established dedicated 
organizations to coordinate efforts to address departmentwide problems 
in areas such as supply chain management. Unless a similar, 
coordinated, departmentwide effort is made to address long-standing 
contract management and oversight problems at deployed locations, DOD 
and its components will continue to be at risk of being unable to 
ensure that contractors are providing the services they are required to 
in an effective and efficient manner. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To improve DOD's management and oversight of contractors at deployed 
locations, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense appoint a 
focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, at a sufficiently senior level 
and with the appropriate resources, dedicated to leading DOD's efforts 
to improve contract management and oversight. The entity that functions 
as the focal point would act as an advocate within the department for 
issues related to the use of contractors to support deployed forces, 
serve as the principal advisor for establishing relevant policy and 
guidance to DOD components, and be responsible for carrying out 
actions, including the following six actions: 

* oversee development of the joint database to provide visibility over 
all contractor support to deployed forces, including a summary of 
services or capabilities provided and by-name accountability of 
contractors; 

* develop a strategy for DOD to incorporate the unique difficulties of 
contract management and oversight at deployed locations into DOD's 
ongoing efforts to address concerns about the adequacy of its 
acquisition workforce; 

* lead and coordinate the development of a departmentwide lessons- 
learned program that will capture the experiences of units that have 
deployed to locations with contractor support and develop a strategy to 
apply this institutional knowledge to ongoing and future operations; 

* develop the requirement that DOD components, combatant commanders, 
and deploying units (1) ensure military commanders have access to key 
information on contractor support, including the scope and scale of 
contractor support they will rely on and the roles and responsibilities 
of commanders in the contract management and oversight process, (2) 
incorporate into their pre-deployment training the need to identify and 
train contract oversight personnel in their roles and responsibilities, 
and (3) ensure mission rehearsal exercises include key contractors to 
increase familiarity of units preparing to deploy with the contractor 
support they will rely on; 

* develop training standards for the services on the integration of 
basic familiarity with contractor support to deployed forces into their 
professional military education to ensure that military commanders and 
other senior leaders who may deploy to locations with contractor 
support have the knowledge and skills needed to effectively manage 
contractors; and: 

* review the services' efforts to meet the standards and requirements 
established above to ensure that training on contractor support to 
deployed forces is being consistently implemented by the services. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 
recommendation. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also 
provided several technical comments which we considered and 
incorporated where appropriate. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 
appoint a focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, at a sufficiently 
senior level and with the appropriate resources, dedicated to leading 
DOD's efforts to improve contract management and oversight. DOD further 
stated that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 
Materiel Readiness established the office of the Assistant Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Program Support) on October 1, 2006 to serve as 
the office of primary responsibility for issues related to contractor 
support. However, DOD noted in its comments that the office is not yet 
fully staffed. 

While we commend the department for taking the initiative to establish 
this office and believe that it is appropriately located within the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics, it is not clear that this office would serve as the 
focal point dedicated to leading DOD's efforts to improve contract 
management and oversight. In our recommendation, we identified several 
actions that such a focal point would be responsible for implementing. 
In concurring with those recommended actions, DOD offered additional 
information on the steps it intended to take in order to address the 
recommended actions. However, none of these steps included information 
on the roles and responsibilities of the office of the Assistant Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) in implementing and 
overseeing these corrective actions. For example, in concurring with 
our recommendation that the focal point develop requirements to ensure 
that mission rehearsal exercises include key contractors, DOD specified 
corrective actions that the Joint Staff, the Defense Acquisition 
University, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense would take. 
However, it is not clear what role the office of the Assistant Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) would have in meeting this 
requirement, nor is it clear that this office would be the entity 
responsible for ensuring the requirement is met, as stated in our 
recommendation. 

