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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittees of the House Committee on Homeland Security: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m. ET:
Wednesday, July 13, 2011: 

Homeland Security: 

Protecting Federal Facilities Remains a Challenge for the Department 
of Homeland Security's Federal Protective Service: 

Statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Director: 
Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

GAO-11-813T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-11-813T, a testimony before the Subcommittees of the 
House Committee on Homeland Security. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

As part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal 
Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for protecting federal 
employees and visitors in approximately 9,000 federal facilities owned 
or leased by the General Services Administration (GSA). FPS has a 
budget of approximately $1 billion and maintains approximately 1,200 
full-time employees and about 13,000 contract security guards that 
help accomplish the agencys facility protection mission. 

This testimony is based on past reports and testimonies and discusses 
challenges FPS faces in carrying out its mission with regard to (1) 
risk management, (2) strategic human capital planning, (3) oversight 
of its contract guard program, and (4) ensuring that its fee-based 
funding structure is the appropriate mechanism for funding the agency. 
GAO also addresses the extent to which FPS has made progress in 
responding to these challenges. To perform this work, GAO used its key 
facility protection practices as criteria, visited FPS regions and 
selected GSA buildings, reviewed training and certification data for 
FPSs contract guards, and interviewed officials from DHS, GSA, guard 
contractors, and guards. 

What GAO Found: 

FPS continues to face challenges in carrying out its mission. 
Specifically: 

* The absence of a risk management program hampers FPSs ability to 
protect federal facilities. For many years, GAO has advocated the 
importance of a risk management approach. GAO reported in August 2010 
that FPS does not use a comprehensive risk management approach that 
links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements. Instead, 
FPS uses a facility-by-facility approach which assumes that facilities 
with the same security level have the same risk regardless of their 
location. Without a risk management approach that identifies threats 
and vulnerabilities and the resources required to achieve FPSs 
security goals, as GAO has recommended, there is limited assurance 
that programs will be prioritized and resources will be allocated to 
address existing and potential security threats in an efficient and 
effective manner. 

* FPS has not fully addressed several key human capital issues. FPS 
continues to operate without a strategic human capital plan to guide 
its current and future workforce planning efforts, as GAO recommended 
in 2009. Further, FPS is not able to determine what its optimal 
staffing levels should be because FPS headquarters does not collect 
data on its workforces knowledge, skills, and abilities. FPS has yet 
to fully ensure that its recent move to an inspector-based workforce 
does not hinder its ability to protect federal facilities. 

* FPS faces longstanding challenges in managing its contract guard 
workforce. Weaknesses in FPSs contract guard program hamper its 
ability to protect federal facilities. GAO reported in 2009 and 2010 
that FPS cannot ensure that its contract guards have required training 
and certifications. FPS is in the process of addressing GAO 
recommendations. For example, FPS revised its x-ray and magnetometer 
training for its inspectors and guards. 

* FPS has not reviewed its fee design or determined an appropriate 
funding mechanism. FPS increased its basic security fee four times in 
6 years to try to cover costs, but has not reviewed its fees to 
develop an informed, deliberate design. FPSs current fee structure 
has consistently resulted in total collection amounts less than agency 
costs and continues to be a topic of congressional interest and 
inquiry. FPS has yet to evaluate whether its fee-based structure or an 
alternative funding mechanism is most appropriate for funding the 
agency, as GAO recommended in 2008 and 2011. 

FPS has made some progress in improving its ability to protect federal 
facilities. For example, in response to GAO recommendations, FPS is 
developing the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP), which 
could enhance its ability to comprehensively assess risk at federal 
facilities and improve oversight of its contract guard program. DHS 
and FPS have initiatives in process to address 21 of the 28 
recommendations GAO has made related to the challenges above, although 
none are yet fully implemented. According to FPS officials, this is in 
part because of changes in the agencys leadership, organization, 
funding, staffing levels, and delays in developing several new 
management systems, such as RAMP. 

