This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-04-342 
entitled 'Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance 
DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts' which was released on March 18, 
2004.

This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a 
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately.

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives: 

United States General Accounting Office: 

GAO: 

March 2004: 

Force Structure: 

Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
Efforts: 

GAO-04-342: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-04-342, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Committee on Armed Services 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been 
under development for defense applications since the 1980s. UAVs were 
used in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003 to observe, track, 
target, and strike enemy forces. These successes have heightened 
interest in UAVs within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 
services. 

GAO was asked to (1) determine how much funding DOD requested, was 
appropriated, and was obligated for major UAV development efforts 
during fiscal years 1999-2003 and (2) assess whether DODís approach to 
planning for UAVs provides reasonable assurance that its investment in 
UAVs will facilitate their integration into the force structure.


What GAO Found: 

During the past 5 fiscal years, Congress provided more funding for UAV 
development and procurement than requested by DOD, and to date the 
services have obligated most of these funds. To promote rapid 
employment of UAVs, Congress has provided nearly $2.7 billion for UAV 
development and procurement compared with the $2.3 billion requested by 
DOD. Because Congress has appropriated more funds than requested, the 
services are able to acquire systems at a greater rate than planned. 
For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Air Force requested $23 million 
to buy 7 Predator UAVs, but Congress provided over $131 millionóenough 
to buy 29 Predators.

DODís approach to planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not 
provide reasonable assurance that its investment in UAVs will 
facilitate their integration into the force structure efficiently, 
although DOD has taken positive steps to improve the UAV programís 
management. In 2001 DOD established a joint Planning Task Force in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. To communicate its vision and 
promote commonality of UAV systems, in 2002, the Task Force published 
the UAV Roadmap, which describes current programs, identifies potential 
missions, and provides guidance on emerging technologies. While the 
Roadmap identifies guidance and priority goals for UAV development, 
neither it nor other key documents represent a comprehensive strategic 
plan to ensure that the services and DOD agencies develop systems that 
complement each other, perform all required missions, and avoid 
duplication. Moreover, the Task Force serves in an advisory capacity to 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, but has little authority to enforce program direction. 
Service officials indicated that their service-specific planning 
documents were developed to meet their own needs and operational 
concepts without considering those of other services. Without a 
strategic plan and an oversight body with sufficient authority to 
enforce program direction, DOD risks fielding a poorly integrated UAV 
force structure, which could increase costs and the risk of future 
interoperability problems.

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD (1) establish a strategic plan to guide UAV 
development and fielding and (2) designate the UAV Task Force or other 
appropriate body to oversee the planís implementation, ensuring that 
sufficient authority is provided. DOD partially concurred with one 
recommendation and disagreed with the other, saying it did not need to 
provide more authority for an organization within the department. GAO 
continues to support both recommendations because of growth in the 
number and cost of UAV programs and their importance to military 
capabilities.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-342.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Neal P. Curtin (202) 
512-4914 or curtinn@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Congressional Funding for UAVs Has Met or Exceeded DOD's Requests: 

DOD Lacks Assurance That Its Planning Will Efficiently Integrate UAVs 
into the Force Structure: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: UAV Funding Requests, Appropriations, and Obligations, Fiscal 
Years 1999-2003: 

Table 2: UAV Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Funding 
Requests, Appropriations, and Obligations, Fiscal Years 1999-2003: 

Table 3: UAV Procurement Funding Requests, Appropriations, and 
Obligations, Fiscal Years 1999-2003: 

Table 4: Framework for Strategic Planning: 

Abbreviations: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

GAO: General Accounting Office: 

UAV; unmanned aerial vehicle: 

United States General Accounting Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

March 17, 2004: 

The Honorable Curt Weldon: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been 
under development for defense applications since the 1980s. UAVs won 
considerable acceptance during military operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq in 2002 and 2003. They were used in these operations to observe, 
track, target, and in some cases strike enemy forces. These and similar 
successes have heightened interest in UAVs within the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and the services. In fact, by 2010, DOD plans to have at 
least 14 different UAVs in the force structure to perform a variety of 
missions.

Given the evolution of UAVs to an operational status, you asked us to 
review DOD's overall planning effort to establish, maintain, and 
operate UAVs. As agreed with your office, we (1) analyzed the extent to 
which DOD requested, was appropriated and was obligated funds for major 
UAV development efforts during fiscal years 1999-2003 and (2) assessed 
whether DOD's approach to planning for UAVs provides reasonable 
assurance that its investment in UAVs will facilitate their integration 
into the force structure.

To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed DOD documentation 
from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2003 for UAV-related procurement 
and research, development, test, and evaluation funding. We obtained 
and examined key departmentwide strategic documents--including the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2002 UAV Roadmap[Footnote 1]--to 
identify the level of DOD's strategic planning for UAVs across the 
department. Additionally, we met with key Office of the Secretary of 
Defense activities and the Joint Staff, as well as key service 
organizations involved in developing UAV force structure planning 
documents. Further information on our scope and methodology appears in 
appendix I.

We performed our work from June 2003 to February 2004 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief: 

During the past 5 fiscal years, Congress provided funding for UAV 
development and procurement that exceeds the amounts requested by DOD, 
and to date the services have obligated about 99 percent of these 
funds. To promote rapid employment of UAVs, Congress appropriated 
nearly $2.7 billion to develop and acquire UAVs from fiscal year 1999 
through fiscal year 2003 compared with the $2.3 billion requested by 
DOD. The majority of the funds--$1.8 billion (67 percent)--have been 
for UAV research, development, test and evaluation. Only three systems 
over these 5 years--the Air Force's Predator and Global Hawk, and the 
Army's Shadow--have matured to the point that they required procurement 
funding, amounting to about $880 million by fiscal year 2003 and 
another estimated $938 million needed by fiscal year 2005. Because 
Congress has appropriated more funds than requested, the services are 
able to acquire systems at a greater rate than planned. For example, in 
fiscal year 2003, the Air Force requested $23 million to buy 7 Predator 
UAVs, but Congress provided over $131 million--enough to buy 29 
Predators. The Air Force has obligated 71 percent of the Predator's 
fiscal year 2003 funding during its first program year.

