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Report to Congressional Committees: 

March 2006: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs: 

GAO-06-391: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-391, a report to congressional committees: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In the last 5 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has doubled its 
planned investments in new weapon systems from about $700 billion in 
2001 to nearly $1.4 trillion in 2006. While the weapons that DOD 
develops have no rival in superiority, weapon systems acquisition 
remains a long-standing high risk area. GAOís reviews over the past 30 
years have found consistent problems with weapon acquisitions such as 
cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. In 
addition, DOD faces several budgetary challenges that underscore the 
need to deliver its new weapon programs within estimated costs and to 
obtain the most from these investments. 

This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an 
independent, knowledge-based assessment of selected defense programs 
that identifies potential risks and needed actions when a programís 
projected attainment of knowledge diverges from the best practices. 
Programs for the assessments were selected based on several factors 
including, (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and (3) 
congressional interest. The majority of the 52 programs covered in this 
report are considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD. This 
report also highlights higher level issues raised by the cumulative 
experiences of individual programs. GAO updates this report annually 
under the Comptroller Generalís authority. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO assessed 52 systems that represent an investment of over $850 
billion, ranging from the Missile Defense Agencyís Airborne Laser to 
the Armyís Warfighter Information Network-Tactical. DOD often exceeds 
development cost estimates by approximately 30 to 40 percent and 
experiences cuts in planned quantities, missed deadlines, and 
performance shortfalls. Such difficulties, absent definitive and 
effective reform outcomes, are likely to cause great turmoil in a 
budget environment in which there are growing fiscal imbalances as well 
as increasing conflict over increasingly limited resources. While these 
problems are in themselves complex, they are heightened by the fact 
that this current level of investment is by no means final and 
unchangeable. A large number of the technologies under development in 
these systems are sufficiently new and immature that it is uncertain 
how long it will take or how much it will cost to make them 
operational. 

Most of the 52 programs GAO reviewed have proceeded with lower levels 
of knowledge than suggested by best practices. Programs that start with 
mature technologies do better. As shown in the figure below, programs 
that began with immature technologies have experienced average research 
and development cost growth of 34.9 percent; programs that began with 
mature technologies have only experienced cost growth of 4.8 percent. 

Average Program Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Cost Growth 
from First Full Estimate: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

If DOD continues to move programs through development without requisite 
technology, design, and production knowledge, costs and schedules will 
increase, which will reduce the quantity delivered to the warfighter. 
This practice will also continue to reduce DODís buying power, as less 
capability will be provided for the money invested. In the larger 
context, DOD needs to make changes in its requirements and budgeting 
processes that are consistent with getting the desired outcomes from 
the acquisition process. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-391. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Paul L. Francis at (202) 
512-4841 or FrancisP@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Forword: 

Letter: 

Fiscal Challenges Confronting DOD Necessitate Better Acquisition 
Outcomes: 

DOD's Weapon Programs Portfolio Often Experiences a Reduced Return on 
Investment: 

A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes: 

Most Programs Proceed with Lower Levels of Knowledge at Critical 
Junctures: 

Historically, Most Cost Growth Is Reported after the Critical Design 
Review: 

How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed: 

Assessments of Individual Programs: 

Airborne Laser (ABL): 

Aerial Common Sensor (ACS): 

Advanced Deployable System (ADS): 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD): 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites: 

Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA): 

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS): 

Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS): 

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System: 

B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP): 

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP): 

C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP): 

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP): 

CH-47F: 

Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21: 

DD(X) Destroyer: 

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE): 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) - Atlas V, Delta IV: 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): 

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile: 

F-22A Raptor: 

Future Combat Systems (FCS): 

Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System: 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD): 

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modernized Space/OCS: 

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System 
(JLENS): 

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): 

Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Site (JTRS AMF): 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1: 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5: 

Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS): 

Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI): 

Land Warrior: 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): 

Longbow Apache Block III: 

Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA): 

21" Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (MRUUV): 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS): 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS): 

PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit: 

MQ-9 Predator B: 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High: 

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB): 

Space Radar (SR): 

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS): 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): 

Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT): 

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft: 

VH-71A Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program: 

Warrior Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Warrior UAV): 

Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS): 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T): 

Agency Comments: 

Scope of Our Review: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Macro Analysis: 

Historical Analysis: 

System Profile Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment: 

Product Knowledge Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment: 

Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Total Projected Cost of DOD's Top Five Programs in Fiscal 
Years 2001 and 2006: 

Table 2: Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 26 Weapon Systems: 

Table 3: Examples of DOD Programs with Reduced Buying Power: 

Table 4: Programs in Our Assessment Yet to Hold a Critical Design 
Review: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Percent of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at Key 
Junctures: 

Figure 2: RDT&E Percentage Increase throughout the Product Development 
Cycle for 29 Programs Completed or in Production: 

Figure 3: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared 
with Best Practices: 

Abbreviations: 

AMRDEC: Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering 
Center: 

ARS: analysis and reporting system: 

ATACMS BAT: Army Tactical Missile System Brilliant Antiarmor 
Submunition: 

BAMS: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance: 

CDA: Commander's Digital Assistant: 

CEC: Cooperative Engagement Capability: 

CMUP: Conventional Mission Upgrade Program: 

DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency: 

DBCS: Dismounted Battle Command System: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

EKV: exoatmospheric kill vehicle: 

EPLRS: Enhanced Position Location Reporting System: 

FY: fiscal year: 

GAO: Government Accountability Office: 

GEO: geosynchronous earth orbit: 

GMLRS: Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System: 

HEO: highly elliptical orbit: 

ICD: Interface Control Design: 

ISR: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance: 

JASSM: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile: 

JDAM: Joint Direct Attack Munition: 

JLENS: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor 
System: 

JPATS: Joint Primary Aircraft Training System: 

JSOW: Joint Standoff Weapon: 

MCS: Maneuver Control System: 

MDA: Missile Defense Agency: 

MDAP: Major Defense Acquisition Program: 

MEADS: Medium Extended Air Defense System: 

MIDS-LVT: Multifunctional Information Distribution System - Low Volume 
Terminal: 

MM III GRP: Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program: 

NA: not applicable: 

NAS: National Airspace System: 

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration: 

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: 

OCS: Operational Control System: 

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

PTIR: precision track illumination radar: 

RDT&E: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation: 

SAR: Selected Acquisition Report: 

SDACS: Solid Divert and Attitude Control System: 

SDR: Systems Design Review: 

SOCOM: Special Operations Command: 

SPC: statistical process control: 

SUR: surveillance radar: 

TBD: to be determined: 

TBIP: Tomahawk Baseline Improvement Program: 

TRL: Technology Readiness Level: 

UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle: 

UHF: ultra high frequency: 

U.S.C.: United States Code: 

Foreword March 31, 2006: 

Congressional Committees: 

Current and expected fiscal imbalances demand that the Department of 
Defense (DOD) maximize its return on investment and provide the 
warfighter with needed capabilities at the best value for the taxpayer. 
Since 1990, we have assessed weapon acquisitions as a high-risk area. 
Not only does it continue to be a high risk area, but it has also taken 
on heightened importance. To transform military operations, DOD has 
embarked on developing multiple megasystems that are expected to be the 
most expensive and complex ever. However, these costly acquisitions are 
running head-on into the nation's unsustainable fiscal path. In the 
past 5 years, DOD has doubled its planned investments in new weapon 
systems from $700 billion to $1.4 trillion. This huge increase has not 
been accompanied by more stability, better outcomes, or more buying 
power for the acquisition dollar. 

This is our fourth annual assessment of weapon programs. It contains 
our assessment of 52 weapon programs representing a projected 
investment of about $850 billion. Unfortunately, our assessments do not 
show appreciable improvement in the acquisition of major weapon 
systems. Rather, programs are experiencing recurring problems with cost 
overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. These cost 
increases mean that DOD cannot produce as many weapons as intended nor 
deliver those weapons to the warfighter when promised. These problems 
occur, in part, because weapon programs do not capture the requisite 
knowledge when needed to efficiently and effectively manage program 
risks. Programs consistently move forward with unrealistic cost and 
schedule estimates, use immature technologies in launching product 
development, and fail to solidify design and manufacturing processes at 
appropriate points in development. 

The past year has seen several major defense reviews that lay down 
approaches to improve the way DOD buys weapons. These reviews contain 
many constructive ideas. If they are to produce better results, 
however, they must heed the lessons taught--but perhaps not learned--of 
acquisition history. Specifically, policy must be manifested in 
decisions on individual programs or reform will be blunted. DOD's 
current acquisition policy is a case in point. The policy supports a 
knowledge-based, evolutionary approach to acquiring new weapons. The 
practice--decisions made on individual programs--sacrifices knowledge 
and executability in favor of revolutionary solutions. It's time to 
challenge such solutions. Reform will not be real unless each weapon 
system is shown to be both a worthwhile investment and an executable 
program. Otherwise, we will continue to start more programs than we can 
finish, produce less capability for more money, and create the next set 
of case studies for future defense reform reviews. 

Signed by: 

David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 

Letter March 31, 2006: 

Congressional Committees: 

One of the single largest investments the federal government makes is 
the development and production of new weapon systems. In the last 5 
years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has doubled its planned 
investments in new weapon systems from about $700 billion in 2001 to 
nearly $1.4 trillion in 2006. It is imperative that these investments 
deliver as promised not only because of their value to the warfighter 
but because every dollar spent on weapon systems means one dollar less 
of something else DOD or the Government can do. There is ample basis 
for serious concerns on this score. The cost of developing a weapon 
system continues to often exceed estimates by approximately 30 percent 
to 40 percent. This in turn results in fewer quantities, missed 
deadlines, and performance shortfalls. In short, the buying power of 
the weapon system investment dollar is reduced; the warfighter gets 
less than promised; and opportunities to make other investments are 
lost. This is not to say that the nation does not get superior weapons 
in the end, but that at twice the level of investment, DOD has an 
obligation to get better results. In the larger context, DOD needs to 
make changes in its requirements and budgeting processes that are 
consistent with getting the desired outcomes from the acquisition 
process. 

Given growing fiscal imbalances as well as competition for increasingly 
scarce resources, this current level of investment is by no means final 
and unchangeable. To get better results, programs need to have higher 
levels of knowledge when they start, which enable better estimates of 
how much they will cost to finish. Currently, a large number of the 
technologies under development in major systems are sufficiently new 
and immature that it is uncertain how long it will take or how much it 
will cost to make them operational. Predictably, developing these 
systems without sufficient knowledge will take longer and cost even 
more than promised and deliver fewer quantities and other capabilities 
than planned. Over the years, we have made a number of recommendations 
to address these issues, both systemically and on individual programs. 

In this report, we assess 52 programs that represent an investment of 
approximately $858 billion.[Footnote 1] Our objective is twofold: to 
provide decision makers with a cross-cutting analysis of DOD weapons 
system investment and also to provide independent, knowledge-based 
assessments of individual systems' attained knowledge and potential 
risks. 

Programs were selected for individual assessment based on several 
factors including, (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and 
(3) congressional interest. The majority of the 52 programs covered in 
this report are considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD. 

Fiscal Challenges Confronting DOD Necessitate Better Acquisition 
Outcomes: 

DOD's investment in the research, development, test, and evaluation 
(RDT&E) and procurement of major weapon systems is expected to rise 
from $147 billion in fiscal year 2006 to $178 billion in fiscal year 
2011.[Footnote 2] DOD's total planned investment in Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs is nearly $1.4 trillion (2006 dollars) for its 
current portfolio, with over $840 billion of that investment yet to be 
made.[Footnote 3] 

Budget simulations by GAO, the Congressional Budget Office, and others 
show that, over the long term, we face a large and growing structural 
deficit due primarily to known demographic trends and rising health 
care costs. As the Comptroller General has noted, continuing on this 
unsustainable fiscal path will gradually erode, if not suddenly damage, 
our economy, our standard of living, and ultimately our national 
security. Federal discretionary spending, along with other federal 
policies and programs, will face serious budget pressures in the coming 
years stemming from new budgetary demands and demographic trends. 
Defense spending falls within the discretionary spending accounts. 
Further, current military operations, such as those in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, consume a large share of DOD budgets and are causing faster wear 
on existing weapons. Refurbishment or replacement sooner than planned 
is putting further pressure on DOD's investment accounts. 

At the same time DOD is facing these problems, programs are commanding 
larger budgets. DOD is undertaking new efforts that are expected to be 
the most expensive and complex ever and on which DOD is heavily relying 
to fundamentally transform military operations. Table 1 shows that just 
5 years ago, the top five weapon systems were projected to cost about 
$291 billion combined; today, the top five weapon systems are projected 
to cost about $550 billion. 

Table 1: Total Projected Cost of DOD's Top Five Programs in Fiscal 
Years 2001 and 2006: 

Billions of constant 2006 dollars. 

2001: Program: F-22A Raptor aircraft; 
2001: Cost: $65.0; 
2006: Program: Joint Strike Fighter aircraft; 
2006: Cost: $206.3. 

2001: Program: DDG-51 class destroyer ship; 
2001: Cost: $64.4; 
2006: Program: Future Combat Systems; 
2006: Cost: $127.5. 

2001: Program: Virginia class submarine; 
2001: Cost: $62.1; 
2006: Program: Virginia class submarine; 
2006: Cost: $80.4. 

2001: Program: C-17 Globemaster airlift aircraft; 
2001: Cost: $51.1; 
2006: Program: DDG-51 class destroyer ship; 
2006: Cost: $70.4. 

2001: Program: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter aircraft; 
2001: Cost: $48.2; 
2006: Program: F-22A Raptor aircraft; 
2006: Cost: $65.4. 

Total; 
2001: Cost: $290.8; 
Total; 
2006: Cost: $550.0. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of table] 

The larger scope of development associated with these megasystems 
produces a much larger fiscal impact when cost and schedule estimates 
increase. The top 5 programs in 2001 and the top 5 programs in 2006 
have both experienced about a 40 percent increase in projected RDT&E 
costs from the first full estimate to the latest estimate. In the same 
base-year dollars, the total fiscal impact was much greater for the 
2006 top 5 programs, however, as RDT&E costs increased by $33.9 billion 
as opposed to $16.9 billion for the top 5 from 2001 because of the 
larger scope of development planned for the 2006 top 5 programs. The 
Joint Strike Fighter and Future Combat Systems contribute significantly 
to this projected cost growth, as their combined cost is greater than 
all of the top 5 programs in 2001. 

DOD's Weapon Programs Portfolio Often Experiences a Reduced Return on 
Investment: 

The way DOD develops and produces its major weapon systems has had 
disappointing consequences. A large number of the programs in our 
assessment are costing more and taking longer to develop than 
estimated. As shown in table 2, total RDT&E costs for 26 common 
set[Footnote 4] weapon programs increased by nearly $44.6 billion, or 
37 percent, over the original business case (the first full estimate). 
The same programs have also experienced an increase in the time needed 
to develop capabilities with a weighted-average schedule increase of 
nearly 17 percent.[Footnote 5] 

Table 2: Cost and Cycle Time Growth for 26 Weapon Systems: 

Billions of constant 2006 dollars 

Total cost; 
First full estimate: $547.7; 
Latest estimate: $627.4; 
Percentage change: 14.6%. 

RDT&E cost; 
First full estimate: $120.4; 
Latest estimate: $164.9; 
Percentage change: 37.0%. 

Weighted average acquisition cycle time[A]; 
First full estimate: 154.5 months; 
Latest estimate: 180.2 months; 
Percentage change: 16.7%. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] This is a weighted estimate of average acquisition cycle time for 
the 26 programs based on total program costs at the first full and 
latest estimates. The simple average for these two estimates was 112.1 
months for the first full estimate and 131.3 months for the latest 
estimate resulting in a 17.2 percent change. 

[End of table] 

Quantities for 9 of the common set programs have been reduced since 
their first estimate.[Footnote 6] In addition, the weighted-average 
program acquisition unit cost for 25 of the 26 programs increased by 
roughly 57 percent.[Footnote 7] 

The consequence of cost and cycle-time growth is manifested in a 
reduction of the buying power of the defense dollar. Table 3 
illustrates six programs included in this assessment with a significant 
reduction in buying power; we have reported similar outcomes in many 
more programs. For example, the Air Force initially planned to buy five 
Spaced Based Infrared System High satellites at a program acquisition 
unit cost of about $816 million (fiscal year 2006 dollars). Technology 
and design components matured late in the development of the satellite, 
which contributed to cost growth and four Nunn-McCurdy[Footnote 8] unit 
cost breaches. Now, the Air Force plans to buy 3 satellites at a 
program acquisition unit cost of about $3.4 billion, a 315 percent 
increase. 

Table 3: Examples of DOD Programs with Reduced Buying Power: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

A Knowledge-Based Approach Can Lead to Better Acquisition Outcomes: 

Over the last several years, we have undertaken a body of work that 
examines weapon acquisition issues from a perspective that draws upon 
lessons learned from best product development practices. Leading 
commercial firms expect that their program managers will deliver high- 
quality products on time and within budget. Doing otherwise could 
result in the customer walking away. Thus, those firms have created an 
environment and adopted practices that put their program managers in a 
good position to succeed in meeting these expectations. Collectively, 
these practices comprise a process that is anchored in knowledge. It is 
a process in which technology development and product development are 
treated differently and managed separately. The process of developing 
technology culminates in discovery--the gathering of knowledge--and 
must, by its nature, allow room for unexpected results and delays. 
Leading firms do not ask their product managers to develop technology. 
Successful programs give responsibility for maturing technologies to 
science and technology organizations, rather than the program or 
product development managers. The process of developing a product 
culminates in delivery and, therefore, gives great weight to design and 
production. The firms demand--and receive--specific knowledge about a 
new product before production begins. A program does not go forward 
unless a strong business case on which the program was originally 
justified continues to hold true. 

Successful product developers ensure a high level of knowledge is 
achieved at key junctures in development. We characterize these 
junctures as knowledge points. These knowledge points and associated 
indicators are defined as follows: 

* Knowledge point 1: Resources and needs match. This point occurs when 
a sound business case is made for the product--that is, a match is made 
between the customer's requirements and the product developer's 
available resources in terms of knowledge, time, money, and capacity. 
Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system 
development is an important indicator of whether this match has been 
made. This means that the technologies needed to meet essential product 
requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended 
environment. 

* Knowledge point 2: Product design is stable. This point occurs when a 
program determines that a product's design is stable--that is, it will 
meet customer requirements, as well as cost, schedule, and reliability 
targets. A best practice is to achieve design stability at the system- 
level critical design review, usually held midway through development. 
Completion of at least 90 percent of engineering drawings at the system 
design review provides tangible evidence that the design is stable. 

* Knowledge point 3: Production processes are mature and the design is 
reliable. This point is achieved when it has been demonstrated that the 
company can manufacture the product within cost, schedule, and quality 
targets. A best practice is to ensure that all key manufacturing 
processes are in statistical control--that is, they are repeatable, 
sustainable, and capable of consistently producing parts within the 
product's quality tolerances and standards--at the start of production. 

A result of this knowledge-based process is evolutionary product 
development, an incremental approach that enables developers to rely 
more on available resources rather than making promises about unproven 
technologies. Predictability is a key to success as successful product 
developers know that invention cannot be scheduled, and its cost is 
difficult to estimate. They do not bring a technology into new product 
development unless that technology has been demonstrated to meet the 
user's requirements. Allowing technology development to spill over into 
product development puts an extra burden on decision makers and 
provides a weak foundation for making product development estimates. 
While the user may not initially receive the ultimate capability under 
this approach, the initial product is available sooner and at a lower, 
more predictable cost. 

There is a synergy in this process, as the attainment of each 
successive knowledge point builds on the preceding one. Metrics gauge 
when the requisite level of knowledge has been attained. Controls are 
used to ensure a high level of knowledge is attained before making 
additional significant investments. Controls are considered effective 
if they are backed by measurable criteria and if decision makers are 
required to consider them before deciding to advance a program to the 
next level. Effective controls help decision makers gauge progress in 
meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals and ensure that managers 
will (1) conduct activities to capture relevant product development 
knowledge, (2) provide evidence that knowledge was captured, and (3) 
hold decision reviews to determine that appropriate knowledge was 
captured to move to the next phase. The result is a product development 
process that holds decision makers accountable and delivers excellent 
results in a predictable manner. 

Most Programs Proceed with Lower Levels of Knowledge at Critical 
Junctures: 

To get the most out of its weapon systems investments, DOD revised its 
acquisition policy in May 2003 to incorporate a knowledge-based, 
evolutionary framework. The policy requires decision makers to have the 
knowledge they need before moving to the next phase of development. 
However, most of the programs we reviewed proceeded with lower levels 
of knowledge at critical junctures and attained key elements of product 
knowledge later in development than specified in DOD policy. Once a 
program gets behind in demonstrated knowledge, it stays behind (see 
fig. 1). 

Figure 1: Percent of Programs That Achieved Technology Maturity at Key 
Junctures: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Only 10 percent of the programs in our assessment demonstrated all of 
their critical technologies as mature at the start of development, 
meaning they fell far short of attaining knowledge point 1 when they 
should have. By the time of their design review--when they should have 
demonstrated knowledge point 2 (stable design)--only 43 percent had 
actually attained knowledge point 1 (all critical technologies mature). 
By the time of the decision to start production when the programs 
should have demonstrated knowledge point 3 (production processes in 
control) one third still had not attained knowledge point 1. Similarly, 
only 35 percent of the programs in our assessment believed they had 
attained knowledge point 2 at the design review and only 58 percent 
believed they had attained knowledge point 2 by the time of the 
decision to start production. None of the programs we assessed that are 
now in production reported using statistical process control data to 
measure the maturity of production processes. This is the data needed 
to demonstrate knowledge point 3. In other words, none of the programs 
demonstrated knowledge point 3. This suggests that programs that follow 
the policy are the exception; the predominant practice is to still 
proceed with knowledge gaps. 

Consequences accrue to programs that are still working to mature 
technologies well into system development when they should be focused 
on maturing system design and preparing for production. These 
consequences involve increased risk of cost growth and schedule delays 
throughout the life of the program. The cost effect of proceeding 
without the necessary knowledge can be dramatic. For example, RDT&E 
costs for the programs that started development with mature 
technologies increased by a modest average of 4.8 percent over the 
first full estimate, whereas the RDT&E costs for the programs that 
started development with immature technologies increased by a much 
higher average of 34.9 percent over the first full estimate. Likewise, 
program acquisition unit costs for the programs with mature technology 
increased by less than 1 percent, whereas the programs that started 
development with immature technologies experienced an average program 
acquisition unit cost increase of nearly 27 percent over the first full 
estimate.[Footnote 9] 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it is the 
department's policy that technologies should be demonstrated in at 
least a relevant environment before a program enters system 
development; whereas, GAO utilizes the best practice standard that 
calls for technologies to be assessed one step higher--demonstration in 
an operational environment. If we applied the DOD's lower standard, the 
number of programs with mature technologies at program start would have 
increased to 23 percent, compared with 10 percent using the best 
practices standard. This is a higher number but does not alter the fact 
that most programs begin development without mature technology. A cost 
consequence for using the lower standard does occur, however. While the 
RDT&E cost growth for programs that started development with immature 
technologies (using the DOD standard) was about the same at 34.6 
percent, the cost growth for the programs that met DOD's maturity 
standard was significantly greater at 18.8 percent than the 4.8 percent 
experienced by those that met the higher best practice standard. 

The order of how knowledge is built throughout product development is 
important to delivering products on time and within cost. Knowledge 
gaps have a cumulative effect. For example, design stability cannot be 
attained if key technologies are not mature. The lack of technical 
maturity weakens the knowledge available at the design review. The 
majority of programs in our assessment that have held a design review 
did so without first maturing critical technologies. Twenty of the 52 
programs we assessed are currently scheduled to hold their critical 
design reviews by the year 2011. Only 2 of those 20 programs currently 
expect to have their technologies fully mature by the time of their 
design reviews, and only 4 of those 20 programs currently expect to 
have at least 90 percent design stability by the time of their critical 
design reviews. 

Historically, Most Cost Growth Is Reported after the Critical Design 
Review: 

We reviewed the development cost experience of 29 programs that have 
completed their product development cycle--the time between the start 
of development and production.[Footnote 10] We found a significant 
portion of the recognized total development cost increases of these 
programs took place after they were approximately half way into their 
product development cycle. These increases typically occurred after the 
time of the design review of the programs. As shown in figure 2, the 
programs experienced a cumulative increase in development costs of 28.3 
percent throughout their product development. Approximately 8.5 percent 
of the total development cost growth occurred up until the time of the 
average critical design review. The remaining 19.7 percent occurred 
after the average critical design review. 

Figure 2: RDT&E Percentage Increase throughout the Product Development 
Cycle for 29 Programs Completed or in Production: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

This historical pattern underscores the challenges DOD faces in 
executing programs currently in development. Table 4 lists the programs 
in our assessment that have yet to hold their critical design 
review.[Footnote 11] 

Table 4: Programs in Our Assessment Yet to Hold a Critical Design 
Review: 

Aerial Common Sensor. 

Advanced Deployable System. 

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System. 

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program. 

Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21. 

Future Combat Systems. 

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System. 

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 

Joint Tactical Radio System Cluster 5. 

Patriot/Medium Extended Air Defense System Combined Aggregated Program. 

Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft. 

Mobile User Objective System. 

National Polar--Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System. 

MQ-9 Predator B. 

Warrior UAV. 

Warfighter Information Network - Tactical. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: List includes only those programs that have started development. 
Four additional programs in our assessment have scheduled their 
critical design review but have not yet started development. 

[End of table] 

The current planned total RDT&E investment of these 16 programs is 
approximately $142 billion with a total planned investment of over $521 
billion. While most of these programs have yet to experience any 
significant cost increases, some have already experienced double digit 
cost increases prior to their design review. Furthermore, all 16 
programs listed began development with immature technologies--10 
currently still have over half of their critical technologies immature. 
For these programs, the markers for risk are present--historical 
experience and technology immaturity--as are the cost, schedule, and 
quantity consequences that attend that risk. If past is prologue, the 
decisions to continue to move programs through development without the 
requisite knowledge will continue to result in programs that are not 
delivered on time nor with the quantities and capabilities promised. 
These consequences are exacerbated in an environment of constrained 
resources as trade-offs become necessary not only within these 
programs, but across the entire weapons portfolio--resulting in a 
reduction of the department's buying power. 

How to Read the Knowledge Graphic for Each Program Assessed: 

We assess each program in two pages and depict the extent of knowledge 
in a stacked bar graph and provide a narrative summary at the bottom of 
the first page. As illustrated in figure 3, the knowledge graph is 
based on the three knowledge points and the key indicators for the 
attainment of knowledge: technology maturity (depicted in orange), 
design stability (depicted in green), and production maturity (depicted 
in blue). A "best practice" line is drawn based on the ideal attainment 
of the three types of knowledge at the three knowledge points. The 
closer a program's attained knowledge is to the best practice line, the 
more likely the weapon will be delivered within estimated cost and 
schedule. A knowledge deficit at the start of development--indicated by 
a gap between the technology knowledge attained and the best practice 
line--means the program proceeded with immature technologies and faces 
a greater likelihood of cost and schedule increases as technology risks 
are discovered and resolved. 

Figure 3: Depiction of a Notional Weapon System's Knowledge as Compared 
with Best Practices: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

An interpretation of this notional example would be that the system 
development began with key technologies immature, thereby missing 
knowledge point 1. Knowledge point 2 was not attained at the design 
review as some technologies were still not mature and only a small 
percentage of engineering drawings had been released. Projections for 
the production decision show that the program is expected to achieve 
greater levels of maturity but will still fall short. It is likely that 
this program would have had significant cost and schedule increases. 

We conducted our review from June 2005 through March 2006 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix II 
contains detailed information on our methodology. 

Assessments of Individual Programs: 

Our assessments of the 52 weapon systems follow. 

[End of section] 

Airborne Laser (ABL): 

MDA's ABL element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks to destroy enemy missiles during the boost phase of their 
flight. Carried aboard a highly modified Boeing 747 aircraft, ABL 
employs a beam control/fire control subsystem to focus the beam on a 
target, a high-energy chemical laser to rupture the fuel tanks of enemy 
missiles, and a battle management subsystem to plan and execute 
engagements. We assessed the Block 2004 design that is under 
development and expected to lead to an initial capability in a future 
block. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Kirtland AFB, N. Mex. 

Funding, FY06-FY11: 
R&D: $4,064.1 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $4,064.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: NA. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Latest costs include all costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Total known cost through fiscal year 2011 is $7,416.2 
million. 

Although program officials expected ABL to provide an initial 
capability during Block 2006, this event has been delayed and only one 
of its seven critical technologies is fully mature. During Block 2004, 
the program continues work on a prototype expected to provide the basic 
design for a future operational capability. Program officials expect to 
demonstrate the other six technologies during a prototype flight test, 
in late 2008, that will assess ABL's lethality. MDA has released about 
94 percent of the engineering drawings for the prototype's design, 
which will be the basis for an initial operational capability during a 
future block if the test is successful. However, additional drawings 
may be needed if the design is enhanced or if problems encountered 
during flight-testing force design changes. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

ABL Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Only one of ABL's seven critical technologies--managing the high power 
beam--is fully mature. The program office assessed the remaining six 
technologies--the six-module laser, missile tracking, atmospheric 
compensation, transmissive optics, optical coatings, and jitter 
control--as nearly mature. According to program officials, all of these 
technologies are needed to provide the system with an initial 
operational capability. 

The program office assessed the six-module laser as being close to 
reaching full maturity. In November 2004, the program demonstrated the 
simultaneous firing of all six laser modules. However, the initial 
operation of the laser was too short to make meaningful predictions of 
its power, and problems experienced during recent tests limited the 
duration of lasing. In December 2005, the program conducted a longer 
duration test of the laser and was able to sustain the beam for more 
than 10 seconds. The program also produced approximately 83 percent of 
the laser's design power, which, according to program officials, is 
sufficient to achieve 95 percent of lethal range against all classes of 
ballistic missiles. 

The program recently completed a series of beam control/fire control 
flight tests and, as a result, has reassessed three of its critical 
technologies--transmissive optics, optical coatings, and jitter 
control--as nearing full maturity. The program plans to demonstrate all 
technologies in an operational environment during a flight test of the 
system prototype, referred to as lethal demonstration, in which ABL 
will attempt to shoot down a short-range ballistic missile. Challenges 
with integrating the laser and beam control/fire control subcomponents 
have delayed this test into late 2008. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess the design stability because ABL's initial 
capability will not be fully developed until the second aircraft is 
well underway. While the program has released 10,280 of the 10,910 
engineering drawings for the prototype, it is unclear whether the 
design of the prototype aircraft can be relied upon as a good indicator 
of design stability for the second aircraft. More drawings may be 
needed if the design is enhanced or if problems encountered during 
flight testing force design changes. 

Production Maturity: 

The program is producing a limited quantity of hardware for the 
system's prototype. However, we did not assess the production maturity 
of ABL because MDA has not made a production decision. 

Other Program Issues: 

In fiscal year 2004, MDA directed the ABL program to restructure its 
prime contract, increase its cost ceiling, and refocus the contractor's 
efforts on making technical progress. However, recent technical 
challenges associated with the program's beam control/fire control 
flight test series and long duration laser testing are causing further 
cost growth and schedule slippage for the program. Since our last 
assessment in January 2005, ABL's planned budget through fiscal year 
2009 increased by $483 million (9.4 percent), primarily in fiscal year 
2009. 

The program plans to award a contract for the second ABL aircraft, 
initially to include only trade studies, in fiscal year 2009. MDA has 
budgeted approximately $16 million for these trade study initiatives in 
an effort to determine the second aircraft system performance 
capabilities and to initiate the design of the second weapon system. 
However, program officials stated that the commitment to purchase a 
second aircraft will not be made until after the system prototype's 
lethal demonstration. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, MDA provided technical 
comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Aerial Common Sensor (ACS): 

The Army's ACS is an airborne reconnaissance, intelligence, 
surveillance, and target acquisition system and is being designed to 
provide timely intelligence data on threat forces to the land component 
commander. The ACS will replace the Guardrail Common Sensor and the 
Airborne Reconnaissance Low airborne systems. ACS will co-exist with 
current systems until it is phased in and current systems retire. The 
Navy will also acquire ACS to replace its current airborne intelligence 
platform, the EP-3. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Fort Monmouth, N.J. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $879.1 million; 
Procurement: $2,892.9 million; 
Total funding: $3,775.6 million; 
Procurement quantity: 33. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

These costs and quantities are expected to change due to the ACS 
program restructuring, as is the acquisition timeline. 

Due to a significant increase in the weight to integrate the prime 
mission equipment on the platform, the Army terminated the development 
contract. However, the ACS program will continue although development 
effort will be scaled back. At development start, only one of ACS' six 
critical technologies was fully mature and two more were nearing 
maturity. Currently, one additional technology is nearing maturity. The 
Army expected to have demonstrated the maturity of all but one critical 
technology by the design review, which was scheduled for December 2006. 
The program office estimated that 50 percent of drawings would have 
been releasable at that time. The Army plans to reevaluate 
requirements, possibly eliminating some, which will likely affect the 
system's technologies, design, cost, and schedule. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

ACS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Only one of ACS's six critical technologies was mature when the program 
started development in July 2004 and two more were nearing maturity. 
When the Army terminated the development contract, one additional 
technology was nearing maturity. The maturity of one of the remaining 
technologies was tied to the development of the airborne version of the 
Joint Tactical Radio System, which would not have been available until 
after ACS was fielded. The Army expected that all of the critical 
technologies except the one tied to the radios would be fully mature by 
2006. It is not clear at this time which requirements might be 
eliminated or the resulting impact to the technology maturity. 