What GAO Recommends: 

DHS and FPS have generally concurred with GAOs past recommendations. 
DHS and FPS have initiatives in process, for example, to address risk 
management, strategic human capital planning, and oversight of its 
contract guard program. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-813T] or key 
components. For more information, contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-
2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Chairmen Lungren and Bilirakis, Ranking Members Clarke and Richardson, 
and Members of the Subcommittees: 

We are pleased to be here to discuss the challenges the Federal 
Protective Service (FPS) faces in carrying out its mission to protect 
federal facilities, particularly with regard to (1) risk management, 
(2) strategic human capital planning, (3) oversight of its contract 
guard program, and (4) ensuring that its fee-based funding structure 
is the appropriate mechanism for funding the agency. We will also 
discuss FPS's assessment of its performance and the extent to which 
FPS has made progress in responding to these challenges. Recent events 
have exposed weaknesses with FPS's ability to protect federal 
facilities, including GAO's covert testing at federal facilities in 
2009, FPS's ongoing penetration testing at federal facilities, and 
FPS's contract security guards allowing components of an active bomb 
to remain in a federal building in Detroit, Michigan, for three weeks 
in March 2011 before a bomb squad was called. 

As part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FPS is 
responsible for protecting federal employees and visitors in 
approximately 9,000 federal facilities owned or leased by the General 
Services Administration (GSA).[Footnote 1] FPS has a budget of 
approximately $1 billion and maintains approximately 1,200 full-time 
employees and about 13,000 contract security guards (also known as 
protective service officers) that help accomplish the agency's 
facility protection mission. FPS's primary responsibilities include 
(1) conducting risk assessments of federal facilities and recommending 
countermeasures aimed at preventing incidents at facilities; and (2) 
undertaking law enforcement activities, including responding to 
incidents at federal facilities. 

This testimony is based on our past reports and testimonies.[Footnote 
2] Work conducted for these reports and testimonies included assessing 
FPS's facility protection efforts using our key security practices as 
a framework.[Footnote 3] We also visited selected FPS regions and 
selected GSA buildings to assess FPS activities firsthand. 
Additionally, we reviewed training and certification data for 663 
randomly selected guards in 6 of FPS's 11 regions. Because of the 
sensitivity of some of the information in our prior work, we cannot 
specifically identify in this testimony the locations of the incidents 
discussed. For all of our work, we reviewed related laws and 
directives; interviewed officials and analyzed documents and data from 
DHS and GSA; and interviewed tenant agency representatives, 
contractors, and guards. These reviews took place between April 2007 
and May 2011. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Additional information on 
scope and methodology is provided in the previously issued products. 

The Absence of a Risk Management Program Hampers FPS's Ability to 
Protect Federal Facilities: 

For many years we have advocated the use of a risk management approach 
that entails managing risk through actions, including setting 
strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, allocating resources 
based on risk, evaluating alternatives, selecting initiatives to 
undertake, and implementing and monitoring those initiatives. Risk 
assessment, an important element of a risk management approach, helps 
decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that 
countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate 
the effects of the risks. 

FPS meets its mission to protect GSA's federal facilities by assessing 
the risks that face those facilities and identifying the appropriate 
countermeasures to mitigate those risks. Despite the importance of 
this mission, FPS has not implemented an effective risk management 
program. In August 2010, we reported that FPS does not use a 
comprehensive risk management approach that links threats and 
vulnerabilities to resource requirements.[Footnote 4] Instead, FPS 
uses a facility-by-facility approach to risk management: we reported 
in 2010 that FPS assumes that all facilities with the same security 
level have the same risk regardless of their location. For example, a 
level IV facility in a metropolitan area is generally treated the same 
as one in a rural area.[Footnote 5] This building-by-building approach 
prevents FPS from comprehensively identifying risk across the entire 
portfolio of GSA's facilities and allocating resources based on risk. 
[Footnote 6] Both our and DHS's risk management frameworks include 
processes for assessing comprehensive risk across assets in order to 
prioritize countermeasures based on the overall needs of the system. 

In response to our recommendations in this area, FPS began developing 
a new system, the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP). 
According to FPS, RAMP will support all components of the risk 
assessment process, including gathering and reviewing building 
information; conducting and recording interviews with GSA and tenant 
agencies; assessing threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to 
develop a detailed risk profile; recommending appropriate 
countermeasures; and producing facility security assessment (FSA) 
reports. FPS also plans to use RAMP to track and analyze workforce 
data, contract guard program data, and other performance data, such as 
the types and definitions of incidents and incident response times. We 
are finalizing our ongoing review of FPS's efforts to develop and 
implement RAMP as well as FPS's transition to DHS's National 
Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) and expect to report on 
these issues soon. 

