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GAO: 

August 2006: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, 
House of Representatives: 

Military Training: 

Management Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Investment in the Joint 
National Training Capability: 

Military Training: 

GAO-06-802: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-802, a report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) established its Training Transformation 
Program to ensure combatant commanders that forces deploying to their 
theaters have had experience operating jointly. The centerpiece of this 
effort is the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) initiative, 
which accounts for 84 percent of the $2 billion the department plans to 
invest by 2011 to provide a persistent global network that will 
increase the level of joint training. GAO assessed the extent to which 
(1) JNTC has improved the ability of the services and combatant 
commands to train jointly, (2) the reserve components are benefiting 
from the JNTC initiative, and (3) the Joint Forces Command has 
developed an accreditation process to facilitate program goals. To 
address these objectives, GAO obtained and analyzed key DOD and JNTC 
documents. GAO also reviewed and analyzed 5 of 16 events selected in 
2005 as JNTC training events, and observed 2 of those events firsthand. 

What GAO Found: 

The extent to which the JNTC initiative is improving joint training 
overall is unclear because DOD has not yet assessed the programís 
results; however, GAOís review of five JNTC-enhanced training events 
found indications of some joint training improvements. Prior GAO work 
and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report have stressed the 
importance of performance metrics to gauge program success. While DODís 
initial training transformation assessment set a basic framework for 
measuring future program performance, DOD has not developed a strategy 
to evaluate the overall impact of the JNTC initiative that includes 
metrics, time frames, and processes for gathering data. Without such a 
plan, DOD will not know whether the money invested in the initiative 
will produce desired results or maximize the benefit for the 
investment. 

Reserve units have participated in JNTC training events, but the unique 
training needs of the reserve components have not been fully considered 
because Joint Forces Command has not established an ongoing working 
relationship with them. The Training Transformation Strategic Plan 
recognizes that the reserve components face unique training 
requirements and circumstances that must be considered. However, the 
command has not established a liaison position for any of the reserve 
components and has not included the reserve components in working 
groups and planning sessions, as it has done with the active service 
components and the combatant commands. Until the command incorporates 
the reserves more fully into the JNTC initiative, the reserve 
components will continue to have limited ability to enhance their joint 
training skills. 

The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop an accreditation process 
to facilitate the JNTC initiativeís goals, but it has not emphasized 
new and emerging missions, taken steps to ensure that accredited joint 
tasks will continue in future training rotations, or incorporated the 
National Guard. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report declares 
that training transformation should emphasize new and emerging mission 
areas, such as irregular warfare and combating weapons of mass 
destruction. The Joint Forces Command has allowed services and 
combatant commands to nominate existing training programs to be 
accredited, but these programs may not reflect the priorities 
established in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report because nomination 
guidance does not emphasize the need to accredit programs that will 
improve proficiency in new and emerging mission areas. Further, no 
training programs specific to the National Guard are currently being 
considered for accreditation. Until the department establishes 
nomination guidance and reaccreditation standards and includes the 
National Guard in the accreditation process, JNTC events may not 
reflect DODís training priorities, the services may not continually 
incorporate JNTC enhancements into their training exercises, and the 
National Guard will continue to have limited ability to enhance its 
joint training skills. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense take a number of actions 
to further enhance the quality of joint training for active and reserve 
components. In response to a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed 
with GAOís recommendations. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-802]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at 
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on 
Training Programs, but Our Analysis Found Indications of Improvements: 

Reserve Components Have Potentially Benefited from JNTC, but Joint 
Forces Command Has Not Fully Embraced the Reserves' Unique Training 
Needs: 

JNTC Training Program Accreditation Process Does Not Give Priority to 
New and Emerging Missions, Ensure Consistent Use of JNTC Capabilities, 
or Include the National Guard: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Description of the Five Training Exercises Examined: 

Table 2: Analysis of Attributes Indicating Potential Improvements in 
Joint Training for Five JNTC-Enhanced Exercises in Fiscal Year 2005: 

Table 3: Programs Accredited in Fiscal Year 2005 and Nominated for 
Accreditation in Fiscal Year 2006: 

Table 4: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment: 

Abbreviations: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

JNTC: Joint National Training Capability: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

August 11, 2006: 

The Honorable Joel Hefley: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Readiness: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

Effective joint operations are fundamental to the ability of the U.S. 
military to decisively defeat its adversaries, and the Secretary of 
Defense has stated that in the new and evolving security environment, 
"Achieving jointness in wartime requires building jointness in 
peacetime." In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report,[Footnote 1] 
Department of Defense (DOD) leadership emphasized that meeting the 
challenges of an uncertain security environment would require 
transformations in education and training. The Defense Planning 
Guidance 2003-2007 directed the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness to work with the services, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant Commander of the Joint Forces 
Command to develop a plan for transforming military training that would 
better enable joint force operations. Consequently, the department 
created the Training Transformation Program, which is focused on 
providing dynamic, capabilities-based education and training for DOD in 
support of national security requirements across the full spectrum of 
service (active and reserve components), joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental (state and local), and multinational operations. The 
ultimate goal of DOD's training transformation is to provide combatant 
commanders with better-prepared individuals, units, staffs, and 
organizations that are aligned with their joint operational needs. 

DOD plans to invest almost $2 billion in the Training Transformation 
Program by 2011. The centerpiece of this effort is the Joint Forces 
Command's Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) initiative, which 
accounts for 84 percent of the department's planned spending. The 
primary goal of the initiative is to provide a persistent global 
network of live, virtual, and constructive capabilities[Footnote 2] 
that will enhance the level of joint training in existing service and 
combatant command training programs. The JNTC initiative is expected to 
enhance the joint operational environment by providing more specific 
guidance on conducting joint mission essential tasks,[Footnote 3] 
creating a persistent joint communication network to support joint 
training with more virtual and constructive capability, and accrediting 
training programs to ensure the appropriate joint environment exists. 
The initiative expects to have established a global network of 
accredited joint training programs across the services and combatant 
commands by 2010. 

You asked us to review the JNTC initiative's implementation. 
Specifically, we assessed (1) the extent to which the JNTC initiative 
has improved the ability of the services and combatant commands to 
train jointly, (2) the extent to which the reserve components are 
benefiting from the JNTC initiative, and (3) the extent to which the 
Joint Forces Command has developed an accreditation process to 
facilitate program goals. 

To address the above objectives, we obtained and analyzed key DOD and 
JNTC documents, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2006 
revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan and the JNTC 
initiative strategic plan. We reviewed and analyzed 5 of 16 combatant 
command and service training events that were selected in 2005 as JNTC 
training events. Our analysis evaluated a number of attributes for each 
of these training events to determine the extent to which the JNTC 
initiative enhanced their joint training capability. Additionally, we 
observed two of the selected events firsthand to obtain a real-time 
assessment of the past and planned evolution of the exercises and 
feedback from exercise participants, including the planners, on the 
extent of joint training. We also met with key officials in the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, as well as officials 
from the combatant commands and service organizations that are affected 
by the JNTC initiative. Additionally, we examined the extent to which 
the reserve components participated in selected training events 
enhanced by the JNTC initiative and formal collaboration mechanisms, as 
well as the development and initial implementation of the JNTC 
initiative's accreditation process. We also interviewed key National 
Guard and reserve component officials to further evaluate the benefits 
that the reserve components derive from the JNTC initiative. We 
discussed our methods and assumptions with agency officials to obtain 
their input, and we also assessed the quality of information and 
determined that it was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We 
performed this review from August 2005 through May 2006 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Further 
information on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

DOD does not know the extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved 
the services' and combatant commands' ability to train jointly because 
it has not yet assessed the program's impact. Our analysis of five 
service and combatant command training events selected to be enhanced 
by the JNTC initiative provided some indications of potential 
improvements in joint training. However, the department's first 
assessment of the Training Transformation Program in 2005 did not 
include an evaluation of the collective impact of the JNTC initiative 
on joint training because the initiative is still early in its 
implementation. Instead, the department has established a basic 
framework for measuring the performance of joint training in future 
assessments. However, the department has not finalized a plan for its 
2007 training transformation assessment that includes metrics, 
processes it will employ, and time frames for obtaining data. Our prior 
work has stressed the importance of performance metrics that set up 
time frames and measurable outcomes to gauge the success of a program's 
implementation. The department's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
also emphasizes that to ensure the department's objectives are being 
met, each organization is accountable for measuring performance and 
delivering results that support the departmentwide strategy. 
Furthermore, the Training Transformation Plan requires periodic reviews 
to measure the impact of training transformation initiatives, including 
the JNTC initiative, on joint training. The training events we analyzed 
from fiscal year 2005 provided indications of improved joint training, 
such as more joint objectives than the prior year's exercises and more 
participation by other services. For example, one Air Force exercise we 
reviewed focused on achieving service-specific objectives before being 
enhanced by the JNTC initiative. Since then, these objectives were 
modified to include some joint training objectives. However, without a 
strategy that clearly identifies how the department's next training 
transformation assessment will evaluate the impact the JNTC initiative 
is having on military joint training, the department will not be in a 
position to know whether the money invested in the initiative will 
produce the desired results or maximize the benefit for the investment. 
To support the efforts of the Joint Forces Command to enhance the level 
of joint training, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to fully 
develop a strategy for the next training transformation assessment to 
evaluate the overall impact of the JNTC initiative's implementation on 
joint training, including time frames, outcome-oriented performance 
metrics, roles and responsibilities, and outcomes. DOD agreed with this 
recommendation and stated it is taking actions to implement it. 