Design Stability: 

The program office estimated that 50 percent of the drawings expected 
for ACS would have been  by the design review, which was scheduled for 
December 2006. However, solving the problem of the increased weight to 
integrate the prime mission equipment will likely affect the system's 
design. 

Other Program Issues: 

In December 2004, five months after the program began development, the 
contractor informed the Army that the weight to integrate prime mission 
equipment onto the selected platform had exceeded the structural limits 
of the aircraft. In January 2005, a contractor team including Lockheed 
Martin and the integration subcontractor initiated a risk mitigation 
strategy to address the problem. At the Army's and Navy's direction, 
the contactor also began to explore using a larger aircraft. In May 
2005, the program manager submitted a program deviation report 
notifying DOD that the issue would likely lead to a nonrecoverable 
program schedule breach. At the Army's request, the Navy convened a 
review team to study the problem without advocating a particular 
solution. In September the review team reported back to the Army. The 
team identified several factors that contributed to the problem, 
including inadequate prime contractor program management as evidenced 
by instability on the contractor's engineering team, lack of design 
specifications for the subcontractors, and insufficient exploration of 
the integration challenges during technology development. 

In September 2005, the Army ordered the contractor to stop all work 
under the current contract except for work necessary to provide a 
written plan with solutions and alternative strategies to maximize 
performance and minimize cost and schedule impacts to the government. 
In November, the contractor briefed the Army on three courses of 
action: refine the configuration to reduce requirements and keep the 
current platform; allow the contractor to acquire a larger platform 
that can accommodate the current prime mission equipment; or decouple 
the platform from system development and have the contractor deliver 
only the prime mission equipment. The Army rejected all three solutions 
and in January 2006, terminated the development contract for the 
convenience of the government. The Army has not yet estimated the 
effect to the development cost and schedule. 

Recent funding cuts appear to reduce the total program cost by $43.1 
million in current year dollars. Reductions were due to reprogramming 
and changes in inflation indices. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Advanced Deployable System (ADS): 

The Navy's ADS is a rapidly deployable undersea surveillance system, 
scheduled for initial deployment as part of the antisubmarine warfare 
mission package on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). ADS is designed to 
detect, track, and report conventional and nuclear submarines in 
shallow waters by laying sensor fields on the ocean floor that send 
data back to the LCS for processing and analysis. We assessed the 
entire system, including its sensors, sensor installation system, in- 
buoy processors, and onboard analysis and reporting system. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: San Diego, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $219.6 million; 
Procurement: $581.3 million; 
Total funding: $809.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 15. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The ADS program entered system development in November 2005 with none 
of its four critical technologies mature. The sensors and the on-board 
processing system are more mature because they leverage existing Navy 
technology. Program officials identified several remaining risks for 
ADS, however, such as the ability of the system to relay data from the 
in-buoy processor to the on-board analysis and reporting system and the 
successful deployment and installation of sensors. According to the 
program office, all technologies are expected to reach maturity in 
2007. ADS is expected to be fully operational with the delivery to LCS 
in 2009. We were unable to assess design stability due to a lack of 
design data at this time. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

ADS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

None of ADS's four critical technologies reached maturity by the start 
of system development in November 2005. Program officials stated, 
however, that the maturity of all critical technologies will be 
demonstrated through complete end-to-end system testing in fiscal year 
2007. 

Two critical technologies--the sensor subsystem, consisting of sensors 
and fiber optic connecting cables, and the on-board analysis and 
reporting system (ARS)--are relatively mature, in part because they 
leverage existing technologies. The ARS is comprised of previously 
developed software and only requires repackaging and integration into 
the ADS. However, although the ARS currently meets its requirements, an 
ongoing challenge is developing enhanced automation tools to reduce 
operator workload, due to limited space on the LCS. The sensor system 
is relatively mature because it uses sensors from previous program 
development. Prototypes of both technologies have already been tested 
in the ocean environment. 

The remaining two critical technologies are less mature, and face 
several risks and challenges. The in-buoy processor system, which 
compresses and processes data from the ocean floor before sending it to 
the LCS, is still in early development. According to program officials, 
the system's ability to transfer data to the ARS is a high-risk area. 
Recent risk reduction efforts aimed to address this issue. The system 
may also employ a reduced-range radio technology as a fallback 
technology. Additional development challenges for ADS include improving 
the overall survivability of the buoys and increasing their endurance. 

The sensor installation system, which deploys and installs sensors on 
the ocean bottom, is complicated by its dependence on many smaller 
technologies. Successful installation of sensors, as well as the 
survivability of connector cables--from fish bites and trawling, for 
example--are major development concerns. Back-up options for sensor 
installation include deploying the arrays manually, as demonstrated in 
a 2003 test or using a deployment vehicle that was demonstrated in a 
fleet exercise in 1999. Recent risk reduction efforts, however, have 
improved the system's performance. In 2004 and 2005, for example, 
sensor deployment and high-speed cable pullout were demonstrated 
successfully. 

Design Stability: 

We were unable to assess ADS design stability due to a lack of design 
data at this time. 

Other Program Issues: 

Originally designed for deployment on another platform, the ADS program 
was redirected in 2003 to focus its initial increment on deployment 
from the LCS. This developmental change caused some redesign of the 
program, but incorporated previously developed sensors and processing 
algorithms. Moreover, although future spirals will provide the 
capability to deploy ADS from an alternate platform, the first 
increment of ADS is wholly focused on deployment from the LCS. 

The LCS also only allows for limited manpower to support ADS processing 
operations. To maximize efficiency, operators may need to be trained in 
multiple systems of the LCS's antisubmarine warfare mission area. ADS 
program officials are concerned that operators may not have the 
expertise necessary to employ ADS effectively. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on this assessment, the Navy stated that according to its 
standards two ADS technologies--the sensor subsystem and the ARS--are 
already mature. According to Navy officials, they evaluate ADS 
technology maturity based on standards set by a Naval research group, 
which considers technologies mature when they have been demonstrated in 
a relevant, rather than an operational environment. 

The Navy stated that it is making progress in reducing risks on key 
technologies through the execution of a Technology Maturity Plan. 
Specifically, Navy officials stated that they are mitigating system 
risks through additional testing of the sensor installation system and 
risk mitigation planning. 

[End of section] 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD): 

MDA's Aegis BMD element is a sea-based missile defense system being 
developed in incremental, capability-based blocks to protect deployed 
U.S. forces, allies, and friends from short-and medium-range ballistic 
missile attacks. Key components include the shipboard SPY-1 radar, hit- 
to-kill missiles, and command and control systems. It will also be used 
as a forward-deployed sensor for surveillance and tracking of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. We assessed only Block 2004 of the 
element's missile, the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3). 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin (AWS), Raytheon (SM-3); 
Program office: Arlington, Va. 

Funding FY06-FY11: 
R&D: $4,962.1 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $4,962.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: NA. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

Costs and quantities are for all known blocks from the program's 
inception through fiscal year 2009. Total known program cost through 
fiscal year 2011 is $10,038.4 million and total quantities are 101. 

[End of table] 

According to program officials, the Block 2004 increment of SM-3 
missiles being fielded during 2004-2005 has mature technologies and a 
stable design. However, the program deferred full functionality of the 
missile's Solid Divert and Altitude Control System, which maneuvers the 
missile's kinetic warhead to its target, to a future upgrade. Program 
officials noted that even with reduced capability, the first increment 
of missiles provide a credible defense against a large population of 
the threat. All drawings for the first increment of missiles have been 
released to manufacturing. The program is not collecting statistical 
data on its production process but is using other means to gauge 
production readiness. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Aegis BMD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials estimate that all three technologies critical to the 
SM-3 missile are mature. These technologies--the missile's third stage 
rocket motor and the kinetic warhead's infrared seeker and Solid Divert 
and Attitude Control System (SDACS)--have been tested in flight. While 
the first two technologies were fully demonstrated in flight tests, the 
SDACS, which steers the kinetic warhead, was only partially 
demonstrated. The SDACS operation in "pulse mode," which increases the 
missile's divert capability, failed during a June 2003 flight test. 
According to program officials, the test failure was likely caused by a 
defective subcomponent within the SDACS, a problem that should be 
corrected through specific design modifications. To implement these 
corrective actions, the program is deferring full functionality of the 
missile's SDACS technology to the next upgrade of the hit-to-kill 
missile. Program officials note that only partial functionality of the 
SDACS is required for Block 2004, which has been successfully 
demonstrated in flight tests. 

Design Stability: 

Program officials reported that the design for the first 11 SM-3 
missiles being produced during Block 2004 is stable with 100 percent of 
its drawings released to manufacturing. The program plans to implement 
design changes in subsequent blocks (delivered during 2006-2007) to 
resolve the SDACS failure witnessed in the June 2003 flight test. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the production maturity of the SM-3 missiles being 
procured for Block 2004. Program officials stated that given the low 
quantity of missiles being produced, statistical process control data 
on the production process would have no significance. The Aegis BMD 
program is using other means to assess progress in production and 
manufacturing, such as integrated product team reviews, risk reviews, 
Engineering Manufacturing Readiness Levels, and missile metrics. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Aegis BMD element builds upon the existing capabilities of Aegis- 
equipped Navy cruisers and destroyers. Planned hardware and software 
upgrades to these ships will enable them to carry out the ballistic 
missile defense mission. In particular, the program is working to 
upgrade Aegis destroyers for surveillance and tracking of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Because this function is new to 
the element, the program has faced a tight schedule to develop and test 
this added functionality during the Block 2004 time frame. Although the 
program aims to upgrade ten destroyers as part of its Block 2004 
increment, this new functionality has been exercised in a limited 
number of flight tests and has never been validated in an end-to-end 
flight test with the GMD system, for which it is providing long range 
surveillance and tracking. Since our last assessment, Aegis BMD's 
planned budget through fiscal year 2009 increased by $453.5 million 
(5.6 percent), primarily in fiscal years 2008 and 2009. 

Agency Comments: 

The Program Office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Satellites: 

The Air Force's AEHF satellite system will replenish the existing 
Milstar system with higher capacity, survivable, jam-resistant, 
worldwide, secure communication capabilities for strategic and tactical 
warfighters. The program includes satellites and a mission control 
segment. Terminals used to transmit and receive communications are 
acquired separately by each service. AEHF is an international 
partnership program that includes Canada, United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands. We assessed the satellite and mission control segments. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $2,108.2 million; 
Procurement: $538.5 million; 
Total funding: $2,646.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 1. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

According to the program office, the AEHF program's technologies are 
mature and the design is stable. However, in late 2004 the program was 
delayed 12 months because key cryptographic equipment would not be 
delivered in time and to allow the program time to replace some 
critical electronic components and add testing. Program officials 
stated the 12-month slip should allow ample time to resolve the issues, 
but added significant cost. Total program cost increased about $1 
billion. The program still faces schedule risk due to the continued 
concurrent development of two critical path items managed and developed 
outside the program. Current plans are to meet full operational 
capability with three AEHF satellites and the first Transformational 
Satellite Communications System (TSAT) satellite, but additional AEHF 
satellites may be acquired if there are deployment delays with TSAT. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

AEHF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

According to the program office, all of the 14 critical technologies 
are mature, having been demonstrated in a relevant environment and most 
progressing into environmental and functional performance testing. 

Design Stability: 

AEHF's design is stable. Virtually all of the expected design drawings 
have been released. The program completed its system level critical 
design review in April 2004. 

Production Maturity: 

Production maturity could not be assessed as the program office does 
not collect statistical process control data. 

Other Program Issues: 

In late 2004, the concurrent development of two critical path items led 
to schedule delays and cost increases. The program was restructured in 
October 2004, when the National Security Agency did not deliver key 
cryptographic equipment to the payload contractor in time to meet the 
launch schedule. The restructuring added 12 months to the program to 
allow time to resolve the cryptographic delivery issues and resolve 
other program problems including replacement of critical electronic 
components and additional payload testing. Delaying the launches and 
resolving these issues added about $800 million to the program. Earlier 
cost increases brought the total increase to about $1 billion, 
incurring a Nunn-McCurdy breach in December 2004 (10 U.S.C. 2433) at 
the 15 percent threshold. 

The program still faces schedule risk due to the continued concurrent 
development of two critical path items developed and managed outside 
the program; the cryptographic components developed and produced by the 
National Security Agency and the Command Post Terminals managed by 
another Air Force Program Office. During 2005, the program developed 
emulators to simulate key cryptographic equipment to allow payload 
testing and integration to continue, and National Security Agency began 
delivery of some actual components, meeting its revised delivery dates. 

Program officials told us the mission control segment continues to meet 
or exceed its schedule and performance milestones. In addition, the 
program made progress in several areas including: completion of end-to- 
end testing for the payload and terminal communications utilizing test 
terminals, completion of static load testing on the satellite 
structure, and delivery of the flight cryptographic hardware, which has 
been installed and tested on the first satellite. 

Three AEHF satellite launches are scheduled for 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
In December 2002, satellites four and five were deleted from the 
program with the intention of using TSAT to achieve full operational 
capability. However, the AEHF contract contains options to buy 
additional satellites if there are deployment problems with TSAT. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA): 

The Navy's AESA radar is one of the top upgrades for the F/A-18E/F 
aircraft. It is to be the aircraft's primary search/track and weapon 
control radar and is designed to correct deficiencies in the current 
radar. According to the Navy, the AESA radar is key to maintaining the 
Navy's air-to-air fighting advantage and will improve the effectiveness 
of the air-to-ground weapons. When completed, the radar will be 
inserted in new production aircraft and retrofitted into lot 26 and 
above aircraft. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: McDonnell Douglas, Corp. 

Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $76.4 million; 
Procurement: $1,483.7 million; 
Total funding: $1,560.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 373. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Procurement funding for the radar is included in the funding for the 
F/A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft programs. 

The AESA radar's critical technologies appear to be mature and the 
design appears stable. However, radar development continues during 
production. The program is tracking a number of risks with the 
technical performance of the radar. If problems are discovered, design 
changes could be required while the radar is in production. Software 
development continues to be the program's top challenge. Problems in 
developing radar software have resulted in deferring several advanced 
capabilities until future software configurations. Radar production 
faces a high risk in 2006 because a material for one of the radar's 
critical technologies is expected to go out of production. Several 
other development and production risks have not been resolved. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

AESA Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

A technology readiness assessment for the radar in fiscal year 2004 
determined that the four critical technologies were mature. To further 
ensure technology maturity, a final technology assessment was held in 
November 2005. 

Design Stability: 

Although the AESA design appears to be stable, development of the radar 
has continued during production. According to program officials, radar 
software continues to be the top program challenge. Several advanced 
radar capabilities have been deferred to future software 
configurations. The radar schedule could not be extended because it is 
directly tied to the F/A-18E/F schedule. According to the program 
office, these capabilities will not be deferred beyond the first 
deployment, and no key performance parameters will be affected by the 
deferral. Since the start of development, the number of lines of 
software code has increased by 17 percent, and software development 
costs have increased by over 40 percent. 

According to a program office risk assessment, other development risks 
could result in design changes: the radar may not be able to track 
sufficient targets simultaneously or detect tail targets at low 
altitude; radiation emissions may interfere with F/A-18E/F weapon 
systems; and the radar power supply may not prevent voltage modulation 
on the aircraft power system. Also, the radar simulation model 
integrated into the F/A-18 training simulator may not accurately 
represent radar operation and performance. Mitigation plans are in 
place to address the design risks and, according to the program office, 
the likelihood of a design change is minimal due to over 500 flights 
with the AESA radar. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because statistical process 
control data are not being collected. Instead, manufacturing processes 
continue to be monitored and controlled at each manufacturing center 
and laboratory. Twenty percent of the 415 radars are to be procured 
during 4 low-rate production runs. The radar's third production run has 
been approved. Nine radars had been delivered as of August 2005. Most 
radars will be installed in F/A-18E/Fs on the aircraft production line, 
but 135 radars are to be retrofitted into already produced aircraft. 

Radar production continues to face a number of risks. A high risk 
involves a foam material for the radar's wideband radome, a critical 
technology. The manufacturer plans to stop producing the material in 
the 2006 time frame, which would affect future radar production. The 
program office plans to mitigate this risk by making a lifetime buy of 
the foam material. According to the program risk assessment, other 
risks include whether: radar manufacturing capacity can ramp up enough 
to meet production and reliability problems with a radar critical 
technology will allow initial radars to meet a specification. Also, low-
rate production is exceeding design-to-cost and firm, fixed-price 
costs. For example, the estimate at completion for the radar contract 
is projected to overrun the target cost by up to 34 percent. 

Other Program Issues: 

In response to a 1999 DOD directive, a requirement was added to the 
radar for antitamper protection to guard against exploitation of 
critical U.S. technologies. According to the program office, a 
successful critical design review for this requirement was completed in 
November 2005. While officials said there is a requirement for this 
protection to have no effect on radar performance, operational tests of 
antitamper models may identify problems that require design changes to 
the protection package. By then, 84 radars are expected to have been 
produced. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS): 

The Army's APKWS is a precision-guided, air-to-surface missile designed 
to engage soft and lightly armored targets. The system is intended to 
add a new laser-based seeker to the existing Hydra 70 Rocket System and 
is expected to provide a lower cost, accurate alternative to the 
Hellfire missile. Future block upgrades are planned to improve system 
effectiveness. We assessed the laser guidance technology used in the 
new seeker. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: TBD; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $56.1 million; 
Procurement: $1,329.6 million; 
Total funding: $1,385.6 million; 
Procurement quantity: 71,565. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Since our assessment of APKWS last year, the Milestone Decision 
Authority curtailed the program. We reported the APKWS entered 
development and held its design review before demonstrating its 
critical guidance technology was fully mature and that initial system- 
level testing identified problems with the design. According to program 
officials, placement of the laser seeker proved to be problematic. The 
combination of development cost overruns, a projected schedule slip of 
1-2 years, unsatisfactory contract performance, and environmental 
issues resulted in curtailment of the initial APKWS program in January 
2005. Program officials expect to award the contract for a restructured 
APKWS program in the second quarter of fiscal year 2006. Due to program 
uncertainty, we were unable to assess design, technology, or production 
maturity. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

APKWS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

At the time of our last report, APKWS had one critical technology-- 
laser guidance. Since the laser technology was employed on other 
platforms, program officials considered it to be mature. However, 
according to program officials, integration of the laser on the fins 
rather than in the head of the missile proved to be more problematic 
then originally estimated. The configuration difficulty presented 
problems that the contractor could not overcome and keep the missile 
within cost and on schedule. The integration issue contributed to the 
cost overrun and protracted schedule, which subsequently led to program 
curtailment and restructuring. Program officials stated they have since 
identified several laser seeker and guidance and control systems 
suitable for the Guided Rocket requirement. Furthermore, program 
representatives feel they have sufficient information to proceed with 
the critical design review immediately after contract award. Because 
the contractor and the specific technical approach to be pursued are 
yet to be determined, we could not assess the maturity of the design, 
technology, or production for the restructured program. 

Other Program Issues: 

Although the APKWS program was scheduled to start production of the 
rocket in fiscal year 2006, a number of program problems related to 
development cost overruns, schedule slippage, and contract performance 
resulted in the Army Program Executive Officer for Missiles and Space 
curtailing the program in January 2005. Following curtailment, the Vice 
Chief of Staff of the Army validated the requirements and approved a 
restructured APKWS program and timeline. Program officials released a 
Draft Request for Proposal in June 2005 and are expecting to award a 
new contract for the restructured APKWS program during the second 
quarter of fiscal year 2006. According to program officials, the 
current fiscal year 2006 President's budget was prepared and submitted 
prior to the Milestone Decision Authority's decision to curtail the 
initial APKWS contract and restructure the program. Ongoing program 
office efforts to align program funding to the new structure have not 
yet been completed. 

Agency Comments: 

The Army provided technical changes, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS): 

The Special Operations Forces' ASDS is a battery-powered dry interior 
hybrid combatant submersible for clandestine insertion/extraction of 
Navy SEALs and their equipment. It is carried to a deployment area by 
specially configured 688-class submarines. ASDS is intended to provide 
increased range, payload, on-station loiter time, endurance, and 
communication/sensor capacity over current submersibles. The 65-foot- 
long 8-foot-diameter ASDS is operated by a two-person crew and includes 
a lock out/lock in diving chamber. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: TBD; 
Procurement: TBD; 
Total funding: TBD; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The ASDS program is being restructured due to reliability problems with 
the first boat, and the production decision for additional units has 
been cancelled. Restructuring includes developing a reliability 
improvement plan and conducting a critical system review to identify 
issues that need to be addressed. ASDS design changes since our last 
report include replacing the silver-zinc battery with a lithium-ion 
battery, replacing the aluminum tail with a titanium tail, and several 
other modifications. At-sea development testing of the lithium-ion 
battery has been completed. Acoustic, or noise level problems, are 
being addressed; however, this requirement does not have to be met 
until delivery of the second ASDS boat. Until ASDS reliability is 
assessed, problems are addressed, and operational testing is completed, 
ASDS technology maturity and design stability remain uncertain. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

ASDS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The program office identified three ASDS critical technologies. 
Although two of the three technologies were mature at the time of our 
last assessment, since that time the aluminum tail (mature) has been 
replaced with a titanium tail. The silver-zinc battery was replaced 
with a lithium-ion battery. In an August 2005 at-sea development test 
of the battery, requirements for speed, range, and endurance were 
exceeded. Acoustic, or noise level problems, are being addressed. In 
earlier tests, the ASDS propeller was the source of the most 
significant noise, and a new composite propeller was installed before 
operational test and evaluation in 2003. Although program officials 
believe the improved propeller will significantly reduce the ASDS 
acoustic signature, precise acoustic measurements are incomplete. Other 
acoustic issues will be addressed on a time-phased basis because the 
acoustic requirement has been deferred until delivery of the second 
boat. 

Design Stability: 

The ASDS experienced a propulsion-related failure during Follow-on 
Operational Test and Evaluation in October 2005, and the Navy 
decertified ASDS from operational test readiness. The Navy is 
investigating the causes of the failure and plans to complete repairs 
and post-repair testing in January 2006. On November 30, 2005, the 
United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Navy announced 
the restructuring of the ASDS program to focus on correcting 
reliability deficiencies with the first boat and to conduct 
verification testing of improvements before continuing operational 
testing. The ASDS Reliability Action Panel, a panel of submarine and 
submersible technical experts from government and industry chartered by 
SOCOM and the Navy in September 2005, noted that there were numerous 
examples of unpredicted component reliability problems and failures 
resulting from design issues and that operational testing should not be 
resumed until completion of a detailed review of mission critical 
systems. 

Consequently, the production decision for additional units has been 
cancelled until the first boat's reliability has been improved. Under 
the ASDS restructuring plan, the critical system review is expected to 
identify known problems and other potential issues and identify what 
design changes are needed. A Vulnerability Assessment Report assessing 
ASDS survivability design features was issued in September 2005 and a 
Capabilities Production Document (to replace the June 2004 ASDS 
operational requirements document) is under review. Until the program's 
critical system review is completed, all requirements are addressed, 
technical problems are solved, and testing is completed, we believe the 
ASDS final design will remain uncertain and may have cost and schedule 
implications. Because the ASDS program is being restructured, we are 
not assessing the current level of ASDS design stability. 

Other Program Issues: 

In December 2004 SOCOM reduced the ASDS program quantity to three units 
due to resource constraints. However, it affirmed that the operational 
requirements document remained valid at six ASDS vehicles. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy concurred with our assessment and provided updated costs, 
which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning System: 

The Army's and Special Operations' ATIRCM/CMWS is a component of the 
Suite of Integrated Infrared Countermeasures planned to defend U.S. 
aircraft from advanced infrared-guided missiles. The system will be 
employed on Army and Special Operations aircraft. ATIRCM/CMWS includes 
an active infrared jammer, missile warning system, and countermeasure 
dispenser capable of loading and employing expendables, such as flares, 
chaff, and smoke. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: BAE Systems North America; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $71.9 million; 
Procurement: $3,605.4 million; 
Total funding: $3,677.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 2,458. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The ATIRCM/CMWS program entered production in November 2003 with 
technologies mature and designs stable. However, one of the five 
critical technologies was recently downgraded due to continued 
technical difficulties. Currently, the program's production processes 
are at various levels of control. The CMWS portion of the program 
entered limited production in February 2002 to meet urgent deployment 
requirements. However, full-rate production for both components was 
delayed because of reliability problems. Over the past several years, 
the program has had to overcome cost and schedule problems brought on 
by shortfalls in knowledge. Key technologies were demonstrated late in 
development and only a small number of design drawings were completed 
by design review. At the low rate production decision point, the Army 
developed a new cost estimate reducing program procurement cost 
substantially. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

ATIRCM/CMWS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The five critical technologies were considered mature until a 
government/industry team recently downgraded the maturity level of the 
infrared jamming head due to technical issues. Additionally, the other 
four technologies did not mature until after the design review in 
February 1997. Most of the early technology development effort focused 
on the application to rotary wing aircraft. When system development 
began in 1995, requirements were expanded to include Navy and Air Force 
fixed wing aircraft. This change caused problems that contributed to 
cost increases of over 150 percent. The Navy and the Air Force 
subsequently dropped out of the program, but the Navy and the Army are 
currently pursuing future joint production planning. 

Design Stability: 

The basic design of the system is complete with 100 percent of the 
drawings released to manufacturing. The design was not stable at the 
time of the design review, with only 22 percent of the drawings 
complete due to the expanded requirements. Two years after the design 
review, 90 percent of the drawings were released and the design was 
stable. This resulted in inefficient manufacturing, rework, additional 
testing, and a 3-year schedule delay. 

Production Stability: 

Production maturity could not be assessed based on the information 
provided by the program office. According to program officials, the 
program has 21 key manufacturing processes in various phases of control 
(7 CMWS and 14 ATIRCM). The CMWS production portion of the system has 
stabilized and benefited from increased production rates. Also, 
processes supporting both ATIRCM and CMWS will continue to be enhanced 
as data is gathered and lessons learned will be included in the 
processes. The Army entered limited CMWS production in February 2002 to 
meet an urgent need. Subsequently, full rate production was delayed for 
both components due to reliability testing failures. The program 
implemented reliability fixes to six production representative 
subsystems for use in initial operational test and evaluation. These 
systems were delivered in March 2004. The full-rate production decision 
for the complete system was recently delayed until June 2010 due to 
ATIRCM performance issues. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Army uses the airframe as the acquisition quantity unit of measure 
even though it is not buying an ATIRCM/CMWS system for each aircraft. 
When the program began, plans called for putting an ATIRCM/CMWS on each 
aircraft. Due to funding constraints, the Army reduced the number of 
systems to be procured and will rotate the systems to aircraft as 
needed. The Army is buying kits for each aircraft, which include the 
modification hardware, wiring harness, cables necessary to install and 
interface the ATIRCM/CMWS to each platform. The Army plans to buy 1,710 
ATIRCM/CMWS systems and 3,571 kits to use for aircraft integration. As 
a result, the true unit procurement cost for each ATIRCM/CMWS system is 
more on the order of $2.8 million. 

The current program baseline includes accelerated funding to procure 
additional ATIRCM/CMWS systems additional nonrecurring engineering 
driven by an increase in the number and types of platforms. The 
quantity of ATIRCM/CMWS systems was increased from 1,076 to 1,710 in 
June 2005. A new Army cost position has been established that reflects 
the impact of the CMWS full rate production decision, the increased 
quantities, and the schedule delays. 

Agency Comments: 

The ATIRCM/CMWS program has been realigned to address Global War on 
Terrorism requirements and implement improvements. In response to a 
November 2003 memo from the Assistant Secretary of the Army to equip 
all Army helicopters in Iraq and Afghanistan with the most effective 
defensive systems, the program office proposed accelerating the CMWS 
portion of ATIRCM. To date, 506 installation kits and 214 CMWS's have 
been fielded. Full-rate production decision for CMWS required a 
separate Initial Operational Test and Evaluation, completed November 
2005. CMWS full rate production decision is planned for February 2006. 

The ATIRCM system experienced performance and reliability issues during 
October 2004 testing. The program has been rebaselined, allowing for 
improved performance, adding a multiband laser capability and increased 
ATIRCM system reliability. Full rate production is currently planned 
for fiscal year 2010. This rebaselined plan was presented and approved 
by the Army Acquisition Executive in December 2005. 

[End of section] 

B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP): 

The Air Force's B-2 RMP is designed to modify the current radar system 
to resolve potential conflicts in frequency band usage. To comply with 
federal requirements, the frequency must be changed to a band where the 
B-2 will be designated as a primary user. The modified radar system is 
being designed to support the B-2 stealth bomber and its combination of 
stealth, range, payload, and near precision weapons delivery 
capabilities. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $464.6 million; 
Procurement: $508.5 million; 
Total funding: $973.2 million; 
Procurement quantity: 14. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The total quantity of 21 units includes 14 to be bought with 
procurement funds and 7 to be bought with R&D funds. All 21 units will 
eventually be placed on operational B-2 aircraft. 

Since our assessment of the B-2 RMP last year, the program successfully 
completed its design review in May 2005 with all four critical 
technologies considered mature. The program had released 85 percent of 
its design drawings by the design review and plans to have 100 percent 
released by the start of production. Program officials told us 
production maturity metrics will be formulated during development and 
these metrics may or may not include manufacturing process control 
data. The program plans to build seven radar units during development 
for pilot training with the B-2 wing prior to the planned completion of 
flight testing. Six of these units will later be modified and placed on 
B-2 aircraft. These units are necessary, but building them in 
development adds to the risk of later design changes because most of 
the radar flight testing will not occur until after these units are 
built. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

B-2 RMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All four B-2 RMP critical technologies were considered mature at the 
design review in May 2005. While the program entered development in 
August 2004 with two of these four critical technologies mature and two 
approaching maturity, the receiver/exciter for the electronic driver 
cards and aspects of the antenna designed to help keep the B-2's radar 
signature low, all four are now considered mature. The program expects 
these technologies to reach a slightly higher level of maturity at the 
start of production in 2007. 

Design Stability: 

The program office completed its design readiness review in May 2005 
and at that time had 85 percent of its drawings released to 
manufacturing. The program plans to have 100 percent of its drawings 
released by the start of production in 2007. The program, however, does 
not use the release of design drawings as a measure of design maturity 
but instead uses the successful completion of design events, such as 
subsystem design reviews, as its primary measure of design maturity. 

Production Maturity: 

Production maturity metrics are planned to be formulated during 
development. These metrics, which may or may not include manufacturing 
process control data, are planned to be used as measures of progress 
toward production maturity during a production readiness review prior 
to the start of production in February 2007. The program is also 
involved in a proof-of-manufacturing effort to demonstrate that the 
transmit/receive modules can be built to specifications. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program plans to build seven radar units during development and 
later modify six of these units for placement on operational B-2 
aircraft. The Air Force needs these radar units for air crew training 
and proficiency operations. Even though these units are necessary, 
building them early in development adds risk because most of the radar 
flight-test activity will not occur until after these units are built. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force concurred with this assessment. 

[End of section] 

C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP): 

The Air Force's C-130 AMP standardizes the cockpit configurations and 
avionics for 14 different mission designs of the C-130 fleet. It 
consolidates and installs the mandated DOD Navigation/Safety 
modifications, the Global Air Traffic Management systems, and the C-130 
broad area review requirements. It also incorporates other reliability, 
maintainability, and sustainability upgrades and provides increased 
situational awareness capabilities and reduces susceptibility of 
Special Operations aircraft to detection/interception. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $829.5 million; 
Procurement: $2,620.4 million; 
Total funding: $3,449.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 454. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The C-130 AMP is utilizing commercial and modified off-the-shelf 
technologies, and it entered system development with five of its six 
critical technologies mature. The final technology reached maturity in 
2005 through a series of demonstration flights. Program officials plan 
to release 90 percent of engineering drawings by the design review and 
have made progress toward that goal. As of December 2005, 100 percent 
of required drawings for Combat Delivery First Flight had been 
released. Program delays have resulted from funding cuts, and sustained 
development contract protests required a portion of the contract to be 
recompeted. The August 2005 design review has been postponed 
indefinitely, and the low rate initial production decision has been 
delayed until June 2006. These dates may change again after program 
restructuring is completed. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

C-130 AMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All of the C-130 AMP's six critical technologies are fully mature, as 
the program is primarily utilizing proven commercial and modified off- 
the-shelf technology for all AMP capabilities. A program official 
stated that the last immature critical technology, Terrain Following 
and Terrain Avoidance radar, reached full maturity in 2005 by meeting 
the key requirement of operability at 250 feet during demonstration 
flights. 

Design Stability: 

As of December 2005, the program office had released 100 percent of 
required drawings for Combat Delivery First Flight. According to the 
Air Force, due to program restructuring, the Combat Talon critical 
design review was postponed indefinitely, and a new review date will be 
established under the current replan effort. 