FPS Has Not Fully Addressed Several Key Human Capital Issues: 

Over the last 3 years we have reported on the challenges FPS has faced 
in the human capital area since moving to DHS from GSA in 2003. As 
mandated by Congress, in 2009 FPS increased the size of its workforce 
to 1,200 full time employees.[Footnote 7] However, FPS continues to 
operate without a strategic human capital plan. We recommended in 2009 
that FPS develop a human capital plan to guide its current and future 
workforce planning efforts.[Footnote 8] We have identified human 
capital management as a high-risk issue throughout the federal 
government, including within DHS. A human capital plan is important to 
both align FPS's human capital program with current and emerging 
mission and programmatic goals, and develop effective processes for 
training, retention, and staff development. In 2009, we reported that 
the absence of such a plan has contributed to inconsistent human 
capital activities among FPS regions and headquarters, as several 
regions told us they have implemented their own processes for 
performance feedback, training, and mentoring. In addition, we found 
that FPS's workforce planning is limited because FPS headquarters does 
not collect data on its workforce's knowledge, skills, and abilities. 
Without such information, FPS is not able to determine what its 
optimal staffing levels should be or identify gaps in its workforce 
needs and determine how to modify its workforce planning strategies to 
fill these gaps. FPS concurred with our recommendation and drafted a 
workforce analysis plan in June 2010. According to FPS, the plan must 
be reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before it is 
subject to approval by the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

FPS also has yet to fully ensure that its recent move to an inspector- 
based workforce does not hinder its ability to protect federal 
facilities. In 2007, FPS essentially eliminated its police officer 
position and moved to an all inspector-based workforce. FPS also 
decided to place more emphasis on physical security activities, such 
as completing FSAs, and less emphasis on law enforcement activities, 
such as proactive patrol. We reported in 2008 that these changes may 
have contributed to diminished security and increases in inspectors' 
workload.[Footnote 9] Specifically, we found that when FPS is not 
providing proactive patrol at some federal facilities, there is an 
increased potential for illegal entry and other criminal activity. 
Moreover, under its inspector-based workforce approach, FPS is relying 
more on local police departments to handle crime and protection issues 
at federal facilities; however, we previously reported that at 
approximately 400 federal facilities across the United States, local 
police may not have the authority to respond to incidents inside those 
facilities.[Footnote 10] 

We recommended in 2008 that FPS clarify roles and responsibilities of 
local law enforcement agencies in responding to incidents at GSA 
facilities.[Footnote 11] While FPS agreed with this recommendation, 
FPS has decided not to pursue agreements with local law enforcement 
officials, in part because of local law enforcement officials' 
reluctance to sign such agreements. In addition, FPS believes that the 
agreements are not necessary because 96 percent of the properties in 
its inventory are listed as concurrent jurisdiction facilities where 
both federal and state governments have jurisdiction over the 
property. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that these agreements 
would, among other things, clarify roles and responsibilities of local 
law enforcement agencies when responding to crime or other incidents. 
We are currently reviewing to what extent FPS is coordinating with 
state and local police departments to ensure adequate protection of 
federal facilities and will issue a report next year. 

FPS Faces Longstanding Challenges in Managing Its Contract Guard 
Workforce: 

FPS's contract guard program is the most visible component of the 
agency's operations and the agency relies on its guards to be its 
"eyes and ears" while performing their duties. Guards are responsible 
for controlling access to federal facilities by checking the 
identification of government employees and the public who enter 
federal facilities, and operating security equipment to screen for 
prohibited items. Since 2009, we have identified weaknesses in FPS's 
contract guard program which hamper its ability to protect federal 
facilities. For example, we reported in 2009 and in 2010 that FPS does 
not have a reliable system to ensure that its 13,000 guards have the 
training and certifications required to stand post at federal 
facilities or comply with post orders once they are deployed.[Footnote 
12] 

In 2009, we also identified substantial security vulnerabilities 
related to FPS's guard program.[Footnote 13] In April and May 2009, 
GAO investigators conducted covert tests and were able to successfully 
pass components of an improvised explosive device (IED) concealed on 
their persons through security checkpoints monitored by FPS guards at 
10 Level IV facilities in 4 major metropolitan areas. In addition, 
FPS's penetration testing--similar to our covert testing--shows that 
guards continue to have problems with detecting prohibited items. 
[Footnote 14] For example, in March 2011, FPS contract guards allowed 
components for an active bomb to remain in a Level IV federal building 
in Detroit, Michigan for 3 weeks before a bomb squad was called to 
remove them. 

