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BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

Report To The Congress

OF THE UNITED STATES

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Can The Army And Air Force Reserves Support The Active Forces Effectively?

The Active military forces cannot fully support the Nation in times of emergency without effective reinforcement by the Selected Reserves.

The Air Reserve forces can meet mobilization and deployment schedules but the Army Reserve Forces may have difficulty doing so.

Army Reserve and National Guard units' readiness could be increased if:

- The Army Reserve component management structure were streamlined.
- More direct assistance were provided by Active Army units.
- Unnecessary and unsupportable units were eliminated.
- Mobilization planning were improved.




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
To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives


This report summarizes the results of our examination of the Army and Air Force Selected Reserve Components' management structures. It discusses opportunities for streamlining the structures, smoothing the transition from a peacetime to a wartime posture, improving mobilization planning, and increasing involvement by the Active Forces in preparing the Reserves for mobilization.

In addition to this report, we have prepared a classified supplement which discusses the configuration and readiness of the Army's Reserve Component forces. The supplement also describes opportunities for expanding the Air Force Associate Program into the Tactical Air Command. Authorized persons can obtain the supplement upon request.

This review is an aspect of our continuing examination of the readiness of this Nation's military forces.

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force.


Comptroller General
of the United States



D I G E S T

The Selected Reserve Forces are critical to the Nation's total military strength. The Air Reserves can meet mobilization and deployment schedules effectively, but indications are that the Army may have difficulty supporting its Active units effectively should an emergency occur. Its readiness could be improved if

- duplicate capabilities were eliminated,
- inefficient headquarters were reorganized,
- peacetime structures were brought more in line with wartime structures,
- more direct assistance were provided by Active Army units,
- unnecessary and unsupportable units were eliminated,
- organization for planning and executing Reserve mobilization were strengthened, and
- mobilization plans were improved.

ARMY RESERVE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

This structure consists of 2 separate components in peacetime with separate headquarters and over 24,000 authorized personnel to provide command and control over their units.

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The Office of the Secretary of Defense has for several years believed that the Reserve structure has excessive layering (duplication), dissimilar peacetime and wartime command arrangements, and serious deficiencies in management structure, readiness, and mobilization and deployment capabilities. GAO believes these deficiencies could be alleviated if some of the responsibilities in this layering were absorbed by other echelons.

AFFILIATION PROGRAM

This program, in which sponsoring Active Army units provide advice and assistance to their affiliated Reserve component units, has been credited with improving the operational readiness of participating Reserve and Guard units. The program has not expanded since it began in 1974, but GAO believes such opportunities exist.

UNNECESSARY AND UNSUPPORTABLE UNITS

Nearly 25 percent of the Army's deployable Reserve component units had no assigned missions during the first 6 months following mobilization. Further, a 1977 Sixth Army study identified 345 units with over 26,000 authorized personnel which could not be supported adequately in a reserve environment.

Maintaining unnecessary and unsupportable units in the Reserves when many high-priority, early-deploying units cannot meet acceptable readiness levels is a misapplication of scarce resources and a burden to the management structure.

ARMY'S ORGANIZATION FOR AND MANAGEMENT OF MOBILIZATION PLANNING

GAO found the following problems in Army's mobilization planning.

- The current organizational structure would have difficulty commanding and controlling the mobilization and deployment of units. It needs strengthening.
- The span of mobilization planning responsibilities at the Army Forces Command is overextended.
- Many requirements necessary to plan and support mobilization have not been identified.
- Army installation mobilization plans are outdated, incomplete, or nonexistent.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR GREATER INTEGRATION
OF THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE AIR FORCES

The Air Force has integrated its Active and Reserve Forces, and its Reserve Forces are, overall, ready and capable of deploying within expected time frames. (See p. 128.)

Those units participating in the Air Force Associate Program serve side-by-side with Active units in flying and maintaining first-line Active Air Force equipment.

Despite the program's success and the Defense Manpower Commission's recommendations that it be expanded to other mission areas, it is found only in the Military Airlift Command and involves only Air Force Reserve units.

The Air National Guard has not participated in the program. GAO was told this was because of the Guard's desire to maintain possession of aircraft during peacetime. This is principally to make sure that aircraft are available for training. (See pp. 139 to 141.)

GAO believes the Associate Program can be expanded to other Air Force mission areas, such as the Tactical Air Command (see p. 136) and that Air National Guard units could participate in the Associate Program.

RECOMMENDATIONS

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense streamline the Army Reserve component management structure, considering the recommendations and alternatives discussed in this report.

Also, the Secretary of Defense should require the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to make Air National Guard units available, as necessary, to fill any Active requirements for Reserve aircrews through the Associate Program.

The Secretary of the Army should:

- Expand the Affiliation Program to include as many deployable Reserve component units as possible. Priority should be given to early-deploying units.
- Require that those Reserve component units scheduled for transfer to other U.S.-based major commands upon full mobilization be formally affiliated, to the extent possible, with their gaining commands.
- Eliminate those deployable Reserve component units having no assigned deployment schedules after completion of the 1978 operations plans assessment.
- Develop a comprehensive plan to identify and act on unsupportable Reserve component units, considering the recommendations developed by the Sixth Army.
- Strengthen the organization for Reserve component mobilization planning by strengthening the Forces Command's mobilization planning capability and decentralizing mobilization coordination responsibilities to subordinate command levels and Active gaining commands.

The Secretary of the Air Force should examine Tactical Air Command and other mission areas for possible application

of the associate concept and consider the concept the norm for staffing new aircrew requirements, consistent with Active Force requirements.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

Army officials agreed that for the most part this report is an accurate assessment of deficiencies in Reserve component elements' roles and command relationships at mobilization and of the state of mobilization planning. The Army is responding to these problems.

The Army agreed that the Affiliation Program is successful and should be fully supported. It said 76 early-deploying units have been selected for affiliation with Active forces in fiscal year 1979, and that other feasible units scheduled to deploy between 31 to 60 days of the initiation of mobilization are programmed for affiliation between fiscal year 1980 through 1983. It also said affiliation of units transferring to other major Army commands upon mobilization has been approved.

The Army should continue to seek candidate units, in addition to those mentioned above, for affiliation.

The Army indicated that many Reserve component units which do not appear to have current valid missions are scheduled for reorganization and will be assigned appropriate missions as the structural changes are completed.

GAO agrees with this scheduling if it fills required missions but does not believe the Army should maintain units for contingency purposes.

The Army agreed that selected units in the Reserve components are difficult to support from both personnel and readiness standpoints. But it said this fact does alleviate these requirements.

GAO believes dependence on unsupportable units is unrealistic and that a comprehensive plan to identify and provide disposition actions on them is needed.

Air Force officials disagreed with GAO's recommendation that Air Guard units should participate in the Associate Program because the program as now practiced would entail overlapping and perhaps conflicting lines of authority. Traditional State/Federal roles of the National Guard would have to be revamped.

The Air Force also disagreed with GAO's recommendation to apply the Associate Program in the Tactical Air Command. (See p. 145.) GAO believes, notwithstanding Air Force officials' comments, that the program has applicability in the command. (See p. 145.)

Regarding the merger of Reserve components as an alternative to current management structures, Defense officials said that they believe "continued discussion of a merger of the National Guard and Army or Air Force Reserve is fruitless." (See app. v, pp. 157, 165, and 166.) However, GAO believes a simultaneous merger of the components offers several advantages and should receive further consideration.


RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS

In view of Defense's responses to many of the issues raised in this report, GAO recommends that the appropriate Congressional oversight and appropriations committees pursue these matters further, including

- exploring opportunities for greater and more rapid expansion of the Affiliation Program with the Army,
- requiring the Air Force to justify its actions in not expanding the Associate Program into other commands and in not

including Air Guard units in the program,
and

--directing Defense to provide an assessment
of the advantages, disadvantages, and cost
savings attributable to the merger alter-
native presented in this report.



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ABBREVIATIONS

ARCOM	Army Reserve Command
CONUSA	Continental U.S. Army
GAO	General Accounting Office
MUSARC	Major U.S. Army Reserve Command
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Army and Air Force Reserve and National Guard forces, which have always been important elements of the Nation's defense capability, are now more important than at any time since their inception. Under the Defense Department's Total Force Policy, formalized in 1973, the Selected Reserves 1/ are the prime source of trained and ready units to augment and sustain the Active Forces during an emergency. In fact, now that the Nation's Active Forces are at their lowest levels since World War II, many of the missions formerly assigned to them now rest with the Selected Reserves.

The number of units in the Selected Reserve Components is shown below.

<u>Reserve component</u>	<u>Units</u>
Army Reserve	3,350
Army National Guard	3,300
Air Force Reserve	454
Air National Guard	<u>1,020</u>
Total	<u>8,124</u>

The following comparisons of Selected Reserve personnel strengths with those of the Active Forces illustrate the importance of the Reserves to the Total Force policy.

1/Those personnel organized into units to serve as required upon mobilization. Selected Reserves is the legislative designation for that portion of the Reserve Forces whose authorized strength is determined annually by the Congress. The Selected Reserves do not include members of the Individual Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, or the Retired Reserve.

<u>Component</u>	<u>Authorized personnel (note a)</u> (thousands)	<u>Percent of authorized strength to total service authorization</u>	<u>Assigned Personnel (note b)</u> (thousands)
Army:			
Active	790.0	57.1	781.8
Reserve	211.3	15.3	189.4
National Guard	<u>382.0</u>	<u>27.6</u>	<u>354.7</u>
Total	<u>1,383.3</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>1,325.9</u>
Air Force:			
Active	572.0	79.9	570.5
Reserve	51.1	7.1	50.4
National Guard	<u>92.5</u>	<u>12.9</u>	<u>91.8</u>
Total	<u>715.6</u>	c/ <u>100.0</u>	<u>712.7</u>

a/Congressionally authorized strengths for fiscal year 1978.

b/ Actual end strengths for fiscal year 1977.

c/Does not add due to rounding.

It should be noted that full wartime personnel requirements for the Reserve components are considerably higher than the congressionally authorized strengths: 706,500 for the Army's Reserve and National Guard and 166,000 for the Air Force's Reserve and Guard.

The following table illustrates the reliance placed on the Reserve components in selected mission areas.

<u>Mission</u>	<u>Percent of responsibility</u>	
	<u>Active Forces</u>	<u>Selected Reserves</u>
Army:		
Deployable forces	44	56
Infantry and armor battalions	48	52
Field artillery battalions	43	57
Tactical support	33	67
Air Force:		
Strategic airlift wartime capability	50	50
Tactical airlift aircraft	39	61
Airborne early warning aircraft	-	100
Air defense interceptors	37	63

Active missions are shifted to the more economical Reserve Forces when it is determined that they can perform them adequately and in accordance with mobilization plans. The costs of Reserve component units range from 20 percent (Army Reserve and Guard) to 75 percent (Air Force and Guard) of the costs of Active units.

Fiscal year 1979 budget figures 1/ for the Reserve components follow.

	<u>Army Reserve</u>	<u>Army National Guard</u>	<u>Air Force Reserve</u>	<u>Air National Guard</u>
	----- (000 omitted) -----			
Reserve personnel	\$532,600	\$ 747,100	\$183,600	\$ 252,200
Operations and maintenance	420,800	795,700	395,300	938,600
Military construction	<u>34,800</u>	<u>49,700</u>	<u>12,500</u>	<u>41,500</u>
Total	<u>\$988,200</u>	<u>\$1,592,500</u>	<u>\$591,400</u>	<u>\$1,232,300</u>

1/Exclude equipment procurement, which is budgeted by the respective Active components.


RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES

Army Reserve Forces

The organizational structures and chains of command of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard are distinctly separate in peacetime. The Army Reserve is a Federal force at all times, commanded through a mixture of Active Army and Army Reserve command levels. On the other hand, the Army National Guard, a Federal force in time of war, is commanded in peacetime by the respective State and Territorial Governors. While the National Guard Bureau and the Active Forces have no direct chain-of-command relationships with the State Guard forces in peacetime, Federal leverage is considerable since about 90 percent of the State Guard's funding is from the Federal Government.


The following chart compares the organizational structures of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard.

ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS COMMAND STRUCTURES



^{1/} MANEUVER TRAINING COMMANDS, ALTHOUGH PART OF THE TRAINING DIVISIONS ORGANIZATIONALLY, ARE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE ARMY READINESS REGIONS.

^{2/} THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU IS A DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY STAFF AGENCY AND MAJOR COMMAND EQUIVALENT; IT IS A JOINT BUREAU OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE. THE BUREAU IS ORGANIZED WITH SUBORDINATE ARMY AND AIR FORCE DIRECTORATES. BY LAW, 50 PERCENT OF THE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AUTHORIZED THE BUREAU ARE ACTIVE DUTY ARMY OR AIR FORCE, AND THE REMAINING 40 PERCENT ARE NATIONAL GUARD STATUTORY TOUR OFFICERS WHO NORMALLY SERVE A PRESCRIBED TOUR OF FOUR YEARS.



The U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia, which commands the Army Reserve, also commands all assigned Active Army components and installations in the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Canal Zone. The Forces Command does not command the State Army Guard Forces, but is responsible for supervising their training and monitoring their readiness. The command exercises these responsibilities through its three subordinate continental U.S. Armies (CONUSAs).


The Army National Guard is composed of 53 separate entities (the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands). The National Guard Bureau provides direction to the State and Territorial Guard Forces through suggestion, persuasion, management of funding, and allocation of units and strength levels. The Bureau carries out such functions as

- developing, submitting to the Congress, and defending the Army Guard budget,
- implementing Army Guard force structure actions,
- providing logistical support (equipment, supplies, and uniforms),
- providing coordination between Active Army, Army Reserve, and State Guard Forces, and
- distributing Defense funds to the State Guard units.


Air Reserve Forces

The organizational structures and chains-of-command of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard are, like those of the Army Reserve Forces, distinctly separate in peacetime. The Air Force Reserve peacetime chain-of-command flows smoothly from the Air Force Chief of Staff downward through Reserve commands to the units. Air National Guard units are commanded in peacetime by their respective State Governors, with no direct link to the Department of the Air Force. Upon mobilization, all Air Reserve Forces are absorbed into Active Air Force commands. The following diagrams show the structural composition and command relationships of the Air Force Reserve and Guard.

AIR RESERVE COMPONENTS COMMAND STRUCTURES



THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU IS A DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE STAFF AGENCY AND MAJOR COMMAND EQUIVALENT. IT IS A JOINT BUREAU OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE. THE BUREAU IS ORGANIZED WITH SUBORDINATE ARMY AND AIR FORCE DIRECTORATES BY LAW. 60 PERCENT OF THE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AUTHORIZED THE BUREAU ARE ACTIVE DUTY ARMY OR AIR FORCE, AND THE REMAINING 40 PERCENT ARE NATIONAL GUARD STATUTORY TOUR OFFICERS WHO NORMALLY SERVE A PRESCRIBED TOUR OF FOUR YEARS.



Serving as the Air Force Chief of Staff's principal advisor on all Air Force Reserve matters, the Chief of the Air Force Reserve establishes policy, provides guidance, and is responsible for all Air Force Reserve planning and programing. His office coordinates with Air Force headquarters to develop the Air Force Reserve mission, budget, and force structure. Headquarters, Air Force Reserve, administers and supervises Air Force Reserve units through three numbered (Reserve) Air Forces.

The Air National Guard is composed of units in 52 States and territories. (The Virgin Islands has no Air Guard units.) The Office of the Director, Air National Guard, under the National Guard Bureau Chief, is the official channel for distributing Air Force policies and regulations to the State Air Guard Forces. As such, the office acts as liaison between the Active Air Force and State Guard headquarters, develops and defends Air Guard budgets, and manages appropriate Federal resources. Although the Guard Bureau and its Air Guard office have no direct command authority over State Air Guard Forces, the Bureau coordinates with State officials through suggestions, encouragement, funds management, and allocation of units and strength levels.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We examined Army and Air Force Reserve component organizational structures, and selected related programs. We reviewed policies, procedures, and practices for providing command, control, and assistance to Reserve Component units. We tested these practices and relationships at selected levels and locations to the extent we deemed practicable. Our fieldwork included:

--Army

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations,
U.S. Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
U.S. Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;
U.S. Army Forces Command,
Fort McPherson, Georgia;
First U.S. Army,
Fort Meade, Maryland;
Sixth U.S. Army, Presidio of San Francisco
San Francisco, California;

Army Readiness Region III,
Fort Meade, Maryland;
Army Readiness Region IX, Presidio of San Francisco,
San Francisco, California;
Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.;
124th Army Reserve Command,
Fort Lawton, Washington;
97th Army Reserve Command,
Fort Meade, Maryland;
351st Civil Affairs Command,
Mountain View, California;
7th Infantry Division,
Fort Ord, California;
41st Infantry Brigade, Oregon Army National Guard,
Portland, Oregon; and
91st Training Division,
Fort Baker, California.

--National Guard Bureau

Office of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau,
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.;
Office of the Director, Army National Guard,
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.;
Office of the Director, Air National Guard,
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.; and
Headquarters, California National Guard,
Sacramento, California.

--Air Force

Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations,
U.S. Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;
Office of the Chief of the Air Force Reserve,
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.;
Tactical Air Command,
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia;
Military Airlift Command,
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois;
Dover Air Force Base, Delaware;
McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey; and
Travis Air Force Base, California.

We also held several meetings with officials of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) to discuss topics addressed in this report.

CHAPTER 2

CAN THE SELECTED RESERVES FULFILL THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY?

The Reserve Forces' readiness and mobilization and deployment capabilities in support of the Active Force are critical to the Nation's total military strength. Members of Congress, the Department of Defense, and officials of the individual services have acknowledged this. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, for example, testified 1/ in 1978 that:

"The active components will face a more accelerated pace of operations in the battlefield of the next war and will need more rapid and more effective reinforcement than has hitherto been imagined.
* * * Rapid and effective mobilization [of the Reserve Forces] will spell the difference between successful defense against the aggressor and a dismal military failure with all its consequences."

Any perception that the Selected Reserves are only backup to the Actives is obsolete; the Department of Defense Total Force Policy assigns the Reserves many responsibilities that historically were assigned to the Actives. A more accurate perception is that the Reserves have important first-line responsibilities in partnership with the Actives but serve only part-time.

Responsibility for ensuring readiness and deployability of the Reserves rests with both the Reserves and the Active Forces. The Active Forces should provide all the assistance possible to integrate the Reserves into the Total Force and enhance their readiness.

Effective and efficient Reserve component management structures are also essential to achieving these goals. The structures must provide for integrated mobilization planning and effective command, training, and support to develop and sustain the units' readiness. To the greatest

1/"Department of Defense Appropriations for 1979," hearings before the Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, House Appropriations Committee, 95:2 (Mar. and Apr. 1978) part 7, p. 257.

possible extent, the structures should mirror their mobilization configurations in peacetime to (1) minimize disruption from structure modifications during the critical early stages of mobilization and (2) provide continuity of operations upon mobilization. Bringing the Reserves to required readiness levels in a period of constrained Defense spending also dictates that they be composed only of required units that can be adequately maintained in the reserve environment.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services should be commended for their efforts to identify and solve problems with the Reserve components' readiness and deployability. Their studies, reports, and actions in these areas are noted throughout this report. However, much more remains to be done. If the Reserves are to successfully perform their missions, the following key questions must be answered affirmatively. Because all are interrelated, deficiencies in any area can adversely affect the overall readiness of the Reserve components.

--Is the total force concept viable?

--Can the Reserve command structures effectively discharge their responsibilities?

--Can the Reserves provide the support the units would need to augment the Actives?

--Are the Reserve Forces composed only of units needed to augment the Actives?

--Can the Actives play a greater role in improving the Reserves' readiness?

IS THE TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT VIABLE?

The Defense Department's Total Force Policy treats all U.S. Active and Reserve Forces as elements of a homogeneous whole. It includes the Active, National Guard, and Reserve components; civilians; and--in planning for contingency operations--U.S. allied forces. The policy relies on the Reserves as the initial and primary augmenting and sustaining force for active duty personnel.