DOD's approach to planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not 
provide reasonable assurance that its investment in UAVs will 
facilitate their integration into the force structure efficiently, 
although DOD has taken certain positive steps to improve the UAV 
program's management. To help manage UAV development, in 2001 DOD 
established the joint Planning Task Force in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense to promote a common vision for UAV-related efforts 
and to establish interoperability standards. To communicate its vision 
and promote UAV interoperability, the Task Force issued the 2002 UAV 
Roadmap, which describes current programs, identifies potential 
missions for UAVs, and provides guidance on developing emerging 
technologies. While DOD's Roadmap provides strategic guidance for the 
development of UAV technology and suggests priority goals for 
developing the technology, neither the Roadmap nor other defense 
planning documents represent a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure 
that the services and other DOD agencies focus development efforts on 
systems that complement each other, will perform the range of priority 
missions needed, and avoid duplication. Consequently, officials from 
each of the services indicated that service-specific UAV roadmaps that 
were recently developed primarily address the services' requirements 
and operational concepts without the benefit of a departmentwide UAV 
strategic plan. Moreover, the Task Force does not have program 
directive authority and serves only in an advisory capacity to the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics. 
As such, the Task Force cannot compel the services to adopt any of its 
suggestions. Without a strategic plan and an oversight body with 
sufficient authority to implement the plan, DOD has little assurance 
that its investment in UAVs will be effectively integrated into the 
force structure. Consequently, DOD risks poorly integrating UAVs into 
the force structure, which could increase development, procurement, and 
logistics costs, and increase the risk of future interoperability 
problems.

To enhance management control over the UAV program, we are recommending 
that the Secretary of Defense establish a strategic plan by modifying 
the Roadmap or developing another document to guide UAV development and 
fielding, and designate the UAV Task Force or another appropriate 
organization to oversee the strategic plan's implementation, providing 
it with sufficient authority to effectively enforce the plan's 
direction, and promote joint operations and efficient expenditure of 
funds. DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation and 
disagreed with the second, saying it did not need to provide more 
authority to an organization within the department. We continue to 
support both recommendations, however, because we believe the growth in 
number and cost of UAV programs, and their importance to military 
capabilities, will need more centralized oversight by DOD.

Background: 

DOD defines a UAV as a powered aerial vehicle that does not carry a 
human operator; can be land-, air-, or ship-launched; uses aerodynamic 
forces to provide lift; can be autonomously or remotely piloted; can be 
expendable or recoverable; and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. 
Generally, UAVs consist of the aerial vehicle, a flight control 
station, information and retrieval or processing stations, and 
sometimes wheeled land vehicles that carry launch and recovery 
platforms.

Evolution of UAV Development and Use: 

UAVs have been used in a variety of forms and for a variety of missions 
for many years. After the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 spy plane in 
1960, certain UAVs were developed to monitor Soviet and Chinese nuclear 
testing. Israel used UAVs to locate Syrian radars and was able to 
destroy the Syrian air defense system in Lebanon in 1982. The United 
States has used UAVs in the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Operation 
Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom for intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance missions and to attack a vehicle 
carrying suspected terrorists in Yemen in 2002. The United States is 
also considering using UAVs to assist with border security for homeland 
security or homeland defense.

Battlefield commanders' need for real time intelligence has been a key 
reason for the renewed interest in UAVs. According to the Congressional 
Research Service, UAVs are relatively lightweight and often difficult 
to detect. Additional advantages include longer operational presence, 
greater operations and/or procurement cost-effectiveness, and no risk 
of loss of life of U.S. service members.[Footnote 2]

DOD operates three UAV types--small, tactical, and medium altitude 
endurance--in its force structure. The Air Force has operated the MQ-1 
Predator since 1996 in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
missions, using a variety of sensors and satellite data links to relay 
information, and in an offensive combat role using Hellfire missiles. 
The Air Force also operates a small UAV called Desert Hawk, a 5-pound 
aerial surveillance system used by security personnel to improve 
situational awareness for force protection. The Army, Navy, and Marine 
Corps have at various times operated the RQ-2 Pioneer since 1986. Only 
operated by the Marine Corps today, the Pioneer provides targeting, 
intelligence, and surveillance. The Marine Corps also operates a small 
UAV called Dragon Eye for over-the-hill reconnaissance. This small, 
4.5-pound UAV is currently in full-rate production. Originally 
envisioned to be a joint Army/Navy/Marine Corps program, the RQ-5 
Hunter was cancelled in 1996 after low-rate initial production. The 
Army currently operates the residual Hunters for intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Army also has selected the RQ-7 
Shadow to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance at the 
brigade level, and full-rate production was approved in 2002. Another 
system, the Raven, a small, 4-pound UAV is being purchased commercially 
off the shelf by both the Army for regular unit support and the Air 
Force for special operations. Numerous other UAVs of various sizes 
remain in development. These include the RQ-4 Global Hawk, a nearly 
27,000-pound, jet-powered UAV with a wing span of over 116 feet used 
for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance over an area of up 
to 40,000 square nautical miles per day; the RQ-8 Fire Scout, a 
vertical takeoff and landing UAV weighing nearly 2,700 pounds; and the 
Neptune, weighing under 100 pounds with a wingspan of 7 feet and 
optimized for sea-based operations.

In addition, congressional action in recent years has been directed 
toward promoting an increase in the number and type of missions on 
which UAVs can be used. For example, section 220 of the Department of 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 specifies that it shall 
be a goal of the armed forces that one-third of the aircraft in the 
operational deep strike aircraft fleet be unmanned by 2010. Moreover, 
in section 1034 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 
year 2004, Congress mandated a DOD report of the potential for UAVs to 
be used for a variety of homeland security and counter drug 
missions.[Footnote 3] Finally, the fiscal year 2004 Defense 
Appropriations Conference Report[Footnote 4] directs that DOD prepare a 
second report by April 2004 detailing UAV requirements that are common 
to each of the uniformed services.