The modernization effort is divided into a number of capability spirals 
due to the various aircraft designs. The first spiral will outfit C-130 
aircraft with core capabilities and an integrated defensive system. 
Special Operations C-130 aircraft will be outfitted first, and future 
spirals are planned for these aircraft because they require additional, 
and unique, defensive systems integration and enhanced situational 
awareness. 

Other Program Issues: 

Since GAO's last review of the C-130 AMP, the program office has 
postponed the design readiness review indefinitely, pushed back the low-
rate initial production 4 months, and delayed the production readiness 
review 18 months. 

Funding reductions in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 delayed the 
development program and contributed to the rescheduling of program 
milestones and the rebaselining of the program. In addition, sustained 
protests associated with the C-130 AMP development contract awarded in 
2001 required that a portion of the contract be recompeted. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP): 

The Air Force's C-5 AMP is the first of two major upgrades for the C-5 
to improve the mission capability rate, transport capabilities and 
reduce ownership costs. The AMP implements Global Air Traffic 
Management, navigation and safety equipment, modern digital equipment, 
and an all-weather flight control system. The second major upgrade, the 
C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (RERP), replaces the 
engines and modifies the electrical, fuel, and hydraulic systems. We 
assessed the C-5 AMP. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $0.0 million; 
Procurement: $145.1 million; 
Total funding: $145.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 12. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Since our assessment of the C-5 AMP last year, the program completed 
developmental test and evaluation in August 2005, 10 months later than 
planned. The program's technologies and design are considered mature as 
they are relying on commercial-off-the-shelf technologies that are 
installed in other commercial and military aircraft. The main challenge 
to the program has been the development and integration of software--to 
which the schedule delay as well as a $23 million cost overrun has been 
attributed. The Air Force plans to modify 59 of the 112 C-5 aircraft. 
The Air Force is also seeking funding to modify the remaining 53 C-5s; 
however, that decision will not be made until the Air Force determines 
the correct mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft needed to meet DOD's airlift 
needs. If the Air Force decides to use the C-17s, it may not upgrade 
some, or all, of the remaining 53 C-5s. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

C-5 AMP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We did not assess the C-5 AMP's critical technologies because the 
program used commercial technologies that are considered mature. 
Program officials stated that those technologies are in use on other 
aircraft and that they have not significantly changed in form, fit, or 
function. For example, the new computer processors are being used in 
the Boeing 777, 717, other commercial aircraft, the KC-10, and a Navy 
reconnaissance aircraft. 

Design Stability: 

Last year we reported that the C-5 AMP had released 100 percent of 
their drawings; however, due to modifications in the design an 
additional 270 drawings were added. As a result, the program had 
completed only 54 percent of the total number of drawings for the 
system by the time of the production decision. The program now reports 
that the contractor has released all of the drawings for the AMP. In 
addition, seven major subsystem-level design reviews were completed 
along with integration activities. Demonstration of these activities 
were completed during developmental test and evaluation, which started 
in December 2002 and was completed in August 2005. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess the production maturity because most components are 
readily available as commercial-off-the-shelf items. This equipment is 
being used on other military and commercial aircraft. In addition, the 
C-5 AMP is incorporating many other off-the-shelf systems and 
equipment, such as the embedded global positioning system, the inertial 
navigation system, and the multifunction control and display units. To 
ensure production maturity, the program office is collecting data 
regarding modification kit availability and the installation schedules. 

Other Program Issues: 

Over the past year, the AMP program ran into significant problems while 
trying to complete software development that have impacted the cost and 
schedule of the program. Most notably, a software build was added to 
fix problems with AMP integration, flight management system stability 
and system diagnostics. The added build caused a $23 million cost 
overrun, which was paid for by shifting funds from the RERP program, 
and extended developmental testing to 10 months. The program office 
acknowledged that an another software build may be added, depending on 
the results of operational testing that is now scheduled to be 
completed in July 2006. 

Last year we reported that the Air Force was conducting mobility 
studies to determine the correct mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft it would 
need in the future. This decision has not been made yet. In the 
meantime, the program office is continuing its plan to provide AMP 
modifications for 59 of the aircraft while all 112 aircraft are 
projected to go through the RERP program. If all 112 aircraft are 
needed and do go through the RERP program, then the Air Force will need 
to request additional money to fund AMP modifications for the remaining 
53 aircraft. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP): 

The Air Force's C-5 RERP is one of two major upgrades for the C-5. RERP 
is designed to enhance the reliability, maintainability, and 
availability of the C-5 through engine replacement and modifications to 
subsystems, i.e. electrical and fuel, while the C-5 Avionics 
Modernization Program (AMP) is designed to enhance the avionics. The 
upgrades are part of a two-phased modernization effort to improve the 
mission capability rate, performance, and transport throughput 
capabilities and reduce total ownership costs. We assessed the C-5 
RERP. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $417.3 million; 
Procurement: $8,150.3 million; 
Total funding: $8,571.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 109. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The RERP is utilizing demonstrated commercial off-the-shelf components 
that require little or no modification. The program ensured that its 
technologies and design were stable at critical points in development. 
The program, which is currently in system development and 
demonstration, plans to enter low-rate production in December 2006. 
However, since last year the program has experienced a 9-month schedule 
delay due to multiple issues, such as a pylon redesign, and has been 
subject to almost $50 million in budget cuts that further increases 
schedule risk. The C-5 RERP program is also dependent on the number of 
aircraft approved to undergo the C-5 AMP modernization program. Until 
additional aircraft are approved for the AMP, it is uncertain how many 
aircraft will undergo the RERP. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

C-5 RERP Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The C-5 RERP's technologies are mature based on an independent 
technology readiness assessment conducted in October 2001. New engines 
account for 64 percent of the expected improvement in mission 
capability rate for the aircraft. The new engines are commercial jet 
engines currently being used on numerous aircraft. According to the Air 
Force technology assessment, these engines have over 238 million flying 
hours of use. 

Design Stability: 

The C-5 RERP's design is undergoing changes due to a necessary redesign 
of the pylon/thrust reverser to address overweight conditions and 
safety concerns for the engine mount area. According to program 
officials, the redesign has contributed 4 months to the overall 9 month 
schedule delay of the program. Prior to this redesign, 98 percent of 
the design drawings were complete. It is unclear what effect the latest 
redesign will have on the completed drawings. According to the program 
office, the seven major subsystem level design reviews were completed 
before the December 2003 system-level design review. 

The program is taking advantage of AMP developed products and lessons 
learned in the C-5 RERP to reduce the risk of potential schedule slips 
associated with software development and integration. For example, 
according to program officials, some of the baseline software and 
systems integration facilities that were developed for C-5 AMP can be 
reused for RERP activities. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess the C-5 RERP's production maturity because the Air 
Force is buying commercially available items. However, we expect that 
production maturity would be at a high level because the engines have 
been commercially available for many years. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program has experienced a 9-month schedule delay since last year 
due to multiple issues including, pylon weight and redesign, asymmetric 
thrust reverser development problems, C-5 AMP delays, and wing rib web 
structure design and manufacture. The 9-month delay has cost the 
program an additional $45 million. In addition, recent budget 
reductions of almost $50 million are increasing the schedule risk of 
the program. Almost half of this money was shifted to the C-5 AMP to 
help that program complete software development activities. The 
remaining funds were cut by OSD because it appeared the program was 
under executing its funds. These cuts, along with the pylon development 
problems mentioned earlier, have forced the delay of the trainer 
program until fiscal year 2008. Program officials are also considering 
aggressive steps, such as hiring additional workers and using multiple 
shifts, to address potential schedule increases. 

RERP officials are currently monitoring negotiations between DOD and 
General Electric to bring General Electric into full compliance with 
the Berry Amendment, which requires certain metals used in military 
systems to be purchased from domestic sources. According to Air Force 
officials, General Electric expects to be in full compliance with the 
Berry Amendment by January 2007, without impact to C-5 RERP. 

The program is still waiting on the results of a mobility study to 
determine the mix of C-5 and C-17 aircraft the Air Force plans to use 
in the future. Until that decision is made, the Air Force is continuing 
its plan to re-engine all 112 C-5 aircraft. Before that can be done, 
however, all 112 will need to complete the AMP upgrade. Yet, the Air 
Force has only provided funding for 59 of the aircraft to receive the 
AMP upgrade at this time. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

CH-47F: 

The Army's CH-47F heavy lift helicopter is intended to provide 
transportation for tactical vehicles, artillery, engineer equipment, 
personnel, and logistical support equipment. It is also expected to 
operate in both day and night. The program goal is to enhance 
performance and extend the useful life of the CH-47 as well as produce 
new helicopters. This effort includes installing a digitized cockpit, 
rebuilding the airframe, and reducing aircraft vibration. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Helicopters; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $7.8 million; 
Procurement: $9,064.4 million; 
Total funding: $9,072.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 454. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The CH-47F technologies appear mature and the design stable, with 100 
percent of the engineering drawings released for manufacturing. CH-47F 
production maturity could not be assessed as the program is not 
collecting statistical process control data on key manufacturing 
processes. Program officials believe that CH-47F production is low risk 
because no new technology is being inserted into the aircraft, two 
prototypes have been produced, and the production process was 
demonstrated during the delivery of one low-rate initial production 
aircraft. Since our last assessment, the CH-47F program entered full 
rate production and increased quantities from 339 to 512 aircraft. 
Because the increase in quantities includes 55 new build helicopters, 
program unit cost increased approximately 12 percent over what we 
reported last year. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

CH-47F Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We did not assess technology maturity or determine the number of 
critical technologies in detail. The CH-47F is a modification of the 
existing CH-47D helicopter. Program officials believe that all critical 
technologies are mature and have been demonstrated prior to integration 
into the CH-47F development program. 

Design Stability: 

The Army entered full rate production in November 2004, with 100 
percent of the drawings released to manufacturing. However, the number 
of drawings completed increased substantially since the start of low 
rate production. As a result, the level of maturity achieved at design 
review was only 11 percent and at low rate production was 31 percent. 
The majority of the new drawings were instituted to correct wire 
routing and installation on the aircraft. Accordingly, the program 
office believed the total number of drawings could not be determined 
until after the first prototype was delivered. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess production maturity because the CH-47F program does 
not collect statistical process control data on its production of 
helicopters. The program office relies on inspections as its means to 
ensure acceptable production results. 

According to the program office, the CH-47 production is low risk 
because two prototypes have been produced during development and the 
Army recently took delivery of its first low-rate initial production 
aircraft. Further, the program reported that during low-rate 
production, it made significant advances in the refinement of CH-47 
production processes. Advances include the implementation of the 
automated management execution system and the introduction of laser 
tracking to identify key mounting points. These enhancements are geared 
toward improving the manufacturing learning curve. However, the program 
office acknowledges that the program will lose some of the learning 
benefits during the anticipated break in production of the CH-47F in 
favor of producing more MG-47 special operations configuration 
helicopters during the next lot of production. 

Other Program Issues: 

In November 2004, the Army Acquisition Executive approved the revised 
program acquisition strategy and approved the start of full rate 
production. This acquisition strategy includes service life extension 
upgrades for the CH-47D fleet and a number of new-build aircraft to 
meet operational fleet requirements. Included in the new baseline is a 
revised acquisition objective quantity of 512 upgraded aircraft as 
opposed to the 339 previously reported. Of the larger quantity, 2 are 
developmental; 55 will be new build CH-47Fs; 58 will be remanufactured 
in the special operations configuration; and 397 remanufactured into CH-
47Fs to replace the current CH-47Ds. Because new builds, as opposed to 
only remanufactured helicopters, have been included in the acquisition 
plan, unit cost increased 12 percent over what we reported last year. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army concurred with 
the information presented in this report. One technical comment was 
provided, which was incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Future Aircraft Carrier CVN-21: 

The Navy's CVN-21 class is the successor to the Nimitz-class aircraft 
carrier and includes a number of advanced technologies in propulsion, 
aircraft launch and recovery, weapons handling, and survivability. 
These technologies are to allow for increased sortie rates and 
decreased manning rates as compared to existing systems. Many of the 
technologies were intended for the second ship in the class, but they 
were accelerated into the first ship in a December 2002 restructuring 
of the program. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Newport News; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $2,370.0 million; 
Procurement: $23,457.7 million; 
Total funding: $25,827.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 3. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Costs decreased due to adjustments in inflation figures and refinements 
to third ship estimates. 

The CVN-21 entered system development in April 2004 with few of its 
critical technologies fully mature. This is due in part to DOD's 
decision to accelerate the installation of a number of technologies 
from the second ship to the first. Program officials state that the 
extended construction and design period allows further time for 
development. They have established a risk reduction strategy that 
includes decision points for each technology's inclusion based on a 
demonstrated maturity level. Fallback technologies exist for 11 of 18 
total critical technologies, but their use would lead to drawbacks, 
such as performance shortfalls and/or an increase in manpower 
requirements. The program has reported a 1-year schedule slip based on 
decisions to balance ship construction in the President's fiscal year 
2006 budget. Program officials expect to meet their design review date, 
currently set for March 2007. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

CVN-21 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

There are currently a total of 18 CVN-21 critical technologies, of 
which 3 are presently mature and 3 are approaching maturity. The 
remaining 12 are at lower levels of maturity. The Navy expects that 14 
of the 18 total technologies will be mature or close to mature by the 
design review in fiscal year 2007, and they expect all but 1 technology 
to be near maturity by production start in 2008. Program officials 
originally reported 16 critical technologies at development start. 
However, one technology was re-defined into two, more specific 
technologies and another was added since that time. 

Six of the critical technologies are being developed by programs other 
than CVN-21. Progress in those programs could affect the CVN-21 
timeline. Those technologies are the Advanced Arresting Gear, Evolved 
Sea Sparrow Missile, Joint Precision Approach and Landing System, Multi-
Function Radar, Volume Search Radar, and the Advance Weapons 
Information Management System/Aviation Data Management and Control 
System. This last technology was redefined after development start. In 
the case of four technologies the program has mature alternate systems 
as backup technologies. Program officials stated that no backup is 
feasible for either Volume Search Radar or Multi-Function Radar without 
major ship redesign. 

Two technologies modified since development start are also not mature. 
The Shipboard Weapons Loader is a self-propelled unit to decrease the 
time required to load weapons onto aircraft. The other technology is 
Smart Stores, which is a software-based system to automate CVN-21's 
inventory and material asset management capabilities. The Navy's 
primary risks identified for this technology center on successful 
integration with planned ship systems. The Navy has identified backup 
technologies for each of these technologies. 

Only one critical technology, the 1,100-ton air conditioning plants, is 
not planned to be near maturity by construction start. Program 
officials believe the plants will reach mature levels shortly after the 
start of construction. Risks associated with the plants are considered 
low by officials since the technology being used is derived from 
commercial applications and enhancements leveraging experience from 
plants found on other US Navy ships. 

Design Stability: 

The CVN-21 program is currently planning a design review date for March 
2007. Rather than measuring design stability by percentage of 
engineering drawings completed, the program uses an alternative metric 
that measures earned hours completed in product model development. As a 
result we could not assess the ship's design stability. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program has delayed delivery of both the first and second ship by 
adding one year to the development schedule. According to program 
officials, the Navy made this decision with the intent to balance ship 
construction dollars in the President's fiscal year 2006 budget. 
Research and development funds were added to the program to bridge the 
additional year, which allows additional time and funding to mature 
technologies in the program. The one year shift does create an 
additional gap, where the Navy will have to operate with only 11 
carriers, between de-commissioning of the USS Enterprise aircraft 
carrier and delivery of the first CVN-21 to the fleet. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy emphasized that, 
based on product model development progress, the CVN-21 program's 
overall design was 44 percent complete as of November 2005 and that the 
program is on schedule to support the construction of the lead ship. In 
addition, the department said that although there was a one year slip 
based on decisions to balance ship construction in the President's 
fiscal year 2006 budget, technology development efforts were unaffected 
and remain on track. 

[End of section] 

DD(X) Destroyer: 

The Navy's DD(X) destroyer is a multimission surface ship designed to 
provide advanced land attack capability in support of forces ashore and 
contribute to U.S. military dominance in littoral operations. The 
program recently completed the system design phase and was authorized 
to begin detail design and construction of the lead ships in November 
2005. The program will continue to mature its technologies and design 
as it approaches construction. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: BAE Systems, Bath Iron Works, Northrop Grumman Ship 
Systems, Raytheon; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $3,241.7 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $3,241.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Costs increased due to changes in cost estimating, additional 
technology development, and a program restructuring. 

Since last year's assessment, the program completed demonstrations of a 
number of its 12 critical technologies. One of the technologies was 
fully mature by the November 2005 production decision. Eight 
technologies were demonstrated in a relevant environment and are near 
full maturity. Some of these technologies will not be fully mature 
until after installation on the first ship as testing in an operational 
environment is not considered feasible. The integrated deckhouse, ship 
computing system, and volume search radar are at lower levels of 
maturity, having completed component level demonstrations. The Navy 
approved the system design to proceed into the next phase, but a number 
of risks remain in both design and technology that could lead to 
changes. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

DD(X) Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

At the November 2005 production decision, one of 12 critical 
technologies for DD(X) was fully mature. While completion of tests in 
2005 advanced the maturity of technologies, development continues as 
the program proceeds with detail design. Eight technologies, the 
advanced gun system and its projectile, autonomic fire suppression, 
hull form, infrared suppression, integrated power system, multifunction 
radar, and peripheral vertical launch system are short of full maturity 
but have been demonstrated in a relevant environment. Program officials 
state that the undersea warfare system is fully mature, based on the 
use of mature components. However, the components will not be 
integrated and tested together until after ship installation. Due to 
practical limitations some of these technologies, the advanced gun 
system and its projectile, hull form, and infrared suppression, will 
not be fully demonstrated until after installation on the lead ship. 

The integrated deckhouse, volume search radar, and ship computing 
system are at lower levels of maturity. The program tested a physical 
model of the deckhouse for stealth requirements and placement of 
apertures to minimize interference, but with only a portion of the 
apertures expected. Analysis of deckhouse resilience to fire and shock 
has been completed, and will be tested during detail design. The volume 
search radar will require additional development to increase 
performance, which may aggravate an already aggressive schedule. 
Software development has been progressing as planned, although about 
three-quarters of the effort remains. 

Design Stability: 

The metric for design maturity used in other programs does not apply to 
DD(X), and therefore the program was not assessed according to this 
metric. Instead the program assesses design stability by reviewing 
design artifacts, which include items like system drawings, ship 
specifications, and major equipment lists. The program office states 
that all 2010 design artifacts are complete, though some may be altered 
as systems continue to mature or are changed to meet cost reduction 
goals. 

On September 14, 2005 the Navy completed the critical design review of 
DD(X) and approved the start of detail design. Risk remains in the 
system design due to issues in the power system, deckhouse, and hull 
form. The concern with the power system is ensuring the design meets 
limits on space and weight. As this system is needed early in 
construction, it could have an impact on schedule if not resolved 
quickly. A number of systems in the deckhouse, including the volume 
search radar and electronic warfare system, are still in development 
and design of the deckhouse could be affected if they exceed margins 
for weight and space. Furthermore, due to the hull form's unique 
design, it has reduced stability in very severe weather conditions. 
Program officials state they can reduce this risk through guidance that 
helps the crew avoid these conditions. Model testing for heavy sea 
conditions also revealed some areas which may require strengthened 
structure, and program officials believe this can be corrected. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy stated that the design, development and testing of critical 
technologies mitigated the significant technical risks prior to 
critical design review. The DD(X) ship design remained stable 
throughout critical technology testing, successfully incorporating all 
necessary component modifications and entering detail design with 
adequate weight margin. A comprehensive test program will address all 
remaining risk areas described in the report. 

The Navy further noted that given the unique nature of shipbuilding, 
with detail design and construction spread over 5 years, comparing 
DD(X) technology readiness levels to the GAO-developed best practices 
is not valid. DD(X) technology readiness levels met current acquisition 
policy guidance in support of the decision to proceed into system 
development in November 2005. 

GAO Response: 

Our approach is valid because our work has shown that technological 
unknowns discovered late in development lead to cost increases and 
schedule delays. Some of the technologies still under development for 
DD(X) could have major impact on ship design and construction 
schedules. 

[End of section] 

E-2D Advanced Hawkeye (E-2D AHE): 

The Navy's E-2D AHE is an all-weather, twin engine, carrier-based, 
aircraft designed to extend early warning surveillance capabilities. It 
is the next in a series of upgrades the Navy has made to the E-2C 
Hawkeye platform since its first flight in 1971. The E-2D AHE is 
designed to improve battle space target detection and situational 
awareness, especially in littoral areas; support Theater Air and 
Missile Defense operations; and improve operational availability. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop-Grumman Corp. 

Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $2,464.8 million; 
Procurement: $9,695.1 million; 
Total funding: $12,159.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 69. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The E-2D AHE program entered system development in June 2003 without 
demonstrating that its four critical technologies had reached full 
maturity. Since that time, one of the program's four critical 
technologies has reached full maturity. The program expects the 
remaining three critical technologies to mature before the production 
decision in March 2009. While more mature backup technologies exist for 
the three critical technologies, use of the backup technologies would 
result in degraded system performance or reduced ability to accommodate 
future system growth. The design met best practice standards at the 
time of design review in October 2005. However, until all the 
technologies are mature, the potential for design changes remains. We 
could not assess production maturity because the program does not plan 
to use statistical process controls. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

E-2D AHE Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

One of the E-2D AHE's four critical technologies (the space time 
adaptive processing algorithms and associated processor) is mature. The 
program expects the remaining technologies (the rotodome antenna, a 
silicon carbide-based transistor for the power amplifier to support UHF 
radio operations, and the multichannel rotary coupler for the antenna) 
to be fully mature before the start of production in March 2009. 

More mature backup technologies exist for the three technologies (the 
rotodome antenna, the silicon carbide-based transistor, and the 
multichannel rotary coupler) and were flown on a larger test platform 
in 2002 and 2003. However, use of the backup technologies would result 
in degraded system performance or reduced ability to accommodate future 
system growth due to size and weight constraints. The next AHE 
technology readiness assessment is to be performed prior to the 
production decision in fiscal year 2009, and the program office 
anticipates that the critical technologies will be mature at that time. 

Design Stability: 

The program had completed 90 percent of its engineering drawings at the 
Critical Design Review, which was completed on October 21, 2005. 
Program officials project that they will have 100 percent completed by 
the planned start of production in March 2009. However, the technology 
maturation process may lead to more design changes. 

Production Maturity: 

The program expects a low-rate production decision in March 2009, but 
does not require the contractor to use statistical process controls to 
ensure its critical processes are producing high quality and reliable 
products. According to the program, the contractor assembles the 
components using manual, not automated, processes that are not 
conducive to statistical process control. The program relies on post- 
production data, such as defects per unit, to track variances and non- 
conformance. The program also conducts production assessment reviews 
every 6 months to assess the contractor's readiness for production. The 
program has updated the manufacturing processes that were established 
and used for the E-2C over the past 30 years. The program considers the 
single station joining tool; the installation of electrical, hydraulic 
and pneumatic lines; and the installation of the prime mission 
equipment all critical manufacturing processes. 

The program is currently building the first two development aircraft. 
According to the program office, there are no significant differences 
in the manufacturing processes for the development aircraft and the 
production aircraft. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the E-
2D AHE program successfully executed all component and subsystem design 
reviews, culminating in the successful completion of the weapon system 
design review in October 2005. This review included a thorough 
evaluation of the four critical technologies and all program risks. 
According to the Navy, critical technologies do not represent a high 
risk to the AHE program at present. 

Flight testing, which will include the four critical technologies, is 
planned to begin in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2007. The test 
program expects to demonstrate the design maturity of all technologies 
and capabilities at that time. A Technology Readiness Assessment will 
be conducted prior to the low rate production decision. 

According to the Navy, integration of statistical process controls 
would require significant investment to update the E-2D aircraft 
manufacturing process. The Navy has elected not to make this investment 
due to the maturity and over 30 years of E-2 production. 

[End of section] 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) - Atlas V, Delta IV: 

The Air Force's EELV program acquires commercial satellite launch 
services from two competitive families of launch vehicles--Atlas V and 
Delta IV. Initiated as an industry partnership, the program's goal is 
to support and sustain assured access to space and reduce the life- 
cycle cost of space launches by at least 25 percent over previous 
systems while meeting the government's launch requirements. A number of 
variants are available depending on the lift capability necessary for 
each mission. We assessed both the Atlas V and Delta IV. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Launch Services, Lockheed Martin Space 
Systems; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $43.4 million; 
Procurement: $23,282.7 million; 
Total funding: $23,326.2 million; 
Procurement quantity: 118. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

While the EELV program office has access to technology, design, and 
production maturity information, it does not collect this information 
because it is buying the launch service. To date, eleven successful 
launches have occurred--three government and eight commercial. A 
technical review was completed, and the program is implementing 
corrective actions to eliminate the cause of an earlier-than-expected 
engine shutdown during the Delta IV Heavy Lift Vehicle launch 
demonstration. The EELV program's total costs have increased due to a 
decline in the commercial launch market upon which the business case 
was based. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

EELV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

We could not assess the technology maturity of EELV because the Air 
Force has not formally contracted for information on technology 
maturity from its contractors. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess the design stability of EELV because the Air Force 
has not formally contracted for the information needed to conduct this 
assessment. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess the production maturity of EELV because the Air 
Force has not formally contracted for information that would facilitate 
this assessment. 

Other Program Issues: 

A decline in commercial launch demand for the EELV launch vehicles 
resulted in a cost increase of more than 25 percent over the program's 
objective and triggered a Nunn-McCurdy breach (10 U.S.C. 2433), that 
required DOD to certify in 2004 that the program is critical to 
national security and its cost estimates are reasonable. In conjunction 
with the certification, the Air Force revised its mission model to 
reflect a reduction of launch vehicles, conducted a study on assured 
access to space, and revised its acquisition strategy. 

DOD continues to be the primary user of EELV launch services due to the 
decrease in commercial demand for launches--which has resulted in a 
reduction in the number of launch vehicles needed. An Air Force study 
on assured access to space addressed concerns about retaining both EELV 
launch providers given the limited number of launches. To ensure access 
to space with two distinct launch vehicles and address the decline in 
commercial launch demand, the government has agreed to share a level of 
risk with the launch providers through a new acquisition strategy. The 
new strategy provides for a contracting approach that supports each 
contractor's annual infrastructure through a launch capability contract 
and replaces price-based competition with an annual award of launch 
service contracts. In April 2005, the Air Force released a Request for 
Proposals for EELV Launch Services and EELV Launch Capabilities 
Contracts. The Air Force planned to award the contracts by October 
2005. However, this has been delayed. Negotiations are currently 
ongoing for the launch capability contracts, and updated proposals are 
being submitted for the launch services contracts covering the 
anticipated fiscal year 2006 launch awards. 

In August 2005, competitors Boeing and Lockheed Martin submitted a 
request to the Federal Trade Commission for an antitrust review to 
support a joint venture. This was withdrawn and resubmitted in 
September 2005. The Federal Trade Commission has requested additional 
information to support the review. The joint venture will combine their 
production, engineering, test, and launch operations for all U.S. 
government launch activity. Both contractors will share equally in the 
profits and costs of all government launches. 

The EELV program is taking corrective action to address a problem with 
the liquid oxygen feed line that falsely indicated propellant depletion 
and resulted in an early engine shutdown of the first stage engine on 
the Delta IV during the Heavy Lift Vehicle Operational Launch Service 
Demonstration that occurred in December 2004. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
it collects data for technology, design, and production maturity. 
However, the Air Force has not contracted for delivery of this data and 
therefore does not have authority to provide this information. Program 
officials also provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): 

The Marine Corps' EFV is designed to transport troops from ships 
offshore to their inland destinations at higher speeds and from longer 
distances than the system it is designed to replace, the Assault 
Amphibious Vehicle 7A1 (AAV-7A1). The EFV will have two variants---a 
troop carrier for 17 combat equipped Marines and 3 crew members and a 
command vehicle to manage combat operations in the field. We assessed 
both variants. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics; 
Program office: Woodbridge, Va. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $742.9 million; 
Procurement: $8,437.9 million; 
Total funding: $9,236.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 1,012. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The EFV's technologies are mature and the design is stable. Early 
development of fully functional prototypes facilitated design 
stability. Technical problems have been encountered, and system 
reliability requirements have been reduced; plans are to fully 
demonstrate all requirements in fiscal year 2010. Fixes for technical 
problems have been identified and corrective actions are in place. 
Production maturity remains a concern because the contractor will not 
start collecting statistical process control data until after 
production starts, and the software development effort is a continuing 
challenge. A fourth program restructuring has resulted in a 2-year 
schedule increase and about a $2-billion increase in cost. The program 
office has had reduced insight into its prime contractor's work 
progress since December 2004 because it has not received detailed 
earned value cost and schedule data. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

EFV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All five of the EFV system's critical technologies are mature and have 
been demonstrated in a full-up system prototype. 

Design Stability: 

The program has now released all of its drawings for the troop carrier 
and command variants, but anticipates that about 12 percent of the 
drawings will require changes to address reliability issues. While 
reliability requirements have been reduced, the program office expects 
to fully demonstrate both reliability and interoperability--key 
performance parameters--during initial operational testing and 
evaluation in fiscal year 2010. The program expects to hold a final 
design review in 2010 that will include any reliability design changes. 
Furthermore, testing in the early system design and demonstration phase 
revealed problems in the hull electronic unit, bow flap, and 
hydraulics. In addition, problems with the hardware and software 
modules caused unsafe testing conditions---the EFV prototypes made 
turns without a direct command. After about a two-month delay to 
address these problems, full vehicle testing was resumed. According to 
the program office, corrective actions for all these problems have been 
identified. 

Production Maturity: 

The program plans to enter low-rate initial production in September 
2006. However, the program office does not plan to require the 
contractor to collect statistical process control (SPC) data until 
after the start of low-rate-initial production to demonstrate that 
critical manufacturing processes will produce products within cost, 
schedule, performance, and quality targets. The program office is still 
in the planning stages for its production readiness reviews that will 
assess the production processes, identify any additional critical 
manufacturing processes, and determine the benefit of using SPC. 
According to the program office, to date, no suppliers have collected 
SPC data for EFV-unique components, but some suppliers are collecting 
SPC data on high-volume commercial parts used on the EFV. Twelve 
critical processes have already been identified and more are expected. 

Other Program Issues: 

The EFV program relies on software to provide all electronic, 
firepower, and communication functions. The program is collecting 
metrics relating to cost, schedule, and quality; is using an 
evolutionary development approach; and has set and completed about 98 
percent of the software requirements for the pending early operational 
assessment. Nevertheless, software development continues to present a 
risk. The program has already experienced growth in the size and cost 
of the software development as well as schedule delays. The program 
manager recognized the risk and has initiated a software risk 
mitigation plan. 

DOD's December 2004 budgetary action to reallocate funding for higher 
priorities served as the basis for the EFV's fourth rebaselining. 
However, according to the program manager, a testing schedule slip of 
about 15 months would have been needed even without DOD's budgetary 
action because additional time would have been needed after the start 
of low-rate initial production in September 2006, for more robust 
reliability testing, production qualification testing and training. 
DOD's budgetary action resulted in a 24-month schedule increase--- 
possibly 9 months more than would have been needed---and a cost 
increase of about $2 billion. According to the program office, the 
rebaselining effort was required in order to make the EFV program 
executable. 

The program office has not collected and managed the program with 
detailed earned value management data since it began restructuring the 
program in December 2004. According to a program official, the earned 
value management system was re-established after a new contractor 
schedule was approved in December 2005. 

Agency Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments, which were 
incorporated, as appropriate. The Navy concurred with our assessment of 
the EFV program. 

Further, the program manager believes the EFV program is on track to 
begin a comprehensive operational assessment in January 2006 and to 
begin its low-rate initial production review in September 2006. 

[End of section] 

Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile: 

The Army's Excalibur is a family of global positioning system-based, 
fire-and-forget, 155-mm cannon artillery precision munitions. It is 
intended to improve the accuracy and range of cannon artillery. Also, 
the Excalibur's near vertical angle of fall is intended to reduce the 
collateral damage area around the intended target, making it more 
effective in urban environments than the current artillery projectiles. 
The Future Combat Systems' non-line-of-sight cannon requires the 
Excalibur to meet its required range. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon, Tucson, Ariz. 

Program office: Picatinny Arsenal, N.J. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $376.0 million; 
Procurement: $1,126.3 million; 
Total funding: $1,502.2 million; 
Procurement quantity: 29,900. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The Excalibur program is proceeding into early production to support an 
urgent early fielding requirement in Iraq for more accurate artillery 
that will reduce collateral damage. This early production run of the 
Excalibur's first block will involve 180 rounds, with planned fielding 
by the last quarter of 2006. According to program officials, 
Excalibur's critical technologies reached full maturity in May 2005, 
and all of its 790 drawings were completed in July 2005. The Excalibur 
unitary variant will be developed in three blocks, which will 
incorporate increased capabilities and accuracy over time. Since our 
last assessment, the planned quantities have been cut in half. The 
program continues to experience increasing unit cost as quantities are 
lowered. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Excalibur Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The Excalibur program is developing its unitary variant in three 
blocks. All three of the unitary variant's critical technologies 
reached full technology maturity in May 2005 at the time of the 
Excalibur's design review. These technologies were the airframe, 
guidance system, and warhead. 