As noted in the report, a lack of clear accountability and authority 
within the department to coordinate actions intended to improve 
contract management and oversight has hindered DOD's ability to 
systematically address its difficulties regarding contractor support in 
the past. We continue to believe that a single focal point with clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities is critical if DOD is to effectively 
address these long-standing problems and we therefore encourage the 
department to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the 
office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program 
Support) in implementing and overseeing each of the corrective actions 
discussed in our recommendation. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies 
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at 
(202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. Key contributors include David A. Schmitt, 
Assistant Director; Vincent Balloon, Carole F. Coffey, Grace Coleman, 
Laura Czohara, Wesley A. Johnson, James A. Reynolds, Kevin J. Riley, 
and Karen Thornton. 

Signed by: 

William M. Solis: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable John Warner: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr. 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
improved its management and oversight of contractors supporting 
deployed forces, we met with DOD, Joint Staff, and service headquarters 
officials to obtain a comprehensive understanding of their efforts in 
addressing the issues raised in our June 2003 report. We also reviewed 
changes to key DOD and DOD component policies and other guidance. In 
some instances, guidance was not available. For example, guidance was 
not available on the appropriate number of personnel needed to monitor 
contractors in a deployed location. In those instances, we relied on 
the judgments and views of DOD officials and contract oversight 
personnel who had served in deployed locations as to the adequacy of 
staffing. We visited select DOD components and various military 
contracting commands in the United States based on their role and 
responsibility in managing and overseeing contracts that support 
deployed U.S. forces. Because there was no consolidated list of 
contractors supporting deployed forces available, we asked DOD 
officials at the components and commands we visited to identify, to the 
extent possible, the extent of contractor support to their deployed 
U.S. forces. We focused our efforts on contractors supporting military 
operations in Iraq and elsewhere in Southwest Asia because of the broad 
range of services contractors provide U.S. forces in support of the 
Global War on Terrorism. 

We held discussions with military commanders, staff officers, and other 
representatives from five Army divisions and one Marine Expeditionary 
Force as well as various higher headquarters and supporting commands 
that deployed to Iraq or elsewhere in Southwest Asia during the 2003- 
2006 time frame to discuss their experiences working with contractors 
and the challenges they faced managing and overseeing contractors in a 
deployed location. Specifically, we met with unit officials responsible 
for such functions as contracting and contract management, base 
operations and logistical support, and force protection and 
intelligence. These units were selected because, for the most part, 
they had recently returned from Southwest Asia and unit officials had 
not yet redeployed or been transferred to other locations within the 
United States. We also met with representatives from the Department of 
State and the U.S. Agency for International Development to discuss the 
extent to which they have visibility over contractors supporting their 
activities in Iraq. In addition, we traveled to deployed locations 
within Southwest Asia, including Iraq, to meet with deployed combat 
units and to discuss the use of contractor support to deployed forces 
with various military commanders, installation commanders, headquarters 
personnel, and other military personnel responsible for contracting and 
contract management at deployed locations. 

We met with 26 U.S. and foreign contractors who provide support to DOD 
in Southwest Asia to discuss a variety of contracting and contract 
management issues. For example, we held discussions with contractors to 
obtain an understanding of the types of services they provide deployed 
U.S. forces and the difficulties they have experienced providing those 
services to DOD in a deployed location. The contractors we met with 
reflected a wide range of services provided to deployed forces, 
including theater support, external support, and systems support, and 
represented both prime contractors and subcontractors. 