We also found in 2010 that although some guard contractors did not 
comply with the terms of their contracts, FPS did not take any 
enforcement action against them.[Footnote 15] According to FPS guard 
contracts, a contractor has not complied with the terms of the 
contract if, for example, the contractor has a guard working without 
valid certifications or background suitability investigations, or 
falsifies a guard's training records. If FPS determines that a 
contractor does not comply with these contract requirements, it can--
among other things--assess a financial deduction for nonperformed 
work, elect not to exercise a contract option, or terminate the 
contract for default or cause. 

We reviewed the official contract files for the 7 contractors who, as 
we testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts with 
expired certification and training records to determine what action, 
if any, FPS had taken against these contractors for contract 
noncompliance.[Footnote 16] According to the documentation in the 
contract files, FPS did not take any enforcement action against the 
contractors for not complying with the terms of the contract. Instead, 
FPS exercised the option to extend the contracts for these 7 
contractors. Additionally, although FPS requires an annual performance 
evaluation of each guard contractor and at the conclusion of contracts 
exceeding $100,000, FPS did not always evaluate the performance of its 
contractors as required, and some evaluations were incomplete and not 
consistent with contractors' performance. 

In response to our recommendations, FPS has taken several steps to 
improve the oversight of its contract guard program. Since July 2009, 
FPS has increased its penetration tests in some regions and the number 
of guard inspections it conducts at federal facilities in some 
metropolitan areas. Additionally, FPS began the process of providing 
additional x-ray and magnetometer training for its workforce. Under 
the new requirement, inspectors must receive 30 hours of x-ray and 
magnetometer training and guards are required to take 16 hours. 
Previously, guards were required to receive 8 hours of training on x- 
ray and magnetometer machines. Finally, FPS expects to use RAMP, once 
it is developed, to determine whether its 13,000 guards have met its 
training and certification requirements and to conduct guard 
inspections. As stated earlier, we are finalizing our review of FPS's 
RAMP. 

FPS Has Not Reviewed Its Fee Design or Determined an Appropriate 
Funding Mechanism: 

We reported in May 2011 that FPS increased its basic security fee 4 
times in 6 years to try to cover costs (an increase of over 100 
percent).[Footnote 17] However, FPS has not reviewed its fees to 
develop an informed, deliberate fee design. We found that timely, 
substantive fee reviews are especially critical for fee-funded 
agencies to ensure that fee collections and operating costs remain 
aligned. FPS has broad authority to design its security fees, but the 
current fee structure has consistently resulted in total collection 
amounts less than agency costs, is not well understood or accepted by 
tenant agencies, and continues to be a topic of congressional interest 
and inquiry.[Footnote 18] 

In 2008, we recommended that FPS evaluate whether its use of a fee- 
based system or an alternative funding mechanism is the most 
appropriate manner to fund the agency. Although FPS agreed with this 
recommendation it has not begun such an analysis. Based on our updated 
work in 2011, we recommended that such an analysis include the 
examination of both alternative fee structures and a combination of 
fees and appropriations as well as the options and trade-offs 
discussed in our 2011 report.[Footnote 19] FPS agreed with this 
recommendation. 

FPS Faces Limitations in Assessing Its Performance: 

We have reported that FPS is limited in its ability to assess the 
effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal facilities.[Footnote 
20] To determine how well it is accomplishing its mission to protect 
federal facilities, FPS has identified some output measures. These 
measures include determining whether security countermeasures have 
been deployed and are fully operational, the amount of time it takes 
to respond to an incident, and the percentage of FSAs completed on 
time. As we reported in 2010, while output measures are helpful in 
assessing performance, outcome measures can provide FPS with broader 
information on program results, such as the extent to which its 
decision to move to an inspector-based workforce will enhance security 
at federal facilities.[Footnote 21] Outcome measures could also help 
identify the security gaps that remain at federal facilities and 
determine what action may be needed to address them. 