Design Stability: 

Excalibur's design appears to be stable because at the time of the May 
2005 design review, 750 of 790 design drawings were releasable. All the 
drawings were complete for the first Excalibur block in July 2005. The 
second block is expected to have a similar number of drawings, and it 
is unknown how many drawings will be involved with the third block. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess Excalibur's production maturity. The first block 
has entered limited production, to support an urgent fielding 
requirement in Iraq, without statistical control data. The program 
plans to collect statistical data during production of all blocks. 
Production of the second block is scheduled for fiscal year 2007 and 
the third block in fiscal year 2010. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program has encountered a number of changes since development began 
in 1997, including a decrease in planned quantities, a relocation of 
the contractor's plant, early limited funding, technical problems, and 
changes in program requirements. It was almost immediately restructured 
due to limited funding, and it was restructured again in 2001. The 
program was again restructured in 2002 and merged with a joint 
Swedish/U.S. program known as the Trajectory Correctable Munition. This 
merger has helped the Excalibur deal with design challenges, including 
issues related to its original folding fin design. In May 2002, due to 
the cancellation of the Crusader, the Army directed the restructure of 
the program to include the Future Combat Systems' Non-Line-of-Sight 
Cannon. 

In December 2002, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics) approved an early fielding plan for the 
unitary version. The plan currently includes developing the unitary 
version of the Excalibur in three blocks. In the first block, the 
projectile would meet its requirements for accuracy in a non-jammed 
environment and lethality and would be available for early fielding. In 
the second block, the projectile would be improved to meet its 
requirements for accuracy in a jammed environment and reliability and 
would be available for fielding to the Future Combat System's Non-Line- 
of-Sight Cannon in September 2008 or when the cannon is available. 
Finally, in the third block, the projectile would be improved to meet 
its range requirement and would be available for fielding to all 
systems in late fiscal year 2011. 

The net effect of these changes has been to lengthen the program's 
schedule and to substantially decrease planned procurement quantities. 
As a result, the program's overall costs and unit costs have 
dramatically increased. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on the draft, the Army noted that Excalibur started as a 
combination of three smaller artillery-related programs with the intent 
to extend range capability with an integrated rocket motor. The current 
Excalibur program will allow three different Army howitzers to fire 
farther away and defeat threats more quickly, lowering collateral 
damage while reducing the logistic support burden. Recent program 
achievements include a production decision for the first block 
configuration to support early fielding to the multinational combat 
forces in Iraq, and successful tests demonstrated both proximity and 
point-detonating modes approximately 5 meters from the target. 

[End of section] 

F-22A Raptor: 

The Air Force's F-22A, originally planned to be an air superiority 
fighter, will also have air-to-ground attack capability. It is being 
designed with advanced features, such as stealth characteristics, to 
make it less detectable to adversaries and capable of high speeds for 
long ranges. It also has integrated aviation electronics (avionics) 
designed to greatly improve pilots' awareness of the situation 
surrounding them. It is designed to replace the Air Force's F-15 
aircraft. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $3,233.1 million; 
Procurement: $16,965.4 million; 
Total funding: $20,509.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 80. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

In December 2005, the F-22A procurement quantities increased to 183 
aircraft. The additional two aircraft are not reflected in this table. 

[End of table] 

The F-22A entered production without ensuring that production processes 
were in control. In December 2004, the Secretary of Defense reduced F- 
22A procurement quantities from 279 to 183. Since our last assessment 
of the program, the Air Force held a full rate decision in April 2005. 
At that time, about 42 percent of the aircraft were already on 
contract. Technology and design matured late in the program and have 
contributed to numerous problems. Avionics problems were discovered 
late in development, which resulted in large cost increases and caused 
testing delays. The Air Force completed initial operational test and 
evaluation in December 2004 and identified several deficiencies that 
required modifications to the aircraft's fuel system, canopy 
transparency, and the applications of low observable materials. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

F-22A Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The three critical F-22A technologies (supercruise, stealth, and 
integrated avionics) appear to be mature. However, two of these 
technologies, the integrated avionics and stealth, did not mature until 
several years after the start of development. Integrated avionics has 
been a source of major problems, delaying developmental testing and the 
start of initial operational testing. Since 1997 the costs of avionics 
has increased by over $951 million or 24 percent and problems 
discovered late in the program were the major contributor. In April 
2004, the Air Force began initial operational test and evaluation after 
reporting that these problems were corrected. 

Design Stability: 

The F-22A design is essentially complete, but it matured slowly, taking 
over 3 years beyond the critical design review to meet best practice 
standards. The late drawing release contributed to parts shortages, 
work performed out of sequence, delayed flight testing, and increased 
costs. Design changes resulted from flight and structural tests. For 
example, problems with excessive movement of the vertical tails and 
overheating problems in the fuselage and engine bay required design 
modifications. The Air Force completed initial operational testing in 
December 2004 and development testing in December 2005. There were 
several design changes required to the aircraft as a result of 
operational testing. These included changes to improve the application 
of low observable materials, modifications to improve the durability of 
canopy transparencies, and implemented software improvements to the 
diagnostic health management system. 

Production Maturity: 

The program office stopped collecting process control information in 
November 2000. The contractor estimated that nearly half of the key 
processes had reached a marginal level of control, but not up to best 
practice standards. The Air Force has 98 production aircraft on 
contract. The Air Force relies on the contractor's quality system to 
verify manufacturing and performance requirements are being met. 
However, the Air Force has not demonstrated the F-22A can achieve its 
reliability goal of 3 hours mean time between maintenance. It does not 
expect to achieve this goal until the end of 2009 when most of the 
aircraft will have already been bought. Best practices call for meeting 
reliability requirements before entering production. At the conclusion 
of initial operational test and evaluation in December 2004, the Air 
Force had only demonstrated about 15 percent of the reliability 
required to meet the current operational requirement. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Air Force is counting on $2.2 billon in future cost reduction plans 
to offset estimated cost growth and enable the program to meet the 
latest production cost estimate. If these cost reduction initiatives 
are not achieved as planned, production costs could increase. 

In January 2005, the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation reported 
the F-22A was "overwhelmingly effective" as an air superiority fighter 
and that its support systems were "potentially suitable." Some 
deficiencies were noted, particularly in reliability and 
maintainability. In August 2005, the Air Force begin follow-on test and 
evaluation, which is designed to demonstrate limited air-to-ground 
capability and correct the deficiencies identified during initial 
operational test and evaluation. The F-22A declared initial operational 
capability in December 2005. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force provided technical comments, which were incorporated as 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Future Combat Systems (FCS): 

The FCS, a program that will equip the Army's new transformational 
modular combat brigades, consists of a family of systems composed of 
advanced, networked combat and sustainment systems, unmanned ground and 
air vehicles, and unattended sensors and munitions. Within a system-of- 
systems architecture, the first increment of the FCS features 18 major 
systems and other enabling systems along with an overarching network 
for information superiority and survivability. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Hazelwood, Mo. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $23,579.1 million; 
Procurement: $98,469.7 million; 
Total funding: $122,724.2 million; 
Procurement quantity: 15. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The FCS program has not demonstrated high levels of knowledge. 
Requirements have been sent to system developers to begin preliminary 
designs, but program officials say they may change due to feasibility 
and affordability constraints. Three years after system development 
began, none of FCS' 49 critical technologies are fully mature. 
Technology maturation will continue throughout system development, with 
an associated risk of cost growth and schedule delays. Based on program 
office estimates, the cost of the restructured FCS program has grown 
substantially. Earlier cost estimates were based on lower levels of 
program knowledge and undefined requirements. Higher levels of 
knowledge have resulted in a more realistic and higher cost estimate. 
Since the FCS dominates Army investment accounts over the next decade, 
further cost growth and schedule delays could affect other Army 
acquisitions. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

FCS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Since our last assessment of FCS, the program assembled an independent 
review team to assess critical technologies. Although a few 
technologies appear to have matured, most have either shown no 
improvement or are now assessed less mature. None of the FCS program's 
critical technologies are fully mature and only 18 technologies are 
nearing full maturity. 

The program is no longer reporting on 5 of the 54 technologies from a 
year ago. According to FCS officials, they met last year with the 
users' representative, the Army Training and Doctrine Command, to 
discuss FCS requirements and critical technologies. They agreed that a 
few of the listed technologies were in fact not technologies. Instead, 
they were capabilities that could be satisfied by existing or planned 
assets. 

The FCS program is not following best practices in maturing its 
technologies. The program's approach involves integration phases that 
allow a staggered start for technologies to be "spun out" to current 
forces. However, program officials allow technologies to be included in 
the integration phases before they are mature. Further, as currently 
scheduled, all four of the currently-planned integration phases will 
have begun before the program has a preliminary design review for the 
system of systems, and each of those integration phases will likely 
begin with immature technologies. As a result, the program will involve 
concurrent technology and product development and face the associated 
risks of such an approach. Furthermore, the individual integration 
phases will not be subjected to the milestone decision process. 

Other Program Issues: 

The cost of the restructured FCS program has increased substantially, 
based on program office estimates. An independent cost estimate will 
not be completed until the spring of 2006. Projected procurement costs 
have increased over 50 percent. Earlier cost estimates were based on 
lower levels of program knowledge and undefined requirements. Higher 
levels of knowledge, such as more defined design concepts for the 
manned ground vehicles and progress in requirements definition, have 
produced a higher fidelity cost estimate. The Army has adopted an 
initiative to substantially reduce FCS procurement acquisition costs. 
However, requirements may have to be reduced accordingly. 

In August 2005, the FCS program completed the System of Systems 
Functional Review. This event demonstrated that the Army understands 
FCS system of systems requirements and is prepared to begin preliminary 
individual system designs. Although it is a significant achievement, 
the program should have demonstrated this level of knowledge 3 years 
ago to support the decision to start development. In addition, program 
officials say they are reserving the right to reduce requirements, 
pending user approval, if technologies do not mature as planned or if 
satisfying a particular requirement is not affordable. The requirements 
uncertainty and immature state of technologies make the FCS acquisition 
approach risky. Furthermore, successful operation of FCS-equipped Units 
of Action depends on the contributions of up to 170 complementary and 
associated programs. FCS will utilize these systems to help satisfy FCS 
operational requirements. However, according to program officials, the 
list of complementary programs continues to evolve and some are 
unfunded. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army stated that 
technology maturity is a key aspect of the process of deciding when a 
technology is provided to current forces. It also stated that while the 
individual integration phases will not be subjected to the milestone 
decision process, the program will have annual reviews with the 
milestone decision authority. The Army commented that the program is 
primarily focused on about 52 critical complementary programs 
considered essential to meeting the top-level key performance 
parameters. 

GAO Response: 

Although technology maturity may drive decisions on providing 
technologies to the current forces, the Army's definition of mature 
technology is below the best practices standard. Our prior work has 
shown that when programs proceed into development with technologies 
that do not comply with best practices, they are exposed to an 
increased risk of cost growth and schedule delays. Also, the list of 
critical complementary programs continues to evolve, and the program 
must manage the associated cost, schedule, and performance gaps that 
may result. 

[End of section] 

Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System: 

The Air Force's Global Hawk system is a high altitude, long endurance 
unmanned aerial vehicle with integrated sensors and ground stations 
providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. 
After a successful technology demonstration, the system entered 
development and limited production in March 2001. Considered a 
transformational system, the program was restructured twice in 2002 to 
acquire 7 air vehicles similar to the original demonstrators (the RQ- 
4A) and 44 of a new, larger, and more capable model (the RQ-4B). 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $1,053.3 million; 
Procurement: $2,773.0 million; 
Total funding: $3,913.8 million; 
Procurement quantity: 37. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Key product knowledge on Global Hawk is lower now than in March 2001 
due to program restructurings. Under the original plan to produce 
aircraft very similar to demonstrators and slowly acquire advanced 
systems, technology maturity and design stability were near best 
practices standards. Program restructurings, however, added the new RQ- 
4B aircraft and advanced sensors, overlapped development and production 
schedules, and accelerated planned deliveries. The new technologies are 
still maturing and the RQ-4B design required extensive changes. 
Officials are implementing statistical process controls, but data is 
incomplete. In November 2004, we reported significant risks from gaps 
in product knowledge and recommended reducing near-term RQ-4B buys to 
only those needed for testing. The program is now experiencing 
development and procurement cost increases, schedule delays, and 
quality problems. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Global Hawk Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Of the Global Hawk's 13 critical technologies, 6 are mature by best 
practices standards; 3 are approaching maturity; and 4 are less mature. 
The less mature technologies include enhanced imagery and signals 
intelligence sensors and improved radar. The desire for these 
capabilities drove the decision to develop and acquire the new RQ-4B 
aircraft, which can carry 50 percent more payload than the RQ-4A. 
Integrating and testing advanced sensors won't be completed until late 
in the program after most of the fleet has already been bought. If 
space, weight, and power limitations or other performance issues 
surface as technologies mature, the program may experience costly 
rework, extended development times, or diminished capabilities. 

Design Stability: 

Program officials reported achieving the best practice standard for 
design drawings approved for manufacturer release in October 2004, 
shortly after RQ-4B production began. However, during the first year of 
production, there were more than 2,000 authorized drawing changes to 
the total baseline of 1,400 drawings. More than half of those changes 
were considered major, requiring model changes. Substantial commonality 
between the A-and B-models had been expected, but as designs were 
finalized and production geared up, design differences were more 
extensive and complex than anticipated. By the time of our review, 
design deficiencies, engineering changes, and work delays had 
contributed to a development contract cost overrun of $209 million. 
Adding to design risk, the Air Force plans to buy almost half the RQ-4B 
fleet before it completes operational tests to verify the aircraft 
design. 

Production Maturity: 

The contractor has completed RQ-4A production and is fabricating the 
first RQ-4Bs. Program and contractor officials are in the process of 
implementing statistical process controls.They've identified critical 
manufacturing processes and started to collect data for demonstrating 
that new processes are capable of meeting cost, schedule, and quality 
targets. Officials also collect and analyze other performance 
indicators such as defects and rework rates to monitor manufacturing 
quality. 

Technology immaturity, increased cost for sensors, and extensive design 
changes contributed to higher RQ-4B production costs than forecast. 
Although improving, there have been recurring concerns about the 
performance and work quality of several key subcontractors. The 
subcontractor building the tail scrapped seven of the first eight main 
box spars due to design maturity and process issues. The wing 
manufacturer terminated its subcontractor due to poor performance and 
quality; subsequently completed wings passed proof load testing and 
were installed onto RQ-4B aircraft. 

Other Program Issues: 

With RQ-4B costs increasing and schedules slipping, the Global Hawk 
program is rebaselining, its fourth since the March 2001 start. In 
April 2005, the Air Force notified the Congress of a Nunn-McCurdy 
breach (see U.S.C. 2433) with an 18-percent unit procurement cost 
increase over the current baseline. Further cost increases are 
expected. In December 2005, we reported that the Nunn-McCurdy notice to 
Congress did not include $400.6 million (in base year 2000 dollars) 
budgeted for retrofit activities, including the procurement and 
installation of signal intelligence sensors in already-built aircraft. 
Including this amount would increase procurement unit cost growth to 31 
percent and require the Secretary of Defense to certify the program to 
Congress. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this product, Air Force officials partially 
concurred and offered technical comments that we incorporated where 
appropriate. They emphasized Global Hawk's early and continuing support 
to military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan with about 5,000 combat 
hours flown by demonstrator aircraft. They stated that DOD conducts 
comprehensive and forward-looking oversight, understands the risks and 
benefits, and implements an appropriate acquisition strategy to 
mitigate risk. Software, not hardware, is the critical element to the 
RQ-4B capability, drives the deployment schedule, and represents the 
chief technical and management challenges. Radar and signals sensors 
are the two critical technologies and portend revolutionary capability 
improvement. Each payload has a dedicated program office and 
contractor. Payload integration includes test and decision points to 
evaluate progress. 

[End of section] 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD): 

MDA's GMD element is being developed to defend the United States 
against limited long-range ballistic missile attacks. The first block, 
Block 2004, consists of a collection of radars and interceptors, which 
are integrated by a central control system that formulates battle plans 
and directs the operation of GMD components. We assessed the maturity 
of all technologies critical to the Block 2004 GMD element, but we 
assessed design and production maturity for the interceptors only. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Company; 
Program office: Arlington, Va. 

Funding, FY06-FY11: 
R&D: $12,410.2 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $12,410.2 million; 
Procurement quantity: NA. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Costs are for all known blocks from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Total known program funding through fiscal year 2011 
is $32,439.8 million. 

Even though only 6 of GMD's 10 critical technologies are fully mature, 
MDA released all hardware drawings to manufacturing and had 10 Block 
2004 interceptors in silos for operational use by December 2005. 
However, ongoing efforts to mature technologies, along with concurrent 
testing and fielding efforts may lead to additional design changes. 
Although MDA is producing hardware for operational use, it has not made 
a formal production decision. Additionally, we could not assess the 
stability of the production processes because the program is not 
collecting statistical data for them. We expect that the prime contract 
could overrun its target cost by as much as $1.5 billion. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

GMD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials assessed all of GMD's 10 critical technologies as 
mature. However, four have not been demonstrated in an operational 
environment and we believe that they cannot be considered fully mature. 
Mature technologies include the fire control software, the 
exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) infrared seeker, the Orbital Sciences 
Corporation booster, the Cobra Dane radar, the EKV guidance, 
navigation, and control subsystem; and the in-flight interceptor 
communications system. The remaining four technologies are nearing 
maturity. These technologies are the Beale radar; EKV discrimination; 
the sea-based X-band radar; and the BV+ booster. The program expected 
to demonstrate all remaining technologies in an operational environment 
by December 2005, but flight test delays and failures prevented the 
demonstrations. The program now plans to demonstrate the remaining four 
technologies by the end of 2007. 

Design Stability: 

Technology issues aside, the design of the Block 2004 ground-based 
interceptor appears stable with 100 percent of its drawings released to 
manufacturing. However, ongoing efforts to mature technologies and the 
concurrent testing and fielding efforts may lead to additional drawings 
and design changes. 

Production Maturity: 

Officials do not plan to make an official production decision, although 
they are delivering interceptors for the Block 2004 emergency 
capability. We could not assess the maturity of the production 
processes for these interceptors because the program is not collecting 
statistical control data. According to program officials, data are not 
tracked because current and projected quantities of GMD component 
hardware are low. Instead, the GMD program measures production 
capability and maturity with a monthly evaluation process called a 
Manufacturing Capability Assessment that assesses critical 
manufacturing indicators for readiness and execution. 

MDA delivered 5 interceptors for the initial capability by September 
2004, and it had 10 interceptors ready for alert by December 2005. MDA 
planned to have 18 interceptors fielded by this time; however, 4 
interceptors procured for fielding were later designated as test assets 
and production of 4 others was delayed as quality control improvements 
were implemented. 

Qualification of a new BV+ booster propellant subcontractor has been 
completed ending a 2 year slowdown in BV+ activities. MDA plans to 
procure the eight BV+ boosters currently under contract, but these 
interceptors will not be fielded until Block 2006. 

Other Program Issues: 

GMD's prime contractor, Boeing, has overrun its budget by $600 million, 
primarily because of quality issues that delayed flight and ground 
tests. Although Boeing expects the large unfavorable cost variances to 
improve as flight testing resumes, we anticipate that the contract will 
overrun its target cost by as much as $1.5 billion. Since our last 
assessment, GMD's planned budget through fiscal year 2009 has increased 
by $2.9 billion (11.2 percent), primarily in fiscal years 2008 and 
2009. 

Agency Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments to a draft of this 
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) II Modernized Space/OCS: 

GPS is an Air Force-led joint program with the Army, Navy, Department 
of Transportation, National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency, United 
Kingdom, and Australia. This space-based radio-positioning system 
nominally consists of a 24-satellite constellation providing navigation 
and timing data to military and civilian users worldwide. In 2000, 
Congress approved the modernization of Block IIR and Block IIF 
satellites. In addition to satellites, GPS includes a control system 
and receiver units. We focused our review on the Block IIF. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing for IIF, Boeing for OCS, Lockheed Martin for 
IIR-M; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $575.5 million; 
Procurement: $1,256.3 million; 
Total funding: $1,831.8 million; 
Procurement quantity: 10. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Costs and quantities include Block IIR, IIR-M, and IIF satellites, and 
the Operational Control System (OCS). Lockheed Martin is the contractor 
for IIR and IIR-M. Boeing is the contractor for IIF and OCS. 

According to the program office, the Block IIF technologies are mature. 
Since the start of the GPS program in 1973, GPS satellites have been 
modernized in blocks with the newer blocks providing additional 
capabilities and benefits. The space-qualified atomic frequency 
standards for the Block IIF satellites are mature but considered a 
critical technology because there is no backup technology for these 
clocks. The contractor was not required to provide data on design 
drawings, and statistical process control techniques are not being used 
to monitor production. As a result, design stability and production 
maturity could not be assessed. R&D cost growth amounted to $399 
million (20.4 percent) for satellite component modernization and the 
control system, and procurement cost growth amounted to $717 million 
(20.1 percent) to procure seven additional IIF satellites. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

GPS Block II Modernization Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The only critical technology on the Block IIF satellites is the space- 
qualified atomic frequency standards and is considered mature. However, 
maintaining an industrial base capable of manufacturing frequency 
standards for GPS appears to be an issue. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess design stability because the Block IIF contract 
does not require that design drawings be delivered to the program. 
However, the program office assesses design maturity by reviewing 
contractor development testing, participating in technical interchange 
meetings and periodic program reviews, and conducting contractor 
development process and configuration audits. The contractor for the 
Block IIF satellites faced significant challenges designing and 
implementing the programming logic for the Application Specific 
Integrated Circuit microcircuit chips. Failure to recognize and 
understand the complexity of the Application Specific Integrated 
Circuit design and delays in security clearances resulted in $46 
million in cost overruns. To offset the overruns, the program office 
reallocated $22 million, and the Congress approved $24 million to be 
reprogrammed from other space programs. According to program officials, 
additional Block IIF satellites are not expected to experience cost 
increases because the microcircuit chip problem has been resolved with 
a dual design. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because the contractor does not 
collect statistical process control data. However, the program office 
reviews earned value management reports, integrated master schedules, 
and test dates as a means of monitoring the contractors' production 
efforts. When monthly earned value management reports and schedule 
reviews show cost overruns and/or schedule slips, the program office 
may choose to request additional information from the contractor. 

Other Program Issues: 

The GPS Operational Control System consists of monitor stations that 
track the navigation signals of all the satellites, remote ground 
antennas that actively send commands to the satellite constellation, 
and two master control stations (primary and backup) that update the 
satellites' navigation messages. Software for the control system, 
referred to as Version 6, is needed to support the operational 
capability of the satellites with new military code signals. The first 
satellite with the new military code was launched in September 2005 and 
a total of 18 satellites with this code need to be on orbit to provide 
initial operational capability to military users. The program office 
estimates that 18 satellites will be on orbit in fiscal year 2011, but 
that Version 6 will not be operational until fiscal year 2012. Thus the 
satellites on orbit with the new military code, while supporting 
constellation sustainment, will not be fully utilized. 

Under the current schedule the initial operational capability for 
Version 6 had already slipped from 2008 to 2010, because funding was 
reallocated to complete development of Block IIF satellites to sustain 
the GPS constellation. During 2005, the program office reorganized and 
stopped work on Version 6 due to the reduced funding and concerns about 
parallel development of two different control systems, Block II and 
Block III (the next generation of satellites and a new control system), 
by potentially two different contractors. The program office plans to 
award a single competitive contract for Version 6 and the Block III 
control system with a first increment that will enable full military 
code capability in 2012. 

R&D cost growth amounted to $399 million (20.4 percent) for satellite 
component modernization and the control system, and procurement cost 
growth amounted to $717 million (20.1 percent) to procure seven 
additional IIF satellites. 

Agency Comments: 

The Air Force generally concurred with this assessment and provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System: 

The Army's JLENS is designed to provide over-the-horizon detection and 
tracking of land attack cruise missiles and other targets. The Army is 
developing JLENS in two spirals. Spiral 1 is completed and served as a 
test bed to demonstrate initial capability. Spiral 2 will utilize two 
aerostats with advanced sensors for surveillance and tracking as well 
as mobile mooring stations, communication payloads, and processing 
stations. JLENS provides surveillance and engagement support to other 
systems, such as PAC-3 and MEADS. We assessed Spiral 2. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Raytheon; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $1,795.2 million; 
Procurement: $4,107.5 million; 
Total funding: $5,967.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: 14. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The program began development in August 2005 with one of its five 
critical technologies mature. The Army determined that JLENS is 
primarily an integration effort based on relatively mature technologies 
from other programs and concluded that none of JLENS technologies meet 
the definition of a critical technology. However, we identified five 
technologies in its technology assessment that could be defined as 
critical because they are essential to JLENS capabilities and 
integrating them will involve changes in size, the arrangement and 
interconnections of subcomponents, and software development challenges. 
The program plans to release 90 percent of the engineering drawings by 
the design review; however, the program faces risk of redesign until 
technologies demonstrate full maturity. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

JLENS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

JLENS entered system development in August 2005 with one of its five 
critical technologies mature. The communications payload technology 
consisting of radios and fiber optic equipment is fully mature and the 
processing station technology--which serves as the JLENS operations 
center--is approaching full maturity. Both sensors--the precision track 
illumination radar (PTIR) and the surveillance radar (SUR) along with 
its platform--are not yet mature. 

In June 2005, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army 
for Research and Technology determined that JLENS is primarily an 
integration effort based on relatively mature technologies from other 
programs and therefore concluded that none of the JLENS technologies 
meet the definition of a critical technology. According to the project 
office, many of the JLENS technologies have legacy components that have 
either been tested or fielded in an environment similar to the expected 
JLENS deployment environment. However, we identified five critical 
technologies based on review of the program's technology maturity 
assessment, an independent assessment by the Army's Aviation and 
Missile Research Development and Engineering Center (AMRDEC), and 
through discussions with program officials. We determined that these 
technologies are critical because they are essential to the attainment 
of JLENS' required capabilities, and some will require physical 
modification and demonstration of subcomponents for use in the JLENS 
operational environment. 

The JLENS sensors support its primary mission to acquire, track, 
classify, and discriminate targets and are being developed using 
components from other programs such as MDA's THAAD and the Navy's SPY- 
3 Radar used on the DD(X) and the Marine Corps' Affordable Ground Based 
Radar. Although the PTIR is similar to the design of the existing SPY- 
3 radar and the program has developed prototypes of PTIR components, 
the radar is not yet mature because only a partial structure of the 
antenna has been built in prototype form. The antenna structure is a 
key component for maintaining the weight requirements of the PTIR and 
has yet to be demonstrated for the JLENS application. Furthermore, the 
antenna patch assemblies, used to transmit and receive radio frequency 
energy, will require unique circuitry and design changes to meet form 
and fit requirements. According to program officials, tests to 
integrate the PTIR prototype components will occur sometime in fiscal 
year 2006. 

While approximately 80 percent of the software used by the PTIR is from 
the SPY-3 radar, nearly two-thirds of the software used by the SUR 
sensor will need to be developed or modified. Also, the SUR uses a 
different processor than legacy software, and some new modules have yet 
to be tested. According to program officials, software items for the 
SUR are the primary challenges for achieving technology maturity 
because they are still being developed and designed. The program 
expects to fully demonstrate full maturity of these items in 2009. 

The JLENS platform consists of the aerostat, mobile mooring station, 
power and fiber optic data transfer tethers, and ground support 
equipment. The mobile mooring station, used to anchor the aerostat 
during operations, is based on a fixed mooring station design. However, 
it is the least well-defined component of the JLENS system because a 
mobile mooring station for large aerostats has never been developed. As 
a result, the current mooring station will need modifications in order 
to meet JLENS mobility requirements. 

Design Stability: 

Program officials estimate that 90 percent of its 6,230 drawings will 
be released by the design review scheduled for September 2008. However, 
until the maturity of the JLENS' critical technologies has been 
demonstrated, the potential for design changes remains. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army stated that the 
JLENS technology maturity and technology readiness assessments were 
reviewed by the Department of the Army and the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense prior to the JLENS Defense Acquisition Board review that was 
held in June 2005. Based upon these and the independent assessment 
conducted by AMRDEC, the review board concluded that the JLENS 
technologies were at an appropriate maturity level to proceed into the 
development phase of the program. The Army also stated that as the 
program moves further into development, it is anticipated that these 
technologies will prove out in the integration process. 

[End of section] 

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): 

The JSF program goals are to develop and field a family of stealthy, 
strike fighter aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. 
allies, with maximum commonality to minimize costs. The carrier 
suitable version will complement the Navy's F/A-18 E/F. The 
conventional take-off and landing version will primarily be an air-to- 
ground replacement for the Air Force's F-16 and the A-10 aircraft, and 
will complement the F-22A. The short take-off and vertical landing 
version will replace the Marine Corps' F/A-18 and AV-8B aircraft. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Arlington, Va. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $24,717.5 million; 
Procurement: $161,111.5 million; 
Total funding: $185,980.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: 2,443. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

JSF program data indicates that 7 of the system's 8 critical 
technologies will not be fully mature until after the first design 
reviews in 2006. Not only is design stability not projected by the time 
of those reviews, one of the two variants to be reviewed in 2006 is 
expected to have released significantly fewer drawings than suggested 
by best practices. Furthermore, the demonstration of a production 
representative aircraft that includes design changes to reduce weight 
will not occur until late 2007, after the start of production. Less 
than a year after the design review, the program plans to enter 
production with little demonstrated knowledge about performance and 
producibility. Software also poses a risk as the program plans to 
develop nearly 19 million lines of code. At the production decision, 
the program will have released about 35 percent of the software needed 
for the system. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

JSF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JSF entered development without its eight critical technologies 
being mature. Recent data provided by the program office indicates that 
maturity has progressed; however, seven technologies are still not 
fully mature and are not expected to be until after the design review. 

Design Stability: 

Currently, 26 percent of the short take-off and vertical landing 
variant and less than 3 percent of the conventional variant drawings 
have been released. Design reviews for these variants are scheduled for 
February 2006. Program data indicates that 75 percent of the drawings 
for the short take-off and vertical landing variant and 18 percent of 
the conventional variant are expected to be released by that time. 
Program officials state that these represent the most critical 
drawings. The program has not yet prototyped any of the expected 
designs. An early prototype is expected to have its first flight in 
August 2006, but does not include many of the design changes that 
resulted from an effort to reduce airframe weight. The first 
demonstration of a prototype that incorporates the design changes is 
scheduled for late 2007. The carrier version design review is not 
scheduled until late 2006. It will not be until 2009 that all three 
variants will be undergoing flight testing. 

Production Maturity: 

The program plans to enter low rate production in early 2007 without 
demonstrating production maturity. The program is taking steps to 
collect key information on the maturity of manufacturing processes but 
will not demonstrate that the aircraft can be produced efficiently by 
the production decision. If schedules are met, the program will deliver 
only one nonproduction representative aircraft before the production 
decision. This aircraft, while not yet complete, has experienced labor 
inefficiencies, part shortages, and major work performed out of 
sequence. The program will also not demonstrate that the aircraft works 
as intended. At the production decision, it will (1) have completed 
less than 1 percent of the planned flight test program, (2) not have 
flight tested a fully configured and integrated JSF, (3) have released 
only 35 percent of the software needed for the system, and (4) have 
little or no data from full scale structural testing. Before 
development is complete in 2013, DOD plans to buy 424 low rate 
production aircraft at an estimated cost of about $49 billion. DOD 
plans to use cost reimbursement-type contracts for its initial 
production orders, meaning that the government will pay any cost 
overruns. 

Other Program Issues: 

The program plans to develop about 19 million lines of software code. 
Officials consider software a high risk item. The first of five major 
software blocks is scheduled to be released in June 2006 to support 
first flight. However, the Defense Contract Management Agency projects 
that this release could be delayed 1 to 3 months. Subsequent blocks are 
showing early indications of falling behind as well. 

At this point the cost estimate represents the program office's 
position. The OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group was to update its 
formal independent cost estimate in the spring of 2005, but now does 
not expect to formally complete its estimate until after the 2006 
design review. However, a preliminary estimate was higher than the 
program office's with large projected funding shortfalls in the 2007 to 
2011 time frame. 

Agency Comments: 

The JSF Program Executive Officer continues to nonconcur with GAO's 
methodology and conclusions on technology maturity. Hardware and 
software integration for multiple subsystems is ongoing in labs, years 
sooner than in legacy programs. Critical design reviews were completed 
in March 2004 for all design areas except the airframe. The air system 
design review in early 2006 will evaluate design maturity and 
performance against requirements. Manufacturing of the first test 
aircraft is well underway with much shorter assembly times than planned 
and exceptional quality demonstrated in fabrication, assembly, and 
mate. As of November 2005 the actual weight of 7,600 delivered 
components is within 1 percent of predictions. While the first aircraft 
lacks some design improvements, demonstrated processes and outcomes 
justify high confidence in design and weight predictions for all 
variants due to commonality of design, tools, and manufacturing 
methods. JSF acquisition strategy, including software development, 
reflects a block approach. Development is on track. 

[End of section] 

Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Site (JTRS AMF): 

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with existing radios and also increase communications and 
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a 
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across 
the services. Program/product offices are developing radio hardware and 
software for users with similar requirements. The Air Force/Navy-led 
AMF program is developing radios that will be integrated into over 160 
different types of aircraft, ships, and fixed stations. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: TBD; 
Program office: Hanscom AFB, Mass. 