We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review: 

Department of Defense: 

* Defense Contract Management Agency, Alexandria, VA; Houston, TX; 

* Defense Logistics Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA: 

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics, Washington, DC: 

* Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 
Materiel Readiness: 

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, 
Washington, DC: 

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 
Washington, DC: 

* U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL: 

* U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA: 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

* J-3 Operations, Washington, DC: 

* J-4 Logistics, Washington, DC: 

* J-7 Operational Plans and Interoperability, Washington, DC: 

* J-8 Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, Washington, DC: 

Department of the Army: 

* Headquarters, Washington, DC: 

- Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1 Personnel: 

- Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 Logistics: 

* Army Contracting Agency, Fort McPherson, GA; Fort Drum, NY; Fort 
Lewis, WA: 

* Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, VA: 

- Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL: 

-- Program Executive Office, Aviation: 

-- Program Executive Office, Missiles & Space: 

- Army Field Support Command, Rock Island, IL: 

-- Program Office, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program: 

- Army Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ: 

- Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, MI: 

* Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, VA: 

* Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA: 

- Combined Armed Support Command, Fort Lee, VA: 

* Stryker Brigades, Fort Lewis, WA: 

- 2nd Infantry Division: 

* 3rd Brigade, Stryker Brigade Combat Team: 

- 25th Infantry Division: 

* 1st Brigade, Stryker Brigade Combat Team: 

- Task Force Olympia: 

- 593rd Corps Support Group: 

* U.S. Army Central Command, Fort McPherson, GA: 

* 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA: 

* 2nd Brigade Combat Team: 

* 26th Brigade Support Battalion: 

* 3rd Sustainment Brigade: 

* 87th Corps Support Battalion: 

* 4th Brigade Combat Team: 

* 703rd Brigade Support Battalion: 

* 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY: 

Department of the Navy: 

* Headquarters, Washington, DC: 

* Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition 
Management: 

* 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, CA: 

Department of the Air Force: 

* Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: 

* Program Office, Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, Tyndall Air 
Force Base, FL: 

Other Government Agencies: 

* Department of State, Washington, DC: 

* U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC: 

Contractors: 

* CACI International, Arlington, VA: 

* Dimensions International, Inc. Sterling Heights, MI: 

* DUCOM, Inc., Sterling Heights, MI: 

* DynCorp International, Irving, TX: 

* General Dynamics Land Systems, Fort Lewis, WA: 

* Kellogg, Brown and Root, Houston, TX; Arlington, VA: 

* L-3 Communications Corp. 

* L-3 Titan Linguist Operations and Technical Support, Reston, VA: 

* Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control, Dallas, TX: 

* Mantech International, Chantilly, VA: 

* M7 Aerospace, San Antonio, TX: 

* PWC Logistics, Kuwait: 

* Readiness Management Support, Panama City, FL: 

* SEI Group, Inc., Huntsville, AL: 

* Triple Canopy, Inc., Herndon, VA: 

The overseas activities and contractors we visited, by country, were: 

Iraq: 

* Camp Victory, U.S. Military: 

* Multi-National Force-Iraq: 

* Multi-National Corps-Iraq: 

* Defense Contract Management Agency: 

* 4th Infantry Division: 

* Camp Victory, Contractors: 

* Kellogg, Brown and Root: 

* L-3 Communications Corp. 

* L-3 Communications ILEX Systems, Inc. 

* L-3 Government Services, Inc. 

* International Zone, U.S. Military: 

* Multi-National Force-Iraq: 

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics: 

* Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Regional Division: 

* Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan: 

* International Zone, Contractors: 

* L-3 Communications Corp. 

* L-3 Titan Linguist Operations and Technical Support: 

* Private Security Company Association of Iraq: 

* Logistics Support Area Anaconda, U.S. Military: 

* Logistics Support Area Anaconda Garrison Command: 

* 3rd Corps Support Command: 

* Aerial Port of Debarkation operations: 

* Program Management Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: 

* Logistics Support Area Anaconda, Contractors: 

* AAI Corporation: 

* DynCorp International: 

* General Atomics Aeronautical Systems: 

* General Dynamics Land Systems: 

* L-3 Communications Corp. 

* L-3 Titan Linguist Operations and Technical Support: 

* M7 Aerospace: 

Kuwait: 

* Camp Arifjan, U.S. Military: 

* Coalition Forces Land Component Command: 

* Area Support Group, Kuwait: 

* Army Contracting Agency, Southwest Asia: 

* Army Field Support Brigade, Southwest Asia: 

* Army Materiel Command: 

* U.S. Embassy, Kuwait City: 

* Camp Arifjan, Contractors: 

* Ahmadah General Trading & Contracting Co. 