Prior GAO Review of UAV Development: 

Most of our prior work has focused on the development, testing, and 
evaluation of unmanned aerial vehicles. As recently as September 2000, 
we reported that DOD was deciding to procure certain UAV systems before 
adequate testing had been completed.[Footnote 5] We found that buying 
systems before successfully completing their testing had led repeatedly 
to defective systems that were later terminated or required costly 
retrofits or redesigns to achieve satisfactory performance. Conversely, 
when DOD focused UAV acquisition on mature technologies that proved the 
military utility of a given vehicle, the department had an informed 
knowledge base upon which to base a decision. For example, even though 
the Predator UAV was based on the existing Gnat 750 UAV, the department 
required Predator's performance to be validated.[Footnote 6] As a 
result, Predator moved quickly to full-rate production and, at the time 
of our current review, had performed a variety of operational missions 
successfully.

Through our prior work, we have also periodically raised the question 
of the potential for duplication of efforts among the services and the 
effectiveness of overarching strategy documents and management 
approaches to avoid duplication and other problems. For example, in 
June 2003 we reported that the Air Force and Navy, which previously 
were independently developing unmanned combat aerial vehicles, had 
agreed to jointly develop a new system for offensive combat missions 
that met both of their needs.[Footnote 7] However, we also pointed out 
that while one program is more efficient than two, the participation of 
two services would increase the challenges of sustaining funding and 
managing requirements. Similarly, as early as 1988, we raised concerns 
about a variety of management challenges related to UAV 
development.[Footnote 8] At that time, various congressional committees 
had expressed concern about duplication in the services' UAV programs 
and stressed the need to acquire UAVs that could meet the requirements 
of more than one service, as the Air Force and Navy have recently 
agreed to try. In response to congressional direction, DOD developed a 
UAV master plan, which we reviewed at that time. We identified a number 
of weaknesses in the 1988 master plan, including that it (1) did not 
eliminate duplication, (2) continued to permit the proliferation of 
single-service programs, (3) did not adequately consider cost savings 
potential from manned and unmanned aircraft trade-offs, and (4) did not 
adequately emphasize the importance of common payloads among different 
UAV platforms. DOD generally concurred with that report and noted that 
it would take until 1990 to reconcile service requirements for 
acquiring a common family of UAVs.

Since our 1988 report, the overall management of defense UAV programs 
has gone full circle. In 1989 the DOD Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering set up the UAV Joint Project Office as a single DOD 
organization with management responsibility for UAV programs. With the 
Navy as the Executive Agency, within 4 years the Joint Project Office 
came under criticism for a lack of progress. Replacing the office in 
1993, the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office was created as the 
primary management oversight and coordination office for all 
departmentwide manned and unmanned reconnaissance. In 1998, however, 
this office also came under criticism for its management approach and 
slow progress in fielding UAVs. In that same year, this office was 
dissolved and UAV program development and acquisition management were 
given to the services, while the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence was assigned to 
provide oversight for the Secretary of Defense.

Congressional Funding for UAVs Has Met or Exceeded DOD's Requests: 

Overall, Congress has provided funding for UAV development and 
procurement that exceeds the amounts requested by DOD during the past 5 
fiscal years, and the services to date have obligated about 99 percent 
of these funds. From fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003, DOD 
requested approximately $2.3 billion, and Congress, in its efforts to 
encourage rapid employment of UAVs by the military services, has 
appropriated nearly $2.7 billion to develop and acquire UAVs. In total, 
the services have obligated $2.6 billion of the appropriated funds. 
(See table 1.): 

Table 1: UAV Funding Requests, Appropriations, and Obligations, Fiscal 
Years 1999-2003: 

Dollars in millions.

1999; 
Presidential budget: $413.2; 
Appropriated: $429.4; 
Obligated: $397.1.

2000; 
Presidential budget: $228.3; 
Appropriated: $257.4; 
Obligated: $256.5.

2001; 
Presidential budget: $333.9; 
Appropriated: $377.0; 
Obligated: $396.1.

2002; 
Presidential budget: $506.3; 
Appropriated: $510.8; 
Obligated: $613.4.

2003; 
Presidential budget: $778.7; 
Appropriated: $1,079.0; 
Obligated: $956.2.

Total; 
Presidential budget: $2,260.5; 
Appropriated: $2,653.6; 
Obligated: $2,619.2.

Source: DOD.

Notes: The Presidential budget column represents funds requested by 
DOD. The Appropriated column includes only these funds appropriated in 
that fiscal year resulting from the budget request; it does not include 
reprogramming, rescissions, and transfers to total obligation 
authority. The Obligated column includes all funds the services and DOD 
have reported as obligated against total obligation authority. We did 
not attempt to reconcile the difference between appropriated and total 
obligation authority.

Columns may not total because of rounding.

[End of table]

Generally, the additional funding provided by Congress was targeted for 
specific programs and purposes, enabling the services to acquire 
systems at a greater rate than originally planned. For example, in 
fiscal year 2003 the Air Force requested $23 million to acquire 7 
Predators, but Congress provided over $131 million--an increase of 
approximately 470 percent--enough to acquire 29 Predators to meet 
operational demands in the war against terrorism. The Air Force has 
obligated 71 percent of the Predator 2003 funding during its first 
program year.

About $1.8 billion (67 percent) of the money appropriated during the 
fiscal year 1999-2003 period went for research, development, test and 
evaluation of the various models, as shown in table 2.

Table 2: UAV Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Funding 
Requests, Appropriations, and Obligations, Fiscal Years 1999-2003: 

Dollars in millions.

1999; 
Presidential budget: $298.7; 
Appropriated: $299.7; 
Obligated: $$285.4.

2000; 
Presidential budget: $144.4; 
Appropriated: $199.4; 
Obligated: $198.6.

2001; 
Presidential budget: $251.7; 
Appropriated: $284.7; 
Obligated: $297.9.

2002; 
Presidential budget: $294.8; 
Appropriated: $309.3; 
Obligated: $315.5.

2003; 
Presidential budget: $574.0; 
Appropriated: $683.8; 
Obligated: $614.1.