Funding FY06-FY11: 
R&D: $842.6 million; 
Procurement: $1,649.1 million; 
Total funding: $2,545.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 3,261. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Costs and quantities reflect the program of record. Both are expected 
to change as a part of a program restructuring currently underway. 

JTRS AMF has taken steps to develop knowledge prior to the start of 
system development. As part of the program's acquisition strategy, a 
pre-system development phase started in September 2004 with the award 
of competitive system design contracts to two industry teams led by 
Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Through this acquisition strategy, program 
officials expect competitive designs that will help mitigate costs and 
other risks. While challenges remain, program officials noted that 
significant progress has been made by both industry teams in 
demonstrating technology and design maturity. The program is scheduled 
to enter system development in June 2006. The JTRS Joint Program 
Executive Office is currently conducting a broad assessment of JTRS. 
The assessment may result in changes to the current JTRS AMF 
acquisition strategy. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

JTRS AMF Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

To help mitigate technical risks and address key integration 
challenges, JTRS AMF awarded competitive predevelopment contracts to 
two industry teams led by Boeing and Lockheed Martin. In July 2006, 
after a full and open competition, a contracting team will be selected 
for the JTRS AMF system development. The program office will use an 
Army organization to prepare an independent Technology Readiness 
Assessment before entry into the system development and demonstration 
acquisition phase. The identification of critical technologies and the 
assessment of their respective maturities will not be available until 
the conclusion of the competitive system design contract work and the 
Technology Readiness Assessment is submitted by the independent 
assessment team. The competitive system design contract work will be 
completed in February 2006. 

Although critical technologies have not been formally assessed for JTRS 
AMF, both teams have demonstrated progress in developing key functions 
of the radio, according to program officials. Preliminary design 
reviews were held in early August 2005 for both teams, and program 
officials indicated that both preliminary designs met the National 
Security Agency's information security requirements. Although the 
program is likely to face challenges as it proceeds through system 
development and demonstration, program officials are confident that the 
program can enter the system development and demonstration phase with 
sufficiently mature technology. This assurance is based on technical 
exchange and review meetings with the contractors, along with vigorous 
risk reduction programs by both the contractors and program office 
established during the pre-system development and demonstration 
contract. 

Other Program Issues: 

The JTRS AMF is depending on the JTRS Cluster 1 program to develop the 
necessary waveforms. However, the JTRS Cluster 1 program is currently 
being restructured due to significant cost and schedule problems. As a 
result, the waveforms being developed under the Cluster 1 contract may 
not be developed in time or may not meet JTRS AMF user requirements 
which may negatively affect hardware design and cause an increase in 
cost and schedule. 

Another issue the program office will need to address is the 
development of technologies necessary to effectively dissipate heat in 
some of its smaller radios. If cooling techniques are not improved, the 
performance of these radios will be limited. In addition, integrating 
the radios into the diverse platforms covered by JTRS AMF will be a 
challenge. 

Because of the ongoing cost, schedule, and technical problems with the 
Cluster 1 program, the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office has begun a 
broader assessment of all JTRS clusters. At this point, it is unclear 
how the JTRS AMF program will be affected by the results of the broader 
assessment. Because of the progress made in the JTRS AMF program, DOD 
may expand the numbers and types of platforms on which it will be 
based. For example, JTRS AMF program officials noted that it is likely 
that the Army's rotary wing JTRS requirements will be moved from JTRS 
Cluster 1 to JTRS AMF. The JTRS Joint Program Executive Office 
developed several alternative acquisition strategies which were 
presented to the Defense Acquisition Board in November 2005. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on our draft, the program office generally concurred with 
our findings and offered technical comments for our consideration. We 
incorporated the technical comments where appropriate. 

In addition, the program office stated that the JTRS AMF program has 
managed the identified risks with mitigation plans and monitoring of 
the competing contractors' technical designs and their use of advanced 
technologies. The waveform dependency risk, for example, is being 
mitigated by the contractors' access to alternate waveform software 
that is similar in features to the Cluster 1 waveform system. The 
contractors have also focused considerable investment in addressing the 
heat dissipation of their designs and projected performance limits as a 
function of industry technology improvements, such as processor speeds 
or device sizes. 

[End of section] 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1: 

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with existing radios and also increase communications and 
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a 
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across 
the services, while product offices are developing radio hardware and 
software for users with similar requirements. The Army-led JTRS Cluster 
1 product office, within the Ground Radio Systems program office, is 
developing radios for ground vehicles. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: San Diego, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $619.1 million; 
Procurement: $14,815.6 million; 
Total funding: $15,434.8 million; 
Procurement quantity: 108,836. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Costs and quantities reflect the program of record. Both are expected 
to change as part of the program's restructuring. 

The JTRS Cluster 1 program is currently being restructured due to 
significant cost and schedule problems that came to light in late 2004. 
Since development began in 2002, the program has struggled to mature 
and integrate key technologies and been forced to make design changes. 
For example, the Cluster 1 design does not meet size, weight, and power 
constraints or security requirements to operate in a networked 
environment. The JTRS program restructure has been approved by the 
Defense Acquisition Executive and provides for a path forward to meet 
security requirements. Over the next year, the program will seek full 
approval of the strategy, targeted for early fiscal year 2007. Due to 
the program restructuring, we did not assess the current overall 
attainment of product knowledge. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

JTRS Cluster 1 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The maturity of Cluster 1's critical technologies is unclear. The 
program reported that 13 of its 20 critical technologies were mature 
indicating that progress has been made since the program entered system 
development in 2002 when none of the program's critical technologies 
were mature. However, this progress is based on a series of contractor 
demonstrations conducted in spring 2005 that used only partially 
functioning prototypes. A planned operational assessment was canceled 
after the Army informed the contractor of possible contract 
termination. Among other things, the demonstrations did not show 
extensive Wideband Networking Waveform capabilities. The Wideband 
Networking Waveform represents the core of the JTRS networking 
capability and its integration is the most significant technical 
challenge to the radio's development, according to program officials. 
In addition, critical technologies such as the network bridging 
software are immature. Moreover, the program continues to be challenged 
by security requirements. The program has identified an interim 
approach to address security requirements that complies with National 
Security Agency guidance and supports the operation of networking 
waveforms and interoperability with non-JTRS networks. However, the 
approach utilizes only partially functioning prototypes and is expected 
to provide only limited capabilities. Program officials noted that a 
follow-up effort involving actual prototypes will provide full 
capabilities. Until the program demonstrates an actual prototype under 
realistic conditions and completes its restructuring of the program, it 
is difficult to evaluate the maturity of its critical technologies. 

Design Stability: 

The program reports achieving design stability for the basic Cluster 1 
radio design. However, the National Security Agency has determined that 
the current design is not sufficient to meet newly discovered security 
requirements needed to operate in an open networked environment. The 
program also continues to reconcile size, weight, and power 
requirements. These challenges and the uncertainty of technology 
maturity raise concern about the program's design stability. 

Other Program Issues: 

In light of the technical problems and cost growth, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense in January 2005 directed the Army to stop work on 
portions of the Cluster 1 development. In April 2005, the Army notified 
the prime contractor that it was considering contract termination. This 
action was taken based on initial findings of an assessment of the 
Cluster 1 program conducted by the newly established JTRS Joint Program 
Executive Office, which concluded that the current program was not 
executable and the contractor's ability to develop the radio was 
questionable. Despite these concerns, the partial stop work order was 
allowed to expire, and the prime contractor was allowed to continue 
portions of the Cluster 1 contract. 

The JTRS Joint Program Executive Office is now proceeding with a major 
restructuring of the program. It has completed its assessments of the 
JTRS clusters, revising the programs' management and financial 
structure and has reviewed Cluster 1 requirements with the intent of 
making the program more achievable. The JTRS Joint Program Executive 
Office developed several acquisition strategies which were presented to 
the Defense Acquisition Board in October and November 2005. The JTRS 
restructure has been approved by the Defense Acquisition Executive, and 
the program will seek full approval of the strategy over the next year. 
Program officials expect the restructured program to be up and running 
in early fiscal year 2007. In the meantime, the program continues to 
mature and support prototype design. The restructured program will 
emphasize an evolutionary acquisition of the radio in increments rather 
than attempting to field a complete capability all at once. In 
addition, DOD officials expect that the development of the helicopter 
variant will be moved to the JTRS Airborne, Maritime and Fixed-Site 
program. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office 
generally agreed with the information provided in this report. Program 
officials also provided technical comments, which were incorporated 
where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5: 

The JTRS program is developing software-defined radios that will 
interoperate with existing radios and also increase communications and 
networking capabilities. A Joint Program Executive Office provides a 
central acquisition authority and balances acquisition actions across 
the services, while product offices are developing radio hardware and 
software for users with similar requirements. The Army-led JTRS Cluster 
5 product office, within the Ground Radio Systems program office, is 
developing handheld, manpack, and small embeddable radios. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics C4 Systems; 
Program office: Ft. Monmouth, N.J. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $341.0 million; 
Procurement: $8,431.1 million; 
Total funding: $8,772.2 million; 
Procurement quantity: 328,514. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

Costs and quantities reflect the program of record. Both are expected 
to change as a part of a program restructuring currently underway. 

[End of table] 

JTRS Cluster 5 began system development with one of its six critical 
technologies considered mature. The program considers the five other 
technologies low risk and anticipates increased levels of maturity, 
though not full maturity, by the production decision in March 2008. We 
did not assess design stability because no production representative 
drawings had been released at the time of our assessment. The total 
number of drawings has also not been identified. The JTRS Joint Program 
Executive Office has conducted a broad assessment of the entire JTRS 
program. A JTRS program restructure has been approved by the Defense 
Acquisition Executive. The program will seek full approval of the 
revised strategy by the start of fiscal year 2007. The revised Cluster 
5 program is described as a moderate risk program. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

JTRS Cluster 5 Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The JTRS Cluster 5 program has identified six critical technologies and 
is focused on a common set of core circuit card assemblies for all its 
handheld, manpack, and small form factor radios. The program office has 
assessed one of the Cluster 5 critical technologies, termed 
environmental protection, as mature for use. The program office has 
assessed two other critical technologies, antenna and power management, 
at a high level of readiness, although not fully mature. However, the 
power management technology may not be as mature as assessed given the 
Cluster 5 requirement to support a JTRS Wideband Networking Waveform. 
This waveform is essential to providing JTRS networking services to 
ensure interoperability over a wide range of frequencies. While it is 
not designated a Cluster 5 critical technology, the JTRS Operational 
Requirements Document designates it as a key performance parameter. 
Operation of this waveform carries with it a large power requirement. 
Because of the technical challenges of meeting that power requirement 
in an acceptable size and weight, the Cluster 5 program is seeking some 
relief from the waveform's requirements and attempting to optimize the 
software code to increase its power efficiency. It is also evaluating 
alternative waveforms such as the Soldier Radio Waveform to provide in 
a power efficient way the needed networked services for radios with 
highly constrained power and antenna size. The remaining Cluster 5 
critical technologies--microelectronics, multichannel architecture, and 
security--require additional development. According to the program 
office, however, all three represent a moderate level of risk and are 
anticipated to reach increased levels of maturity by the production 
decision. 

The program continues to address size, weight, and power requirements. 
The Cluster 5 two-channel manpack radios are to have a maximum weight 
of 9 pounds. In comparison, current single channel manpack radios weigh 
in excess of 13 pounds. However, the JTRS Joint Service Capabilities 
Working Group recently gave the program relief in meeting this weight 
requirement. 

Design Stability: 

We did not assess the design stability of JTRS Cluster 5 because the 
total number of drawings is not known and there are currently no 
releasable drawings complete. 

Other Program Issues: 

In authorizing the Cluster 5 program to begin system development in 
April 2004, the Army Acquisition Executive directed that the program 
assess the technological maturity of its plans for acquiring Future 
Combat System unique small form factor JTRS capability. This review was 
scheduled for spring 2005. However, in February 2005 the newly 
appointed JTRS Joint Program Executive Officer assumed responsibility 
for all JTRS Clusters, including Cluster 5, and began an assessment of 
all JTRS Clusters. Based on this assessment, the JTRS Joint Program 
Executive Office developed several alternative acquisition strategies 
which were presented to the Defense Acquisition Board in October and 
November 2005. The restructured program will emphasize developing and 
evolving the radio products in increments rather than attempting to 
field a complete capability all at once. According to program 
officials, delivering a JTRS capability in increments will make the 
JTRS Program executable and reduce cost, schedule, and performance 
risk. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on our draft, the program office generally concurred with 
our findings and offered technical comments for our consideration. Many 
of the technical comments involved updated information on the status of 
the JTRS restructuring. We incorporated all relevant updated 
information into our report. 

[End of section] 

Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS): 

The J-UCAS program is a joint Air Force and Navy effort to develop and 
demonstrate the technical feasibility and operational value of a 
networked system of high performance, weaponized unmanned aircraft. 
Planned missions include suppression of enemy air defenses, precision 
strike, persistent surveillance, and potentially others such as 
electronic attack as resources and requirements dictate. The program 
consolidates two formerly separate service efforts and is to develop 
and demonstrate larger, more capable, and interoperable aircraft. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing, Johns-Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab, 
Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding, FY06-FY12: 
R&D: $3,876.7 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $3,876.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Costs and quantities are budgeted amounts from the joint program's 
inception in fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2009. Total known 
program cost through fiscal year 2012 is $4,792.5 million. 

None of the eight critical technologies for this pre-acquisition 
program are currently mature, but J-UCAS officials project that, due 
primarily to planned risk reduction efforts, three will be mature and 
five will be approaching maturity to support a potential system 
acquisition start in fiscal year 2012. The J-UCAS program has been 
buffeted by frequent changes in leadership, funding, and priorities. 
Leadership recently transitioned from the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency to the Air Force with Navy participation and funding 
was reduced. The Quadrennial Defense Review then recommended 
restructuring the J-UCAS program to develop a longer-range carrier- 
based unmanned combat aircraft for the Navy. The Air Force plans to 
consider J-UCAS technologies and accomplishments in its efforts to 
develop a new long-range persistent strike capability. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

J-UCAS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

None of the eight critical technologies identified for this pre- 
acquisition program are currently mature. Technologies include adaptive 
autonomous operations (for controlling groups of aircraft flying in a 
coordinated manner without human inputs) and force integration (for 
interoperating with intelligence sources and strike and surveillance 
packages). Most technologies are in a maturity range in which basic 
components are integrated to establish they will work together and 
components are integrated with reasonably realistic support elements 
for testing in a simulated environment. 

J-UCAS program officials have established a structured and disciplined 
framework for maturing technologies, using both in-house efforts and 
technology developments outside the program. Officials project that, at 
a potential system start-up in fiscal year 2012, three technologies 
will be mature at the best practices standard and the remaining five 
will be approaching maturity. 

As currently envisioned, the J-UCAS program will develop technologies 
and operationally assess demonstrator aircraft from two prime 
contractors sharing a common operating system, payloads, and 
subsystems. Boeing X-45, Northrop-Grumman X-47, and common systems and 
technologies are on contracts and proceeding forward. The Air Force and 
Navy could then use the results of the operational assessment to decide 
whether to start system development program(s). 

Other Program Issues: 

The just-completed Quadrennial Defense Review recommended restructuring 
the J-UCAS program and develop an unmanned longer-range carrier-based 
aircraft to increase naval reach and persistence. The Air Force is 
focusing its resources on delivering a new long-range strike 
capability. Officials will consider J-UCAS technologies and 
accomplishments in the analysis of alternatives for the new strike 
capability. Final decisions, future plans, and funding requirements 
were not available to us at the time of our review. 

Prior to the Quadrennial Defense Review, the J-UCAS program had already 
undergone several changes in leadership, program direction and 
priorities, and funding. Recognizing the potential for synergy and cost 
savings, OSD consolidated separate Air Force and Navy efforts in a 
joint program in October 2003 under DARPA leadership. The previous 
service efforts had been targeted to specific service needs and 
different missions; under the joint program, the emphasis was on 
developing interoperable and networked systems utilizing a common 
operating system, sensors, and weapons. A December 2004 program budget 
decision by OSD reduced future budgets, directed a restructure to 
emphasize development of air vehicles, and directed that management be 
transitioned to the Air Force with Navy participation; this was 
accomplished in November 2005. 

Congress reduced funding in the 2005 and 2006 budget requests. For 
2005, Congress expressed concerns that the joint program had not 
properly coordinated with the two services and directed that the 
technology demonstrators be completed in support of Air Force and Navy 
requirements. For 2006, Congress expressed concerns about fluctuations 
in the program, including Service ownership, and apparent 
incompatibility of the Air Force and Navy requirements. The Congress 
also directed DOD to conduct an independent study to review technical 
requirements and options for cost savings, and to provide an analysis 
and recommendation on whether the Air Force and Navy are sufficiently 
different in their respective requirements and level of development to 
merit separation into service-unique programs. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, DOD said that all critical 
technologies are projected to be mature enough to support start of 
system development expected in fiscal year 2012. Subsequently, J-UCAS 
program officials briefed us on the process and results of a new 
reassessment of technology maturity levels. We updated this product to 
reflect the reassessment and incorporated current events from the 
Quadrennial Defense Review. 

[End of section] 

Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI): 

MDA's KEI element is a missile defense system designed to destroy 
medium, intermediate, and intercontinental ballistic missiles during 
the boost and midcourse phases of flight. Key components include hit- 
to-kill interceptors, mobile launchers, and fire control and 
communications units. We assessed the proposed land-based KEI 
capability, which according to program officials, will be available in 
2014. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman; 
Program office: Fair Lakes, Va. 

Funding FY06-FY11: 
R&D: $5,137.3 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $5,137.3 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Table reflects known costs of program from program inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Procurement cost has yet to be determined. Total 
known cost through fiscal year 2011 is $5,678.0 million. 

KEI's seven critical technologies are at a relatively low level of 
maturity, with two rated as high risk--the interceptor's booster motors 
and the algorithm that enables the kill vehicle to identify the threat 
missile's body from the luminous exhaust plume. According to MDA 
officials, integration issues and hardware manufacturability are being 
addressed, and the design of the demonstration hardware should become 
the design for the operational KEI element. In 2008, MDA will assess 
KEI's achievements and decide how the program should proceed. If a 
decision is made to move forward, MDA plans to finalize the design 
during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2011. At that time, two 
technologies will have been demonstrated in flight tests, and four in 
ground tests. KEI underwent a replan to compensate for fiscal year 2005 
funding cuts and additional requirements, causing program delays. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

KEI Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

All seven KEI critical technologies are at a relatively low level of 
maturity. These technologies are part of the element's interceptor, the 
weapon component of the element consisting of a kill vehicle mounted 
atop a boost vehicle. Of the seven technologies, four pertain to the 
boost vehicle that propels the kill vehicle into space. Boost vehicle 
technologies include two types of booster motors, an attitude control 
system, and a thrust vector control system. The remaining three 
technologies are related to the kill vehicle--its infrared seeker, 
divert system, and plume-to-hardbody algorithms. Although all 
technologies are immature, three of the seven are new applications of 
existing technologies developed by other missile defense programs. The 
infrared seeker and the third stage rocket motor come from the Aegis 
BMD program, and the divert system comes from the GMD program. Backup 
technologies exist for all technologies, but the infrared seeker. 
However, these technologies are at the same low level of maturity as 
the critical technologies. 

Program officials noted that they expect the design of the 
demonstration hardware to be the design of the operational hardware. 
Therefore, integration and manufacturability issues are being addressed 
in the design of the demonstration hardware. According to program 
officials, KEI's operational design will be finalized in 2011. By that 
time, MDA plans to demonstrate two critical technologies--the thrust 
vector control system and one of the two types of boosters--in two 
booster flight tests. Other technologies will have been demonstrated in 
ground tests, such as hardware-in-the-loop tests and flight tests. The 
integration of all critical technologies will be demonstrated in an 
element characterization test early in fiscal year 2012, a sea risk 
reduction flight test in late 2012, followed by the first integrated 
flight test early in 2013. 

Design Stability: 

The KEI program office estimates that KEI's design will incorporate 
about 7,500 drawings. Program officials expect 5,000 of these drawings 
to be complete when it holds a critical design/production readiness 
review for the land-based capability in 2009. However, it is too early 
to make an accurate assessment of KEI's design because all of KEI's 
technologies are not mature. In addition to using the number of 
drawings released as a measure of the design's maturity, the program 
also plans to use Engineering and Manufacturing Readiness Levels to 
determine the design's manufacturability and Software Readiness Levels 
to assess the maturity of KEI's software. 

Other Program Issues: 

In fiscal year 2008, MDA plans to assess KEI's accomplishments and make 
decisions about the program's future. If MDA decides to acquire KEI, 
program officials expect to begin development of a space-based test 
bed. MDA expects to expend about $673 million between fiscal years 2008 
and 2011 on the test bed's development, which, when complete, is 
envisioned as a limited constellation of space based interceptors 
capable of providing an additional layer of defense against ICBMs. In 
spite of its unknown future, program officials are working to extend 
KEI's contract from January 2012 (98 months) to September 2015 (143) 
months. Additionally, the program has directed its contractor to 
investigate the effect of making KEI capable of defeating threat 
missiles during the midcourse of their flight. 

The KEI program underwent a program replan to compensate for fiscal 
year 2005 funding cuts and the addition of new requirements, such as a 
requirement for nuclear hardening imposed by MDA. Under the replan the 
Block 2010 land-based capability was combined with the Block 2012 sea- 
based capability, both of which utilize the same interceptor. According 
to program officials, KEI is undergoing further restructuring which has 
delayed the land-based capability into Block 2014 and the sea-based 
capability into Block 2016. Program officials noted that if they 
receive additional funding, the land-based capability could still be 
delivered during Block 2012. 

Agency Comments: 

MDA provided technical comments, which were incorporated where 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Land Warrior: 

The Army's Land Warrior program is developing modular, integrated, 
soldier-worn systems intended to enhance the lethality, situational 
awareness, and survivability of dismounted combat and support soldiers. 
The program restructured in 2005 in an effort to field capability to 
the current force, focusing on the Dismounted Battle Command System 
(DBCS). DBCS comprises the Commander's Digital Assistant and the 
MicroLight Enhanced Position Location and Reporting System, elements of 
the previously planned Land Warrior system. We assessed DBCS. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics; 
Program office: Fort Belvoir, Va. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $438.5 million; 
Procurement: $8,255.8 million; 
Total funding: $8,694.2 million; 
Procurement quantity: 84,658. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

As an early spiral of Land Warrior, the Dismounted Battle Command 
System is technologically less ambitious than previous efforts. The 
system's three critical technologies (power, radio communications, and 
the personal area network) are mature; however, the personal area 
network that connects the components together did not reach maturity by 
the time of the DBCS critical design review in February 2005. The 
program did not achieve design stability by this design review, but all 
drawings are currently releasable. We could not assess production 
maturity for DBCS because the program is not collecting statistical 
process control data at this time. However, the results of an early 
evaluation of DBCS conducted by the Army Test and Evaluation Command in 
August 2005 recently led the Army to terminate the DBCS effort and 
focus on developing the full Land Warrior ensemble. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Land Warrior Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

An early spiral of Land Warrior, DBCS is intended to provide a limited, 
near-term capability to the current force to improve infantry unit 
battle command and situational awareness. As a partial capability, DBCS 
is technologically less ambitious than the system we assessed last 
year. The DBCS comprises two adapted commercially available components: 
the Commander's Digital Assistant (CDA) and the MicroLight Enhanced 
Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS). Running the Army's Force 
XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below situational awareness software, 
the CDA is intended to provide leaders at the platoon and company level 
with blue (friendly) force tracking capability. The MicroLight EPLRS 
will provide voice and data communications at the squad level and 
higher. The three critical technologies for DBCS, radio communications 
(the MicroLight EPLRS), power for the CDA (batteries), and the personal 
area network that connects the components together, are mature by best 
practice standards. 

We did not assess technology maturity for the limited number of full 
Land Warrior ensembles the Army is procuring for assessment purposes in 
2006. Last year we assessed what was then Block II of the program, the 
Land Warrior--Stryker Interoperable system. At that time, two of the 
system's four critical technologies were not mature (the personal area 
network and radio communications). The Land Warrior system will 
eventually use the JTRS Cluster 5 embedded radio (assessed elsewhere in 
this report), scheduled to be available in fiscal year 2011. 

Design Stability: 

The program reported that 23 design drawings out of a total expected 
number of 70 were releasable at the February 2005 critical design 
review for DBCS, and that all 70 drawings are currently releasable. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess the maturity of production processes for DBCS 
because the program is not collecting statistical process control data 
at this time. Officials told us that while General Dynamics has not 
fully identified the key manufacturing processes, the company has 
initiated manufacturing planning in accordance with ISO 9000 
guidelines. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Army restructured the program in 2005 in response to congressional 
direction to immediately field some Land Warrior capabilities to the 
current force, terminating the Block II effort that was underway. The 
restructured program comprised three phases. The first phase was 
focused on fielding the Dismounted Battle Command System to leaders of 
up to 30 of the Army's Brigade Combat Teams. The Army conducted an 
early evaluation of DBCS in August 2005, during which soldiers from the 
10th Mountain Division used the system in training for an upcoming 
deployment to Afghanistan. The Army Test and Evaluation Command 
concluded that DBCS was not suitable for light infantry operations and 
reported that the system's weight and physical configuration reduced 
soldiers' mobility. In addition, the demonstration revealed concerns 
about power consumption as well as an inability to interoperate with 
the unit's existing radios. Noting that the unit would not take DBCS to 
Afghanistan, DOD's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 
concluded that the system did not demonstrate the necessary 
capabilities and that the current system was not mature. 

The second phase of the program, still on track, is focused on 
developing an integrated Land Warrior capability in support of the 
Army's Stryker Brigades. Slightly less capable than the system we 
assessed last year, the program plans to field 486 of these systems to 
one Stryker battalion in fiscal year 2006 for assessment purposes. The 
third phase, Ground Soldier System, is the future iteration of Land 
Warrior capability intended to provide a dismounted soldier capability 
to the Army's Future Combat Systems. In early 2005, the program 
completed a plan to consolidate the Land Warrior program with the 
Army's Future Force Warrior Advanced Technology Demonstration effort. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS): 

The Navy's LCS is to be a surface combatant optimized for littoral 
warfare with innovative hull designs and reconfigurable mission 
packages to counter threats in three mission areas: mine, 
antisubmarine, and surface warfare. The ship and mission packages are 
being developed in spirals with the first four ships, Flight 0, 
produced in two designs. We assessed only Flight 0 ships and their 
associated mission packages. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $654.4 million; 
Procurement: $592.0 million; 
Total funding: $1,246.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 2. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Two of the ships will be procured using research and development funds. 
Quantity shown is the number of ships procured, seven mission packages 
will also be procured with funds shown. 

The LCS program entered system development in June 2004. The program 
office identified 41 critical technologies for the mission packages and 
43 technologies between the two ship designs. Since our last review, 
LCS has continued to test and mature its technologies for the mission 
packages. Currently 19 of the 41 mission package technologies are fully 
mature; seven are near full maturity; and 15 remain in development. The 
technologies that have not reached maturity affect all three of the 
mission packages, each of which will go through critical design review 
in 2006. The majority of technologies for the ship designs are fully 
mature or near maturity, except for those used for launch and recovery 
or command and control of off-board vehicles. Both ship designs have 
begun production. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

LCS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Nine of the technologies under development for LCS are used in multiple 
applications or mission packages. Since these technologies are used on 
different platforms or in different environments, the program office 
chose to assess them in each setting separately. This results in a 
total of 41 critical technologies, 19 of which are currently mature. 

The first mine warfare mission package will align with delivery of the 
first ship in January 2007. In this mission, the MH-60S helicopter is 
to carry subsystems for either detection or neutralization of mines. A 
key component for attaching subsystems to the helicopter is currently 
undergoing flight testing to correct deficiencies. Delay of the MH-60 
could leave gaps in the ability to detect some mines while increasing 
the time needed to neutralize others. The unmanned surface vehicle has 
a similar mine neutralization capability as the MH-60S, which also acts 
as its fallback. Neither the vehicle nor its payload is currently 
mature, and failure to deploy it on LCS will lead to increased use of 
the MH-60S. For mine warfare the vertical tactical unmanned autonomous 
vehicle, an unmanned helicopter, will employ the coastal battlefield 
reconnaissance and analysis system for detection of mines on the beach. 
Both the vehicle and its payload are currently immature, and no 
fallback is available to LCS. 

The first antisubmarine and surface warfare packages will align with 
delivery of the second LCS in fiscal year 2008. The MH-60R helicopter, 
fully mature in each configuration, is critical for these missions. 
Antisubmarine and surface warfare will also be performed by a number of 
other immature systems, including the vertical tactical unmanned 
autonomous vehicle and the unmanned surface vehicle. The MH-60R is the 
fallback for those systems should they fail to mature. As a 
consequence, reliance on helicopters will increase should the unmanned 
systems fail to deploy with LCS. 

Demonstration of mission package technologies will continue through 
2008 and includes experiments with surrogate platforms. All 
technologies are expected to reach maturity by delivery of their 
respective mission package. 

While the designs of the first LCS ships are novel in the experience of 
the Navy, the majority of ship-specific technologies are mature or 
close to full maturity. The Lockheed Martin design, the first to be 
produced, currently has 16 of 21 technologies mature or close to full 
maturity. The General Dynamics design currently has 20 of 22 
technologies mature or close to full maturity. Most of the immature 
technologies are used to launch and recover or control the vehicles 
used in mission packages. 

Design Stability: 

Design of mission packages is tracked in a unique manner as some of the 
"technologies" used are fully developed systems. These systems are 
being designed and produced by other programs and, to ensure that the 
mission packages will be compatible with LCS, the program has 
established a set of interface specifications that each system must 
meet. These specifications regulate issues like electrical, 
communications, and maintenance needs. The specifications for 
components of mission packages will be reviewed as part of a critical 
design review for each warfare package. Both designs of the first 
spiral of LCS ships have begun production. Application of commercial 
design specifications and standards to Navy shipbuilding have created 
some challenges during the design process, as has leveraging designs 
with commercial lineage for military use. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on the draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
LCS program implements spiral development to rapidly field capabilities 
that fill current operational gaps while achieving unprecedented 
flexibility for the future. Efficient spiral implementation is achieved 
through modular mission packages operated through a common interface 
specification. Mission package systems have been selected from best 
"state of the practice" technologies to satisfy requirements, ranging 
from mature acquisition programs to technology demonstrators. While 
component systems may be technically mature, repackaging and 
integration into operational mission packages requires verification 
testing to validate performance. Program test plans include specific 
events to rapidly demonstrate the technical maturity of the modular 
systems, and the flexibility of the modular open architecture greatly 
reduces the risk and impact from any single component. 

[End of section] 

Longbow Apache Block III: 

The Army's AH-64D Longbow Apache can be employed day or night, in 
adverse weather and obscurants, and is capable of engaging and 
destroying advanced threat weapon systems. The primary targets of the 
aircraft are mobile armor and air defense units, with secondary targets 
being threat helicopters. Block III enhancements are to ensure the 
Longbow Apache is compatible with the Future Combat System 
architecture, is a viable member of the future force, and is 
supportable through 2030. We assessed the Block III portion of the 
Apache. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $714.9 million; 
Procurement: $1,159.2 million; 
Total funding: $1,874.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 110. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The Apache Block III program plans to begin system development in March 
2006 with approximately 67 percent of its critical technologies fully 
mature. However, while the Army plans to develop the Block III in one 
acquisition program, it also plans for the program to be comprised of 
two development phases. The Army expects to approve funding for the 
first phase in 2006 and the second after 2010. Overall, program 
officials project that at the start of development seven of the fifteen 
critical technologies will be fully mature, six approaching full 
maturity, and two immature. Due to the acquisition strategy and 
budgetary constraints, no further efforts to mature the less-than-fully 
mature technologies will occur until fiscal years 2010 to 2015. 
According to the program, these technologies are primarily software 
upgrades that will be easy to retrofit into helicopters. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Longbow Apache BLIII Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials report that 6 of 15 critical technologies are 
currently fully mature. Further, when the program enters the system 
development and demonstration phase in March 2006, an additional 
technology--the Level 4 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Control--will have 
reached full maturity. These mature technologies are planned for 
insertion in the helicopter in the initial production lots. For 
example, the composite main rotor blade and the modernized signal 
processor units are already fully mature and will be incorporated in 
the 2010 to 2012 time frame. Due to the acquisition strategy and 
budgetary constraints, no further efforts to mature the 8 immature 
technologies will occur until fiscal years 2010 to 2015. As aircraft 
come off the production line, the program will have provisions in place 
that will allow for these technologies to be inserted when they are 
fully mature and available in the 2015 time frame. 

Technical insertions for the Apache Block III effort consist of two 
general categories: processor upgrades and non-processor upgrades. The 
first development phase addresses some of the processor upgrades and 
all of the non-processor upgrades. The second developmental effort 
addresses the remaining processor upgrades. The processor upgrades are 
open or partitioned software architectures that will allow integration 
of most of the improvements. Processor upgrades include changes to the 
Instrument Flight Rules, the Modernized Signal Processor, the Radar 
Frequency Interferometer, the Control of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, the 
Cognitive Decision Aiding System, the Fire Control Radar Range 
Extension, the Multi-Mode Laser, Aided Target Detection and 
Classification, Maritime Targeting Modes, and the Radar Frequency 
Interferometer passive ranging. Nonprocessor upgrades include changes 
to the engine, an improved drive system, and the composite main rotor 
blade. 