In addition, we reported in 2010 that FPS does not have a reliable 
data management system that will allow it to accurately track these 
measures or other important measures such as the number of crimes and 
other incidents occurring at GSA facilities.[Footnote 22] Without such 
a system, it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the 
effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal employees and 
facilities, allocate its limited resources, or make informed risk 
management decisions. For example, weaknesses in one of FPS's 
countermeasure tracking systems make it difficult to accurately track 
the implementation status of recommended countermeasures such as 
security cameras and x-ray machines. Without this ability, FPS has 
difficulty determining whether it has mitigated the risk of federal 
facilities to crime or a terrorist attack. FPS concurred with our 
recommendations and states that its efforts to address them will be 
completed in 2012 when its automated information systems are fully 
implemented. 

FPS Has Begun Some Initiatives, but Most GAO Recommendations Have Not 
Been Fully Implemented: 

FPS has begun several initiatives that, once fully implemented, should 
enhance its ability to protect the more than 1 million federal 
employees and members of the public who visit federal facilities each 
year. Since 2008, we have made 28 recommendations to help FPS to 
address its challenges with risk management, strategic human capital 
planning, oversight of its contract guard workforce, and its fee-based 
funding structure. DHS and FPS have generally agreed with these 
recommendations. As of July 2011, as shown in Table 1, FPS was in the 
process of addressing 21 of them, although none were fully 
implemented. Of the remaining 7, 5 were recommendations from our May 
2011 report, and we would not necessarily expect them to be fully 
implemented yet. According to FPS officials, the agency has faced 
difficulty in implementing many of our recommendations because of 
changes in its leadership, organization, funding, and staffing levels. 
In addition, FPS officials stated that its progress in implementing 
our recommendations has been affected by delays in developing several 
new management systems, such as RAMP. 

Table 1: Status of GAO Recommendations to the Federal Protective 
Service: 

GAO Report: Budget Issues: Better Fee Design Would Improve Federal 
Protective Service's and Federal Agencies' Planning and Budgeting for 
Security, GAO-11-492, May 2011: 

Recommendation: Conduct regular reviews of FPS's security fees and use 
this information to inform its fee setting; 
Status: Not implemented. 

Recommendation: Include systemwide capital investments when estimating 
costs and include them when setting basic security fee rates; 
Status: Not implemented. 

Recommendation: Make information on the estimated costs of key 
activities as well as the basis for these cost estimates readily 
available to affected parties to improve the transparency and 
credibility--and hence the acceptance by stakeholders--of the process 
for setting and using the fees; 
Status: Not implemented. 

Recommendation: Assess and report to Congress on: (1) the current and 
alternative fee structures, to include the options and trade-offs 
discussed in this report, and if appropriate, and (2) options to fund 
FPS through a combination of fees and direct appropriations, to 
include the options and trade-offs discussed in this report; 
Status: Not implemented. 

Recommendation: Evaluate and report to Congress on options to mitigate 
challenges agencies face in budgeting for FPS security costs, such as: 
(1) an alternative account structure for FPS to increase flexibility, 
while retaining or improving accountability and transparency or (2) an 
approved process for estimating fee rates; 
Status: Not implemented. 

Recommendation: Collect and maintain an accurate list of points of 
contact of customer agency officials responsible for budget and 
billing activities as well as facility designated points of contact as 
we previously recommended in 2010; 
Status: In process. 

GAO Report: Homeland Security: Addressing Weaknesses with Facility 
Security Committees Would Enhance Protection of Federal Facilities, 
GAO-10-901, August 2010; 
Recommendation: Develop and implement procedures that, among other 
things, outline the facility security committees' organization 
structure, operations, decision-making authority, and accountability; 
Status: In process. 

GAO Report: Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Contract 
Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of 
Contract Guards, GAO-10-341, April 2010: 

Recommendation: Identify other approaches and options that would be 
most beneficial and financially feasible for protecting federal 
facilities; 
Status: In process. 

Recommendation: Rigorously and consistently monitor guard contractors' 
and guards' performance and step up enforcement against contractors 
that are not complying with the terms of the contract; 
Status: In process. 

Recommendation: Complete all contract performance evaluations in 
accordance with FPS and Federal Acquisition Regulations requirements; 
Status: In process. 

Recommendation: Issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure 
that contract files have required documentation; 
Status: In process. 

Recommendation: Develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards at 
federal facilities outside metropolitan areas; 
Status: In process. 

Recommendation: Provide building-specific and scenario-based training 
and guidance to its contract guards; 
Status: In process. 

Recommendation: Develop and implement a management tool for ensuring 
that reliable, comprehensive data on the contract guard program are 
available on a real-time basis; 
Status: In process. 