Through the participation of selected units and individuals in JNTC- 
enhanced events, the reserve components have benefited from the JNTC 
initiative, but the unique training needs of the reserve components 
have not been fully considered because Joint Forces Command has not 
established an ongoing working relationship with them. According to 
Joint Forces Command officials, the command has not established a 
liaison position for any of the reserve components and has not included 
the reserve components in working groups and planning sessions, as it 
has done with the active service components and the combatant commands. 
According to service and reserve officials, the initiative's process 
action teams, which are responsible for joint program coordination, are 
composed of representatives from the services and combatant commands 
but do not receive input from any of the reserve components. The 
Training Transformation Strategic Plan recognizes that the reserve 
components face several unique training requirements and circumstances 
that must be considered at each step of this process, from strategic 
planning through implementation. For example, compared to active duty 
service members, reservists and National Guard members generally have 
less time to train, less access to current technologies, and an 
additional responsibility to conduct joint domestic missions related to 
homeland defense. Until the Joint Forces Command incorporates the 
reserve components more fully into the JNTC initiative, the reserve 
components will continue to have limited ability to enhance their joint 
training skills. To increase the benefits of joint training programs 
for the reserve components, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Joint Forces Command to establish liaison officers for the 
reserve components and include representatives from the reserve 
components as active participants in JNTC initiative working groups and 
planning sessions. DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, 
agreeing a liaison position was needed for the National Guard, but that 
the current service liaison structure was adequate to represent the 
other reserve components. We continue to believe that the entire 
reserve component would benefit if they had a more active voice in JNTC 
working groups and planning sessions. 

The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop a process for accrediting 
active service and combatant command training programs to facilitate 
the goals of the JNTC initiative, but it has not emphasized new and 
emerging missions, taken steps to ensure that accredited joint tasks 
will continue to be incorporated into future training rotations after 
programs complete initial accreditation, or accredited any National 
Guard-specific training programs. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report declares that training transformation should emphasize new and 
emerging mission areas, such as irregular warfare, complex 
stabilization operations, combating weapons of mass destruction, and 
information operations. The JNTC accreditation process is intended to 
ensure that all units participating in joint training, regardless of 
location, experience a recurring, consistent, realistic training 
environment. The Joint Forces Command has allowed active services and 
combatant commands to nominate specific joint tasks within their 
existing training programs to be accredited. During fiscal year 2005, 
the Joint Forces Command conditionally accredited joint tasks in 4 
training programs and plans to grant accreditation to tasks in as many 
as 23 additional programs during 2006. However, the Joint Forces 
Command's nomination guidance does not emphasize the need to accredit 
service and combatant commander training programs that will improve 
proficiency in new and emerging mission areas. Currently, in some 
instances, nominations for accreditation are based on the services' 
needs to enhance joint training for the maximum number of participants. 
In addition, the Joint Forces Command plans to reaccredit programs 
every 3 years, but the command has not established standards or a 
process for reaccreditation that would ensure that service and 
combatant command training programs continuously incorporate and expand 
upon previously accredited joint training tasks. Further, no training 
programs specific to the National Guard are currently being considered 
for accreditation by the Joint Forces Command because there is no 
mechanism in place for nominating them. For example, the National Guard 
has approached the Joint Forces Command to accredit its Vigilant Guard 
exercise program outside the normal nomination process because there is 
not a mechanism in place that allows the National Guard to nominate 
programs. Currently, this request is being discussed by Joint Forces 
Command and National Guard leadership. Until the department establishes 
nomination guidance and reaccreditation standards, JNTC events may not 
reflect DOD's training priorities and the services and combatant 
commands may not continually incorporate JNTC enhancements into future 
rotations of their training exercises. Additionally, until Joint Forces 
Command incorporates the National Guard into the accreditation process, 
the National Guard training programs may not be able to take full 
advantage of JNTC resources, such as participation from other 
components, access to new technologies and modeling, and training 
environments that realistically portray overseas and domestic joint 
operations. To support the efforts of the Joint Forces Command to 
enhance the level of joint training and to increase the benefits of 
joint training programs for the reserve components, we recommend that 
the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness to (1) establish guidelines for the services 
and combatant commands to follow when nominating programs for future 
accreditation that reflect the importance of new and emerging missions, 
as emphasized by DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report; (2) 
establish reaccreditation standards and criteria that will ensure that 
a recurring, consistent, realistic joint training environment exists 
for all units participating in future rotations of accredited joint 
training programs; and (3) expand the accreditation process to include 
National Guard training programs. DOD agreed with these recommendations 
and is planning actions to implement them. 

Background: 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has overall 
responsibility for the Training Transformation Program and, through the 
use of the Training Transformation Executive Steering Group and the 
Training Transformation Senior Advisory Group, oversees the execution 
of three capabilities or initiatives: JNTC, the Joint Knowledge 
Development and Distribution Capability, and the Joint Assessment and 
Enabling Capability. According to the 2006 Training Transformation 
Implementation Plan,[Footnote 4] these 3 initiatives are designed to 
prepare individuals, units, and staff for the new strategic environment 
and to provide enabling tools and processes to carry out joint 
missions. Specifically: 

* The JNTC, focusing on collective training, is expected to prepare 
forces by providing units and command staff with integrated live, 
virtual, and constructive training environments. This initiative would 
add enhanced service and combatant command training that emphasizes 
jointness and enables global training and mission rehearsal in support 
of combatant command operations. 

* The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability, which 
focuses on individual training, is intended to prepare future decision 
makers and leaders to better understand joint operations and the common 
operational picture, as well as to respond innovatively to adversaries. 
It develops and distributes joint knowledge via a dynamic, global- 
knowledge network that provides immediate access to joint education and 
training resources. 

* The Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability is expected to assist 
leaders in assessing the value of transformational training initiatives 
to individuals, organizations, and processes, and to link the impact of 
the Training Transformation Program to combatant commanders' readiness 
requirements. This initiative is also supposed to provide the processes 
and tools to continuously improve joint training. 

The JNTC initiative, the leading initiative for training 
transformation, is managed by a Joint Management Office within the 
Joint Forces Command's Joint Trainer Directorate. This Joint Management 
Office, which was established in 2003, manages the operational, 
technical and program resources necessary to implement the initiative. 
The Joint Management Office coordinates its management efforts of the 
initiative with the Office of the Secretary of Defense through senior 
and executive advisory groups. The overall purpose of the JNTC 
initiative is to provide a persistent capability to combatant command 
and service training programs to create an appropriate, realistic joint 
operating environment within their existing training activities. To 
accomplish this, DOD plans to spend about $1.5 billion on the JNTC 
initiative through fiscal year 2011, or 84 percent of training 
transformation total funding. The JNTC initiative was deemed by the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness to be operationally 
capable in October 2004--indicating that the initial infrastructure of 
networked sites and systems needed to enhance the joint environment of 
training exercises was in place. During fiscal year 2005, 16 combatant 
command and service training events were selected by the Joint Forces 
Command to enhance their joint training environment through the JNTC 
initiative. 

The JNTC initiative includes several key efforts to enhance the joint 
training environment of combatant commands and services. These efforts 
include the following: 

* Development of joint task articles. This is an effort to enhance the 
level of details associated with joint mission essential tasks that are 
identified by the combatant commands as critical to joint operations, 
and to provide joint trainers specific guidance for developing 
exercises and other joint training activities. These task articles are 
a set of processes, procedures, or actions that address critical 
horizontal (actions between services) and vertical (actions between a 
service and a higher joint force command) elements of interoperability 
for specific joint mission essential tasks. Currently, the JNTC 
initiative has developed 156 approved articles and has 88 under various 
stages of development. 

* Joint training and experimentation network. The joint network is 
intended to be a large-capacity communications network that will 
provide persistent support to joint training exercises, service stand- 
alone events, exercise preparation and rehearsal, experimentation, 
evaluation of advanced training technologies, and evaluation of new 
warfighting concepts. The network, when complete, will enable the Joint 
Forces Command to use live, virtual, and constructive simulations in 
concert to enhance the joint training environment for combatant 
commands and services. By the end of fiscal year 2005, the joint 
network had been expanded to 33 sites, including one in Hawaii and one 
in Germany. 

* Accreditation and certification programs. The JNTC accreditation 
program works toward ensuring that combatant command and service joint 
training programs include the appropriate joint environment for the 
joint tasks being trained. Accreditation is program-centric, whereby 
entire service and combatant command training programs are evaluated 
and accredited for training selected joint tasks in a joint environment 
that meets specific joint standards or conditions. The intent of this 
effort is to establish a process that ensures delivery of a recurring, 
consistent, realistic training environment for all units participating 
in joint training, regardless of the locations from which they are 
participating. The Joint Forces Command accredited 4 training programs 
during fiscal year 2005 and is expecting to accredit 23 more programs 
during 2006. JNTC's certification effort concurrently ensures that the 
technical aspects of the training programs--the sites and the systems 
comprising the training infrastructure, networks, and ranges--support 
the accredited training program. 

The JNTC initiative, now 1 year after being deemed initially 
operational capable, is expected to reach full operational capability 
in 2010 when it will provide a global joint training network that 
allows live, virtual, and constructive participation by services, 
combatant commands, and coalition and interagency partners in 
accredited training programs. 

DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on 
Training Programs, but Our Analysis Found Indications of Improvements: 

The full extent to which the JNTC initiative has improved the ability 
of the services and combatant commands to train jointly is not clear 
because DOD has not yet assessed the full impact of the JNTC initiative 
efforts on joint training or developed a strategy for conducting such 
an assessment. Based on our examination of 5 of the 16 fiscal year 2005 
exercises that the Joint Forces Command helped to fund and enhance 
through the JNTC initiative, we found indications that the JNTC 
initiative has begun to improve joint training. Examples we found 
include increases in the use of joint objectives and increases in 
participation by other services. Without a comprehensive assessment of 
the JNTC initiative's enhancement of joint training programs, DOD has 
no assurance that its investment in the initiative will produce the 
desired results. 