The processor technologies are primarily software upgrades that are low 
risk and easily field-retrofitable into helicopters with minimal cost 
without having to return to the production-processing facility. 
According to program officials, there will be costs associated with 
retrofitting the helicopters but these costs should be minimal given 
the ability to add software changes in the field and because the 
helicopter would have to be returned to the production plant to 
accomplish these upgrades. Also, given the fact that the government 
will perform the software retrofits on its own as part of the normal 
software update process, the financial impact will be minimal. Further, 
based on the current technology readiness levels, program officials 
believe the technical risk to these technologies is low even though no 
back-up technologies exist. If, for some reason, the technology is 
unavailable for insertion at its given time, the program would proceed 
with the existing technology until the new technology can be 
incorporated. 

Agency Comments: 

The Army concurred with our assessment. 

[End of section] 

Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA): 

The Navy's MMA is part of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) 
family of systems, along with the BAMS Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
and Aerial Common Sensor (ACS). This family of systems is intended to 
sustain and improve the Navy's maritime warfighting capability. The MMA 
is the replacement for the P-3C Orion. Its primary roles are persistent 
antisubmarine warfare; antisurface warfare; and intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Integrated Defense Systems; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $5,910.5 million; 
Procurement: $20,540.6 million; 
Total funding: $26,572.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 108. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The MMA program entered development with none of its four critical 
technologies mature. According to the program office, these 
technologies will be demonstrated in a relevant environment by design 
review and tested in an operational environment by the production 
decision. The program evaluated six other technologies but decided they 
were not critical because they had already been demonstrated in a 
relevant or operational environment. The system's technology maturity 
will be demonstrated at least 3 years later than recommended by best 
practices standards. However, if those technologies do not mature as 
expected, the program has identified mature back-up technologies. In 
addition, during the program's preliminary design review, a 
recommendation was made to reassess whether all critical technologies 
in the program have been identified. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

MMA Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

None of the four critical technologies--integrated rotary sonobuoy 
launcher, electronic support measures digital receiver, data fusion, 
and acoustic algorithms--are mature. These technologies have not moved 
beyond the laboratory environment. For three of the technologies, the 
components have not been integrated into a prototype system. The 
program expects the four technologies to be demonstrated in a relevant 
environment by design review in July 2007 and tested in an operational 
environment by the production decision in May 2010. The system's 
technology maturity will be demonstrated at least 3 years later than 
recommended by best practices standards. 

The program office and the contractor developed maturation plans and 
identified mature backup technologies for each of the critical 
technologies. According to program officials, the MMA would lose some 
capabilities but still meet its minimum system requirements if it used 
these backups. For example, one of the biggest technology challenges 
for the MMA identified by program officials is the electronic support 
measures digital receiver. This technology exists as a prototype and 
has been demonstrated in a high fidelity laboratory environment. The 
program is leveraging the digital receivers currently in development on 
the EA-18G program. If the EA-18G digital receiver program is 
unsuccessful, the program will have to use legacy analog off-the-shelf 
receivers, which would prevent them from gaining an increased 
sensitivity for certain signals. 

The four technologies we assessed were identified in the MMA's 
technology readiness assessment. The program evaluated six other 
technologies but decided they were not critical because they had 
already been demonstrated in a relevant or operational environment. 
However, during the program's November 2005 preliminary design review, 
a recommendation was made to reassess whether all critical technologies 
in the program have been identified. 

Design Stability: 

We did not assess design stability as the number of releasable drawings 
is not yet available. 

Other Program Issues: 

As of August 2005, the MMA program is on budget and on schedule. 
However, if the MMA fails to develop as expected or experiences 
schedule slippage, the Navy would have to rely on its aging P-3C Orion 
fleet, which according to DOD is plagued by serious airframe life 
issues, poor mission availability rates, high ownership costs, and 
limited system growth capacity. 

The MMA shares the persistent intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance role with the BAMS UAV. The BAMS UAV development start 
and initial operations capability have been delayed 18 months and three 
years respectively. If the BAMS UAV does not develop as planned or 
continues to experience schedule delays, the MMA is its fallback and 
according to the Navy's most recent analysis, the overall cost of the 
program would increase due to a need to procure additional MMA 
aircraft. In addition, a third element planned for the BAMS family of 
systems is the ACS. The ACS is intended to replace three current 
systems: the Army's Guardrail Common Sensor, Airborne Reconnaissance 
Low, and the Navy's EP-3. However, DOD issued a stop-work order to the 
ACS program prime contractor in September 2005 and terminated the 
contract in January 2006, because the airframe selected for the ACS 
could not accommodate the intended ACS mission equipment. Decisions 
concerning the ACS program that have not yet been made may determine 
whether the Navy participates in a future ACS program. One of the 
alternatives previously assessed by the Navy to replace the EP-3 
included incorporating the ACS equipment onto the MMA airframe. 

Agency Comments: 

The Navy concurred with GAO's assessment of the MMA program. We 
incorporated technical comments provided by the Navy as appropriate. 
The Navy stated that the program continues to manage the four critical 
technologies. It stated that the maturation of these technologies is on 
schedule and will be demonstrated in a relevant environment prior to 
the July 2007 design readiness review. It also stated that the program 
continues to meet or exceed the cost, schedule, and performance 
parameters defined in the program's baseline agreement and that the 
prime contractor also continues to execute the contract within cost and 
schedule parameters. 

[End of section] 

21" Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (MRUUV): 

Launched and recovered from submarine torpedo tubes, the Navy's 21" 
MRUUV will independently perform a range of information gathering 
activities. It supplants two related programs now limited to prototype 
development, the long-term mine reconnaissance system and the advanced 
development unmanned undersea vehicle. Each MRUUV system will include 
the vehicle, combat and control interfaces, and enabling equipment for 
either mine countermeasure or ISR missions. This assessment is as of 
January 2006. The planned July 2006 decision to enter development has 
since been delayed. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: TBD; 
Program office: Washington, D.C. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: TBD; 
Procurement: TBD; 
Total funding: TBD; 
Procurement quantity: 11. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Program costs are business sensitive and cannot be published until 
after MRUUV design contract is awarded. 

One of the MRUUV program's six critical technologies is currently 
mature. While the program expects to have fully matured four of the 
five remaining critical technologies by the time of development start 
in July 2006, the final technology--a rechargeable battery for the 
system--is not expected to reach maturity until 2008. Given the cost 
growth and schedule slippage experienced on previous unmanned undersea 
vehicle programs, DOD is treating the program as if it were a larger 
development effort and providing increased oversight. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

21'' MRUUV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

One of the MRUUV's six critical technologies is currently mature and 
the program expects to have at least four of the remaining five 
critical technologies fully mature by the start of system development 
in July 2006. The one exception, a rechargeable battery used for power 
supply, may require further development to ensure proper integration. 

The Littoral Precision Undersea Mapping Array is a critical sonar 
technology that enables object identification and obstacle avoidance, 
essentially forming the "eyes" of the vehicle. An advanced development 
model of the Mapping Array already has been developed, tested, and 
deployed on a 21" vehicle, thereby successfully demonstrating its mine 
identification capability. A more advanced, lighter-weight prototype is 
scheduled to be completed and tested in an operational environment in 
fiscal year 2006. 

The synthetic aperture sonar takes detailed pictures of underwater 
objects. A surface ship has towed a sonar model in an ocean environment 
to provide preliminary engineering data. A final prototype, will be 
completed in fiscal year 2006 and will be tested in open water in early 
fiscal year 2007. 

According to the project manager, the maturity of the software that 
provides MRUUV's autonomous operational capability has already been 
demonstrated. This software is currently being used in operational 
unmanned undersea vehicles and can be applied to the MRUUV to enable it 
to perform its basic mission requirements. Nevertheless, software 
development will continue, with incremental improvements added as they 
are developed. This may include an enhanced ability to make autonomous 
decisions and functionality that will facilitate a more efficient 
equipment swap process. 

Technology to manage the vehicle launch and recovery process involves 
acoustic signaling and mechanical activities. A predecessor vehicle on 
which MRUUV is based has demonstrated homing, docking, and replacement 
into a model submarine hull. Maturity of this technology could be 
demonstrated by system development start if at-sea tests with a real 
submarine are successful. 

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technology will be used 
to provide remote monitoring capability, which involves placing the 
vehicle in a strategic location to listen for specific signals. Such 
technology, essentially a sensor antenna, already exists and is 
operational on Navy unmanned aerial vehicle platforms. However, it 
needs to be miniaturized and adapted for an ocean environment, which 
should be demonstrated in May 2006 when the technology will be fit onto 
a small underwater vehicle shell and used in at sea testing. 

MRUUV's final critical technology is battery power. Although a stable 
conventional battery has been developed, the Navy is also pursuing the 
development of a rechargeable battery. While the rechargeable battery 
has attained functional capability, it will require further refinement 
to ensure fit into a small unmanned undersea vehicle. This is expected 
to occur in 2008. 

Other Program Issues: 

Although total investment in the MRUUV is expected to be less than $365 
million in research and development funding, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense may designate the program as an Acquisition 
Category I. Officials at DOD believe that the program requires enhanced 
oversight and visibility into program activities because of the cost 
growth and schedule slippage that plagued previous unmanned undersea 
vehicle programs. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy stated that the 
MRUUV program expects to have demonstrated all major technology risks 
through other programs or through the science and technology community 
by the time it reaches system development in July 2006. According to 
Navy officials, remaining risks will be the responsibility of the prime 
contractor to address within the systems engineering and design 
integration process. The Navy also commented that a carefully 
structured acquisition strategy and risk management program will 
continue to mitigate risks as the program progresses through its design 
phase. In subsequent comments, Navy officials noted that, as would be 
expected of a pre-MDAP program, the MRUUV effort is continuing to 
evolve and that since GAO conducted its audit work the program has 
experienced significant changes and is likely to experience additional 
changes. 

[End of section] 

Mobile User Objective System (MUOS): 

The Navy's MUOS, a satellite communication system, is expected to 
provide low data rate voice and data communications capable of 
penetrating most weather, foliage, and manmade structures. It is 
designed to replace the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Follow-On satellite 
system currently in operation and provide support to worldwide, 
multiservice, mobile, and fixed-site terminal users. MUOS consists of a 
network of advanced UHF satellites and multiple ground segments. We 
assessed both the space and ground segments. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems; 
Program office: San Diego, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $2,547.0 million; 
Procurement: $2,170.1 million: 

Total funding: $4,737.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 4. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

In September 2004, the MUOS program was authorized to begin 
development. The program currently has 9 of 11 critical technologies 
mature. The remaining technologies are projected to be mature by March 
2007, in time for the critical design review. The program intends to 
order long lead items for the first two satellites before achieving a 
final design. This early procurement could lead to rework causing cost 
increases and schedule delays if relevant designs change prior to 
critical design review. In addition, the MUOS development is schedule- 
driven, posing several risks to the program. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

MUOS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Eight of nine critical technologies were mature at the development 
start decision in September 2004. The number of critical technologies 
has increased by two since our assessment of the program last year due 
to continuing program analyses resulting in increased knowledge of 
required technologies. Currently, nine of eleven critical technologies 
are mature. The remaining technologies, a new cryptographic chip for 
the ground satellite control segment and a digital to analog converter, 
are expected to be mature by the time the program reaches its critical 
design review in March 2007. Mature backup technologies exist in the 
event that they fail to mature in time. However, use of the backup 
technologies would increase the vulnerability to attacks on signal 
transmissions used to ensure the satellites remain properly placed in 
their orbits and increase risk of program cost and schedule growth. 

Design Stability: 

The MUOS program has begun procuring long lead items for the first two 
satellites before achieving a final design. According to the program 
office, $125.5 million (then year dollars) in long lead items are to be 
ordered before critical design review in March 2007, nearly double the 
amount estimated last year. Such procurement could lead to rework if 
relevant designs change prior to the system-level critical design 
review, causing program cost increases and schedule delays. According 
to the program office, delaying long lead procurement until after 
critical design review would cause the program schedule to slip. In 
addition, the program office noted that the majority of the long lead 
procurements are planned after respective segment-level critical design 
reviews (which precede the system-level critical design review) and 
that most are for standard commercial satellite bus components. 

Additionally, the program office has not estimated the total number of 
design drawings needed to build the satellites, but this number will 
likely be known next year. The development contract requires the 
completion of 90 percent of the design drawings as a condition of 
conducting critical design review. 

Other Program Issues: 

In June 2004, DOD delayed the first MUOS satellite launch by one year 
to fiscal year 2010 due to a delay in awarding the development contract 
and to mitigate schedule risk. While the MUOS program has stayed within 
its cost and schedule estimates, its schedule remains compressed. For 
example, the importance of the first MUOS launch date has increased due 
to an unexpected failure of a UHF Follow-On satellite in June 2005. 
Communication capabilities are now expected to degrade in 2009, one 
year earlier than previously estimated. Also, operational capability 
from the first satellite may be used before formal on-orbit operational 
testing is to take place. Usually, such testing occurs prior to placing 
a satellite into service. Finally, an independent assessment conducted 
for the MUOS development start decision states that the program is 
schedule-driven due to software development. 

According to the program office, development of MUOS ground software 
represents one of the highest risks to the program due to the size and 
complexity of the contractor's design. The program office stated that 
the ground software is to be developed in three builds comprised of two 
to four increments each (for a total of eight increments) to mitigate 
schedule risk. Additionally, the program intends to track and assess 
software development using numerous metrics we have found to be useful 
for program success. However, our review of the software development 
shows cost and schedule growth risks remain due to the concurrent 
development of the three builds. Specifically, during the approximately 
4-year software development time frame, about one-half of this period 
consists of concurrent development among the software builds. Such 
concurrency can increase the severity of software problems due to their 
cascading cost and schedule impacts on other builds. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 
(NPOESS): 

NPOESS is a triagency National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), DOD, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
satellite program to monitor the weather and environment through the 
year 2020. Current NOAA and DOD satellites will be merged into a single 
national system. The program consists of five segments: space; command, 
control, and communications; interface data processing; launch; and 
field terminal software. We assessed all segments. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology; 
Program office: Silver Spring, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $4,083.7 million; 
Procurement: $1,309.6 million; 
Total funding: $5,393.3 million; 
Procurement quantity: 4. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

As a result of technical problems, the program office now estimates the 
total program cost at about $8.3 billion. As of November 2005, our 
estimate was about $9.7 billion. 

In August 2002, the NPOESS program committed to the development of 
operationally capable satellites with only 1 of 14 critical 
technologies mature and about half of its drawings released to 
manufacturing. All but three of these technologies are expected to be 
mature by design review in February 2007. The program office is not 
collecting statistical process control data to assess production 
maturity because of the small number of units being produced. It 
considers two of the four critical sensors key program risks because of 
technical development challenges. In November 2005, our analysis showed 
the contractor was $253.8 million over budget and may have a potential 
overrun of about $1.4 billion at completion. The program reported a 
Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) unit cost breach in January 2006, at the 
25 percent threshold, due to continuing technical problems. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

NPOESS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Only 1 of the program's 14 critical technologies was mature at the 
production decision in August 2002. One critical technology was deleted 
from NPOESS in 2005. The program projects that all but three of the 
remaining technologies will be mature by the design review in 2007. 

The program undertook the NPOESS Preparatory Project, a demonstration 
satellite, to reduce risk and provide a bridging mission for NASA's 
Earth Observing System. This satellite is to demonstrate three of the 
four critical sensors in an operational environment and was scheduled 
for launch in May 2006. However, the launch of this satellite was 
delayed 23 months from the contract award date to April 2008. This 
effort is to provide data processing centers with an early opportunity 
to work with sensors, ground controls, and data-processing systems and 
allow for incorporating lessons learned into the NPOESS satellites. 
Since our assessment last year, the program office reports that three 
sensors continue to experience cost increases and schedule delays due 
to technical challenges. Two of these are considered critical sensors. 

Design Stability: 

In August 2002, the program committed to the fabrication and production 
of two satellites with operational capability before achieving design 
stability or production maturity. Program officials indicated that 
about 55 percent of the design drawings have been released to 
manufacturing, and expect to release about 88 percent by the design 
review in 2007, which represents a decline of 6 percent from last 
year's estimate. The design review date and other schedule dates are 
subject to revision based on the results provided by an independent 
program assessment, DOD review, and Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) 
certification process. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because, according to the 
program office, it does not collect statistical process control data 
due to the small number of units to be built. However, program 
officials report the contractors track and use various metrics for 
subcomponents, such as rework percentages and defect containment, to 
track production progress. 

Other Program Issues: 

In 2002, DOD extended the launch date of one of its legacy 
meteorological satellites to 2010, delaying the need for NPOESS and 
reducing NPOESS funding by about $65 million between fiscal years 2004 
and 2007. Funding reductions prompted a restructuring of the NPOESS 
program. In September 2005, the program office submitted a new total 
program cost estimate of about $8.3 billion. In November 2005, we 
estimated total program cost to increase to about $9.7 billion at 
completion. This represented about a 50 percent increase from the 
original program cost estimate of $6.5 billion. In January 2006, the 
program reported a Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) unit cost breach, at 
the 25 percent threshold, due to continuing technical problems. NPOESS 
officials stated the most recent increase is due to technical issues 
surrounding the program, including the development of key sensors. In 
addition, given the challenges currently facing the program, the 
scheduled first launch date slipped 17 months from the contract award 
date to September 2010. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that every aspect of the program is being evaluated by various internal 
and external groups and noted that management changes to better align 
the management structure with the program phase have recently occurred 
at the program office and at the prime contractor. It stated that 
management, design, and manufacturing process issues at multiple levels 
have contributed to the current instrument problems and resulting cost 
and schedule issues. It further stated that several options are being 
reviewed for technical viability and cost effectiveness as part of the 
Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) certification process. The program office 
noted that any changes resulting from this process may produce 
substantial cost, schedule, and technical performance changes. The 
program office also noted that part of the schedule slips were due to 
congressional budget cuts. Technical comments were also provided and 
incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit: 

The Army's Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program is the process by 
which the Patriot missile system transitions to the MEADS. The MEADS 
mission is to provide low-to-medium altitude air and missile defense 
with the capability to counter, defeat, or destroy tactical ballistic 
missiles, cruise missiles, and other air-breathing threats. MEADS is a 
codevelopment program among the United States, Germany, and Italy. We 
assessed the MEADS fire unit portion of the program. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: MEADS International; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $4,306.8 million; 
Procurement: $12,149.2 million; 
Total funding: $16,456.0 million; 
Procurement quantity: 48. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The program office expects the first complete MEADS fire unit to be 
available in fiscal year 2015. 

The MEADS fire unit began development in 2004 with two mature critical 
technologies, three critical technologies nearing maturity, and one 
immature critical technology. The technologies remain at these levels. 
Program plans call for a system design review in 2009, but program 
estimates project that only one of the six fire unit technologies will 
be more mature at that time than at development start. The program 
office anticipates that all critical technologies will be fully mature 
by the start of production in the first quarter of fiscal year 2013. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

PATRIOT/MEADS CAP Fire Unit Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Only two of the six critical technologies--launcher electronics and 
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile integration--are mature. 
Three other critical technologies--low noise exciter that manages the 
radars' frequencies, cooling system for the radars, and slip ring that 
carries power and coolants to the radars--are nearing maturity. The 
remaining critical technology--the transmit/receive module that 
transmits/receives signals for the fire control radar--is immature. 

The program office projects that the transmit/receive module will 
increase in maturity by the time of the system design review planned 
for 2009. The program office expects that the five other critical 
technologies will be at the same maturity levels as they were at the 
start of development. The office expects all critical technologies to 
be fully mature by the start of production in late 2012. There are no 
backup technologies for any of the MEADS critical technologies. 

Design Stability: 

We could not assess the design stability of MEADS because the number of 
releasable drawings and total drawings expected were not available. The 
program office expects to know the total number of releasable drawings 
at the design review in 2009. 

Other Program Issues: 

MEADS is being developed to employ the current PAC-3 missile and the 
future PAC-3 missile segment enhancement variant. The missile segment 
enhancement is a U.S.-funded effort to improve on the current PAC-3 
missile capability. Program estimates indicate that the Army plans to 
develop and procure missiles at a cost of approximately $6.1 billion. 
We did not assess the missile and the missile segment enhancement, and 
the associated costs are not included in our funding information. 

The MEADS program has adopted an incremental acquisition approach 
wherein MEADS major items are incrementally inserted into the current 
Patriot force. There are three increments, with the first beginning in 
2008, another in 2010, and the final in 2013. The program office plans 
for each increment to introduce new or upgraded capability into the 
program. The Army expects MEADS to achieve initial operating capability 
in 2017 with four units. 

Agency Comments: 

The Army generally concurred with this assessment. It indicated that we 
addressed critical technologies that were already areas of intense 
management focus. The Army also noted that it still expects all 
technologies to be fully mature by production and further stated that 
there are risk mitigation plans for the maturing technologies and 
alternate back-up technologies identified for the transmit/receive 
module. Additionally, the Army noted that, at the design review in 
2009, the design work in the critical technologies will be at the 
maturity level required to fabricate the system prototype necessary to 
demonstrate required system capabilities. 

[End of section] 

MQ-9 Predator B: 

The Air Force's MQ-9 Predator B is a multirole, medium-to-high altitude 
endurance unmanned aerial vehicle system capable of flying at higher 
speeds and higher altitudes than its predecessor, the MQ-1 Predator A. 
The Predator B is designed to provide a ground attack capability to 
find and track small ground mobile or fixed targets. Each Predator B 
system will consist of four aircraft, a ground control station, and a 
satellite communication suite. We assessed the first increment of the 
air vehicle. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated; 
Program office: Dayton, Ohio: 

Funding FY06-FY11: 
R&D: $127.7 million; 
Procurement: $635.5 million; 
Total funding: $763.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 32. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Cost data are for all known costs from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Total estimated program cost is $1,209.4 million. 

The Predator B entered system development in February 2004 with three 
of its four critical technologies mature. The Air Force expects the 
fourth technology to be ready in May 2006. However, no suitable back-up 
technology is available. If this technology fails to mature as 
expected, the Predator B will not be able to effectively perform its 
primary mission--to destroy enemy targets. In 2004, the program changed 
to an incremental acquisition strategy. The Air Force appears to have 
made significant progress in completing design drawings for the first 
increment and projects that it will have achieved design stability by 
the 2006 critical design review. The program has already begun 
production of the Predator B aircraft, but operational testing is not 
scheduled to be complete until 2008. At that point, about one-third of 
the quantity will be on contract or delivered. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Predator B Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Three of the Predator B's four critical technologies--the synthetic 
aperture radar, the multispectral targeting system, and the air 
vehicle--are fully mature. The prototype of the avionics subsystem 
technology, designed to integrate and store data necessary to launch 
munitions, will begin ground testing in February 2006. The Air Force 
expects that the technology will be integrated and mature in May 2006. 
This represents about a 10 month slip from last year's estimate. No 
suitable back-up technology exists. If this critical technology fails 
to mature, it will prevent the Predator B from effectively performing 
its primary mission, to destroy enemy targets. Subsequent increments 
may require other new technologies. 

Design Stability: 

After its Milestone B approval in February 2004, the program office was 
directed to revise its acquisition strategy to develop Predator B in 
three increments. The Air Force appears to have made significant 
progress in completing design drawings for the first increment of 
Predator B. At the time of our assessment last year, the program 
indicated that just over 35 percent of the drawings for the first 
increment had been completed. It now reports that over 85 percent of 
the drawings are complete. The program office continues to expect that 
94 percent of the drawings for the first increment will be completed by 
the time of the critical design review in September 2006. Program 
officials acknowledge that additional drawings will be needed for 
subsequent increments. Design changes and modification of drawings are 
likely to occur late in development, increasing the need to retrofit 
already acquired systems. 

Production Maturity: 

Program officials said the contractor does not plan to use statistical 
process controls to ensure product quality. Instead, it plans to use 
other quality control measures such as scrap, rework, and repair to 
track product quality. Also, initial operational testing, which is to 
demonstrate that a product is ready for production, is not scheduled to 
be complete until mid-2008. By that point, about one third of the 
aircraft will either be in production or already delivered. 

Other Program Issues: 

In 2004, the Predator program office was directed to adopt an 
incremental acquisition strategy and field an interim combat capability 
by fiscal year 2006. By adopting an incremental acquisition strategy, 
the program office is using the preferred approach to weapon 
acquisitions. To reduce the risks of concurrently developing and 
producing Predator Bs, the program office lowered annual buy quantities 
and extended production 5 years through 2014. Nevertheless, the program 
schedule still contains a high degree of concurrency. Before the 
conclusion of initial operational testing, the Air Force will have 
already contracted for about one third of the total aircraft production 
quantity. The Air Force currently projects that half of these aircraft 
will need to be retrofitted to bring them up to the baseline 
capability. Additional changes stemming from the test program would 
further perturb the aircraft's cost, schedule, and manufacturing plan. 

The Air Force is still evaluating a variety of lightweight munitions 
for use on the Predator B. The Air Force is also weighing the 
possibility of adding new system capabilities such as launching very 
small or micro unmanned aerial vehicles from the Predator B. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
the stores management system is making good progress and its completion 
is considered a low risk activity. The hardware has been installed on a 
test aircraft and will begin ground testing in February 2006. The Air 
Force also noted that Congress has directed an increase to the yearly 
production buys in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. Program planning is in 
place to upgrade these aircraft to support initial operational testing 
in 2008. The Air Force stated that the ongoing developmental and 
operational testing effort and the operational assessment to be 
conducted in 2006 will provide valuable feed back to the acquisition 
and operational commands. 

[End of section] 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High: 

The Air Force's SBIRS High program is a satellite system intended to 
meet requirements in the missile warning, missile defense, technical 
intelligence, and battlespace characterization missions. A replacement 
for the Defense Support Program, SBIRS High consisted of four 
satellites (plus a spare) in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO), two 
sensors on host satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO), and fixed 
and mobile ground stations. In 2005, the number of GEO satellites was 
reduced to three. We assessed the sensors and satellites only. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $3,498.9; 
Procurement: $1,629.6; 
Total funding: $5,128.5; 
Procurement quantity: 1. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Acquisition cycle time is currently unknown as the Air Force Space 
Command has not defined the initial operational capability. 

The SBIRS High program's critical technologies and design are now 
mature. Production maturity could not be determined because the 
contractor does not collect production statistical process control 
data. In August 2004 the contractor delivered the first payload (HEO 1 
sensor) after a delay of 18 months; the second was delivered in 
September 2005 after a delay of 21 months. Since we last reported, 
total costs have increased by more than $1 billion. The cost growth 
resulted in two additional Nunn-McCurdy (10 U.S.C. 2433) unit cost 
breaches and a decision not to buy two satellites. Although program 
officials have acknowledged that the GEO satellites are orders-of- 
magnitude more complex than the HEO sensors, they now believe a more 
realistic program schedule has been developed. The first GEO satellite 
delivery has been delayed an additional 5 months to late 2008. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

SBIRS High Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The SBIRS High program's three critical technologies--the infrared 
sensor, thermal management, and on-board processor--are mature. 
However, program officials stated that flawed initial systems 
engineering created first-time integration and test risk associated 
with the GEO staring sensor. According to program officials, early test 
results of the scanning and staring sensors are positive. The staring 
sensor is to have the ability to stare at one earth location and then 
rapidly change its focus area, representing a significant leap in 
capability over the current system. 

Design Stability and Production Maturity: 

In portraying the program's events in this assessment, we considered 
the production decision to have occurred at the time of design review 
because this is when the program office began ordering long lead parts 
for the fabrication of satellites. Although the program's design is now 
considered stable since almost all drawings have been released, design- 
related problems are now the issue. Design problems led to delayed 
delivery of both HEO sensors, which were accepted for operations 
without meeting all program specifications. Given the added complexity 
of the GEO satellites over the HEO sensors, the probability is high 
that major design flaws will be discovered on the GEO satellites as 
well. 

We could not assess the production maturity of SBIRS High because the 
contractor does not collect production statistical process control 
data. However, the program office tracks and assesses production 
maturity through detailed monthly manufacturing and test data and 
monthly updates on flight hardware qualifications. The program office, 
in late 2005, implemented initiatives for its flight software 
development processes and placed full-time program office personnel at 
the contractor's facility. According to program officials, about 95 
percent of flight hardware for the first GEO satellite and 85 percent 
for the second has been delivered. 

Other Program Issues: 

Integration and testing of the first GEO payload and spacecraft has 
begun. It was during this process that the design errors in the HEO 
sensors were discovered. Given the high probability that major design 
flaws will emerge on these satellites as well, costly redesigns that 
could further delay delivery are likely. However, according to program 
officials, additional engineering tests have been instituted to address 
design issues and reduce the likelihood of significant schedule 
impacts. To accommodate these tests, each GEO satellite's delivery was 
delayed by an additional five months, bringing the delay to 19 months 
for each satellite. 

In July 2005, the program reported its third and fourth Nunn-McCurdy 
unit cost breaches (10 U.S.C. 2433). As part of the mandatory program 
certification process triggered by one of the cost breaches, the 
program was restructured in late 2005. The program now includes 
procurement of only one GEO satellite--reduced from three--and the 
procurement contract is contingent upon the performance of the first 
developmental GEO satellite. Although the program has reduced the total 
number of satellites it will procure, total program funding continues 
to increase, and revised estimates indicate the average procurement 
cost per unit is now 224 percent above the 2002 approved program 
baseline. The Air Force was recently directed to begin efforts to 
develop a viable competing capability, in parallel with the SBIRS 
program, and to submit a plan for this new program by April 2006. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force acknowledged 
that the cost of the program was significantly underestimated at 
inception and the program suffered from a lack of military 
specifications with proper quality controls and that past restructures 
and replans did not fully recognize the extent of rework necessary to 
ensure mission success. It noted that the recent comprehensive review 
of the program resulted in a more realistic assessment of integration 
and testing timelines and a revised funding profile that accounts for 
the potential rework costs and schedule delays. In addition, the 
program has developed one integrated schedule for the remaining program 
and created a government cost estimating capability. The Air Force 
noted that technical issues will be uncovered, but early problem 
identification and prompt resolution will minimize the impacts to the 
integrated program activity. Technical comments were provided and 
incorporated where appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB): 

The Air Force's SDB is a small autonomous, conventional, air-to-ground, 
precision bomb able to strike fixed and stationary targets. The weapon 
will be installed on the F-15E aircraft and is designed to work with 
other aircraft, such as the F-22A. The Air Force is in the process of 
implementing a competitive acquisition strategy for a second increment 
of the program, which includes a precision strike against moving 
targets in adverse weather capability. This analysis addresses only the 
first increment of the program. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing; 
Program office: Eglin AFB, Fla. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $51.2 million; 
Procurement: $1,215.6 million; 
Total funding: $1,266.9 million; 
Procurement quantity: 23,842. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The six critical technologies for the SDB are mature, and the design is 
stable. The program office held the design review prior to starting 
system development and, although data were not collected, the program 
maintains that the contractor has released 100 percent of the 
production drawings. In 2004, the program began a test program, which 
combines developmental, live fire, and operational testing in an effort 
to decrease time spent in system development. Of 37 developmental tests 
conducted, 35 were considered successful. Causes of failure for the 
other two have been identified and corrected. Some operational tests 
remain to be completed. SDB was approved for low rate production in 
April 2005. We could not assess production maturity as statistical 
process control data were not available. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

SDB Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The program office assessed all six critical technologies for the SDB 
as mature. The technologies are the airframe, the Anti-Jam Global 
Positioning System, the fuze, the Inertial Navigation System, the 
carriage, and warhead. Program officials stated that all technologies 
have been tested in realistic environments and have achieved their 
final form, fit, and function. 

Design Stability: 

The design review was held prior to the start of system development 
and, although data were not collected, the program office maintains 
that Boeing has now completed 100 percent of the production drawings. 
According to the program office, although the contractor has ultimate 
responsibility for the weapon system and has given the government a 20- 
year "bumper to bumper" warranty, the program office has insight into 
the contractor's configuration control board process and all changes 
are coordinated with the government. 

The SDB program began a program of developmental, live-fire, and 
operational testing in 2004. This combined testing approach is designed 
to eliminate or reduce redundant testing. As of the date of this 
review, all developmental tests were complete. Of the 37 developmental 
tests conducted, two were classified as failures. Program officials 
told us that the causes of the two failures have been corrected and 
verified through additional flight tests. However, due to the 
concurrency of the test program, SDB continues to face an aggressive 
schedule in the coming months. Operational testing will be conducted 
throughout fiscal year 2006, to be followed by a full rate production 
decision at the end of fiscal year 2006. 

Production Maturity: 

We could not assess production maturity because statistical process 
control data were not available. In developing the SDB, Boeing used 
many key components that are common with the Joint Direct Attack 
Munition (JDAM). The SDB production line will be colocated in the same 
facility used to produce the JDAM. According to program officials, the 
production line layout is very similar to the processes currently used 
for the JDAM. As of the date of this review, no critical manufacturing 
processes that impact the critical system characteristics had been 
identified. SDB was approved for low-rate initial production in April 
2005 and will begin full-rate production in 2006. 