Total; 
Presidential budget: $1,563.6; 
Appropriated: $1,776.8; 
Obligated: $1,711.5.

Source: DOD.

Notes: The Presidential budget column represents funds requested by 
DOD. The Appropriated column includes only those funds appropriated in 
that fiscal year resulting from the budget request; it does not include 
reprogramming, rescissions, and transfers to total obligation 
authority. The Obligated column includes all funds the services and DOD 
have reported as obligated against total obligation authority. We did 
not attempt to reconcile the difference between appropriated and total 
obligation authority.

Columns may not total because of rounding.

[End of table]

The programs were generally divided into efforts to develop tactical 
UAVs and medium-to-high-altitude endurance UAVs and, until 2002 when 
the Predator was armed, were focused on meeting surveillance and 
reconnaissance needs. Only three systems--the Army's Shadow and the Air 
Force's Predator and Global Hawk--have matured to the point where they 
required procurement funding during fiscal years 1999 through 2003. By 
fiscal year 2003, appropriations totaled nearly $880 million, as shown 
in table 3.

Table 3: UAV Procurement Funding Requests, Appropriations, and 
Obligations, Fiscal Years 1999-2003: 

Dollars in millions.

1999; 
Presidential budget: $114.5; 
Appropriated: $129.8; 
Obligated: $111.7.

2000; 
Presidential budget: $83.9; 
Appropriated: $58.0; 
Obligated: $57.9.

2001; 
Presidential budget: $82.3; 
Appropriated: $92.3; 
Obligated: $98.2.

2002; 
Presidential budget: $211.5; 
Appropriated: $201.5; 
Obligated: $297.9.

2003; 
Presidential budget: $204.7; 
Appropriated: $395.2; 
Obligated: $342.1.

Total; 
Presidential budget: $696.9; 
Appropriated: $876.8; 
Obligated: $907.8.

Source: DOD.

Notes: The Presidential budget column represents funds requested by 
DOD. The Appropriated column includes only those funds appropriated in 
that fiscal year resulting from the budget request; it does not include 
reprogramming, rescissions, and transfers to total obligation 
authority. The Obligated column includes all funds the services and DOD 
have reported as obligated against total obligation authority. We did 
not attempt to reconcile the difference between appropriated and total 
obligation authority.

Funding obligations exceed appropriations as a result of reprogramming 
and other financial actions during the 3 years allowed for the use of 
procurement money.

Columns may not total because of rounding.

[End of table]

DOD estimates that an additional $938 million in procurement funding 
will be needed through fiscal year 2005.

DOD Lacks Assurance That Its Planning Will Efficiently Integrate UAVs 
into the Force Structure: 

DOD's planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not provide 
reasonable assurance that UAVs will be integrated into the force 
structure efficiently, although the department has taken certain 
positive steps to improve its management of the UAV program. 
Specifically, DOD created a joint UAV Planning Task Force and developed 
a key planning document, the UAV Roadmap 2002-2027. However, neither 
the Joint Task Force nor the Roadmap is sufficient to provide DOD with 
reasonable assurance that it is efficiently integrating UAVs into the 
force structure. Consequently, the individual services are developing 
their own UAVs without departmentwide guidance, thus increasing the 
risk of unnecessarily duplicating capabilities and leading to 
potentially higher costs and greater interoperability challenges.

DOD Has Taken Positive Steps to Improve Program Management: 

Since 2000 DOD has taken positive steps to improve the management of 
the UAV program. In October 2001 the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics created the joint UAV Planning 
Task Force to function as the joint advocate for developing and 
fielding UAVs. The Task Force is the focal point to coordinate UAV 
efforts throughout DOD, helping to create a common vision for future 
UAV-related activities and to establish interoperability standards. For 
example, the Task Force is charged with developing and coordinating 
detailed UAV development plans, recommending priorities for development 
and procurement efforts, and providing the services and defense 
agencies with implementing guidance for common UAV programs.

Moreover, the development of the 2002 Roadmap has been the Task Force's 
primary product to communicate its vision and promote UAV 
interoperability. The Roadmap is designed to guide U.S. military 
planning for UAV development from 2002 to 2027 and describes current 
programs, identifies potential missions for UAVs, and provides guidance 
on developing emerging technologies. The Roadmap is also intended to 
assist DOD decision makers in building a long-range strategy for UAV 
development and acquisition to support defense plans contained in such 
future planning efforts as the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Current Efforts Do Not Provide Reasonable Assurance for Efficiently 
Integrating UAVs into the Force Structure: 

While the creation of the joint Task Force and the UAV Roadmap are 
important steps to improve management of the UAV program, they are not 
enough to provide reasonable assurance that DOD is developing and 
fielding UAVs efficiently. The UAV Roadmap does not constitute a 
comprehensive strategic plan for developing and integrating UAVs into 
force structure. Moreover, the Joint Task Force's authority is 
generally limited to program review and advice but is insufficient to 
enforce program direction.

DOD Lacks a Comprehensive Strategic Plan for Developing and Fielding 
UAVs: 

While DOD has some elements of a UAV strategic-planning approach in 
place, it has not established a comprehensive strategic plan or set of 
plans for developing and fielding UAVs across DOD. The Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993 provides a framework for 
establishing strategic-planning and performance measurement in the 
federal government, and for ensuring that federal programs with the 
same or similar goals are closely coordinated and mutually reinforcing. 
The strategic planning requirement of this framework consists of six 
key components, described in table 4.

Table 4: Framework for Strategic Planning: 

Key components: Mission statement--explains why the program exists and 
what it does. Reflects statutory basis, if applicable.

Key components: Long-term goals and objectives--typically general in 
nature and lays out what the agency wants to accomplish in the next 5 
years. Should be expressed in a manner that allows for future 
assessment of whether they are being achieved.

Key components: Approaches (strategies)--general methods the agency 
plans to use to accomplish long-term goals.

Key components: Relationship between long-term goals and objectives and 
annual performance goals--explains how annual goals will be used to 
measure progress toward achieving the long-term goals.

Key components: External factors--factors external to the agency or 
program and beyond its control that may significantly affect the 
agency's ability to accomplish goals.