DOD Has Yet to Assess the Overall Impact of the JNTC Initiative on 
Training Programs: 

DOD has not yet assessed the full impact of JNTC efforts on joint 
training; therefore both the overall impact the JNTC initiative is 
having on joint training programs and the extent to which it is 
achieving the program's goals are unclear. The Training Transformation 
Implementation Plan does not include a requirement for the JNTC Joint 
Management Office to assess whether the JNTC initiative has improved 
the ability of the services and combatant commands to train jointly. 
The JNTC Joint Management Office receives feedback through working with 
the services and combatant commands, but no formal evaluation of JNTC 
efforts has been conducted. The individual services and combatant 
commanders are aware of JNTC enhancements to their specific training 
programs and resulting improvements and are documenting some of these 
enhancements in after action reports and lessons learned reports. For 
example, the Navy's preliminary assessment of its Fleet Synthetic 
Training --Joint 05-2 exercise stated that the value added through 
rapid delivery and improved interoperability and repeatability of the 
Fleet Synthetic training capability and the joint network will save 
operating costs while providing quality joint and coalition training to 
the warfighter. Additionally, as a result of a lesson learned during 
Terminal Fury 05, JNTC funds were used to develop an analytical tool 
that enabled analysts to search through recorded exercise model data 
and replay selected training exercises, which helped explain to the 
exercise control group and the training audience how and why a 
particular event occurred. However, these types of reports do not 
provide an overall assessment of the collective impact JNTC efforts are 
having on joint training. 

DOD's most recent assessment of its training transformation efforts, 
conducted by the Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability in support of 
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, is known as the training transformation block assessment. 
This block assessment, conducted for the first time in 2005, is the 
primary mechanism for providing feedback to senior DOD leadership on 
how well DOD is meeting its training transformation goals. The block 
assessment is to provide an assessment every 2 years that measures, 
guides, and evaluates the progress of the training transformation 
initiatives, including the JNTC initiative. These evaluations are 
intended by DOD to be an innovative use of performance assessment 
tools, techniques, and policies, using well-defined metrics to provide 
a feedback capability to the leadership. Additionally, DOD recently 
announced its plans to conduct a Joint Training Program Review during 
mid-2006 to examine training transformation efforts and to realign 
these efforts with the recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report and 
program strategic guidance. 

Our prior work,[Footnote 5] the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 
and DOD's Training Transformation Implementation Plan emphasize the 
importance of establishing performance metrics that set up time frames 
and measurable outcomes to gauge the success of a program 
implementation. GAO's Human Capital: A Guide on Assessing Strategic 
Training Programs and Development Efforts in the Federal Government 
emphasizes the importance of using program performance information to 
assess the progress that training and development programs make toward 
achieving results. The guide states that agencies should keep in mind 
that they need to collect data corresponding to established training 
objectives throughout the implementation process to refine and 
continually improve, deliver, and enhance learning. Furthermore, the 
guide asserts that it is important for agencies to develop and use 
outcome-oriented performance measures to ensure accountability and to 
assess progress toward achieving results aligned with the agencies' 
missions and goals. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report emphasizes 
that each initiative is accountable for measuring performance and 
delivering results that support the departmentwide strategy. DOD's 
Training Transformation Implementation Plan requires periodic reviews 
to assess the success of its Training Transformation Program. According 
to the plan, every 2 years, a formal program assessment should be 
conducted to measure the impact of training transformation initiatives 
on joint force readiness. The results of those assessments are intended 
to help leaders decide strategy modifications and subsequent 
investments. 

DOD's initial 2005 training transformation block assessment did not 
evaluate the JNTC initiative's collective impact on joint training. 
According to DOD officials, this assessment was not expected to provide 
a comprehensive evaluation of the JNTC initiative's impact on joint 
training because the initiative is still early in its implementation. 
Instead, it served as a baseline or framework for identifying joint 
training measurements for future assessments, and provided a status of 
the JNTC initiative's efforts implemented to date. However, the 2005 
assessment did not address training efficiency measured by specific 
cost, schedule, and outcome-oriented performance metrics. Specifically, 
the 2005 assessment highlighted some progress: (1) the JNTC initiative 
is providing more joint training through accreditation and 
certification; (2) combatant command joint mission essential tasks are 
addressed in events and integrated into training objectives for each 
event; and (3) rapidly configurable, persistent training networks, such 
as the Joint Training and Experimentation Network, are a current 
reality and are being improved. However, the 2005 Training 
Transformation Assessment Report noted that because of a wide variation 
of joint training activities, the task of developing metrics that 
supported effective assessment and corresponding program status 
progress was unduly complicated. 

The 2005 block assessment did identify 10 metrics DOD is considering 
for its future assessments, such as the 2007 block assessment. These 
metrics include the percentage of combatant command joint mission 
essential tasks trained in the joint exercise; the number of programs 
accredited and certified; and the number of participants using JNTC 
resources. However, many of these metrics are output oriented and not 
outcome performance measures, which are necessary to gauge the success 
of program implementation. Additionally, one of the block assessment's 
recommendations is to institutionalize a process to develop metrics for 
training transformation exercises for use in future assessments. 
However, it has not finalized its plans for which metrics are to be 
assessed or identified the time frames and processes it will employ for 
obtaining data. Because DOD has not finalized its metrics or identified 
a process to collect the data, training transformation officials stated 
that it may be difficult to show the impact of JNTC efforts on joint 
training even in the 2007 block assessment. Without a comprehensive 
assessment of JNTC's enhancement of joint training programs, DOD has no 
assurance that the money invested in the JNTC initiative will produce 
the desired results of providing combatant commanders with better 
prepared forces aligned with their joint operational needs or maximize 
the benefit for DOD's investment. 

Indications Are That the JNTC Initiative Has Begun to Improve Joint 
Training: 

Even though DOD has yet to assess the overall impact of the JNTC 
initiative on joint training, our analysis found indications of 
potential improvements, such as events that include more joint 
objectives and allow for more joint participation. 

According to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction,[Footnote 
6] joint training is defined as "Military training based on joint 
doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare joint 
forces and/or joint staff to respond to strategic and operational 
requirements deemed necessary by combatant commanders to execute their 
assigned missions. Joint training involves forces of two or more 
Military Departments interacting with a combatant commander or 
subordinate joint force commander; involves joint forces and/or joint 
staffs; and is conducted using joint doctrine or joint tactics, 
techniques, and procedures." 

Based on this definition, we selected several attributes to evaluate 
the effect the JNTC initiative had on joint training. Specifically, we 
determined whether selected JNTC events conducted in 2005 reflected the 
following: 

* increased use of joint training objectives, 

* increased use of joint task articles, 

* increased involvement of other services, 

* increased use of virtual and constructive training capabilities, and: 

* persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC 
initiative. 

DOD officials reviewed the attributes listed above and agreed their use 
was appropriate in evaluating the effect of the JNTC initiative on 
joint training. 

We analyzed 5 of 16 exercises conducted in fiscal year 2005 that the 
Joint Forces Command helped to fund and enhance through the JNTC 
initiative. Table 1 describes the exercises selected for our analysis. 

Table 1: Description of the Five Training Exercises Examined: 

Exercise: Terminal Fury; 
Description: Terminal Fury is a combatant command exercise designed to 
train and evaluate the staff of the Pacific Command Headquarters and 
one of its joint task forces in conducting crisis action planning. The 
exercise makes extensive use of constructive models. The only live 
participants in the exercise are the staff of the Pacific Command 
Headquarters and the staff of the Joint Task Force. 

Exercise: Air Warrior I; 
Description: Air Warrior I is a live exercise designed to train 
aircrews and ground personnel in the planning and execution of close 
air support. The Air Force's aircraft deploy to and operate from Nellis 
Air Force Base, Nevada. The Air Force ground units involved in 
coordinating the close air support attacks deploy to and operate with 
their associated Army units at Fort Irwin, California. 

Exercise: Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint; 
Description: Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint is a virtual and 
constructive exercise designed to develop and maintain warfighting 
proficiency of naval units through tactical exercises conducted by 
ships while they are in port. It uses shore-based and ship-embedded 
simulation, stimulation systems, and distribution networks to conduct 
the exercise. 

Exercise: National Training Center; 
Description: The Army conducts several live exercises each year at the 
National Training Center that are designed to prepare brigade combat 
teams for operations. While historically these exercises have involved 
armored tank units clashing in the desert, over the past 3 years 
training has changed to meet the demands of ongoing operations in 
Operation Iraq Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The National 
Training Center is located at Fort Irwin, California, and the Army 
holds the exercises in conjunction with the Air Force's Air Warrior I 
exercises. (See above.) 

Exercise: Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructors Course; 
Description: The Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course is 
a graduate level course of instruction, which is required for the 
Marine Corps' aviation squadron weapons and tactics instructors. The 7- 
week class involves academics, a flight phase, and live exercises. The 
course is taught at the Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Arizona. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of table] 

Enhancements to the exercises brought about by the JNTC initiative were 
many and varied. Some of the improvements purchased with JNTC 
funds[Footnote 7] included radios, aircraft instrument pods, threat 
emitters that imitated ground base enemy radar, and cruise missile 
simulators. The Air Force used JNTC funds to help establish an Air 
Support Operations Center that improved the realism of the Air Warrior 
I exercise by including real-world joint operational organizations. The 
Joint Forces Command also used JNTC funds to make improvements in 
computer models used in the Terminal Fury exercise. Aircraft, including 
former Russian aircraft, were obtained with JNTC funds to act as 
opposing forces in the Weapons and Tactics Instructor course. JNTC 
funds were also used to hire personnel and place them at service and 
combatant command headquarters to assist in improving the joint 
environment of existing exercises. Finally, the joint network is 
supported and funded by JNTC funds, allowing a large number of 
simulators and constructive models from around the country to connect 
and interact in support of training programs. 

To analyze the exercises, we developed a comparative analysis[Footnote 
8] based on the attributes discussed above. This practice allowed us to 
determine the measure of change in attributes for each selected 
training exercise prior to fiscal year 2005 and afterwards. We obtained 
and reviewed exercise documentation, such as exercise planning 
documents and after action reports for selected exercises to determine 
the measure of change in the exercise based on our attributes. Our 
analysis revealed indications that some joint training improvements 
were made in each of the exercises we assessed. Table 2 summarizes the 
results of our analysis. 

Table 2: Analysis of Attributes Indicating Potential Improvements in 
Joint Training for Five JNTC-Enhanced Exercises in Fiscal Year 2005: 

Increased use of joint training objectives; 
Terminal Fury[A]: [Empty]; 
Air Warrior I: X; 
Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint: X; 
National Training Center: X; 
Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course: X. 

