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Installation of Army Truck Armor during Current Wartime Operations' 
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Report to Congressional Committees: 

March 2006: 

Defense Logistics: 

Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation of Army Truck 
Armor during Current Wartime Operations: 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-160]: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-160, a report to congressional committees: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In April 2005, GAO reported on factors affecting the timely production 
of up-armored high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and 
add-on armor kits for HMMWVs, as well as other items critically needed 
by deployed forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Due to high interest 
by Congress and the public regarding vehicle armor, GAO initiated this 
subsequent engagement to examine issues affecting the production and 
installation of armor for medium and heavy trucks. The objectives were 
to (1) determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and 
installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what factors 
affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what actions 
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army have taken to improve the 
timely availability of truck armor. To address these objectives, GAO 
collected and analyzed supply data for medium and heavy tactical trucks 
used by Army forces. 

What GAO Found: 

The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the 
production and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 
except for fuel tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for 
tankers is expected by January 2007. Although the Army first identified 
a requirement for 3,780 truck armor kits for five types of trucks in 
November 2003, it did not produce all of the kits until February 2005 
and did not install the kits to fully meet the requirement until May 
2005  18 months after the initial requirement was identified. However, 
by that time, requirements had increased substantially. As subsequent 
requirements for an additional 7,847 kits, excluding tankers, were 
identified, the time lag to meet them lessened. 

Time to Meet Initial Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. Note: Does not include the 5-ton 
truck or fuel tankers, which had not been identified at the time of the 
initial November 2003 requirement. 

[End of figure] 

A number of factors contributed to the time to provide truck armor kits 
to deployed troops, placing them at greater risk as they conducted 
wartime operations in vehicles not equipped with the preferred level of 
protection. For example, the Army missed a valuable opportunity to have 
substantial numbers of truck armor kits available for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom by not fully capitalizing on approved operational requirements 
established in 1996. In addition, production time lengthened because 
contracts were awarded for amounts less than total requirements due to 
increasing needs for truck armor and inadequate funding. As was the 
case for other critical wartime shortages that GAO previously examined, 
sufficient documentation was lacking to determine why funding was not 
available when needed, limiting effective oversight over funding 
decisions. Material shortages and limited tanker kit installation rates 
also impacted the availability of truck armor. 

DOD and the Army have taken a number of short-term actions, such as 
leveraging available funding, to improve truck armor availability 
during current operations. The Army is also developing a long-term 
armoring plan to improve the availability of truck armor for future 
operations. 

What GAO Recommends: 

Expanding on one of its April 2005 recommendations, GAO is recommending 
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army to establish a process to 
document and communicate all urgent wartime funding requirements for 
supplies and equipment when identified and the disposition of funding 
decisions. DOD concurred with the intent of the recommendation. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-160. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact William Solis at (202) 
512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Army Expects to Have Met Most Truck Armor Requirements by January 2006: 

Several Factors Lengthened the Time to Provide Truck Armor Kits: 

DOD and the Army Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts: 

Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck: 

Heavy Equipment Transporter: 

Palletized Load System: 

M939 5-Ton Truck: 

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles: 

M915 Truck Family: 

Tankers: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Time to Meet Initial Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type: 

Table 2: Time to Meet Latest Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type: 

Table 3: Comparison of Types of Vehicles Requiring Armor Kits in 1996, 
2003, and 2005 and Quantities of Kits Needed and Available: 

Table 4: Organizations Interviewed during Review: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Production and Installation of Truck Armor Kits to Meet Army 
Requirements: 

Figure 2: Army Truck Armor Requirements, November 2003 through 
September 2005: 

Figure 3: Availability of Funding Compared to Truck Armor Requirements: 

Figure 4: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck: 

Figure 5: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced 
and Installed: 

Figure 6: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and 
Ordered: 

Figure 7: Heavy Equipment Transporter: 

Figure 8: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and 
Installed: 

Figure 9: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and 
Ordered: 

Figure 10: Palletized Load System: 

Figure 11: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced 
and Installed: 

Figure 12: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and 
Ordered: 

Figure 13: M939 5-Ton Truck: 

Figure 14: Comparison of M939 5-Ton Truck Armor Kit Requirements to 
Kits Produced and Installed: 

Figure 15: FMTV RACK Truck: 

Figure 16: FMTV LSAC Truck: 

Figure 17: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced 
and Installed: 

Figure 18: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and 
Ordered: 

Figure 19: M915 Truck Tractor: 

Figure 20: Comparison of M915 Family of Trucks Armor Kit Requirements 
to Kits Produced and Installed: 

Figure 21: Comparison of M915 Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and 
Ordered: 

Figure 22: An M969 Tanker: 

Figure 23: Comparison of Tanker Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced 
and Installed: 

Abbreviations: 

AR2B: Army Requirements and Resourcing Board: 

ASBP: Army Strategic Planning Board: 

CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command: 

CFLCC: Coalition Forces Land Component Command: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FMTV: Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles: 

GSIE: Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise: 

HEMTT: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck: 

HET: Heavy Equipment Transporter: 

HMMWV: High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle: 

IED: Improvised Explosive Device: 

LSAC: Low Signature Armored Cab: 

OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom: 

OIF: Operation Iraqi Freedom: 

ONS: Operational Needs Statement: 

ORD: Operational Requirements Document: 

PLS: Palletized Load System: 

RACK: Radian Armor Crew Kit: 

TRADOC: Training and Doctrine Command: 

Letter March 22, 2006: 

The Honorable John W. Warner: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

When combat operations were declared over during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF), U.S. and coalition forces transitioned to stabilization 
operations to restore public order and infrastructure in Iraq. Since 
that time, U.S. forces have come under frequent and deadly attacks from 
insurgents using a variety of weapons that include improvised explosive 
devices (IED), mortars, and rocket launchers. During this situation 
there have been numerous attacks on military convoys as they carry 
supplies and equipment throughout the region. The threat of IEDs, in 
particular, has become increasingly frequent and has been ranked as the 
number one killer of U.S. troops in Iraq. The explosives used in IEDs 
consist mainly of dynamite, land mines, old artillery shells or other 
types of military ordnance. Many IEDs are hidden and disguised along 
traffic routes and are remotely detonated against unsuspecting military 
personnel. 

As a result of experiences in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and 
the services have taken several immediate steps to improve the 
protection of military forces operating in the region. Among these is 
the fielding of new capabilities to counter emerging threats 
encountered in Iraq, to include such improvements as add-on-armor for 
trucks and systems for detecting and defeating IEDs. 

Since the onset of OIF, we have reported on several supply chain 
management issues that have impeded support to the warfighter.[Footnote 
1] For example, after visiting the theater in 2003, we provided our 
preliminary observations on the effectiveness of logistics support 
during OIF.[Footnote 2] Among the problems we observed were the 
unavailability of spare parts, hundreds of backlogged shipments, and an 
inability to track shipments at the distribution centers. In April 
2005, we reported on shortages of a number of critical items during 
OIF, to include certain protective items such as body armor and armored 
high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV).[Footnote 3] We 
identified a number of systemic causes for these shortages, including 
inaccurate requirements, delayed funding, and ineffective distribution 
processes. As a result, we made several recommendations to the 
Secretary of Defense calling for actions, such as ensuring the accuracy 
of Army war reserve requirements and developing and exercising 
deployable distribution capabilities, to improve DOD's system for 
supplying items to U.S. forces. 

Due to high interest by Congress and the public regarding the 
availability of armor for HMMWVs and other vehicles, we initiated this 
subsequent engagement under the authority of the Comptroller General of 
the United States to examine issues affecting the production and 
installation of armor for medium and heavy trucks used by Army forces 
during OIF and other ongoing operations in the U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM) area of responsibility.[Footnote 4] Our objectives were to 
(1) determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and 
installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what factors 
affected the time to provide truck armor to deployed forces, and (3) 
identify what actions DOD and the Army have taken to improve the timely 
availability of truck armor. 

In conducting this review, we focused on medium and heavy tactical 
trucks used by Army forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, which 
included those in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 5] We also reviewed 
the production and installation of truck armor for Marine Corps forces, 
which we will report separately. To identify the extent to which truck 
armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements, we 
visited numerous DOD and Army organizations to obtain data on the 
requirements, funding, production, and installation of truck armor 
kits. We considered the armor requirement as met for each type of truck 
when the quantity of armor kits produced and installed onto vehicles 
equaled the requirement. Based on the information gathered, we 
identified factors that affected the time to provide truck armor kits 
to deployed forces. We also identified DOD's and the Army's short-term 
and long-term efforts to improve the availability of truck armor. We 
assessed the reliability of the data we obtained and determined that 
they were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We 
performed our review from April 2005 to January 2006 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. A detailed discussion 
of our scope and methodology is located in appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the 
production and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 
except for fuel tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for 
tankers is expected by January 2007. Although the Army first identified 
a requirement for 3,780 truck armor kits for five types of trucks in 
November 2003, it did not produce all of the kits until February 2005 
and did not install the kits to fully meet the initial requirement 
until May 2005--18 months after the requirement was identified. 
However, by that time, requirements had increased substantially. As 
subsequent requirements for an additional 7,847 kits, excluding 
tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them lessened. Until add-
on armor kits were installed, units in the theater developed their own 
interim improvised armor of locally fabricated steel armor plates to 
obtain some level of protection for their vehicles. 

We identified a number of factors that contributed to the time to 
provide truck armor kits to deployed troops, placing them at greater 
risk as they conducted wartime operations in vehicles that were not 
equipped with the preferred level of protection. The factors we 
identified include: 

* The Army did not fully capitalize on approved operational 
requirements for truck armor that were established in 1996. The 1996 
requirements were similar to those developed in 2003 in response to 
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, addressing similar threats for 
most of the same types of trucks. Generally, official requirements such 
as these lead to the development and production of new systems to 
address the specified required capabilities. Production of armor kits 
based on the 1996 requirements may have increased the availability of 
truck armor for current operations in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle 
East. 

* The Army's award of contracts to armor contractors for amounts less 
than the total requirement caused production schedules to be longer 
than they might have otherwise been. Instead of awarding contracts in a 
way that maximized production rates, the Army awarded contracts in 
amounts less than the total requirement because requirements increased 
due to operational conditions and the Army received its allocation of 
funding from DOD at less than the total requirement. Funding was not 
always available to award contracts at the time requirements were 
identified, but neither DOD nor Army officials could explain or 
document why increased funding was not provided earlier or how funding 
decisions were made. In April 2005, we reported that insufficient and 
delayed funding also contributed to critical wartime shortages of 
armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, and tires, and that we 
could not determine why sufficient funding was not provided earlier 
because adequate documentation of funding requests was not available. 
Without formal documentation and communication of urgent wartime 
funding requirements and the disposition of funding decisions, the 
rationale for funding decisions and the officials and organizations 
accountable for making those decisions may not be subject to effective 
oversight by Congress or the Secretary of Defense. 

* Material shortages impacted the availability of Army truck armor. For 
example, production levels for several Army kits were constrained, in 
part, by shortages of material and components such as steel and door 
handles. Further, competition between the Army and Marine Corps for 
limited contractors and materials exacerbated problems with limited 
availability of materials. 

* Limited installation rates affected the Army's ability to install 
armor kits onto tankers. The rotation of fuel trucks into the 
maintenance area as they returned from missions paced the installation 
of armor. In addition, unique requirements to coat the tankers with a 
protective chemical limited the numbers of armor installation sites 
available for armor installation due to the need for controlled 
environmental conditions. As a result, the total length of time to 
field tanker armor was stretched out over a longer period. 