Key components: Program evaluations--a description of how program 
evaluations were used to establish or revise strategic goals.

Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, Agency Strategic Plans under 
GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate Congressional Review, GAO/GGD-10.1.16 
(Washington, D.C.: May 1997).

[End of table]

When applied collectively and combined with effective leadership, the 
components can provide a management framework to guide major programs, 
efforts, and activities, including the development and integration of 
UAVs into the force structure.

However, neither the UAV Roadmap nor other DOD guidance documents 
represent a comprehensive strategy to guide the development and 
fielding of UAVs that complement each other, perform the range of 
priority missions needed, and avoid duplication. DOD officials 
acknowledged that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not issued 
any guidance that establishes an overall strategy for UAVs in DOD. 
While high-level DOD strategic-planning documents provide some general 
encouragement to pursue transformational technologies, including the 
development of UAVs, these documents do not provide any specific 
guidance on developing and integrating UAVs into the force structure.

Nonetheless, the Roadmap represents a start on a strategic plan because 
it incorporates some of the key components of strategic planning 
provided by the Results Act framework as shown by the following: 

* Long Term Goals--The Roadmap states its overall purpose and what it 
hopes to encourage the services to attain. The Roadmap refers to the 
Defense Planning Guidance's intent for UAVs as a capability and 
indicates that the guidance encourages the rapid advancement of this 
capability. At the same time, it does not clearly state DOD's overall 
or long-term goals for its UAV efforts. Similarly, while it states that 
it wants to define clear direction to the services, it does not clearly 
identify DOD's vision for its UAV force structure from 2002 through 
2027.

* Approaches to Obtain Long-Term Goals--The Roadmap's Approach section 
provides a strategy for developing the Roadmap and meeting its goal. 
This approach primarily deals with identifying requirements and linking 
them to needed UAV payload capabilities, such as sensors and associated 
communication links. The approach then ties these requirements to 
forecasted trends in developing technologies as a means to try to 
develop a realistic assessment of the state of the technology in the 
future and the extent to which this technology will be sufficient to 
meet identified requirements. At the same time, however, the Roadmap 
does not provide a clear description of a strategy for defining how to 
develop and integrate UAVs into the future force structure. For 
example, the Roadmap does not attempt to establish UAV development or 
fielding priorities nor does it identify the most urgent mission-
capability requirements. Moreover, without the sufficient 
identification of priorities, the Roadmap cannot link these priorities 
to current or developing UAV programs and technology.

Beyond strategic planning, the Results Act calls for agencies to 
establish results-oriented performance measures and to collect 
performance data to monitor progress. The Roadmap addresses, in part, 
key elements of performance measurement, as shown in the following: 

* Performance Goals--The Roadmap established 49 specific performance 
goals to accomplish a variety of tasks. Some of these goals are aimed 
at fielding transformational capabilities without specifying what 
missions will be supported by the new capabilities. Others are to 
establish joint standards and control costs. Nonetheless, of the 49 
goals, only 1 deals directly with developing and fielding a specific 
category of UAV platform to meet a priority mission-capability 
requirement--suppression of enemy air defenses or strike electronic 
attack. The remaining goals, such as developing heavy fuel aviation 
engines suitable for UAVs, are predominantly associated with developing 
UAV or related technologies, and UAV-related standards and policies to 
promote more efficient and effective joint UAV operations. Thus, the 
Roadmap does not establish overall UAV program goals.

* Performance Indicators--Some of the 49 performance goals have 
performance indicators that could be used to evaluate progress, such as 
the reliability goal for decreasing the annual mishap rate for large 
UAVs. However, many other goals have no established indicators, such as 
developing standards to maximize UAV interoperability. Furthermore, the 
Roadmap does not establish indicators that readily assess how well the 
program will meet the priority mission capabilities needed by the 
services and theater commanders.

While the Roadmap has incorporated some key strategic-planning 
components, it only minimally addresses the other key components. 
According to officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 
UAV Roadmap was not intended to provide an overarching architecture for 
UAVs departmentwide. It does, however, provide some significant 
guidance for developing UAV and related technologies. In addition to 
the 49 separate goals, the Roadmap also provides a condensed 
description of DOD's current UAVs, categorizing them as operational, 
developmental, and other (residual and conceptual) UAV systems. The 
Roadmap further sought to identify current and emerging requirements 
for military capabilities that UAVs could address.

In addition to the Roadmap, the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council[Footnote 9] has reviewed several UAVs and issued guidance for 
some systems, such as the Army's Shadow and the Air Force's Predator. 
According to Joint Staff officials, however, neither the Joint Staff 
nor the council has issued any guidance that would establish a 
strategic plan or overarching architecture for DOD's current and future 
UAVs. In addition, in June 2003 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff created the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
to provide a top-down capability-based process. Under the system, five 
Functional Capabilities Boards have been chartered, each representing a 
major warfighting capability area as follows: (1) command and control, 
(2) force application, (3) battle space awareness, (4) force 
protection, and (5) focused logistics. Each board has representatives 
from the services, the Combatant Commanders, and certain major 
functions of the Under Secretary of Defense. Each board is tasked with 
developing a list of capabilities needed to conduct joint operations in 
its respective functional area. Transformation of these capabilities is 
expected, and the boards are likely to identify specific capabilities 
that can be met by UAVs. Nonetheless, according to Joint Staff 
officials, these initiatives will also not result in an overarching 
architecture for UAVs. However, the identification of capabilities that 
can be met by UAVs is expected to help enhance the understanding of 
DOD's overall requirement for UAV capabilities.