Increased use of joint task articles; 
Terminal Fury[A]: [Empty]; 
Air Warrior I: X; 
Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint: X; 
National Training Center: [Empty]; 
Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course: [Empty]. 

Increased involvement of other services; 
Terminal Fury[A]: [Empty]; 
Air Warrior I: X; 
Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint: X; 
National Training Center: X; 
Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course: X. 

Increased use of virtual and constructive training capabilities; 
Terminal Fury[A]: ; X; 
Air Warrior I: [Empty]; 
Fleet Synthetic Training 
--Joint: ; X; 
National Training Center: [Empty]; 
Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course: ; X. 

Persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC 
initiative; 
Terminal Fury[A]: ; X; 
Air Warrior I: ; X; 
Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint: ; X; 
National Training Center: ; X; 
Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course: ; X. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information and documents. 

Note: An X indicates where the JNTC initiative has improved the joint 
training to some degree. 

[A] Terminal Fury is a historical joint combatant command exercise; 
therefore the level of increase in its joint training environment was 
not as apparent as it was for service exercises. 

[End of table] 

Our analysis of the five exercises and discussions held with exercise 
planners at two of these exercises revealed several key areas in which 
indications exist that the JNTC initiative has begun to improve joint 
training. 

* Increased use of joint training objectives. Our analysis found that 
for four of the five exercise events we reviewed, the services 
increased the number of joint training objectives to which they 
trained. For example, prior to being enhanced by the JNTC initiative, 
Air Warrior I's exercise objectives were determined by the squadron 
commanders and were focused on achieving service-specific objectives. 
After JNTC, service-specific training objectives were modified to 
include some joint training objectives, such as conducting a joint, 
live-fire event within a realistic combat scenario and employing real- 
time joint and combined fires. In another exercise, according to the 
exercise planner, JNTC efforts enabled the Navy Fleet Synthetic 
Training --Joint exercise to include Army and Air Force units in its 
exercise. Through the participation of the Army and Air Force units, 
the Navy began including joint interoperability training objectives in 
exercise planning documents for both Navy Fleet Synthetic Training -- 
Joint 05-2 and 06-1. The National Training Center's primary focus, both 
before and after the JNTC initiative, has been on accomplishing service-
specific training objectives. However, after the JNTC initiative's 
involvement, the National Training Center has added some joint and 
interoperability tasks in its exercises, although these tasks are 
subordinate to the service-specific training objectives. Prior to the 
JNTC initiative, the Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor course 
trained to the six functions of Marine Corps aviation, which had some 
joint aspects. After JNTC designation, the Marine Corps continued to 
train to the six functions of Marine Corps aviation, but it began using 
several joint tactical tasks and joint training objectives in the 
exercise. 

* Increased use of joint task articles. The Air Force and the Navy used 
joint task articles in enhancing their Air Warrior I and Fleet 
Synthetic Training --Joint exercises. Joint task articles detail the 
integrated tasks and steps necessary to provide a specific warfighting 
capability to a joint force commander and are based on the joint 
mission essential tasks. Air Force officials compared the task article 
for close air support with current practices at Air Warrior I and 
identified deficiencies in the procedures used during these exercises 
prior to 2005. Steps were then taken to correct the deficiencies which 
included adding an Air Support Operations Center. Consequently, Air 
Warrior I exercises are now conducted more in line with close air 
support joint doctrine. The Navy also made extensive use of the task 
articles in preparing for its accreditation review. 

* Increased involvement of other services. Four of the five exercises 
we examined showed that participation had expanded to include more 
services when compared to years before the JNTC enhancements were 
included. The fifth exercise was a combatant command exercise that was 
already joint and did not show an increase in the participation of 
other services as a result of JNTC efforts. Joint training requires the 
involvement of two or more services; therefore the JNTC initiative used 
a variety of means, such as additional funding and the Joint Training 
and Experimentation Network, to increase the participation of other 
services in an exercise. As a result, Navy and Marine air units and the 
staff of the Commander, Third Fleet, participated in the National 
Training Center/Air Warrior I exercises in 2005. Army and Air Force 
units participated in the Navy's Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint in 
2005 and 2006. A NATO Airborne Warning and Control aircraft joined the 
Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor course exercise in 2005, 
and a similar unit from the United Kingdom plans to participate in 
2006. 

* Increased use of virtual and constructive training capabilities. Our 
analysis showed that key virtual and constructive training capabilities 
made possible by the use of the Joint Training and Experimentation 
Network have had a positive impact on three of the five exercises we 
examined. The joint network is a persistent, rapidly reconfigurable 
communications network that connects multiple training sites. According 
to Navy training exercise planners, the joint network is what allowed 
the Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint exercises to include Army and Air 
Force simulators to participate in the exercise. For example, we 
observed during a recent Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint exercise, 
Army and Navy operators, using virtual and constructive capabilities, 
track an incoming missile attack and coordinate a joint response. 
Without the joint network, the Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint 
exercises would likely have remained solely a Navy exercise. According 
to Terminal Fury exercise planners, the joint network improved Terminal 
Fury by increasing the capacity to include a larger number of 
constructive models in the exercise. For example, Tactical Simulation 
is a very large intelligence model used to simulate the entire spectrum 
of intelligence operations. Prior to the joint network, the Tactical 
Simulation model was not included in the exercise because the model was 
too large to transport to Hawaii. The joint network provided the means 
to connect the Tactical Simulation model to the exercise from its home 
station in the continental United States. In addition, Terminal Fury 
participants are spread out over a wide area, including several sites 
in Hawaii and the continental United States. According to Terminal Fury 
exercise planners, two tools made possible by the joint network, Video 
Teleconferencing and Voice Over Internet Protocol, provided the means 
by which these geographically separated sites could coordinate the 
execution of the exercise. Finally, according to a Marine Corps 
official, the joint network has aided the Marine Corps Weapons and 
Tactics Instructor Course in developing exercise scenarios, executing 
the exercise, and connecting a virtual Unmanned Aerial Vehicle to the 
exercise. 

* Persistent capabilities added to exercises funded by the JNTC 
initiative. All five exercises reviewed received enhancements that will 
continue to benefit these exercises into the future. Each exercise 
received a persistent link to the joint network and embedded Support 
Element staff hired to assist service and combatant command 
headquarters in adding joint capabilities to their exercises. In 
addition, the Air Force received radios and aircraft instrument pods 
for Air Warrior I, computer model improvements were made for Terminal 
Fury, and the National Training Center received surrogate weapons for 
its opposing force. All these persistent capabilities were procured 
with JNTC funds. 

In addition to the improvements noted above, we also found that the 
JNTC initiative has reduced some of the travel and transportation costs 
associated with one of the five exercises we examined. Specifically, a 
number of the constructive models used in the Terminal Fury exercise 
are based in the continental United States. In prior years, the 
hardware and supporting personnel would have to travel to Hawaii to 
participate in the exercise. Since the joint network connected these 
models to the exercise from their home stations, there was no need to 
move the hardware and support staff to Hawaii for the exercise. 

Finally, there are a number of JNTC efforts under way to further 
improve joint training. For example, in future iterations of the 
National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercise, the Air Force would 
like to use the joint network to include a Joint Surveillance Target 
Attack Radar System aircraft simulator to create a realistic joint 
environment. Due to their limited number and the high demand for these 
aircraft, the planes are not always available to participate in the 
exercises. The joint network will allow the use of these aircraft 
simulators in the National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercise by 
having them participate virtually from their home stations. In addition 
to increasing the availability of these aircraft virtually in future 
exercises, the joint network will also reduce the travel, 
transportation, and fuel costs of deploying and using the actual 
aircraft in the National Training Center/Air Warrior I exercises. 

Reserve Components Have Potentially Benefited from JNTC, but Joint 
Forces Command Has Not Fully Embraced the Reserves' Unique Training 
Needs: 

Reserve component members have benefited from JNTC-enhanced training 
events, but the unique training needs of the reserve components have 
not been fully considered because the Joint Forces Command has not 
established an ongoing working relationship with them. 

Reserve Units Have Participated in JNTC Training Events: 

Members of the reserve components have potentially benefited from JNTC- 
enhanced training when they participate in active service-and combatant 
command-sponsored combat training programs enhanced by the JNTC 
initiative, such as predeployment and mission rehearsal exercise 
programs. For example, based on our analysis of five training events 
enhanced by the JNTC initiative, reserve and guard units and 
individuals have participated to a limited extent in all but one of the 
five events. Specifically, Air National Guard personnel participated in 
a fiscal year 2005 Air Warrior I exercise, Army reservists participated 
in a fiscal year 2005 National Training Center exercise, Navy 
reservists participated in a fiscal year 2005 Fleet Synthetic Training-
-Joint exercise, and Marine Corps reservists participated in a fiscal 
year 2006 Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course exercise. Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs officials stated that 
reserve participation in many of these events occurred, in part, 
because active duty units were unavailable to fully participate and 
reserve units were asked to fill in. According to JNTC and service 
officials, reserves participating in these events may benefit from many 
of the same JNTC enhancements to the joint training environment as do 
active forces. To date, Joint Forces Command officials said they have 
relied on active service components and combatant commands to involve 
the reserve components in JNTC-enhanced training. 

Joint Forces Command Has Not Established a Working Relationship with 
the Reserve Components: 

In an effort to develop and manage active service and combatant command 
training programs, the Joint Forces Command has developed formal 
coordination mechanisms, including liaison officers, planning 
conferences, and process action teams that involve numerous 
participants from various organizations within the active service and 
combatant commands, but these coordination mechanisms do not include 
reserve personnel. For example, the Joint Forces Command has 
established on-site liaison officer positions to serve as the active 
service representative on a daily basis to communicate with the JNTC 
officials and aid in the development of the business and operational 
processes related to the JNTC initiative. Currently, all liaison 
officer positions include representatives from the active services with 
no representatives from the reserve components. According to Joint 
Forces Command officials and service liaison officers, these active 
service liaison officers primarily represent their respective active 
service components' needs and issues and do not specifically 
communicate the needs of the reserve component to Joint Forces Command 
officials. 

Active services and combatant command personnel also regularly attend 
planning conferences to organize upcoming training exercises. These 
meetings occur periodically throughout the initial, middle, and final 
planning stages of an exercise, and to date, the Joint Forces Command 
has not reached out specifically to the reserve components to include 
them in these planning conferences. The Joint Forces Command has also 
established nine process action teams organized by functional areas in 
operations, technical, and program management to discuss JNTC 
implementation and development. These process action teams perform a 
vast array of responsibilities, such as: 

* developing JNTC event requirements and timelines; 

* defining required operational capabilities in order to fully 
coordinate live, virtual, and constructive opposition forces into joint 
training; 

* defining technical goals for data systems that will enable joint 
distributed training; 

* selecting advanced training technologies to ensure integration of 
live, virtual, and constructive components into a seamless joint 
training environment; and: 

* developing all JNTC budget and program activities. 

According to Joint Forces Command officials, the reserve components are 
not formally invited to participate in these process action teams. 

DOD guidance regarding reserve components and joint training requires 
full integration of the reserve components into every aspect and each 
stage of the overall process in developing a joint training initiative. 
For example, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report specifically 
highlights the need for joint training to include the reserve 
components in ensuring the readiness of the total force. In addition, 
the Training Transformation Strategic Plan identifies that the reserve 
components face several unique training requirements and circumstances 
that must be considered at each step of this process, from strategic 
planning through implementation. Further, the 2005 training 
transformation block assessment calls for including the reserve 
components' training in transformation training events. Specifically, 
the assessment states that the reserve components (1) should 
participate in training transformation events in order to integrate the 
reserve component with the active component and (2) may have special 
needs for training, and training events should be tailored to meet 
these needs. 

During discussions with Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Reserve Affairs, officials, they noted the following unique reserve 
training circumstances that should be considered when developing the 
JNTC enhancements: 

* Geography. Since members of the National Guard and reserves are often 
not physically located at their respective home duty stations, the 
scheduling of training is more complex. 

* Limited training time. Reservists are constrained to 39 training days 
per year. Only if a reservist is activated or volunteers can he/she 
exceed this limitation. 

* Competing requirements. Reservists must complete training 
requirements similar to the active core training requirements, such as 
general military training and physical training, as well as satisfying 
any other reserve requirements. Reservists must also consider and 
manage their civilian careers along with their military obligations. 

* Limited training assets. Resources, such as classrooms and computer 
simulation systems and networks for joint training (such as those that 
enable live, virtual, and constructive participation), are not readily 
available to National Guard members and reservists. 

* Lack of training predictability. Since reserve components are 
currently not included in the scheduling of joint training events, 
planning for joint training opportunities is much more difficult and 
erratic. 

Along with these unique training requirements, National Guard Bureau 
officials stated that some of the National Guard's missions, such as 
homeland defense and responding to natural disasters, should be 
included as a part of the JNTC initiative that currently are not. 

As a result of the absence of formal reserve component representation 
in the development of the JNTC initiative, the unique characteristics 
of the reserve component have not been incorporated into the 
initiative's development of joint training requirements. According to 
Joint Forces Command officials, the inclusion of unique reserve 
component training needs into the JNTC initiative is a long-term goal. 
To date, there has been no specific effort made by the Joint Forces 
Command to develop joint tasks or technical enhancements associated 
with the needs and missions of the reserve components. 

The JNTC initiative's priority remains on active services and combatant 
commands, as the development of joint tasks and technical enhancements 
has been primarily for existing active service and combatant command 
training programs. According to Joint Forces Command officials, the 
process for the development of joint articles has involved the active 
services and combatant commands and focused on developing tasks for 
combat missions, such as close air support, joint force targeting, and 
joint fires. Although reserve members deploying to overseas operations 
are expected to perform these combat tasks as appropriate, Joint Forces 
Command officials have stated that the development of joint articles 
has not significantly focused on tasks unique to the reserve 
components, such as disaster relief and homeland defense. Further, the 
reserve components were not included in the team responsible for the 
development of joint articles. Additionally, the development of the 
Joint Training and Experimentation Network has established permanent 
capability throughout the continental United States at active service 
and combatant command facilities. The joint network has been 
coordinated with existing active training networks, such as the Navy's 
Continuous Training Environment, according to Navy officials, and the 
Air Force's Distributed Mission Operations Center. According to Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs officials, 
interfaces with reserve and guard networks have not yet occurred. The 
continued lack of focus on the joint training needs of the reserve 
components will limit their ability to enhance their joint training 
skills. 

JNTC Training Program Accreditation Process Does Not Give Priority to 
New and Emerging Missions, Ensure Consistent Use of JNTC Capabilities, 
or Include the National Guard: 

The Joint Forces Command has begun to develop a process of accrediting 
training programs and joint tasks to facilitate the JNTC goals. 
However, the command has not (1) placed priority on accrediting 
training programs related to new and emerging missions, as highlighted 
in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review Report; (2) taken steps 
to ensure that accredited joint training will continue to occur after 
initial accreditation; and (3) accredited any National Guard-specific 
training programs. 

Joint Forces Command Has Begun an Accreditation Process: 

In fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command began a process of 
accrediting active services' and combatant commands' training programs 
on specific joint tasks, in an effort to facilitate the goals of the 
JNTC initiative. The intent of the accreditation process is to validate 
that the training programs can provide the training audience, 
regardless of location, with a recurring, consistent, realistic 
environment for the joint tasks being trained. An accreditation review 
is not an inspection or a report card, but can be compared to 
accrediting a university, where individual courses of instruction are 
officially approved.[Footnote 9] Initially, the JNTC initiative used an 
event-centric approach that focused on enhancing single designated 
training events. Starting in fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command 
began employing a program-centric approach that focused on establishing 
permanent joint capabilities, which can be used for all rotations of 
active service and combatant command training programs. Previously, the 
event-centric approach only provided a limited number of soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, and marines with an opportunity to experience a JNTC- 
enhanced joint training event. Specifically, one rotation of the Navy's 
Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint exercise would have been enhanced by 
the JNTC initiative, and the one event would have incorporated enhanced 
joint capabilities. However, in the program-centric approach, the 
number of training opportunities using JNTC enhancements significantly 
increases. Now, every rotation of the Fleet Synthetic Training --Joint 
exercise has the opportunity to include enhanced joint training. 

The accreditation process involves several steps, beginning with the 
nomination process and ending with the Joint Forces Command's 
recommendation. The key steps of the accreditation process are 
summarized below: 

* The Joint Forces Command sends a message to the active services and 
combatant commands, requesting that they nominate training programs and 
joint tasks to be accredited. 

* Once the active services and combatant commands submit their training 
programs for nomination, the Joint Forces Command reviews and selects 
these programs, and consolidates and prioritizes a master schedule of 
those nominated programs to include joint tasks to be performed by each 
program. 

* To familiarize the active services and combatant commands with the 
accreditation process, the Joint Forces Command's Accreditation Review 
Team develops a Web site for each training program and provides 
training for the services and combatant commands. 

* The Joint Forces Command schedules site visits with cognizant active 
service and combatant command officials to perform its accreditation 
review. 

* The Joint Forces Command team conducts the review and makes a 
recommendation to the Commander, who will grant the appropriate level 
of accreditation status to that training program on specific joint 
tasks, in the final accreditation report.[Footnote 10] 

JNTC Nomination Guidance for Accreditation Does Not Emphasize 
Priorities Identified by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report: 

Although the Joint Forces Command has begun its accreditation process 
to facilitate the JNTC goals, it has not emphasized nominating training 
programs that place a priority on new and emerging missions as stressed 
in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. These new and emerging 
mission areas include irregular warfare, complex stabilization 
operations, combating weapons of mass destruction, and information 
operations, which may emphasize additional skill sets than offensive 
combat operations, such as cultural awareness training and coordination 
with other agencies. In the past nomination cycles, there has been no 
guidance that provides criteria for nominating training programs and 
joint tasks. In lieu of established nomination guidance, we found that 
the active services nominated training programs based on several 
reasons. For example, Army and Marine Corps officials told us they 
selected programs based on their need to enhance joint tasks for the 
maximum number of participants. The Navy nominated programs based on 
their ability to provide joint and coalition training. The Air Force 
nominated programs based on their perceived gains from adding jointness 
to the training environment. While there have been no specific 
nomination criteria, the Joint Forces Command has established criteria 
it uses for selecting programs once nominated. These criteria focus on 
(1) programs that address critical joint training issues that are 
affecting warfighting capabilities; (2) the mission of organizations 
that will receive joint training; (3) programs that provide 
predeployment training; and (4) joint throughput, or the number of 
multi-service and joint units that can be trained on required joint 
training. These criteria do not emphasize skill sets required for new 
and emerging mission areas. 

Currently, the Joint Forces Command is in the process of developing 
guidance for future use that will provide criteria for nominating 
programs. These criteria ask active services and combatant commands to 
nominate programs that have the following traits: (1) primary training 
audience composed of units or staff; (2) established system for 
providing training feedback; (3) established training cadre and/or 
exercise control structure; and (4) realistic threat portrayal (i.e., 
opposing forces) within the training programs. Additionally, it 
provides nomination criteria for accrediting the joint tasks within the 
program. The criteria requires that the joint tasks (1) come from the 
Universal Joint Task List[Footnote 11] or the latest approved list of 
joint tasks, and (2) fall within the normal core competencies and 
normal training environment of the nominated training programs. 
Although the Joint Forces Command has proposed nomination guidance, its 
draft guidance still has not emphasized the need to accredit tasks 
within active service and combatant command training programs that will 
improve proficiency in new and emerging mission areas. Until DOD 
establishes such nomination guidance, new and emerging missions will 
not be given priority in the accreditation process and thus be able to 
incorporate the JNTC enhancements. 

By the end of fiscal year 2005, the Joint Forces Command had 
conditionally accredited joint tasks in 4 programs and plans to grant 
accreditation to joint tasks in as many as 23 additional programs by 
the end of 2006. Most of these training programs focus primarily on 
traditional combat missions. For example, the Navy's Fleet Synthetic 
Training --Joint program has been conditionally accredited on seven 
joint tasks, including developing and sharing intelligence, conducting 
joint fires, conducting air and missile defense operations, and 
conducting defensive counter air operations. Additionally, the Joint 
Forces Command anticipates that the active services and combatant 
commands will nominate 3 or 4 additional programs for accreditation in 
2007. Table 3 shows the total nominated programs, including the 4 
programs conditionally accredited in fiscal year 2005 and the 23 
programs planned to be accredited for 2006. 

Table 3: Programs Accredited in Fiscal Year 2005 and Nominated for 
Accreditation in Fiscal Year 2006: 

Active service/combatant command: Army; 
Training program: Battle Command Training Program[A]; 
Joint Readiness Training Center; 
National Training Center; 
Combat Maneuver Training Center. 

Active service/combatant command: Air Force; 
Training program: Blue Flag[A]; 
Air Warrior I; 
Air Warrior II; 
Virtual Flag; 
Red Flag; 
Cope Thunder; 
Warrior Prep Center (nominated by European Command). 

Active service/combatant command: Navy; 
Training program: Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint[]; 
Joint Task Force Exercise. 

Active service/combatant command: Marine Corps; 
Training program: Marine Aviation Weapons Training Squadron 1; 
Marine Air Ground Task Force Staff Training Program; 
Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Center; 
Mountain Warfare Training Center. 

Active service/combatant command: Joint Forces Command; 
Training program: Unified Endeavor Mission Rehearsal Program[A]. 

Active service/combatant command: Pacific Command; 
Training program: Pacific Command Joint Task Force Training Program. 

Active service/combatant command: Central Command; 
Training program: Internal Look. 

Active service/combatant command: Northern Command; 
Training program: Ardent Sentry. 

Active service/combatant command: European Command; 
Training program: Joint Training Requirements and Exercise Division; 
Warrior Prep Center. 

Active service/combatant command: Strategic Command; 
Training program: Strategic Command Training Program. 

Active service/combatant command: Special Operations Command; 
Training program: Able Warrior/Able Focus. 

Active service/combatant command: Southern Command; 
Training program: Southern Command Joint Exercise Program. 

Active service/combatant command: Transportation Command; 
Training program: Turbo Challenge. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD documentation. 

[A] Indicate training programs conditionally accredited in fiscal year 
2005 by Joint Forces Command. 

[End of table] 

Accreditation Process Has No Mechanism to Ensure Recurring Use of JNTC 
Capabilities: 

The Joint Forces Command has not taken steps to ensure that accredited 
joint training will consistently reoccur in active service and 
combatant command training programs. As previously noted, the intent of 
the accreditation process is to ensure that all units participating in 
joint training, regardless of location, experience a recurring, 
consistent, realistic joint environment. In addition, DOD has directed 
the services to conduct joint training to the maximum extent possible 
in accredited exercises. As previously noted, in fiscal year 2005, the 
Joint Forces Command began to transition its JNTC initiative from an 
event-centric approach to a broader program-centric approach, focusing 
on establishing permanent joint capabilities, which can be used for all 
rotations of training events, not just a single designated training 
event. 

However, the Joint Forces Command has not taken steps to ensure that 
joint tasks previously accredited will consistently be incorporated in 
future service and combatant commander training events. According to 
DOD officials, the services and combatant commands should participate 
in the accreditation process in order to obtain JNTC funding for their 
nominated training programs. However, according to a Joint Forces 
Command official, the command cannot require the services and combatant 
commands to train to the joint tasks that have been accredited. Service 
officials we spoke with stated that currently there are no consequences 
for them not continuing to include accredited joint tasks in future 
training rotations. While service officials recognized the value of 
training to accredited joint tasks, they also recognized that there are 
competing demands for their time and resources that may preclude them 
from training to joint tasks. Situations that compete for their time 
and resources include service-specific unit training requirements, 
shortage of training funds, and the deployment of personnel and 
equipment to overseas operations. While the Joint Forces Command 
provides financial contributions to the services to help offset the 
costs associated with incorporating the JNTC enhancements, it is not 
clear if the JNTC initiative's financial contributions are significant 
enough to function as leverage to encourage the repeated training of 
accredited joint tasks. For example, an Army official stated that the 
Army has budgeted $640 million to support its combat training centers 
in fiscal year 2006, and that the Joint Forces Command's support for 
the Army's combat training centers amounts to $11.6 million. 

The Joint Forces Command is taking a proactive step to help support the 
active services and combatant commands in embedding JNTC enhancements 
in their training programs. It is hiring Support Elements--JNTC 
representatives placed permanently at service and combatant command 
training programs--to help ensure that the program officials implement 
the JNTC initiative by creating a supporting relationship between 
organizations. Additionally, the Support Elements are to assist program 
officials with joint training planning and executions at their 
locations and ensure that standards are maintained in accreditation 
reviews. However, according to JNTC officials, these individuals alone 
may not be able to ensure that accredited joint training will continue 
to occur. Furthermore, it is too early to determine if the services 
will continue to include joint tasks on a regular basis, since the 
Joint Forces Command only began the accreditation process in 2005 and 
only recently established positions to be filled by Support Element 
representatives. 

The Joint Force Commander plans to reaccredit training programs every 3 
years but has not established criteria for their reaccreditation 
process that would ensure that services and combatant commanders 
continue to incorporate and expand on previously accredited joint 
tasks. According to the JNTC Accreditation Concept of Operations, a 
reaccreditation process will be used to reaffirm accredited status upon 
expiration (following 3 years) or determine the status of a training 
program that has undergone such significant change that the existing 
program is considerably different from the program that last received 
accreditation status. However, this concept of operations does not 
address what standard of training needs to be accomplished or what 
level of accredited tasks should be trained to receive reaccreditation. 
Without providing adequate reaccreditation guidance, the Joint Forces 
Command may risk not accomplishing the intent of JNTC's accreditation 
efforts. Moreover, until DOD establishes standards for reaccrediting 
training programs that ensure the consistent incorporation of JNTC 
enhancement in future training rotations, DOD risks not maximizing its 
investment in the JNTC initiative. 

No National Guard Training Programs Have Been Considered for JNTC 
Accreditation: 

DOD encourages the integration of the reserve components into joint 
training. Specifically, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
reinforces the need for joint training to include the reserve 
components in ensuring the readiness of the total force, and a DOD 
directive on military training[Footnote 12] says that to the maximum 
extent possible, all components shall conduct joint training in 
accredited events. Our analysis found that the National Guard has 
developed joint training exercise programs dealing with missions 
involving homeland defense and security. However, no National Guard 
training programs have currently been considered for JNTC 
accreditation. Joint Forces Command officials stated they have not 
placed a priority on involving the National Guard in the JNTC 
accreditation process, and incorporating the National Guard into the 
JNTC initiative is still a long-term goal for the Joint Forces Command. 
The Joint Forces Command has not sent request messages seeking 
nominations for joint training accreditation to the National Guard as 
it has done for the active services and combatant commands. In 
addition, we found that the Joint Forces Command has not established a 
process for nominating and accrediting National Guard-specific training 
programs. 

The National Guard Bureau has approached the Joint Forces Command about 
considering the Vigilant Guard training program--a series of training 
exercises that will further enhance the preparedness of the National 
Guard to perform roles and responsibilities related to homeland defense 
and defense support to civil authorities--for the JNTC accreditation 
process. The training program involves 4 to 6 states per event with a 
focus on the training and coordination of the newly established state 
joint force headquarters and state joint task forces. Vigilant Guard 
provides the National Guard the opportunity to execute core joint 
tasks, such as (1) acquire and communicate operational-level 
information and maintain status; (2) establish, organize, and operate a 
joint force headquarters; and (3) provide theater support to other DOD 
and government agencies. However, National Guard officials stated that 
Vigilant Guard has not yet been considered for accreditation by the 
Joint Forces Command. 

National Guard Bureau officials have also recently discussed with the 
Joint Forces Command officials the potential for linking the National 
Guard's GuardNet network to JNTC's joint network. GuardNet is a network 
for delivering telecommunications services to National Guard users in 
54 U.S. states and territories, providing persistent connectivity. It 
consolidates video and data functions to support simulation, training, 
mobilization command and control, and computer emergency response, in 
addition to operational missions assigned to the National Guard. These 
telecommunications capabilities have helped to reduce stress on the 
National Guard force by decreasing personnel travel and increasing home 
station time available for training. To date, National Guard officials 
stated that GuardNet has not been integrated into JNTC's joint network 
design. Although Joint Forces Command and National Guard officials have 
had meetings regarding the inclusion of both Vigilant Guard and 
GuardNet into the JNTC joint network, National Guard Bureau officials 
stated that no action has yet been taken. Without specific JNTC- 
accredited training programs and linkages with JNTC's joint network, 
National Guard training programs may not be able to take full advantage 
of JNTC resources, such as participation from other components, access 
to new technologies and modeling, and training environments that 
realistically portray overseas and domestic joint operations. 

Conclusions: 

In the new security environment, U.S. forces are conducting 
significantly more complex operations requiring increased joint 
interoperability among participants in the theater and on the 
battlefield. DOD's JNTC initiative is designed to help the services and 
combatant commands meet these challenges. Without thoroughly assessing 
the progress of the Joint Forces Command's training transformation 
efforts, DOD does not know the value added to the readiness of services 
and combatant commands resulting from the significant investment of 
resources devoted to the JNTC initiative. Furthermore, recent domestic 
events and ongoing overseas operations have placed extremely high 
demands on the reserve components, which play a critical role in 
executing our national defense strategy. Once mobilized, reservists and 
National Guard members operate in the same joint environment as active 
service members. Unless the reserve components receive the training 
necessary to allow them to operate seamlessly in this environment, 
reservists may be unprepared to face the full range of responsibilities 
they are called upon to perform both at home and abroad. Until the 
Joint Forces Command embraces the reserve components, incorporating 
their unique training needs into the development of the JNTC 
initiative's joint training enhancements, the reserve and the National 
Guard forces will not be able to take full advantage of the enhanced 
joint training offered through this initiative. Additionally, without 
clear criteria to guide the accreditation and reaccreditation process, 
DOD will have no assurance that the joint training initiative reflects 
DOD's training priorities on new and emerging threats or that the 
services and combatant commands will continually take advantage of the 
resources and capabilities provided by the JNTC initiative. Without 
consistently training its forces in a recurring, realistic, joint 
operating environment, DOD will lack assurance that forces deployed to 
its theaters will have the necessary skills to operate effectively in 
today's complex, multinational, interagency operations. Also, without 
incorporating the National Guard into the accreditation process, DOD 
has no assurance that the National Guard will experience realistic 
overseas and domestic joint operational training environments portrayed 
by JNTC enhancements. Furthermore, DOD needs to address the issues 
highlighted above in order to ensure that the joint training benefits 
from its $1.5 billion investment in the JNTC initiative are being 
optimized. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To further enhance the quality of joint training and to increase the 
benefits of the JNTC initiative for the reserve components, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five 
actions: 

* direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
fully develop a strategy for the next training transformation 
assessment to evaluate the overall impact of the JNTC initiative's 
implementation on joint training, including time frames, outcome- 
oriented performance metrics, roles and responsibilities, and outcomes; 

* direct the Joint Forces Command to establish liaison officers for the 
reserve components and include representatives from the reserve 
components as active participants in JNTC working groups and planning 
sessions; 

* direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
establish guidelines for the services and combatant commands to follow 
when nominating programs for future accreditation that reflect the 
importance of new and emerging missions, as emphasized by DOD's 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report; 

* direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
establish reaccreditation standards and criteria that will ensure that 
a recurring, consistent, realistic joint training environment exists 
for all units participating in accredited joint training programs; and: 

* direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
expand the accreditation process to include National Guard training 
programs. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with four 
recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation to 
establish reserve liaisons. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix 
II. 

Specifically, DOD agreed with our recommendation that the department 
develop a strategy for evaluating the overall impact of the JNTC 
initiative as part of its 2007 training transformation assessment. DOD 
stated that it is in the process of developing a plan for its 2007 
assessment that will include detailed metrics and roles and 
responsibilities and will address the impact of transformation 
initiatives on DOD-wide training. 

DOD also agreed with our recommendations to (1) establish guidelines 
that emphasize the need for the services and combatant commands to 
consider new and emerging issues when nominating programs for 
accreditation, (2) establish reaccreditation standards and criteria, 
and (3) expand the accreditation process to include National Guard 
training programs. DOD stated that its accreditation guidance will be 
refined to include consideration of new and emerging missions during 
the next phase of accreditation reviews. Additionally, DOD stated that 
the Joint Forces Command will ensure that the accreditation concept of 
operations is strengthened to include specific reaccreditation 
standards. Further, DOD stated it will add National Guard training 
programs with the appropriate joint environment to the accreditation 
nomination list. Moreover, it noted that the JNTC Joint Management 
Office is actively discussing this action with National Guard 
leadership to develop a plan for inclusion of National Guard joint 
training programs. 

Finally, DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Joint 
Forces Command establish liaison officers for the reserve components 
and include reserve component representatives as participants in JNTC 
working groups and planning sessions. The department agreed it should 
establish liaison officers for the National Guard and include Guard 
representatives as participants in JNTC working groups and planning 
sessions. However, DOD stated that the joint training requirements of 
the other reserve components are adequately addressed through the 
current service liaison officer structure within JNTC and the assigned 
reserve Joint Warfighting Center. DOD's approach would require that the 
Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corp reserves continue to voice their 
training needs indirectly through their respective service headquarters 
rather than through direct participation. However, as discussed in this 
report, Training Transformation documents and officials from the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense's Office of Reserve Affairs have 
recognized that the reserve components have some unique training 
requirements and that these requirements have yet to receive priority 
in the Joint Forces Command's JNTC initiative. We continue to believe 
that all reserve components would benefit if the Joint Forces Command 
would establish liaison officers for both the National Guard and the 
service reserve components and include them as active participants in 
JNTC working groups and planning sessions to allow them to voice their 
unique training needs and enhance their awareness of new developments 
and opportunities in joint training. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the 
Commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command. We will make copies 
available to others upon request. In addition, this report is available 
at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this 
report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Janet A. St. Laurent, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the Joint National Training Capability 
(JNTC) initiative has improved the ability of the services and 
combatant commands to train jointly, we analyzed 5 of the 16 training 
exercises selected by the Joint Forces Command to incorporate JNTC 
enhancements in fiscal year 2005. We reviewed relevant exercise 
planning documents pertaining to the exercises and JNTC enhancements. 
We also discussed the impact of the JNTC initiative with a variety of 
officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, service 
headquarters, combatant commands, and Joint Chiefs of Staff who were 
involved in this effort. Additionally, we discussed our methods, the 
attributes to be assessed, and the information collected with agency 
officials and determined that they were sufficiently reliable for our 
purposes. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make 
inferences about a population, because some elements of the population 
have no chance of being selected. Specifically, we did the following: 

* To select the five exercises, we reviewed the descriptions and 
training profiles provided by JNTC initiative officials, and in 
consultation with these officials, we identified one event selected by 
the Joint Forces Command to be enhanced by the JNTC initiative from 
each of the military services and one sponsored by a combatant command. 

* To analyze the exercises, we identified attributes that would allow 
us to quantitatively discern the differences in selected exercises 
prior to their JNTC designation and afterwards. We then developed a 
detailed data collection instrument to precisely and consistently 
gather attribute information for comparative analysis. Our analysis of 
these attributes allowed us to determine the measure of change in a 
selected fiscal year 2005 training exercise prior to fiscal year 2005 
and afterwards. We obtained and reviewed exercise documentation, such 
as exercise planning documents, and after action reports for selected 
exercises to determine the measure of change in the exercises based on 
our attributes. 

* To augment our documentation review of the JNTC initiative's impact 
on existing service and combatant exercises, we met with service, 
combatant command, and JNTC officials to discuss their perspectives on 
the overall value added to joint training by the JNTC initiative. We 
then visited and observed 2 of the 5 exercises to obtain a real-time 
assessment of the past and planned evolution of the exercises and 
feedback from exercise participants, including the planners. 

To determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) had assessed the 
full impact of the JNTC effort on joint training through its first 
training transformation assessment, we reviewed and analyzed key DOD 
and JNTC documents, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 
2006 revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2005 
Training Transformation Assessment Report, and the JNTC initiative's 
strategic plan. Additionally, we met with Office of the Secretary of 
Defense officials directly involved in conducting the training 
transformation assessment to discuss the methodology for the current 
assessment and plans for future assessments. 

To determine the extent to which the reserve components are benefiting 
from the JNTC initiative, we obtained and analyzed key DOD and JNTC 
documentation, including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2006 
revised Training Transformation Implementation Plan, the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the JNTC strategic and 
implementation plans, to identify program guidance on the inclusion of 
the reserve components in training transformation initiatives and 
assess the level of coordination established between the JNTC 
initiative and the reserve components. We also examined the extent to 
which the reserve components participated in JNTC current events and 
formal collaboration mechanisms to further evaluate the effectiveness 
of the program to benefit the reserve components. Additionally, we 
conducted interviews with key reserve, National Guard, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, service, and JNTC representatives to discuss the 
overall impact of the JNTC initiative on the reserve components. 

To determine the extent to which the Joint Forces Command has developed 
an accreditation process that facilitates program goals, we obtained 
and reviewed key accreditation documentation, such as the Accreditation 
Concept of Operations, JNTC accreditation program briefing slides, the 
draft accreditation handbook and DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report. We also reviewed and analyzed key DOD and JNTC documents, 
including the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2006 revised 
Training Transformation Implementation Plan and the JNTC strategic 
plan, to identify program guidance and critical milestones. 
Additionally, we reviewed selected training programs' JNTC 
accreditation reports. To augment our documentation review, we met with 
service, combatant command, and JNTC officials to discuss the status 
and intent of the accreditation process. Specifically, we inquired 
about the status of the accreditation effort, the nomination process, 
and the reaccreditation process. We also examined to what extent the 
reserve components participated in the JNTC initiative's accreditation 
process. Table 4 lists the organizations and locations we visited 
during the course of this review. 

Table 6: Organizations and Locations Included on This Assignment: 



Organization: Army; 
Locations: Headquarters Department of the Army, Army Training, 
Collective Training Division, Washington, D.C. 

Organization: Army; 
Locations: Army National Guard, Readiness Center, Arlington, Virginia. 

Organization: Air Force; 
Locations: Headquarters Air Force, Joint Exercises and Training 
Innovation, Washington, D.C. 

Organization: Air Force; 
Locations: Air Combat Command, Joint Training and Exercise Directorate, 
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. 

Organization: Marine Corps; 
Locations: Headquarters, Marine Corps Training and Education Command, 
Quantico, Virginia. 

Organization: Marine Corps; 
Locations: U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia. 

Organization: Navy; 
Locations: Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Ranges and Fleet Training 
Branch, Arlington, Virginia. 

Organization: Navy; 
Locations: Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia. 

Organization: Navy; 
Locations: Tactical Training Group, Atlantic, Dam Neck, Virginia. 

Organization: Navy; 
Locations: USS McFaul, (DDG-74), Norfolk, Virginia. 

Organization: National Guard; 
Locations: National Guard Bureau, Alexandria, Virginia. 

Organization: Joint organizations; 
Locations: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve 
Affairs, Washington D.C. 

Organization: Joint organizations; 
Locations: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Readiness and Training 
Policy and Programs, Washington, D.C; 
- Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability Joint Management Office, 
Alexandria, Virginia. 

Organization: Joint organizations; 
Locations: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C; 
- Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate, 
Washington, D.C. 

Organization: Joint organizations; 
Locations: U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia; 
- Joint National Training Capability Joint Management Office, Suffolk, 
Virginia; 
- Joint Training Directorate and Joint Warfighting Center, Suffolk, 
Virginia. 

Organization: Joint organizations; 
Locations: U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii; 
- Headquarters, Joint Training Directorate, Camp Smith,; Hawaii. 

Organization: Joint organizations; 
Locations: U.S. Pacific Air Force, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. 