DOD and the Army have taken several actions to improve truck armor 
availability. Several short-term solutions to increase the rate of 
production were instituted during operations in Iraq. For example, to 
mitigate the effects of funding requirements at less than the total 
requirements, the Army used money budgeted for other procurement 
programs to award contracts for production of armor kits before 
additional armor funds arrived. In addition, Army headquarters also 
developed the initial armor kit requirements based on emerging needs 5 
months before units in the theater formally submitted their 
requirements for validation, which allowed it to begin seeking funds 
for armor kits and award contracts for design and production earlier. 
The Army also expanded its armor installation capacity to increase 
installation rates. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Staff) 
established a team, called the Joint Armor Fusion Cell, to monitor the 
progress of armoring trucks as well to provide assistance to the Army 
to expedite the availability of armor kits. For example, the Joint 
Armor Fusion Cell helped identify and deploy personnel from the Air 
Force and Navy to perform armor installations in the theater and in the 
United States, thereby speeding up the availability of truck armor to 
the units. The Army is also developing a long-term plan to address 
future truck armoring needs. While we did not evaluate the plan's 
potential for success, we did note that it is aimed at identifying long-
term requirements for truck armor and developing solutions to address 
these requirements. 

We are expanding upon a recommendation in our April 2005 report that 
was directed at improving the effectiveness of the Army's wartime 
supply support--to address a broader systemic problem that affected the 
availability of truck armor. To ensure that funding needs for urgent 
wartime requirements are identified quickly, requests for funding are 
well documented, and funding decisions are based on risk and an 
assessment of the highest priority requirements, we are recommending 
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to 
establish a process to document and communicate all urgent wartime 
funding requirements for supplies and equipment at the time they are 
identified and the disposition of funding decisions. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 
stated it agreed with the intent of our recommendation but stated that 
it believes the Army's current requirements validation process conforms 
to the process described in our recommendation. Our work has 
demonstrated, however, that once requirements are validated, funding 
must be made available to execute programs to respond to those 
requirements. Because, as we noted in this report and in April 2005, 
funding requests from the Army to DOD to resource validated 
requirements and the corresponding decisions as to the amount and 
timing of funding to be provided were not adequately documented, we 
were unable to determine the reasons why funding was not made available 
to respond to urgent wartime requirements as needed. We continue to 
believe these events in the funding process for urgent wartime 
requirements must be fully documented to provide effective program 
oversight and to ensure funding decisions are made based on risk and an 
assessment of the highest priority requirements. The Department's 
responses are reprinted in appendix III and our evaluation of them 
appears later in this report. 

Background: 

Army convoys carrying supplies and equipment in the CENTCOM area of 
responsibility have been subjected to deadly attacks by insurgents 
using IEDs and other weapons. In response to these attacks, the Army 
has undertaken several force protection measures such as adding armor 
to a number of medium and heavy trucks operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and other CENTCOM locations. 

Deployed Army Forces Face a Significant Threat from IEDs: 

Army convoys operating in the CENTCOM area of responsibility have been 
subjected to deadly attacks by enemy forces. In particular, attacks in 
Iraq by insurgents using IEDs have placed trucks and personnel at 
tremendous risk as they carry supplies and equipment throughout the 
region. In May 2003, U.S. and coalition forces began stabilization 
operations in Iraq that continue today. However, since that time, the 
United States has incurred more casualties than during major combat 
operations, mostly due to ambushes and IED attacks by insurgents 
operating in Iraq. The threat from IEDs has grown progressively, from 
single mortar rounds, to multiple explosives linked together, to 
suicide car bombs. In the spring of 2004, nearly every attack from an 
IED resulted in a coalition casualty. In particular, U.S. military 
convoys have been the targets of these types of attacks. In addition to 
attacks in Iraq, U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan have been 
subjected to IED attacks. 

IEDs take a variety of shapes and sizes and have been employed in a 
number of different ways. They can contain commercial or military 
explosives, homemade explosives, or military ordnance and ordnance 
components. For example, mortar and artillery projectiles have been 
employed as IEDs in Iraq. In addition, IEDs have been placed in many 
vehicles--from small sedans to large cargo trucks--and stationed along 
the roadways. Furthermore, "person-borne" suicide bombs have also been 
used, with explosives contained in a vest, belt, or clothing that is 
specifically modified to conceal and carry this material. 

Outfitting Army Trucks with Armor: 

In light of the threat posed by IEDs and other weapons, such as mortars 
and rocket launchers, the Army has taken several force protection 
measures to include adding armor to a number of medium and heavy trucks 
operating in Iraq, and Afghanistan.[Footnote 6] The Army's medium and 
heavy tactical trucks that are being armored include: M939 5-ton 
trucks, family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV), heavy expanded 
mobility tactical trucks (HEMTT), heavy equipment transporters (HET), 
palletized load systems (PLS), the M915 truck family, and tankers. 
Appendix II contains a detailed description of each Army vehicle in 
addition to a discussion of the armor kit availability and the 
significant factors that affected armor availability for each truck. 

The Army's medium tactical trucks include the M939 5-ton and FMTV. The 
M939 tactical truck is a general-purpose military vehicle, primarily 
designed for tactical, off-road use. The M-939 is a 5-ton capacity, six-
wheel drive cargo truck used for transportation of all types of 
supplies and comes in various vehicle types, including a cargo truck, 
dump truck, and wrecker. The Army's FMTV addresses medium tactical- 
vehicle requirements for unit mobility and unit resupply, and 
transportation of equipment and personnel. The FMTV consists of the 
light medium tactical vehicle, which has a 2.5-ton capacity, and the 
medium tactical vehicle, which has a 5-ton capacity. 

The Army's heavy tactical trucks include the HEMTT, HET, PLS, M915, and 
tankers. The Army utilizes the HEMTT to provide transport capabilities 
for the resupply of various combat vehicles and weapons systems. The 
HET is used to transport, deploy, recover, and evacuate main battle 
tanks and other heavy tracked and wheeled vehicles to and from the 
battlefield. The PLS performs long distance and local hauls and unit 
resupply in the tactical environment to support combat units. The PLS 
consists of a truck with self-loading capabilities and a trailer. The 
Army's family of M915 trucks consists of highway tractors used 
primarily for the long distance transport of containers, which is 
similar to commercial tractor-trailer trucks. 

The Army uses its tankers to haul and dispense bulk fuel. Four models 
of fuel tankers are involved in the Army's armoring program: the M967, 
the M969, the M978, and the M1062. The primary component of the tanker 
armoring effort is a self-sealing coating material that is sprayed onto 
the exterior of the fuel tank. When a small arms round penetrates the 
coating material and the fuel tank, the hole self seals and the fuel 
leak is stopped within minutes. A secondary component is composed of a 
set of armor panel kits mounted at select locations on the fuel tanker 
to protect critical equipment that is not protected by the coating 
material. 

Processes for Developing Truck Armor Requirements and Solutions: 

The Army identified wartime truck armor requirements and initiated a 
procurement program to develop an armor solution, which involved 
seeking funding from a variety of sources, identifying and contracting 
with suppliers for armor materials and components, designing and 
testing armor solutions, and installing armor onto trucks in the 
CENTCOM area of responsibility or other installation sites in the 
United States and Europe. 

Process for Developing Wartime Requirements: 

When a need for new equipment is identified by Army warfighters 
deployed to Iraq and other CENTCOM locations in support of the global 
war on terrorism, official requirements for these items are developed 
through the submission of the Army's operational needs statement (ONS). 
Army field commanders prepare an ONS, which documents the urgent need 
for a materiel solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a 
capability that impacts mission accomplishment. The ONS is sent forward 
through the unit's chain of command to the Coalition Forces Land 
Component Command (CFLCC) for theater-level approval, while an 
information copy is provided directly to Army headquarters for an 
initial check to ensure the requested capability and operational 
concept are clearly stated. 

Once approved by CFLCC, the ONS is forwarded to the Office of the 
Deputy Chief of Staff G-3 at Army headquarters where it is reviewed and 
validated by the Army Strategic Planning Board (ASPB).[Footnote 7] The 
ASPB is chaired by the G-3, with representatives from other Army 
headquarters staff offices and major Army commands. In the case of 
truck armor, once the requirement is validated by the ASPB, it is 
transmitted to the Program Executive Office-Combat Support and Combat 
Service Support, which manages the procurement of truck armor through 
its Project Manager for Tactical Vehicles (Project Manager). Validated 
requirements are also passed to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 
G-8 and the Army Budget Office to obtain the necessary funding. 

Development of Truck Armor Solutions: 

To address validated requirements for truck armor, the Army initiated a 
procurement program to develop an armor solution for its deployed 
trucks. Procurement is funded through congressional appropriations. 
However, at the time requirements for current operations were 
identified in November 2003, there were no truck armor kit procurement 
programs in place. Consequently, funding for armor kits in the current 
Army procurement budgets did not exist. Because no funding was 
available at the time the requirements were identified, the Army 
obtained funding for its program from a variety of sources. While the 
Army can reprogram a small amount of funds from one program budget to 
another, the majority of funding had to be approved by the Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and in some cases, 
Congress. Specifically, to obtain funding for truck armor, the Army 
sought approval from the DOD Comptroller and Congress to reprogram 
funding from other procurement or appropriations accounts,[Footnote 8] 
requested funding from the DOD-managed Iraqi Freedom Fund,[Footnote 9] 
and requested armor funding through supplemental appropriations. 

The Army's approved armor protection for medium and heavy tactical 
vehicles consisted of add-on armor kits to be installed on vehicles 
already in use in the theater of operations or prior to deployment. 
These kits included armor panels and ballistic glass, as well as other 
components such as air conditioners. For all trucks except the M939 5- 
ton, the Army awarded contracts to armor companies to produce add-on 
kits for each type of truck. According to Army officials, as needed 
production quantities increased, the Army modified these contracts to 
reflect the additional quantities and revised prices. In the case of 
the 5-ton truck, the armor kits were produced by the Ground Systems 
Industrial Enterprise (GSIE), an Army organization of depots and other 
facilities.[Footnote 10] Instead of a contract, agreements on 
quantities and costs for work were provided through Military Inter- 
departmental Purchase Requests (MIPR), which were issued to GSIE for 
each new production order. Once armor kits were produced by contractors 
or Army depots, they were shipped to installation sites in the United 
States, Middle East, and Europe, where they were installed onto trucks 
by military or contractor personnel. 

Army Expects to Have Met Most Truck Armor Requirements by January 2006: 

The Army expects to have met its current requirements for the 
production and installation of truck armor by the end of January 2006 
except for fuel tankers. Completion of armor kit installation for 
tankers is expected by January 2007. Figure 1 shows the overall 
production and installation quantities of truck armor as compared to 
requirements. The Army's solution to addressing truck armor 
requirements focused on developing add-on armor kits to be attached to 
the vehicles. These add-on armor kits included armor panels and 
ballistic glass, as well as other components such as air conditioners. 

Figure 1: Production and Installation of Truck Armor Kits to Meet Army 
Requirements: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Although the Army first identified a requirement for 3,780 truck armor 
kits for five types of trucks in November 2003, it did not produce all 
of the kits until February 2005 and did not install the kits to fully 
meet the initial requirement until May 2005, or 18 months later. As 
shown in table 1, the time to produce and install armor kits to meet 
initial requirements varied by truck type, and ranged from 15 to 18 
months. However, as shown in figure 1, by that time requirements had 
increased substantially. More detailed information on requirements, 
production, and installation times for each specific truck is provided 
in appendix II. 

Table 1: Time to Meet Initial Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type: 

Truck type: HEMTT; Initial November 2003 requirement: 1,080; Date 
required quantities produced: January 2005; 
Date required quantities installed: February 2005; Total months to 
fully meet initial requirement: 15. 