Planning Task Force Has Limited Authority: 

As a joint advocate for UAV efforts, the joint UAV Planning Task 
Force's authority is limited to program review and advice. The Task 
Force Director testified in March 2003 that the Task Force does not 
have program directive authority, but provides the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with advice and 
recommended actions. [Footnote 10] Without such authority, according to 
the Director, the Task Force seeks to influence services' programs by 
making recommendations to them or proposing recommended program changes 
for consideration by the Under Secretary. Nonetheless, according to DOD 
officials, the Task Force has attempted to influence the joint 
direction of service UAV efforts in a variety of ways, such as 
reviewing services' budget proposals, conducting periodic program 
reviews, and participating in various UAV-related task teams. For 
example, the Task Force has encouraged the Navy to initially consider 
an existing UAV rather than develop a unique UAV for its Broad Area 
Marine Surveillance mission. The Task Force has also worked with the 
Army's tactical UAV program, encouraging it to consider using the 
Navy's Fire Scout as an initial platform for the Future Combat Systems 
class IV UAV. The Task Force also regularly reviews services' UAV 
program budgets and, when deemed necessary, makes budget change 
proposals. For example, the Task Force, in conjunction with other 
Secretary of Defense offices, was successful in maintaining the Air 
Force's Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle program last year when the Air 
Force attempted to terminate it. The Task Force was also successful in 
overturning an attempt by the Navy to terminate the Fire Scout rotary 
wing UAV program. However, the Task Force cannot compel the services to 
adopt any of its suggestions. For example, according to the Director, 
no significant progress has been made in achieving better 
interoperability among the Services in UAV platform and sensor 
coordination, but work continues with the services, intelligence 
agencies, Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Joint Forces 
Command to this end.

Developing Service-Specific UAV Force Structures without Clear 
Departmentwide Strategic Guidance Increases Risk: 

As they pursue separate UAV programs, the services and DOD agencies 
risk developing UAVs with duplicate capabilities, potentially leading 
to greater costs and increased interoperability challenges. The House 
Appropriation Committee, in a 2003 report, expressed concern that 
without comprehensive planning and review, there is no clear path 
toward developing a UAV force structure.[Footnote 11] Thus, the 
committee directed that each service provide an updated UAV roadmap. 
These reports were to address the services' plans for the development 
of UAVs and how current UAVs are being employed. Officials from each of 
the services indicated that their UAV roadmap was developed to 
primarily address their individual service's requirements and 
operational concepts. However, in their views, high-level DOD guidance-
-such as the Joint Vision 2020, National Military Strategy, and Defense 
Planning Guidance--did not constitute strategic plans for UAVs that 
would guide the development of their individual service's UAV roadmap. 
These officials further stated that the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense's 2002 UAV Roadmap provided some useful guidance, especially in 
regard to UAV technology, but was not used to guide their UAV roadmap's 
development. Moreover, they did not view the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense's Roadmap as a departmentwide strategic plan nor an overarching 
architecture for integrating UAVs into the force structure. Moreover, 
according to the service officials developing the service-level UAV 
roadmaps, there was little collaboration with other services' UAV 
efforts.

Thus, DOD has little assurance that the current approach to developing 
and fielding UAVs in the services will result in closely coordinated or 
mutually reinforcing program efforts, as recommended by the Results 
Act. While the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff have tried to coordinate these efforts through the Joint UAV 
Planning Task Force, the absence of a guiding strategy and sufficient 
authority has made it difficult to have reasonable assurance that 
development and fielding are being done efficiently. If not managed 
effectively, this process can potentially lead to the development and 
fielding of UAVs across DOD and the services, which may unnecessarily 
duplicate each other. For example, the Army, Marine Corps, and Air 
Force are individually developing small, backpackable, lightweight UAVs 
for over-the-horizon and force protection reconnaissance missions. 
Likewise, both the Marine Corps and Army are individually pursuing 
various medium-sized tactical UAVs with both fixed and rotary wings to 
accomplish a variety of missions, including tactical reconnaissance, 
targeting, communications relay, and force protection.

Conclusions: 

Without a strategic plan and an oversight body with sufficient program 
directive authority to implement the plan, DOD has little assurance 
that its investment will result in UAV programs being effectively 
integrated into the force structure. Consequently, DOD risks poorly 
integrating UAVs into the force structure, which could increase 
development, procurement, and logistics costs; increase the risk of 
future interoperability problems; and unnecessarily duplicate efforts 
from one service to the next.

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To enhance management control over the UAV program, we recommend that 
the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: 

* establish a strategic plan or set of plans that are based on mission 
requirements to guide UAV development and fielding by modifying the 
Roadmap or developing another document or documents and, at a minimum, 
ensure that the plan links operational requirements with development 
plans to ensure that the services develop systems that complement each 
other, will perform the range of missions needed, and avoid duplication 
and: 

* designate the UAV Task Force or another appropriate organization to 
oversee the implementation of a UAV strategic plan; provide this 
organization with sufficient authority to enforce the plan's direction, 
and promote joint operations and the efficient expenditure of funds.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 
with our first recommendation and disagreed with the second. DOD 
partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of 
Defense establish a strategic plan or set of plans to guide the 
development and fielding of UAVs by modifying the Roadmap or developing 
another appropriate document. DOD stated that its preferred way to 
address UAV planning was through the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System, which is a capability-based planning process at the 
Joint Staff level that will identify UAV capabilities as needed across 
the five major joint warfighting areas through the use of the 
Functional Capabilities Boards.

We continue to believe that DOD needs a departmentwide strategic plan 
establishing the mission capabilities required of UAVs and the detailed 
strategy for effectively developing and acquiring these capabilities. 
DOD acknowledged that its UAV Roadmap is not a broad strategic plan. 
Moreover, as we pointed out in our report, DOD recognized in its UAV 
Roadmap the need for a focused strategic plan for UAV capabilities, 
stating that the Roadmap was "to assist Department of Defense decision 
makers in developing a long-range strategy for UAV development and 
acquisition in future Quadrennial Defense Reviews and other planning 
efforts"--a strategy that has yet to be created. Such a strategic plan 
would provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the joint UAV 
Planning Task Force, or other appropriate authorities with the 
additional leverage and guidance to ensure effective oversight of the 
services' development and integration of UAV capabilities into the 
joint warfighting force structure. The Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System process, which DOD referred to, may be a useful 
tool for DOD to implement its capabilities-based planning approach. 
However, we continue to believe that a strategic plan for UAVs would be 
an important element in assuring UAV decisions and development reflect 
decisions made within the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System process and are consistent with the strategic plan's 
intent.