Other Program Issues: 

The Air Force's 2006 budget includes $47 million to begin development 
of the second increment of the SDB program. At the time the fiscal year 
2006 budget was prepared, the Air Force planned to have Boeing, the 
prime contractor for the first increment, add the second increment 
requirements to the first increment contract. However, in late 2004, 
Lockheed Martin filed a bid protest of the contract award to Boeing, 
after a former senior Air Force procurement official acknowledged bias 
in favor of Boeing. In February 2005, GAO sustained the protest. 
Responding to the GAO's decision and recommendation, the Air Force 
agreed to recompete the contract for the second increment. The Air 
Force is in the process of implementing a competitive acquisition 
strategy for a second increment. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force concurred 
with the information presented and provided technical comments, which 
were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Space Radar (SR): 

SR is an Air Force-led, joint DOD and intelligence community program to 
develop a satellite to find, identify, track, and monitor moving or 
stationary targets under all-weather conditions and on a near-continual 
basis across large swaths of the earth's surface. As envisioned, SR 
would generate volumes of radar imagery data for transmission to ground-
, air-, ship-, and space-based systems. We assessed the space segment. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: TBD; 
Program office: Colorado Springs, Colo. 

Program Office: Eglin AFB, Fla. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $9,726.9 million; 
Procurement: $9,767.6 million; 
Total funding: $22,970.7 million; 
Procurement quantity: 22. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Cost and quantities could change because the Air Force is restructuring 
the SR program. 

Five critical technologies will support the SR program, and they are 
still being matured. The program office is focusing its efforts on 
technology risk reduction and concept definition activities. At this 
point, the program is expected to enter system development before any 
of the technologies are mature. The Air Force is restructuring the 
program to address concerns about the affordability of SR, which 
includes schedule and cost evaluations and several changes to the 
acquisition strategy. In 2007, the program plans to decide whether to 
develop on-orbit demonstration satellites to validate technology 
maturity and costs. Launch of the first fully operational SR satellite 
is scheduled for fiscal year 2015. Design and production maturity could 
not be assessed because SR is not yet a formal acquisition and has not 
begun product development. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

SR Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The program office assessed the electronically steered array, on-board 
processing, signal-processing algorithms for moving target indication, 
information management system, and moving-target indication 
exploitation hardware and software as the critical technologies needing 
further development. 

The program office is focusing its efforts on technology risk reduction 
and concept definition activities. For example, subcomponents for the 
electronically steered array are being integrated with laboratory 
components to demonstrate proper functioning. In addition, on-board 
processing capabilities are being demonstrated and conceptual designs 
for storing and processing data have been developed. The program is 
also working to further mature the remaining critical technologies. 
However, the program expects to start the product development phase 
before these technologies mature. 

Other Program Issues: 

As a result of congressional concerns about the affordability of SR, 
DOD and other SR users have now agreed on a path to develop a single 
space radar system to meet national needs. The Air Force is 
restructuring the program to reflect this agreement and schedule and 
associated costs are being evaluated. The new path includes several 
changes to the SR acquisition. First, in early 2005, a new Space Radar 
Integrated Program Office was established in Chantilly, Virginia, to 
work with the intelligence community, DOD and other users, senior Air 
Force leadership, and the Congress. Second, the new SR senior 
leadership established a framework with overarching guidance for 
maturing the critical technologies. Third, a team of program office 
personnel and mission partners established a new plan to drive fiscal 
year 2006 risk reduction activities and revised cost estimates. 
Finally, the SR acquisition strategy now calls for the development of a 
smaller constellation of high performance, more affordable satellites 
and a potential on-orbit demonstration to validate technology maturity 
and costs. A final decision on an on-orbit demonstration is not 
expected until fiscal year 2007. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
in response to congressional concerns and as a result of the recent 
restructure, the program has implemented a disciplined program 
framework approach to mature technology and reduce risk and is working 
more closely with all stakeholders. The Air Force also said that this 
program framework consolidates and provides coherent big picture 
direction to multiple technology-development testing and 
experimentation activities--such as ground, existing space, and air 
components--with a focus on proving technologies early in the concept 
development phase of the program to reduce technical and schedule risk 
in the future. Moreover, according to Air Force officials, a robust 
requirements definition process has been implemented to provide early 
stakeholder input and acceptance to stabilize requirements, further 
reducing future risk. 

[End of section] 

Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS): 

MDA's STSS element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks designed to track enemy missiles throughout their flight. The 
initial increment is composed of two demonstration satellites built 
under the Space Based Infrared System Low program. MDA plans to launch 
these satellites in 2007 to assess how well they work within the 
context of the missile defense system. MDA is also studying 
improvements to the STSS program, and it will be building next 
generation satellites. We assessed the two demonstration satellites. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Northrop Grumman Space Technology; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding, FY06-FY11: 
R&D: $3,146.4 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $3,146.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Columns include all known costs and quantities from the program's 
inception through fiscal year 2009. Total known program cost through 
fiscal year 2011 is $5,996.34 million. 

Three of the STSS program's five critical technologies are mature, and 
the remaining two technologies are expected to reach maturity in early 
2006. The STSS design appears otherwise stable, with all drawings 
released to manufacturing. The program office has identified certain 
risk areas, such as infrared payload completion, payload data processor 
software completion, and system integration and functionality. 
Additionally, quality and workmanship problems with the payload have 
continued and have resulted in cost and schedule overruns with the 
payload contract. However, the program office still expects early 
delivery and launch of the satellites. The planned budget for STSS 
through fiscal year 2009 grew by more than $1.1 billion, mainly in 
fiscal years 2008 and 2009, due to the addition of funds for designing 
and developing the program's operational constellation. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

STSS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Three of the five critical technologies--satellite communication cross- 
links, on-board processor, and acquisition sensor--are mature. This is 
one less than reported last year as MDA corrected its assessment of one 
of the technologies. The remaining two technologies--the track sensor 
and the single-stage cryocooler--will be mature upon completion of the 
thermal vacuum testing on the first satellite's payload, which is 
expected to occur in early 2006. 

Design Stability: 

The STSS program's design is stable, with all drawings released to 
manufacturing. When the STSS program started in 2002, design drawings 
and the satellite components for the partially built satellites from 
the Space Based Infrared System Low effort were released to 
manufacturing. By the time STSS went through its design review in 
November 2003, the program office had released all subsequent design 
drawings. However, until the maturity of the remaining two STSS 
technologies has been demonstrated, the potential for design changes 
remains. 

Other Program Issues: 

The STSS program is in the process of completing the assembly, 
integration, and testing of the satellite components and software 
development. Until this work is complete, certain risk areas will 
remain. These include infrared payload completion, payload data 
processor software completion, and system integration and functionality 
testing. Other risk areas that the program office had identified 
previously--such as the hardware and software status, ground software 
development completion, and parts obsolescence--have been resolved. 

The quality and workmanship problems with the payload subcontractor 
persist. These problems have continued for the last 2 years and have 
contributed to a schedule delay in delivering the payload and a likely 
cost overrun of between $20 million and $30 million on the payload 
subcontract. Integration issues have also been discovered as the 
subcontractor continues to integrate and test the payload at 
successively higher levels of integration. The cause of most of these 
problems is due to the difference in configuration between the 
pathfinder hardware that served as the test bed for the payload 
software and the actual flight hardware. In addition, the actual 
payload thermal vacuum test is taking about 30 to 45 days longer than 
expected to resolve hardware issues that have emerged as a result of 
the payload being tested in a vacuum and at cold temperatures--a 
relevant environment--for the first time. In response to these issues, 
quality control efforts at the subcontractor's site have undergone 
significant restructuring. In addition, the prime contractor stepped up 
its inspection and supervision of all processes at the subcontractor's 
site and has provided mentoring. 

According to the program office, many of the quality-related variances 
could have been avoided if better quality processes had been in place 
at the payload subcontractor. The program office expects that the 
quality improvements that the payload subcontractor has implemented 
will reduce the number of quality-related problems in the future. 
According to the program office, the integration issues that have been 
discovered are not unusual for a first time integration effort but are 
taking more time than planned to work through. Upon completion of the 
first satellite's payload, the program office expects the cost and 
schedule variances to abate, although they will not recover. In 
addition, the second satellite's hardware has consistently moved 
through integration and testing much more efficiently than the first 
satellite's hardware. Thus, the program office still expects the prime 
contractor to deliver and launch the satellites in February 2007, which 
is earlier than the contract date, and has placed an order through NASA 
for the Delta II launch vehicle. Since our last assessment, STSS' 
planned budget through fiscal year 2009 increased by $1,195.9 million 
(35.3 percent), primarily in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, due to the 
addition of funds for designing and developing the program's 
operational constellation. 

Agency Comments: 

MDA was provided an opportunity to comment on a draft of this 
assessment, but it did not have any comments. 

[End of section] 

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): 

MDA's THAAD element is being developed in incremental, capability-based 
blocks to provide a ground-based missile defense system able to defend 
against short-and medium-range ballistic missile attacks. THAAD will 
include missiles, a launcher, an X-band radar, and a fire control and 
communications system. We assessed the design for the Block 2008 
initial capability of one fire unit that MDA plans to hand off to the 
Army in fiscal year 2009 for limited operational use. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding, FY06-FY11: 
R&D: $4,135.5 million; 
Procurement: $0.0 million; 
Total funding: $4,135.5 million; 
Procurement quantity: 0. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Costs are for all known blocks from the program's inception through 
fiscal year 2009. Total known program funding through fiscal year 2011 
is $12,985.3 million. 

Program officials assessed THAAD's technologies as mature and its 
design as generally stable, with 95 percent of the engineering design 
drawings released. The design of Block 2008, which is expected to 
provide a limited operational capability, is a further maturation of 
THAAD 's Block 2004 design. MDA began flight testing the design with a 
successful controlled test flight on November 22, 2005-8 months later 
than originally planned. According to program officials, the delay was 
the result of technical problems encountered during the integration of 
the THAAD missile, most of which have been solved. The current schedule 
is aggressive, calling for the completion of as many as five flight 
tests within one fiscal year. However, program officials expect to 
recover most of the flight schedule and complete 15 flight tests before 
handing the first fire unit over to the Army in fiscal year 2009. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

THAAD Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials assessed all of THAAD's critical technologies as 
mature. All of these technologies are included in four major 
components: the fire control and communications component; the 
interceptor; the launcher; and the radar. 

After experiencing early test failures, program officials made changes 
in the execution of the THAAD program that allowed it to make progress 
in maturing critical technologies. Officials placed more emphasis on 
risk reduction efforts, including adopting technology readiness levels 
to assess technological maturity. 

Design Stability: 

Program officials reported that THAAD's basic design is nearing 
completion, with approximately 95 percent of the expected 9,852 
engineering drawings released. However, if problems are encountered 
during future flight tests, the total number of drawings could 
increase. 

Production Maturity: 

We did not assess THAAD's production maturity because MDA does not know 
when it will transition THAAD to the Army for production. The one fire 
unit that will be handed off to the Army in 2009 for limited 
operational use is considered to be primarily a test asset. Prior to a 
production decision, the program office plans to assess production 
maturity using risk assessments and verification reviews for assurance 
of the contractor's readiness to proceed with repeatable processes and 
quality. 

Other Program Issues: 

MDA expected to begin flight tests in March 2005. However, because of 
technical problems experienced during the integration of the THAAD 
missile, the first test was pushed out to November 2005. The current 
schedule is aggressive, calling for the completion of as many as five 
flight tests within one fiscal year. However, program officials told us 
that most of the technical problems have been solved and that they are 
confident that they will recover most of the flight test schedule. The 
program expects to complete 15 flight tests before handing the first 
fire unit over to the Army in fiscal year 2009. 

The problems incurred by the missile component also affected the 
program's cost performance. According to program officials, for the 
first time since its contract was awarded in 2000, the THAAD program is 
experiencing an unfavorable cumulative cost variance. Program officials 
noted that as of October 2005, the program was overunning its prime 
contract cost by approximately $50 million. Also, since our last 
assessment THAAD's planned budget through fiscal year 2009 has 
increased by $514.8 million (4.5 percent) primarily in fiscal years 
2008 and 2009. 

Agency Comments: 

MDA provided technical comments, which were incorporated where 
appropriate. 

[End of section] 

Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT): 

The Air Force's TSAT system is the space-borne element of the Global 
Information Grid that will provide high data rate military satellite 
communications services to DOD users. The system is designed to provide 
survivable, jam-resistant, global, secure, and general-purpose radio 
frequency and laser cross-links with other air and space systems. The 
TSAT system consists of a constellation of five satellites, plus a 
sixth satellite to ensure mission availability. We assessed the six 
satellites. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing, Booz Allen Hamilton, Lockheed Martin Corp., 
Northrop Grumman, Raytheon; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $12,351.4 million; 
Procurement: $3,814.7 million; 
Total funding: $16,192.5 million; 
Procurement quantity: 4. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

In January 2004, the TSAT program received formal approval to begin 
preliminary design development activities. To date, the program has 
focused on risk reduction and systems definition (e.g., requirements 
allocation and system design) leading to a planned Systems Design 
Review (SDR). The first launch schedule has been delayed by 24 months 
from its in initial approved program baseline in June 2004, as a result 
of 2005 congressional reductions and anticipated reductions in 2006. 
TSAT plans to begin product development activities for the first 
increment (two satellites) following SDR in November 2006 with all of 
its critical technologies mature, and at that time, a contract will be 
awarded to acquire operational satellites. According to program 
officials, a new acquisition strategy is being developed, which will 
result in a new program baseline, cost estimates, and schedule. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

TSAT Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

In January 2004, DOD approved the TSAT program to enter the preliminary 
design phase. One of the program's nine technologies was fully mature. 
The program has focused its efforts on maturing critical technologies 
and conducting systems definition activities. System definition 
activities include requirements allocation and system design 
activities. According to program officials, product development 
activities will begin in November 2006 after a contractor is selected 
to conduct detailed design studies and development efforts. At that 
time, the program expects all critical technologies for the first 
increment to be mature. 

Currently only four of its seven critical technologies are mature. 
However, program officials expect all critical technologies to be 
mature before initiating product development activities for the first 
increment in 2006. 

Of the seven technologies, only four technologies--packet processing 
payload, communication-on-the-move antenna, information assurance space 
for internet protocol encryption and information assurance for 
transmission security--are mature. We previously identified information 
assurance as a single critical technology, but obtained more detailed 
data for this report. The other three--dynamic bandwidth and resource 
allocation, protected bandwidth efficient modulation waveforms, and 
single access laser communication--are scheduled to reach maturity in 
2006, about 3 years after the approval to start preliminary design 
development activities. 

Other Program Issues: 

The TSAT program cannot currently provide data on design stability, 
production maturity, or software development for satellite production 
because it has not yet selected a contractor to develop, build, and 
field the TSAT space segment. Contracting activities to select a single 
contractor are scheduled to begin in November 2006, with final award in 
early 2007. 

The initial June 2004 program baseline had a first satellite launch 
scheduled for October 2011. The program office now estimates a first 
launch date of October 2013 and attributes the launch delay to 
appropriations reductions in fiscal year 2005 as well as anticipated 
reductions in fiscal year 2006. The Appropriations conferees reduced 
the program by $400 million due to concerns about the state of 
technology maturity and concerns that DOD may have prematurely ruled 
out the possibility of evolving the Advanced Extremely High Frequency 
and the Wideband Gapfiller System programs. The report also stated that 
transition to a formal acquisition program should be deferred until the 
TSAT technologies are mature and have been demonstrated in a relevant 
environment. The report requires that DOD submit the results of an 
independent review that: (1) determines whether additional Advanced 
Extremely High Frequency or Wideband Gapfiller System satellites will 
be required and how many; and (2) whether it is feasible to insert 
advanced capabilities by evolving these programs. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Air Force stated that 
the TSAT risk reduction and systems definition activities are on 
schedule. Currently the program is conducting the third independent 
evaluation of the contractor's laser communications subsystems, with 
the fourth and final tests scheduled for mid 2006. To date, all test 
goals have been met, according to the Air Force. Similar testing is 
being conducted on other key technologies, and all are on a path to be 
fully matured by late 2006. According to the Air Force, the program's 
first launch has been delayed from 2011 to late 2013 due to budget 
reductions. These delays have resulted in increased life cycle cost and 
account for the majority of the increases shown in this draft. 

GAO Comment: 

In subsequent discussions, TSAT program officials stated that they are 
developing a new acquisition strategy, along with an updated baseline 
with new milestones, reflecting the $400 million congressional budget 
reduction. 

[End of section] 

V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft: 

The V-22 Osprey is a tilt rotor, short/vertical takeoff and landing 
aircraft being developed by the Navy for Joint Service application. 
Variants are designed to meet the amphibious/vertical assault needs of 
the Marine Corps, the strike rescue needs of the Navy, and the special 
operations needs of the Air Force and the U.S. Special Operations 
Command. The MV-22 version will replace the CH-46E and CH-53D 
helicopters of the Marine Corps. We assessed the MV-22 Block A. The 
Navy completed its operational evaluation of the aircraft in June 2005. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Bell-Boeing JPO; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $1,010.4 million; 
Procurement: $27,357.1 million; 
Total funding: $28,407.1 million; 
Procurement quantity: 375. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Operational test and evaluation of MV-22 Block A has been completed, 
and the aircraft found to be operationally effective and suitable. 
Block B is predicted to have a drop in performance due to increased 
weight. Tests of Block A revealed deficiencies with the troop seat 
restraint system that has resulted in a redesign of the seat, which may 
require change to the aircraft structure to achieve desired seat crash 
retention capability. Also, flight clearance restrictions limited some 
aspects of testing, particularly survivability, defense maneuvers, and 
tactics. Deficiencies were identified with shipboard operations, 
passenger capability, and operations at altitude. In September 2005, 
the Department of Defense approved V-22 for full rate production; 
however, production aircraft continue to be accepted with numerous 
deviations and waivers. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

V-22 Program: 

Design Stability: 

The design of MV-22 Block A is considered stable. However, recent Block 
A operational evaluation tests identified deficiencies that could 
result in design changes to parts of the aircraft. Specifically, during 
operational tests the troop seat was considered a major deficiency and 
has been redesigned to address shoulder harness and comfort issues. In 
2002, the Navy established a more crashworthy configuration requirement 
to be consistent with DOD and Federal Aviation Administration goals to 
meet common crash-worthiness standards for mission equipment. According 
to the program office, a change will be made to contract specifications 
to require these more stringent standards. Analysis is ongoing to 
determine if installation of these newly qualified seats will require 
aircraft structural changes to fully achieve their designed crash 
retention capability and what impact these changes would have on the 
aircraft's key performance parameters. 

Production Maturity: 

In 2001, the V-22 was approved for a limited annual production rate. In 
September 2005, DOD approved the V-22 for full rate production even 
though a 2004 review found one contractor had parts production problems 
that could affect its ability to support full-rate production. Produced 
aircraft continue to be accepted with numerous deviations and waivers, 
but the number of deviations and waivers at acceptance are not now as 
significant as they have been in the past. 

Other Program Issues: 

Based on evaluation tests, the Navy reported that the MV-22 Block A is 
operationally effective and suitable. However, the Navy's test report 
identified three major deficiencies that must be corrected and verified 
by additional operational tests. Of the three major deficiencies, troop 
seating and egress were considered the most severe. This deficiency 
required redesign of the seats to address comfort and seat restraint 
deficiencies. Also, while tests proved that the aircraft was capable of 
carrying 24 combat-equipped troops, it is anticipated that operational 
commanders will prefer that only 18 troops be carried in order to make 
room for their extra gear. 

Operational tests also identified 38 minor and 50 other deficiencies. 
Of the minor deficiencies, the need to eliminate flight clearance 
restrictions and increase the defensive-maneuvering envelope of the 
aircraft are a priority. Flight clearance restrictions limited some 
survivability, defensive maneuvers, and tactics testing and may reduce 
aircraft survivability if they are not lifted. The minor deficiencies 
identified could also affect operations. They include restricted 
shipboard operations, limits on operations above 10,000 feet altitude, 
passenger cabin cooling effectiveness, reliability problems with 
aircraft components, overheating of the drivetrain gearbox in hot 
weather, and the lack of supplemental oxygen for passengers that will 
restrict long-range mission profiles with troops on board. 

DOD has also concluded that the V-22 Block A aircraft is operationally 
effective in low and medium threat environments and is operationally 
suitable. However, DOD projects that Block B will not meet the Land 
Assault External-Lift and Amphibious External-Lift missions (key 
performance parameters). The predicted shortfall could be mitigated by 
lower aircraft weight, lower operating altitude, or lower temperatures. 
DOD's report does make a number of recommendations that address 
operational effectiveness and suitability as well as survivability 
concerns. Operational effectiveness recommendations included the need 
to conduct follow-on operational tests to assess V-22 survivability in 
realistic landing zone tactical approaches. These tests and tactics 
development are needed to expand the maneuvering flight envelope as 
much as possible and to determine whether there is operational utility 
in the use of more extreme helicopter-style maneuvering in a high- 
threat environment. Operational suitability recommendations included 
the need to implement upgrades to the passenger seats and harnesses. 
The report noted that emergency dual engine failures in the 
conversion/vertical take-off landing mode below 1,600 feet above the 
ground are unlikely to be survivable. Survivability recommendations 
included the need to install and test a defensive weapon. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the V-22 program office 
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

[End of section] 

VH-71A Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program: 

The Navy's VH-71A will be a dual-piloted, multi-engine helicopter 
employed by Marine Helicopter Squadron One to provide safe, reliable, 
and timely transportation for the President and Vice President of the 
United States, heads of state, and others in varied and at times 
adverse climatic and weather conditions. When the President is aboard, 
the VH-71A will serve as the Commander in Chief's primary command and 
control platform. The system will replace the VH-3D and VH-60N. It will 
be developed in two increments. We assessed increment one. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Lockheed Martin Systems Integration; 
Program office: Patuxent River, Md. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $2,822.3 million; 
Procurement: $2,253.4 million; 
Total funding: $5,179.8 million; 
Procurement quantity: 23. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Program costs include costs for increments one and two. 

In January 2005, the VH-71A program began system development and 
committed to production without fully maturing technologies, achieving 
design stability, or demonstrating production maturity. Program 
officials recognize that the VH-71A is a nontraditional acquisition 
with significant risks due to an aggressive schedule dictated by the 
White House in 2002. They stated that most of the system's technologies 
are nondevelopmental and are currently deployed on other platforms. 
However, neither of the VH-71A's two critical technologies were 
demonstrated in an operational environment at development start, and 
the program planned to have only 65 percent of its drawings released by 
design review. Concurrency in development, design, and production 
increases the likelihood of cost growth and schedule delays because 
components being procured may have to be reworked to meet the final 
design. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

VH-71A Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

The VH-71A program's two critical technologies were nearing maturity 
when the program began development and committed to production in 
January 2005. Since then, one of those technologies, the 10-inch 
cockpit control displays, matured. A prototype of the other critical 
technology, the Communication and Subsystem Processing Embedded 
Resource Communications Controller, has not been flight tested and is 
not projected to be demonstrated in an operational environment until 
2007. The program office believes the risk associated with fully 
maturing this technology to be low because the subsystem components 
that make up the technology are currently flying on other operational 
aircraft. Program officials stated that most of the VH-71A technologies 
were not identified as critical because they were flying on the EH-101 
helicopter, on which the VH-71A is based. 

Design Stability and Production Maturity: 

In January 2005, the program committed to the production of five 
aircraft without a final design or fully defined production processes. 
At that time, 55 percent of the program's total estimated drawings were 
releasable to manufacturing. Sixty-five percent were projected to be 
releasable by the design review in December 2005, and 80 percent were 
expected to be completed by early 2006, one year after the production 
decision. This concurrency in design and production increases the 
likelihood of cost growth and schedule delays because components being 
procured may have to be reworked to meet the final design. According to 
program officials, the drawings that have not been released are most 
likely related to modified communications and navigation systems and 
software. The program considers the design for the rest of the air 
vehicle and the production processes for the system mature because they 
are based on the EH-101, which is currently in service. However, design 
development will continue through low rate initial production as the 
program concurrently develops its manufacturing processes. The program 
will not collect statistical process control data to demonstrate 
production maturity, but it will monitor indicators, such as number of 
non-conforming products, quality notifications, hours per process, and 
scrap and rework rates. 

Other Program Issues: 

The VH-71A program's aggressive schedule increases risk in the test 
program and negatively affects the program's ability to incorporate the 
insights gained from testing in increment one. To mitigate some of the 
schedule risk, the program has adopted a test philosophy that combines 
contractor, development, and operational testing. The Director, 
Operational Test and Evaluation, has not formally approved the 
program's test plans and is working with the program to make the plans 
more event-based and to develop metrics to measure progress. 

Congressional insight into the program is currently limited because the 
program will not start reporting on progress against its cost, 
schedule, and performance baselines until June 2006, at the earliest. 
This reporting has been delayed because the program does not have an 
approved program baseline, even though the decision to start 
development and production was made in January 2005. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Navy provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 
Additionally, the Navy stated that the program is executing an 
accelerated schedule driven by an urgent White House need to replace 
existing assets. It believes the GAO assessment does not emphasize the 
risk mitigation actions taken. Specifically, the incremental 
development approach minimizes risk through modification of a 
certified, fielded EH-101 to the VH-71 configuration, with high-risk 
items deferred to the second increment. According to the Navy, this 
approach allows the program to meet schedule requirements while 
mitigating acknowledged risks associated with concurrent design, 
development, and procurement. Use of an existing aircraft for increment 
one also takes advantage of established manufacturing, production, 
logistics, and training capabilities while reducing the requirements 
for flight test, and an aggressive integrated test approach maximizes 
early, robust testing, including operational tests. Deferring high-risk 
development work to increment two provides time to accomplish design, 
development, and test activities associated with more traditional 
development programs. 

[End of section] 

Warrior Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Warrior UAV): 

The Army's Extended Range Multipurpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, now 
called Warrior, is to replace the Hunter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. A 
system is composed of 12 air vehicles, and 5 ground control stations 
with associated ground data terminals and portable control stations. 
The system is expected to provide reconnaissance, communications, 
signal intelligence, lethal and nonlethal attack and interoperability 
with manned aviation assets such as Apache and the Advanced 
Reconnaissance Helicopter. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Atomics; 
Program office: Huntsville, Ala. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $276.7 million; 
Procurement: $1,443.8 million; 
Total funding: $1,720.6 million; 
Procurement quantity: 12. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

Cost and quantities include all known quantities from program inception 
through fiscal year 2015. 

Currently two of Warrior's four critical technologies are mature. The 
program expects to have matured the other two critical technologies by 
the time of the program's design readiness review in June 2006. 
However, if these technologies do not mature in time, the Army reports 
that it has two mature back up technologies that can be used in their 
place. General Atomics, which makes the Air Force Predator UAV, is the 
prime contractor for the Warrior UAV. Program officials estimate that 
about 90 percent of Warrior's design is nondevelopmental because it is 
already in use on Predator or other systems. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Warrior UAV Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

Program officials report that two of four critical technologies are 
mature. These technologies are the heavy fuel engine, which is 
certified by the Federal Aviation Administration, and the automatic 
take-off and landing system whose technology is based on a similar 
system in use on the Hunter and other unmanned aerial vehicle systems. 
The two remaining critical technologies, the airborne ethernet and the 
multirole tactical common data link, are expected to reach maturity 
before the June 2006 design readiness review. 

The airborne ethernet provides communications capabilities among the 
avionics, the payload data recorder, the air link data units and the 
payloads and weapons systems. The technology will permit transmission 
of live data rather than time-delayed data. Program officials assess 
risk to the program associated with this technology as low because a 
mature back-up technology exists and because the interfaces for the 
system--such as payloads and the support equipment package, the payload 
data recorder and the meteorological sensor--are in place. Further, 
officials stated that Warrior's design is similar to that of the Air 
Force Predator A, which is already fielded. 

The multirole tactical common data link is being developed to support 
data transmission at higher rates, provide interoperability with other 
systems, such as the Apache, and provide for controlling the air 
vehicle itself from other platforms. According to Army officials, the 
technology is based on an Army program that is currently running 6 
months ahead of the schedule needed for introduction to the Warrior 
system. Similar to the airborne ethernet, a tactical data link 
currently exists on other systems and could be used for the Warrior to 
provide a capability but at a slower rate and offering remote control 
of the payloads though not the entire vehicle. 

Design Stability: 

The Warrior UAV program office did not provide complete data on the 
number of drawings expected or currently completed. As a result, we 
could not assess current design maturity. Program officials did 
estimate, however, that 90 percent of the system's design was non- 
developmental and is already in use in the Predator or other systems. 
As a result, the Army expects design stability by the time of the 
design review in June 2006. 

Other Program Issues: 

Cost and quantity data reported in this assessment may change. The Army 
has not decided how many Warrior systems it will buy. Since approving 
development start in April 2005, the Army has increased the number it 
plans to buy from 5 to 12 through fiscal year 2015. For this review, 
the Army provided data on cost and quantities and its funding plan 
through fiscal year 2015. However, program office officials stated that 
the Army has not decided how many Warrior systems it will buy in total 
nor how long the system will be produced. 

Agency Comments: 

The program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated 
as appropriate. Program office officials also stated that the Warrior 
design utilizes basic airframe technology from the Predator A, but also 
borrows from the Predator B design. Warrior's design is tied to the 
Apache Block III (manned-unmanned teaming) and Future Combat Systems as 
a network enabler. 

[End of section] 

Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS): 

WGS is a joint Air Force and Army program intended to provide essential 
communications services to U.S. warfighters, allies, and coalition 
partners during all levels of conflict short of nuclear war. It is the 
next generation wideband component in DOD's future Military Satellite 
Communications architecture and is composed of the following principal 
segments: space segment (satellites), terminal segment (users), and 
control segment (operators). We assessed the space segment. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: Boeing Satellite Systems; 
Program office: El Segundo, Calif. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $118.6 million; 
Procurement: $786.2 million; 
Total funding: $904.8 million; 
Procurement quantity: 2. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of table] 

The WGS program's technology and design are mature. We did not review 
production maturity data because of the commercial nature of the WGS 
acquisition, but unit level manufacturing is essentially complete. The 
contractor continues to experience problems assembling the satellites. 
Improperly installed fasteners on a satellite subcomponent have 
resulted in rework on the first satellite and extensive inspections of 
all three satellites currently being fabricated. The program office 
estimates an increase of about $276.2 million for the program, largely 
due to cost growth resulting from a production gap between satellites 
three and four. The launch of the first satellite has now been delayed 
for over 3 years and is currently scheduled for June 2007. The delay 
will increase costs and add at least 22 months to the time it takes to 
obtain an initial operational capability from the system. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

WGS Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

WGS has two technologies that are vital to program success: the digital 
channelizer and the phased array antenna. According to program 
officials, both technologies were mature when the program made a 
production decision in November 2000. 

Design Stability: 

The WGS design is complete, as the program office has released all the 
expected drawings to manufacturing. 

Production Maturity: 

The commercial nature of the WGS acquisition contract precludes the 
program office from having access to production process control data. 
However, manufacturing for WGS is essentially complete, as all the 
units have been manufactured and delivered for the first satellite. 

Although the design for WGS is mature and development of the first 
satellite is complete, the program continues to experience problems 
assembling the satellites. For example, during the replacement of a 
subcomponent on the first satellite, it was discovered that certain 
fasteners had been improperly installed. Discovery of the problem 
resulted in extensive inspections on all three satellites currently 
being fabricated, with rework required on the first satellite. In all, 
148 fasteners have been found that required rework and over 1,500 
fasteners per satellite required additional inspection or testing. The 
testing is expected to be completed in the summer of 2006. According to 
program officials, the contractor is considering initiatives to improve 
oversight to avoid similar problems in the future. 

Other Program Issues: 

Last year we reported a December 2005 launch date for the first WGS 
satellite. This date slipped to March 31, 2006, because of a launch pad 
conflict with a higher priority national security satellite. At that 
time, the program office reported that the initial operational 
capability would not be impacted by the schedule slip. However, the 
launch slipped again when the fastener issue surfaced. The launch of 
the first satellite is now scheduled for June 2007. The program office 
reports that the 15-month slip in the schedule for all three satellites 
will add workforce and rework costs (borne by the contractor) to the 
program and delay the time it takes to obtain an initial operational 
capability by 22 months. 

In December 2002, DOD directed the addition of WGS satellites four and 
five as part of the Transformational Communications Architecture. The 
purpose of these satellites will be to support increased bandwidth 
required for the Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance mission. These satellites are to launch in fiscal years 
2009 and 2010, respectively. The current contract options must be 
extended and renegotiated to cover the cost of the likely 2-to 3-year 
production gap between satellites three and four. The program office 
has selected a contractor and is currently negotiating the final 
contract price for procuring satellites four and five. Preliminary 
estimates show that the production gap is the main driver of the total 
overall cost increase of about $276.2 million for the program. Because 
of the delays in the schedule for the first three satellites, the 
program office is working with the contractor to reassess the schedule 
for satellites four and five. The results could impact the full 
operational capability date for the system. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office stated 
that rework activities associated with the 148 improperly installed 
fasteners have been completed and additional inspection and testing of 
the remaining fasteners will be completed in 2006. The program office 
also stated that the government and contractor are instituting 
increased levels of oversight on the supplier's quality management 
program to avoid these types of problems on future satellites. 