Truck type: HET; 
Initial November 2003 requirement: 500; 
Date required quantities produced: February 2005; 
Date required quantities installed: March 2005; Total months to fully 
meet initial requirement: 16. 

Truck type: PLS; 
Initial November 2003 requirement: 800; 
Date required quantities produced: January 2005; 
Date required quantities installed: May 2005; Total months to fully 
meet initial requirement: 18. 

Truck type: FMTV; 
Initial November 2003 requirement: 1,150; 
Date required quantities produced: February 2005; 
Date required quantities installed: March 2005; Total months to fully 
meet initial requirement: 16. 

Truck type: M915; 
Initial November 2003 requirement: 250; 
Date required quantities produced: December 2004; 
Date required quantities installed: March 2005; Total months to fully 
meet initial requirement: 16. 

[End of table] 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Note: Does not include the 5-ton truck or fuel tankers, which had not 
been identified at the time of the initial November 2003 requirement. 

As subsequent requirements for an additional 7,847 kits, excluding 
tankers, were identified, the time lag to meet them lessened. The Army 
now estimates that the total demand for all 11,627 required truck armor 
kits, excluding tankers, will have been met in January 2006, or 10 
months after the latest requirements increase was validated in March 
2005.[Footnote 11] Table 2 shows the time needed to complete production 
and installation of armor kits to meet the latest validated 
requirements increase from March 2005. The Army estimates that 
production of a sufficient number of tanker kits to meet requirements 
will be completed by May 2006, but does not expect to complete 
installation of tanker kits until January 2007. 

Table 2: Time to Meet Latest Truck Armor Requirements by Truck Type: 

Truck type: HEMTT; Current requirement as of September 2005: 2,246; 
Date required quantities produced: September 2005; 
Date required quantities installed: December 2005; Total months to 
fully meet requirement from March 2005 increase: 9. 

Truck type: HET; Current requirement as of September 2005: 663; 
Date required quantities produced: August 2005; 
Date required quantities installed: September 2005; 
Total months to fully meet requirement from March 2005 increase: 6. 

Truck type: PLS; Current requirement as of September 2005: 944; 
Date required quantities produced: March 2005; 
Date required quantities installed: July 2005; 
Total months to fully meet requirement from March 2005 increase: 4. 

Truck type: FMTV; Current requirement as of September 2005: 3,377; 
Date required quantities produced: August 2005; 
Date required quantities installed: December 2005; 
Total months to fully meet requirement from March 2005 increase: 9. 

Truck type: M915; Current requirement as of September 2005: 1,805; 
Date required quantities produced: December 2005; 
Date required quantities installed: January 2006 (estimated); 
Total months to fully meet requirement from March 2005 increase: 10. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Note: Does not include the 5-ton truck, for which requirements 
decreased in March 2005 or tankers, for which requirements did not 
increase in March 2005. As of September 2005, the current 5-ton truck 
armor requirement was 2,592 and the tanker requirement was 1,192. 

[End of table] 

Before armor kits were available, units operating in the CENTCOM area 
of responsibility developed their own interim improvised armor, 
consisting of locally fabricated steel armor plates, to obtain some 
level of protection for their vehicles. As a result, interim armor with 
minimum protection standards in accordance with Army policy was in 
place on some vehicles by the time the preferred add-on armor kits were 
available for installation. In addition, CFLCC issued a directive in 
February 2005 stating that no unarmored vehicles would be allowed to 
operate in Iraq outside of secured forward operating bases. During 
congressional testimony held in the spring and summer of 2005, Army 
officials confirmed that this policy had been fully implemented with 
use of approved interim improvised armor or add-on armor kits. 

Several Factors Lengthened the Time to Provide Truck Armor Kits: 

We identified a number of factors that contributed to the time to 
provide truck armor to deployed troops. First, the Army did not fully 
capitalize on a requirement for truck armor that had been identified 
prior to operations in OIF. Second, availability of armor kits was 
constrained by the Army's funding of contracts at less than the total 
requirement. Third, material shortages also affected the availability 
of armor kits. Finally, limited installation rates lengthened the time 
to provide armor kits for tankers. As a result, troops were placed at 
greater risk as they conducted wartime operations in vehicles not 
equipped with the preferred level of protection. 

Army Did Not Fully Capitalize on Truck Armor Requirements Identified 
Prior to Operations in Iraq: 

The Army did not fully capitalize on an earlier operational requirement 
for truck armor that was identified several years before current 
operations in Iraq began, which caused the Army to lose an opportunity 
to have a significant number of armor kits already available when 
operational needs arose in Iraq for this capability. An official 
requirement for truck add-on armor kits was identified and approved by 
the Army in 1996 to address threats similar to what deployed forces are 
currently facing in Iraq. On January 19, 1996, the Army's Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) issued an operational requirement document 
(ORD) for the tactical wheeled vehicle crew protection kit.[Footnote 
12] Generally, official requirements documents lead to the development 
and production of new systems to address the specified required 
capabilities. 

According to Army officials, the Army developed this ORD because 
officials recognized that operations in Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia 
exposed troops to a civilian threat and led to concerns over 
countermine protection for supply and troop transport vehicles. The 
crew protection kit was to provide increased crew survivability in 
tactical wheeled vehicles against small arms fire, artillery/mortar 
fire, mines, submunitions, and IEDs where needed while operating 
throughout an area of operations. The ORD described the threat against 
U.S. forces usually consisting of small arms, hand portable antitank 
weapons such as light antitank weapons and rocket propelled grenades, 
and IEDs. According to the document, tactical wheeled vehicles at that 
time lacked armor protection to provide crew survivability against 
these threats. No existing ballistic protection systems had met this 
requirement, with one exception of the Up-Armored Heavy HMMWV. 
According to the ORD, the kit's capabilities would enable all units to 
provide ballistic protection to crews of tactical wheeled vehicles, 
including most of the same types of trucks being armored today in the 
Middle East. 

Once the ORD was approved, the Army Tank-Automotive Research, 
Development and Engineering Center built prototype armor kits for the 
HMMWV and 5-ton truck, and blast testing was also done at Fort A.P. 
Hill. The ORD specified a number of kits to be built and available to 
add on to vehicles as operations dictated the need for them. However, 
the Army never fully addressed this requirement. The need for armor 
kits after Somalia never materialized, and, according to Army 
officials, the ORD was not completed because funding was not available 
to fully meet the 1996 requirement due to other higher funding 
priorities in the Army. According to one Army official, given the 
amount of effort expended to develop and approve the ORD, it is 
relatively uncommon for an ORD not to be funded through production, 
especially when research and development funds had been spent, 
prototypes developed, and blast testing performed. 

Even though the 1996 requirement was not fully addressed, a small 
number of armor kits were produced around this time period for two 
types of trucks, the HEMTT and the PLS, to support operations in 
Bosnia.[Footnote 13] According to the Army's Project Manager, 
development of these kits was initiated in response to an ONS from 
units deployed to Bosnia. The ONS was submitted prior to completion of 
the ORD. However, these kits did not meet all the protective 
requirements specified in the ORD, such as providing blast protection. 
The Bosnia kits were never installed on vehicles and were placed into 
storage because the need for them was never realized. 

The Army's November 2003 armor requirement, developed in response to 
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, addressed the same vehicles 
confronting similar threats as those found in the January 1996 ORD. 
This November 2003 requirement for the crew protection kit validated an 
operational wartime need for add-on armor kits for light, medium, and 
heavy tactical wheeled vehicles in support of OIF and OEF. The 
requirement cites the January 1996 ORD as providing the basis for add- 
on armor and extends the requirement to continue identifying 
alternative capabilities for development, testing, and procurement. The 
November 2003 requirement noted that the armor kits are necessary to 
provide a capability to protect against small arms fire, IEDs, mine 
blast protection, and artillery fragmentation; and to minimize 
degradation of the vehicle mission. Army officials in theater modified 
the November 2003 requirement by changing the distribution of armor and 
prioritizing armor needs; however, the amounts of armor kits required 
remained the same. Table 3 shows the 1996 and 2003 requirements, as 
well as the most recent armor requirements. 

Table 3: Comparison of Types of Vehicles Requiring Armor Kits in 1996, 
2003, and 2005 and Quantities of Kits Needed and Available: 

Types of vehicles: 5-Ton; 
Quantities of armor kits: 1996 ORD requirement: 750; 
Quantities of armor kits: Kits available as of November 2003: 0; 
Quantities of armor kits: Initial 2003 requirement: 0; 
Quantities of armor kits: Current 2005 requirement: 2,592. 

Types of vehicles: HET; 
Quantities of armor kits: 1996 ORD requirement: 50; 
Quantities of armor kits: Kits available as of November 2003: 0; 
Quantities of armor kits: Initial 2003 requirement: 500; 
Quantities of armor kits: Current 2005 requirement: 663. 

Types of vehicles: PLS; 
Quantities of armor kits: 1996 ORD requirement: 50; 
Quantities of armor kits: Kits available as of November 2003: 32; 
Quantities of armor kits: Initial 2003 requirement: 800; 
Quantities of armor kits: Current 2005 requirement: 944. 

Types of vehicles: HEMTT; 
Quantities of armor kits: 1996 ORD requirement: 450; 
Quantities of armor kits: Kits available as of November 2003: 182; 
Quantities of armor kits: Initial 2003 requirement: 1,080; 
Quantities of armor kits: Current 2005 requirement: 2,246. 

Types of vehicles: M915; 
Quantities of armor kits: 1996 ORD requirement: 200; 
Quantities of armor kits: Kits available as of November 2003: 0; 
Quantities of armor kits: Initial 2003 requirement: 250; 
Quantities of armor kits: Current 2005 requirement: 1,805. 

Types of vehicles: FMTV; 
Quantities of armor kits: 1996 ORD requirement: 500; 
Quantities of armor kits: Kits available as of November 2003: 0; 
Quantities of armor kits: Initial 2003 requirement: 1,150; 
Quantities of armor kits: Current 2005 requirement: 3,377. 

Types of vehicles: Tanker; 
Quantities of armor kits: 1996 ORD requirement: 0; 
Quantities of armor kits: Kits available as of November 2003: 0; 
Quantities of armor kits: Initial 2003 requirement: 0; 
Quantities of armor kits: Current 2005 requirement: 1,192. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

NOTE: The kits for the HEMTT and PLS were not developed in response to 
the 1996 ORD. Rather, they were developed in response to anticipated 
needs for operations in Bosnia and did not meet the blast protection 
requirements specified in the ORD. 

[End of table] 

Because not all the kits required under the 1996 ORD were developed, 
the Army went into Iraq with less protective capability than it might 
otherwise have done. However, the Army's work done in support of the 
ORD and the Bosnia kits laid a foundation to meet future truck armor 
requirements. For example, the limited number of kits developed for 
military operations in Bosnia was pulled from storage and used in Iraq. 
Furthermore, according to Army officials, the knowledge gained and the 
processes for design, research, development, and testing of these kits, 
as well as the kits themselves, were used to address and meet the need 
for armor during current operations. Based on these efforts, the Army's 
Project Manager for truck armor in 2003 had knowledge of the concepts 
of designing and building armor kits, the necessary materials in terms 
of weight and protective capabilities, and system performance 
requirements and technical specifications for ballistic protection. In 
addition, the 2003 requirement for kits cites the January 1996 ORD as 
providing the basis for add-on armor. 