DOD did not concur with our recommendation to designate the UAV 
Planning Task Force or another appropriate organization to oversee the 
implementation of a UAV strategic plan and provide this organization 
with sufficient authority to enforce the plan's direction. In its 
response, DOD indicated that the Secretary of Defense already has the 
authority needed to accomplish the intent of our recommendation. To 
buttress its point, DOD identified four actions taken to influence 
service development, evaluation, acquisition, and fielding of certain 
UAVs.

We acknowledge in our report that the formation of the Task Force 
represents a step in the right direction for DOD and that the Task 
Force has achieved some successes in coordinating some UAV programs. In 
our recent report on the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle, in fact, we 
gave the Task Force credit for bringing the Air Force and Navy programs 
together into a joint program. However, the Task Force has not always 
been successful. For example, no significant progress has been made in 
achieving better interoperability among Service UAVs and sensors. Our 
concern is that with UAVs assuming ever-greater importance as key 
enabling technologies, and with increasing sums of money being 
allocated for a growing number of UAV programs, DOD needs more than a 
coordination mechanism. It needs an organization with authority to 
achieve the most cost-effective development of UAVs. Consequently, we 
continue to believe that the recommendation is sound, and that to 
effectively implement a strategic plan for UAVs, the Secretary needs to 
designate an appropriate office with the authority to oversee and 
implement the strategy.

DOD's comments are included in their entirety in appendix II. DOD 
provided technical comments, which we included in our report as 
appropriate.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further 
distribution of this report until 14 days from its issue date. At that 
time,we will send copies of this report to other appropriate 
congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, 
Office of Management and Budget, and it will be available at no charge 
on GAO's Web site at http: //www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any 
questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4914. Key 
contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Signed by: 

Neal P. Curtin: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section]

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) 
requested, received, and used funds for major unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) development efforts during fiscal years 1999-2003, we reviewed 
department and service documentation for major operational UAV 
programs, programs that are in procurement, and programs that are under 
development and to be procured by 2010. Funding data were obtained from 
various sources. We obtained the funding levels that DOD requested for 
UAV programs from the justification books used to support DOD's budget 
requests and the DOD Comptroller's Congressional Funding tracking 
database. We also obtained the funding levels appropriated to service 
UAV programs by analyzing the services' Appropriation Status by Fiscal 
Year Program and Subaccounts reports.[Footnote 12] Additionally, we 
analyzed these reports to determine the extent to which these 
appropriated funds were obligated within their allowed program years. 
We did not conduct a comprehensive audit to reconcile the differences 
in appropriated and obligated funds.

To assess whether DOD's approach to developing and employing UAVs 
ensures that UAVs will be efficiently integrated into the force 
structure, we reviewed key departmentwide strategic documents, such as 
the Defense Planning Guidance, to identify the level of DOD's strategic 
planning for UAVs and its impact on service planning. We discussed the 
level of strategic planning for UAVs with key DOD and service officials 
from organizations with key roles in DOD's g development, such as the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense's Joint UAV Planning Task Force; the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence; the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council; and U.S. Joint Forces Command. We reviewed each service's 
current UAV roadmap and held discussions with officials from service 
activities involved in planning and developing their UAV force 
structure roadmaps. We also reviewed in detail the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027, and 
assessed the extent to which it establishes an overall DOD management 
framework for developing and employing UAVs departmentwide. We used the 
principles embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act of 
1993 as criteria for assessing the UAV Roadmap.

We performed our work from June 2003 to February 2004 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON 
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:

5 MAR 2004:

Mr. Neal P. Curtin:

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. General Accounting Office:

Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Mr. Curtin:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report GAO-04-342, "FORCE STRUCTURE: Improved Strategic Planning Can 
Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts," dated February 6, 2004 
(GAO Code 350212).

The DoD partially concurs with the draft report's first recommendation, 
and does not concur with the second recommendation. The rationale for 
the DOD's position is provided at enclosure 1. Enclosure 2 provides 
additional comments and suggested changes to the report.

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. For further questions concerning this report, please contact 
Dyke Weatherington, UAV Planning Task Force, 703-695-6188.

Sincerely,

Signed for: 

Glenn F. Lamartin: 
Director: Defense Systems:

Enclosures:

1. DOD Comments to the GAO Recommendations 2. DOD Comments on the Draft 
Report:

GAO Draft Report - Dated February 6, 2004 GAO CODE 350212/GAO-04-342:

"FORCE STRUCTURE: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DoD's 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts":

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS:

RECOMMENDATION 1: Establish a strategic plan or set of plans based on 
mission requirements to guide UAV development and fielding by modifying 
the Roadmap or developing another document or documents and, at a 
minimum, ensure that the plan links operational requirements with 
development plans to ensure that the Services develop systems that 
complement each other, will perform the range of missions needed, and 
avoid duplication. (p. 17/GAO Draft Report):

DoD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. The DoD UAV Roadmap addresses a wide 
variety of UAV systems, however it is not a broad UAV strategic plan 
based on mission areas or requirements. UAVs contribute in several 
functional capability areas as described in the new Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process, including Battle 
Space Awareness (BA) and Force Application (FA). The JCIDS process 
establishes Functional Capabilities Boards (FCB) that are responsible 
for all aspects, materiel and nonmateriel, of their assigned functional 
area(s). Each FCB works to coordinate, integrate and deconflict the 
efforts of all DoD Components within its assigned functional area(s). 
Each FCB ensures that new capabilities are conceived and developed in 
an integrated joint warfighting context. UAV systems are one of many 
possible materiel solutions available to each FCB for given mission 
capabilities, and should not be the exclusive focus of a separate plan 
as recommended by the GAO. The focus of capability based planning 
within the Department should be (and is, with JCIDS) on the needed 
mission capability and all possible solutions, materiel and 
nonmateriel, including UAVs. We will continue to work with the Joint 
Staff to develop detailed mission capability plans.

