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entitled 'Chemical and Biological defense: DOD Needs Consistent 
Policies and Clear Processes to Address the Survivability of Weapon 
Systems Against Chemical and Biological Threats' which was released on 
May 1, 2006.

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United States Government Accountability Office:

GAO:

Report to Congressional Committees:

April 2006:

Chemical and Biological defense:

DOD Needs Consistent Policies and Clear Processes to Address the 
Survivability of Weapon Systems Against Chemical and Biological Threats:

GAO-06-592:

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-592, a report to congressional committees.

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The possibility that an adversary may use chemical or biological 
weapons against U.S. forces makes it important for a weapon system to 
be able to survive such attacks. In the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress mandated that the Department of 
Defense submit a plan to address weapon system chemical and biological 
survivability by February 28, 2005. This plan was to include developing 
a centralized database with information about the effects of chemical 
and biological agents on materials used in weapon systems.  DOD did not 
submit its plan as mandated.  GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the extent 
to which DOD addresses weapon system chemical and biological 
survivability during the acquisition process, and (2) DODís internal 
controls for maintaining a comprehensive database that includes 
chemical and biological survivability research and test data for weapon 
system design and development.

What GAO Found: 

The extent to which chemical and biological survivability is considered 
in the weapon system acquisition process is mixed and varied.  Although 
DOD strategic guidance and policy has emphasized the growing threat of 
an adversaryís use of chemical and biological weapons for over a 
decade, DOD, joint, and military service weapon system acquisition 
policies are inconsistent and do not establish a clear process for 
considering and testing system chemical and biological survivability.  
To assess the extent DOD addresses chemical and biological 
survivability during the acquisition process, GAO conducted a  non 
probability sample of nine major weapon systems based on high dollar 
value, whether the system was a joint program, and risk of exposure to 
chemical and biological weapons.  Because DOD and joint acquisition 
policies do not require that survivability be specifically addressed, 
the military services have developed their own varying and unique 
policies. Thus, for the nine weapon systems GAO reviewed, the program 
offices involved made individual survivability decisions, resulting in 
inconsistent survivability consideration and testing.  In the absence 
of DOD requirements, program offices also inconsistently document their 
decisions regarding how they consider and test chemical and biological 
survivability. Furthermore, DOD policies do not establish a clear 
process for responsibility, authority, and oversight for monitoring 
program office decisions regarding chemical and biological 
survivability.  Without establishing consistent policies requiring that 
chemical and biological survivability be considered during weapon 
system acquisition, and a clear process for doing so, military planners 
and commanders are likely to face varying weapon system performance, 
availability, and interoperability issues.  These could negatively 
affect system availability in a contaminated environment and limit 
DODís ability to identify risk and ensure that appropriate decisions 
are made.
 
DOD, through its Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), maintains 
a centralized database for science and technology information that 
could facilitate program officesí consideration of weapon system 
chemical and biological survivability, but the comprehensiveness of 
this database is unknown due to inadequate internal controls. It is 
unlikely that the DTIC database contains fully comprehensive 
information about this for three reasons. First, it is unclear whether 
this information is covered by the broad DOD policy directing that 
scientific and technical information be submitted to DTIC. Second, 
there is no established process for submitting scientific and technical 
information to DTIC. As a result, it is submitted to DTIC through the 
ad hoc actions of individual personnel and organizations, and some DOD 
officials expressed concern that not all information is being submitted 
to DTIC. Third, no office or organization in DOD has been given clear 
oversight responsibility to ensure that information is submitted to 
DTIC. The lack of a database with comprehensive information about 
weapon system chemical and biological survivability creates the risk of 
unnecessary expenditures on duplicative testing.

What GAO Recommends:

GAO is recommending modifications to DODís current weapon system 
acquisition policy to ensure that (1) weapon system chemical and 
biological survivability is consistently addressed and (2) that DODís 
chemical and biological scientific and technical information database 
is comprehensive.  DOD concurred with GAOís recommendations and 
currently has actions underway for their implementation. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-592].

To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Davi D' Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or 
dagostinod@gao.gov. 

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

DOD and the Military Services Do Not Consistently Address Weapon System 
Chemical and Biological Survivability:

Comprehensiveness of Chemical and Biological Survivability Information 
in DOD's Centralized Database Is Unknown:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendixes:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix II: Sampled Weapon System Programs Either Conducted or 
Considered Some Level of Chemical and Biological Survivability Testing:

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

Figures:

Figure 1: Intended Flow of Documents Containing Technical Data Related 
to Chemical and Biological Contamination Survivability:

Figure 2: Chemical and Biological Testing Performed on Sampled Weapon 
Systems:

Abbreviation:

CBIAC: Chemical and Biological Information Analysis Center:

DOD: Department of Defense:

DTIC: Defense Technical Information Center:

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548:

April 28, 2006:

Congressional Committees:

The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that an adversary may use 
chemical or biological weapons against U.S. forces to respond to our 
superior conventional warfare capabilities and potentially gain an 
advantage on the battlefield. This increases the importance of 
considering a weapon system's ability to survive chemical and 
biological attacks as part of its design and development. DOD's 
investment of billions of dollars in modern weapon systems makes it 
critical that equipment can continue to operate after a battlefield is 
contaminated and can be reused after undergoing decontamination 
procedures.

DOD and service policies consider chemical and biological survivability 
to be the capability of a system and its crew to withstand a chemically 
or biologically contaminated environment without losing the ability to 
accomplish the assigned mission. This capability includes a weapon 
system's ability to withstand chemical or biological decontamination, a 
process that may itself be caustic, corrosive, or otherwise harmful to 
the system. Throughout this report, we will refer to this issue as 
weapon system chemical and biological survivability.