Army's Awarding of Contracts for Less Than the Total Requirement 
Constrained Armor Kit Production: 

The Army's award of armor contracts for quantities less than the total 
requirement constrained the production of armor kits. The award of 
contract quantities in amounts less than the total requirements instead 
of all at one time affected production rates and caused production 
schedules to be longer than they might otherwise have been. The award 
of contracts in this manner was, in part, a result of several increases 
in requirements over time due to changing operational conditions. 
Another factor that contributed to obtaining less than the total 
requirement was the delayed flow of funding available for armor kits. 

Awarding Contracts at Less Than the Total Requirement Lengthened the 
Time to Meet Requirements: 

For all of the Army trucks we reviewed except for the 5-ton truck, the 
Army's award of contracts for quantities less than the total 
requirement instead of all at one time caused production schedules to 
be longer than they might otherwise have been. Contractors tend to size 
their production levels to the contract orders they have on hand. Thus, 
larger contract quantities generally mean increased production rates. 
Larger up-front contracts can affect a contractor's production capacity 
for a number of reasons. For example, according to one contractor 
producing armor kits for all four of the Army's heavy trucks, ordering 
smaller quantities of armor kits caused a lack of continuity for its 
supply base and fluctuations in kit deliveries. More specifically, the 
contractor experienced (1) a lack of supplier commitment, which wavered 
with the uncertainty of future orders; (2) fluctuations in its labor 
force; (3) constrained ability to make process improvements to expedite 
production, such as the creation of specialized tooling, due to a short-
term focus of work; and (4) insufficient support for investment and 
facility decisions that would have resulted in more efficient 
production operations for the contractor and its supply base. 

In some cases, increases in requirements caused contracts to be awarded 
in an intermittent fashion. In other cases, funding was not available 
to award complete contract quantities to meet requirements at the time 
requirements were identified. Although it is difficult to determine the 
exact effects of intermittent contracting on the availability of armor 
kits, we identified a number of specific cases where it lengthened the 
production schedule. For example, there were breaks in production for 
three different types of truck kits (the FMTV, HEMTT, and HET) because 
the contractors had completed their current contact orders and new 
orders were not placed early enough to maintain continuous production. 
In one of these cases regarding an armor kit for the FMTV, the 
contractor received an additional contract from the Army in December 
2004 for 1,049 kits as it neared completion of its current requirement 
of 771 kits. Although the new requirement for additional kits was 
validated by the Army in April 2004, funding was not available to award 
the new contract until December 2004, which was not early enough to 
overcome the required 15-week material lead time. As a result, 
production stopped and new production did not resume until 2 months 
later. According to the contractor, production could have been 
maintained or even accelerated if the new contract had been awarded in 
time to meet the long lead time item requirements. 

In the cases of the HEMTT and the HET armor kits, the production lines 
stopped when the contractor completed the current contract quantities 
of 1,598 and 665 armor kits respectively. The contractor did not 
receive additional contract awards of 791 HEMTT kits and 131 HET kits 
until April 2005, or about a month after completion of the previous 
contract quantities in March 2005. By that time, production had already 
stopped, employees and subcontractors were released, and equipment and 
facility space were given up for other uses. As a result, there was a 
two and a half month break in production. The reason the additional 
production quantities were not awarded earlier was that validated 
requirements did not increase until March 2005, which, according to 
Army Project Manager officials, was too late to avoid a production 
stoppage. 

In another example of the impact of intermittent contract awards, the 
initial armor kit production contract for the M915 was awarded in April 
2004 for 250 kits, which was based on the validated Army requirement at 
the time. However, when subsequent contracts for 240 and 136 kits were 
awarded in September and October 2004 respectively, due to increasing 
Army requirements, the manufacturer, an Israeli subcontractor to the 
primary contractor, did not have sufficient capacity to keep up with 
the demand. This was due, in part, to other commitments the 
manufacturer already had for producing Marine Corps truck armor. As a 
result, the production levels for M915 kits were lower than desired 
based on the new requirements and remained so until July 2005 when the 
contractor was able to transition production from the Israeli 
subcontractor to its own facilities in the United States. According to 
contractor officials, if they had known in the beginning that the total 
quantities needed by the Army would have been as high as they were, 
they would have proceeded differently from the outset, such as using a 
different manufacturer. 

In one instance, the quantities of contracts also adversely affected 
the costs of armor kits. Specifically, the first contract for the FMTV 
armor kits was awarded in February 2004 for 270 kits. Subsequently, in 
March 2004, a second contract was placed for 501 kits. According to the 
contractor, the quantity in the initial contract was too low for the 
Army to receive the highest price break, which was received for the 
second contract. As a result, the first 270 kits cost the Army over 
$1.7 million more than if the two production quantities had been 
combined. The Army made the two orders separately because funding was 
not available to award all quantities at one time. 

Truck Armor Requirements Increased Due to Changing Operational 
Conditions: 

The Army's requirements for truck armor increased numerous times since 
November 2003 due to changing operational conditions. Army headquarters 
developed and approved the first requirement for truck armor kits in 
November 2003 in consultation with Army officials from the theater of 
operations. Army headquarters validated an operational wartime need for 
kits in support of OIF and other CENTCOM operations, and approved 3,780 
armor kits for medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles. According to 
Army officials, this requirement arose based on an identification of 
the need for truck armor and an August 2003 requirement from Army units 
in the theater for additional up-armored HMMWVs. All subsequent 
requirements for specific numbers of armor kits have been generated by 
Army theater commanders in the field and forwarded to Army headquarters 
for approval and funding. 

The Army has continued to validate additional requirements for truck 
armor as the need has evolved and increased over the course of 
operations to the present, with March 2005 being the most recent date 
for validated requirements increases. In September 2005, the total 
requirement for truck armor decreased slightly based on revised unit 
needs.[Footnote 14] Army theater level commanders have requested 
additional kits by documenting their requirements in ONSs. Army 
headquarters validated these requirements on several occasions between 
April 2004 and March 2005. Figure 2 illustrates the increases in the 
Army's requirements for truck armor according to the approval of the 
multiple ONSs. 

Figure 2: Army Truck Armor Requirements, November 2003 through 
September 2005: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Increasing requirements for truck armor from the first requirement in 
November 2003 were a direct result of operational conditions. Army 
officials from the theater of operations attributed these increasing 
requirements to the enemy's changing tactics and the increase in 
frequency and lethality of IEDs. In addition, the number of trucks in 
Iraq increased over time, which drove a corresponding increase in truck 
armor requirements. As noted previously, changing requirements 
necessitated the Army awarding production contracts in an intermittent 
manner; and, in some cases, led directly to gaps in production levels. 

Incremental Funding Lagged Behind Requirements, Delaying Contract 
Awards: 

The flow of funding for truck armor kits was initially provided in 
amounts less than total requirements and lagged significantly behind 
validated requirements. As a result, the Army could not award contracts 
for the full required quantities of armor kits at the time requirements 
were validated. Instead, the Army awarded contracts as funding became 
available. Figure 3 shows the availability of funding for truck armor 
kits as compared to armor kit requirements.[Footnote 15] 

Figure 3: Availability of Funding Compared to Truck Armor Requirements: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Although funding was not always available to award contracts at the 
time requirements were identified, the Army did provide some advanced 
funding to the contractors to buy items with long lead times, such as 
steel and ballistic glass, to mitigate some of the effects of delayed 
production contracts. To do this, the Army Project Manager used funds 
designated for the installation of armor kits already under contract 
until sufficient armor kit production funding was made available. 
However, according to Army Project Manager officials, they only used 
this advanced funding approach when they were certain additional 
funding would be administratively approved, because of the risks 
associated with using these installation funds and not being able to 
replace them. 

We could not specifically determine why the required funds for armor 
kits were not made available when the Army first identified the 
requirements because neither the Army nor DOD could provide us with 
sufficient records to track when the Department of the Army requested 
funding from the DOD Comptroller. Special funding requests from the 
Army to the DOD Comptroller were required because funding for armor 
kits was not available in the Army's procurement budget. According to 
Army officials, the Army requested full funding for the truck armor 
requirements when first identified, but the DOD Comptroller denied the 
requests and provided only a limited amount of funding over several 
months. However, the Army was not able to document these funding 
requests. 

Additionally, DOD Comptroller officials were unable to verify or 
document how much funding the Army asked for and when it was requested. 
DOD Comptroller officials further noted that although there was 
sufficient funding available in the Iraqi Freedom Fund to fund all of 
the truck armor requirements at the time they were initially identified 
by the Army, there were other competing funding priorities that would 
have prevented DOD from fully funding the entire truck armor 
requirement at once. Examples of these competing priorities include 
other force protection requirements such as the procurement of up- 
armored HMMWVs and night vision equipment, IED countermeasures, 
reimbursements to other coalition forces for logistics support, 
operational costs associated with deploying a Marine Expeditionary 
Force to Iraq, financing clearance of captured munitions, and funding 
for various classified programs. 

In April 2005, we reported that insufficient and delayed funding also 
contributed to critical wartime shortages of armored vehicle track 
shoes, lithium batteries, and tires. However, we could not determine 
why sufficient funding was not provided earlier because adequate 
documentation was not available to track when the Army requested the 
additional funding from DOD.[Footnote 16] Without formal documentation 
and communication of urgent wartime funding requirements and the 
disposition of funding decisions, the rationale for funding decisions 
and the officials and organizations accountable for making those 
decisions may not be subject to effective oversight by Congress or the 
Secretary of Defense. 

Material Shortages Affected Availability of Army Truck Armor Kits: 

Material shortages negatively impacted the Army's ability to meet 
requirements for all of its vehicles except for the FMTV and tankers. 
For example, the contractor producing armor kits for the Army's heavy 
trucks stated that shortages of armor-grade steel and aluminum 
constrained production rates for the HEMTT, HET, PLS, and M915 armor 
kits between July 2004 and November 2004. The shortage was alleviated 
through Army, Joint Staff, and congressional efforts to work directly 
with material suppliers to increase the amount of armor plates for the 
military. 

In addition, shortages of material negatively impacted the production 
of M939 5-ton armor kits, which were produced by the Army depots. 
According to GSIE officials, the production capacity for 5-ton truck 
armor kits was established based on the availability of material and 
components that are used to build the armor kits. When GSIE was asked 
to accelerate the production of M939 5-ton kits, the lack of 
availability of certain materials limited GSIE's ability to increase 
production levels. Examples of items that were difficult to obtain 
included several sizes and types of steel, door handles, and wiper 
components. 

Army and Marine Corps officials also found themselves in competition 
for armor contractors and materials, which exacerbated the problems 
with material shortages. For example, as mentioned previously, the 
initial manufacturer for the Army's M915 armor kits did not have 
sufficient capacity to meet needed production levels as requirements 
increased. This was due, in part, to the fact that the company had 
committed most of its capacity to producing Marine Corps truck armor by 
the time additional Army requirements were identified. Although minor 
schedule improvements were achieved as a result of discussions and 
agreements on joint schedules between the two services, it was still 
insufficient to meet the Army's needs. As a result, the Army moved 
production of the M915 to another company in the United States, which 
created further delays. 

Limited Installation Rates Constrained the Availability of Tanker Armor 
Kits: 

A significant factor that affected the availability of armor kits for 
tankers was a limited installation rate. For example, the installation 
of add-on armor kits was slowed by the rate of rotation of trucks into 
the in-theater installation facilities as they returned from missions. 
Operational constraints limited the number of vehicles that could be 
taken out of use at any one time. In addition, unique requirements to 
coat the tankers with a protective chemical prior to installing armor 
panels also limited the installation rate. The primary component of the 
tanker armoring effort is a self-sealing coating material that is 
sprayed onto the exterior of the fuel tank. When a small arms round 
penetrates the coating material and the fuel tank, the hole self-seals 
and the fuel leak stops. The proper application of the chemical coating 
requires controlled environmental conditions, such as humidity and 
temperature, which has led to a limited number of spray locations 
accessible to the Army. Thus, although production of armor kits for 
tankers is expected to be completed by May 2006, because of these 
constraints, installation of enough kits to meet requirements is not 
expected to be finished until 8 months later in January 2007. 