Organization: Joint organizations; 
Locations: U.S. Pacific Fleet, Makalapa Compound, Hawaii. 

Organization: Joint organizations; 
Locations: Headquarters, Joint Task Force 519, Hawaii. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

We performed this review from August 2005 through May 2006 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
4000 Defense Pentagon Washington D.C. 20361-4000: 

July 21, 2006: 

Janet A. St. Laurent: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
Government Accountability Office: 
G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. St. Laurent: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report, "Military Training: Actions 
Needed to Enhance DoD's Investment in the Joint National Training 
Capability," dated June 21, 2006 (code 350724 / GAO-06-802). 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on this draft. We 
see value in the GAO's review and the resultant observations. We concur 
with four of the five recommendations and partially concur with the 
remaining recommendation. The Department's comments on the GAO draft 
recommendations are enclosed, along with comments on the draft report. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Paul W. Mayberry: 
Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness): 

Enclosures: 
As stated: 

GAO Draft Report- Dated June 21, 2006
GAO CODE 350724/GAO-06-802: 

"Military Training: Management Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's 
Investment Joint National Training Capability" 

Department Of Defense Comments to the Recommendations: 

Recommendation l: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
fully develop a strategy for the next training transformation 
assessment to evaluate the overall impact of the Joint National 
Training Capability (JNTC) implementation on joint training, including 
timeframes, outcome-oriented performance metrics, roles and 
responsibilities, and outcomes. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department is developing a comprehensive 
assessment strategy for all of joint training and specifically for the 
Training Transformation Program as detailed in the Training 
Transformation (T2) Strategic and Implementation Plans. The Joint 
Assessment and Enabling Capability (JAEC), as part of T2, was chartered 
specifically to assess the effectiveness of T2, including the Joint 
National Training Capability (JNTC). An execution plan for the 2005 
block assessment baseline was released in May 2005 (Training 
Transformation 2005 Block Assessment Execution Plan). The 2005 Training 
Transformation Assessment report formed the baseline for ongoing 
training program assessments and reported favorably on the initiatives 
when published in December 2005. A detailed plan for the 2007 
assessment will be released for T2 stakeholder coordination in August 
2006. This plan will include detailed metrics, roles, and 
responsibilities and address the desired continuous assessment of T2 
and the impact of our transformation initiatives on defense-wide 
training, consistent with the recommendation. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Commander, Joint Forces Command, to establish liaison 
officers for the Reserve components and include representatives from 
the Reserve components as active participants in Joint National 
Training Capability working groups and planning sessions. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. We concur with the National Guard 
portion of the recommendation, however the recommendation does not 
apply to the entire Reserve component, "the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, 
Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve in 
addition to Army National Guard and Air National Guard. The report 
addresses National Guard and Reserve component interchangeably. The 
joint training requirements of the Reserve components of the Military 
Services beyond the National components are adequately addressed 
through the current Service liaison officer structure the Joint 
National Training Capability (JNTC) and assigned Reserve Joint 
Warfighting Center staff. This is reinforced also with the provisioning 
of all forces (to include the Reserve component forces) to U.S. Joint 
Forces Command by their respective Service component commands (e.g., 
U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S, Air Force Air Component Command, etc). 
As a result of this report, U.S. Joint Forces Command leadership will 
ensure that the full Reserve component becomes more engaged in the JNTC 
process. Advocates for the Reserve component include the OSD Reserve 
Affairs representation on the Training Transformation Executive 
Steering Group, Senior Advisory Group, and Joint Integrated Process 
Team, and by Reserve component officers at U.S. Joint Forces Command. 
Our total force concept of active duty and Reserve component forces 
serves as a foundation of U.S. military force employment and thus 
serves as a vehicle for training planning, execution, and assessment. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
establish guidelines for the Services and combatant commands to follow 
when nominating programs for future accreditation that reflect the 
importance of new and emerging missions, as emphasized by DoD's 2005 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 

Dod Response: Concur. The Department supports the U.S. Joint Forces 
Command (JSCOM)-led accreditation process as the proper vehicle for 
determining operational requirements of the various programs conducting 
Joint training. While we concur with the recommendation, it is 
worthwhile to note that the category "new and emerging missions' is 
only one source of total training requirements. During the first round 
of accreditation reviews (FY 05 and FY 06) the Services and Combatant 
Commanders were asked to nominate programs and their associated joint 
training tasks for accreditation In the next phase FY 07 and FY 08) we 
will institute a more directive approach to the process, as required by 
the 2006 DoD Defense Review and the Strategic Planning Guidance for FY 
2007-2013, The accreditation guidance will be refined to include 
consideration of new and emerging missions identified in the 2006 DoD 
Quadrennial Defense Review. This will likely require additional 
resources. The details are under consideration within the Department. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
establish re-accreditation standards and criteria that will ensure a 
recurring, consistent, and realistic joint training environment exists 
for all units participating in accredited joint training programs. 

DOD Response: Concur. The U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is the lead 
agency for executing Joint National Training Capability accreditations 
under direction of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness), 
and will ensure that the Accreditation Concept of Operations is 
strengthened to include specific re-accreditation standards. During the 
time of this GAO review, the accreditation program was in its first 
round of activity with selected service and combatant command events. 
The Joint National Training Capability Joint Management Office is 
developing re-accreditation standards aligned with the ongoing 
accreditation activity. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to 
expand the accreditation process to include National Guard training 
programs. 

DOD Response: Concur. Accreditation of National Guard training programs 
is currently under coordination by the Joint National Training 
Capability Joint Management Office; however an element of consideration 
is realignment of Training Transformation (T2) resources. The 
Department will add National Guard Training programs with appropriate 
joint context to the accreditation nomination list. The Joint National 
Training Capability Joint Management Office lively discussing this 
action with National Guard leadership to develop a plan for inclusion 
of National Guard joint training programs. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Janet St. Laurent, (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland, Assistant 
Director; Fred Harrison; Joe Faley; Bonita Anderson; Angela Watson; 
Yong Song; Kevin Keith; Susan Ditto; and Rebecca Shea also made major 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Management Approach and Processes Not Well- 
Suited to Support Development of Global Information Grid. GAO-06-211. 
Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2006. 

Military Training: Funding Requests for Joint Urban Operations Training 
and Facilities Should Be Based on Sound Strategy and Requirements. GAO- 
06-193. Washington, D.C.: December 8, 2005. 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment 
Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2005. 

Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve 
Personnel and Equipment Shortages. GAO-05-660. Washington, D.C.: July 
12, 2005. 

Military Training: Actions Needed to Enhance DOD's Program to Transform 
Joint Training. GAO-05-548. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005. 

Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and 
Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform 
Military Capabilities. GAO-05-70. Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2004. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Army and Marine Corps Need to 
Establish Minimum Training Tasks and Improve Reporting for Combat 
Training Centers. GAO-05-8. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005. 

Military Education: DOD Needs to Develop Performance Goals and Metrics 
for Advanced Distributed Learning in Professional Military Education. 
GAO-04-873. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004. 

Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas 
and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T. Washington, 
D.C.: April 29, 2004. 

Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development 
Efforts in the Federal Government. GAO-04-546G. Washington, D.C.: March 
2004. 

Military Training: Strategic Planning and Distributive Learning Could 
Benefit the Special Operations Forces Foreign Language Program. GAO-03- 
1026. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2003. 

Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air 
Support of Ground Forces. GAO-03-505. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2003. 

Military Transformation: Progress and Challenges for DOD's Advanced 
Distributed Learning Programs. GAO-03-393. Washington, D.C.: February 
28, 2003. 

Military Transformation: Actions Needed to Better Manage DOD's Joint 
Experimentation Program. GAO-02-856. Washington, D.C.: August 29, 2002. 

Military Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in 
Readiness Reporting. GAO-02-525. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2002. 

Defense Budget: Need to Better Inform Congress on Funding for Army 
Division Training. GAO-01-902. Washington, D.C.: July 5, 2001. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Units Better Equipped, but Training 
and Readiness Reporting Problems Remain. GAO-01-27. Washington, D.C.: 
November 14, 2000. 

Force Structure: Army Is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces, 
but Challenges Remain. GAO/NSAID-00-162. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 
2000. 

Army National Guard: Enhanced Brigade Readiness Improved but Personnel 
and Workload Are Problems. GAO/NSAID-00-114. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 
2000. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] The Quadrennial Defense Review is a congressionally imposed DOD 
effort to be conducted every 4 years to set defense strategy and goals. 

[2] "Live training" refers to live simulations involving real people 
operating real systems in a live environment. "Virtual training" 
involves virtual simulations using real people operating simulated 
systems. "Constructive training" refers to simulated people operating 
simulated systems, often referred to as war games. 

[3] Joint mission essential tasks are tasks selected by a joint force 
commander deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using 
the common, universal language. 

[4] Department of Defense, Training Transformation Implementation Plan, 
2006 - 2011 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006). 

[5] GAO, Human Capital: A Guide on Assessing Strategic Training 
Programs and Development Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G 
(Washington, D.C.: March 2004). 

[6] Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01C, Joint 
Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

[7] JNTC funds were distributed between the Joint Forces Command and 
the services. These funds were channeled through the Operations and 
Maintenance; Other Procurement; and Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation appropriations. 

[8] A cost analysis was not done because the data needed were not 
readily available. Specifically, the JNTC funds resided in different 
appropriations; the source of cost information was spread over a number 
of organizations; and some fixed costs, such as installation of the 
joint network, sustainment of the joint network, and maintenance of 
existing exercise infrastructure, represented a number of exercises and 
other activities. 

[9] Similar to the accrediting of a university, a training program is 
accredited, not the training audience. As the accrediting agency, the 
Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center ensures that the 
training program has the required resources and addresses key elements 
to provide quality joint training to the training audience. 

[10] When the Joint Forces Command considers a training program for 
accreditation, it assesses the program and determines if it merits 
being fully accredited, conditionally accredited, or not qualified to 
be accredited. 

[11] The Universal Joint Task List is a menu of capabilities that may 
be selected by a joint force commander to accomplish the assigned 
mission. 

[12] Department of Defense Directive, 1322.18, Military Training. 

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