Recommendation: Verify the accuracy of all guard certification and 
training data before entering them into RAMP, and periodically test 
the accuracy and reliability of RAMP data to ensure that FPS 
management has the information needed to effectively oversee its guard 
program; 
Status: In process. 

GAO Report: Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices 
Would Improve the Federal Protective Service's Approach to Facility 
Protection, GAO-10-142, October 2009: 

Recommendation: Provide the Secretary with regular updates, on a 
mutually agreed-to schedule, on the status of RAMP and the National 
Countermeasures Program, including the implementation status of 
deliverables, clear timelines for completion of tasks and milestones, 
and plans for addressing any implementation obstacles; 
Status: In process. 

Recommendation: In conjunction with the National Countermeasures 
Program, to develop a methodology and guidance for assessing and 
comparing the cost-effectiveness of technology alternatives; 
Status: In process. 

Recommendation: Reach consensus with GSA on what information contained 
in the building security assessment is needed for GSA to fulfill its 
responsibilities related to the protection of federal buildings and 
occupants, and accordingly, establish internal controls to ensure that 
shared information is adequately safeguarded; guidance for employees 
to use in deciding what information to protect with sensitive but 
unclassified designations; provisions for training on making 
designations, controlling, and sharing such information with GSA and 
other entities; and a review process to evaluate how well this 
information sharing process is working, with results reported to the 
Secretary regularly on a mutually agreed-to schedule; 
Status: In process. 

GAO Report: Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Should 
Improve Human Capital Planning and Better Communicate with Tenants, 
GAO-09-749, July 2009: 

Recommendation: Improve how FPS headquarters collects data on its 
workforce's knowledge, skills, and abilities to help it better manage 
and understand current and future workforce needs; 
Status: In process. 

Recommendation: Use these data in the development and implementation 
of a long-term strategic human capital plan that addresses key 
principles for effective strategic workforce planning, including 
establishing programs, policies, and practices that will enable the 
agency to recruit, develop, and retain a qualified workforce; 
Status: In process. 

Recommendation: Collect and maintain an accurate and comprehensive 
list of all facility-designated points of contact, as well as a system 
for regularly updating this list; 
Status: In process. 

Recommendation: Develop and implement a program for education and 
outreach to all customers to ensure they are aware of the current 
roles, responsibilities, and services provided by FPS; 
Status: In process. 

GAO Report: Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces 
Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal 
Facilities, GAO-08-683, July 2008: 

Recommendation: Develop and implement a strategic approach to manage 
its staffing resources including determining the optimum number of 
employees needed to accomplish its facility protection mission and 
allocate these resources based on risk management principles; 
Status: In process. 

Recommendation: Clarify roles and responsibilities of local law 
enforcement agencies in regard to responding to incidents at GSA 
facilities; 
Status: In process. 

Recommendation: Improve FPS's use of the fee-based system by 
developing a method to accurately account for the cost of providing 
security services to tenant agencies and ensuring that its fee 
structure takes into consideration the varying levels of risk and 
service provided at GSA facilities; 
Status: Not implemented. 

Recommendation: Evaluate whether FPS's current use of a fee-based 
system or an alternative funding mechanism is the most appropriate 
manner to fund the agency; 
Status: Not implemented. 

Recommendation: Develop and implement specific guidelines and 
standards for measuring its performance, including outcome measures to 
assess its performance and improve the accountability of FPS; 
Status: In process. 

Recommendation: Improve how FPS categorizes, collects, and analyzes 
data to help it better manage and understand the results of its 
efforts to protect GSA facilities; 
Status: In process. 

Source: GAO: 

Note: We reviewed information from FPS regarding our recommendations 
and, based on this information, categorized our recommendations 
accordingly. "In process" indicates that FPS has actions ongoing but 
has not completed them. "Not implemented" indicates that FPS has not 
yet taken any action to address our recommendations. 

[End of table] 

Chairmen Lungren and Bilirakis, Ranking Members Clarke and Richardson, 
and members of the Subcommittees, this completes my prepared 
statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or other 
members of the Subcommittees may have at this time. 

Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact me at (202) 
512-2834 or by e-mail at goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions 
to this testimony include Tammy Conquest, Assistant Director; Colin 
Fallon; Chelsa Gurkin; Alicia Loucks; Jackie Nowicki, Assistant 
Director; Justin Reed; and Susan Michal-Smith. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Budget Issues: Better Fee Design Would Improve Federal Protective 
Service's and Federal Agencies' Planning and Budgeting for Security. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-492]. Washington, D.C.: 
May 20, 2011. 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on the Federal Protective 
Service's Workforce Analysis and Planning Efforts. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-802R]. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 
2010. 

Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Use of Contract Guards 
Requires Reassessment and More Oversight. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-614T]. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 
2010. 

Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Contract Guard Program 
Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract Guards. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-341]. Washington, D.C.: 
April 13, 2010. 

Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges Impact the Federal Protective 
Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-506T]. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 
2010. 

Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices Would Improve 
the Federal Protective Service's Approach to Facility Protection. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-142]. Washington, D.C.: 
October 23, 2009. 

Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Has Taken Some Initial 
Steps to Address Its Challenges, but Vulnerabilities Still Exist. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1047T]. Washington, 
D.C.: September 23, 2009. 

Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Should Improve Human 
Capital Planning and Better Communicate with Tenants. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-749]. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 
2009. 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective 
Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered By 
Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T]. Washington, D.C.: July 8, 
2009. 

Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several 
Challenges That Raise Concerns About Protection of Federal Facilities. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-897T]. Washington, 
D.C.: June 19, 2008. 

Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several 
Challenges That Raise Concerns About Protection of Federal Facilities. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-914T]. Washington, 
D.C.: June 18, 2008. 

Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several 
Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683]. Washington, D.C.: 
June 11, 2008. 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on the Federal Protective 
Service's Efforts to Protect Federal Property. [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-476T]. Washington, D.C.: February 
8, 2008. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] In this testimony, we refer to property that is owned by the 
federal government and under the control and custody of GSA as GSA- 
owned property. 

[2] See related GAO products at the end of this statement. 

[3] GAO, Homeland Security: Addressing Weaknesses with Facility 
Security Committees Would Enhance Protection of Federal Facilities, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-901] (Washington, D.C.: 
August 5, 2010). 

[4] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-901]. 

[5] The level of security FPS provides at each of the 9,000 federal 
facilities varies depending on the building's security level. Based on 
the Department of Justice's (DOJ) 1995 Vulnerability Assessment 
Guidelines, there are five types of security levels. A level I 
facility is typically a small storefront-type operation such as a 
military recruiting office which has 10 or fewer employees and a low 
volume of public contact. A level II facility has from 11 to 150 
employees, a level III facility has from 151 to 450 federal employees 
and moderate to high volume of public contact, a level IV facility has 
over 450 employees, a high volume of public contact, and includes high 
risk law enforcement and intelligence agencies. FPS does not have 
responsibility for Level V facilities which include the White House 
and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Interagency Security 
Committee has recently promulgated new security level standards that 
will supersede the 1995 DOJ standards. 

[6] GAO, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces 
Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal 
Facilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008). See also [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-901]. 

[7] Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 110-329, Division D, 122 Stat. 3574, 3659-3660 (2008). This 
requirement for FPS to maintain a minimum number of full time 
equivalent positions has been included in subsequent appropriations 
acts. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142, 2156-2157 (2009), and Department 
of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. 
No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38, 142-143 (2011). 

[8] GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Should Improve 
Human Capital Planning and Better Communicate with Tenants, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-749] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 30, 2009). 

[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683]. 

[10] At approximately 400 federal facilities nationwide, the federal 
government has exclusive jurisdiction of its facilities, whereby the 
federal government has all of the legislative authority within the 
land area in question and the local police have no residual police 
power. 

[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683]. 

[12] GAO, Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal 
Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered 
By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T] (Washington, D.C.: July 8, 
2009). See also GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's 
Contract Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use 
of Contract Guards, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-341] (Washington, D.C.: April 13, 
2010). 

[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T]. 

[14] FPS employs Operation Shield to systematically assess the 
effectiveness of FPS countermeasures, including Protective Service 
Officers, at federal facilities. 

[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-341]. 

[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T]. 

[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-492]. 

[18] Pub. L. No. 109-295, title II, 120 Stat. 1355, 1361 (Oct. 4, 
2006). 

[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-492]. 

[20] GAO, Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices Would 
Improve the Federal Protective Service's Approach to Facility 
Protection, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-142] 
(Washington, D.C.: October 23, 2009). 

[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-142]. 

[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-142]. 

[End of section] 

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