RECOMMENDATION 2: Designate the UAV task force or another appropriate 
organization to oversee the implementation of a UAV strategic plan, 
providing this organization sufficient authority to enforce the plan's 
direction, and promote joint operations and efficient expenditure of 
funds. (p. 17/GAO Draft Report):

DoD RESPONSE: Non-Concur. The Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) established the UAV 
Planning Task Force (PTF) in 2001 to provide oversight and 
recommendations consistent with the responsibilities vested within 
AT&L; to include promoting payload commonality, 
developing and enforcing interface standards, ensuring multi-Service 
cooperation, promoting joint experimentation for integrating UAVs into 
combat operations, assisting the transition of promising UAV-related 
technologies, and resolving overarching export policy and airspace 
issues. The Department believes that the USD (AT&L) has sufficient 
oversight and influence to effectively integrate UAV capability into 
the Combatant Commanders' operational forces. The Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) retains the ability to impact programs and 
modify program direction and resources when appropriate. The Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process affords OSD the 
opportunity to adequately review and enforce program activities, 
including UAV activities, across Services. Additionally, JCIDS, a 
capabilities-based process, focuses on developing integrated joint 
warfighting capability, providing analysis of requirements and 
solutions across Services. Together, these existing processes are in 
place to promote the sharing of information, identify areas of 
cooperation, and recommend program adjustments to correct capability 
gaps and redundancies.

The UAV PTF, in combination with other Department and Service 
organizations, has been very successful in influencing the development, 
evaluation, acquisition and fielding of UAV capability. A few examples 
of recent UAV efforts include:

1. The creation of a Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) program, 
combining capabilities needed by the Air Force and Navy into a Joint 
program that will demonstrate critical capabilities and enhance 
jointness and competition, beginning with an Operational Assessment in 
2007.

2. The Navy and Army are coordinating their program offices' efforts to 
develop their respective vertical takeoff UAV (VTUAV) capabilities by 
developing a common base aircraft to be used in Littoral Combat Ship 
and Future Combat Systems projects.

3. The Joint Small UAV Project Manager (PM) Working Group --initiated 
on the UAV PTF's recommendation and chaired by the Army PM for UAVs --
promotes the sharing of information, data, techniques, and technologies 
related to small UAVs. Recent successes include an Army, United States 
Marine Corps (USMC), and SOCOM combined buy of a Small UAV infrared 
camera, saving 50 percent in unit costs; sharing training curriculum 
and training manuals between the USMC and the Army; providing a SOCOM 
training team to support Army efforts; and putting in place a 
frequency-compliant communications system development that supports 
all Small UAVs.

4. The UAV PTF and the Services have applied DoD experience and assets 
to support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conduct UAV 
demonstrations. The demonstrations have helped evaluate and 
characterize the potential to rapidly transition DoD UAV capability for 
DHS use.

enclosure (1):

[End of section]

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the person named above, Fred Harrison, Lawrence E. 
Dixon, James Mahaffey, James Driggins, R.K. Wild, and Kenneth Patton 
also made major contributions to this report.

[End of section]

Related GAO Products: 

Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed for Controls on Exports of Cruise 
Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-493T. Washington, D.C.: 
March 9, 2004.

Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed to Better Control Technology 
Exports for Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-175. 
Washington, D.C.: January 23, 2004.

Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to 
the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program's Success. GAO-03-598. 
Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Questionable Basis for Revisions to Shadow 
200 Acquisition Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-00-204. Washington, D.C.: 
September 26, 2000.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration. GAO/NSIAD-00-78. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 
2000.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Demonstration Approach Has Improved 
Project Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-33. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 1999.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress toward Meeting High Altitude 
Endurance Aircraft Price Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-29. Washington, D.C.: 
December 15, 1998.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Outrider Demonstrations Will Be Inadequate to 
Justify Further Production. GAO/NSIAD-97-153. Washington, D.C.: 
September 23, 1997.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Acquisition Efforts. GAO/T-NSIAD--97-
138. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1997.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System Is Not Appropriate for Navy 
Fleet Use. N GAO/SIAD-96-2. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1995.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Performance of Short Range System Still in 
Question. GAO/NSIAD-94-65. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 1993.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: More Testing Needed Before Production of 
Short Range System. GAO/NSIAD-92-311. Washington, D.C.: September 4, 
1992.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium Range System Components Do Not Fit. 
GAO/NSIAD-91-2. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1991.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Realistic Testing Needed Before Production of 
Short Range System. GAO/NSIAD-90-234. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 
1990.

Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master 
Plan. GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 1988.

FOOTNOTES

[1] U.S. Department of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap, 2002-
2027 (Washington, D.C.: December 2002).

[2] Congressional Research Service, Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs), 96-75F (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 1998).

[3] The act also mandated that the Secretary of Defense conduct a study 
of future naval platform architecture, including the potential for 
unmanned ships in the future.

[4] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-283 at 291 (2003).

[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: 
Questionable Basis for Revisions to Shadow 200 Acquisition Strategy, 
GAO/NSIAD-00-204 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2000).

[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's 
Demonstration Approach Has Improved Project Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-33 
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 30, 1999).

[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions: Matching 
Resources with Requirements Is Key to the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle 
Program's Success, GAO-03-598 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003).

[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of 
DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan, GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 9, 1988).

[9] The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is a joint organization 
made up of senior representatives from each of the services to review 
joint experimentation and make appropriate recommendations to the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3180.1, (Washington, D.C.: 
Oct. 31, 2002).

[10] Statement of the Director, Joint UAV Planning Task Force before 
the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Armed Services 
Committee, Mar. 26, 2003.

[11] Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 2003 Report, H.R. Rep. 
No. 107-532 at 207.

[12] These reports are commonly referred to as Accounting Report (M) 
1002. 

GAO's Mission: 

The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, 
exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability 
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use 
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides 
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make 
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to 
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, 
integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains 
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an 
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search 
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You 
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other 
graphics.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its 
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document 
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to 
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order 
GAO Products" heading.

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. General Accounting Office

441 G Street NW,

Room LM Washington,

D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: 	

	Voice: (202) 512-6000: 

	TDD: (202) 512-2537: 

	Fax: (202) 512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Public Affairs: 

Jeff Nelligan, managing director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 U.S.

General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 Washington, D.C.

20548: