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BY THE U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Report To The Secretary Of Defense

Better Use Of Available Data Would Improve Mobilization Planning For Inductees

The Department of Defense (DOD) will rely on the Selective Service System to deliver inductees after a full mobilization. Since 1974, it has changed its delivery schedules several times based on such factors as the System's delivery capability, the capacity of the services' training bases, or the availability of trained reservists. However, DOD has not analyzed systematically the military services' actual need for inductees.

Even though the data exist, the system that DOD uses for making wartime manpower planning decisions collects insufficiently detailed data on each service's wartime needs and expected manning shortages and surpluses to enable it to validate the accuracy of the current inductee request schedule. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense obtain the available information from the services and use it either to validate or to change the current inductee schedule, as appropriate.



030362

GAO/NSIAD-85-11
OCTOBER 22, 1984

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UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

B-199333

The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This report discusses the accuracy of the current DOD request for inductees that the Selective Service System would provide after a full mobilization.

The report contains recommendations to you on page 11 concerning actions that would help to ensure the accuracy of the inductee request. As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the House Committee on Government Operations and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs not later than 60 days after the date of the report, and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget, to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and to interested Congressional committees.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Frank C. Conahan".

Frank C. Conahan
Director

D I G E S T

In the event of mobilization for a national emergency, the strength of the military forces would need to be quickly increased. While the National Guard, the Reserve, and other sources of pretrained personnel would provide a significant portion of this increase, the services would also need to obtain many untrained individuals who, after initial training, could be assigned as replacements and fillers to existing or newly forming units.

To obtain such untrained personnel, the Department of Defense (DOD) will rely on the Selective Service System to provide inductees for all the services. The schedule of inductee deliveries has changed three times since DOD established it in 1974. The schedule which was still in effect in July 1984 was sent to the System by DOD in November 1980. This schedule calls on the System to provide the first inductees by 13 days after the mobilization decision (M+13) and 100,000 inductees within 30 days (M+30). Of the 100,000, 80,000 are scheduled for delivery to the Army. In addition to inductees, the services also will train volunteers.

GAO conducted this review to determine whether, since 1974, DOD has based its schedules for inductee deliveries on (1) a thorough analysis of mobilization-personnel needs and (2) an accurate assessment of expected service manning shortages and surpluses. (See p. 2.)

GAO found:

- DOD based its inductee schedule requests on changes in factors such as the delivery capability of the Selective Service System, training base capacity, or availability of trained reservists. It did not analyze systematically the services' needs for inductees. (See pp. 3-4.)
- Although DOD has acknowledged that a systematic process is necessary, it has made, to date, no systematic analysis either to validate or to change the current inductee schedule set in 1980. (See p. 6.)

--DOD could better ensure the accuracy of mobilization planning and the inductee request if the services would provide available occupation-specific data to DOD's War-time Manpower Planning System. However, DOD has not required the services to provide this data, primarily because the services have resisted doing so. (See pp. 7-8.)

Available Army reports illustrate the value of such occupation-specific data by identifying expected occupational shortages that require personnel with extensive experience, those that require personnel who would need initial entry training of longer duration than the time that would be available following mobilization, as well as those that could be filled by inductees who would receive all necessary training after mobilization. (See pp. 8-9.)

--The Army data also would allow the planners to identify those shortage positions that could be filled by soldiers cross-trained from occupations with manning surpluses. (See p. 9.)

--The Navy and Air Force could provide DOD with similar mobilization planning data on occupational needs, as well as expected manning shortages and surpluses. (See p. 9.)

--If the Selective Service System delivers the 80,000 inductees to the Army between M+13 and M+30, the Army's supply of untrained personnel could exceed its training capacity in the first month after mobilization by about 63,000 persons. (See p. 14.)

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

GAO recommends that the Secretary

--require the services to submit sufficient occupational data, either through the War-time Manpower Planning System or another planning system, so that DOD can ensure the accuracy of each service's wartime needs and expected manning shortages and surpluses.

--ensure that the requirements for inductees are based on a systematic analysis of the

services' wartime needs and their ability to meet these needs with available personnel; and

--submit to the Selective Service System, as necessary, a revised request for inductees. (See p. 10.)

AGENCY COMMENTS

DOD partially agreed with GAO's recommendations, stating that

--it would develop a methodology for the systematic analysis of the Army's inductee requirements;

--it would work with the Army to develop and analyze, on a onetime basis, the occupational data needed to ensure the accuracy of the Army's wartime needs; and,

--if the onetime analysis substantiated a need for a revised inductee schedule, it would ask the services to validate their inductee needs and would initiate a revision of the schedule by the end of fiscal year 1985.

DOD also said that if its work with the Army resulted in substantial changes to either the delivery schedule or the size of the mobilization training base, it would consider making the data-reporting requirements a recurring one. Since the Army is scheduled to receive the largest share of inductees after a mobilization, GAO believes that the actions planned by DOD represent a good first step toward ensuring the accuracy of wartime needs and inductee requirements.

DOD disagreed with certain of GAO's findings. First, regarding the lack of a systematic method for validating inductee requirements, DOD said that the Army, after using all 80,000 inductees it is scheduled to receive, would not be able to resolve all its possible wartime skill shortages. Although the Army may well continue to have shortages, GAO believes that only through detailed analyses of occupational shortages, and related training requirements, can either DOD or the Army determine which requirements can be met by inductees who enter the training base during the first month after mobilization.

Second, DOD said that the number of Army untrained personnel that could exceed its training capacity in the first month after mobilization should be 31,000 persons, not 74,000 as stated in a draft of this report. GAO has revised its calculation of the training capacity shortage to 63,000, recognizing the Army's need to have soldiers in reception centers during the fourth week of mobilization who are preparing to begin formal training in the fifth week.

The remaining difference between the Army's shortage estimate and GAO's revised estimate is due primarily to the Army's use of a training-base-capacity figure from an Army study that it has already determined is invalid, and GAO's use of a figure from a more recent study being done by the Army's training command, which the Army is still reviewing.

Agency comments and GAO's evaluation are discussed in detail in chapter 4.

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ABBREVIATIONS

DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	General Accounting Office
MOS	military occupational specialty
WARMAPS	Wartime Manpower Planning System

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Upon mobilization, the military services would need additional personnel to increase Active and Reserve units from peacetime to wartime strength. They would also need personnel to replace casualties. Sources of pretrained personnel to meet mobilization needs include Individual Ready Reservists, retirees, and prior service volunteers. Untrained sources include delayed entry personnel,¹ non-prior-service volunteers, and inductees provided by the Selective Service System. The Department of Defense's (DOD's) current mobilization schedule calls, at the maximum, for the Selective Service System to deliver the first inductee within 13 days after mobilization (M+13) and the 100,000th inductee within 30 days (M+30). Of the four services, the Army is scheduled to receive the largest share of inductees--as many as 80,000 by M+30.

HOW ARE WARTIME NEEDS DETERMINED?

Part of DOD's responsibility for wartime planning is to determine how many inductees are needed and when they are needed. To facilitate planning, the Office of the Deputy Assistant, Secretary of Defense (Mobilization Planning and Requirements), has directed the services to provide information concerning personnel needs as input to the Wartime Manpower Planning System (WARMAPS). WARMAPS was established by DOD Directive 1100.18 on August 26, 1980, as the standard DOD-wide procedure for computing the manpower requirements² and personnel that would be available for a conflict. With this information, DOD and the services can adjust manpower programs and identify the extent to which funding constraints affect the potential shortages within the first 180 days of mobilization. The directive states that DOD's peacetime policy is to provide enough military and civilian personnel for each occupation and skill level to satisfy projected wartime demands that, because of training requirements, cannot be met after mobilization.

¹Recruits in the delayed entry program sign contracts to enlist in the Armed Forces but are allowed to delay the actual time of entry.

²DOD uses the term "manpower requirement" to refer to the number and kinds of people needed to achieve and maintain full-strength levels for all units in the approved force structure.

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Our objectives were to determine whether DOD has based its requests for inductees on (1) a thorough analysis of mobilization personnel needs and (2) an accurate determination of expected service manning shortages/surpluses. We examined requests DOD has made of the Selective Service System since 1974, when the active draft ended.

To do this, we visited the offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations and Logistics) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Mobilization Planning and Requirements) in Washington, D.C. We also reviewed DOD policies and procedures, WARMAPS summaries, and previous GAO reports on mobilization planning.

We interviewed headquarters officials of the Selective Service System in Washington, D.C., to find out the agency's capabilities to provide the requested inductees. In addition, we reviewed (1) the System's documents and other reports on the agency's ability to meet DOD's wartime personnel needs, (2) the Military Selective Service Act, and (3) DOD directives regarding the mobilization schedule for inductees.

Because the Army would receive the most inductees, we interviewed Army headquarters officials in Washington, D.C. Our purpose was to learn how they had determined mobilization-personnel needs. We also collected and analyzed data and information from Army studies to corroborate information obtained from interviews.

We performed our review from September 1982 through July 1984, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

CHAPTER 2

INDUCTEE REQUIREMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN BASED ON SPECIFIC MOBILIZATION NEEDS

The Selective Service System ended active inductions in 1973. Since that time, the System's role has been limited to preparing for resuming active inductions in the event of a mobilization. The needs of the services would control the degree to which such inductions would take place after mobilization. These needs are expressed in a schedule of maximum mobilization inductee deliveries that DOD levied on the System. The actual request for inductees would be based on the nature of the conflict, the warning time, and the rate of mobilization. Also, for inductions to be resumed, the Congress would have to restore the induction authority.

The schedule of inductee deliveries has changed three times since DOD established it in 1974. The schedule which was still in effect in July 1984 was sent to the System by DOD in November 1980.

In response to our 1980 review of the military manpower mobilization system,³ DOD said that their newly established WARMAPS would provide the necessary data to determine inductee requirements systematically. However, to date, DOD has made no adjustments in the 1980 schedule, nor has DOD validated it.

DOD did not base its previous four schedules on systematic analyses of the services' needs. Rather, according to DOD officials, they based these schedules on judgments about (1) how wartime requirements would be met from the various sources of pretrained and untrained personnel and (2) either the capacity of the training base, or changes in the System's delivery capability or in the number of trained reservists.

FACTORS CONSIDERED IN CHANGES TO INDUCTEE-DELIVERY SCHEDULE

The inductee-delivery schedules have varied considerably since 1974: The 1975 schedule did not require the first 100,000 inductees until 150 days after mobilization; the current schedule requires the first 100,000 within 30 days. According to DOD officials, these changes reflected judgments about the training-base capacity and changes in either Selective Service System delivery capability or the number of trained reservists. Because DOD has not maintained documentation to support these judgments, we could not verify their bases.

³Actions to Improve Parts of the Military Manpower Mobilization System Are Underway (FPCD-80-58, July 22, 1980).

DOD officials explained their judgmental schedule on the basis that it was the least expensive method of meeting personnel requirements. Officials said that inductees, along with volunteers, represented the least expensive means of satisfying wartime-personnel needs because the costs of training and compensation are incurred only in a crisis. Accordingly, DOD officials said that, before any analysis was made, they decided to depend as much as possible on the least expensive source of personnel. Thus, for planning purposes, they rely on those inductees and volunteers who will have completed their 90-120 days of initial training, to the extent feasible, to offset requirements for trained people that occur after the first 3 months of mobilization.

According to DOD officials, DOD requires each service to plan and program for enough pretrained people who, along with the inductees and volunteers to be trained, provide the needed time-phased supply of trained personnel.

The first mobilization inductee-delivery schedules

In 1974, after active inductions had ceased but while peacetime draft registrations were continuing, DOD prepared an inductee-delivery schedule calling for the first inductee within 30 days after mobilization and the 100,000th inductee within 90 days.

According to the DOD official responsible at that time for preparing the schedule, the decisions made in preparing the schedule were mostly judgmental, and bases for them included estimates of the Army's capability to provide the necessary training within the desired time frames. In fact, according to this official, the schedule was increased to reflect a judgment that the training capacity could be expanded by increasing the size of the training companies. The necessity for delivering inductees within 30 days was a judgmental planning figure.

In 1975, the President decided to end peacetime draft registrations. The Military Selective Service Act still required the System to maintain enough personnel to restore the System to full operation in a national emergency. Because of the System's diminished delivery capacity, however, DOD reduced substantially its inductee-delivery schedule from the 1974 schedule. According to a DOD official, this change was justified in view of a belief that there were enough trained reservists to meet the services' manpower needs during the early months following a mobilization. The new schedule called for delivering the first inductees within 110 days, instead of 30 days, and delivering the 100,000th within 150 days, instead of 90 days.

1977 inductee-delivery schedule placed
greater demands on the System

By the end of 1976, the Selective Service System had entered into a deep standby status, which involved dismantling field offices, including local boards and state offices. By 1977, however, rapidly declining numbers of trained reservists to meet the postmobilization needs of the services led DOD to increase its request for inductees. The new schedule called for the first inductee within 30 days, rather than 110 days, and for the 100,000th inductee within 60 days, rather than 150 days.

In a memorandum to the Director, Selective Service System, requesting the tighter schedule, DOD said that there were still considerable uncertainties in projecting the wartime manpower requirements and assets. DOD went on to state that, as understanding of the actual wartime needs for inductees improved, it would change the schedule.

Final schedule further increased demands

In February 1980, DOD reaffirmed the 1977 schedule. In doing so, it told the Director, Selective Service System, that this schedule would keep the services' training bases operating at capacity. It pointed out, however, that the capacity could change as the Army was reexamining its ability to accept new trainees earlier.

DOD sent the most recent adjustment to the schedule to the System in November 1980. This schedule called for the first inductees at M+13 and for the 100,000th by M+30. DOD based the schedule on the Army's request for 80,000 inductees by M+30, which, in turn, was based on the Army's best estimate of its potential training-base capacity. A DOD official told us that DOD had not based the revised requirement on a comprehensive analysis of need at a specific time; rather, the requirement represented a planning target. Further, the official said that DOD also based the more stringent schedule on the System's enhanced capability which resulted from the resumption of draft registration in July 1980.

The Army based its request for 80,000 inductees on a potential training-base capacity of 133,000 by M+30. Three months after the November 1980 schedule was established, the Army testified that the actual training-base capacity at M+30 was considerably lower, based primarily on then current levels of equipment for the mobilized training base.⁴ A DOD official

⁴Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, February 24 and 26 and March 3, 5, 10, 17, and 19, 1981, pp. 3309 and 3310.

told us that DOD knew that its schedule exceeded the Army's training capacity, but that DOD had provided guidance to the Army to improve its wartime training capacity. According to this official, once the training bases, particularly the Army's, were adequately resourced, the schedule would closely match DOD's training capacity. (App. I discusses the Army's supply of untrained personnel and its training-base capacities.)

DOD HAS NOT SYSTEMATICALLY
VALIDATED INDUCTEE REQUIREMENTS

In response to our 1980 review (see p. 3), DOD officials said that the induction schedule should be based on personnel needs and indicated that the newly established WARMAPS would provide the necessary data to analyze inductee requirements systematically. However, this analysis has not been made because, as discussed in chapter 3, WARMAPS lacks detailed occupational information on the services' expected wartime personnel shortages.

In commenting on the lack of validation or change to the inductee-delivery schedule, DOD officials said that, if mobilization occurred now, inductees would likely be called more slowly than required by the maximum delivery schedule. Officials pointed out, however, that some inductees would still be needed at M+13 days and that, as the Army training-base capacity continued to improve, the rate of inductees required would approach that on the schedule. DOD officials stated also that their Manpower Board and its subordinate Military Manpower Accessions Committee, both parts of the DOD Crisis Management System, would determine in an emergency the actual flow of inductees.

CHAPTER 3

WARMAPS LACKS SUFFICIENT OCCUPATIONAL DETAIL TO IDENTIFY WARTIME SHORTAGES ACCURATELY

While WARMAPS was established by DOD to identify the nature and magnitude of wartime requirements and supplies of trained people, it presently collects only aggregate data which does not accurately identify occupational shortages. The services have more specific information readily available. If they would provide this information to DOD, DOD could more accurately assess wartime shortages by occupation and whether such shortages could be eliminated by training recruits who enter the forces after mobilization. More specifically, this information could also enable DOD to determine more accurately how many inductees would be required and when they would be needed. However, primarily because of service resistance, DOD has not required the services to provide this data.

USE OF FEW OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES MASKS SHORTAGES

DOD cannot accurately identify occupations that would be short upon mobilization because the information it requires from the services for WARMAPS covers only a few general categories.

WARMAPS can process up to 99 occupations, and the occupations of each service could conform to these categories by use of the DOD Occupational Conversion Manual. However, DOD has requested cumulative balances of only a few categories: two in 1982--combat and other--and five in 1983: combat; medical; logistics, services, and supply; technical, engineering, maintenance, and repair; and communications and intelligence.

Combining many occupations into a few categories causes an appearance of overages in some occupations to offset an appearance of shortages in others. While such calculations of cumulative balances are useful for managing the end strength of the peacetime force, they mask occupational shortages that would need to be filled in wartime.

SERVICE RESISTANCE TO WARMAPS

Because of Service objections, DOD decided in 1981 to reduce the frequency and detail required in WARMAPS. The Army and the Air Force objected primarily to the frequency of submissions and to the level of detail required. For example, the Army believed that the task of organizing and transmitting large volumes of detailed information was unjustified by its usefulness to DOD. The Air Force said that the inputs required an excessive amount of work and that, as a result, the required

categories of data should be reduced. Consequently, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in October 1981, announced several actions to reduce WARMAPS inputs, including reducing the number of war scenarios for which data was required and reducing the level of detail to the minimum necessary for DOD to execute its responsibilities for program-objective memoranda review.

According to DOD officials, the level of detail now provided on personnel shortfalls is insufficient to determine adequately

- the total number of inductees required;
- the total shortfalls of personnel by skill after mobilization;
- the adequacy of the supply of pretrained individuals available immediately after mobilization, in particular, Individual Ready Reservists and retirees, to fill units to wartime strength and to replace casualties; and
- the adequacy of the services' training bases to accommodate the projected mobilization-training load by job skill.

SERVICES HAVE SYSTEMS THAT IDENTIFY WARTIME OCCUPATIONAL SHORTAGES

Although the Army has submitted WARMAPS data for only the requested occupational categories, a new Army computer model--called the 1322 Reporting System--is identifying specific occupations that would be short in wartime. This data could provide DOD planners with a more accurate basis for determining inductee needs than the WARMAPS system. For example, while WARMAPS data for fiscal year 1984 showed that at M+120 the Army would be understaffed by about 100,000 enlisted personnel, the more detailed Army reports document that there would be an expected occupational enlisted shortfall of some 260,000, together with some offsetting surpluses of personnel in easy-to-man skills.

If utilized in WARMAPS, such detailed Army data would allow DOD to analyze the projected occupational shortfalls in terms of those that require personnel with extensive experience, those that require personnel who would need initial entry training of longer duration than the time that would be available following mobilization, as well as those that could be filled by inductees who would receive all necessary training after mobilization. The Army data also would allow the planners to identify those shortage positions that could be filled by soldiers cross-trained from occupations with manning surpluses.

For example, Army data for fiscal years 1984/1985 showed that 30 percent of the projected occupational shortages at M+120 were for trained and experienced personnel, such as supervisory technicians, or tank commanders, positions that could not be filled by newly trained inductees.

The vast majority of the remaining occupational shortages were in combat arms for which inductees could be trained in the duration between mobilization and M+120. Other shortages, however, were in high tech and intelligence occupations, skills that require far more training time than would be available in the immediate post-mobilization period.

Thus, by M+120, inductees could receive the needed 13 weeks of training in how to provide support fire with a mortar and meet the Army's need for 7,961 additional Indirect Fire Infantrymen. They could not, however, receive the 35 weeks of training needed to acquire the necessary electronics, electro-mechanics and hydraulics skills necessary to meet the Army's M+120 day need for 45 Air Defense Radar Repairers.

Even though the Navy has not submitted occupational data to WARMAPS, it also has identified specific wartime shortages through the Navy Manpower Mobilization System. This system was designed to enable Navy planners and programmers to determine scenario-dependent mobilization manpower requirements, to assess the ability of the personnel system to meet these requirements, and to successfully defend the need for additional personnel during resource-allocation proceedings. A Navy manpower mobilization subsystem, the Personnel Attainability Assessment, determines which Navy occupations could not be filled by personnel who would become available upon mobilization. The Navy first made this assessment in 1981, and will complete a new computation in 1984.

Although the Air Force has submitted WARMAPS data for only the specified broad occupational categories, it, too, can identify occupations that would be short in wartime. Since 1972, the Air Force has annually identified occupations which would have wartime shortfalls through the FORSIZE/MANREQ exercise. This exercise compares Air Force wartime requirements with authorized manpower in the Active and Reserve forces. After the occupations which would be short are identified each year, actions are taken through the Critical Military Skills Program to help reduce wartime military skill shortfalls by converting civilian positions to military positions, contracting decisions, and other actions.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AGENCY COMMENTS, AND OUR EVALUATION

CONCLUSIONS

In order to make sound decisions for establishing an inductee-delivery schedule, DOD must base its requirements on systematic analysis of wartime needs and available personnel resources within specific time frames. While WARMAPS marked the beginning of improvements by DOD in wartime manpower planning, DOD still does not have the occupational detail necessary to adequately determine the total number of inductees required from the Selective Service System and to fulfill other important responsibilities, such as ensuring that plans are prepared for the cross training of personnel surplus to wartime occupational needs.