The viability of the total force concept depends on whether each component can perform its assigned missions in support of the other components. For example, the ability of the Army Reserves to deploy to Europe to augment the

Active Forces in a major contingency would depend on the mobilization of the Air Reserves. And the successful deployment of both depends on the amount and quality of combat support (both organic and that provided by host nations) in Europe. Although the Total Force Policy seems to be a viable concept, it is not without its problems. Two particularly important and timely concerns are

- the All Volunteer Force concept, especially concerning the Army Reserve Forces and
- the amount and quality of host nation support available in Europe.

The All Volunteer Force

The draft was last used to meet military personnel needs in 1972. Since then, effective military forces, including Reserves capable of rapid mobilization and deployment, have depended largely on the success of the All Volunteer Force concept.

Prior to the All Volunteer Force, young males facing conscription had the choice of a 2-year active duty tour and several years of Reserve requirement or a 6-year assignment with a Reserve component, of which several months were devoted to full-time active duty. During the Vietnam conflict, most young men chose the Reserves because they believed the choice would cause less disruption in their personal lives. Consequently, Reserve components during that time were able to maintain strengths at about total authorized fill, even while being selective with applicants.

The large numbers of reservists in the late 1960s and early 1970s meant large numbers of discharges in the mid to late 1970s. By fiscal year 1974, 1/ because of the winddown of the Vietnam conflict and elimination of the draft, the Army Reserve components found it more difficult to attract enlistees. The abundance of draft-motivated volunteers (who had provided 70 percent of the Army Reserves' enlistees during the Vietnam conflict) had disappeared, and the number of new enlistees who had not had previous military experience declined to a trickle.

1/The first full fiscal year of the All Volunteer Force.

The net result was an inability of the Army's Reserve components to maintain personnel strength levels at Vietnam conflict era fill percentages. The Army Reserve components had only 77.3 percent of their full wartime personnel requirements as of April 1978.

In June 1978, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, testified 1/ that the All Volunteer Force was a success. He said that a strong case could, in fact, be made that the Active Forces are stronger and better manned than at any other time. He based his statements on the following.

- The Active Forces have remained within 1-1/2 percent of congressionally authorized strengths in every year since the beginning of the All Volunteer Force.
- The costs of the program were about \$3 billion a year, or almost identical to the 1970 cost projections made by the Gates Commission in recommending the adoption of an All Volunteer Force.
- All recruits meet the established mental, physical, and moral standards for enlistments.

The Assistant Secretary also stated, however, that the services have problems meeting some military personnel requirements, principally in the Reserve Forces. These, he said, are centered in shortages of Army National Guard and Army Reserve enlisted personnel, whose strengths have declined 15 percent in the last 5 years, and in declines in the Army's pool of pretrained individuals not affiliated with Reserve units. He also stated that the fiscal year 1980 Defense budget submission to the Congress would include proposals for major, but as yet not refined, steps for solving these problems. The steps will be generally along the lines of (1) increased manning of early-deploying Reserve units where, he said, peacetime manning is essential to combat readiness and (2) increased levels of pretrained personnel.

1/Hearings before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Armed Services Committee, (June 20, 1978).

Congressman Robin Beard, testifying before the same Subcommittee, painted a much darker picture. The Congressman, expressing a number of concerns resulting from a study of the All Volunteer Force, 1/ stated "First, I am shocked at the poor state of mobilization and the weakened posture of our reserves." Other concerns he discussed included:

- The current Selective Service System has no idea where to find American youth.
- Mental qualification scores for new recruits are declining each year.
- Unit training cutbacks are negatively affecting operational readiness.
- Equipment shortages are adversely affecting both Active and Reserve units.
- The volunteer Army is plagued by social welfare problems to the detriment of its mission.
- Most recruits view military service as just a job; the concepts of duty, honor, and country as motivation for service have little meaning.

Congressman Beard concluded:

"I am not here to blame the Army or its personnel for its failure to live up to our expectations. In most cases, I believe they have done the best they can with the mandate we gave them.

What does concern me, however, is that the Army's can do attitude has resulted in its minimizing its problems to the point that the picture of our Army presented to the American public has been totally distorted."

1/"The Beard Study: An Analysis and Evaluation of the United States Army," an independent study commissioned by Congressman Robin Beard of the House Armed Services Committee (Apr. 1978).

Congressman William Stieger, also testifying before the Subcommittee, indicated general improvement in today's All Volunteer Force over the drafted Army but stated that problems remain in attrition, manning the Reserves, improving the recruiting process, and providing adequate medical care. He added that "None of these challenges is insuperable. Each requires specific attention to manpower management. None requires a draft."

The preceding discussion shows clearly the concern over the All Volunteer Force and the Army Reserve Forces' significant personnel shortages. Lack of personnel, in fact, is recognized as the single largest problem facing the Reserves.

The ability of the All Volunteer Force concept to staff the total Army Force has been the subject of intense study and debate, and debate over resurrecting the draft as an alternative to the All Volunteer Force has begun in the Congress, the press, and elsewhere. This report does not specifically address the draft or the effectiveness of the All Volunteer Force. Since it is an alternative to the All Volunteer Force there is no reason to believe debate over the draft will diminish. Rather, it will probably grow. Other GAO reports and ongoing reviews address effectiveness of the All Volunteer Force. One recent report, 1/ for example, addressed the question: What has been the incremental cost of the All Volunteer Force?

Host Nation support

The continuing improvement in Warsaw Pact military capabilities in recent years has dictated the need for programs to improve U.S. combat effectiveness in Europe. Some of these programs have increased the ratio of combat troops to support forces in Europe without increasing overall U.S. military forces there. One such program converted U.S. headquarters and military support personnel to combat personnel in response to the Nunn Amendment. 2/ The amendment required a reduction of 18,000 in authorized support personnel in Europe during fiscal years 1975 and 1976.

1/"Additional Cost of the All Volunteer Force," (FPCD-78-11, Feb. 6, 1978).

2/An amendment to the fiscal year 1975 Department of Defense Appropriations Authorization Act. The amendment was named after Senator Sam Nunn who was a moving force behind it.

To compensate for reductions in support troops in Europe, U.S. forces have increased reliance on host nations' support and on the military support units of the Army's Reserve Forces. The latter is reinforced by the following excerpt from 1976 Senate Armed Services Committee hearings, 1/ in which Senator Nunn discussed with the Honorable William Brehm, Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the progress made in meeting requirements established by the Nunn Amendment.

"Senator Nunn. Has it [the Nunn Amendment] required shifts in the Reserve missions back in this country?

"Mr. Brehm. It very definitely has an impact on Reserve missions. In particular, what we are doing is identifying Reserve support units which would move to Europe early in a deployment to take the place of the support units that had been eliminated under the conversion program. It is necessary to identify those units to make sure they have equipment and are manned at sufficient levels for early deployment, that they know who they are and they know something about the job they are going to have to do when they deploy early, and the Joint Staff and the Services are now engaged in a detailed study of this particular management program.

"Senator Nunn. Overall, do you think the result of this conversion is a plus as far as our combat capability in Europe?

"Mr. Brehm. I believe it is, very definitely.

"Senator Nunn. What disadvantages have flowed from it?

"Mr. Brehm. I think the main disadvantage * * * is the generation of the concern on the part of our commanders in Europe as to whether the support forces that they need to constitute a balanced force will, in fact, be there when they are required, and it is incumbent upon us here in

1/"Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths," hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 94:2 (Feb. and Mar. 1976) part 7, pp. 4139 and 4140.

Washington to make sure that that comes about through proper allocation of resources and the assurance that we have good deployment planning laid out."

The United States is presently negotiating or has completed arrangements with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to receive various wartime support services, including procurement, telecommunications, transportation, facilities, construction, and airfield services. But many problems need to be resolved before this support becomes reliable. For example, some agreements state that priority for available resources will go to the host country. Also, military officials in Europe do not expect host nation arrangements to be completely resolved before the mid-1980s.

There are also serious questions about the availability of support from non-U.S. civilians (local nationals and especially third-country hires) in wartime. For example:

- German laws governing the use of civilian employees take precedence over Army directives concerning local civilian personnel management. U.S. officials stated that there are no assurances that local civilians would be available to U.S. forces in case of war.
- The requirement to negotiate with work councils representing civilians working for U.S. forces hampers management flexibility.

Any unfortunate developments in negotiating with the European allies for wartime support services or substantial wartime losses of non-U.S. civilian employees in such important areas as transportation, supply, and security would make rapid and effective mobilization and deployment of the U.S. Reserve Forces even more critical.

The issues of U.S. combat and combat support personnel ratios in Europe and host nation support are not addressed further in this report. However, we have recently issued indepth reports on both issues. They are, respectively:

--"Benefits and Problems Associated With Improving the Ratio of U.S. Combat Troops to Military Support Personnel in Europe" (LCD-78-408A, June 7, 1978).

--"Planning Host Nation Support for U.S. Forces in Europe" (LCD-78-402, Aug. 9, 1978) (classified SECRET/NOFORN).

CAN THE RESERVE COMMAND STRUCTURES DISCHARGE THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES EFFECTIVELY?

Effective Reserve component command structures must provide the command and support Reserve and Guard units need to attain acceptable readiness levels and to be prepared to mobilize and deploy. The structures must also function effectively upon mobilization and have the capability to change from a peacetime to a wartime configuration with minimum modification and turbulence. Furthermore, the structures must be as streamlined as possible to carry out these responsibilities with the minimum resources.

The Air Reserve structure is relatively efficient and viable. On the other hand, the Army Reserve component structure contains duplicative and overlapping capabilities, is unable to move from a peacetime to a wartime configuration without significant structure modification, and has deficiencies in the mechanisms for developing mobilization plans. (See chs. 3, 6, and 7.)

Officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense have for several years believed the Army's Reserve component command structure is excessively layered and dissimilar in peacetime and wartime command arrangements. Their perceptions center on the command levels below the Army Forces Command and above the unit level and on those commands which have no postmobilization missions.

A June 1977 memorandum from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics stated that, to correct deficiencies in the Army Reserve components, the Army and the Defense Department would jointly:

"Streamline command and control of Army Reserve Components by aligning the peacetime structure with the wartime chain of command.

--Eliminate or significantly reduce unneeded, oversize, or unwieldy management structures; i.e. layering of command control which reduces responsiveness.

--Eliminate reporting procedures that do not contribute to combat readiness, training or command and control.

--Expedite corrective action to ameliorate potential mobilization and deployment problems identified in Army Reserve Components MOBEX [exercise] in November-December 1976."

Discussions with numerous Active Army and Army Reserve officials and a review of correspondence revealed that many Army officials do not share the Defense Department's perception of excessively layered Reserve commands. We found nearly unanimous opinion, however, that shortcomings in the structure's mobilization capability dictate the structure's modification. In fact, the Army, including the Reserve components, should be commended for the sincere efforts put forth to identify deficiencies in the Reserve component structure's mobilization capabilities.

One such effort was the Army's MOBEX 76 1/ exercise which tested, among other factors, the Active and Reserve Forces' mobilization plans and procedures. The report on MOBEX 76 identified major lessons learned during the exercise and the actions needed to achieve a greater total Army capability to mobilize.

Partly as a result of MOBEX 76, the Army Forces Command's Command Relationship Study was undertaken to determine optimum command relationships among the Forces Command, other major commands, installations, and Reserve component commands in the United States requiring minimal change in the transition from peacetime to wartime operation. The

1/The Army's mobilization exercise conducted in November and December 1976.

study, dated December 1977, stated that exercises, including MOBEX 76, have concluded that the current organizational structure cannot command and control the mobilization and deployment of the Army. The study included numerous recommendations for improving the organizational structure. (Many of the recommendations and Army headquarters' actions on them are discussed in chapter 6.)

Acting on its perception of excess layering, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in December 1977, directed the Army to absorb 500 military and 500 civilian personnel reductions from the Reserve component structure in fiscal year 1979 and an additional 269 military personnel reductions in fiscal year 1980. The Army Vice Chief of Staff then directed the Forces Command to develop proposals for absorbing the Reserve component personnel reductions. He stated that he saw the personnel reductions as a vehicle to eliminate layering and move to a command structure supporting operational plans for mobilization. He said the full manpower reductions were less important, however, than a fresh approach to current organizational and command relationships. Mobilization, rapid deployment, and expected wartime command associations should, he said, be key considerations in developing the proposals.

A detailed discussion of the Forces Command's proposal for reducing personnel spaces and modifying the structure is on page 110. We believe other alternative should be considered, as presented on page 114.

Subsequent to development of the Forces Command proposal, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, by letter dated August 24, 1978, approved the Army's request to apply the 1,269 personnel reduction to the total Army rather than solely to the Reserve component management structure. In approving the Army's request, the Assistant Secretary reached an agreement with the Army Vice Chief of Staff that an improved mobilization command and control structure could be achieved in about 2 years.

Toward that end, another Army study, called the "Army Command and Control Study - 82," was begun in October 1978 to:

--Provide a headquarters-level examination of the current Army command and control organization (including the Reserve component structure) in the United States.

--Provide recommendations to improve command and control.

--Allow for evolutionary rather than forced precipitous changes in the Army's U.S. command structure.

The study was initiated on the bases of indications that the command, control, and support structure of the present organization (1) contains layering and duplications and (2) does not insure continuity of command during the transition from peace to war. The study is expected to be completed in August 1979.

CAN THE RESERVES PROVIDE THE SUPPORT
THE ACTIVES WOULD REQUIRE IN
A MAJOR CONTINGENCY?

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs stated in congressional testimony that almost all the Air Reserve Forces, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Naval Reserve are ready to meet their demanding mobilization and deployment schedules. But he indicated this is not the case with the Army Reserve Forces.

At the request of the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the Congressional Budget Office studied the reporting systems used by the Defense Department in assessing the readiness of the Reserve components. The report, which emphasized the readiness of the Army's Reserve Forces, was completed in September 1977. It concluded, in part:

"The many variables influencing reserve readiness make it impossible to conclude with certainty how ready the reserves are. But all indications of reserve readiness--readiness reports, exercises, and others--suggest that today's reserve ground units would have difficulty in mobilizing, reaching fully trained status, and deploying in the first few months of a major war. This is especially true of larger combat units."

The readiness ratings 1/ for Army Reserve and Guard units scheduled for deployment to the European theater in a major war, as shown in the classified supplement to this report, justify the concern over the ability to meet planned deployment schedules. The results of MOBEX 76 reinforced these conclusions.

Further evidence of the Reserves' questionable capability to rapidly mobilize and deploy involves an Army National Guard affiliated brigade. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, in congressional hearings, 2/ stated:

"Under the Affiliation program, Reserve Component units required to support mobilization contingencies join with active Army counterpart units to develop and share means and methods of improving combat readiness and deployability. The Army National Guard participates in the following manner: Four infantry brigades and nine separate combat battalions of the Guard are affiliated to "Round out" or raise to standard configuration those active Army divisions that are under-structured due to manpower constraints. These round out units are scheduled to deploy with their Army division sponsors upon mobilizations."

Affiliated units are among the most important in the Reserve Forces. This is particularly true of the round out units, which comprise integral elements of several Active Army divisions. Yet discussions with officials of an Army National Guard round out brigade and its parent Active Army division, along with review of their readiness ratings and deployment schedules, revealed that the brigade cannot deploy with its division. (A detailed discussion of this subject is presented in the classified supplement

1/These ratings are based on Army reports of units' combat readiness conditions as submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Force Status and Identity Report system. Under this system, units are rated from C-1 to C-4, with C-1 denoting full readiness and C-4 not ready.

2/"Department of Defense Appropriations for 1979," hearings before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense, House Appropriations Committee, 95:2, (Mar. and Apr. 1978) part 7, p. 258 and 259.

to this report.) Our 1977 report 1/ on the Army's planning and implementation of the 16 active division concept also stated:

" * * * the New Divisions may not be as combat ready as others because of the questionable capability of their Reserve Component Brigades to mobilize, deploy, and fight with active brigades."

In addition to the inadequate personnel levels discussed earlier, equipment fill and the quality and quantity of training affect Reserve Forces' readiness. This report does not address the underlying causes of deficiencies in these areas, but all have a direct bearing on the ability of the Army's Reserves to perform their missions.

Equipment

Equipment levels are at 72 percent of total peacetime authorization for the overall Army Reserve and at 73 percent overall for the Army National Guard. These levels fall well short of optimum and adversely affect units' readiness ratings.

The Congressional Budget Office, in a February 1978 study entitled "Improving the Readiness of the Army Reserve and National Guard: A Framework for Debate," cited 1977 congressional testimony of Administration officials. The officials reported that, relative to the authorized equipment levels, the Army Reserve components were short of the following types of equipment.

- Tanks, 898 (35 percent of their authorization). 2/
- M88 tank recover vehicles, 291 (55 percent of authorization).
- 8-inch howitzers, 65 (17 percent of authorization).
- M113 personnel carriers, 2,403 (67 percent of authorization).

1/"How the Army Planned for Three New Divisions and How This Can Be Improved," (LCD-76-454, Aug. 4, 1977) (Classified CONFIDENTIAL).

2/Percentages are Congressional Budget Office computations based on total authorizations submitted by the Army Reserve components.

The Chiefs of the National Guard Bureau and the Army Reserve more recently testified that the Reserves are also seriously short of communications and electronics equipment.

Defense and Army Reserve component officials, while agreeing that equipment shortages are still a problem, indicate that progress is being made both in increasing equipment fill levels and in updating existing equipment. An indication of such progress was provided during our visit to an Army National Guard round out infantry brigade, when officials reported that the brigade has its full complement of equipment and that it is in top condition. (The brigade's readiness reports bore this out.)

Training

The readiness and deployability of the Army's Reserve Forces depend, in large part, on training--both for the individual soldier and for the units as a whole. Defense and Army officials, GAO, and other agencies have expressed great concern over the quality and quantity of individual and unit training in the Reserves.

In an August 1977 letter to the Commander of the Forces Command, the Commander of the Sixth U.S. Army indicated significantly improved training for Sixth Army reservists and guardsmen over that of the previous year. He also cited significant weaknesses identified during units' 1977 annual training periods. These included:

- Shortages of personnel assigned and present with the units at the sites, stemming from a shortage of assigned personnel, high turnover, attendance at military schools, and civilian job commitments.
- Serious shortages of fully qualified and capable junior officers and noncommissioned officers in most units.
- A lack of fully capable training evaluators at some units.

The Commander's letter concluded:

"On balance, I conclude that this year training was much improved but continues to be hampered by low strength and personnel turbulence. I am still convinced that units within this Army area will be

training at company and lower levels until such time as we can stem the exodus of qualified people from the Reserve Component units."

An Active Army advisor to a State National Guard headquarters recently analyzed Reserve component training capabilities. Although a single advisor made the study in only one State, key officials of an Army readiness region and the Sixth Army agreed that it was "a well documented objective portrayal of the real-life limitations on attainable Reserve Component combat training readiness levels." The advisor's study delineated the following.

- Although Reserve units have a total of 38 training days a year, they actually have no more than 26.5 days in which to conduct individual and unit training. The remaining 11.5 days are used for such activities as travelling to and from training sites and maintaining individual and unit equipment.
- Individual training, even for an infantryman at the lowest skill level, requires virtually all of a unit's available weekend training time. Training of lower level noncommissioned officers--who, as first-line supervisors are expected to train entry-level personnel--could be considered mandatory overtime.
- Realistically estimated, the time needed to accomplish even the minimum platoon-level training requirements would be more than an adequate challenge for a unit's 2-week annual training period.
- Due to a 30- to 35-percent personnel turnover rate, annual repetition of platoon-level training over 3 years will just about enable a unit to stay even.
- Any advance to company- or battalion-level training will simply result in degradation--through personnel turbulence--of whatever squad, crew, section, or platoon proficiency had been attained.

The advisor concluded that assigned goals of company and battalion training are categorically beyond the Reserves' capabilities.

Several of our past reports have addressed Reserve training, as summarized below.

--An October 3, 1975, report 1/ stated that Reservists could not attain essential skills, partly because training support services and equipment were inadequate, and that available training time was not used efficiently.

--A June 25, 1975, report 2/ estimated that in fiscal year 1974, reservists' time devoted to other than official jobs or spent idle totaled 15 million staff-days and cost about \$1.2 billion (43 percent of the \$2.7 billion authorized by the Congress for drills and active duty training during that period).

The Assistant Defense Secretary for Reserve Affairs 3/ has stated that the lack of more meaningful training "occurs because the reservists themselves--those not on full-time duty--have to spend too much of their own time doing the planning, training preparation, administration, and logistics." He concluded:

"We believe that most of this work should be done by full-time personnel. The secret of the better readiness of the Air Reserve Forces, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Naval Reserve is that they maximize the utilization of their Reservists by having enough full-timers on hand to get the training prepared in advance. This also allows for better training management and a more professional and effective training program."

1/"The Reserves--Can They Effectively Augment the Active Forces?" (LCD-75-402) (classified SECRET).

2/"Need to Improve Efficiency of Reserve Training" (FPCD-75-134).

3/"Department of Defense Appropriations for 1979," hearings before the Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, House Appropriations Committee, 95:2 (Mar. and Apr. 1978) part 7, p. 242.

What can be done?

Clearly, deficiencies in personnel levels, equipment fill, and the quality and quantity of training hamper the Army Reserve Forces' ability to achieve acceptable readiness and rapid mobilization and deployment capabilities. The Defense Department, Army, and National Guard have taken some initiatives to correct these deficiencies, and our prior reports contain numerous recommendations and alternatives for improving the Reserves' capabilities.

In addition, a Congressional Budget Office study ^{1/} details many proposals to increase the Reserves' readiness and attempts to estimate the cost of the various proposals. The proposals include

- increased personnel levels,
- reenlistment bonuses and educational assistance,
- increased full-time assistance for the Reserves,
- extended training periods,
- increased equipment procurements,
- increased pay for reservists, and
- a draft for the Reserves.

We believe other opportunities exist to improve Reserve Force unit personnel, training, and readiness levels. They involve (1) redistributing the personnel and resources from unnecessary and unsupportable Army Reserve and Guard units to higher priority, earlier deploying units and (2) increasing the assistance that Active Army units provide to Reserve units through expansion of the Army Affiliation Program. These opportunities are discussed in the remainder of this chapter and in chapters 4 and 5.

^{1/}"Improving the Readiness of the Army Reserve and National Guard: A Framework for Debate" (Feb. 1978).

ARE THE ARMY'S RESERVE FORCES COMPOSED
OF UNITS NEEDED TO AUGMENT THE ACTIVES?

According to Army criteria, the Selected Reserves should be composed only of units required during the first 6 months of mobilization. Logic dictates, in addition, that only those units which can be provided enough support and assistance to achieve reasonable readiness status should be in the force.

In an April 1976 report to the Congress, the Defense Manpower Commission noted the need for changes in Selected Reserve units, partly because of reconfiguration of the total force support structure required by expanding the Active Army from 13 to 16 divisions. The report also commented on an accompanying increased requirement for Reserve personnel. The Commission recommended identification of units not needed for mobilization and their rapid inactivation or conversion to units for which there is a valid requirement.

Nearly 3 years after the Commission's work, we found many units with no identified wartime mission (see p. 61) and many units which the Army appears incapable of adequately supporting in the reserve environment (see p. 64). In view of the Army Reserve Force's poor overall readiness, especially regarding personnel levels, units without identified wartime missions should be removed from the force and the resources they consume should be spread over higher priority units. Similarly, units which by their nature cannot be adequately supported should be removed.

Another area of concern identified but not pursued in depth in this report deals with nonessential Army Reserve and National Guard units. Our October 1975 report (see p. 26) discussed this area, as summarized below.

"* * * several organizations, such as judge advocate, civil affairs, military history, and public information units, do not appear to be essential to initial mobilization requirements. Although these noncombat organizations generally do not have much equipment, they are authorized money and manpower which could be used by more essential organizations.

"* * * even if these units are needed later for mobilization requirements, they are the types of units which seem to require only a minimal amount of unit training."

The report recommended that the Secretary of Defense eliminate those units which are of marginal value in meeting initial mobilization requirements. The recommendation stated that the men, money, and material of eliminated units could be redistributed to high-priority, early-deploying combat units to improve their readiness.

CAN ACTIVE ARMY FORCES PLAY A GREATER ROLE
IN IMPROVING THE RESERVES' READINESS?

The Air Force provides advice and assistance to its Reserve and Guard units through the Active Air Force commands, which would absorb the units upon mobilization. This program, referred to as the gaining command concept, is explained on pages 127 and 128. We believe the Air Force has very nearly attained an integrated Active and Reserve Force, consistent with the objectives of the Total Force Policy. This integration has been achieved, in our opinion, not only because Air Reserve units participate in Active Air Force operations and missions but also because of the close working relationships between the Active and Reserve Forces under the gaining command concept.

The Army, on the other hand, has established a complex, layered command structure from which Army Reserve and Guard units obtain advice and assistance (see pp. 31 to 35) and therefore has not integrated its Active and Reserve Forces. Opportunities exist, in our opinion, to significantly expand the assistance Active Army units provide to Reserve units through expansion of the Army's Affiliation Program. This program is designed to provide assistance to participating Reserve and Guard units, but from Active Army units rather than the Reserves' command structure.

The Affiliation Program closely parallels the Air Force gaining command concept, except that Active Army units sponsoring Reserve or Guard units do not necessarily "gain" them upon mobilization. 1/

The Congress, the Defense Department, the Army, the Defense Manpower Commission, and GAO have all endorsed the Affiliation Program as a success in upgrading the Reserves' readiness. The Defense Manpower Commission, for example, recommended that the program be expanded to include battalions and brigades from the National Guard divisions, insofar as they could be accommodated by the Active Army. Despite these endorsements--and Army plans to do so--the program has not been expanded from the original 97 Reserve component battalions.

Such expansion would, in our opinion, enhance the readiness of sponsored Reserve and Guard units and allow for a more efficient and streamlined Reserve component command structure. Assuming full peacetime personnel levels, the Army's Reserve component command structure consists of approximately 1 person for every 29 Army reservists and guardsmen. The Air Reserve component structure, in contrast, has 1 person for every 45 reservists and guardsmen. As these figures show, the differing Army and Air Force methods for providing advice and assistance to their Reserve units have a definite impact on the size of their command structures.

1/The Army has initiated its own gaining command program, which establishes tentative wartime assignments for some deploying U.S.-based units with their gaining European-based headquarters. It is designed to strengthen wartime planning relationships, promote exchange of communication between U.S.- and European-based commanders, and identify areas and items for training emphasis.

CHAPTER 3

IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT

COMMAND STRUCTURE COULD ENHANCE ITS EFFICIENCY

AND THE FORCES' READINESS

If the Nation is to have a truly strong total Army Force, the Reserves must achieve acceptable readiness levels and the capability to mobilize and deploy in an emergency within expected time frames. The Reserve Forces, therefore, must have, in addition to personnel and equipment, a command structure that can effectively deliver needed assistance, support, and planning for its units during peacetime and upon mobilization.

A 1973 Army reorganization, called STEADFAST, brought about the current Reserve Force command structure: a combination of Active Army commands with dual responsibilities for the Actives and Reserves, Active Army Commands dedicated to commanding only the Reserves, and Reserve commands. The current structure has serious problems. For years, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has been concerned that the structure is excessively layered and does not closely enough resemble its wartime configuration. Our examination revealed significant duplications of functions among the structure's echelons. We also found that one Army Reserve command layer was incapable of providing the assistance to its subordinate units that it was charged with providing. Further, the current structure differs significantly from the structure that would be needed at mobilization--a situation that would cause confusion and turmoil at that critical time.

We believe changes in the Reserve component command structure, including greater reliance on available command capabilities, are needed.

THE ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

As shown on page 5, the Army Reserve and Army National Guard have distinctly separate peacetime organizational structures. The U.S. Army Forces Command commands the Army Reserve and has training supervision and readiness monitoring responsibilities for the Army

National Guard. Altogether, it commands or supervises forces totaling approximately 1 million people. The command discharges these responsibilities through several subordinate management echelons, discussed below.

The continental U.S. armies


The Forces Command's tremendous span of control has resulted in a policy of management by exception. As immediate subordinate commands, the three continental U.S. armies (CONUSAs) have been delegated most of the Forces Command's Reserve component management functions. Within their respective geographical areas, they command the Army Reserve, supervise the training and monitor the readiness of the Army Guard, and supervise the preparation of Reserve component mobilization plans.

The Army readiness regions

Responsibility for the support and supervision of Army Reserve and Guard units' training and readiness is further delegated to the readiness regions assigned to each CONUSA. However, the regions do not exercise command authority over either the Army Reserve or the Guard. Instead, their primary mission is to insure that Reserve component units receive the necessary assistance to attain acceptable readiness levels.

The geographically oriented readiness regions were structured to carry out three collateral functions--identify the need for assistance, match this need with the assets available, and provide the assistance. These functions were generally to be accomplished by unit advisors, headquarters staffs, and readiness groups, respectively.

ARMY READINESS REGION ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE



The specific functions and responsibilities of each of these major elements are discussed below. 1/

Advisor positions

Division- and brigade-level units, general officer commands, Army Reserve commands, and State Guard headquarters are authorized dedicated advisors. In addition, some battalion-sized units, because of their unique nature, mobilization priority, or geographical isolation, are also authorized dedicated advisors. The role of the advisor, is essentially one of assistance, not advice. Some of the advisors' major functions and responsibilities are:

- Serve as principal point of contact between Reserve component commanders and readiness region headquarters.
- Assist units in establishing, achieving, and sustaining unit readiness.
- Monitor and evaluate readiness reports.
- Assist the appropriate readiness region headquarters coordinator in determining the readiness posture of units.
- Coordinate assistance from readiness group branch and functional teams.
- Assist units in securing training facilities, transportation, and other training assistance.

Senior advisors are subordinate elements of, and report directly to, the readiness region headquarters. They normally supervise advisors assigned to subordinate units of the command they advise.

1/As of December 1977, the 9 readiness region headquarters staffs had a combined authorized strength of 413; the 28 readiness groups had a combined authorized strength of 2,558; and the Army had 1,754 advisor positions.

Readiness region
headquarters staff

Each of the nine readiness region headquarters consists of a commander, who is an Active Army major general, and administrative and operations elements. The majority of the personnel assigned to operations are readiness coordinators with two major responsibilities: evaluating units and coordinating assistance efforts. With regard to the evaluation function, the readiness region commanders hold the coordinators responsible for knowing the strengths and weaknesses of particular units.

Readiness groups

The readiness groups, the third major element of the readiness regions, consist of a chief, administrative and clerical assistants, branch teams, and functional teams. Branch teams consist of officers and enlisted men, organized by branch (infantry, armor, transportation, etc.) to assist in training Reserve and Guard units within the group's geographical boundary. Functional teams provide assistance in administration, maintenance, logistics, and similar areas.

Some of the readiness groups' major functions are summarized below.

- Providing branch and functional team assistance.
- Assisting in establishing and achieving appropriate training objectives.
- Assisting in achieving and sustaining individual and unit readiness.
- Assisting in securing training facilities, transportation, and other training assistance.
- Employing administrative specialists to provide advice, assistance, and instruction as necessary.
- Maintaining liaison with and conducting visits to senior Army Guard and Reserve commands.

This assistance is provided by mobile assistance teams that are tailored, in coordination with unit advisors, to meet specific mission requirements.

Major intermediate Army Reserve commands

The principal command and control headquarters between the CONUSAs and Army Reserve units are the 12 major U.S. Army Reserve commands (MUSARCs) and the 19 Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs). (See p. 5.) The MUSARCs, except for two maneuver area commands, are functionally oriented units (military police, engineer, etc.) scheduled for overseas deployment in the event of a war. They generally command similar subordinate units.

ARCOMs, on the other hand, are peacetime headquarters, commanding the large number of disparate Army Reserve units within their geographic boundaries that are not under the command of MUSARCs.

The boundaries and headquarters locations of the ARCOMs, as well as those of the readiness regions and CONUSAs, are shown on the following page.

DUPLICATIONS AMONG READINESS REGION ELEMENTS


We found numerous duplications between the functions of readiness region headquarters' coordinators and those of the regions' readiness groups, the regions' advisors, and the CONUSAs' headquarters staffs. We believe duplications of the coordinators' functions, coupled with the capability of other elements of the Reserve component management structure to absorb their functions, make the coordinators (and hence the readiness region headquarters) an unnecessary management echelon. Many officials we spoke with agreed.

Questionable role of readiness region coordinators

Our review of the readiness region headquarters' coordinators disclosed that:

- Coordinators have a very minor practical role in coordinating and providing assistance for Reserve component units.
- Advisors duplicate the coordinators' functions approximately 70 percent of the time.
- Coordinators duplicate many of the CONUSA staff's monitoring and evaluation functions.

BOUNDARIES AND HEADQUARTERS LOCATIONS FOR CONTINENTAL
U.S. ARMIES, ARMY READINESS REGIONS, AND ARMY RESERVE COMMANDS



Most of the assistance provided to Reserve component units is accomplished without involvement by the coordinators. Affiliated units request assistance directly from their Active component sponsors. One coordinator indicated that he had no role in this process. Furthermore, he said he was frequently unaware that the assistance was provided.

Similarly, nonaffiliated units usually submit requests for assistance directly to a readiness group. While the percentages may vary from one readiness group to another, the three group chiefs we talked to estimated that at least 90 percent of their groups' workloads were generated from requested received directly from Reserve component units. The chiefs indicated that the remaining 10 percent came from coordinators and advisors and from formal requests submitted through the chain of command.

According to one readiness group chief, his group's assistance workload comes from two primary sources. First, group personnel make frequent visits to advise unit commanders of the assistance the group can provide. Second, when a readiness group assists a unit, it has an opportunity to identify additional areas where it may be of service.

In general, Army officials indicated that the coordinators' primary assistance role is to arrange for an alternate means of support when a readiness group cannot provide the assistance requested by units. This can happen, for example, when a readiness group receives several requests for assistance during the same period and lacks the resources to meet all requirements simultaneously. Under these circumstances, if the readiness group is unable to balance its workload by providing some of the requested assistance on alternate dates, it will generally seek backup support from another readiness group or arrange for a mobile training team from an Active unit. The latter is normally coordinated through the director of reserve component support at the nearest Active Army installation.

Although the coordinator may become involved in both of these instances, his involvement is not essential in either. For example, one readiness group chief stated that his branch assistance team chiefs routinely go directly

to their counterparts in other readiness groups to obtain backup support. He indicated that no action was required by the coordinator when this was done. Similarly, although the coordinator must approve all requests for mobile training teams, readiness group team chiefs said that:

- The coordinators seldom deny these assistance requests.
- Branch team chiefs in the readiness group, generally know how and where to obtain additional support.
- Branch team chiefs usually accomplish the actual coordination with the installation director of reserve component support once the coordinator has authorized the use of a mobile training team.

From this discussion, it is apparent that the readiness groups are capable of operating fairly autonomously. Although they must go through the coordinators to arrange for certain types of assistance, they seem capable of assuming the coordinators' role in this process. One reason for this is that the coordinators and the readiness group assistance teams are both organized by branch (infantry, transportation, etc.).

Duplications between coordinator and advisor functions

Another reason for the limited assistance role of coordinators is the existence of dedicated advisors at Reserve and Guard headquarters and units. Our analysis shows that the advisors (who are also responsible for coordinating assistance) and coordinators duplicate each other's efforts approximately 70 percent of the time. The overlapping functions and the percentage of time coordinators estimate they spend on each are shown on the following page. 1/

1/These functions and the time estimates were provided by Army Readiness Region IX. They were discussed with advisors and coordinators in the region to determine the extent of overlap.

Percentage
of time.

Function

30	Make visits to (1) evaluate ongoing training, (2) evaluate factors that impact on training, (3) determine outside training assistance required, (4) check adequacy of local training areas, (5) listen to and respond to problem areas, (6) check adequacy of training support, and (7) review current and long-range objectives.
15	Coordinate training assistance.
15	Visit and remain with units undergoing training exercises.
6	Attend miscellaneous conferences and displays (to plan for annual training, see training aids, etc.).
2	Respond to higher headquarters' requests for assistance (to review and comment on training documents).
<u>2</u>	Review results of staff visits and inspections.
<u>70</u>	

In many instances, advisors not only duplicate coordinator functions but also are better able to do them. This is primarily because advisors have much more interaction with their units than do the coordinators. Whereas coordinators generally visit their units only two or three times a year, the advisors are collocated with the units and observe them almost daily. In addition, advisors can concentrate on assisting the units, while coordinators must also be concerned with their evaluation responsibilities.

The coordinators' evaluation role

Most of the functions done by coordinators but not duplicated by advisors relate to evaluations. Specifically, coordinators spend approximately 15 percent of their time preparing data for briefings and approximately 10 percent of their time reviewing and providing comments on units' annual training evaluations.

One readiness region commander admitted that advisors have the information needed for evaluations, but he felt it would be inappropriate to use them in an evaluation role. This opinion was shared by the advisors we talked to. All agreed that (1) the advisor must establish a good rapport with the Reserve or Guard commander if he is to be effective and (2) this rapport would be damaged if the advisor were required to provide negative feedback on the unit.

Although this may be true, the Army makes many other inspections and evaluations that seem to obviate the need for the coordinators' evaluations. In fact, one senior Army advisor criticized what he described as the over-supervision of Reserve component units. Similarly, a Sixth Army study noted that excessive and uncoordinated visits and redundant inspections had interrupted and delayed Reserve units' training. The study stated:

"Many Army Reserve units are receiving an excessive number of official visits, inspections, evaluations, etc., often within days of each other. Some units in the 96th ARCOM, for example, have had an inspection, reinspection, evaluation, command, staff, or technical visit, etc., during every weekend for the past year. Except for mobile training teams or other unit requested assistance, the plethora of visits and inspections during inactive duty training (weekend training) interrupts, delays, or forces postponement of mission essential training."

We found that both the CONUSAs and the Army readiness regions maintain consolidated unit reference files on the results of these inspections and evaluations. In addition, the CONUSAs closely monitor those units that fail to meet minimum standards and have a program to recognize superior and outstanding units.

Although the CONUSA staffs may not have the readiness regions' detailed knowledge of every unit, we believe they have sufficient information to manage by exception. Furthermore, we believe that individual units should be supervised by the State Guard and MUSARC command level, not the CONUSA level. Since the readiness regions were established as an extension of the CONUSA headquarters and were not intended to usurp the prerogatives and responsibilities of Reserve component commanders, we

question whether the Army needs a separate management layer with the types of detailed information the coordinators develop.

Questionable need for
readiness region headquarters

Many Army officers, both Active and Reserve, question the need for readiness region headquarters in general, and the coordinators in particular. For example, the training officer of an affiliated Army Guard infantry brigade stated that the coordinator's removal would not affect the brigade's readiness. Also, a senior Army advisor to a State Guard headquarters noted the apparent duplications between the readiness region and CONUSA headquarters staff. He said he saw no reason why the readiness region's functions could not be assumed by the CONUSA's Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, the staff section with overall responsibility for training supervision.

We discussed this alternative with the Sixth Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Training and his deputy. Both agreed that (1) there are numerous duplications between their office's and readiness region headquarters' functions and (2) the readiness region headquarters' functions could, and probably should, be absorbed into the CONUSA structure. One duplication cited was that between each CONUSA headquarters' office of training evaluation and the coordinators.

The offices of training evaluation were established during 1976 to evaluate inactive duty training (weekend training). These evaluations are made by officers of the same branch as the unit they are inspecting. (For example, a transportation officer will evaluate a transportation unit.) In that respect, the offices are organized similar to the operations divisions of readiness region headquarters. But unlike the readiness region coordinators, who are generally either colonels or lieutenant colonels, the CONUSA evaluators are generally majors. According to the Sixth Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, there is no need to have higher ranking officers perform these functions. This opinion was supported by training technicians at a State Guard headquarters and an ARCOM, who said the Sixth Army evaluators provide an extremely thorough, but fair, assessment of a unit's training program.

The Forces Command has a different perception of readiness region headquarters. As discussed on page 114,

in 1978 the command proposed reducing readiness region headquarters' staffing from 413 to 261 personnel while modifying the headquarters' structure. One reason for retaining the headquarters echelon was the importance the command places on the Active Army major generals who command the headquarters. In transmitting his proposal to the Army Chief of Staff, the Forces Command commander noted:

"* * * the catalyst of the whole program is the major general ARR (Army readiness region) commander. His ability to deal with State Adjutant Generals, ARCOM commanders and the whole hierarchy of Reserve Component command as an equal, as one who shares a common mission, as the visible contact point for matching Reserve Component needs with the Active Component assets, and representing the Total Army concept, and who is in fact the executive in charge of the operation effort cannot be overemphasized."

We were unable to verify this statement. However, we believe there are alternatives for accomplishing these functions without retaining what is, in our opinion, an unnecessary management layer. One alternative would be to retain one of the major generals in each CONUSA area as a deputy CONUSA commander. At the present time, one readiness region commander in each CONUSA area has this responsibility as an additional duty.

IMPACT OF AFFILIATION ON READINESS GROUP STAFFING

In its proposal to alter the Reserve component management structure in response to directed personnel reductions, the Forces Command did not consider eliminating the readiness regions' readiness group. The proposal noted:

"* * * The Readiness Groups are almost universally recognized as the best aspect of STEADFAST, irreplaceable in their role and stretched now to the limits of practicality in their geographic distribution."

We agree that readiness groups, as focal points for technical and functional assistance to Reserve component units, are an important aspect of the STEADFAST reorganization. However, we believe the Army's Affiliation Program offers both an alternative to the readiness group assistance concept and an opportunity to reduce readiness group staffing.

Current readiness group staffing is based on the number of Reserve component units assigned to the groups. Although some Active units provide their affiliated units the same types of assistance as that provided by the readiness groups, the readiness group assets have not been reduced accordingly. Consequently, the capabilities of the Active units are duplicated by those of the readiness groups.

For instance, the Fort Lewis, Washington, Readiness Group of Readiness Region IX, has a 10-person infantry branch assistance team whose principal 1/ responsibilities are to provide support to the Oregon National Guard's 41st Infantry Brigade and the Washington Guard's 81st Infantry Brigade. However, the Active Army's 7th and 9th Divisions are affiliated with and provide support to the 41st and 81st Brigades, respectively. In addition, the Fort Lewis Readiness Group's 4-person field artillery branch assistance team provides assistance almost exclusively to Reserve component units affiliated with the 7th and 9th Divisions.

The support the 7th and 9th Divisions have provided to their affiliated Guard units has been outstanding, according to Active Army and Guard officials. For example, the Sixth Army Commanding General wrote the following assessment of the support provided by Active units during the 1977 annual training period:

"Although the four divisions (1st, 4th, 7th, and 9th) respond to the training support mission for the Reserve Components in different ways, each did a simply outstanding job * * *. If I were to single out one effort as the most outstanding, I would mention the program implemented by the 1st Brigade of the 7th Division for its roundout brigade, the 41st Infantry Brigade of the Oregon National Guard. This program focused on improvements of the skills of the individual soldiers * * *. The 41st Brigade Commander stated emphatically this was the best annual training year ever experienced by his brigade and will provide impetus to his recruiting efforts while serving to retain the better soldiers."

1/The Fort Lewis Readiness Group also supports an Army Reserve training division and a special forces battalion.

An Army readiness region coordinator, noting the 7th Division's outstanding support of the 41st Brigade's 1978 annual training, said he considered the division's training program to be as good as any he had seen conducted by either an Active or a Reserve unit.

The Active units are also capable of supporting their Reserve units during weekend training. For example, the Deputy Commander of Army Readiness Region IX noted that at times the 9th Infantry Division appears to have almost as many personnel at the 81st Brigade's weekend training assemblies as the brigade. Weekend support becomes more difficult when Active and Reserve units are not located close by. But even this does not prevent the Active units from providing effective support. For example, the 7th Division Commander told us his division is capable of providing the 41st Brigade with all the assistance it needs. Likewise, the training officer of the 41st Brigade told us that the 7th Division gave his brigade all of the assistance it asked for, and sometimes more.

For economic reasons, however, the brigade continues to receive some assistance from the readiness group's branch assistance teams. As one 7th Infantry Division officer noted, "It's much cheaper for the Readiness Group to send a sedan down from Fort Lewis (approximately 150 miles) than it is for us to fly someone up from Fort Ord (approximately \$154 round-trip air fare)."

As noted earlier, we believe the readiness groups are an important echelon of the Army's Reserve component management structure. But readiness group support to affiliated units duplicates the capabilities of sponsoring Active Army units. We believe the Fort Lewis Readiness Group's infantry branch assistance team can be reduced from 10 to 4 persons because of the assistance provided to its assigned units by the 7th and 9th Divisions. (The group would continue to support the training division and special forces battalion noted earlier.) Also, the readiness group's four-person field artillery assistance team can be eliminated, for the same reason.

The Deputy Commander of Readiness Region IX, headquarters of the Fort Lewis Readiness Group, informed us that paperwork had already been initiated to reduce the number of advisors to the 81st Brigade, due to the brigade's affiliation with the 9th Division, and that the same probably should have been done for the readiness

group. But the paperwork was withdrawn when the region learned of the Forces Command's study of the Reserve component management structure in response to directed personnel reductions.

We believe the Army should reevaluate criteria and levels of staffing of the readiness groups, in light of the assistance provided to affiliated Reserve component units by their Active unit sponsors. We also believe expansion of the Army's Affiliation Program would further reduce the need for readiness group assets. (Opportunities to expand the Affiliation Program are discussed in chapter 4.)

INEFFICIENT INTERMEDIATE ARMY RESERVE COMMANDS

As described on page 35, the major intermediate command and control headquarters for Army Reserve units, below the CONUSA level, are the MUSARCs and the ARCOMs. The MUSARCs, in our opinion, possess the technical orientation to provide effective command over and assistance to similar subordinate units. The ARCOMs, on the other hand, are neither staffed for nor capable of providing meaningful technical guidance to their units. Much of the functional assistance provided to Army Reserve units comes from other echelons of the Reserve component management structure.

The primary mission of Army Reserve units in peacetime is training to prepare for mobilization and deployment. The ARCOMs are responsible for providing training assistance to their subordinate units, including:

- Developing unit training plans.
- Supervising unit training.
- Coordinating training facilities.

Other ARCOM responsibilities toward their units include:

- Financial management (programming, budgeting, and funds management).

- Force development (providing higher headquarters with information on the activation, inactivation, or conversion of subordinate units).
- Mobilization planning.
- Monitoring and evaluating their units' readiness posture.
- Supervising the Army Reserve material maintenance program.
- Providing personnel, legal, and administrative services for ARCOM and subordinate units' personnel.
- Supervising the recruiting and retention of Army Reserve personnel.
- Assisting their units in reaching their mobilization stations in the event of mobilization.

The geographic boundaries of the 19 ARCOMs are shown on page 36. The average ARCOM headquarters' staff consists of approximately 35 full-time technicians and 140 part-time reservists. ARCOM command spans vary; the largest commands 119 units with authorized strengths totaling 12,550 people as of April, 1978, and the smallest commands 41 units with authorized strengths of 6,258.

The 97th ARCOM, located at Fort Meade, Maryland, commands 97 Army Reserve units in Maryland, Delaware, the District of Columbia, and Virginia. The 97th's headquarters is authorized 134 personnel and has 130 on hand. The ARCOM is authorized 38 full-time personnel and has 34 on hand. (Most of the full-time civilian technicians are also Army reservists.)

Fourteen 1/ units, representing a large variety of branches and skills, report directly to the 97th. The types of units include

1/Many Army Reserve units report to higher headquarters which, in turn, report to the ARCOMs.

- psychological operations,
- military intelligence,
- Judge advocate general,
- special forces,
- military police,
- combat service support,
- medical hospital units,
- U.S. Army Reserve schools, and
- Army garrison units.

The 97th is not staffed for or capable of developing its subordinate units' training plans or of providing indepth training assistance. Unit training plans are prepared by the units, according to 97th officials. The ARCOM relies primarily on its subordinate functional headquarters to provide technical guidance to the units. Technical guidance is also provided, we were told, by readiness groups, readiness region advisors, the First Army, and Active Army units affiliated or otherwise associated with the units.

According to 97th ARCOM officials, their training assistance is primarily administrative in that the headquarters reviews its units' training plans to determine their adequacy, as prescribed by Army regulations. ARCOM officials also visit the units to determine whether they are doing their training in accordance with regulations. The 97th's other training-related functions include (1) coordinating schedules and facilities for the units' annual training and (2) scheduling individuals for military occupational specialty training or other training.

The ARCOM's units are evaluated during their 2-week annual training periods by Army evaluators and readiness region officials. ARCOM officials are present but advise and assist, rather than evaluate, the units.

Forces Command officials recognized duplications in training responsibilities among the ARCOMs and other Reserve component management echelons (including the

CONUSAs, readiness region coordinators, readiness groups, and advisors). But they stated that the ARCOMs are incapable of carrying out the training function. Thus, they believe duplication does not exist in performance.

We believe the ARCOMs' inability to carry out their training function, as well as their reliance on other management echelons for this function, impairs direct command and control of Army Reserve units. In addition, the ARCOMs' other responsibilities, such as financial management, personnel administration, and force development, are generally administrative and could be performed within an alternative management structure. Eliminating or consolidating the ARCOMs would simplify and streamline the Reserve component management structure and allow the redistribution of their resources to satisfy unfilled requirements, such as garrison units. (See p. 115.)

CONCLUSIONS

A streamlined and efficient Reserve component management structure is essential to achieving acceptable readiness levels and the capability to rapidly mobilize and deploy in support of the Active Forces. But the current structure contains duplications and inefficiencies.

The readiness region coordinators' functions are essentially duplicated by the readiness groups, advisors, and CONUSA staffs. We, therefore, believe the coordinators, and hence the headquarters, could be eliminated, and their roles could be assumed by the CONUSAs. The Forces Command believes that the readiness groups are perhaps the best aspect of the current Reserve component management structure. Although we agree that the groups are important, they are not irreplaceable. The assistance Active Army units provide to Reserve component units through the Affiliation Program offers an attractive alternative to that provided by the groups.

Also, current readiness group staffing criteria do not consider the support provided to affiliated units by their Active component sponsors. Consequently, duplications exist in the capabilities of Active component sponsors and the readiness groups. We believe the Army should reevaluate readiness group staffing and reduce it, as appropriate.

The 19 ARCOMs, charged with the command and control of a large number and variety of Army Reserve units, are peacetime headquarters with no identified post-mobilization missions. Although the ARCOMs are responsible for providing technical assistance to subordinates, they are essentially administrative headquarters. They are neither staffed for nor capable of providing meaningful technical assistance, with the exception of coordinating training facilities, to the units under them. Therefore, they must rely on other management echelons to provide this assistance. The ARCOMs could, in our opinion, be eliminated and their functions performed within an alternative, more efficient management structure. Some of the viable alternatives are discussed in chapter 9.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense streamline the Army's Reserve component management structure, considering the recommendations and alternatives discussed in this report.

We also recommend that the Secretary of the Army reevaluate and reduce, as appropriate, the readiness groups' staffing.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

The Department of the Army agreed with our recommendation on streamlining the Reserve component management structure. Officials commented that it was in recognition of this need that a major study effort, called Army Command and Control Study-82, under the supervision of the Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army was developed. According to Army officials, the study, begun in September 1978 and scheduled for completion in August 1979, is addressing the major problems outlined by our report.

The study, discussed on page 20 of this report, was initiated with the following objectives relating to an Army command and control structure for the United States:

1. Provide for an orderly and rapid transition from peace to war during mobilization.
2. Reduce to a minimum reorganizational turmoil immediately following mobilization.

3. Assure proper command and control of Active, National Guard, and Reserve units in peacetime and in war.
4. Assure that appropriate attention is paid to readiness, training, and war planning in competition with the necessary day-to-day functions during peacetime.
5. Continue to stimulate Active Army interest in the readiness and training of National Guard and Reserve units.
6. Utilize appropriately the National Guard and Reserve chains of command.
7. Integrate National Guard and Reserve units ultimately into a total Army command and control system upon mobilization.
8. Streamline the present organization by eliminating any excessive layering.

According to the Army, any major streamlining actions taken before the Command and Control Study-82 group submits its final recommendations to the Army Chief of Staff in August 1979 would be premature and would present significant potential for unnecessary turbulence. We agree that major structuring actions are potentially turbulent and should not be undertaken without being studied carefully. The recommendations and alternatives presented in this report should, in our opinion, be included in the study group's deliberations.

CHAPTER 4

THE ARMY'S AFFILIATION PROGRAM CAN INTEGRATE THE ACTIVE ARMY WITH ITS RESERVE COMPONENTS

The total Army's dependence on the Reserve components to meet mobilization and deployment requirements demands the highest possible integration of the Active Army with its Reserve components. A principle means of accomplishing this end is the Army's Affiliation Program.

The Affiliation Program is a funded program designed to improve the operational readiness and deployability of Reserve component units through peacetime association with Active Army units. The program currently includes 76 Army National Guard and 17 Army Reserve battalion-sized units. The units, with authorized strengths totaling 64,600, represent 13.5 percent of the Army Guard's and 3.2 percent of the Army Reserve's total authorized strengths. Most are considered early-deploying units, since they are scheduled for deployment within 60 days of initiation of general mobilization.

Affiliated Reserve component units have benefited from the program, in our opinion, and Army officials fully support it. However, only three additional brigades have been affiliated since the program began in 1974, and their inclusion was not a conscious decision to expand the program. Rather, it resulted from the Army's conversion from 13 to 16 Active Force divisions and shortages of active-duty personnel to staff the new divisions. Since 1975, the Army has considered expanding the program by 70 to 120 combat support and combat service support companies and platoons but has not carried out these plans. The Army was funded for this expansion in fiscal year 1978.

In addition to the Affiliation Program, two other programs offer potential for total Army integration: the Active Component Battalion Support During Annual Training Program and the Mutual Support Program. The former program, which provides Active Army support to major, nonaffiliated Reserve component units during annual training, began with the 101st Airborne Division in 1974 and was expanded in 1976. The Army's 1978 goal is to provide such support to all major non-affiliated Reserve component separate brigades and

divisions (8 Guard divisions and 16 Guard and Reserve separate brigades), and its future intention is to involve all major U.S.-based Active Army divisions and separate brigades.

Army costs for the annual training program have not been determined. The 1977 program was unfunded, and Air Force transportation to move Active Army units to Reserve component annual training sites was not charged to the Army. However, if aircraft transportation is charged to the Army in fiscal year 1978, the cost is estimated at \$3 million to \$4 million, depending on the type of aircraft used.

The Mutual Support Program's objectives are to improve Reserve component unit and individual mission capabilities; to assist Active component units by using Reserve component combat support and combat service support units; and to enhance the Total Force through shared experience, facilities, and understanding.

Although the Mutual Support Program is informal and unfunded, the governing regulation directs Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard commanders to:

"* * * seek each other out and make known what facilities, equipment, and assistance can be made available in mutual support. They will initiate programs to expand those activities which support the development of increased unit readiness or effectiveness."

Examples of support made available to Reserve component units include

- providing demonstration troops for Reserve component unit training,
- providing mobile training teams to assist in skill training for Reserve component personnel,
- conducting specialized training at Active Army installations, and
- instructing and assisting in preventive maintenance.

In 1975, the Forces Command initiated a Directed Mutual Support Program with 25 Reserve component combat support and combat service support companies associated with the same number of Active component units. This pilot project was considered a stepping stone to the Affiliation Program. Additional data on the numbers or types of units involved, costs incurred by either component, and quantifiable results were not available at the Department of the Army, the Forces Command, or the CONUSAs.

THE AFFILIATION PROGRAM

The Affiliation Program improves the operational readiness of Reserve component units through peacetime association with Active Army units. In 1977, the Office of the Secretary of Defense studied the program and found that the overall strength of affiliated units declined less than that of nonaffiliated units and that affiliated units' equipment levels and training readiness were higher. Telephone interviews with affiliated unit commanders, also part of the study, revealed overwhelming support for the program.

The Chief of the Army Reserve and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau have repeatedly favored the Affiliation Program during congressional hearings. Also, the Defense Manpower Commission, in its April 1976 report, referred to the program as probably the most important Army action to upgrade Reserve component unit readiness.

Under the program, Active Army units assist and supervise the equipping and training of the affiliated Reserve component units. The program has the following levels of affiliation.

--Roundout: Due to personnel constraints, some Active Army divisions have less than the standard number of maneuver brigades, battalions, or support units. Reserve component units are designated to roundout, or raise, the under-structured divisions to standard configuration. The roundout concept calls for participating units to deploy with their Active command sponsor divisions.

- Augmentation: Some Active component units, organized at standard configuration, have Reserve component augmentation units which will increase their combat power. Under this concept, Reserve component units deploy with or shortly after their Active component sponsors.
- Deployment capability improvement: Participating Reserve component units in this level of affiliation receive dedicated Active component support to meet sufficient readiness levels for their deployment schedules. These Reserve component units are not scheduled to deploy with their Active component sponsors.

The governing Affiliation Program regulation places considerable responsibility on the Active component sponsor for increasing the operational readiness of affiliated Reserve component units. Examples of Active Army support provided to affiliated units include

- assisting the units in planning for annual training,
- supporting and evaluating annual training,
- preparing the units' reports of yearly training evaluation,
- assisting the units in planning and conducting inactive duty training,
- preparing and conducting Army training tests,
- helping the units to meet premobilization training objectives, and
- assisting the units in maintaining current data on their personnel, equipment, and training status.

In 1978, the Affiliation Program was funded at \$4.1 million. Most of this is expended on travel costs and per diem for Active Army personnel travelling to the units they sponsor.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR REDUCING THE WORKLOAD OF
THE RESERVE COMPONENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

In addition to improving unit readiness and increasing understanding between the Active Army and its Reserve components, the Affiliation Program offers significant opportunities for reducing the Reserve component management structure's workload. That is, whatever assistance is available to affiliated units from the Active Army sponsors need not be provided by the readiness regions and ARCOMs. Since the Active sponsors are responsible for assisting their affiliated units in planning, evaluating, and conducting training, etc., readiness regions and ARCOMs can reduce their assistance accordingly. And their excess resources--personnel, time, money--can then be redirected toward nonaffiliated units or eliminated.

For example, Army Readiness Region III officials stated that they reduced their assistance to the 14 affiliated units in their area by 30 percent. Also, officials at Readiness Region IX said they could withdraw three infantry battalion advisors and an eight-man artillery battalion team from the 81st Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) of the Army National Guard without reducing the brigade's effectiveness.

The Reserve component management structure's workload could be further reduced by affiliating units which are subordinate to the Forces Command in peacetime with the commands responsible for their mobilization command and control. Such affiliation would also reduce turbulence at mobilization.

For example, the 12 Army Reserve training divisions will move, upon mobilization, to Army training centers in the continental United States to train replacement personnel. Because of their training missions, the divisions will become subordinates of the Training and Doctrine Command. The following chart shows the training divisions' stations and personnel strengths.

<u>Division</u>	<u>Home station</u>	<u>Mobilization station</u>	<u>Personnel strengths</u>	
			<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Onhand</u>
70th	Livonia, Mich.	Ft. Benning, Ga.	3,107	2,492
76th	W. Hartford, Conn.	Ft. Gordon, Ga.	2,423	2,176
78th	Edison, N.J.	Ft. Dix, N.J.	2,423	1,981
80th	Richmond, Va.	Ft. Bragg, N.C.	2,423	2,785
84th	Milwaukee, Wis.	Ft. Hood, Tex.	3,104	2,226
85th	Chicago, Ill.	Ft. Bliss, Tex.	2,423	1,774
91st	Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.	Ft. Ord, Cal.	2,423	1,820
95th	Midwest City, Okla.	Ft. Polk, La.	3,107	2,431
98th	Rochester, N.Y.	Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo.	3,090	2,773
100th	Louisville, Ky.	Ft. Knox, Ky.	2,571	2,447
104th	Vancouver Barracks, Wash.	Ft. Lewis, Wash.	3,107	2,456
108th	Charlotte, N.C.	Ft. Jackson, S.C.	<u>3,107</u>	<u>3,382</u>
Total			<u>33,308</u>	<u>28,743</u>

The Reserve component management structure presently has many of the same administrative and support responsibilities for training divisions as for other Army Reserve units. For example, Army Readiness Region IX, located in San Francisco, provides the 91st and 104th Training Divisions with three infantry branch advisors each, plus coordinators to periodically evaluate the divisions.

Officials of the 91st Training Division told us that during a 1977 inspection, Army Inspector General representatives questioned the logic of placing the division under the Forces Command in peacetime but under the Training and Doctrine Command after mobilization. According to the officials, the Army Inspector General team believed the division's ability to carry out its mission was complicated in two ways by the command relationship. First, the

division was not supervised by the command which develops the policies and procedures the division would use to accomplish its mission. Second, a change of command would be required upon mobilization. The Inspector General's representatives and division officials agreed that a change in the chain of command at that time would be an unnecessary complication. We believe that affiliating the training divisions with their postmobilization command would further integrate the units with the Active components and would allow the Army readiness regions to withdraw their advisors and reassign them to deploying Reserve component units.

Other examples of Reserve component units which are subordinate to the Forces Command in peacetime but to other headquarters after mobilization are strategic military intelligence units and Signal Corps units. Many mobilized military intelligence units will fall under the Defense Intelligence Agency, and many signal units will fall under the Army Communications Command. Like the training divisions, many of these units are entitled to the same support from the Reserve component management structure as other Reserve component units. Furthermore, these types of units often require very sophisticated training expertise and assistance beyond the ability of the management structure.

Many strategic military intelligence units already receive much of their training support and assistance from the Defense Intelligence Agency. For example, the nine military intelligence units in the 97th ARCOM receive all their intelligence-related training support from the Defense Intelligence Agency. If all strategic military intelligence units were affiliated with the Defense Intelligence Agency and Signal Corps units with the Army Communications Command, the same benefits as those available from affiliating the training divisions with the Training and Doctrine Command would accrue.

CONCLUSIONS

The Army Affiliation Program has proved to be a successful vehicle for increasing Active Army units' involvement with their Reserve component counterparts. The program has, in fact, been credited with enhancing the personnel strengths and training readiness of affiliated Reserve component units. Despite its success, the Affiliation Program has not been materially expanded since it began in 1974.

We believe expansion of the program would increase participating Reserve and Guard units' readiness and enhance their integration with the Active Forces. Since Active units give their affiliated units much of the same assistance that echelons of the Reserve component management structure are staffed to provide, the program's expansion would also allow for staffing reductions in that structure--especially in the Army readiness regions.

Many Army Reserve units under the Forces Command in peacetime could be affiliated with their gaining commands. The training divisions, military intelligence units, and Signal Corps units are examples. Affiliating such units would, we believe, improve their readiness and facilitate their transition into the commands which would gain them upon mobilization.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army:

- Require that those Reserve component units scheduled for transfer to other U.S.-based major Army commands upon full mobilization be formally affiliated, to the extent possible, with their gaining commands.
- Expand the Affiliation Program to include as many deployable Reserve component units as possible. Priority should be given to early-deploying units.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

Commenting on our recommendations, the Army stated that affiliation of units transferring to other major commands upon mobilization has been addressed and approved for implementation in the third quarter of fiscal year 1979.

The Army also stated that affiliation of deploying Reserve component units with like-type Active units has proven successful. According to Army officials, three additional phases of affiliation are currently scheduled. For example, 76 early-deploying Reserve component units have been selected for Phase I, which is scheduled for implementation in fiscal year 1979. The proposal is undergoing final staffing at Army headquarters.

The Army noted, however, that increased emphasis being placed on early deployability of Active units, combined with decreased equipment fill levels [created by increased Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets overseas] and increased training demands decrease the units' ability to fully support Reserve component affiliation. The Army further noted that in some cases sufficient numbers of like-type Active units are not available for affiliation on a one-on-one basis. Geographic separation of Active and Reserve component units is also a consideration. It concluded that the affiliation program should not be considered the panacea to Reserve component readiness.

We believe that affiliating Active and Reserve component units to the greatest extent possible enhances the Reserves' readiness. While we did not do an indepth analysis of the number of units that could feasibly be affiliated with like Active units, we believe the number is substantial. We believe the Army should not only approve affiliation of the 76 units scheduled for fiscal year 1979, but should continue to seek other candidate units. Phases II and III of the affiliation expansion program should be pursued as vigorously.

Regarding the increased emphasis being placed on early deployability of Active units, similar emphasis is being placed on the Reserve components. Reserve component units are also faced with decreased equipment fill levels as a result of increased Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets. Geographic separation of affiliated units is a consideration, but we found successful affiliation between the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Ord, Cal., and the Oregon Army National Guard's 41st Infantry Brigade, although they are located more than 750 miles from each other.

Therefore, while we agree that affiliation should not be considered the panacea to Reserve component readiness, the Reserve components' importance to the total Army Force and the success of the Affiliation Program dictate the program's expansion wherever possible.

CHAPTER 5

MODIFICATIONS IN THE ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT FORCE

STRUCTURE COULD ENHANCE THE FORCES' READINESS

In view of the Army Reserve components' limited resources, care must be taken to ensure their expenditure on only required, supportable units. We believe the Army's Reserve Forces contain units which are not essential to the Reserves' mission and which, because of their missions and/or configurations, cannot be adequately supported in the reserve environment.

The elimination or other disposition of unnecessary and nonsupportable units and the redistribution of their resources to higher priority units would result in better readiness of the Reserve Forces and better application of scarce resources. Elimination of these units would also improve the Reserve component management structure's efficiency, since it would materially reduce the number of units the structure must command and support.

NONESSENTIAL UNITS IN ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS

The Army's heavy reliance on its Reserve component forces to provide rapid, effective reinforcements for the Active Force in the event of conflict dictates the need for trained, ready Reserve component units. This is particularly true of the units scheduled for deployment during the first few months following full mobilization. During those months, before the mechanisms for inducting, training, and assigning additional personnel are functioning smoothly, Reserve component units will have to rely largely on the personnel and equipment they have at mobilization to perform their assigned missions. The Selective Service System and the Army's training base could be expected to begin regularly supplying filler personnel 5 months following mobilization.

Our analysis revealed (in addition to large overall personnel shortages) significant personnel shortages and low readiness ratings in early-deploying units. At the same time,

however, nearly 25 percent of the deployable units 1/ in the Reserve component force have no assigned missions during the first 6 months following mobilization. We believe this is a misapplication of scarce resources.

Developing and assigning missions
to Reserve component units

The Department of the Army annually conducts a sophisticated analysis of the types and numbers of units needed in the total Army Force. The resulting product, the Troop Program Guidance, shows the mix of Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard units that should be in the Army force structure at the end of a 5-year cycle, beginning in the second fiscal year following the year in which the analysis is made. For example, the fiscal year 1978 analysis resulted in a guidance document covering fiscal years 1980-84. The guidance shows the types and numbers of supportable units needed during the first 6 months following a full mobilization. Any other needed units are considered an unmanned requirement and are not programed into the force.

The Troop Program Guidance, according to Army officials, is the "programing" world. The "real" world, according to the officials, is the list of established units--those available to fill theater operations requirements established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army Chief of Staff, and the Army's theater commanders. The configuration of established Reserve component units, we were told, lags considerably behind the programed configuration.

Many units lacking
deployment schedules

To assess the composition of the Army's Reserve component forces, we analyzed lists of (1) all established units, 2/

1/Excludes those units whose principal missions would involve assignments in the United States, such as training divisions.

2/"The U.S. Army Forces Command Mobilization Troop Bases Stationing Plan" (Dec. 12, 1977).

(2) units dedicated for deployment to the European theater, 1/ and (3) units without specified deployment areas. 1/ Details of our analysis can be found in the classified supplement to this report. Overall, however, we found that, of the Reserve component units logically considered deployable, over 24 percent were not scheduled for overseas deployment during the first 6 months following mobilization. As noted earlier, the Army's criterion for placing units in the Selected Reserves is the need for them during the first 6 months following mobilization.

In addition to lacking deployment schedules, many of the units appear to be of questionable need in the early stages of mobilization. In fact, many require personnel skills that are available in the civilian community and/or are not difficult or overly time consuming to acquire.

Department of the Army officials stated that, although the lists of units dedicated for deployment to the European theater and not scheduled for deployment were the most current available, they were based on a 1976 analysis of theater operations plans. A similar analysis for 1977 was not completed, and the 1978 analysis was in process but not completed as of late June 1978. The officials said the 1978 analysis would show requirements for many of the units which presently have no assigned missions. In addition, we were told the Army's fiscal year 1978 Troop Program Guidance, which covers fiscal years 1980-84, contains requirements for many of these types of units.

Because the 1978 analysis was not completed when we made our review, we could not determine its impact on the number of units without assigned deployment schedules. Similarly, since the fiscal year 1978 Troop Program Guidance identifies units by type and not by specific units, we could not identify fiscal year 1980-84 requirements for these units. Further, requirements identified in the Troop Program Guidance are susceptible to changes during the approximately 18 months between completion of the document and its implementation or during the 5 years of the program itself.

1/Department of the Army computerized list of Reserve component units scheduled, by month, for deployment to the European theater and all strategic worldwide orientation units (Mar. 24, 1978).

Army rationale for maintaining
units without assigned missions

In addition to saying that many units without currently assigned deployment dates would be given deployment schedules, Army officials stated that the units (1) provide a pool from which requirements for specific types of units can be filled as they arise, (2) can be used as replacements for units lost in transit to or during combat, (3) can be converted from lower priority to higher priority units, (4) are held in the system to fill requirements that are anticipated within a few years, or (5) simply represent scarce assets (personnel) for the Reserve components.

A principal concern of Army officials, as can be seen from the above comments, involved the turbulent effects of force structure actions on Reserve component forces. We were told that the above units can fill new requirements through conversions without having to go through the turbulent process of inactivating units and then activating from ground zero other units if and when new requirements come about. We believe that the units presently scheduled to deploy to the European theater in the 6th month following mobilization offer the Army a source for filling new requirements as they arise. These units, which comprise 5.5 percent of the Reserve component deployable forces, are very similar to the types of units which presently have no deployment schedules, as can be seen from the classified supplement to this report.

We believe that units that still have no firm assigned deployment dates after completion of the 1978 theater operation plans should be eliminated and their resources reallocated to higher priority, early-deploying units. Unit personnel from the inactivated units should be invited to join other Reserve component units or the Inactive Ready Reserve as alternatives to their release from the Selected Reserves.

NONSUPPORTABLE UNITS IN ARMY
RESERVE COMPONENTS

Many units, ranging from small cellular teams 1/ and detachments to companies, cannot be adequately supported in the reserve environment. As a result, these units, placed in the Reserve components to perform specific missions within the context of the total Army Force, cannot meet the readiness standards required of them. Further, because the units require extensive support, they cause a disproportionate burden on the Reserve component management structure. In our opinion, the magnitude of the problem needs to be identified and actions taken to resolve it.

In 1976, the Sixth Army conducted a comprehensive study of initiatives the Army could take to achieve greater combat readiness of the Army Reserve Force. The study, entitled "Something for Nothing," included an analysis of nonsupportable units in the Army Reserve and categorized these units into three groups.

1. Those with low-skill, low-grade requirements that provide little challenge, little opportunity to learn or perfect usable skills, and little promotion potential.
2. Those composed of personnel who perform the same functions in their civilian occupations.
3. Those requiring unique skills which necessitate long training periods or the use of sophisticated but unavailable equipment.

On April 26, 1977, the Sixth Army submitted to the Army Forces Command, in response to its request, a more comprehensive list of the types of Reserve units believed to be unsupportable in the reserve environment. The list, which discussed the units' problems and made recommendations on

1/Army Regulation 310-25 defines "cellular teams" as Table of Organization and Equipment units or detachments formed to carry out a special function and not administratively self-contained.

their disposition, identified 31 types of units in the Army Security Agency and in the chemical, engineer, logistics, medical, military police, and Signal Corps branches.

We analyzed Army documents to determine the total number of units of the types identified in the Sixth Army list. We found that as of June 1978, 293 such units or detachments were in the Army Reserve and another 52 were in the Army National Guard. The following chart shows the authorized personnel strengths of these units.

<u>Branch or component</u>	<u>Number of units</u>	<u>Total authorized personnel</u>
Army Security Agency:		
Reserve	15	1,815
Guard	-	-
Chemical:		
Reserve	43	701
Guard	-	-
Engineer:		
Reserve	8	665
Guard	-	-
Combat support:		
Reserve	67	12,054
Guard	20	3,020
Medical:		
Reserve	119	2,876
Guard	28	631
Military police:		
Reserve	34	1,409
Guard	1	38
Signal Corps:		
Reserve	7	2,057
Guard	<u>3</u>	<u>903</u>
Total	<u>345</u>	<u>26,169</u>

Fiscal year 1978 and planned fiscal year 1979 Reserve Force structuring actions revealed that the only actions on the above were the inactivation of one Reserve engineer (forestry) unit and two Reserve combat support (supply) companies.

Examples of the types of units, their problems, and recommended solutions from the Sixth Army list follow.

Army Security Agency units

"There are six U.S. Army Reserve Army Security Agency units located within the Sixth Army area. The readiness condition of the units is at an unacceptable level, and has been such for the past eight years. Military Occupational Specialty qualification percentages have never reached assigned levels. Unit strengths have been consistently low and accompanied by high percentages of personnel turnover. The units have experienced great difficulty in training hardskill specialities and maintaining required proficiencies. Despite numerous reorganizations and Army Security Agency programs designed to enhance readiness, the units have not progressed appreciably, and there is no evidence that they will do so in the foreseeable future. Currently, these units in the Army area have an overall fill of 76 percent; with a 47 percent annual personnel turnover.

"Only 46 percent of the personnel assigned are Military Occupational Specialty qualified. The study team concluded that the investment of considerable time, money, and manpower in the continuation of these units in the Army Reserve, and any proposal to utilize these units effectively upon mobilization, is unwise and impractical.

"The team recommended that Army Reserve Army Security Agency units organized under Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment be eliminated from the Army Reserve force structure and consideration be given to increasing the number of such units in the Active Command. Personnel from the units could fill other intelligence requirements where training considerations and skill maintenance permit less stringent standards."

Signal units

"This unit suffers from equipment shortages and chronic low strength. Of the 246 enlisted personnel authorized, 180 are E-4 and below. Of this number, 50 are E-3 messengers. With a structure like this, it is little wonder that recruiting/retention efforts have proven

unsuccessful. Elimination of low-skill, low-grade positions would permit units of this type to concentrate their efforts on training rather than trying to recruit personnel to be permanent Privates First Class as is now the case.

"The team recommended the unit be reduced to cadre level. The mobilization/deployment time for this unit is such that it could be activated, filled and trained after mobilization, and still meet its present deployment date."

Engineer units (well-drilling)

"These units are an administrative and logistical nightmare. Composed of only five enlisted personnel, they are almost totally dependent on another unit to do everything for them. They were never intended to function independently such as is expected when they are put in the Army Reserve. Further, there is serious doubt that such units have to be maintained in the Reserve. These skills are generally available in the civilian community and could easily be obtained by a variety of means if they are needed after mobilization.

"The team recommended that these units be eliminated from the Army Reserve force structure and be activated after mobilization. If such teams must be put into the force prior to mobilization they should be integrated into the unit they would become part of in wartime."

Department of the Army and Army Forces Command officials informed us that the CONUSAs do not have a complete enough perspective of overall force structuring requirements to conclusively determine the relative need for and supportability of Reserve component units. However, we believe that, as a direct subordinate of the Army Forces Command with responsibility for commanding all assigned Army Reserve units in the western United States, the Sixth Army's judgment on the supportability of Reserve component units holds considerable credence. In light of the apparent magnitude of the problem outlined by the Sixth Army, we asked Army Forces Command,

Army Reserve Chief, and Department of the Army officials what actions had been taken to identify nonsupportable Reserve components units and to resolve the problems. They said that, although there is considerable concern over nonsupportable units, no action had been taken. Department of the Army officials stated that problems with these units are being handled on a case-by-case basis.

CONCLUSIONS

The Army's Reserve component units suffer from large, overall personnel shortages and readiness deficiencies. Significant personnel shortages and low unit readiness ratings exist in early-deploying units, as well. Despite these shortfalls, many unnecessary units are in the Reserve component force structure.

Although Army criteria state that the Reserve components should be composed of only those units required within 6 months following a full mobilization, nearly 25 percent of the components' deployable units had no identified and assigned missions or scheduled deployment dates within 6 months of mobilization. Many appeared to be of questionable need in the early stages of mobilization, and many required skills that are available in the civilian community and/or are not difficult to acquire.

We believe that maintaining units without assigned missions when higher-priority and early-deploying units suffer severe personnel and readiness shortfalls is a misapplication of scarce and needed resources. In our opinion, units still without firm and assigned deployment schedules after completion of the Army's 1978 force assessments should be eliminated and the resources they would consume redistributed to higher-priority units.

In April 1977, the Sixth Army study identified a variety of units which cannot, because of factors peculiar to them, be adequately supported in the reserve environment, and which cannot meet the readiness standards required of them. We found that such units (mostly of company or detachment size), had authorized strengths of approximately 26,000. If similar studies were done by the First and Fifth Armies, the list could grow. The only actions taken or planned on these units during fiscal years 1978 and 1979 involved the inactivation

of three units. Army officials informed us that problems with unsupportable units were being handled on a case-by-case basis.

Gaps are created in the Army Force when units cannot perform the missions assigned to them. In addition, attempting to support a large number of unsupportable units places a heavy burden on the Reserve component management structure. We believe a comprehensive action plan is needed to identify and eliminate the types and numbers of unsupportable units. In our opinion, the Sixth Army's study provided several sound recommendations for dealing with such units, and the Army should promptly consider them.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army:

- Eliminate those deployable Reserve component units still having no firm assigned deployment schedules after completion of the 1978 operations plans assessment. The resources thus saved should be reallocated to upgrade the readiness of early-deploying Reserve component units.
- Develop a comprehensive plan to identify and act on nonsupportable Reserve component units and detachments. In developing the plan, consideration should be given to the recommendations developed by the Sixth Army.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

Addressing the first recommendation, Army officials commented that the recommendation tends to focus on current force requirements and ignores programed requirements. They stated that every effort is made to insure that each unit retained has a readily identifiable mission within the span of program years. Further, units scheduled for reorganization may not appear to have current valid missions, but those units will be assigned appropriate missions as their structural changes are completed. The Army's plans for reorganizing the Reserve Intelligence Force, which the Army stated would require use of all existing [related type] units, was given as an example.

Additionally, the Army commented that a major problem area highlighted by previous exercises is that of adequate

manning at mobilization stations to effectively manage mobilization and deployment activities. It stated that the total force required to remain in the United States for training and support deployment is not completely identified at this time, but that requirements for this force will remain. A major study, the Total Army Mobilization Base Force Requirements Model, has been initiated which, according to the Army, will incorporate base operations into the Total Army Analysis.

We recognize the dynamic nature of the Total Army Analysis process and, as this chapter points out, the need to reorganize Reserve component units in response to changing force requirements. Army officials gave us examples of deployable units which were scheduled to (1) receive schedules in response to operations plans assessments and (2) for reorganization to conform to new doctrine.

We agree that the units scheduled for reorganization, such as those needed to structure the planned reorganization of the Reserve Intelligence Force, should be retained. Similarly, the units scheduled to receive deployment schedules as a result of operations plans assessments should be retained.

During this review we recognized and discussed with Army officials the need for adequate manning of mobilization stations to effectively manage mobilization and deployment activities. As the Army's comments point out, the resources required to support forces deployed from mobilization stations in the United States were not fully known. However, approximately one-third of the deployable Reserve component units without assigned deployment schedules were assigned mobilization station support missions.

We concur with the Army's efforts to identify requirements for mobilization station support. We believe that since the Army's study assigns a high priority to needed mobilization station support units, the deployable units without assigned deployment schedules would be excellent sources for filling requirements.

We believe, notwithstanding the above, that the Army has other units which are not presently scheduled to receive deployment dates and are not currently scheduled for reorganization. These units are (1) retained in anticipation of future requirements, (2) held as a source of replacement units, and (3) held for converting lower priority to higher-priority requirements. We believe these units should be eliminated.

As noted in this chapter, about 5.5 percent of the deployable Reserve component forces are not scheduled for deployment until the 6th month following mobilization day. These units are very similar to the types of units which presently have no deployment schedules. The late deploying units, in our opinion, provide a resource from which the Army could satisfy the types of needs listed above.

Addressing the second recommendation, the Army agreed that selected units within the Reserve component are difficult to support from both personnel and readiness viewpoints. It also stated that the fact that units are difficult to maintain does not alleviate requirements for the units.

We agree with these statements. However, in our opinion, requirements for units are not satisfied by the existence of units which cannot perform the missions for which they were established. In fact, such circumstances could be dangerous since reliance could be placed on nonsupportable units. We therefore believe a comprehensive plan is needed to identify and provide disposition actions on such units. The Sixth Army's recommendations provide, in our opinion, several alternatives for addressing nonsupportable units. There are undoubtedly others. Alternatives should be sought, and the most appropriate ones acted upon.

Regarding the transfer of Reserve component personnel from inactivated to other units, the Army said transfer of total personnel assets to other units should not be assumed. Inactivations of geographically dispersed units would, the Army said, create a loss through inability to assign individuals to another unit, particularly within the same skill area.

We agree that transfer of total personnel assets could not be assumed. Some personnel losses would be expected as unnecessary units are inactivated. However, with the more

than 6,600 Army Reserve component units that now exist in the United States and its territories, coupled with the large personnel shortages of the Reserve component, we believe opportunities would be available for the large majority of displaced personnel to serve, whether in a Reserve or a National Guard unit. Certainly, some cross-training into other skills would be required. In addition, the resulting personnel gains for the higher priority, earlier deploying units would be a positive factor.

CHAPTER 6

THE TRANSITION FROM A PEACETIME TO

A WARTIME STRUCTURE COULD HAVE PROBLEMS

Although the Total Force Policy calls for the effective integration of Active and Reserve component units into a single cohesive force, such integration does not exist in the Army's peacetime structure and will not occur until after Reserve units have mobilized and deployed overseas. As a result, the Army's management structure in the continental United States must be able to supervise and assist Reserve units not only during peacetime but also during the critical period of mobilization. However, tests of mobilization procedures have demonstrated that the current organizational structure cannot effectively command and support Reserve units during this transitional period.

The Army has identified the causes of this problem but has not yet taken definitive actions to improve the situation. The Forces Command's December 1977 Command Relationship Study cited the following problems.

- Many peacetime headquarters have no missions during the most critical phase of mobilization, whereas others must assume either new or expanded roles.
- Command responsibilities and relationships during mobilization are not clearly defined.
- The Forces Command, in an effort to decentralize its operations following mobilization, has assigned the CONUSAs responsibilities that they will be unable to perform.
- The personnel turbulence that mobilization would produce in many Army installations' management structures could severely limit their ability to support mobilizing units.
- Many semiactive and State-operated installations may be unable to carry out their assigned mobilization station missions.
- Additional emphasis and increased coordination is needed in the mobilization planning process.

The study also made recommendations to rectify what it described as the total inadequacy of the current concept for commanding and controlling the Reserves during mobilization. But because the Department of the Army either disapproved or deferred action on many of these recommendations, many serious deficiencies remain unresolved.

We believe this combination of structural problems and planning deficiencies must be eliminated if the Total Force Policy is to become a viable concept. This chapter discusses the mobilization process, and chapter 7 discusses the mobilization planning process.

THE ARMY'S MOBILIZATION PROCESS

The term "mobilization" refers to the act of ordering members of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve to active duty in preparation for war or another national emergency. In a more general sense, it refers not only to the act but also to the entire process of transitioning from a peacetime to wartime posture. The Reserves need this preparation period to accomplish certain administrative actions and to attain acceptable levels of readiness.

Although both the size of the force mobilized and the manner in which mobilization tasks are accomplished will vary with the nature of the threat, Army plans generally assume a full and deliberate mobilization. Under this scenario, all Reserve component units and personnel would be mobilized under conditions that would permit an orderly accomplishment of required tasks in five phases.

- Phase I: Preparatory.
- Phase II: Alert.
- Phase III: Mobilization at home station.
- Phase IV: Movement to mobilization station.
- Phase V: Operational readiness determination.

Two of these phases are especially critical to a successful mobilization of the Reserve components. One is the preparatory phase during which units are in a peacetime status. If Reserve units are to successfully mobilize and deploy, they must continually take actions during this period to reduce the administrative processing that will be required following mobilization. They must also maintain at least the minimum readiness standards that have been estab-

lished for them. The other critical phase is that of operational readiness determination, which begins with a unit's arrival at its mobilization station and ends with its deployment overseas. It is during this phase that units will generally do most of their postmobilization administrative processing and will receive the additional personnel, equipment, and training necessary to attain a fully combat ready status.

MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS CREATED BY MOBILIZATION

To facilitate the transition from peacetime to wartime, the Reserve components' peacetime management structure should, to the extent practical, mirror the postmobilization configuration. Ideally, the peacetime structure should contain only those headquarters needed for mobilization. Furthermore, peacetime command relationships and responsibilities should remain in effect throughout the mobilization process. Those headquarters most familiar with the Reserve components' strengths and weaknesses during peacetime should supervise their operation during mobilization.


The current management structure does not meet these criteria. Many headquarters in the peacetime structure have no specific responsibility for Reserve units during the operational readiness determination phase. Conversely, the installations, which have only limited responsibility for the Army Reserves during peacetime and virtually no responsibility for the Army National Guard, must assume command of both during the readiness determination phase.

Peacetime headquarters without a mission during mobilization

The amount of command structure turbulence that will occur upon mobilization becomes readily apparent when the peacetime structure (see p. 5) is compared with the structure that will be used during the operational readiness determination phase, as illustrated on the next page. The most obvious difference between the two structures is the absence of many peacetime headquarters in the postmobilization structure. The following table shows the nondeployable headquarters ^{1/} that do not have any specific responsibilities after their units have arrived at the mobilization stations.

^{1/}This analysis excludes the National Guard Bureau and the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve.

OPERATIONAL READINESS DETERMINATION PHASE
COMMAND STRUCTURE (NOTE A)



NOTE A: THE POST-MOBILIZATION COMMAND CONCEPT IS DESCRIBED ON PAGE 78 .

<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Number in the Reserve structure</u>	<u>Average authorized strength of each headquarters</u>	<u>Total authorized strength</u>
ARCOM	19	140	2,660
Readiness region	9	510	4,590
State Guard headquarters	53	143	7,579
Maneuver training command	9	319	2,871
Maneuver area command	<u>2</u>	460	<u>920</u>
Total	<u>92</u>		<u>18,620</u>

The peacetime missions and postmobilization roles of these headquarters are summarized below.

--ARCOMs command Army Reserve units in peacetime and during the first four phases of mobilization. They relinquish all responsibility for a unit upon its arrival at the mobilization station and have no additional postmobilization missions.

--The Army readiness regions, along with their 28 subordinate readiness groups, assist the CONUSAs in the peacetime training management of the Reserves. They continue this mission through phase III but have no specific responsibilities once the units depart for their mobilization stations.

--The State Guard headquarters supervise National Guard units in peacetime. In the event of mobilization, part of each headquarters is ordered to active Federal service and organized as a State area command. The State area commands report directly to the CONUSA commanders and exercise control over Guard units from the time they are mobilized at home stations until they arrive at their mobilization stations (Phases III and IV). The commands have no responsibility for the units after that point but do have other contingency missions that require their continued existence. The non-Federal portions of the State headquarters continue under State control to supervise Army Guard units until they are mobilized at home stations. They have no mission once all of the units have mobilized at home stations.

--The two maneuver area commands and nine maneuver training commands plan, prepare, conduct, and control peacetime training tests and exercises for other Reserve units. The basic difference between the two headquarters is that the area commands deal with high-level headquarters, and the training commands deal with lower level headquarters and individual units. Neither headquarters has a postmobilization mission.

The training divisions and MUSARCs ^{1/} are also excluded from the readiness determination phase command structure, but most of these headquarters have specific postmobilization missions. The training divisions will teach basic and advanced individual training to new recruits, and 10 of the 12 MUSARCs are scheduled for deployment outside the United States. The two nondeploying MUSARCs are the maneuver area commands discussed above.

^{1/}The term "MUSARC" is normally used to describe any general officer command that reports directly to a CONUSA. In this report, however, the term is not used to refer to ARCOMS.

Headquarters with expanded postmobilization missions

At the same time that headquarters will drop out of the Reserve management structure, others will be added. For example, the Training and Doctrine Command will assume command of the 12 training divisions, the Health Services Command will assume command of all nondeployable medical units, and those installations that have been designated as mobilization stations will assume command of deployable units.

Additional changes will occur before the Reserve units arrive at their mobilization stations. As noted earlier, 10 MUSARCs are deployable units. In some instances, they will move to their mobilization stations before their subordinate units. If this happens, the responsibility for commanding and supporting the units while still at their home stations will be transferred to the ARCOMs in whose geographical areas the units are located. In the National Guard, as noted previously, State area commands must be created out of portions of each State's peacetime headquarters to command and support the units from phase III until they arrive at their mobilization stations.

Postmobilization command relationships

The changes in command responsibilities discussed above require a similar shift in command relationships. For example, the CONUSA commanders have neither responsibility for nor control over installations during peacetime but must exercise control over Reserve units through these installations during the operational readiness determination phase.

If the postmobilization management structure is to function effectively, command relationships and responsibilities must be clearly defined. Although such responsibilities and command relationships are specified in numerous Army regulations, plans, and directives, the Command Relationship Study pointed out that these references frequently contain conflicting guidance and vague and undefined mission assignments. In some instances, the deficiencies have been so severe that they have prevented effective mobilization planning. (See ch. 7.)

Unclear postmobilization mission
of the CONUSAs

The installations and CONUSAs are, by far, the most important headquarters in the Reserve postmobilization management structure. However, the Army has never clearly defined the relationship between the two.

Prior to June 1978, the Army used the term "command through installations" to describe this relationship. Under this concept, the CONUSA commander exercised authority over installations in matters related to the Reserves' mobilization and deployment but had no responsibility for installation management or the deployment of Active component units. The chain of command in these areas would continue to go directly from the installations to the appropriate major Army command--generally either the Forces Command or the Training and Doctrine Command.

Army officials admitted that this was a very awkward and ill-defined relationship. For one thing, it forced the installation and CONUSA commanders to share responsibility for deploying units with no clear delineation of responsibilities. More important, the CONUSA headquarters were not staffed to command either the installations or the mobilized Reserve units.

The Forces Command, to (1) clarify this relationship and (2) assign responsibilities to the CONUSA headquarters that were commensurate with their capabilities, discarded the command-through-installations concept in June 1978 and replaced it with the following.

"Upon closure at mobilization stations, Reserve Component units will be attached or assigned to the installation. CONUSA will act as Deputy Commanding General, Forces Command, for post-mobilization training and deployment readiness."

Sixth Army officials agreed that this new definition did little to clarify the situation, because the CONUSAs' relationship with the installations was still ill-defined. Similar confusion over the CONUSAs' role was found at the installations. At one installation, the mobilization planner expected no assistance from the CONUSA. At the

other, the planner assumed that the CONUSA would continue to play a major role in Reserve component management throughout the mobilization process. He expected considerable assistance, especially in training supervision. Neither planner had coordinated with the CONUSA to determine what assistance could be expected.

Clearly, the CONUSAs and installations cannot develop effective mobilization plans under these conditions. Poorly defined relationships also make it difficult to plan for the effective use of peacetime headquarters that do not have specific postmobilization missions. For example, Army Readiness Region IX, was recently directed to develop a plan for assisting the Sixth Army in its postmobilization mission. The region drafted such a plan, but officials conceded that it is very vague and agreed that it is virtually impossible to develop such a plan until responsibilities are more clearly defined.

Additional guidance needed for other headquarters

Not all of the confusion in the postmobilization command structure has involved the CONUSAs. The States, for example, were not given adequate guidance on the organization, composition, and mission of the State area commands until May 1978. As a result, one State we visited in April 1978 had not developed a State area command organizational structure, had no idea which personnel in the peacetime headquarters would be used to form the command, and could not tell us what the command's responsibilities would be.

THE FORCES COMMAND DILEMMA--HOW TO DECENTRALIZE MANAGEMENT CONTROL

The Army Forces Command's span of control is so great during peacetime that it must rely on management by exception. The scope of its responsibilities becomes even greater during the transition from peacetime to wartime as it assumes command of Army National Guard units, executes deployment plans for Active component units, and supervises the mobilization and deployment of the Reserves. As a result, the need to rely on subordinate commanders to accomplish the day-to-day supervision of operations will continue and probably increase following mobilization.

The command-through-installations concept is an intuitively appealing method of accomplishing this decentralized management. The CONUSAs, as the largest peacetime headquarters dedicated to Reserve component management, are the logical choice to supervise Reserve operations during mobilization and deployment. Similarly, the installations command Active component units during peacetime and should be able to command and control the Reserves following mobilization. Unfortunately, tests of Army mobilization procedures have demonstrated that this structure could not function effectively. One primary reason is the inability of the CONUSA headquarters to effectively carry out their command responsibilities.

CONUSA ability to command Reserve component units upon mobilization

As part of the Command Relationship Study, the Army assessed the CONUSAs' capability to exercise the following basic functions of command.

- Operational control.
- Training supervision.
- Logistical support.
- Personnel and administrative support.
- Resource allocation.

The study concluded that the CONUSAs could carry out the operational control and training supervision functions but were neither organized nor staffed to accomplish the other functions.

The CONUSAs' inability to accomplish their command responsibilities, and therefore the Army's inability to decentralize operations during mobilization, can be attributed largely to changes made during the Army's 1973 STEADFAST reorganization. That reorganization reduced the number

of CONUSAs from four to three and cut their combined authorized strength by nearly 70 percent. ^{1/} This major reduction in personnel reflected a similar decrease in the CONUSAs' responsibilities. Whereas they were once major command headquarters responsible for most Army activities in their respective geographical areas, they are now essentially administrative and training headquarters concerned almost exclusively with the Reserves. Although they have retained the mission of commanding the Army Reserve, the CONUSAs no longer control the resources needed to accomplish many command functions.

Many command functions are performed, instead, by installations which no longer report to the CONUSAs. For example, the Army's budget, as well as most of its supply and maintenance support, is provided by Active Army installations.

Installations' ability to support mobilization

The Command Relationship Study concluded that Active Army installations are the only subordinate Forces Command headquarters capable of commanding Reserve units during mobilization. At the same time, however, the study warned that many Active units and personnel currently involved in installation management will deploy concurrently with the mobilization of the Reserves. This, the report concluded, could severely limit the installations' abilities to support the Reserves.

^{1/}The STEADFAST reorganization also created 9 readiness regions and 28 readiness groups to assist Reserve units in identifying and correcting readiness deficiencies, especially in training. However, this was done by simultaneously decreasing the number of dedicated unit advisors and was therefore more a reorganization of assets than a creation of new headquarters. There were approximately 4,400 advisor positions below the Army level prior to the reorganization compared with the current authorized strength of 4,594 for all readiness regions, readiness groups, and advisors.

For example, many senior Army officers wear "two hats" in that they are commanders of major deployable units, as well as installation commanders. While this arrangement functions reasonably well in peacetime, it leaves the installations without commanders when the officers deploy with their units.

A related problem is the dual slotting of a great number of other unit personnel. This practice has enabled the Army to substantially reduce the peacetime cost of installation management but will create personnel turbulence in the management structure of many installations upon mobilization. For example, Fort Hood has 588 tactical unit personnel involved in installation operations. These personnel will deploy with their units, leaving a void in installation management which must be filled.

These problems are compounded by the fact that many installations will have to expand their responsibilities upon mobilization. For example, the Fort Ord commander noted in a September 1977 message to the Forces Command that expanding the installation's mission would create a fierce competition for available training and support resources. He indicated that Fort Ord would have to carry out the following actions while establishing an 18,000-trainee Army training center.

- Predeployment training and processing of the 7th Infantry Division.
- Early deployment of the other Active Army units.
- Arrival of Reserve component units to complete preparation for early deployment.
- Arrival and training of the 7th Division's affiliated units. (The 7th has an Army National Guard roundout brigade.)
- Assignment of both nondeploying and late-deploying units to assist in accomplishing the installation's mission.
- Support of about 130 Reserve component units while mobilized at their home stations.

--Support of the activation and operations of Camp Roberts and Fort Irwin, California, as mobilization stations.

Fort Ord officials estimate they will have to increase the garrison's authorized strength from 2,134 to 2,967 to accomplish their expanded postmobilization missions. This is in addition to the 7 Reserve units (with a combined authorized strength of 3,018) that will be assigned to accomplish the Army training center's mission and the 3 nondeployable Reserve units (with a combined authorized strength of 72) that will be assigned to assist in other installation functions.

An even greater problem exists at the 14 semiactive and State-operated installations that have been designated as mobilization stations. We question whether these installations can expand from what is essentially a caretaker status during peacetime to fully operational training and reception stations immediately following mobilization.

The problems identified at Camp Roberts, California, during MOBEX 76 illustrate the difficulties that most of these installations will experience. Camp Roberts is federally owned, but leased to and operated by the California Army National Guard during peacetime. Upon mobilization, it will be reclaimed by the Federal Government and activated as a mobilization station for 46 Army Reserve and National Guard units.

The post's peacetime mission is to provide the facilities, firing ranges, and other assistance necessary to support Reserve component training requirements. To accomplish these tasks, the California Army Guard is authorized 53 full-time military and civilian employees, augmented by 112 guardsmen who train 1 weekend a month and 2 weeks during their annual training period. Many guardsmen fill both a full-time and a part-time position. Upon mobilization, this staff must expand immediately to an authorized strength of 2,059.

The Army has not identified the personnel who will fill most of these positions. The 621st U.S. Army Reserve Garrison, a Reserve unit with an authorized strength of 368, will form the nucleus of the expanded staff. In addition,

the Army expects to fill 112 other positions with guardsmen assigned to the Camp Roberts training site. The remaining 1,579 employees, however, will have to come from either local civilian hires or the Individual Ready Reserve.

MOBEX 76 demonstrated that it is not realistic to assume that local hires and the Individual Ready Reserve can expand the Camp Roberts staff. The exercise report noted that Camp Roberts is in a rural, low-population farming area and estimated that blue-collar positions would take well over 6 months to fill. Similarly, a test of the procedures to requisition personnel through the Reserve Component Personnel Activity Center indicated that less than 15 percent of the personnel needed from the Individual Ready Reserve would be available during the first 6 weeks following mobilization.

This inability to rapidly expand the installation's management structure, combined with other deficiencies noted during MOBEX 76, led the 6211th Garrison commander to conclude that Camp Roberts was incapable of accomplishing its mobilization station mission. The other deficiencies included:

- Approximately \$9.3 million in construction costs would be needed before the post could support mobilizing units.
- The post has no hospital facilities, does not have access to medical equipment and supplies, and has no plans to obtain medical support elsewhere.
- Many barracks and other buildings will require a great deal of renovation before they can be considered habitable.
- Computer and data card transmission capabilities do not exist, thus seriously degrading the ability to requisition both the installation's and the mobilizing units' needed supplies.
- The communications system is totally inadequate to support mobilizing units.
- The equipment necessary to operate the support functions (such as mechanical handling equipment, vehicles, and office machines) is not available and will have to be requisitioned.

The Army has taken at least one action since MOBEX 76 to alleviate Camp Roberts' postmobilization management problems. At the time of the exercise, Camp Roberts was expected not only to support mobilizing Reserve units but also to establish a training center for approximately 18,000 new recruits. By eliminating this requirement, the Army has substantially reduced the scope of Camp Roberts' post-mobilization mission and has thereby reduced the number of personnel required in the postmobilization management structure 1/. However, 6211th Garrison officials conceded that they still must rely heavily on civilian employees who will probably not be available in the time required. Furthermore, they said nothing had been done to resolve the miscellaneous deficiencies described above.

Consequently, we believe it is still questionable whether Camp Roberts can function effectively as a mobilization station.

ARMY EFFORTS TO RESOLVE POSTMOBILIZATION COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS

The Army has been aware of its postmobilization command and control problems since 1975 but has yet to decisively resolve them. The December 1977 Command Relationship Study was expected to finally provide answers to these difficult problems.

The study recommended that the Army retain its present structure and suggested that the problem of transitioning into a mobilization configuration could be resolved by (1) making more effective use of subordinate headquarters and other elements to accomplish mobilization and deployment missions and (2) decentralizing mobilization planning and execution using the CONUSAs as the key headquarters. As noted below, however, Army headquarters either disapproved or deferred many of the study's recommendations--especially those related to the postmobilization role of the CONUSAs and installation instability. As a result, many command

1/Although a new authorization document has not yet been approved, an Army official projected a total reduction of approximately 900 positions.

structure deficiencies remain. The study's recommendations and the Army's May 1978 decisions were as follows. 1/

--Assignment of readiness region and ARCOM headquarters to the CONUSAs upon mobilization. (Approved.)