* British Link Kuwait: 

* Combat Support Associates: 

* Computer Sciences Corporation: 

* IAP World Services: 

* ITT Industries: 

* Kellogg, Brown and Root: 

* Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Co. 

* Tamimi Global Co. 

United Arab Emirates: 

* Dubai, Contractors: 

* Kellogg, Brown and Root: 

* Prime Projects International: 

We conducted our review from August 2005 through October 2006 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Acquisition TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS: 
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington DC 20301-3000: 

DEC 14 2006: 

Mr. William M. Solis: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Solis: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, "Military Operations: High-Level DoD Action Needed to Address 
Long-standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors," 
dated November 2, 2006, (GAO Code 350739/GAO-07-145). 

The DOD concurs with the draft report recommendations and appreciates 
the opportunity to comment. Technical comments were provided 
separately. For further questions concerning our input, please contact 
Lt Col Jill Stiglich, 703-695-8567. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Shay D. Assad: 
Director, Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy: 

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

GAO Draft Report - Dated November 2, 2006 GAO Code 350739/GAO-07-145: 

"Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long- 
standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendation: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
appoint a focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, at a sufficiently 
senior level and with the appropriate resources, dedicated to leading 
DoD's efforts to improve contract management and oversight. The entity 
that functions as the focal point would act as an advocate within the 
Department for issues related to the use of contractors to support 
deployed forces, serve as the principal advisor for establishing 
relevant policy and guidance to DoD components, and be responsible for 
carrying out actions, including the following: 

* oversee development of the joint database to provide visibility over 
all contractor support to deployed forces, including a summary of 
services or capabilities provided and by-name accountability of 
contractors; 

* develop a strategy for DoD to incorporate the unique difficulties of 
contract management and oversight at deployed locations into DoD's 
ongoing efforts to address concerns about the adequacy of its 
acquisition workforce; 

* lead and coordinate the development of a Department-wide lesson- 
learned program that will capture the experiences of units that have 
deployed to locations with contractor support and develop a strategy to 
apply this institutional knowledge to ongoing and future operations; 

* develop the requirements that DoD components, combatant commanders, 
and deploying units (1) ensure military commanders have access to key 
information on contractor support, including the scope and scale of 
contractor support they will rely on and the roles and responsibilities 
of commanders in the contract management and oversight process, (2) 
incorporate into their pre-deployment training the need to identify and 
train contract oversight personnel in their roles and responsibilities, 
and (3) ensure mission rehearsal exercises include key contractors to 
increase familiarity of units preparing to deploy with the contractor 
support they will rely on; 

* develop training standards for the Services on the integration of 
basic familiarity with contractor support to deployed forces into their 
professional military education to ensure that military commanders 
andother senior leaders who may deploy to locations with contractor 
support have the knowledge and skills needed to effectively manage 
contractors; and: 

* review the Services' efforts to meet the standards and requirements 
established above to ensure that training on contractor support to 
deployed forces is being consistently implemented by the Services. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Logistics and Materiel Readiness (DUSD (LM&R)) established the office 
of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) 
(ADUSD (PS)) on 1 October 2006 and has given the incumbent this 
mission. The office is not yet fully staffed, but the intent is to make 
the ADUSD (PS) the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR). 

Recommendation: Oversee development of the joint database to provide 
visibility over all contractor support to deployed forces, including a 
summary of services or capabilities provided and by-name accountability 
of contractors. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational 
Tracker (SPOT) has been identified as the DOD Enterprise Solution by 
the DOD Investment Review Board (IRB) and once the Defense Business 
Systems Management Council (DBSMC) concurs with this designation 
(expected to occur at their 30 November 2006 meeting), SPOT will be 
declared by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 
and Readiness (OUSD (P&R)) in coordination with the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics (OUSD 
(AT&L)) as the Joint Solution required by Department of Defense 
Instruction 3020.41 (DoDI 3020.41). 

Recommendation: Develop a strategy for DOD to incorporate the unique 
difficulties of contract management and oversight at deployed locations 
into DOD's ongoing efforts to address concerns about the adequacy of 
its acquisition workforce. 

DOD Response: Concur. Section 854 of the 2007 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) requires the Department to develop joint 
policy on requirements, program management and contingency contracting. 
This language includes assessing the health of the military and 
civilian acquisition work force to support deployed forces. As part of 
this assessment, DOD will study the roles and missions of Defense 
Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the Services in contract 
oversight, assess the Department's ability to execute this mission and 
protect its interests and make recommendations on needed changes to 
military and civilian force structure. 

Recommendation: Lead and coordinate the development of a Department- 
wide lesson-learned program that will capture the experiences of units 
that have deployed to locations with contractor support and develop a 
strategy to apply this institutional knowledge to ongoing and future 
operations. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition Technology and Logistics /Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy (OUSD (AT&L) / (DPAP)), Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) and the Services all have websites that capture 
current lessons learned; however, the department will develop and 
implement a systematic strategy for capturing, retaining and applying 
lessons learned, including updating training of personnel involved in 
Contingency Acquisition. DPAP and DAU are currently examining 
implementing one common website and will receive input from Services on 
its utility/ viability/usability as a collection site for Contingency 
Contracting information and make whatever changes the joint community 
considers necessary to maximize its utility. Once this is done, DPAP 
will promulgate guidance to the Services requiring their contingency 
contractor personnel to submit lessons learned and after action 
reports. DAU will develop a systematic method of studying and assessing 
this information and promulgating significant findings through 
coursework and other forums. 

Recommendation: Develop the requirements that DOD components, combatant 
commanders, and deploying units (1) ensure military commanders have 
access to key information on contractor support, including the scope 
and scale of contractor support they will rely on and the roles and 
responsibilities of commanders in the contract management and oversight 
process, (2) incorporate into their pre-deployment training the need to 
identify and train contract oversight personnel in their roles and 
responsibilities, and (3) ensure mission rehearsal exercises include 
key contractors to increase familiarity of units preparing to deploy 
with the contractor support they will rely on. 

DOD Response: Concur: 

(1) DODI 3020.41 requires the designation or development of a joint 
database on contractor personnel and contract capability to capture the 
information necessary to give the Combatant Commander (CCDR) both 
visibility of contractor personnel and contracts and a basis for 
assessing risk and capabilities available to him in theater. The 
Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) has been 
identified as the DOD Enterprise Solution by the DOD Investment Review 
Board (IRB) and the Defense Business Systems Management Council (DBSMC) 
concurred with this designation (at their 30 November 2006 meeting), 
SPOT was declared by OUSD (P&R) in coordination with OUSD (AT&L) as the 
Joint Solution. 

(2) The Joint Staff, in conjunction with its Army Lead Agent and Air 
Force Technical Review Authority, is working on a new Joint 
Publication, JP 4-10, Contracting and Contractor Management in Joint 
Operations that will address the roles of Contracting Officer's 
Representatives (COR), Administrative Contracting Officers and related 
personnel (Quality Assurance Representatives). In addition, DPAP will 
work with DAU to ensure COR training reflects recent lessons learned 
and assess whether a separate or tailored Contingency COR Course is 
needed. Contracting Support Plans associated with operations plans 
(OPLANs) and operations orders (OPORDs) will address the requirement to 
identify and train CORs prior to deployment. This requirement will be 
incorporated into the next update of the Logistics Annex to the Joint 
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCAP) which contains requirements for 
OPLANS. 

(3) The Joint Staff will review how contractors could/should be 
incorporated into joint training exercises. For Service specific 
training, DAU will study the Army's incorporation of Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) personnel into their training exercises 
and develop a Case Study for use by all the Services on how this has 
been done (please see next DOD response for specifics on Army 
training). The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) will encourage 
the Services to incorporate contractor personnel into training 
exercises whenever it makes sense. 

Recommendation: Develop training standards for the Services on the 
integration of basic familiarity with contractor support to deployed 
forces into their professional military education to ensure that 
military commanders and other senior leaders who may deploy to 
locations with contractor support have the knowledge and skills needed 
to effectively manage contractors. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Joint Staff is researching Joint education 
for logisticians which will include efforts on contract and contractor 
management. However, clearly there is a need for broader E-1 to 0-10 
level training for non-acquisition military personnel in order for them 
to understand the basics regarding contractor personnel (command and 
control issues, contractor status, contractor entitlements) and 
contracts (unauthorized commitments, constructive changes) given the 
tremendous growth in the utilization of contracts to support 
contingency operations. OSD will mandate the development of core 
training on these topics and also mandate the Services incorporate this 
into recruit and command level training as well as pre-deployment 
training. 

The Army continues to develop and improve platform training for LOGCAP 
in seven courses at the Army Logistics Management College and the 
Captains Career Course, in addition to the Army War College and the 
Contractors on the Battlefield Elective Seminar Course at the Army 
Command and General Staff College. The Combined Arms Support Command 
(CASCOM) Training Directorate continues to develop training strategy 
and curriculum outline on LOGCAP and partners with the Training and 
Doctrine Command and Combined Arms Center to develop and incorporate 
LOGCAP training into existing courses and expand LOGCAP training in 
additional courses. LOGCAP planners from the LOGCAP Operations 
Directorate at Fort Belvoir continue to participate in exercises like 
the Joint Transformation Wargame, Ulchi Focus Lens, and Blue Advance. 
LOGCAP planners also continue to provide pre-deployment training to 
deploying Army and Marine units and provide information on the LOGCAP 
statements of work and various task orders that will support the units 
in Iraq. Additionally, Army representatives have also provided 
training, to include lesson plans, briefing, and test questions, to the 
Marine Corps Engineer School and Marine Corps contracting instructors. 
Representative from DCS worked with the Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU) and OUSD (AT&L) to develop the current contingency contracting 
courses on the DAU portal. Finally, DCS, G-4 funded the initiative to 
create a web based LOGCAP Interactive multi-media Instruction Course in 
the Sustainment Portal and the CASCOM Training Directorate executed the 
development. This initiative provides the ability for individual self-
training on LOGCAP and provides a source where instructors can obtain 
the latest information on LOGCAP and Contractors Accompanying the 
Force. 

Recommendation: Review the Services' efforts to meet the standards and 
requirements established above to ensure that training on contractor 
support to deployed forces is being consistently implemented by the 
Services. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Joint Log Test Case Logistics Services 
Initiative on Contractors Accompanying the Force: Accountability and 
Visibility will examine related governance and consider how governance 
might need to change to best support this joint capability. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Military Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor Employees 
Supporting Deployed Forces May Lack Critical Information, but U.S. 
Forces Take Steps to Mitigate the Risks Contractors May Pose. GAO-06- 
999R. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private 
Security Providers. GAO-06-865T. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006. 

Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security 
Providers. GAO-05-737. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005. 

Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's Orders to 
Support Military Operations. GAO-05-201. Washington, D.C.: April 29, 
2005. 

Defense Logistics: High-Level DOD Coordination Is Needed to Further 
Improve the Management of the Army's LOGCAP Contract. GAO-05-328. 
Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2005. 

Military Operations: DOD's Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts 
Requires Strengthened Oversight. GAO-04-854. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 
2004. 

Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed 
Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans. GAO-03-695. 
Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003. 

Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost in 
the Balkans. GAO/NSIAD-00-225. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2000. 

Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program. GAO/NSIAD-97-63. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 
1997. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Estimated figures are used because neither DOD nor the services 
have a single point that collects information on contracts that support 
deployed forces. 

[2] Established in 1985, LOGCAP is an Army program that preplans for 
the use of global corporate resources to support worldwide contingency 
operations. In the event that U.S. forces deploy, contractor support is 
then available to a military commander as an option. 

[3] See the end of this report for a list of prior GAO reports and 
testimonies on the use of contractors to support deployed U.S. forces. 

[4] See GAO, Military Operations: Contractors Provide Vital Services to 
Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DOD Plans, GAO-03-
695 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003). 

[5] See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999) and Internal 
Control Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: 
August 2001). 

[6] A host country national is an employee of a contractor who is a 
citizen of the country where the work is being performed. 

[7] A third country national is an employee of a contractor who is 
neither a citizen of the United States nor the host country. 

[8] For example, in 2003 DOD relied on a Department of the Interior 
contracting office that specializes in awarding and administering 
contracts for other agencies to obtain contractor-provided intelligence-
related services quickly to support U.S. forces in Iraq. See GAO, 
Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's Orders to 
Support Military Operations, GAO-05-201 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 
2005). 

[9] Department of Defense Instruction 3020.41, Contractor Personnel 
Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces (Oct. 3, 2005). 

[10] DOD Instruction 3020.41 requires the department to maintain by- 
name accountability of contractors deploying with the force, who are 
defined as systems support and external support contractors, and 
associated subcontractors, specifically authorized in their contract to 
deploy to support U.S. forces. At the time of our review, DOD was in 
the process of clarifying whether additional contractor personnel 
should be included in the joint database. 

[11] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 109-702, p. 243 (Sept. 29, 2006). 

[12] See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks 
Remain for Forces Overseas, GAO/NSIAD-00-181 (Washington, D.C.: July 
19, 2000) and Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, 
Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's 
Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington, 
D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004). 

[13] Multi-National Force-Iraq is responsible for counter-insurgency 
operations to isolate and neutralize former regime extremists and 
foreign terrorists and for organizing, training, and equipping Iraq's 
security forces. Multi-National Corps-Iraq is the tactical unit of 
Multi-National Force-Iraq responsible for command and control of 
operations in Iraq. 

[14] A fragmentary order, or FRAGO, is an abbreviated form of an 
operation order used to inform units of changes in missions and the 
tactical situation. 

[15] We recently reported that military commanders in Iraq have 
instituted a variety of base access procedures to address the risk 
third country and host country nationals may pose. See GAO, Military 
Operations: Background Screenings of Contractor Employees Supporting 
Deployed Forces May Lack Critical Information, but U.S. Forces Take 
Steps to Mitigate the Risks Contractors May Pose, GAO-06-999R 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2006). 

[16] This database is known as the Synchronized Pre-deployment and 
Operational Tracker. 

[17] See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, 
D.C.: January 2005). 

[18] See GAO, Information Technology: DOD Needs to Leverage Lessons 
Learned from Its Outsourcing Projects, GAO-03-371 (Washington, D.C.: 
Apr. 25, 2003) and Military Training: Potential to Use Lessons Learned 
to Avoid Past Mistakes is Largely Untapped, GAO/NSIAD-95-152 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 9, 1995). 

[19] See GAO/NSIAD-00-181. 

[20] Army Regulation 700-137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP) (Dec. 16, 1985). 

[21] After-action reports provide an official description of the 
results of military operations. An after-action report typically 
includes a summary of objectives, operational limitations, major 
participants, a description of strengths and weaknesses, and 
recommended actions. 

[22] For example, it is improper for an agency to order a supply or 
service outside the scope of the contract because the work covered by 
the order is subject to the Competition in Contracting Act (10 U.S.C. ß 
2304 and 41 U.S.C. ß 253) requirements for competition. 

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