Until DOD requires the services to provide occupational detail on its needs, as well as its expected manning shortages and surpluses, either through WARMAPS or another system, the inductee schedule will continue to be based on judgments such as training-base constraints or selective service delivery capability rather than on a more systematic analysis. Consequently, the System may be expending resources preparing to deliver unneeded inductees while, at the same time, neglecting the planning required to meet DOD's actual inductee need.

If the services would provide greater occupational detail on wartime needs, as well as expected manning shortages and surpluses, DOD could better assess the adequacy of mobilization plans. Specifically, with better data, DOD could assess wartime occupational needs, identify those needs that would require increases in the Reserve Forces or in other programs of pre-trained personnel, ensure that all available personnel are utilized, and, finally, determine how many inductees would be needed within specific time frames.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense

- require the services to submit sufficient occupational data, either through WARMAPS or another planning system, so that DOD can ensure the accuracy of each service's wartime needs and expected manning shortages and surpluses;
- ensure that the requirements for inductees are based on a systematic analysis of the services' wartime needs and their ability to meet these needs with available personnel; and

--submit to the Selective Service System, as necessary, a revised schedule for inductees.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

DOD partially agreed with the first recommendation, stating that it would work with the Army to develop and analyze the relevant occupational data on a onetime basis. DOD said that if this analysis resulted in substantial changes to either the inductee-delivery schedule or the size of the mobilization training base, it would consider institutionalizing the data-reporting requirement. Since the Army is scheduled to receive the largest share of inductees after a mobilization, we believe that the actions DOD and the Army plan are a good first step.

DOD also partially concurred in our second recommendation. It said that it would develop the methodology for the systematic analyses of inductee requirements during its work with the Army.

DOD disagreed, however, with our finding that it does not use a systematic method for validating inductee requirements. DOD explained that it based its validation of requirements on the fact that the Army, after using all 80,000 inductees it is scheduled to receive and after taking full advantage of the improving mobilization training-base capacity, would not be able to resolve all the skill shortages that would exist in this decade. This process is, at best, an aggregate analysis which, in our view, is not rigorous systematic validation. Although the Army may well continue to have shortages after receiving inductees, it is only through detailed analyses of occupational shortages, and related training requirements, that one can determine which requirements can be met by inductees entering the training base between M+13 and M+30.

In response to our last recommendation--that a revised inductee schedule be submitted to the Selective Service System, as necessary, DOD said that if the onetime analyses substantiated a need for a revised schedule, it would ask the services to validate their inductee needs and that, further, it would initiate a revision of the schedule by the end of fiscal year 1985.

In commenting on its 1981 decision to reduce the frequency and detail required in WARMAPS (see p. 7), DOD said that the decision was based on a Secretary of Defense policy that provided increased authority and responsibility to the services. Therefore, the services are now responsible for making inductee estimates, planning for adequate training-base capacity, and informing DOD if the delivery schedule should be revised. Although the services have been delegated responsibility for these activities, DOD still is responsible for determining the overall inductee request and ensuring the accuracy thereof. In addition, DOD still needs reliable information for monitoring and assessing service progress in achieving manpower objectives and, as it did in the case of the Army's shortfall in training-

base capacity (see p. 5), for providing guidance to the services.

DOD also said that because the Army's occupational assessment revealed more serious shortages of combat skills than were apparent in an aggregated analysis, occupational analysis would not reduce the demand for inductees. DOD said that it believed, however, that occupational analysis might permit some refinement in the schedule.

The draft of this report stated that the Army's supply of untrained personnel could exceed its training capacity in the first month after mobilization by about 74,000 persons. DOD disagreed with this estimate, citing the Army's calculation of the shortage at 31,000. DOD said that our calculation did not include soldiers who would be in reception centers on M-Day, as well as those who would have to be in the centers at the end of the first month. The Army would need these soldiers to maintain a flow of individuals to begin training in the second month. While we did not verify the accuracy of the Army's estimate, we agree that there is a need to maintain a flow of soldiers into formal training. Accordingly, we revised our estimate of the number of reporting personnel who could not be accommodated to 63,000. (See p. 14.)