[End of section] 

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T): 

WIN-T is the Army's high-speed and high-capacity backbone 
communications network. It is to provide reliable, secure, and seamless 
video, data, imagery, and voice services, allowing users to communicate 
simultaneously at various levels of security. WIN-T is to connect Army 
units with higher levels of command and provide Army's tactical portion 
of the Global Information Grid. WIN-T is being fielded in blocks. We 
assessed the first block. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Program Essentials: 

Prime contractor: General Dynamics Government Systems Corp. 

Program office: Ft. Monmouth, N.J. 

Funding needed to complete: 
R&D: $505.9 million; 
Procurement: $10,002.4 million; 
Total funding: $10,508.4 million; 
Procurement quantity: 1. 

Program Performance (fiscal year 2006 dollars in millions): 

[See PDF for image] 

The latest cost data reflect the program of record; these data are 
expected to change as part of the program's restructuring. 

[End of table] 

WIN-T entered system development with 3 of its 12 critical technologies 
nearing maturity. While these 12 technologies will not be fully mature 
at the time production begins, some were demonstrated during a recent 
developmental test/operational test event; the program office expects 
that all 12 will be assessed as nearing maturity based on an updated 
independent technology readiness assessment that will be completed in 
preparation for a milestone B "re-look" scheduled for August 2006. 
While design stability is evaluated during WIN-T's design reviews, it 
cannot be assessed using our methodology because the program office 
does not track the number of releasable drawings. However, the 
government will require the contractor to deliver critical Interface 
Control Design documents, which, according to the program office, will 
allow tracking of design stability by an independent assessor. 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

WIN-T Program: 

Technology Maturity: 

WIN-T entered system development with 3 of its 12 critical technologies 
close to reaching full maturity. While program officials do not expect 
these 12 technologies to reach full maturity until the network is built 
and can be demonstrated in an operational environment, some of the 
technologies were demonstrated in a relevant environment during a 
developmental test/operational test event in November 2005; the Army 
Test and Evaluation Command will complete its assessment of this event 
by April 2006. The WIN-T program office expects that all 12 critical 
technologies will be assessed as close to fully mature following the 
evaluation of results from this test event. An updated independent 
technology readiness assessment will be performed in preparation for 
what the program office has described as a WIN-T milestone B "re-look" 
currently scheduled for August 2006. This updated assessment will 
include demonstration results from the developmental test/operational 
test event. 

Design Stability: 

Design stability could not be assessed using our methodology because 
the program office does not plan to track the number of releasable 
drawings as a design metric. According to the program, WIN-T is not a 
manufacturing effort, but primarily an information technology system 
integration effort. Consequently, the government does not obtain 
releasable design drawings for many of WIN-T's components, particularly 
commercial components. Instead, design stability is evaluated at the 
preliminary and critical design reviews using the exit criteria 
developed by the government. For the milestone B "re-look," the 
government will require the contractor to deliver critical Interface 
Control Design documents which, according to the program office, will 
allow tracking of design stability by an independent assessor. 
According to DOD, the WIN-T design will evolve using performance-based 
specifications and open systems design and is to conform to DOD's Joint 
Technical Architecture, which specifies the minimum set of standards 
and guidance for the acquisition of all DOD systems that produce, use, 
or exchange information. 

Other Program Issues: 

A major revision to the WIN-T acquisition strategy was completed in 
2004. In September 2004, DOD approved a decision to combine the 
competing contractor teams for WIN-T's system design and development. 
The two originally competing contractors are now teamed to establish a 
single architecture for WIN-T that, according to the revised 
acquisition strategy, will leverage each contractor's proposed 
architecture to provide the Army with a superior technical solution for 
WIN-T. Establishing the single WIN-T architecture a year earlier than 
originally planned is expected to allow other Army programs to begin 
following that architecture for the Future Force. 

The global war on terrorism and the lessons learned from recent 
military operations have shifted the Army's focus toward providing 
improved communications and networking capabilities in the near term as 
well as for the Future Force. The Army fielded a beyond-line-of-sight 
communications network system in 2004 to units deployed in Iraq: the 
Joint Network Node. This system is an improvement over past 
capabilities, but does not meet all of WIN-T's requirements -- 
particularly for on-the-move communication. Currently, the Army is 
assessing how best to transition the Joint Network Node to WIN-T. 

Also, in August 2005, the Department of the Army conducted a study that 
explored options for better synchronizing three of its major system 
development efforts--WIN-T, the Future Combat Systems, and the Joint 
Tactical Radio System program. As a result of this study, the WIN-T 
program will be rebaselined to meet emerging requirements; a new WIN-T 
capability development document that will support the rebaselining of 
the program is currently under review. A milestone B "re-look" to 
rebaseline the program is planned for August 2006, and a new date for 
the WIN-T production decision, originally scheduled for March 2006, 
will be established then. 

Agency Comments: 

In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the Army provided 
technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. 

Agency Comments: 

DOD did not provide general comments on a draft of this report, but it 
did provide technical comments. These comments, along with agency 
comments received on the individual assessments, were included as 
appropriate. (See app. I for a copy of DOD's response.) 

Scope of Our Review: 

For the 52 programs, each assessment provides the historical and 
current program status and offers the opportunity to take early 
corrective action when a program's projected attainment of knowledge 
diverges significantly from the best practices. The assessments also 
identify programs that are employing practices worthy of emulation by 
other programs. If a program is attaining the desired levels of 
knowledge, it has less risk-but not zero risk-of future problems. 
Likewise, if a program shows a gap between demonstrated knowledge and 
best practices, it indicates an increased risk-not a guarantee-of 
future problems. The real value of the assessments is recognizing gaps 
early, which provides opportunities for constructive intervention-such 
as adjustments to schedule, trade-offs in requirements, and additional 
funding-before cost and schedule consequences mount. 

We selected programs for the assessments based on several factors, 
including (1) high dollar value, (2) stage in acquisition, and (3) 
congressional interest. The majority of the 52 programs covered in this 
report are considered major defense acquisition programs by DOD. A 
program is defined as major if its estimated research and development 
costs exceed $365 million or its procurement exceeds $2.19 billion in 
fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. (See app. II for details of the 
scope and methodology.) 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. 
We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, 
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions on this report, please contact me at (202) 
512-4841 or Paul Francis at (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this 
report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Katherine V. Schinasi: 
Managing Director: 
Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable John W. Warner: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: 
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON: 
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000: 

MAR 6 2006: 

Mr. Paul Francis: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Francis: 

This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report, 
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, dated 
February 9, 2006 (GAO Code 120460/GAO-06-391). We have enclosed 
technical comments to ensure accuracy. These comments should be 
reflected in the final report and in the individual program summaries. 
My point of contact is Mr. Skip Hawthorne, (703) 692-9556, or e-mail: 
skip.hawthorne@osd.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Domenic C. Cipicchio: 
Acting Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

In conducting our work, we evaluated performance and risk data from 
each of the programs included in this report. We summarized our 
assessments of each individual program in two components--a system 
profile and a product knowledge assessment. We did not validate the 
data provided by the Department of Defense (DOD). However, we took 
several steps to address data quality. Specifically, we reviewed the 
data and performed various quality checks, which revealed some 
discrepancies in the data. We discussed the underlying data and these 
discrepancies with program officials and adjusted the data accordingly. 
We determined that the data provided by DOD were sufficiently reliable 
for our engagement purposes, after reviewing DOD's management controls 
for assessing data reliability. 

Macro Analysis: 

Data for the total planned investment of major defense acquisition 
programs were obtained from funding-stream data included in DOD's 
selected acquisition reports or from data obtained directly from the 
program offices and then aggregated across all programs in base year 
2006 dollars. 

To assess the total cost, schedule, and quantity changes of the 
programs included in our assessment presented in table 2 and on pages 6 
and 7, it was necessary to identify those programs with all of the 
requisite data available. Of the 52 programs in our assessment, 26 
constituted the common set of programs where data were available for 
cost, schedule, and quantity at the first full estimate, generally 
milestone B, and the latest estimate. We excluded programs that had 
planning estimates as their first full estimate and if the first full 
estimate and latest estimate fell within a one year period of each 
other. Data utilized in this analysis were drawn from information 
contained in selected acquisition reports or data provided by program 
offices as of January 15, 2006. We summed the costs associated with 
RDT&E and total costs consisting of research, development, testing and 
evaluation, procurement, military construction, and acquisition 
operation and maintenance. The schedule assessment is based on the 
change in the average acquisition cycle time, defined as the number of 
months between program start and the achievement of initial operation 
capability or an equivalent fielding date. 

The weighted calculations of acquisition cycle time and program 
acquisition unit cost for the common set of programs were derived by 
taking the total cost estimate for each of the 26 programs and dividing 
it by the aggregate total cost of all 26 programs in the common set. 
The resulting quotient for each program was then multiplied by the 
simple percentage change in program acquisition unit costs to obtain 
the weighted unit cost change of each program. Next, the sum of this 
weighted cost change for all programs was calculated to get the 
weighted unit cost change for the common set as a whole. To assess the 
weighted-average acquisition cycle time change, we multiplied the 
weight calculation by the acquisition cycle time estimate for each 
corresponding program. A simple average was then taken to calculate the 
change between the first full estimate and the latest estimate. We 
believe these calculations best represent the overall progress of 
programs by placing them within the context of the common set's 
aggregate cost. 

To assess the percentage of programs with technology maturity, design 
stability, and production maturity at each key juncture presented in 
figure 1 and on pages 11 and 12, we identified programs that had 
actually proceeded through each key juncture-development start, system 
design review, and production start-and obtained their assessed 
maturity. The percentage in figure 1 and on pages 11 and 12 include 
programs in the 2006 assessment only. The population size for the 
technology maturity at development start is 30 programs; design review 
is 21 programs; and production start is 15 programs. The population 
size for the design stability at design review is 20 programs; and 12 
programs at production start. The population size for production 
maturity at production start is 16 programs. This information was drawn 
from data provided by the program office as of January 15, 2006. For 
more information, see the product knowledge assessment section in this 
appendix. 

Historical Analysis: 

For the historical RDT&E cost growth analysis in figure 2, we selected 
programs that have completed 100 percent of their product development 
cycle-defined as the period of time between the start of the system 
development and demonstration phase and the start of production. We 
identified 29 programs that are now in production or have been 
completed since 1998. We reviewed information provided in DOD's 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) or through schedule information we 
obtained from program officials via our assessments to determine which 
programs are complete and which ones are in production. We also 
reviewed the DOD Selected Acquisition Report Summary tables to identify 
completed programs. We chose completed programs that had a final SAR 
report month of December 1998 or later. We also chose programs that 
only had a development estimate baseline rather than a production 
estimate baseline because we could then calculate an associated product 
development cycle time. 

Development start refers to the commitment to system development that 
coincides with either milestone II or milestone B, which begins DOD's 
system development and demonstration phase. The product development 
cycle concludes with production. The production decision generally 
refers to the decision to enter the production and deployment phase, 
typically with low rate initial production. To identify the conclusion 
of the cycle, or development end, we first attempted to establish the 
date of the low rate initial production decision. If this date was not 
available we then used the milestone C or III date, or the production 
estimate date. We identified these dates using the latest SAR for each 
individual program or through schedule information obtained from 
program officials via our assessments. Once the product development 
cycle dates were identified, we then converted the time between the two 
dates into a number of months for each program. 

For each of the 29 programs in our analysis, we identified the RDT&E 
development estimate and each subsequent estimate of RDT&E costs 
throughout the product development cycle by reviewing each of the 
program's SAR. Each SAR report date was then used in calculating the 
percentage into the product development cycle where the estimate fell. 
Once these calculations were completed for each of the 29 programs, we 
aggregated the RDT&E estimates at each percentage point from 1 to 100 
percent. The end result was the cumulative cost change in 2006 dollars 
for 29 programs from the development estimate with a cost change 
plotted for each point from 1 to 100 percent complete. For example, the 
AIM 9X Air to Air Missile's product development cycle was 45 months. 
The development estimate for RDT&E was $602.2 million in December 1996. 
The first SAR after development start was the December 1997 SAR, which 
reported an RDT&E estimate of $589.9 million (2006 dollars). The 
December 1997 SAR was 12 months into development or approximately 27 
percent into the product development cycle. Since estimates are 
reported on an annual basis, the initial development estimate for the 
AIM-9X was carried through up to 26 percent of the cycle time, the 1997 
SAR estimate was then plotted at 27 percent and carried through up to 
the next reporting period, December 1998, which was plotted at 53 
percent and so forth until 100 percent of the cycle time was completed. 
Once this was completed for all programs, we were able to identify the 
RDT&E cost growth trend for all 29 programs. 

To identify the average critical design review date we obtained the 
latest date as reported in the program's latest SAR or as provided to 
us via our program assessments. If the critical design review date was 
not included in the SAR, we attempted to contact the current program 
manager and obtain the date. We were able to identify 21 critical 
design review dates for the 29 programs. Once this date was identified, 
we calculated the percentage into the development cycle the critical 
design review occurred. For example, the AIM-9X SAR reported that the 
critical design review took place in March of 1998, approximately 15 
months, or 33 percent, into the 45 month development cycle. Next, we 
calculated a weighted average design review date for the 21 programs. 
The weighted calculations were derived by taking the latest RDT&E cost 
estimate at the completion of the product development cycle for each of 
the 21 programs and dividing it by the sum of all 21 programs. The 
resulting quotient for each program was then multiplied by the 
percentage into the product development cycle when the design review 
occurred. This resulted in a weighted calculation that was then summed 
across all 21 programs. The result was the weighted average design 
review percentage. 

The maximum RDT&E increase for the 21 design review programs was 129.10 
percent for the V-22 program. The minimum RDT&E increase for the 21 
programs was -15.9 percent for the Joint Primary Aircraft Training 
System. The graphic on page 14 displays the RDT&E cost trend for all 29 
programs and is not limited to the 21 programs with design review 
dates. We found the same trend of RDT&E cost growth occurred for the 29 
programs as for the 21 programs. 

System Profile Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment: 

In the past 5 years, DOD revised its policies governing weapon system 
acquisitions and changed the terminology used for major acquisition 
events. To make DOD's acquisition terminology more consistent across 
the 52 program assessments, we standardized the terminology for key 
program events. In the individual program assessments, program start 
refers to the initiation of a program; DOD usually refers to program 
start as milestone I or milestone A, which begins the concept and 
technology development phase. Similarly, development start refers to 
the commitment to system development that coincides with either 
milestone II or milestone B, which begins DOD's system development and 
demonstration phase. The production decision generally refers to the 
decision to enter the production and deployment phase, typically with 
low rate initial production. Initial capability refers to the initial 
operational capability, sometimes also called first unit equipped or 
required asset availability. For the MDA programs that do not follow 
the standard DOD acquisition model, but instead develop systems in 
incremental capability-based blocks, we identified the key technology 
development efforts that lead to an initial capability for the block 
assessed. 

The information presented on the funding needed to complete from fiscal 
2006 through completion, unless otherwise noted, draws on information 
from SARs or on data from the program office. In some instances the 
data were not yet available, and we annotate this by the term "to be 
determined" (TBD), or not applicable, annotated (NA). The quantities 
listed only refer to procurement quantities. Satellite programs, in 
particular, produce a large percentage of their total operational units 
as development quantities, which are not included in the quantity 
figure. 

To assess the cost, schedule, and quantity changes of each program, we 
reviewed DOD's SARs or obtained data directly from the program offices. 
In general, we compared the latest available SAR information with a 
baseline for each program. For programs that have started product 
development-those that are beyond milestone II or B-we compared the 
latest available SAR to the development estimate from the first 
selected acquisition report issued after the program was approved to 
enter development. For systems that have not yet started system 
development, we compared the latest available data to the planning 
estimate issued after milestone I or A. For systems not included in 
SARs, we attempted to obtain comparable baseline and current data from 
the individual program offices. For MDA systems for which a baseline 
was not available, we compared the latest available cost information to 
the amount reported last year. 

All cost information is presented in base year 2006 dollars using 
Office of the Secretary of Defense approved deflators to eliminate the 
effects of inflation. We have depicted only the programs' main elements 
of acquisition cost-research and development and procurement; however, 
the total program costs also include military construction and 
acquisition operation and maintenance costs. Because of rounding and 
these additional costs, in some situations the total cost may not match 
the exact sum of the research and development and procurement costs. 
The program unit costs are calculated by dividing the total program 
cost by the total quantities planned. These costs are often referred to 
as program acquisition unit costs. In some instances, the data were not 
applicable, and we annotate this by using the term "NA." In other 
instances, the current absence of data on procurement funding and 
quantities precludes calculation of a meaningful program acquisition 
unit cost, and we annotate this by using the term "TBD." The quantities 
listed refer to total quantities, including both procurement and 
development quantities. 

The schedule assessment is based on acquisition cycle time, defined as 
the number of months between the program start, usually milestone I or 
A, and the achievement of initial operational capability or an 
equivalent fielding date. In some instances, the data were not yet 
available, and we annotate this by using the term TBD, or were 
classified. 

The intent of these comparisons is to provide an aggregate or overall 
picture of a program's history. These assessments represent the sum 
total of the federal government's actions on a program, not just those 
of the program manager and the contractor. DOD does a number of 
detailed analyses of changes that attempt to link specific changes with 
triggering events or causes. Our analysis does not attempt to make such 
detailed distinctions. 

Product Knowledge Data on Each Individual Two-Page Assessment: 

To assess the product development knowledge of each program at key 
points in development, we submitted a data collection instrument to 
each program office. The results are graphically depicted in each two- 
page assessment. We also reviewed pertinent program documentation, such 
as the operational requirements document, the acquisition program 
baseline, test reports, and major program reviews. 

To assess technology maturity, we asked program officials to apply a 
tool, referred to as technology readiness levels, for our analysis. The 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration originally developed 
technology readiness levels, and the Army and Air Force Science and 
Technology research organizations use them to determine when 
technologies are ready to be handed off from science and technology 
managers to product developers. Technology readiness levels are 
measured on a scale of one to nine, beginning with paper studies of a 
technology's feasibility and culminating with a technology fully 
integrated into a completed product. (See app. III for the definitions 
of technology readiness levels.) Our best practices work has shown that 
a technology readiness level of 7--demonstration of a technology in an 
operational environment--is the level of technology maturity that 
constitutes a low risk for starting a product development program. In 
our assessment, the technologies that have reached technology readiness 
level 7, a prototype demonstrated in an operational environment, are 
referred to as mature or fully mature and those that have reached 
technology readiness level 6, a prototype demonstrated in a relevant 
environment, are referred to as approaching or nearing maturity and are 
assessed as attaining 50 percent of the desired level of knowledge. 
Satellite technologies that have achieved technology readiness level 6 
are assessed as fully mature due to the difficulty of demonstrating 
maturity in an operational environment-space. 

In most cases, we did not validate the program offices' selection of 
critical technologies or the determination of the demonstrated level of 
maturity. We sought to clarify the technology readiness levels in those 
cases where information existed that raised concerns. If we were to 
conduct a detailed review, we might adjust the critical technologies 
assessed, the readiness level demonstrated, or both. It was not always 
possible to reconstruct the technological maturity of a weapon system 
at key decision points after the passage of many years. 

To assess design stability, we asked program officials to provide the 
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for 
completion by the design review, the production decision, and as of our 
current assessment. In most cases, we did not verify or validate the 
percentage of engineering drawings provided by the program office. We 
sought to clarify the percentage of drawings completed in those cases 
where information existed that raised concerns. Completed engineering 
drawings were defined as the number of drawings released or deemed 
releasable to manufacturing that can be considered the "build-to" 
drawings. 

To assess production maturity, we asked program officials to identify 
the number of critical manufacturing processes and, where available, to 
quantify the extent of statistical control achieved for those 
processes. In most cases, we did not verify or validate this 
information provided by the program office. We sought to clarify the 
number of critical manufacturing processes and percentage of 
statistical process control where information existed that raised 
concerns. We used a standard called the Process Capability Index, which 
is a process performance measurement that quantifies how closely a 
process is running to its specification limits. The index can be 
translated into an expected product defect rate, and we have found it 
to be a best practice. We sought other data, such as scrap and rework 
trends, in those cases where quantifiable statistical control data were 
unavailable. 

Although the knowledge points provide excellent indicators of potential 
risks, by themselves, they do not cover all elements of risk that a 
program encounters during development, such as funding instability. Our 
detailed reviews on individual systems normally provide for a fuller 
treatment of risk elements. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Technology Readiness Levels: 

Technology Readiness Level: 1. Basic principles observed and reported; 
Description: Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research 
begins to be translated into applied research and development. Examples 
might include paper studies of a technology's basic properties; 
Hardware/Software: None (Paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration Environment: None. 

Technology Readiness Level: 2. Technology concept and/or application 
formulated; 
Description: Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, 
practical applications can be invented. The application is speculative 
and there is no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption. 
Examples are still limited to paper studies; 
Hardware/Software: None (Paper studies and analysis); 
Demonstration Environment: None. 

Technology Readiness Level: 3. Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of concept; 
Description: Active research and development is initiated. This 
includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to physically 
validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology. 
Examples include components that are not yet integrated or 
representative; 
Hardware/Software: Analytical studies and demonstration of nonscale 
individual components (pieces of subsystem); 
Demonstration Environment: Lab. 

Technology Readiness Level: 4. Component and/or breadboard. Validation 
in laboratory environment; 
Description: Basic technological components are integrated to establish 
that the pieces will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity" 
compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of "ad 
hoc" hardware in a laboratory; 
Hardware/Software: Low fidelity breadboard. Integration of nonscale 
components to show pieces will work together. Not fully functional or 
form or fit but representative of technically feasible approach 
suitable for flight articles; 
Demonstration Environment: Lab. 

Technology Readiness Level: 5. Component and/or breadboard validation 
in relevant environment; 
Description: Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. 
The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably 
realistic supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a 
simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory 
integration of components; 
Hardware/Software: High fidelity breadboard. Functionally equivalent 
but not necessarily form and/or fit (size weight, materials, etc.) 
Should be approaching appropriate scale. May include integration of 
several components with reasonably realistic support 
elements/subsystems to demonstrate functionality; 
Demonstration Environment: Lab demonstrating functionality but not form 
and fit. May include flight demonstrating breadboard in surrogate 
aircraft. Technology ready for detailed design studies. 

Technology Readiness Level: 6. System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment; 
Description: Representative model or prototype system, which is well 
beyond the breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant 
environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated 
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity 
laboratory environment or in simulated operational environment; 
Hardware/Software: Prototype--Should be very close to form, fit and 
function. Probably includes the integration of many new components and 
realistic supporting elements/subsystems if needed to demonstrate full 
functionality of the subsystem; 
Demonstration Environment: High-fidelity lab demonstration or 
limited/restricted flight demonstration for a relevant environment. 
Integration of technology is well defined. 

Technology Readiness Level: 7. System prototype demonstration in an 
operational environment; 
Description: Prototype near or at planned operational system. 
Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of 
an actual system prototype in an operational environment, such as in an 
aircraft, vehicle or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a 
test bed aircraft; 
Hardware/Software: Prototype. Should be form, fit and function 
integrated with other key supporting elements/subsystems to demonstrate 
full functionality of subsystem; 
Demonstration Environment: Flight demonstration in representative 
operational environment such as flying test bed or demonstrator 
aircraft. Technology is well substantiated with test data. 

Technology Readiness Level: 8. Actual system completed and "flight 
qualified" through test and demonstration; 
Description: Technology has been proven to work in its final form and 
under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the 
end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and 
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if 
it meets design specifications; 
Hardware/Software: Flight qualified hardware; 
Demonstration Environment: DT&E in the actual system application. 

Technology Readiness Level: 9. Actual system "flight proven" through 
successful mission operations; 
Description: Actual application of the technology in its final form and 
under mission conditions, such as those encountered in operational test 
and evaluation. In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug 
fixing" aspects of true system development. Examples include using the 
system under operational mission conditions; 
Hardware/Software: Actual system in final form; 
Demonstration Environment: OT&E in operational mission conditions. 

Source: GAO and its analysis of National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration data. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Paul L. Francis (202) 512-4841: 

Acknowledgments: 

David B. Best, Alan R. Frazier, and Bruce H. Thomas made key 
contributions to this report. Other key contributors included Robert L. 
Ackley, D. Catherine Baltzell, Ridge C. Bowman, Maricela Cherveny, 
Thomas J. Denomme, Arthur Gallegos, William R. Graveline, David J. 
Hand, Michael J. Hazard, Barbara H. Haynes, LaTonya D. Miller, John E. 
Oppenheim, Rae Ann H. Sapp, Wendy P. Smythe, Robert S. Swierczek, and 
Karen S. Zuckerstein. 

The following staff were responsible for individual programs: 

System: Airborne Laser (ABL); 
Primary Staff: LaTonya D. Miller. 

System: Aerial Common Sensor (ACS); 
Primary Staff: Dayna L. Foster/Michael W. Aiken. 

System: Advanced Deployable System (ADS); 
Primary Staff: Cristina A. Connelly/Diana L. Dinkelacker. 

System: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD); 
Primary Staff: Ivy G. Hubler. 

System: Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites (AEHF); 
Primary Staff: Bradley L. Terry. 

System: Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESA); 
Primary Staff: Joseph E. Dewechter/Jerry W. Clark. 

System: Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS); 
Primary Staff: Michele R. Williamson/Wendy P. Smythe. 

System: Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS); 
Primary Staff: Mary K. Quinlan. 

System: Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasure/Common Missile Warning 
System (ATIRCM/CMWS); 
Primary Staff: Danny G. Owens/Leon S. Gill. 

System: B-2 Radar Modernization Program (B-2 RMP); 
Primary Staff: Don M. Springman/Andrew H. Redd. 

System: C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (C-130 AMP); 
Primary Staff: Marvin E. Bonner/Sean D. Merrill. 

System: C-5 Avionics Modernization Program (C-5 AMP); 
Primary Staff: Cheryl K. Andrew/Sameena N. Ismailjee. 

System: C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Reengining Program (C-5 RERP); 
Primary Staff: Sameena N. Ismailjee/Cheryl K. Andrew. 

System: CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter (CH-47F); 
Primary Staff: Wendy P. Smythe/Danny G. Owens. 

System: Future Aircraft Carrier (CVN-21); 
Primary Staff: Brendan S. Culley/Trevor J. Thomson. 

System: DD(X) Destroyer; 
Primary Staff: J. Kristopher Keener/Marc J. Castellano/Christopher R. 
Durbin. 

System: E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (E-2 AHE); 
Primary Staff: Gary L. Middleton/Judy T. Lasley. 

System: Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV); 
Primary Staff: Maria A. Durant. 

System: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV); 
Primary Staff: Leon S. Gill/Danny G. Owens/Steven B. Stern. 

System: Excalibur Precision Guided Extended Range Artillery Projectile; 
Primary Staff: John P. Swain/Carrie R. Wilson. 

System: F-22A Raptor; 
Primary Staff: Marvin E. Bonner. 

System: Future Combat Systems (FCS); 
Primary Staff: Marcus C. Ferguson/John P. Swain/Guisseli Reyes. 

System: Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle; 
Primary Staff: Bruce D. Fairbairn/Charlie Shivers. 

System: Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD); 
Primary Staff: Ivy G. Hubler. 

System: NAVSTAR Global Positioning System II (GPS) II Modernized 
Space/OCS; 
Primary Staff: Jean N. Harker/Peter J. Grana. 

System: Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor 
System (JLENS); 
Primary Staff: Alan R. Frazier/Wendy P. Smythe. 

System: Joint Strike Fighter (JSF); 
Primary Staff: Matthew B. Lea/Matthew T. Drerup. 

System: Joint Tactical Radio System Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Site 
(JTRS AMF); 
Primary Staff: Paul G. Williams/Ridge C. Bowman. 

System: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 1; 
Primary Staff: Ridge C. Bowman/Paul G. Williams. 

System: Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Cluster 5; 
Primary Staff: Ridge C. Bowman/Paul G. Williams/Tristan T. To. 

System: Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS); 
Primary Staff: Bruce D. Fairbairn/Charlie Shivers. 

System: Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI); 
Primary Staff: Jonathan E. Watkins. 

System: Land Warrior; 
Primary Staff: Joel C. Christenson/Susan K. Woodward. 

System: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS); 
Primary Staff: J. Kristopher Keener/Christina A. Connelly/Christopher 
R. Durbin. 

System: Longbow Apache Block III; 
Primary Staff: Wendy P. Smythe/Danny G. Owens. 

System: Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA); 
Primary Staff: Matthew F. Ebert/Heather L. Barker. 

System: 21" Mission Reconfigurable Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (MRUUV); 
Primary Staff: Diana L. Dinkelacker/Marc J. Castellano. 

System: Mobile User Objective System (MUOS); 
Primary Staff: Richard Y. Horiuchi. 

System: MQ-9 Predator B; 
Primary Staff: Rae Ann H. Sapp. 

System: National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 
System (NPOESS); 
Primary Staff: Suzanne S. Olivieri/Lisa P. Gardner/Carol R. Cha. 

System: PATROIT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) Combined 
Aggregate Program (CAP) Fire Unit; 
Primary Staff: Tana M. Davis. 

System: Space Based Infrared System High (SBIRS High); 
Primary Staff: Maricela Cherveny/Leslie K. Pollock. 

System: Small Diameter Bomb (SDB); 
Primary Staff: Carrie R. Wilson/Guisseli Reyes. 

System: Space Radar (SR); 
Primary Staff: Tony A. Beckham. 

System: Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS); 
Primary Staff: Sigrid L. McGinty. 

System: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); 
Primary Staff: Jonathan E. Watkins. 

System: Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT); 
Primary Staff: Arturo Holguin Jr. 

System: V-22 Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (V-22); 
Primary Staff: Jerry W. Clark/Bonita P. Oden. 

System: VH-71A Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program; 
Primary Staff: Ronald E. Schwenn/Joseph H. Zamoyta/Kevin J. Heinz. 

System: Warrior Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Warrior UAV); 
Primary Staff: Carol T. Mebane/Michele R. Williamson. 

System: Wideband Gapfiller Satellites (WGS); 
Primary Staff: Tony A. Beckham. 

System: Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T); 
Primary Staff: James P. Tallon/Gwyneth M. Blevins/Paul G. Williams/Amy 
L. Sweet. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

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(120460): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] This estimate includes total RDT&E; procurement; military 
construction; and acquisition operation and maintenance appropriations 
to develop the weapon systems. The macro analyses contained in this 
report are based on data as of January 15, 2006, and may not reflect 
subsequent events. For example, the Joint Tactical Radio System 
programs are currently being restructured. 

[2] Estimates in then-year dollars as reported in the Fiscal Year 2006 
Department of Defense Future Years Defense Program Table 1-1 for RDT&E 
and Procurement. 

[3] This estimate is for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). 
MDAPs are programs identified by DOD as programs that require eventual 
RDT&E expenditures of more than $365 million or $2.19 billion in 
procurement in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. 

[4] The common set refers to the 26 programs that we were able to 
assess since development began. The 26 programs are ACS, AEHF, AESA, 
APKWS, B-2 RMP, C-5 AMP, C-5 RERP, CH-47F, CVN-21, E-2D AHE, EFV, 
Excalibur, F-22A, FCS, Global Hawk, JSF, JTRS Cluster 5, Land Warrior, 
MMA, MUOS, NPOESS, Patriot/MEADS CAP, Predator B, SDB, V-22, and WGS. 
We limited this analysis to these 26 programs because all data 
including cost, schedule, and quantities were available for comparison 
between program estimates. The data in table 2 does not represent the 
same common set of 26 programs reported in the 2005 assessment. GAO, 
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs, 
GAO-05-301 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005). 

[5] A weighted average gives more expensive programs a greater value. 

[6] The 9 programs are AEHF, Excalibur, APKWS, V-22, JSF, C-5 RERP, F- 
22A, Global Hawk, and C-5 AMP. 

[7] This estimate is a weighted average based on total program cost and 
does not include the Excalibur program because of its extreme unit cost 
growth. The simple average program unit cost increase for the same 25 
programs is 36 percent. The weighted average, including the Excalibur, 
is 62 percent. 

[8] 10 U.S.C ß 2433. Requires DOD to (1) notify Congress whenever unit 
cost growth is at least 15 percent, and (2) "certify" the program to 
Congress when unit cost growth is at least 25 percent above the latest 
approved acquisition baseline cost estimate. 

[9] These percentages are program cost weighted averages. The simple 
average increase for program acquisition unit costs is 2.8 percent for 
the programs that started development with mature technologies and 19.8 
percent for the programs that started development with immature 
technologies. 

[10] The 29 programs include: ATIRCM/CMWS, AEHF, AESA Radar, AIM-9X/Air 
to Air Missile, ATACMS BAT, B-1B CMUP, Bradley Fighting Vehicle A3 
Upgrade, CH-47F, CEC, EELV, F/A-18E/F, F-22A, GMLRS Tactical Rocket, 
JASSM, JDAM, JPATS, JSOW, Longbow Hellfire, M1A2 Abrams, MCS, MM III 
GRP, MIDS-LVT, NAS, SDB, Strategic Sealift, Stryker Family of Vehicles, 
Tactical Tomahawk, Tomahawk TBIP, and V-22. The average design review 
is based on 21 of the 29 programs that either reported a critical 
design review date in the annual Selected Acquisition Reports or was 
provided to us by program officials. 

[11] Data as of January 15, 2006. 

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