--Expansion of the CONUSAs' peacetime responsibilities to include:

1. Monitoring logistics and personnel assets. (Approved.)
2. Developing an information system to provide mobilization logistics and personnel status to CONUSAs during peacetime. (Disapproved.)
3. Reviewing and approving Reserve component mobilization plans. (Approved.)
4. Concurring on installation mobilization plans. (Approved.)

--Expansion of the CONUSAs' postmobilization responsibilities to include:

1. Training supervision for mobilized Reserve component units. (Approved.)
2. Certification of a unit's readiness for deployment. (Deferred.)
3. Redistribution of assets available on station to insure fill of early-deploying units. (Deferred.)
4. Operational control over installations in matters pertaining to the readiness and availability of units for deployment. (Deferred.)

1/The Health Services Command was exempted from all approved recommendations.

--Retention and use of State area commands subsequent to full mobilization for the execution of other contingency missions. (Approved.)

--Authority to predesignate personnel for installations' Table of Distribution and Allowances. (Disapproved.)

Later, the Forces Command recommended that the ARCOM headquarters be used in an installation management role following mobilization. Army headquarters has not yet taken action on this recommendation.

CONCLUSIONS

The successful mobilization and deployment of the Army Reserve Forces depends largely on peacetime preparation for such events. Developing effective peacetime and wartime command relationships between Active Army and Reserve component elements, along with sound mobilization planning, are indispensable in peacetime, since time will be a crucial commodity upon mobilization. Army tests have demonstrated that the Army would have difficulty mobilizing and deploying its Reserve Forces effectively. The inability of the peacetime Reserve component organizational structure to move into a mobilization configuration without significant structural modification is a principal contributing factor. Ninety-two Reserve component commands and headquarters, with authorized strengths of over 18,000 personnel, have no specific post-mobilization missions. Identifying and assigning missions to these commands during a full mobilization would contribute to turmoil during the critical early stages.

The lack of clearly defined postmobilization command relationships between Active and Reserve elements--especially between Army installations and the CONUSAs--is another critical factor that would cause confusion during mobilization. Furthermore, active and semiactive installations lack definitive mobilization planning (including who will command the installations, where will necessary installation support personnel and resources come from, and how will needed support for mobilizing units be provided). The lack of facilities, personnel, and mobilization plans at some semi-active installations makes their capability to serve as mobilization stations questionable.

If the Army is to effectively mobilize and deploy the Reserves, it must, in our opinion, (1) reduce the turbulence in changing the peacetime Reserve component structure into a mobilization configuration, (2) clearly define post-mobilization roles and relationships of Active Army and Reserve component command elements, and (3) develop sound plans for executing a full mobilization--particularly at the installation level.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army:

- Define and clarify Active Army and Reserve component elements' roles and command relationships during mobilization--particularly between Army installations and the CONUSAs.
- Review and strengthen active and semiactive installations' plans for operating as mobilization stations upon a full mobilization. The review should include an assessment of and judgment on the capabilities of semiactive installations to serve as mobilization stations.

AGENCY COMMENTS

Army officials agreed with the need to address the problems the above recommendations are directed toward. They commented that these problems were partially addressed in the Army Forces Command's Command Relationship Study. (See p. 162.) Also, the problems are being addressed by the Army Command and Control Study-82 group. (See p. 162.)

CHAPTER 7

THE ARMY'S ORGANIZATION FOR AND MANAGEMENT OF RESERVE

COMPONENT MOBILIZATION PLANNING CAN BE STRENGTHENED

Effective planning to execute mobilization within a viable command structure is imperative to successfully mobilizing the Reserve Forces. However, deficiencies exist in the Army's organizational mechanisms for developing and coordinating mobilization plans and in the plans themselves. Our examination revealed the following major deficiencies.


- The Forces Command's span of mobilization planning responsibilities is overextended and its planning division is understaffed. As a result, its ability to manage and coordinate planning activities is inhibited.
- Many of the requirements necessary to plan and support mobilization have not been identified.
- Installations' mobilization plans are outdated, incomplete or nonexistent.

Recent Army studies and mobilization exercises have also found problems in mobilization planning. Although the Army has taken significant steps to revise its mobilization procedures and guidance, planning problems remain. We believe opportunities exist to improve mobilization planning and the command structure and to thereby improve the Army's capability to mobilize its Reserve components.

ARMY MECHANISMS FOR MOBILIZATION PLANNING

The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff general war plans supporting NATO defense are the driving factor in the Army's mobilization plans. To support NATO and other force requirements, mobilization planning must assess existing Army capabilities, both Active and Reserve component, and gear these capabilities to timephased requirements. Developing and coordinating these plans is a complex process, as illustrated on the following page.

ARMY MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND COORDINATION FLOW CHART



Army headquarters is responsible for providing mobilization policy guidance in accordance with the general war plans. This guidance is provided in the Army Force Mobilization Guidance and the Army Capabilities Plan.

In accordance with Army policy, the Forces Command prepares, coordinates, and publishes the Reserve Component Mobilization Plan which provides general mobilization guidance and instructions to all subordinate elements, the Army National Guard, and the five other major commands. An annex to the plan, the Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan, lists all deploying Reserve component units as well as those non-deploying units assigned mobilization support missions in the United States.

CONUSAs are responsible for preparing and executing plans for mobilizing the Reserve component units within their geographical areas in accordance with the Mobilization Plan. Also, Forces Command installations are assigned the critical and complex task of preparing mobilization plans for expanding their capability to receive, house, train, equip, and support Reserve component units.

Coordinating the Reserve component units', installations', and major commands' mobilization plans is imperative to insure consistent and complete planning throughout the Army. The Forces Command has delegated to the CONUSAs the responsibility to review and approve Army Reserve and Army National Guard mobilization plans and to concur with installation mobilization plans, to insure coordination.

THE FORCES COMMAND'S OVEREXTENDED SPAN OF CONTROL

The Forces Command is the largest operational command in the U.S. Defense system. It directly manages 38 major subordinate commands and five field operating activities. The command's headquarters has 15 functionally oriented staff activities divided into 53 divisions. Practically all of these activities have some degree of mobilization responsibility, and all affect mobilization planning. In addition, the mobilization support provided to the command by the other major commands and the Air Force must be coordinated.

The Command's central coordinating authority for all aspects of mobilization is the Mobilization Planning Division, which prepares, coordinates, and publishes the mobilization plan. The division's other responsibilities include

- recommending additions and deletions of Reserve components' general support forces required to support mobilization,
- preparing and conducting Forces Command mobilization exercises and after action reports,
- reviewing and making recommendations on the revision of Army regulations and other publications which concern mobilization,
- conducting staff and assistance visits to installations concerning mobilization matters,
- assisting command, general staff, and senior service colleges in preparing instruction programs and seminars on mobilization,
- conducting information briefings on mobilization planning to update major Army commands, Army agencies, and subordinate commands, and
- conducting special mobilization studies.

The division's mobilization planning responsibility is carried out by eight professional staff personnel, one of whom is temporary. Division officials said they lack the necessary trained personnel to effectively coordinate mobilization plans and must rely on the various Army elements for guidance and feedback. On a day-to-day basis, the division manages by exception and depends on other activities or mobilization exercises to surface problems.

During mobilization exercises PRIME RATE 75, POLE VAULT 76, and MOBEX 76, the Forces Command's overextended span of control surfaced time and again. MOBEX 76, for example, identified 197 problems adversely affecting the Army's capability to mobilize its Reserve Forces. Forces Command officials said that more than half of these problems were related to a lack of planning coordination. Responding to the MOBEX findings, the December 1977 Command Relationship Study stated that the Forces Command's span of control was greatly overextended for direct management of its forces and activities and that the command must manage by exception, relying on subordinate commands to accomplish its missions and tasks.

Mobilization Planning Division officials said their most difficult responsibility was to channel mobilization guidance through the "almost autonomous" National Guard

Bureau to coordinate mobilization planning with the State and territorial adjutant generals. Division officials said that this autonomy inhibits coordination and feedback. For example, its draft 1975 Reserve Component Mobilization Plan took 11 months to be approved by the National Guard Bureau. After MOBEX 76, the division issued a revised Reserve Component Mobilization Plan on which the Bureau made 40 changes, all applicable to Guard units.

Other examples of the Forces Command's problems in coordinating mobilization planning are discussed below.

Coordinating with the Army Communications Command

Adequate communications are vital to the Army's ability to mobilize geographically widespread Reserve component units. Upon mobilization, the requirements for Army communication systems will immediately surge above peacetime requirements. MOBEX 76 revealed, however, that the communication expansion programs of mobilization stations were inadequate to support mobilization.

Communications augmentation and expansion programs for installations are to be coordinated between the Forces Command and the Communications Command, which is responsible for installing communications during mobilization. MOBEX 76 revealed that Reserve component units designated to operate installation communications systems are being trained by the Forces Command to operate as combat support units. Therefore, these units cannot adequately operate installation communications systems. Expansion of communications at semiactive and State-operated installations was most severely affected by this deficiency.

We found that the Forces Command has made no progress in coordinating communication augmentation with the Communications Command. Of the Reserve components' 24 Signal Corps units scheduled to employ to U.S. installations to support mobilization Active and Reserve component units, 12 are designated to support communications at mobilization stations. The other 12 have no mission. Forces Command officials said that all are needed for installation support due to personnel shortages. However, none of the 24 units has the proper military occupational specialties and equipment to operate installation communication. Coordination between the two commands to determine the requirements necessary to restructure these units has not occurred. Further, the Forces Command's Mobilization Planning Division was unaware of this situation.

Coordinating with the Air Force

Weather support will be required at mobilization stations during mobilization, especially at stations providing aviation support. By joint regulation, the Air Force is responsible for providing weather support to the Army.

MOBEX 76 found that mobilization stations receiving support from the Air Force will lose such support when Air Force weather teams deploy. Although the Army has identified the requirements at these installations, the Air Force has not yet identified the weather support forces or means to meet the requirements. Therefore, weather support at mobilization stations remains inadequate. Again, the Mobilization Planning Division was unaware of this problem.

UNIDENTIFIED SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

Many of the problems surfaced in MOBEX 76 resulted from not identifying the support requirements necessary for the Army to adequately plan and execute mobilization. These requirements are generally provided by installations and include such support as housing, food, clothing, automated data processing, transportation, and communications.

We examined 15 cases of unidentified requirements surfaced in MOBEX 76 and found that 10 remain deficient, as follows:

1. Of 53 mobilization stations, 31 have not identified the number of postal-qualified personnel needed to provide locator service during mobilization.
2. The Army has not identified those semiactive and State-owned installations where troop and unit densities would merit their designation as subordinate readiness reporting commands.
3. Requirements for additional transportation assets and upgrading rail spurs on posts have not been identified.
4. Requirements for additional laundry and dry cleaning capacity necessary to support mobilization stations have not been identified.
5. Requirements for additional troop housing at mobilization stations have not been identified.

6. Requirements for additional Reserve component unit personnel to support installation transportation systems have not been identified.
7. Three mobilization stations have not identified the critical job skills necessary during mobilization.
8. Upon mobilization, installations' automated data processing facilities will be saturated and non-essential systems will suspend processing. These nonessential systems have not been identified.
9. Requirements for outside engineering assistance during mobilization have not been identified.
10. Requirements for Reserve component unit training and equipment to augment and expand installation communications systems have not been identified.

DEFICIENCIES IN INSTALLATIONS'
MOBILIZATION PLANS

Installations' mobilization plans should encompass mobilization stations' abilities to

- receive, house, train, equip, and support mobilization units and
- establish or expand activities to meet mobilization needs.

A station's plan, consisting of a basic plan and required annexes for various functional areas (personnel and administration, logistics, engineering, medical, etc.) should facilitate the station's mobilization mission by (1) defining procedures to be followed, (2) providing guidance to subordinate units, and (3) assigning responsibilities to organizations and staff elements assigned and attached to or supported by the installation during mobilization.

Our examination of the mobilization plans of an Active Army installation and two semiactive, State-operated installations revealed they were outdated, incomplete, or nonexistent. These deficiencies were the result of several factors.

- Many of the mobilization support requirements necessary for proper planning (discussed earlier) had not been identified.

- Emphasis on mobilization planning was lacking.
- The number of mobilization planning personnel was insufficient.
- A closed-loop management system to ensure development of effective plans was lacking.

In some instances, the planning deficiencies that exist today surfaced not only during MOBEX 76 but also during a January 1975 mobilization exercise.

Mobilization planning at Fort Ord

During peacetime, Fort Ord is the home of 20 Active component units, the largest of which is the 7th Infantry Division. Upon mobilization, the scope of the installation's responsibilities will expand significantly. (See p. 83.)

At the time of our review, the Ford Ord mobilization plan was more than 4 years old and had not been revised or updated since it was prepared. During the intervening 4 years, the following changes had occurred.

- The 7th Infantry Division was activated on the post.
- The average authorized strength of deployable Reserve component units mobilizing at the post had increased over 300 percent.
- The time frames for phasing in the installation's training center mission were changed significantly.

All of these changes have had a major impact on Fort Ord's postmobilization support requirements and therefore should have been incorporated in a revised mobilization plan. Although Fort Ord partially drafted a new mobilization plan in February 1978, the draft was missing 14 of the required 18 annexes. 1/ Not included were such annexes as personnel and administration, logistics, medical, and communication and electronics.

1/Fort Ord officials advised us on October 31, 1978, that their draft mobilization plan was nearing completion.

Fort Ord was also missing plans to support its basic mobilization plan. For example, it did not have a plan for (1) allocating billets, mess and maintenance space, and administrative areas to mobilizing units or (2) expanding the installation (to include construction of additional facilities) in support of mobilization.

Mobilization planning at Camp Roberts

Camp Roberts, a State-operated and semiactive installation, is planned to be activated as a mobilization station for 46 Army National Guard units.

Mobilization planning responsibility for Camp Roberts has been transferred back and forth between Fort Ord and the California Army National Guard in recent years. Fort Ord had the responsibility prior to 1976 but did not develop a mobilization plan. Since Fort Ord again assumed responsibility from the Guard in February 1978, it has done nothing to update the plan prepared by the Guard in 1976.

The present Camp Roberts mobilization plan is outdated and incomplete. It is based on the assumption that the installation will become a major training center for new recruits, even though this responsibility has been eliminated. Another serious deficiency concerns the amount and type of support to be provided by Fort Ord. MOBEX 76 demonstrated that Camp Roberts would have a difficult time expanding its peacetime operations sufficiently to accomplish its mobilization station mission. (See p. 84.) The Camp Roberts plan resolves this problem by assuming that Fort Ord will provide initial personnel, medical, logistical, automatic data processing, training aid, communications, and other support, as required.

However, Fort Ord officials doubted that they would be able to provide this support concurrently with their own mission changes and expansion and maintained that the Forces Command should task them to provide any required assistance. In addition, they said this tasking should allow them to increase their personnel authorization. As of June 1978, Fort Ord officials had not identified what, if any, assistance they would provide to Camp Roberts in the event of mobilization.

Mobilization planning at Fort Irwin

Fort Irwin, like Camp Roberts, is operated by the California Army National Guard during peacetime but activated as a Federal mobilization station upon mobilization. Fort

Irwin does not have a mobilization plan, even though it will serve as a mobilization station for 49 units with authorized strengths totaling 13,045 as of May 1978.

Three headquarters share responsibility for the absence of a mobilization plan. Fort McArthur, California, had the mobilization planning responsibility for Fort Irwin until its inactivation in 1975, when the responsibility was transferred to Fort Ord. No mobilization plan existed when Fort Ord assumed the planning responsibility. Likewise, no plan existed when the responsibility was transferred to the California Army Guard in July 1976 or when it was transferred back to Fort Ord in February 1978. Fort Ord had not begun drafting Fort Irwin's plan as of July 1978.

RECENT ARMY ACTIONS

As discussed on page 86, the Army approved certain Command Relationship Study recommendations that would partially alleviate overcentralization of mobilization planning at the Forces Command by expanding the CONUSAs' pre-mobilization responsibilities. However, the study's recommendation to create 96 mobilization staff positions at the CONUSAs and readiness regions was disapproved. Also, review and approval authority for installations' mobilization plans remains the Forces Command's responsibility, even though the CONUSAs have concurrence authority. The command's span of control therefore remains overextended, in our opinion.

On the other hand, significant progress has been made in revising Army headquarters and Forces Command mobilization guidance and procedures. MOBEX 76 found that such guidance and procedures were obsolete, incomplete, and voluminous, as follows:

- The Army Capabilities Plan provided little assistance to most mobilization planners below the department level and was obsolete and incomplete.
- Army Regulation 135-300 contained many obsolete, incomplete, and unnecessary requirements that did not provide a clear guide for essential unit mobilization actions.
- The Reserve Component Mobilization Plan did not provide necessary, detailed procedural guidance and was not distributed below major Reserve component unit levels.

--Other detailed procedures and requirements which apply to units during mobilization were contained in scores of functionally related peacetime-oriented regulations.

The Army revised its regulations effective July 1978 and published the Capabilities Plan in June 1978. Also, the Forces Command published a revised Mobilization Plan in February 1978, even though the Army had not met its milestone for completing its revisions. This plan serves as an interim measure to correct numerous Reserve component mobilization procedural problems identified by MOBEX 76. It is termed a "quick fix" to the previous plan, and the Forces Command acknowledged that it does not provide long-term solutions to many of the more serious mobilization problems. The Forces Command has also drafted the Unit Mobilization Procedures Guide to be distributed to units for use in MOBEX 78.

The Army planned to test its revised plans and procedures in MOBEX 78 and to make additional revisions accordingly. We believe that, if the Army completes its present efforts to revise plans and fine tunes its procedures, Reserve component mobilization capabilities will be enhanced.

CONCLUSIONS

Serious deficiencies exist in the Army's organizational mechanisms for developing mobilization plans, in the plans themselves, in controlling the mobilization planning process, and in the command structure's ability to execute these plans.

Presently, the Forces Command is too involved in detailed mobilization planning and coordination to effectively exercise its proper management functions of providing its subordinates with overall planning guidance and reviewing their planning actions. We believe that the culmination of these problems degrades the Army's ability to effectively and efficiently mobilize its Reserve Forces. We also believe that the problems reflect a general lack of emphasis on mobilization planning relative to training and equipping the units.

The Army has made significant progress in revising mobilization guidance and procedures. However, its weak mobilization planning organization and management structure deficiencies will continue to stifle mobilization planning and execution. As stated in the MOBEX 76 Final Evaluation Report, "Procedural improvements alone will help but not completely solve the overall [mobilization] problem."

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army:

- Strengthen the organization for and management of Reserve component mobilization planning by decentralizing mobilization coordination responsibilities to subordinate command levels and Active Army gaining commands.
- Give the CONUSAs review and approval authority over installations' mobilization plans, and ensure that the CONUSAs and installations have sufficient, qualified personnel to effectively coordinate mobilization planning.
- Strengthen the Forces Command's organization for mobilization planning so that it can exercise overall control of the mobilization planning process.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

The Army commented that this chapter is generally an accurate analysis of the state of mobilization planning. The Army also stated, however, that the chapter failed to bring out the many advancements that have been made since MOBEX 76 and the importance of MOBEX 78 in keeping the issue on the "front burner."

The Army stated that issues discussed in this chapter have been addressed by the Army Forces Command's Command Relationship Study and are being further addressed by Army Command and Control Study-82. In addition, the Army commented that problems in mobilization will be addressed in the Service's Program Objective Memorandum for the period fiscal year 1981-85.

We agree that significant advances have been made in mobilization planning since the completion of MOBEX 76. Further, work done during this review, along with subsequent discussions with Defense Department officials, reinforce the Army's point that mobilization planning is a high priority and topical issue.

We believe the actions outlined by the Army should significantly improve the state of mobilization planning.

CHAPTER 8

DUPLICATION IN THE SEPARATE

ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS' OPERATIONS CAN BE REDUCED

Maintaining separate Army Reserve and Army National Guard components in peacetime has resulted not only in a large and complex management structure to command and service the components but also in duplicative functional activities. Operations are duplicated in such areas as

- financial management,
- logistical support and management,
- recruiting,
- personnel management, and
- maintenance programs.