The 32,000-person difference between the Army's shortage estimate and our revised estimate is due primarily to the Army's position that the training-base capacity through the first 4 weeks is 84,000, rather than the 56,000 indicated by preliminary estimates of a current on-going assessment by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command.

The Army has been studying the postmobilization training-base capacity continuously since 1979. Although a 1982 internal Army report found the 84,000-person estimate to be inaccurate, the Army continues to use the figure for planning purposes. The Army report cited study deficiencies in determining shortages in equipment, personnel, and facilities and ultimately led the Army to initiate the current Training and Doctrine Command study.

DOD characterized the current study as an analysis of the Training and Doctrine Command's capability to execute the post-mobilization training mission using only resources currently on hand. This characterization, however, is inconsistent with criteria established by the Training and Doctrine Command for conducting the study. The command told its installations to consider also those resources already programmed, i.e., expected to be available, in addition to resources actually on hand.

Furthermore, according to DOD, the study does not reflect the actions the Army will take to provide additional resources in the near term or to program resources to resolve critical shortages that cannot be satisfied by other means. However,

Army officials told us that the Army has yet to develop a contingency plan for providing the additional resources. Consequently, while we recognize that the 56,000-person estimate is subject to change, we believe that it is more reliable than the 84,000 figure the Army has suggested.

ARMY'S MOBILIZATION SUPPLY OF UNTRAINED
PERSONNEL AND ITS CAPACITY TO TRAIN THEM

After the mobilization decision, the Army would need to train new personnel. However, if the current schedule of inductees were implemented now, about 133,000 new personnel (see below) would report for training in the first month after mobilization. However, the Army's training bases could handle only 56,000, and its reception centers only 14,000. This would leave a surplus of 63,000 personnel who could not be accommodated. This shortfall is due to the Army's long-standing problem of inadequate post-mobilization training capabilities.

VARIOUS SOURCES OF
UNTRAINED PERSONNEL AVAILABLE
UPON MOBILIZATION

The primary sources of personnel available for initial entry-level training following mobilization include delayed entry personnel, Reserve entry personnel, volunteers, inductees, and personnel at reception centers. The supply of personnel that could be available for training by M+30 is listed below:

Delayed entry personnel	25,000
Reserve entry personnel	13,000
Volunteers (5-year monthly average)	12,000
Inductees	80,000
Personnel at reception centers	<u>3,000</u>
Total	<u><u>133,000</u></u>

Delayed-entry personnel

Individuals aged 17 or older may enlist in the delayed-entry program. They are then obligated to serve, but they may delay entry to active duty up to 12 months. These accessions are scheduled into the training base as space permits for up to 365 days. The 1-year restriction is set by law. In this program, the monthly supply in calendar year 1982 included an average of 25,000 males who would be eligible for immediate call-up after mobilization.

Reserve entry personnel

National Guard and Army Reserve personnel scheduled for initial entry training constitute the Reserve entry program. In calendar year 1982, the number of high school graduate males in the Army Guard and Reserve awaiting initial entry training and eligible for immediate call-up averaged 13,000 per month.

Volunteers

Over the last 3 years, the number of volunteers expected upon mobilization has varied considerably. In 1980 testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the Army said that it had planned for 15,000 volunteers per month during a mobilization. However, since that time, the Army has made plans to reduce drastically its recruiting force immediately after mobilization. The recruiting force would operate at less than 20 percent of the peacetime rate, which could restrict the flow of volunteers. The Army maintains that the volunteer rate would depend on the popularity of the conflict, and has decided to plan for about 8,000 volunteers per month. This rate, however, has not been confirmed with past experience on volunteer rates in the first 30 days after an incident involving this country. Army volunteer rates from 1978 to 1982 have averaged 12,000 per month.

Inductees

According to DOD officials, the Army's share of inductees varies from 80 to 100 percent, based on the stated needs of the other services. Therefore, the Army's share could be higher than 80,000.

Personnel at reception centers

The Army estimates that on M-Day there will be 3,000 persons who have already joined the Army and are being processed through reception centers. While at these centers, personnel (1) receive uniforms, weapons, and identification tags, (2) get immunizations, and (3) fill out personnel records. Upon completion of processing activities, these persons are ready to begin formal training.

ARMY TRAINING BASE OUTPUT REQUIREMENTS
EXCEED CAPABILITY

The Army has a long-standing problem of inadequate post-mobilization training capabilities.

According to preliminary estimates of the Army Training and Doctrine Command's 1983 study of the mobilization training base,

the capacity for initial entry-level training at M+30, or the first 4 weeks, would be about 56,000. This capacity is some 28,000 below the current training requirement goal--84,000--and even further below the 133,000-person training requirement that would need to be met in order for the Army to fully staff its current mobilized force structure.⁵ In addition to the 56,000 persons who could enter formal training by M+30, the Army estimates that it would place an additional 14,000 inductees in reception centers during the last week of the first month following mobilization. It would do this to maintain the flow of individuals into formal training at the beginning of the fifth week. Army headquarters expects to review the study results to verify the appropriateness of the methodology and to determine whether it accurately states the capability of the training base and its resource requirements for expansion. They plan to complete this review by late 1984.

A primary purpose of the study was to optimize capacity across the entire training base by implementing new training strategies and redistributing resources. The data gathered for the study reflects the additional resources needed by type and time frame for each course of instruction. It also documents the minimum essential resources (personnel, equipment, and facilities) needed to expand the training bases.

In a February 1983 report, as well as in previous reports, we reported on the problems the Army must solve to expand the mobilization training base.⁶ With the completion of the recent study, the Army should be able to identify specific resources needed at each training installation and to develop plans for acquiring them.

⁵Following the 133,000 surge of new trainees required between M-Day and M+30, the monthly requirement thereafter would be substantially lower.

⁶Army's Ability to Expand Training Base upon Mobilization Remains Limited (GAO/FPCD-83-2, Feb. 2, 1983).

ARMY'S 1322 REPORTING SYSTEM

To provide information for WARMAPS and for other purposes, the Army has developed a mobilization-planning model called the 1322 Reporting System. This system compares total Army requirements with total available assets for each military occupational specialty (MOS) and for each of the Army's five skill levels. This comparison yields shortages or overages for each MOS and skill level. Total shortages thus can be calculated by summing all shortages, taking into account those soldiers in overage skills who possess the requisite abilities and who could be transferred to shortage areas.⁷ The system uses data to determine, for example, how many entry-level cannon crewmen would be needed at M-day, M+30, and subsequent 10-day increments up to M+180. It also determines the number of entry-level cannon crewmen that would be on hand. Additionally, the system takes into account the wartime manpower structure required for full mobilization, as well as casualty projections.

In making these calculations, the Army has developed some assumptions and uses information from various Army data bases and organizations. It calculates total Army personnel needs by using the wartime structure requirements and skill level and casualty projections set by MOS. Total Army assets on M-day would include personnel in the active Army, the Army National Guard and the Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserves, retirees, and trainees already in the training bases. The system is time-phased so that information can be reported as of M-day and in 10-day increments through M+180. The time-phasing capability takes into account casualties incurred, as well as the time needed to phase in individuals.

According to the 1322 System's analysis, the Army's major wartime shortages would be in combat occupations, such as infantry, combat engineering, armor crew, and cannon crew. For example, the total shortage for infantry occupations by M+90 would be over 100,000. By summing the shortages in all specialties at all skill levels, the system has identified, by specified time frames, the total occupational shortages for fiscal year 1984.

The 1322 System's analysis is based on the following factors:

- The 1322 System assumes that personnel can be matched with requirements regardless of their actual location.
- The System uses the mobilization scenario in Defense Guidance for the then current fiscal year.

⁷Also, some retraining of people in overage skills could offset other shortages.

--The data provided by various Army offices are actual inventories for current and near year analyses, adjusted to reflect the number of personnel expected to report for duty.

--Individuals are phased in over time, and skill substitution criteria in assigning of pretrained individuals are considered.

--Personnel already in training at M-day are considered.

The 1322 reports are to be used for various purposes, including managing of Individual Ready Reservists and scheduling mobilization training. The Army plans to use the 1322 reports to prepare an Individual Ready Reserve objective for each MOS and skill. It will then convert these objectives into specific management plans to increase critical skills that are short of mobilization requirements. The 1322 reports are also the basis for the Post-Mobilization Training Base Output Requirements Report, upon which the Training and Doctrine Command schedules mobilization training.

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