This report updates aspects of our prior work and is intended to help 
facilitate DOD's efforts to address chemical and biological 
survivability in its weapon system acquisition process. Both GAO's and 
DOD's Inspectors General have previously reported on problems regarding 
this aspect of weapon system acquisition. For example, in 2003 we 
reported that DOD had not developed a systematic approach for ensuring 
that the services appropriately incorporate chemical and biological 
survivability into weapon system design and testing.[Footnote 1] In the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005,[Footnote 2] 
Congress mandated that DOD submit a plan for addressing such 
survivability by February 28, 2005. This plan was to include 
development of a centralized database containing comprehensive 
information about the effects of chemical and biological agents and 
contaminants on the materials used in weapon systems. In addition, the 
Senate Armed Services Committee directed that we evaluate DOD's plan 
and report our findings to Congress within 180 days of the plan's 
submission. As of April 3, 2006, DOD has not submitted the mandated 
plan. On August 2, 2005, DOD provided Congress with an interim report 
in partial response to the congressional mandate. The interim report 
indicated that DOD may not fully address the mandate until the end of 
fiscal year 2007. In anticipation of receiving DOD's plan and to 
provide a foundation for our review you asked us to examine DOD's 
existing policies and processes for considering chemical and biological 
survivability of weapon systems, and to assess the status of DOD's 
efforts to create a centralized chemical and biological effects 
database. Our objectives were to evaluate (1) the extent to which DOD 
addresses weapon system chemical and biological survivability during 
the acquisition process, and (2) DOD's internal controls for 
maintaining a comprehensive database that includes chemical and 
biological survivability research and test data for weapon system 
design and development.

To examine the extent to which DOD addresses weapon system chemical and 
biological survivability during the acquisition process, we reviewed 
DOD, joint staff, and service policies, guidance, and procedures and 
obtained documentation and interviewed officials throughout DOD and at 
program offices from a non probability sample of nine major weapon 
systems based on several factors including (1) high dollar value (2) 
whether the system is a joint program, and (3) risk of exposure to 
chemical and biological weapons.[Footnote 3] To evaluate the adequacy 
of DOD's internal controls for maintaining a comprehensive database 
that facilitates the inclusion of chemical and biological survivability 
in weapon system design and development, we reviewed DOD and service 
policies, guidance, and procedures and conducted interviews with 
database officials, officials at the weapon system program offices we 
visited, and members of the chemical and biological testing community. 
We compared these policies, guidance, and procedures to the objectives 
and fundamental concepts of internal controls defined in Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government.[Footnote 4] We conducted 
our review from February 2005 through January 2006 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. More detailed 
information on our scope and methodology is provided in appendix I.

Results in Brief:

DOD, joint, and military service weapon system acquisition policies 
inconsistently address and do not establish a clear process for 
considering and testing system chemical and biological 
survivability.[Footnote 5] Although DOD strategic guidance and policy 
have for the last decade repeatedly emphasized the growing threat of an 
adversary's use of chemical and biological weapons, DOD and joint 
acquisition policies currently do not require that survivability be 
specifically addressed, and the military services have developed their 
own varying and unique policies. In the absence of consistent policies 
from DOD and the services, the nine weapon system program offices we 
reviewed made inconsistent decisions in their consideration and testing 
of weapon system survivability, even for similar systems. For example, 
the program offices for the three land systems we reviewed each 
conducted very different tests, even though all three systems are 
intended for the same operating environment. Similarly, the program 
offices for the nine weapon systems we reviewed did not consistently 
document their chemical and biological survivability decisions because 
of the absence of a DOD or joint requirement for them to do so. 
Although the program offices could provide documentation regarding what 
chemical and biological survivability testing was conducted, they did 
not have a consistent method to track what was considered or not 
included. Furthermore, DOD is unable to exercise oversight of program 
office decisions regarding weapon system chemical and biological 
survivability because DOD and service policies have not established a 
clear oversight process for monitoring these decisions. According to 
DOD officials, chemical and biological survivability is not usually a 
key performance parameter,[Footnote 6] so the Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA)[Footnote 7] does not provide oversight, and there is no 
specific chemical and biological survivability Functional Capabilities 
Board to review program office survivability decisions.

DOD, through the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC),[Footnote 
8] maintains a centralized database that could facilitate program 
offices' consideration of weapon system chemical and biological 
survivability, but the extent to which this database is comprehensive 
is unknown. Although DOD policy requires DTIC to maintain a 
comprehensive database of scientific and technical information, it is 
unlikely that this database contains all DOD-related data about the 
effects of chemical and biological agents and decontaminants on weapon 
systems for three reasons. First, it is unclear whether chemical and 
biological survivability information is covered by the broad DOD policy 
directing that scientific and technical information be submitted to 
DTIC. Some DOD officials we interviewed also told us there is 
disagreement about whether this policy applies to chemical and 
biological information. Second, there is no established process for 
submitting scientific and technical information to DTIC. As a result, 
information is submitted through the ad hoc actions of individual 
personnel and organizations, and some DOD officials expressed concern 
that not all the information is being submitted. Third, no office or 
organization in DOD has been designated as having oversight 
responsibility to ensure that information is submitted to DTIC. The 
lack of a database with comprehensive information about weapon system 
chemical and biological survivability could result in unnecessary 
expenditures on duplicative testing. For example, if research or 
testing is performed regarding an aspect of survivability, but its 
results not entered in the DTIC database, a program office interested 
in the same research might fail to recognize it had already been 
performed and cause the same work to be redone.

We are making recommendations for DOD to modify its policy to better 
ensure that weapon system chemical and biological survivability is 
consistently addressed in the acquisition process and that DTIC's 
centralized database contains comprehensive chemical and biological 
survivability information. In commenting on our draft, DOD agreed with 
all our recommendations and stated it expects to (1) issue a department 
Chemical Biological Contamination Policy by May 2006, (2) subsequently 
draft a DOD Directive addressing Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 
Nuclear Survivability, and (3) develop a chemical and biological 
material effects database by the end of Fiscal Year 2007.