DOD and the Army Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability: 

DOD and the Army have taken a number of actions to improve the timely 
availability of truck armor. Some of the actions were short-term and 
were meant to address the immediate armor need for deployed forces in 
Iraq and other CENTCOM locations. Other efforts are long-term plans 
designed to improve the overall availability of truck armor for future 
operations. 

DOD and the Services Took Actions to Improve Availability of Truck 
Armor during Current Operations: 

DOD and the Army have taken a number of short-term actions to improve 
the availability of truck armor to meet the needs of forces deployed 
for OIF and other CENTCOM operations. Examples of these efforts include 
the following: 

* Leveraging of available Army funds. The Army's Project Manager for 
Tactical Vehicles took a number of steps to leverage available funding 
in an attempt to mitigate the effects of an inadequate funding flow for 
truck armor. For example, it used funding designated for future armor 
kit installations to buy long lead time materials and award some 
contracts for armor kits until additional armor kit funding could be 
made available. In addition, when the Project Manager received funding 
for armor kits from Army headquarters, it allocated the funding among 
all the armor kit contracts to maintain sufficient work flow to keep 
all production lines open, rather than fund some truck kits to the full 
level of requirements. While these efforts may have improved the timely 
availability of armor kits, as we noted earlier, the inadequate 
availability of funding still contributed to a longer schedule in many 
cases. 

* Early identification of Army requirements. Army headquarters 
developed the initial requirements for truck armor based on emerging 
needs before formal requirements were submitted by units in the 
theater. As noted earlier, the first requirement for truck armor was 
developed and validated by Army headquarters in November 2003, while 
the first requirements submitted from units in the theater were not 
actually validated until April 2004. As a result, the Army was able to 
begin seeking funding and awarding contracts for design and production 
of armor kits earlier than if it had waited for an official request 
from units in the theater. 

* Addition of armor installation sites. To reduce armor installation 
time, as requirements and production levels for truck armor increased, 
the Army expanded its installation capacity in the CENTCOM area of 
responsibility through the addition of installation sites, going from 
one initial facility in Kuwait to nine facilities in Kuwait, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan between August 2004 and July 2005. As indicated in figure 
1, during this period, production levels increased dramatically from 
220 kits per month in August 2004 to a peak level of almost 1,800 kits 
per month by May 2005. After increasing the numbers of installation 
facilities, according to Army officials, total installation capacity 
has grown from approximately 50 kits per week to more than 350 kits per 
week. 

* Establishment of Joint Staff fusion cell. In December 2004, the Joint 
Staff's Directorate of Logistics established a team, called the Joint 
Armor Fusion Cell, to monitor the progress of the services' armoring 
efforts to enhance visibility of the program to DOD and congressional 
leadership. In addition, the armor fusion cell was established to 
accelerate the availability of armor kits by identifying and fixing 
gaps in the supply chain. For example, the Joint Staff armor fusion 
cell, working with the Army, helped identify and deploy certified 
welders from the Air Force and Navy to assist with production and 
installation of armor in the United States and in the CENTCOM area of 
responsibility, thereby speeding up the availability of truck armor to 
the units. The cell also worked with the U.S. Transportation Command to 
increase the use of airlift for armor kits within the CENTCOM area of 
operations, which reduced the need for ground transportation and 
increased the speed of deliveries to armor installation sites. 

Army Has Developed a Long-term Plan to Address the Availability of 
Truck Armor for Future Operations: 

The Army is taking long-term actions to improve the availability of 
truck armor for future operations through the development of a long- 
term armoring plan. While we did not evaluate the plan's potential for 
success, we did note it is aimed at identifying long-term requirements 
for truck armor and developing solutions to address these requirements. 

The Army's long-term plans, designed to improve the overall 
availability of truck armor for future operations, are outlined in the 
Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Long Term Armoring Strategy. The Army's 
G8 division for programming, analysis, and materiel integration tasked 
TRADOC to develop this plan in January 2005. The Long Term Armoring 
Strategy incorporates the Army's plan to provide add-on armor to its 
tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. Under the plan, add-on armor will 
consist of two kits, one that includes hardware to be placed on the 
vehicle to receive the armor, and another that contains the actual 
armor. The plan also includes provisions to facilitate the production 
and availability of armor. Estimated costs for the armor are based on 
current armor models that use heavy metals, such as steel and aluminum; 
however, according to Army program office officials, they are 
considering the use of lighter metals for greater efficiency but at 
higher costs. 

According to the Long Term Armoring Strategy, its purpose is to 
demonstrate the Army's deliberate process to outline a path forward and 
avoid long response times for providing truck armor in the future. The 
plan further notes that the framework supports a balanced approach for 
procurement of armoring kits that mitigates risk and enhances safety 
and force protection. According to the plan, the end state is a 
tactical wheeled vehicle fleet that provides the commanders with 
flexibility to increase the protection level when needed and ensures 
the Army's ability to rapidly acquire additional kits. The initial 
draft concept was completed in March 2005 and a final plan was 
presented to the G8 division in June 2005. According to the program 
office, Army headquarters approved the plan in August 2005 with a few 
outstanding issues to be resolved. The necessary protection level for 
trucks is based on the Department of the Army's approved threat 
assessment, developed by the intelligence community, which spans 
through 2018. The Long Term Armoring Strategy will be implemented in 
concert with the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer Modularity 
and Modernization Strategy,[Footnote 17] which is aimed at addressing 
the Army's truck needs through fiscal year 2018. 

The Army's long-term plan for add-on armor for trucks requires two 
kits. The A kit provides a basic framework of fixtures for all trucks 
ready to accept armor and includes hard to install parts and permanent 
mounting provisions for the B kit. The B kit contains the actual armor 
to be applied to all trucks fitted with an A kit and includes modular 
components to be installed and removed by two crewmen. The B kits will 
be procured based on operational and training requirements, while all 
trucks will be outfitted with A kits. The A kits will be installed by 
2018 on current trucks during recapitalization and on newly produced 
vehicles at the factory. The second quarter of fiscal year 2006 is the 
program manager's proposed deadline to begin installing all trucks with 
A kits; however, as of September 2005 the date was not finalized. 
Program officials advocate the use of lighter materials for producing 
the kits instead of the heavier metals currently being used. According 
to these officials, lighter materials like ceramics are more expensive 
but could provide greater efficiencies such as reducing the amount of 
weight on a vehicle, preventing wear and tear, and allowing for more 
weight to be apportioned for operational purposes. 

The long-term plan includes provisions to facilitate the production and 
availability of armor in the future. As part of the plan, the Army will 
own the blueprints for the armor to expand competition from multiple 
sources and avoid relying on one contractor at critical decision points 
when more kits are needed. According to Army officials, contractors 
currently own the blueprints, and the Army's ability to buy quantities 
on demand could be restricted by the contractors' production 
capabilities. Technical requirements to facilitate the availability of 
armor in the future include maximizing the commonality of kit 
components among vehicles, and ensuring compatibility of the A and B 
kits with future armor upgrades. 

Army program officials stated that preliminary budget estimates for the 
armoring plan have been developed and included in the Army's future 
budget plans for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. However, these 
estimates are based on the costs of the current armor kits produced 
with heavy metals and do not include estimates of the costs of lighter 
armor as advocated by the program office. Final cost estimates and a 
decision about the types of armor to be used have not yet been 
finalized. 

Conclusions: 

A number of challenges hindered the Army's ability to provide truck 
armor in the timeliest manner to its deployed forces operating in the 
Middle East. While some of these challenges may have resulted from 
operational conditions in the region that the Army and DOD had little 
control over, other limitations were a direct result of key decisions 
and ineffective supply processes within the Army and DOD. The 
availability of truck armor was limited by the Army's decision not to 
fully fund previously identified requirements, numerous increases in 
requirements, the Army's inability to timely obtain funding for current 
wartime needs from DOD or within its own budget, and limited industrial 
base resources. 

In our prior report examining critical supply shortages during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, we recommended that the Army take actions to 
address two of these same issues.[Footnote 18] Specifically, we 
recommended the Army expedite the funding process to support timely and 
sufficient funding for wartime requirements, and assess the industrial 
base capacity to minimize acquisition delays. One of these 
recommendations, to assess the industrial base, would also apply to the 
Army's approach to armoring trucks. The other related recommendation to 
improve the timeliness of the funding process was specific to the 
individual types of supplies we examined, and may not be directly 
applicable to truck armor as it was written. 

The results of both our current and prior work indicate a broader 
systemic problem of not documenting and communicating urgent wartime 
funding requirements and the disposition of funding decisions. We 
reported in April 2005 that funding delays also contributed to critical 
wartime shortages of armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, 
and tires, but we could not determine why sufficient funding was not 
provided earlier because adequate documentation of funding requests was 
not available. Without formal documentation and communication of urgent 
wartime funding requirements and the disposition of funding decisions, 
the rationale for funding decisions and the officials and organizations 
accountable for making those decisions may not be subject to effective 
oversight by Congress or the Secretary of Defense. It is likely DOD 
could again face urgent requirements to rapidly develop and produce 
materiel solutions to improve force capability or protection of 
deployed forces. Without improving DOD's ability to provide that 
support to the warfighters in the timeliest manner, deployed military 
personnel and their missions may be placed at significant risk because 
they lack the necessary equipment and supplies at the critical times 
they may be needed. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To ensure funding needs for urgent wartime requirements are identified 
quickly, requests for funding are well documented, and funding 
decisions are based on risk and an assessment of the highest priority 
requirements, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the 
Secretary of the Army to establish a process to document and 
communicate all urgent wartime funding requirements for supplies and 
equipment at the time they are identified and the disposition of 
funding decisions. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the 
intent of our recommendation, but stated that it believes the Army 
Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B) process, previously the ASPB 
process discussed earlier in this report, conforms to the process 
described in our recommendation. As noted by DOD, the AR2B is a forum 
where urgent wartime requirements are reviewed, staffed, and validated. 
However, as demonstrated by our work, once requirements are validated, 
funding must be made available to execute programs to respond to those 
requirements. When sufficient funding is not available in the Army's 
budget for the validated requirement, the Army must seek additional 
funding through DOD. Because, as we noted in this report and in April 
2005, funding requests from the Army to DOD to resource validated 
requirements and the corresponding decisions as to the amount and 
timing of funding to be provided were not adequately documented, we 
were unable to determine the reasons why funding was not made available 
to respond to urgent wartime requirements as needed. In addition, in 
April 2005 we also reported that funding requests for critical wartime 
supplies such as armored vehicle track shoes, lithium batteries, and 
tires also could not be tracked from the Army Materiel Command, where 
they originated, to Army headquarters for validation, which precluded 
our ability to determine why funding for these items lagged behind the 
time the need was identified. We continue to believe these events in 
the funding process for urgent wartime requirements must be fully 
documented to provide effective program oversight and to ensure funding 
decisions are made based on risk and an assessment of the highest 
priority requirements. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix III. 
DOD also provided technical comments that have been incorporated where 
appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and 
the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available 
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no 
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report, 
please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or [Hyperlink, solisw@gao.gov]. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who 
made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

William M. Solis, Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To address our objectives, we examined the Army's programs to produce 
and install armor for each of its medium and heavy tactical wheeled 
vehicles, or trucks, operating in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
area of responsibility, which included Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 
19] The Army trucks we examined included the family of medium tactical 
vehicles (FMTV), heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT), heavy 
equipment transporter (HET), palletized load system (PLS), M915 truck 
tractor, M939 5-ton tactical truck, and fuel tankers. Descriptions of 
each of these trucks along with detailed information on the 
availability of armor for each truck are included in appendix II. 

To determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed 
to meet identified requirements, we interviewed DOD and Army officials 
involved in identifying armor requirements, providing funding, and 
acquiring truck armor for deployed forces. We also met with truck armor 
contractors from the industrial base. A complete list of the DOD and 
other organizations that we met with during this review is found in 
table 4. We also collected and analyzed armor supply data such as 
requirements, funding levels, contract order awards, production levels, 
and installations for the period November 2003 (when truck armor 
requirements were first formally identified) through September 2005, 
which we obtained from the Army based on source documents. We 
considered the armor requirement met for each type of truck when the 
quantity of armor kits installed onto vehicles equaled the requirement. 
We did not, however, visit the CENTCOM area of responsibility to 
validate the extent to which armor kits had been installed and were 
actually in use by trucks. 

Table 4: Organizations Interviewed during Review: 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Arlington, Va. 

Joint Staff, Directorate of Logistics, Arlington, Va. 

U.S. Army: 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and 
Comptroller, Arlington, Va. 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics), Arlington, Va. 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), Arlington, Va. 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, 
Logistics, and Technology, Arlington, Va. 

Program Executive Office Combat Support and Combat Service Support,; 
Project Manager Tactical Vehicles, Warren, Mich. 

U.S. Army Central Command/Coalition Forces Land Component Command 
(Logistics), Fort McPherson, Ga. 

U.S. Army Materiel Command: 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), Fort Belvoir, Va. 

Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Mich. 

Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise, Rock Island, Ill. 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va: 

U.S. Army Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, Va. 

U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Ga. 

National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Va. 

Defense Contract Management Agency, District West, Phoenix, Ariz. 

Armor Holdings, Inc. and Simula, Inc., Phoenix, Ariz. 

Stewart and Stevenson, Inc., Sealy, Tex. 

Radian, Inc., Troy, Mich. 

VSE Corporation, Alexandria, Va. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

To determine what factors affected the time to provide truck armor to 
deployed forces, we analyzed the armor supply data we collected to 
identify trends and isolate factors that impacted the timeliness of 
producing and installing armor. We also met with and collected 
additional information from DOD, Army and armor contractor officials 
involved with the armor acquisition programs to evaluate the 
significance of these factors and to determine the extent of their 
impact on the availability of truck armor. 

To determine what actions DOD and the Army have taken to improve the 
availability of truck armor for current and future operations, we 
interviewed military service and Joint Staff personnel to identify 
short-and long-term efforts to address supply shortages. We also 
reviewed documentation related to addressing future truck armor needs. 
However, we did not evaluate the identified solutions' potential for 
success. 

We assessed the reliability of the truck armor supply data we obtained 
for this review by interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about 
the data and corroborating it with other information gathered from 
other military service organizations and armor contractors, and by 
reviewing existing documentation about the data and the sources that 
produced the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. We performed our audit from 
April 2005 through January 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Assessment of Truck Armoring Efforts: 

We assessed the armoring efforts for each of the following medium and 
heavy trucks: heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks, heavy equipment 
transporters, palletized load systems, M939 5-ton trucks, family of 
medium tactical vehicles, M915 truck family, and tankers. For these 
seven types of trucks we reviewed, each assessment provides the status 
of the armoring efforts at the time of our review. The profile presents 
a general description of the truck and the approach to developing armor 
solutions. The assessments also include our evaluation of the extent to 
which armor kits were produced and installed to meet identified 
requirements and the significant factors that affected armor 
availability. 

The Army's efforts to armor its heavy and medium tactical wheeled 
vehicles have been hindered by awarding contracts for quantities less 
than the total requirement, material shortages, and a limited rate of 
installation. The Army's efforts to armor its trucks experienced 12 to 
18 month delays between when initial requirements were identified and 
when the initial requirements were met, although requirements for all 
vehicles increased over time such that by the time the initial 
requirements were met, the actual requirements were in excess of that 
initial amount. The schedule for contract orders constrained the Army's 
ability to meet requirements for all vehicles except 5-ton trucks. 
Material shortages negatively impacted the Army's ability to meet 
requirements for all vehicles except for medium tactical vehicles and 
tankers. Limited installation rates constrained the availability of 
tanker armor. 

Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck: 

The Army uses its heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) to 
provide transport capabilities for the resupply of various combat 
vehicles and weapons systems. Figure 4 shows an example of a HEMTT. To 
protect the HEMTT crew from enemy fire in Iraq, the Army contracted 
with Simula Inc. to develop and build add-on armor kits for 
installation on HEMTTs. The Army's armoring program involves applying 
armor kits to 2,705 HEMTTs. 

Figure 4: Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Simula developed about 180 armor kits for the HEMTT in 1996 to support 
operations in the Balkans. However, the kits were placed in storage and 
never actually used. When armor requirements were identified for 
operations in Iraq, the Army and Simula retrieved and tested the stored 
kits and subsequently shipped them to southwest Asia for use in Iraq. 
In February 2004, the Army contracted with Simula to begin production 
of new kits. 

Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified 
Requirements: 

Requirements for 1,080 HEMTT armor kits were first identified in 
November 2003, but a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement 
were not installed until February 2005, or 15 months after the first 
requirement was established. Identified requirements continued to grow 
to a level of 2,430 armor kits by March 2005, but dropped slightly in 
September 2005 to 2,246. However, as of September 2005 the total amount 
of kits installed was 2,088, or 158 fewer than the quantity required. 
Figure 5 compares the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit 
requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed. 
According to Army officials, the total number of required armor kits 
was installed by December 2005. 

Figure 5: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced 
and Installed: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits: 

Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the 
HEMTT. First, the Army's lack of timeliness of contract awards over the 
life of the program constrained the overall production schedule. 
Second, a shortage of key materials, specifically steel and aluminum 
negatively impacted the contractor's ability to maximize production in 
the early stages of the program. 

Contracts Constrained Production: 

The Army issued five contracts for HEMTT armor kits, which affected the 
contractor's ability to produce more kits faster. For example, 
according to contractor officials, they have not had capacity 
constraints in the building of HEMTT armor kits; however, they sized 
production capacity to meet the quantities in the contract that the 
contractor had been awarded. Therefore, production levels were lower 
than they could have been if the contractor had received a contract for 
larger quantities of kits upfront, which prevented production of more 
of the kits sooner. One reason for the Army's use of a contract in this 
manner was the fact that funding was received in amounts less than the 
total requirements and initially lagged several months behind 
requirements. As shown in figure 6, the availability of funding 
affected the pace of contract awards. 

Figure 6: Comparison of HEMTT Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and 
Ordered: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Another reason for the lower quantity of contract orders was the 
changing requirements for HEMTT armor kits. For example, armor kit 
production output for the HEMTT dropped to zero in April and May 
because the contractor had completed production for the current 
requirement. However, subsequent contract orders were awarded after the 
contractor had ceased production. By the time that the contractor had 
received the last two contracts for 791 and 319 HEMTT armor kits, 
respectively, production had already stopped, employees and sub- 
contractors were released, and equipment and facility space were given 
up for other uses. Consequently, production of the 791 and 319 kits had 
to wait about two months until the contractor could restart this 
industrial base. 

Although an additional requirement had been identified in March 2005, a 
contract to meet this requirement was not awarded until April 2005, 
which was not soon enough to prevent the stoppage of the production 
line. According to the Army's program manager, to prevent a production 
stoppage the requirement would have had to be identified and the 
contract order issued several months earlier. 

Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production: 

A shortage of armor materials, specifically steel and aluminum, 
negatively impacted the HEMTT armor kit program. Shortages of high hard 
armor steels and aluminum negatively affected the start up and pace of 
production through the end of 2004. The material shortages were 
eventually rectified by the intervention of the Army's Tactical Wheeled 
Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various congressional staff 
appealing directly to the material suppliers. 

Heavy Equipment Transporter: 

The heavy equipment transporter (HET) is a system used by the Army to 
transport, deploy, recover, and evacuate main battle tanks and other 
heavy tracked and wheeled vehicles to and from the battlefield. The HET 
system consists of a truck tractor and HET trailer, as shown in figure 
7. The Army's armoring effort involves applying armor to a total of 796 
HETs. In April 2004, the Army contracted with Simula Inc. to begin 
producing armor kits for the HET. 

Figure 7: Heavy Equipment Transporter: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified 
Requirements: 

Requirements for 500 HET armor kits were first identified in November 
2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement 
were not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first 
requirement was established. Identified requirements continued to grow 
to 758 by March 2005, but dropped in September 2005 to 663. As of 
September 2005 the total number of kits installed was 700, or 37 
greater than the quantity required. Figure 8 compares the time elapsed 
from the identification of armor kit requirements to the time when kits 
were produced and installed. 

Figure 8: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced and 
Installed: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits: 

Two significant factors affected the contractor's ability to produce 
armor kits for the HET. First, the award of contracts over the armoring 
program's life and a lack of contractor visibility into upcoming 
contracts affected HET production. Second, the HET armoring program was 
also negatively impacted by a material shortage. 

Contracts Constrained Production: 

The Army issued four contracts for the HET, which lagged behind 
requirements. This limited the contractor's ability to maximize 
production of HET kits. Specifically, contractor officials told us that 
they did not have capacity constraints in the building of HET armor 
kits; however, they sized production capacity to meet the quantities in 
the contract orders that they had been awarded. Therefore, production 
levels were lower than they could have been if the contractor had 
received contract orders for larger quantities of kits upfront, which 
prevented production of more of the kits sooner. Significant reasons 
for awarding less than the total requirements were changing 
requirements and delayed and less than the total funding. Figure 9 
demonstrates the relationship among timing of requirements, funding, 
and contracts. 

Figure 9: Comparison of HET Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and 
Ordered: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

A lack of contractor visibility into upcoming contract awards also 
affected HET production. Specifically, the Army awarded a contract for 
131 additional HET add-on-armor kits in April 2005. However, in 
February 2005 the contractor's supply base had completed production for 
HET components related to the previous contract order for 66 HET kits. 
Consequently, the supply base required two months to reinitiate 
production of these components from a cold start. If the contractor had 
had visibility into the upcoming contract, it could have maintained the 
needed supply base and reduced production time for the additional 131 
HETs by 2 months. 

Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production: 

The HET armoring program was also negatively impacted by a material 
shortage. The shortage of materials, specifically of high-hard armor 
steels and aluminum, affected the start up of heavy tactical vehicle 
contract orders and the pace of production through the end of 2004. The 
material shortages were eventually rectified by the intervention of the 
Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various 
congressional staff appealing directly to the material suppliers. 

Palletized Load System: 

The Army's palletized load system (PLS) performs long distance and 
local haul, and unit resupply in the tactical environment to support 
combat units. The PLS is supposed to facilitate the rapid movement of 
combat configured loads of ammunition as well as all classes of 
supplies and containers. The PLS consists of a truck with self-loading 
capabilities and a trailer, as shown in figure 10. 

Figure 10: Palletized Load System: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

According to contractor officials, the Army's Tank-Automotive Research, 
Development and Engineering Center had developed and built around 30 
armored kits to support operations in the Balkans; however, the kits 
were placed in storage and never used. Subsequently, when armor 
requirements were identified for operations in Iraq, the Army retrieved 
the kits from storage and shipped them to southwest Asia for use in 
Iraq. In February 2004, the Army issued contract orders to Simula Inc. 
to produce additional PLS armor kits. Simula Inc. has completed 
production of a total of 1,282 armor kits, which satisfies the current 
requirement for 914 armor kits and provides 368 spare PLS armor kits 
for future requirements. 

Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified 
Requirements: 

Requirements for 800 PLS armor kits were first identified in November 
2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement 
were not installed until May 2005, or 18 months after the first 
requirement was established. By March 2005, the identified requirements 
had increased by 114, which were met in July 2005. In September 2005, 
the identified requirements increased again by 30, which were met in 
September 2005. Figure 11 compares the time elapsed from the 
identification of armor kit requirements to the time when kits were 
produced and installed. In anticipation of a greater requirement, the 
Army program office ordered 338 kits above the Army's current 
requirement. 

Figure 11: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced 
and Installed: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits: 

Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the 
PLS. First, the Army's use of contracts for quantities less than total 
requirements over the life of the program constrained the overall 
production schedule. Second, a shortage of key materials, specifically 
steel and aluminum, negatively impacted the contractor's ability to 
maximize production. 

Contracts Constrained Production: 

The Army issued four contracts for PLS kits, which initially lagged 
behind requirements and affected the contractor's ability to maximize 
the production of PLS kits. According to contractor officials, they 
have not had capacity constraints in the building of PLS armor kits; 
however, they sized production capacity to meet the quantities in the 
contracts that the contractor had been issued. Therefore, production 
levels were lower than they could have been if the contractor had 
received contracts for larger quantities of kits upfront, which 
prevented the production of more of the kits sooner. Significant 
reasons for awards for less than the total requirements were changing 
requirements and delayed and less than total funding. Figure 12 
demonstrates the relationship among timing of requirements, funding, 
and contracts. 

Figure 12: Comparison of PLS Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and 
Ordered: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production: 

The PLS armoring program was also negatively impacted by material 
shortages. The shortage of materials, specifically of high-hard armor 
steels and aluminum, affected the start up of heavy tactical vehicle 
contract orders and the pace of production through the end of 2004. The 
material shortages were eventually rectified by the intervention of the 
Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Office to set priorities and by various 
Congressional staff appealing directly to the material suppliers. 

M939 5-Ton Truck: 

The Army's M939 5-ton tactical truck is a general-purpose military 
vehicle, primarily designed for tactical, off-road use. The M-939 is a 
5-ton capacity, six-wheel drive cargo truck used for transportation of 
all types of supplies and comes in various vehicle types, including a 
cargo truck, dump truck, and wrecker. Figure 13 shows an example of an 
M-939 5-ton truck. 

Figure 13: M939 5-Ton Truck: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The M939 5-ton truck armoring effort includes manufacturing armoring 
kits for 3,000 5-ton trucks at six army facilities through a program 
manager agreement with the Army's Ground Systems Industrial Enterprise 
(GSIE).[Footnote 20] GSIE began producing truck kits in December 2004 
and completed the last kits in July 2005. 

Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified 
Requirements: 

Requirements for 2,229 M939 5-ton truck armor kits were first 
identified in April 2004; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet 
that requirement were not produced until June 2005, or 14 months after 
the first requirement was established. As of September 2005, 2,224 kits 
had been installed. Identified requirements grew to 3,073 by August 
2004, but dropped 2,688 by March 2005, and dropped again slightly in 
September 2005 to 2,592. By June 2005 a sufficient quantity of kits had 
been produced to meet those requirements. Figure 14 compares the time 
elapsed from the identification of armor kit requirements to the time 
when kits were produced and installed. The Army estimated the required 
quantity of kits would have been installed by January 2006. According 
to GSIE officials, GSIE does not anticipate any further production 
orders for the M939 armor kits. 

Figure 14: Comparison of M939 5-Ton Truck Armor Kit Requirements to 
Kits Produced and Installed: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Availability of Armor Kits: 

Shortages of material negatively impacted the production of M939 5-ton 
armor kits. According to GSIE officials, the production capacity for 
the 5-ton truck armor kits was established based on the availability of 
material and components that are used to build the armor kits. When 
GSIE was asked to accelerate the production of M939 5-ton kits, the 
lack of availability of certain materials limited GSIE's ability to 
increase the production quantity of the armor kit. Examples of items 
that were difficult to obtain included armor grade steel, door handles, 
and wiper components. 

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles: 

The Army's family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV) addresses medium 
tactical-vehicle requirements for unit mobility and unit resupply, and 
transportation of equipment and personnel. The FMTV consists of the 
Light Medium Tactical Vehicle, which has a 2.5-ton capacity, and the 
Medium Tactical Vehicle, which has a 5-ton capacity. Variants of the 
FMTV include cargo trucks and tractor, van, wrecker, and dump truck 
models. The FMTV armoring effort involves producing a total of 3,890 
armor kits. 

The FMTV armoring production is split between two separate contractors, 
Radian Inc. and Stewart and Stevenson Inc. The Army's Tank-Automotive 
Research, Development and Engineering Center designed and produced a 
small number (approximately 35) of FMTV armor kits with components that 
bolt onto the cab. In March 2003, the Army arranged for Radian to help 
with the installation of these kits onto vehicles. In February 2004, 
Radian received a contract to produce 270 kits based on the Army 
design. The kit being produced by Radian is called the Radian Armor 
Crew Kit (RACK). Figure 15 shows an example of an FMTV RACK truck. 
Stewart and Stevenson produces an armored cab, called the Low Signature 
Armored Cab (LSAC), that replaces the FMTV cab in its entirety. Figure 
16 shows an example of an FMTV LSAC truck. On its own initiative, in 
2002, Stewart and Stevenson developed an FMTV armored cab design to 
protect against mine blasts. Subsequent to its first armored cab 
design, Stewart and Stevenson modified its design based on the emerging 
threats in Iraq, and in October 2004, after completing design and 
testing, received its initial contract from the Army to produce 385 
LSAC cabs. 

Figure 15: FMTV RACK Truck: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Figure 16: FMTV LSAC Truck: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified 
Requirements: 

Requirements for 1,150 FMTV armor kits were first identified in 
November 2003; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that 
requirement were not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the 
first requirement was established. Identified requirements continued to 
grow to 3,335 by March 2005, and again to 3,377 by September 2005. 
However, as of September 2005 only 3,053 RACK and LSAC kits had been 
installed, or 324 fewer than the quantity required. Figure 17 compares 
the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit requirements to 
the time when kits were produced and installed. According to Army 
officials, the total number of required armor kits was installed by 
December 2005. 

Figure 17: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced 
and Installed: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Contracts Constrained Production: 

Orders for FMTV armor kits were awarded for less than the total 
requirement and lagged behind requirements. These contracts slowed 
production of armor kits for both FMTV contractors. For Radian, there 
was a complete break in production because the final contract for 1,049 
FMTV armor kits was received after its long lead time for ordering 
items needed to maintain continuous production. According to the Radian 
officials, production could have been maintained or even accelerated if 
the requirements had been identified and funding provided in time to 
meet the long lead time. However, the contractor did not have any 
visibility into the pending requirements and was told by the Army that 
there would be no further contracts for kits. In addition, according to 
a Stewart and Stevenson official, if they had been awarded the contract 
for the final 292 armor kits in the March/April 2005 time frame, they 
could have finished producing the kits in the July/August 2005 time 
frame, or 3 months earlier than the October/November 2005 time frame 
when the kits were estimated to be completed. Significant reasons for 
ordering in this manner were changing requirements and delayed and less 
than total funding. Figure 18 demonstrates the relationship between 
timing of requirements, funding, and contracts. 

Figure 18: Comparison of FMTV Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and 
Ordered: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Contracts Affected Price: 

The award of contracts in quantities less than total requirements 
resulted in the Army not receiving the best price available for the 
RACK. The Army ordered FMTV kits from Radian in increments of 270 and 
501 in February 2004 and March 2004, respectively. The 270 kits that 
the government ordered did not allow for receiving the highest price 
break for production quantities, while the 501 kits the government 
ordered allowed for the best price break available. For the 272 kit 
contract, the cost was about $51,603 for each kit, and for the 501 kit 
contract, the cost was $45,271 for each kit, a difference of $6,332 per 
kit. According to the Army program officials, the reason there were two 
contract awards was that funding was not available for the full 
quantity in February 2004. 

M915 Truck Family: 

The Army's family of M915 trucks comprises highway tractors used 
primarily for the long distance transport of containers. The M915 is 
very similar to commercial tractor-trailer trucks. Figure 19 
illustrates an M915 truck. To protect the M915 crew from enemy fire in 
Iraq, the Army contracted with Simula Inc., Radian Inc. and Armor Works 
Inc. to develop and build add-on armor kits. The Army's armoring 
program involves producing armor kits for 2,026 M915s. 

Figure 19: M915 Truck Tractor: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified 
Requirements: 

Requirements for 250 M915 truck armor kits were first identified in 
November 2003, but a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement 
were not installed until March 2005, or 16 months after the first 
requirement was established. Identified requirements continued to grow 
to 1,877 armor kits by March 2005, but dropped slightly in September 
2005 to 1,805. However, as of September 2005 the total number of kits 
installed was 1,295, or 510 fewer than the quantity required. Figure 20 
compares the time elapsed from the identification of armor kit 
requirements to the time when kits were produced and installed. Army 
officials estimated that the total number of required armor kits would 
have been installed by January 2006. 

Figure 20: Comparison of M915 Family of Trucks Armor Kit Requirements 
to Kits Produced and Installed: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits: 

Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for the 
M915. First, the Army's award of contracts for less than the total 
requirement over the life of the program constrained production. 
Second, a shortage of key materials, specifically steel and aluminum, 
negatively impacted the contractor's ability to maximize production. 

Contracts Constrained Production: 

Contracts for the M915 truck armor kits were awarded in quantities less 
than the total requirement and generally lagged behind requirements. 
This manner of contracting for M915 armor kits constrained production, 
particularly for Simula. The Army issued four contracts to Simula for 
1,228 of the M915 armor kits over a 9-month period. According to Simula 
officials, they subcontracted the workload to Plasan Sasa in Israel 
based on the first contract of 250. However, subsequent to the first 
contract, the Army validated additional requirements of 1,627 kits 
between April 2004 and March 2005. However, Simula was not aware when 
the first contract was awarded that the total quantities could 
eventually exceed 1,600. Had the contractor been aware of this, it 
would have proceeded differently from the outset, such as using a 
different manufacturer. By the time the additional contracts came into 
Simula, Plasan Sasa was facing capacity constraints in the production 
of the M915 armor kits. Unable to overcome the capacity constraints at 
Plasan Sasa, Simula negotiated with Plasan Sasa to bring some of the 
M915 production to the United States. In total, Simula arranged to 
complete 738 of the 1,228 M915 armor kits in the United States. 
Significant reasons for awarding contracts in this manner were changing 
requirements and delayed and less than total funding. Figure 21 
demonstrates the relationship among timing of requirements, funding, 
and contracts. 

Figure 21: Comparison of M915 Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Funded and 
Ordered: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Material Shortages Negatively Impacted Production: 

Shortages of strategic armor materials negatively impacted M915 armor 
kit production. Shortages of high-hard armor steels and aluminum 
affected the start up of contract orders and the pace of production 
through the end of 2004. The material shortages were eventually 
rectified by the intervention of the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle 
Office to set priorities and by various congressional staff appeals 
directly to the material suppliers. 