Background:

In the post-Cold War era, the proliferation of chemical and biological 
weapon technologies in developing countries presents DOD with a 
national security challenge. The 1997, 2001, and 2006 Quadrennial 
Defense Reviews as well as other DOD publications have emphasized the 
need to address the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons. 
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review specifically states that DOD's 
vision is to organize, train, equip, and resource the future force to 
deal with all aspects of the threat posed by weapons of mass 
destruction. It notes that DOD has doubled its investment in chemical 
and biological defenses since 2001, and is increasing funding for its 
Chemical Biological Defense Program across the Future Years Defense 
Program by $2.1 billion (approximately 20 percent). However, 
experiences during the Persian Gulf War and the preparations for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom exposed weaknesses in the preparedness of U.S. 
forces to defend against a chemical or biological attack. In addition, 
we and DOD's Inspector General have published reports addressing 
continued problems in aspects of DOD's chemical and biological defense 
preparedness. Finally, at present there remain disagreements within DOD 
regarding the nature and extent of the chemical and biological threat 
and the degree to which major weapon systems should be survivable 
against such threats and capable of operating in a contaminated 
environment (see app. II). This lack of agreement could adversely 
affect DOD's ability to develop and carry out a coherent plan to defend 
against chemical and biological threats.

Until 2003, DOD's acquisition procedures[Footnote 9] (unless waived) 
required that weapon systems survivability be addressed in accordance 
with assessed threat levels, including chemical and biological, 
anticipated in the weapon system's projected operating environment. 
These procedures defined survivability as the capability of a weapon 
system and crew to avoid or withstand a man-made hostile environment 
without suffering an abortive impairment of its ability to accomplish 
its designated mission. The Army, Navy, and Air Force issued 
supplemental acquisition policies that established service-specific 
procedures to address the chemical and biological contamination 
survivability of their weapon systems. In 2003, DOD replaced its 
acquisition procedures with a Defense Acquisition Guidebook, which, 
together with the controlling DOD directive and instruction,[Footnote 
10] no longer specifically requires that weapon system survivability 
against chemical and biological threats be addressed during the system 
design and development phase. According to a DOD official, this action 
was part of a DOD effort to simplify its weapon system acquisition 
process. The only current DOD acquisition requirement specifically 
related to chemical and biological threats is that weapon system 
program offices address protection for crew members (as opposed to the 
weapon system itself) against the effects of a chemical or biological 
threat.[Footnote 11]

As part of weapon system design and development efforts, DOD uses 
scientific and technical information from research and testing 
activities to better understand various chemical and biological agents 
and their impact on military operations, including the survivability of 
weapon systems. DTIC maintains a centralized database containing a 
broad range of scientific and technical information intended to 
maximize the return on investment in research, evaluation, and 
studies.[Footnote 12] In addition to its centralized database, DTIC 
uses the Chemical and Biological Information Analysis Center (CBIAC), a 
contractor-operated information analysis center, to maintain additional 
databases and provide information specific to chemical and biological 
issues.[Footnote 13] DOD indicated in its August 2005 interim report 
that it intends to build on the existing databases maintained by CBIAC 
and to develop a centralized database by the end of fiscal year 2007 
that contains comprehensive information on the effects of chemical and 
biological agents and decontaminants on weapon systems.

In executing its role as a coordinating point for DOD scientific and 
technical information databases and systems, DTIC makes information 
available throughout DOD. Figure 1 illustrates the intended flow of 
information among testing facilities, program offices, and DTIC.

Figure 1: Intended Flow of Documents Containing Technical Data Related 
to Chemical and Biological Contamination Survivability:

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

[End of figure] 

DOD and the Military Services Do Not Consistently Address Weapon System 
Chemical and Biological Survivability:

DOD and the military services do not consistently address weapon system 
chemical and biological survivability during the acquisition process. 
In the absence of clear DOD guidance and effective controls, 
responsibility for decisions regarding weapon system chemical and 
biological survivability has devolved largely to the individual 
military services and weapon system program offices. The program 
offices we visited do not consistently document their chemical and 
biological survivability decisions, nor is there an established, clear, 
and effective DOD-level process for the oversight of these decisions.

DOD and Service Policies Do Not Establish a Clear Process for 
Considering and Testing Weapon System Chemical and Biological 
Survivability:

Although emphasis is placed on chemical and biological threats in DOD's 
strategic guidance, DOD and military service policies do not establish 
a clear process for considering and testing weapon system chemical and 
biological survivability. While DOD acquisition policies require that 
survivability of personnel after exposure to chemical and biological 
agents be addressed by all weapon system programs, they do not 
specifically require the consideration of weapon system 
survivability.[Footnote 14] There also are no DOD policies regarding 
the quantity and type of weapon system survivability testing that 
should be conducted. In addition, joint staff policies do not address 
or provide specific instruction as to how chemical and biological 
survivability should be considered during the acquisition process, or 
how this consideration should be monitored, reviewed, and 
documented.[Footnote 15]

Each of the existing service acquisition policies is therefore unique 
and differs in the extent and amount of detail it requires for 
considering weapon system chemical and biological survivability. DOD 
acquisition officials told us that each weapon system service sponsor 
has the ability to decide whether and to what extent to incorporate 
survivability testing. Of the military services, the Army has the most 
detailed policy for addressing this. However, while emphasizing the 
need to monitor and review chemical and biological survivability issues 
in general, Army policies allow service sponsors and program offices to 
individually decide how and to what extent to consider weapon system 
survivability during the acquisition process. The Air Force and Navy 
have less detailed policies and also leave decision making to the 
weapon system sponsor and program office. Navy officials told us that, 
in their opinion, having less rigid requirements was advantageous 
because it reduces system development time and costs.

The extent to which services consider weapon system survivability 
during the acquisition process is further influenced by differences in 
how each service perceives the chemical and biological threat and plans 
to conduct operations in a contaminated environment. The Army focuses 
on tactical and theater chemical and biological threats against exposed 
ground combat personnel and equipment. In comparison, the Air Force 
concept of operations in a contaminated environment is mainly a 
strategy of avoidance and protection, while the Navy view is that a 
chemical or biological attack on surface ships is a less likely threat.

In the absence of DOD-wide policies and processes, DOD officials stated 
that the responsibility for determining the extent of chemical and 
biological survivability consideration or testing has fallen largely on 
the individual weapon system program offices, in consultation with each 
service sponsor. However, program offices also lack specific guidance 
and a clear process governing the extent to which chemical and 
biological survivability should be considered or tested. In our review 
of nine weapon system programs, we found that the program offices 
exercised broad discretion over whether or to what extent to evaluate 
the need for and benefit of conducting chemical and biological 
survivability testing. Although all nine of these program offices had 
conducted or were considering some kind of testing, we found that the 
extent and nature of this testing varied widely, even for similar types 
of systems. For example, the two sea-based weapon system program 
offices we reviewed considered chemical and biological testing 
differently, even though both systems are intended for similar 
operating environments. The program offices for the three land systems 
we reviewed also conducted very different tests from one another, 
although these systems also are intended for the same operating 
environment.

Many factors affected the program offices' determination about the 
extent to test a weapon system's chemical and biological survivability, 
including the type of system (air, land, or sea), required system 
capabilities, system concept of operation, perceived chemical and 
biological threat, and other factors relating to the status of system 
cost, schedule, and performance. A more detailed discussion of the 
testing conducted for the nine weapon system programs we reviewed can 
be found in appendix II.

Program Offices Did Not Consistently Document Chemical and Biological 
Survivability Decisions:

The nine weapon system program offices we reviewed did not consistently 
document their decisions regarding how they considered or tested 
chemical and biological survivability. Although they could provide 
documentation regarding what survivability testing was conducted, they 
did not have a consistent method to track what was considered or was 
not included, because there is no DOD, joint, or service requirement 
for program offices to document these decisions. DOD officials stated 
that there is currently no DOD-level process for documenting how weapon 
system program offices determined whether to consider or test chemical 
and biological survivability.

DOD Lacks Effective Survivability Oversight:

There is no effective DOD-level oversight of how chemical and 
biological survivability is considered by weapon system program 
offices. In 1993, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to 
designate an office as the single DOD focal point for chemical and 
biological defense matters.[Footnote 16] DOD subsequently identified 
the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and 
Biological Defense Programs as the single DOD focal point for chemical 
and biological defense matters.[Footnote 17] However, the military 
services and various offices within DOD never adopted a consistent 
method for incorporating chemical and biological survivability and 
related testing into major weapon system development acquisition, 
including oversight responsibilities. Between 1994 and 2004, GAO and 
DOD Inspector General reports identified multiple management and 
oversight process problems regarding the incorporation of chemical and 
biological survivability into weapon system development. Various 
military service acquisition offices and DOD agencies, such as the U.S. 
Army Nuclear Chemical Agency, and the office of the Assistant to the 
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense, 
held differing views as to where this responsibility resided and how 
chemical and biological survivability should be incorporated into 
weapon system development. These differing views have hindered the 
development of an oversight process and prevented effective monitoring 
of weapon system program office decisions regarding chemical and 
biological survivability. Although the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense 
Programs directed the development and issuance of DOD's August 2005 
interim report, DOD continues to lack a clear and effective department- 
level process for overseeing the inclusion of chemical and biological 
survivability in weapon system development.

In addition, according to DOD officials, no single joint organization, 
such as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council[Footnote 18] or the 
Joint Requirements Office,[Footnote 19] specifically monitors or tracks 
whether weapon system chemical and biological survivability is 
considered in the weapon system acquisition process. There also is no 
specific chemical and biological survivability Functional Capabilities 
Board[Footnote 20] to review program office survivability decisions. 
DOD officials stated that these joint oversight organizations do not 
have a role in overseeing weapon system chemical and biological 
survivability and that consideration of survivability requirements 
during the acquisition process is therefore service-specific. 
Furthermore, because chemical and biological survivability is not 
usually a key performance parameter[Footnote 21] for a weapon system, 
it is often traded off to satisfy other pressing requirements dealing 
with the weapon system cost, schedule, or performance. DOD officials we 
spoke with acknowledged that program cost and schedule concerns could 
reduce the amount of chemical and biological weapon system 
survivability testing conducted. While the Milestone Decision Authority 
focuses on requirements associated with key performance parameters, 
none of the nine weapon systems we reviewed included chemical and 
biological survivability as a key performance factor. Only specific 
chemical and biological equipment-such as detection, protection, and 
decontamination equipment-have identified chemical and biological 
survivability as a key performance parameter.

Comprehensiveness of Chemical and Biological Survivability Information 
in DOD's Centralized Database Is Unknown:

DOD, through DTIC, maintains a centralized database for science and 
technology information that could facilitate program offices' 
consideration of weapon system chemical and biological survivability, 
but the comprehensiveness of the survivability information in this 
database is unknown. We found it unlikely that this database is 
comprehensive for three reasons: (1) DOD policy is unclear as to 
whether chemical and biological information is covered by the policy, 
(2) no process has been established governing how information should be 
submitted to DTIC, and (3) no office or organization is responsible for 
overseeing that information is submitted to DTIC.

It is unclear whether chemical and biological survivability information 
is covered by the broad DOD policy directing that scientific and 
technical information be submitted to DTIC. This policy requires that 
DTIC be provided with copies of DOD-sponsored scientific and technical 
information, but does not specifically address whether chemical and 
biological survivability information is included. Some DOD officials 
involved in chemical and biological survivability research and/or 
testing told us that they believed they were not required to submit the 
results of their work to DTIC. Further, there is no established process 
for submitting chemical and biological information to DTIC.[Footnote 
22] As a result, individual personnel and organizations submit 
information to DTIC through ad hoc actions, and some DOD officials 
expressed concern that not all information is submitted to DTIC as 
required.

Finally, no office or organization in DOD has been clearly designated 
as responsible for exercising oversight to ensure that chemical and 
biological research and testing results are submitted to DTIC. The DOD 
instruction addressing management of the collection of scientific and 
technical information assigns responsibility for submitting research 
and testing results to the DOD activities involved,[Footnote 23] but 
this instruction does not specifically indicate whether the activity 
sponsoring or approving the work or, alternatively, the organization 
performing it is responsible for its submission to DTIC. Officials at 
the DOD research and testing facilities we visited told us they 
routinely submitted the results of their work to DTIC, and we observed 
that DTIC and CBIAC were storing large amounts of this information. The 
two major DOD chemical and biological research and testing facilities 
we visited had an oversight process in place for ensuring that all 
research and testing projects submitted the required information to 
DTIC. However, responsibility for submitting this information was 
either left to individual research or testing staff, or was presumed to 
have been submitted to DTIC by the program offices requesting the work. 
DTIC officials stated that DTIC was not responsible for ensuring that 
DOD research and testing facilities submitted all research and testing 
results, and that DTIC had neither the authority nor the desire to do 
this. We could not identify any military service or program office 
level oversight for ensuring that research and testing results were 
submitted to DTIC, and some of the program offices we visited said the 
submission of research and test results to DTIC was not their 
responsibility. The absence of an internal control for ensuring that 
research and test results are submitted to DTIC and entered in DTIC's 
database could result in unnecessary expenditures on duplicative work. 
For example, if research or testing is performed regarding an aspect of 
survivability, but its results not entered in the DTIC database, 
officials in another program office interested in the same research or 
testing might fail to recognize it had already been performed and cause 
this work to be done again.

Conclusions:

The issues identified in previous DODIG and GAO reports regarding 
weapon system incorporation of chemical and biological survivability 
during the system acquisition process remain largely unresolved. 
Without DOD establishing consistent policy requiring that chemical and 
biological survivability be considered during weapon system acquisition 
and establishing a clear process for doing so, the incorporation of 
chemical and biological survivability into major weapons system 
acquisition is likely to remain varied and inconsistent. Consequently, 
military planners and commanders are likely to face varying weapon 
system performance, availability, and interoperability issues. This, in 
turn, could complicate the planning and execution of operations and 
increase the risk of mission failure, because systems that are not 
chemically or biologically survivable but become exposed to chemical or 
biological agents may not be available to a combatant commander for 
reuse in critical missions, such as deploying or supplying troops. 
Furthermore, without consistent documentation of program offices' 
rationales for trade-off decisions in their consideration of weapon 
system chemical and biological survivability, DOD's ability to identify 
and analyze associated risks could be hindered. Finally, the absence of 
a clearly defined DOD-level process for overseeing military service and 
program office actions limits DOD's ability to ensure that appropriate 
weapon system survivability decisions are being made.

Without clarifying existing policies regarding which research and 
testing information should be submitted, the process to be used for 
submitting it, and which DOD offices or organizations are responsible 
for overseeing its submission, DTIC will likely be unable to ensure the 
maintenance of a centralized database containing comprehensive chemical 
and biological research and testing information. This could limit DOD's 
ability to efficiently and economically assess the effects of chemical 
and biological agent contamination on weapon system components and 
materials, and could result in duplicative research and testing, thus 
causing unnecessary design and development costs.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

To better ensure the incorporation of chemical and biological 
survivability into weapon systems, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics to take the following six actions:

* Either modify current DOD policy or develop guidance to ensure that 
chemical and biological survivability is consistently addressed in the 
weapon system acquisition process. This policy or guidance should:

- establish a clear process for program offices to follow regarding the 
extent to which chemical and biological system survivability should be 
considered and tested;

- require consistent, DOD-wide documentation of decisions regarding how 
weapon system chemical and biological survivability is considered and 
tested; and:

- establish an oversight process within DOD and the services for 
monitoring weapon system program office decisions;

* modify current DOD policy to ensure that DOD's database of chemical 
and biological scientific and technical information is comprehensive. 
This modified policy should:

- state which chemical and biological survivability information belongs 
in the body of scientific and technical information that is required to 
be submitted to DTIC;

- clarify responsibilities and establish a specific process for the 
submission of chemical and biological scientific and technical 
information to DTIC; and:

- designate which DOD office or organization is responsible for 
exercising oversight to ensure that this information is submitted to 
DTIC.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all 
recommendations. Regarding our recommendations for either modifying 
current DOD policy or developing guidance to ensure that chemical and 
biological survivability is consistently addressed in the weapon system 
acquisition process, DOD plans to issue a Chemical Biological 
Contamination Survivability Policy by May 2006 and subsequently draft a 
DOD Directive addressing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 
Nuclear Survivability. With regard to our recommendations for modifying 
current DOD policy to ensure that DOD's database of chemical and 
biological scientific and technical information is comprehensive, DOD 
initiated the development of a chemical and biological material effects 
database by forming and hosting an executive steering committee that 
met for the first time in March 2006. DOD plans to establish and 
institute this database at the Chemical and Biological Defense 
Information and Analysis Center (CBIAC) managed by the Defense 
Technical Information Center (DTIC). The Assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs is 
overseeing the development of this database, which DOD expects to be 
ready by the end of Fiscal Year 2007. DOD's comments are reprinted in 
appendix III. DOD also provided technical comments, which we have 
incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the 
Air Force, the Army, the Navy, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; 
and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies 
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http:// 
www.gao.gov].

If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who 
made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Signed By:

Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management:

List of Congressional Committees:

The Honorable John Warner: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate:

The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate:

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives:

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

To assess the extent to which DOD addresses weapon system chemical and 
biological survivability during the acquisition process, we reviewed 
DOD, joint staff, and service policies, guidance, and procedures and 
interviewed officials throughout DOD. We also conducted a non 
probability sample of nine major weapon systems.[Footnote 24] We 
selected programs for this non probability sample based on several 
factors, including (1) high dollar value,[Footnote 25] (2) whether the 
weapon system was a joint program, and (3) risk of exposure to chemical 
and biological weapons. The methodology used to select our sample 
helped achieve a sample of weapon systems that was both diverse and 
relevant to chemical and biological survivability. For example, the 
sample includes weapon systems from all military services and all types 
of systems-land, sea, and air. The sample also includes both legacy 
systems and those currently in development. To understand how DOD's 
acquisition, testing, and data submission and storage policies affect 
weapon systems program offices' practices, we spoke with officials and 
examined documentation from the nine weapon system program offices we 
reviewed. The list of selected weapons systems is provided below:

* C-17 Globemaster:

* DD(X) Destroyer:

* Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle:

* F/A-22 Raptor:

* Future Combat Systems:

* Joint Strike Fighter:

* Littoral Combat Ship:

* Stryker Infantry Carrier:

* V-22 Osprey Vertical Lift Aircraft:

To determine the extent to which DOD maintains a comprehensive database 
for facilitating the inclusion of chemical and biological survivability 
in weapons system design and development, we reviewed DOD and service 
policies, guidance, and procedures. We compared these policies, 
guidance, and procedures to the objectives and fundamental concepts of 
internal controls defined in Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government. We also conducted interviews with database 
officials and members of the chemical and biological testing community 
and reviewed documents at the following locations in consultation with 
DOD officials and identified as crucial to this subject area in 
previous GAO reports:

* Air Force Research Laboratory, Dayton, Ohio:

* Army Research Laboratory, Survivability and Lethality Analysis 
Directorate, Aberdeen, Maryland:

* Chemical and Biological Information Analysis Center, Edgewood, 
Maryland:

* Defense Technical Information Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia:

* West Desert Test Center, Dugway Proving Ground, Utah:

* Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Alexandria, Virginia:

We conducted our review from February 2005 through January 2006 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Sampled Weapon System Programs Either Conducted or 
Considered Some Level of Chemical and Biological Survivability Testing:

We conducted a non probability sample of nine weapon system programs 
and found that all conducted or were considering some kind of system 
survivability testing. The survivability of the weapon system programs 
we reviewed was tested by an array of testing procedures and a variety 
of simulated and live chemical and biological agents and 
decontamination solutions. Seven conducted either coupon[Footnote 26] 
testing of materials or component testing. In a few cases, chemical and 
biological survivability testing was only conducted at the weapons 
system level and not at the coupon or component level. All of the 
weapon system program offices we interviewed conducted literature 
searches, discussions with subject matter experts, and consulted with 
testing facilities and organizations (such as the West Desert Test 
Center) to develop their chemical and biological survivability testing 
strategy. Figure 2 shows the different types of testing related to 
chemical and biological survivability that had been performed on the 
selected weapon systems at the time of our review. This figure does not 
reflect either planned or unplanned survivability testing that might be 
performed with regard to these systems in the future.

Figure 2: Chemical and Biological Testing Performed on Sampled Weapon 
Systems:

[See PDF for image] 

Sources: Army: 1, 2; Navy: 4, 5(Littoral Combat Ship Office); Marine 
Corp: 9, 3(General Dynamics Land System); Air Force: 6, 7, 8. GAO 
analysis of DOD data.

[End of figure] 

Program Offices' Chemical and Biological Survivability Testing Varied 
for Reviewed Weapon Systems:

We found that the extent and nature of chemical and biological 
survivability testing varied widely in all nine weapon systems we 
reviewed, even for similar types of systems. Both sea-based weapon 
systems we reviewed exhibited varying consideration of chemical and 
biological testing. For example, the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
program office considered chemical and biological survivability testing 
low-risk due to the perceived operating environment and concept of 
operations for this weapon system. Officials stated that the key 
survivability approach will be to reduce susceptibility to 
contamination through detection and avoidance. In contrast, the Navy's 
next generation destroyer DD(X) was designed with a higher chemical and 
biological system protection level, and consequently the program office 
conducted limited coupon testing of specific materials found in the 
ship's superstructure.[Footnote 27] In its technical comments on this 
report, DOD stated that this occurred because the DD(X) concept of 
operations does not preclude exposure to chemical and biological 
attacks, while the LCS concept of operations does preclude exposure to 
chemical and biological agents. These systems thus utilized different 
concepts of operations although both are intended to operate in a 
littoral environment.

DOD and program officials stated that land systems would be those most 
likely to include chemical and biological survivability testing because 
of the increased likelihood of encountering contamination on the modern 
battlefield. However, these programs also conducted tests very 
different from each other although they are intended for the same 
operating environment. The Marine Corps' Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle 
program office conducted four chemical and biological materials tests 
that looked at the effects of decontaminants on a variety of materials 
and included extensive tests using Chemical Agent Resistant Coating on 
the exterior and interior of the vehicle. In comparison, program 
officials from the Army's new wheeled personnel carrier, Stryker, used 
a different approach, focusing on applying a chemical agent simulant to 
a complete Stryker vehicle and then conducting decontamination 
procedures. However, in this case a different testing approach for a 
similar system may have been appropriate because the Stryker is not 
constructed with new materials and all existing materials used in 
constructing the Stryker meet military specification requirements for 
chemical and biological survivability. The Army's Future Combat System 
is currently reassessing chemical and biological survivability in its 
design and development. This program is still in development and has 
not reached the point where definitive decisions on chemical and 
biological survivability are applicable. The Army sponsor and the 
program office have been coordinating with the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council, U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, and the Army 
Training and Doctrine Command in creating chemical and biological 
survivability requirements.

Of the four aircraft weapon system programs we sampled, three conducted 
similar levels of chemical and biological testing. Of the three current 
systems, the Air Force's F/A-22 Raptor and Joint Strike Fighter program 
offices conducted testing as extensive as that conducted by the Navy 
for the V-22 Osprey, although these two systems were assessed as much 
less likely to encounter chemical and biological contamination as the V-
22 Osprey. The V-22 Osprey program office performed vulnerability 
assessments, survivability assessments, and some material coupon tests. 
Both the Air Force Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-22 Raptor program 
offices conducted complementary material and component contamination 
and decontamination compatibility tests. To identify material 
survivability issues, the F/A-22 Raptor program office contracted with 
a defense contractor to perform a literature search in advance of any 
testing. The Joint Strike Fighter program office effectively employed 
the results of this F/A-22 Raptor testing performed by using the 
survivability manual developed for the F/A-22 Raptor rather than 
developing its own. This manual was effectively used as a reference to 
meet both program's chemical and biological survivability and 
decontamination thresholds following exposure to chemical and 
biological weapons and decontamination procedures. The legacy aircraft 
system we reviewed, the C-17, conducted little chemical and biological 
testing because much of its testing and development occurred during a 
different threat environment. Program officials stated that 
decontamination procedures for the C-17 were developed in the 1980s and 
that the chemical and biological survivability requirements were 
drastically scaled down after the end of the Cold War.

Variety of Factors Affected Testing Decisions:

Many factors affected the program office's determination about the 
extent to test a weapon system's chemical and biological survivability. 
These factors included the type of system (i.e., air, land, or sea), 
required system capabilities, system concept of operation, the 
perceived chemical and biological threat, and other factors related to 
the status of system cost, schedule, and performance. Senior DOD 
officials stated that each service sponsor has the ability to choose 
whether to accept the risks related to cost and schedule to incorporate 
testing of chemical and biological survivability.

DOD officials stated that in general land systems are perceived as the 
most likely to encounter chemical and biological contamination and that 
the perceived threat for sea and air systems has traditionally been 
considered lower than the perceived threat for land systems. This 
perception was based on old Cold War concepts and has since changed. 
DOD officials told us that asymmetric threats are a greater concern 
today and that system developers must weigh the threat context as they 
are developing systems and deciding what types of survivability to test 
based on perceived risk.

Program offices we visited stated that the high financial cost of both 
live and simulated chemical and biological agent testing was a factor 
that influences decisions about testing weapon system chemical and 
biological survivability. For example, officials at the Expeditionary 
Fighting Vehicle program office estimated that coupon testing with live 
agents could cost approximately $30,000 to $50,000, and full system, 
live agent field testing of equipment at a facility such as the West 
Desert Test Center at Dugway Proving Grounds would cost approximately 
$1 million. In addition, the C-17 program office stated that live agent 
testing cost approximately $1 million. Interviews with various DOD 
research facilities where testing is conducted supported these amounts. 
F/A-22 program officials also stated that although they conducted 
coupon and component tests, they would not encourage a full system 
chemical and biological survivability test because such a test would be 
too expensive and would destroy the aircraft being tested.

[End of section]

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Assistant To The Secretary Of Defense: 
3050 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3050:

Nuclear And Chemical And Biological Defense Programs:

Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino:

Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Ms. D'Agostino:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report, "CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 
DEFENSE: DoD Needs Consistent Policies and Clear Processes to Address 
the Survivability of Weapon Systems Against Chemical and Biological 
Threats," dated April 4, 2006 (GAO Code 350641/GAO-06-592). The DoD 
concurs with the draft report and our responses to the recommendations, 
along with other comments, are enclosed.

The DoD is in the process of addressing Public Law 108-375, which 
parallels findings from the May 2003 GAO Report (GAO-03-325C). As a 
result of this law, the DoD is implementing the following tasks: 
development of definitions, policies, and procedures; analysis and test 
support; support plan; chemical and biological materials effects 
database; and development of an oversight process.

The DoD will issue a final Chemical Biological Contamination 
Survivability Policy by May 2006, along with an updated Report to 
Congress. This final policy will replace the interim policy issued last 
year. After the final policy is issued, the DoD will draft a Department 
of Defense Directive that will address chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear survivability.

The DoD formed an Executive Steering Committee to execute the 
development of a materials effects database. This committee held their 
kick-off meeting March 21 2006.

Should you have any questions, please phone or e-mail the point of 
contact, Mr. Anthony Lee, anthony.lee@osd.mil, 703-695-5486.

Sincerely,

Signed By:

Dale Klein:

Enclosure: As stated:

GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED APRIL 4, 2006 GAO CODE 350641/GAO-06-592:

"Chemical And Biological Defense: DoD Needs Consistent Policies and 
Clear Processes to Address the Survivability of Weapon Systems Against 
Chemical and Biological Threats":

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations:

RECOMMENDATION 1: To better ensure the incorporation of chemical and 
biological survivability into weapon systems, the GAO recommends that 
the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to either modify current DoD 
policy or develop guidance to ensure that chemical and biological 
survivability is consistently addressed in the weapon system 
acquisition process. This policy or guidance should:

* establish a clear process for program offices to follow regarding the 
extent to which chemical and biological system survivability should be 
considered and tested;

* require consistent, DoD-wide documentation of decisions regarding how 
weapon system chemical and biological survivability is considered and 
tested; and:

* establish an oversight process within DoD and the Services for 
monitoring weapon system program office decisions. (Page 24/GAO Draft 
Report):

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Office of the Special Assistant for Chemical 
and Biological Defense and Chemical Demilitarization Programs 
(SA(CBD&CDP)) developed a draft policy to address chemical and 
biological contamination survivability (CBCS). This draft policy 
establishes a process for material developers to follow to determine: 
(1) which systems must address CBCS, (2) how CBCS will be addressed 
through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS), (3) implementation of this process, and (4) the development of 
quantitative and measurable performance attributes with thresholds and 
objectives. The draft policy mandates the use of the JCIDS process in 
satisfying CBCS requirements and annual reporting of CBCS-related 
program decisions. The draft policy directs the Assistant to the 
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense 
Programs (ATSD(NCB)) to provide oversight of the CBCS program and 
provides a process for this oversight. This draft policy was reviewed 
by all the Military Services and is expected to be issued by May 2006.