Tankers: 

The Army uses its tankers to haul and dispense bulk fuel. There are 
four models of fuel tankers involved in the Army's armoring program: 
the M967, the M969, the M978, and the M1062. Figure 22 shows an example 
of an M969 tanker. The primary component of the tanker armoring effort 
is a self-sealing coating material that is sprayed onto the exterior of 
the fuel tank. When a small arms round penetrates the coating material 
and the fuel tank, the hole self-seals and the fuel leak is stopped 
within minutes. The second component of tanker armoring comprises armor 
panel kits mounted at select locations on the fuel tanker to protect 
critical equipment not protected by the coating material. VSE 
Corporation is applying the self-sealing coating to the tankers and is 
manufacturing the armor kit for the M967, the M969, and the M1062 
tankers. Oshkosh Truck Corporation is manufacturing the armor kit for 
the M978 tanker. 

Figure 22: An M969 Tanker: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Extent Armor Kits Were Produced and Installed to Meet Identified 
Requirements: 

Requirements for armoring 371 tankers were first identified in August 
2004; however, a sufficient number of kits to meet that requirement 
were not produced and installed until August 2005, 12 months after the 
initial requirement was identified. Identified requirements have 
continued to grow to 1,375 armor kits by January 2005, but dropped in 
September 2005 to 1,192. However, as of September 2005 the total amount 
of armor kits installed was 443, or 749 fewer than the quantity 
required. Figure 23 compares the time elapsed from the identification 
of armor kit requirements to the time when kits were produced and 
installed. Army officials estimate that the total number of required 
armor kits will be produced by May 2006 and installed by January 2007. 

Figure 23: Comparison of Tanker Armor Kit Requirements to Kits Produced 
and Installed: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Significant Factors Affecting Availability of Armor Kits: 

Two significant factors affected the availability of armor kits for 
tankers. First, the Army's award of contracts for less than the total 
requirement over the life of the program constrained production. 
Second, installation of armor kits was constrained by a limited rate of 
rotation for tankers into installation facilities and unique 
requirements for applying the protective spray-on coating. 

Contracts Constrained Availability of Armor Kits: 

The production time line for one of the armor kits, for the M967 
tanker, is longer than it would have been if contract awards had been 
for the total requirement. The Army awarded two contracts for M967 
armoring with quantities of 171 and 152, with an 8-month interval 
between the two contracts. According to the contractor, if all 323 
tanker kits had been awarded together, the total production time line 
would have decreased due to production efficiencies. Contracts for the 
other three tankers, the M969, the M978, and the M1062, were awarded 
for the total requirement and, therefore, the contractor stated that 
production has gone as efficiently as possible. 

Limited Installation Rates Paced Availability of Armor Kits: 

A significant factor that affected the availability of armor kits for 
tanker trailers was a limited installation rate. For example, the 
installation of add-on armor kits was slowed by the rate of rotation of 
trucks into the in-theater installation facilities as they returned 
from missions. Operational constraints limited the number of vehicles 
that could be taken out of use at any one time. In addition, unique 
requirements to coat the tankers with a protective chemical prior to 
installing armor panels also limited the rate of installation. The 
proper application of the chemical coating requires controlled 
environmental conditions, such as humidity and temperature, which has 
led to a limited number of spray locations accessible to the Army. 
Thus, although production of armor kits for tankers is expected to be 
completed by May 2006, because of these constraints, installation of 
enough kits to meet requirements is not expected to be finished until 8 
months later in January 2007. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: 
ACQUISITION TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS: 
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON: 
WASHINGTON DC 20301-3000: 

Mr. William M. Solis: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Solis: 

This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report, 
DEFENSE LOGISTICS: Several Factors Limited the Production and 
Installation of Army Truck Armor during current Wartime Operations, 
dated January 30, 2006 (GAO Code 350658/GAO-06-160). 

The Department concurs with the intent of the recommendation in the 
draft report. Our specific comments concerning the recommendation, as 
well as minor editorial comments, are attached. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. 

Mark D. Schaeffer: 
Acting Director: 
Defense Systems: 

Attachment: As stated: 

GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED JANUARY 30, 2006 
GAO CODE 350658/GAO-06-160: 

"DEFENSE LOGISTICS: Several Factors Limited the Production and 
Installation of Army Truck Armor during Current Wartime Operations" 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS: 

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to establish a process to document and 
communicate all urgent wartime funding requirements for supplies and 
equipment at the time they are identified and the disposition of 
funding decisions. (p. 35/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD RESPONSE: Concur with intent. The Army Requirements and Resourcing 
Board (AR2B) conforms to the process described in the GAO 
recommendation. 

As referenced in the report, the Army Strategic Planning Board (ASPB) 
was established to manage the Army's transition to a wartime focus in 
response to the attacks in New York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania 
on September 11, 2001. The ASPB was an element of the Army Strategic 
Campaign Plan for the War on Terrorism. In December 2004, the ASPB was 
merged with the Army's Setting the Force General Officer Steering 
Committee to form the AR2B. 

The AR2B serves as the venue for cross-leveling information and 
requirements to include urgent wartime requirements for supplies and 
equipment with corresponding resourcing solutions. AR2B includes 
representation from all major Headquarters Department of the Army staff 
sections, Army Material Command, Multinational Force-Iraq, Army 
European Command, and Army Pacific Command. This process synchronizes 
Army Staff agency and Major Commands executing war support and 
reconstitution efforts as they interface with their Joint Staff and 
Army counterparts. The AR2B is the mechanism for presenting critical 
information to the Army Senior Leadership for rapid-decision making, 
through weekly Executive Updates. The AR2B functions as an iterative 
and adaptive forum to provide an integrating framework to organize and 
synchronize support for the Army Campaign Plan and the Global War on 
Terrorism. It provides a bridge between national strategic guidance, 
national military guidance, and Major Command/Army Service Component 
Command plans and efforts. The AR2B links near-term demands in the Year 
of Execution and Budget Year for resource realignment, and provide a 
framework for future planning and analysis that enables responsive risk 
mitigation. The AR2B is a forum where numerous urgent wartime 
requirements are presented as operational needs from Combatant 
Commanders and are reviewed, staffed, and validated. The AR2B has 
developed recommendations to the Army Senior Leadership for over 3200 
tasks in support of immediate Combatant Commander needs. The 
accelerated process is completed within 2 weeks to 2 months, as opposed 
to the normal 12-24 months for routine budget processes. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements: 

GAO Contact: 

William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or [Hyperlink, solisw@gao.gov]: 

Acknowledgements: 

In addition to the contact named above, David Schmitt, Assistant 
Director; Renee S. Brown, Judith C. Collins, Kenneth E. Patton, Richard 
G. Payne, Jay Rangaram, Maria-Alaina I. Rambus, Paulina T. Reaves, Cary 
B. Russell, Patricia Sari-Spear, Rebecca Shea, and John D. Strong also 
made key contributions to this report. 

(350658): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] DOD relies on a number of individual processes and activities, 
known collectively as supply chain management, to purchase, produce, 
and deliver products and services to the warfighter during contingency 
operations. The goal of supply chain management is to deliver the 
"right items" to the "right place" at the "right time." 

[2] GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the 
Effectiveness of Logistics Activities During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
GAO-04-305R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2003). 

[3] GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability 
of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005). 

[4] CENTCOM is one of DOD's five geographic combatant commands, whose 
area of responsibility encompasses 27 countries in Southwest Asia, 
South and Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa. In addition to OIF, 
CENTCOM is involved in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. 
The other four geographic combatant commands are U.S. European Command, 
U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Northern Command. 

[5] The Army also developed armor for HMMWVs, a light tactical wheeled 
vehicle. We examined issues affecting the production of armor for 
HMMWVs in our prior report on wartime supply availability, so we did 
not include them in this review. See GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions 
Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items during Current and 
Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005). 

[6] Other force protection measures taken include the fielding of 
personal body armor and electronic IED countermeasures, as well as 
changes to unit level tactics and training. 

[7] The ASPB was established by the Army on September 14, 2001 in 
response to the terrorists attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., and 
Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001. The charter of the ASPB is to 
manage the Army's rapid transition to a wartime focus as well as 
sustain the Army's continuing contribution to homeland security and the 
war against terrorism. 

[8] The services are allowed to reprogram, without DOD approval, a 
total of up to $20 million per year into the procurement account that 
includes armor kits. However, because the funding needed for armor kits 
exceeded this amount, the services had to request approval for any 
funding reprogramming in excess of the $20 million from the DOD 
Comptroller, which in turn had to be approved by Congress. 

[9] The Iraqi Freedom Fund is a special account providing funds for 
additional expenses for military forces in Iraq and those operations 
authorized by Pub. L. No. 107-40 (Sept. 13, 2001), Authorization for 
Use of Military Force, and other operations and related activities in 
support of the global war on terrorism. 

[10] GSIE comprises Anniston Army Depot, Red River Army Depot, Sierra 
Army Depot, Rock Island Arsenal, Watervliet Arsenal, the Lima Tank 
Plant (a government-owned, contractor-operated facility), and a 
business center staff located at Rock Island Arsenal. GSIE's objective 
is to operate as a single business unit, efficiently using the 
industrial capabilities of each installation while simultaneously 
transforming those capabilities to meet the needs of Army forces. 
GSIE's goal is to continuously improve support to the soldiers and 
reduce the cost of GSIE products and services. 

[11] In March 2005 the Army validated a requirement for 13,377 trucks 
and tankers, which was the last validated requirement for truck armor. 
However, in September 2005, the total requirement decreased slightly to 
12,819 based on revised nonvalidated needs from units in the theater. 

[12] During this time, the need for and operational capabilities 
required of new systems were documented in an ORD, which is a statement 
containing operational effectiveness, suitability, and related 
operational parameters for a proposed concept or system. ORDs were 
approved by the Commander of TRADOC. In 2003, the ORD was replaced by 
the Capability Development Document and the Capability Production 
Document in accordance with a new joint requirements determination 
process as part of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System. 

[13] These kits included approximately 182 kits for the HEMTT and 32 
kits for the PLS. 

[14] In March 2005 the Army validated a requirement for 13,377 trucks 
and tankers, which was the last validated requirement for truck armor. 
However, in September 2005, the total requirement decreased slightly to 
12,819 based on revised nonvalidated needs from units in the theater. 

[15] Funding requirements and availability data provided includes armor 
kits for HMMWVs as well as medium and heavy tactical trucks. 

[16] GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability 
of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005). 

[17] The purpose of the Army's Tactical Wheeled Vehicle and Trailer 
Modularity and Modernization Strategy is to lay out a comprehensive 
strategy for meeting modularity requirements and modernizing the 
current tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. The strategy aims to fill 
shortages of vehicles through new tactical wheeled vehicle 
procurements; modernize the fleet through recapitalization of existing 
vehicles and acquisition of new vehicles; conduct future competition 
for certain trucks in fiscal year 2007; and use advanced concept and 
technology demonstrations and analysis of alternative results to 
determine whether to improve the future vehicle fleet by either 
continuing modernization or beginning a new program. 

[18] GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability 
of Critical Items during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005). 

[19] The Army also developed armor for HMMWVs, a light tactical wheeled 
vehicle. We examined issues affecting the timely production of armor 
for HMMWVs in our prior report on wartime supply availability, so we 
did not include them in this review. See GAO, Defense Logistics: 
Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items during 
Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 
2005). 

[20] GSIE is composed of Anniston Army Depot, Red River Army Depot, 
Sierra Army Depot, Rock Island Arsenal, Watervliet Arsenal, the Lima 
Tank Plant (a government-owned, contractor-operated facility), and a 
business center staff located at TACOM Rock Island. GSIE's objective is 
to operate as a single business unit, efficiently utilizing the 
industrial capabilities of each installation, while simultaneously 
transforming those capabilities to meet the needs of the Army. 

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