RECOMMENDATION 2: To better ensure the incorporation of chemical and 
biological survivability into weapon systems, the GAO recommends that 
the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to modify current DoD policy to 
ensure that DoD's database of chemical and biological scientific and 
technical information is comprehensive. This modified policy should:

* state which chemical and biological survivability information belongs 
in the body of scientific and technical information that is required to 
be submitted to the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC);

* clarify responsibilities and establish a specific process for the 
submission of chemical and biological scientific and technical 
information to DTIC; and:

* designate which DoD office or organization is responsible for 
exercising oversight to ensure that this information is submitted to 
DTIC. (Pages 24-25/GAO Draft Report):

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The DoD recognizes the need for a chemical and 
biological material effects database. The DoD initiated development of 
such a database by forming and hosting an executive steering committee 
which met for the first time in March 2006. The DoD plans to establish 
and institute this database at the Chemical and Biological Defense 
Information and Analysis Center (CBIAC) managed by the Defense 
Technical Information Center (DTIC). The CBCS Database Executive 
Steering Committee is addressing such issues as data selection, 
database population, and data submission. The ATSD(NCB) oversees 
development of this database, which is expected to be ready by the end 
of Fiscal Year 2007.

[End of section]

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact:

Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov:

Acknowledgments:

In addition to the contact named above, William Cawood, Assistant 
Director; Renee S. Brown, Jane Ervin, Catherine Humphries, David 
Mayfield, Renee McElveen, Anupama Patil, Matthew Sakrekoff, Rebecca 
Shea, and Cheryl Weissman also made key contributions to this report.

(350641): 

[End of section]

FOOTNOTES

[1] GAO, Chemical and Biological Defense: Sustained Leadership 
Attention Needed to Resolve Operational and System Survivability 
Concerns (May 30, 2003).

[2] Pub. L. No. 108-375, ß 1053 (Oct. 28, 2004).

[3] Because the sample is a non probability sample, it cannot be used 
to make generalizations about weapon system program office acquisition, 
testing, or database submission practices. 

[4] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/ 
AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

[5] In commenting on this report DOD noted, and we agree, that the Army 
has a long-standing policy in place for addressing weapon system 
nuclear, biological, and chemical survivability. However, as noted on 
page 9 Army policies allow service sponsors and program offices to 
individually decide how and to what extent to consider weapon system 
survivability during the acquisition process.

[6] Key performance parameters are those attributes or characteristics 
of a system that are considered critical or essential to the 
development of an effective military capability and those attributes 
that make a significant contribution to the key characteristics.

[7] MDA is the designated individual with overall responsibility for a 
program. The MDA has the authority to approve entry of an acquisition 
program into the next phase of the acquisition process and is 
accountable for cost, schedule, and performance reporting to higher 
authority, including congressional reporting.

[8] DTIC is the central coordinating point for DOD's scientific and 
technical information databases and systems.

[9] DOD Regulation 5000.2-R, Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAPS) and Major Automated Information System 
(MAIS) Acquisition Programs, Apr. 5, 2002.

[10] See DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 
2003; DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition 
System, May 12, 2003; Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Defense 
Acquisition University, www.akss.dau.mil/dag/.

[11] Crew members could be protected by such means as individual 
protective suits and masks, or by air filtration and overpressure built 
into weapon system crew compartments.

[12] According to DOD Instruction 3200.14, DTIC is the central 
coordinating point for DOD scientific databases and systems, including 
those related to chemical and biological data. 

[13] DTIC manages 9 contractor-operated information analysis centers.

[14] See DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, May 12, 
2003, and DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition 
System, May 12, 2003.

[15] See Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 3170.01E, Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System, May 11, 2005.

[16] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-160, Section 1701 (Nov. 30, 1993).

[17] The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical 
and Biological Defense Programs falls under the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

[18] The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is an advisory council 
that assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying 
and assessing the priorities for joint military requirements to achieve 
current and future military capabilities. Chaired by the Vice Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Council comprises a senior officer 
from each of the military services. Representatives from other DOD 
entities, such as the combatant commands and the joint staff, serve in 
an advisory role to the Council.

[19] The Joint Requirements Office is the office within DOD responsible 
for the planning, coordination, and oversight of joint chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear defense operational requirements. 
It also serves as the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff's single source 
of expertise to address all issues involving chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear defense within passive defense, consequence 
management, force protection, and homeland security.

[20] A Functional Capabilities Board is a permanently established body 
that is responsible for the organization, analysis and prioritization 
of joint warfighting capabilities within an assigned functional area.

[21] Key performance parameters are those attributes or characteristics 
of a system that are considered critical or essential to the 
development of an effective military capability and those attributes 
that make a significant contribution to the key characteristics.

[22] DOD Instruction 3200.14, "Principles and Operational Parameters of 
the DOD Scientific and Technical Information Program", May 13, 1997, 
states that a manual should be developed prescribing procedures, 
practices, standards, and training guides necessary to implement a 
comprehensive, efficient, and effective DOD scientific and technical 
information program, including a process for submitting research and 
testing results to a central database. However, such a manual has not 
been developed. DOD officials told us that they do not intend to 
develop such a manual and that reference to this manual will be removed 
from future versions of the DOD instruction.

[23] See DOD Instruction 3200.14, "Principles and Operational 
Parameters of the DOD Scientific and Technical Information Program," 
May 13, 1997, which states, "Primary distribution of all documents 
regardless of form, shall be the responsibility of the DOD activity 
that performed or sponsored the work in whole or in part. Primary 
distribution shall be to the technical community having a direct and 
immediate interest in the outcome of the research and evaluation or 
studies efforts. The DTIC, applicable DOD Information Analysis Centers, 
and the local DOD technical library or repository that supports the 
activity responsible for sponsoring and creating the documents shall be 
recipients of the primary distribution at the same time."

[24] Because the sample is a non probability sample, it cannot be used 
to make generalizations about weapon system program office acquisition, 
testing, or database submission practices related to chemical and 
biological survivability.

[25] Seven of nine of the programs covered in this report are 
considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD. A program is 
defined by DOD as major if its estimated research and development costs 
exceed $365 million or its procurement exceeds $2.19 billion in fiscal 
year 2000 constant dollars.

[26] A coupon-or-swatch is a test specimen cut from a bolt of material. 
The swatch should be selected to be representative of the area of the 
material to be tested.

[27] The DD(X) program office stated that there are plans for 
additional production testing (at both the component and total system 
level) to include the Countermeasure Washdown System, Chemical 
Detection Systems, and the Collective Protection System.

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