The Army Reserve generally works with and receives considerable support from the Active Army in the above areas. For example, the Active Army is deeply involved in managing the Army Reserve recruiting program. We were told that the Army Recruiting Command will manage the Reserve recruiting program nationwide by mid-1979. Active Army installations also provide extensive supply support to all Army Reserve units. And Army Reserve units presently depend on the Active Army for most maintenance support above the organizational maintenance level.

Conversely, Army National Guard Forces, in conjunction with the National Guard Bureau, operate and manage these programs at the State level independently of the Active Army and the Army Reserve.

To get an indication of opportunities for greater consolidation, we examined maintenance support programs of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard. We believe there are significant opportunities for improving the efficiency and cost effectiveness of the components' operations through greater interdependence.

THE RESERVE COMPONENTS' MAINTENANCE SUPPORT STRUCTURES

The Army Reserve and Army National Guard have separate support structures for nonaircraft (surface) maintenance.

Army Reserve units are provided organizational maintenance support and a limited amount of direct-level support from area maintenance support activities. In general, however, the units receive both direct- and general-level maintenance support from 31 Active Army installations. (Area maintenance support activities are supervised by the 19 ARCOMs.)

Army National Guard units receive maintenance support, through the general support level, exclusively from State Guard shops. Organizational-level support is provided through organizational maintenance shops. Each State has several of these shops, each of which is structured to support approximately a battalion-size unit. California, for example, has 43. The units receive direct- and general-level support from the 54 combined support maintenance shops in the continental United States. The Army National Guard has additional maintenance support capability in its mobilization and training equipment sites, which are primarily equipment pools located at annual training sites. If collocated with a combined support maintenance shop, the mobilization and training equipment sites have only organizational maintenance capabilities; if not, the sites have both organizational and direct and general support shops.

The Active Army provides depot-level maintenance support to both Reserve components.

DUPLICATIVE CAPABILITIES IN ARMY, ARMY RESERVE, AND ARMY GUARD MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS

The Army has for years known of the costly duplications among Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard maintenance capabilities. The potential for more effective cross-use of these resources has been pointed out in numerous Army reports dating back to at least 1972. For example:

--A 1972 study ^{1/} concluded that a single maintenance and logistical system was needed to serve the Active Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard and indicated that such a system would result in dollar savings and in increased efficiency and equipment readiness.

^{1/}"Alternatives for Improved Army Forces Capabilities," Department of the Army (mid-1972).

--A 1975 study 1/ concluded that there was potential for cost savings through more effective cross-use of Reserve component maintenance capabilities.

--A 1976 report 2/ noted that joint use of Reserve component maintenance facilities could reduce the requirement for shops, of which there are 998, and for technicians, whose annual salaries exceed \$200 million. The report said a unified maintenance support plan, an integrated construction program, and a closer affiliation with Active Army maintenance activities would be in consonance with the Total Force Policy and would improve the use of resources.

--A 1977 study 3/ concluded that the integration of Active Army and Reserve component maintenance and supply resources and the establishment of coordinated areas of responsibilities offer opportunities for significant efficiencies and improved support. The report noted that there are command, funding, and legal considerations and that more extensive use of intraservice support agreements among the Active Army, Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve could serve as an interim measure.

Our 1975 report 4/ on maintenance also cited this problem.

The Logistics Evaluation Agency's 1977 report identified numerous opportunities for increased efficiency and effectiveness, including:

1/"Cross-Utilization of Reserve Component Maintenance Capabilities," Headquarters, Sixth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, California (Mar. 12, 1975).

2/"Reserve Component Technical and Maintenance Programs," (SO77-202) U.S. Army Audit Agency (Nov. 4, 1976).

3/"Improved Maintenance Support Among the Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve," Department of the Army Logistics Evaluation Agency (May 1977).

4/"Productivity of Military Below-Depot Maintenance--Repairs Less Complex Than Provided at Depots--Can Be Improved," (LCD-75-422, July 29, 1975).

- The consolidation of Active Army and Army National Guard maintenance facilities that are currently collocated at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Devens, Massachusetts; Fort Douglas, Utah; Los Angeles, California; New York, New York; and Fort Carson, Colorado.
- The establishment of interservice support agreements between neighboring States to have organizational maintenance shops near State boundaries receive support from a combined support maintenance shop or a mobilization and training equipment site in another State. (Six candidates were identified.)
- The establishment of interservice support agreements between States and Active Army installations to have organizational maintenance shops receive support from Active Army installations. (Twenty candidates were identified.)
- The establishment of intraservice support agreements between Active Army installations and States to have Army Reserve units receive support from either a combined support maintenance shop or a mobilization and training equipment site.

The Agency estimated that the Army would save approximately \$2.59 million 1/ in annual transportation costs if Army Reserve and Guard units received direct and general support maintenance from the nearest activity possessing the capability. It also estimated that 111,000 maintenance technician staff-hours could be diverted from transporting to maintaining equipment. The report recommended that detailed economic analyses be performed before any of these changes are made.

The following examples, extracted from the 1975 Sixth Army study and the 1977 Army Logistics Evaluation study, respectively, illustrate duplicative maintenance capabilities and describe opportunities for greater cross-use of maintenance assets.

1/The Agency indicated that this was a conservative estimate and stated that the potential economies are likely to be considerably greater.

Maintenance support to Army Reserve units
in Utah, Idaho, and Montana

The Active Army's Salt Lake Support Detachment (Utah), a subelement of Fort Carson, Colorado, provides direct and general maintenance support to Army Reserve area maintenance support activities in Salt Lake City, Utah; Ogden, Utah; Pocatello, Idaho; Boise, Idaho; Missoula, Montana; Billings, Montana; and Helena, Montana. The distance of these shops from the Salt Lake Support Detachment ranges from one-fourth mile to 540 miles, and most shops are over 300 miles away.

The Sixth Army study noted that this type of maintenance basing causes costly per diem and travel. Adjacent to the Salt Lake Support Detachment is a new, modern Army Reserve area maintenance support activity capable of expansion. Additionally, the Utah National Guard's combined support maintenance shop (with direct and general support capabilities) is located nearby. According to the study, it would appear difficult to justify retention of these three facilities all within the former bounds of Fort Douglas.

The study provided the following alternative method of providing direct and general support maintenance to the area maintenance support activities.

"The Idaho National Guard's Combined Support Maintenance Shop at Boise and the Montana National Guard's Combined Support Maintenance Shop at Helena have an equal or greater support capability and are more ideally located to support AMSAs [Army Reserve area maintenance support activities] in those States than is the Support Detachment located at Salt Lake City. Relieving Fort Carson of the responsibility to provide DS [direct support] to the Area Maintenance Support Activities identified above and assigning this responsibility to the Army National Guard Utah, Idaho, and Montana respectively, would materially reduce travel cost, improve response time, and permit the interactivation of the Salt Lake Support Detachment activity."

Maintenance support to
Army Guard units in Georgia

The Army Guard's combined support maintenance shop in Georgia is in the northwest corner of the State, and many of the organizational maintenance shops are a considerable distance away. The capability of the Guard's mobilization and training equipment site at Fort Stewart, Georgia, can

be increased by transferring personnel from the combined support maintenance shop to the mobilization and training equipment site. If this were done, the Guard's organizational maintenance shops at Savannah, Hinesville, Statesboro, and Brunswick could be supported by the equipment site at an annual savings of \$136,000. Additionally an intraservice support agreement could be negotiated to have Fort Benning support the Columbus organizational maintenance shop and Fort Gordon support the Augusta organizational maintenance shop, at an annual savings of \$34,000. This would reduce the Georgia Army National Guard's maintenance transportation costs from \$337,000 to \$167,000 a year.

FACTORS INHIBITING INTEGRATION OF MAINTENANCE CAPABILITIES

Despite its awareness of redundant maintenance capabilities, the Army has not acted decisively to resolve the problem. The Army Reserve and Guard continue to receive maintenance support from separate maintenance structures, and little, if any, improvement has been made in the cross use of Army Reserve, Guard, and Active component maintenance capabilities. As of September 1978, the Army was still making the economic analyses recommended by the Logistics Evaluation Agency. According to Forces Command and National Guard Bureau officials, no changes in the components' maintenance systems had been made as of that date.

The Army's lack of progress to date has several underlying causes. Under current funding procedures, for example, maintenance technician personnel levels are based on the equipment density supported by a given maintenance facility. That is, if the Army Guard accepted a maintenance workload from the Army Reserve, the Army Reserve would have to transfer the maintenance responsibility to the Guard activity on a full-time basis, the increased equipment density would be converted into technician staff year equivalents, the positions would be funded at the Guard's average rate and the Army Reserve would reimburse the Guard for the appropriate share of overhead.

According to a Sixth Army official, this funding procedure is generally not cost effective for the supported unit. For example, one intraservice support agreement with a southwestern State cost \$33,000 for 2.3 staff-years and 29 percent of overhead. Vehicle work orders were accomplished

under this agreement at the rate of approximately \$27.50 an hour, compared with an average of \$8.50 an hour at a typical active installation. 1/

The 1977 Logistics Evaluation Agency report cited congressionally imposed personnel ceilings as another factor inhibiting the more extensive use of intraservice support agreements. The Reserve components' constraints are softened by procedures to redistribute dollars from one component to another to pay for services rendered. For instance, the Active Army can reimburse the Guard for maintaining Active Army equipment. However, personnel spaces cannot be transferred in order for the Guard to do the maintenance. Consequently, provisions must be legislated to authorize supplemental technicians to do the additional workloads called for in intraservice support agreements. 1/

The Army Audit Agency's 1976 report cited a third factor inhibiting greater integration of the Army components' maintenance capabilities, as follows:

"Although a need for a single logistical system within the Army was recognized, we found that an inherent feeling existed among State and ARCOM commanders to be self sustaining. The reluctance of both the Army Reserve and the Army Guard to use the others' facilities as well as the Active maintenance shops created duplicative maintenance capabilities."

An analysis of the above problem areas, sufficiently detailed to develop recommendations for solving each, was outside the scope of this review. Our work indicated, however, that the funding and personnel problems are undoubtedly inhibiting factors to effective integration of Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army Guard maintenance capabilities. On the other hand, reluctance by the Reserve components to use each other's and the Active's maintenance capabilities should not be an inhibiting factor.

CONCLUSIONS

Numerous functional activities are duplicated between the Army's Reserve components. Whereas the Army Reserve relies largely on the Active Army for support in such areas

1/This example was extracted from Sixth Army's 1975 study.

as recruiting, supply support, and maintenance, the Army Guard is much more autonomous and has many essentially separate activities.

Significant opportunities exist for cross-using the Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army Guard components' ground maintenance capabilities. If the Reserve components obtained maintenance from the nearest available activities, more efficient and cost-effective maintenance operations would result. In our opinion, the total cost of maintenance to the Army should be the determining factor in cross-using the components' maintenance capabilities. Furthermore, if the problem were approached from the total Army standpoint, the inhibitors mentioned above would largely disappear.

Although the Army has been aware of duplicative maintenance capabilities among its components for several years, it has not yet taken definitive actions to integrate capabilities.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense institute the policy that the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve should seek direct- and general-level maintenance support from the nearest appropriate Active Army or Army Guard facility.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

The Department of Defense acknowledged the need for improved maintenance support among and between Army components, but indicated that the Army was taking action to rectify the situation. For support, it provided several examples of implemented actions.

While we agree that some improvements have been made in this area, we believe these improvements are minor when compared to the magnitude of the problem.

More importantly, we believe the Army must address the, as yet, unresolved problems noted in our report before it can achieve any significant improvements in the future. This is especially true of the parochialism problem which, in our opinion, is the primary reason for the general lack of progress to date.

CHAPTER 9

ALTERNATIVES EXIST TO IMPROVE THE RESERVE COMPONENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

Previous chapters of this report demonstrate clearly, we believe, the need for changes in the Army Reserve component management structure. The structure has overlapping capabilities and duplications in command functions. Dissimilarities between peacetime and wartime command arrangements result in a structure incapable of transitioning smoothly during mobilization and of effectively commanding and controlling mobilizing units and coordinating installation support. Finally, the mobilization planning organization is unable to effectively coordinate and routinely monitor and evaluate planning activities during peacetime.

We believe that viable alternatives exist to create a command structure capable of carrying out the Army's mobilization mission. Alternatives being considered by the Army and others that should be considered are presented below.

FORCES COMMAND ALTERNATIVES TO RESERVE COMPONENT MANAGEMENT

In January 1978, Army headquarters directed the Forces Command to study alternatives for correcting deficiencies in the Reserve component management structure, including alternatives for reducing military and civilian personnel by 1,269 in fiscal years 1979 and 1980. (See p. 20.) The Forces Command's study was submitted to Army headquarters on April 12, 1978.

Options considered and recommended alternative

The Forces Command's study addressed three fundamental options.

- A proportional reduction of personnel in each headquarters, retaining the existing structure.
- The elimination of one or more Reserve component management echelons.
- Some integration of the Active and Reserve structures at the CONUSA and corps level and/or at the installation and readiness region level.

During our review, we also learned that the study had given some consideration to merging the Army Reserve into the Army National Guard.

The command recommended that the present structure be retained but modified to improve it by:

- Eliminating the perceived layering by eliminating the nine readiness regions, transferring about 63 personnel spaces to form nine offices of the chief of training and mobilization, and creating nine subordinate training and mobilization support groups. The offices would be CONUSA staff extensions at the former readiness region duty stations.
- Assigning postmobilization missions to the newly created offices of training and mobilization and the 19 ARCOMs. The offices would become CONUSA subordinate commands over mobilizing units, and the ARCOMs would assume garrison support missions to command predesignated installations.
- Decentralizing mobilization planning responsibilities to the training and mobilization support groups and thereby relieving the Forces Command of its over extended planning responsibilities.
- Eliminating at least 60 percent of the maintenance assistance and instruction teams (parts of the readiness regions' readiness groups) determined to be unnecessary.
- Creating a third Army corps in the continental United States to assume operational control of Active division and brigade forces in the Sixth Army area and thereby reducing the Forces Command's span of control.

The resource impact of the recommendations is summarized on the following page.

	<u>Personnel</u>		
	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Eliminate readiness regions	(319)	(94)	(413)
Eliminate 60% of maintenance assistance teams	(126)	(137)	(263)
Subtotal	<u>(445)</u>	<u>(231)</u>	<u>(676)</u>
Create training and mobilization offices	54	9	63
Create training and mobilization support groups	171	27	198
Create another Army corps	<u>84</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>84</u>
Subtotal	<u>309</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>345</u>
Net personnel reductions	<u>(136)</u>	<u>(195)</u>	<u>(331)</u>

	<u>Cost</u>
Readiness region reorganization	\$1,465,000
Army corps	254,000
ARCOM reorganization	<u>Minimal</u>
Total	<u>\$1,719,000</u>

Forces Command rationale

The Forces Command rejected proportional reductions in personnel and integration of the Active and Reserve structure. Officials believe that, although proportional reductions would satisfy the mandated 1,269 personnel reduction, they would severely degrade management capabilities because personnel would be reduced without a corresponding reduction in workload. And the option failed to address any of the structural problems.

Integration in any form was opposed by the command based on Active component commanders' overextended span of control. The overextension results from differences in the two components' missions; Active component units generally have missions to deploy on short notice, while Reserve component units must first mobilize and then deploy later. The importance of Active units' immediate deployment capability

relegates the Reserve component units to a "second class" status. Prior to the 1973 STEADFAST reorganization, Active and Reserve component management was fully integrated and Reserve matters often received less attention. Therefore, the Forces Command opposed integration because it would reduce emphasis on the Reserve components as a viable portion of the total Army.

During the study, the advantages of merging the Army Reserve into the Guard were discussed, as follows:

- The Army Guard is more community-based than the Army Reserve. As a result, recruiting and retention would be enhanced.
- The Army Guard has an important peacetime mission of disaster relief and controlling civil disturbances, The Army Reserve cannot be used for these purposes.
- Command and control problems are less with the Guard. However, the Guard contains combat units which have strong internal command and control structures, while the Reserve has mostly detachment-size units with little or no internal command and control structures.

In addition to these factors, Forces Command officials believe a merger would emphasize the State boundaries rather than the little-known ARCOM boundaries. If the United States were attacked, confusion would run rampant among the general population, so the well-known State boundaries would be more useful. However, the command did not explore the details of merging the Reserve into the Guard. The idea had been proposed in the past with no success due to congressional resistance, and future success was considered unlikely.

Forces Command officials believed that the present Reserve component management structure is the most advantageous and that their proposal provides evolutionary changes that are sound, practical, and progressive--a logical follow-on to the Command Relationship Study.

Advantages and disadvantages

The Forces Command's proposal adequately solves one of the problems identified in the Reserve component management structure but only partially solves the others.

The proposal would resolve the problem of Army commands not having postmobilization missions by using the nine offices of training and mobilization as CONUSA subordinate commands over mobilizing Reserve component units and by giving the 19 ARCOMs postmobilization missions.

As discussed in chapter 7, the Forces Command's mobilization planning responsibilities are overcentralized, which inhibits planning and planning coordination. The proposal recommends decentralizing these planning responsibilities by assigning them to the offices of training and mobilization and their subordinate training and support groups. However, this proposal does not go as far as the Command Relationship Study, which recommended 96 similar positions for the CONUSAs and readiness regions.

As discussed in chapter 3, we believe the present Reserve component management structure contains duplications in command responsibilities among the CONUSAs, readiness regions, and ARCOMs. The Forces Command's proposal would only somewhat lessen the impact of this problem by a net personnel reduction of 152 from the present 413 positions in the readiness regions. The proposal would also add mobilization planning responsibilities to the offices.

Further, the proposal would only partially address the directed 1,269 reduction in management personnel by eliminating 321 positions.

Finally, the recommendation to retain the present Reserve component management structure perpetuates the dissimilarities between peacetime and wartime command arrangements, as discussed in chapter 6. Command officials maintain that dissimilarities are necessary to obtain the different objectives of a peacetime and a wartime Army. They contend that during peacetime the Reserve Component management structure must be designed to minimize costs while providing adequate training and that the cost objective is eliminated upon mobilization, when rapid mobilization and deployment are the primary considerations. The officials stated that the structure must change to reflect the changing objectives.

GAO ALTERNATIVES

Although the Forces Command's proposal is, in our opinion, a viable alternative to the Army's Reserve component command structure, there are other, perhaps more viable,

options available. Defense and the Army should carefully consider the alternatives presented in this report, along with any others available, then choose and implement the best of them.

Consolidated Army Reserve Component Headquarters

We believe a viable alternative to the present management structure is the consolidation of Army Reserve management and command headquarters below the numbered Army level. Coupled with our recommendations to (1) reduce the number of nonsupportable Reserve component units, (2) eliminate unnecessary units, and (3) expand the Army's Affiliation Program, such a consolidation would significantly streamline the Army's Reserve components, improve management of the forces, and bring the structure more into line with its wartime configuration.

Chapter 3 noted the functional duplications between the nine readiness region headquarters and their subordinate readiness groups and advisors and between the headquarters' functions and the CONUSAs' capabilities in the training and readiness evaluation areas. The chapter also noted that the 19 ARCOMs were neither staffed for nor capable of providing effective command and control, especially in the area of training, over their assigned units.

We believe the Army's Reserve component management structure would be improved if the nine readiness region headquarters and the 19 ARCOMs were eliminated and if their responsibilities for Army Reserve units were absorbed by 10 consolidated command headquarters. The new headquarters' geographic areas would equate to those of the nine existing readiness regions, with the addition of one headquarters in the western United States for geographic span-of-control reasons. The 10 new headquarters would be located on Active Army installations so that they could function as installation headquarters upon deployment of the installations' Active Army tenant units during a full mobilization.

Under this structure, the new headquarters would be in the Army Reserve chain of command, reporting directly to their respective CONUSAs. The new headquarters would assume the ARCOMs' command and control responsibilities over those Army Reserve units not commanded by the functionally oriented MUSARCs. (The MUSARCs would continue to report to their respective CONUSAs.)

Staffing the consolidated headquarters

The 10 new headquarters would be staffed by a combination of Active Army and Army Reserve personnel, under the command of the Active Army major generals currently commanding the readiness regions. The headquarters' staffs would be drawn from the current staffs of the readiness region headquarters, the ARCOMs, and the Active Army advisors to the ARCOM headquarters. This would allow continuity in the existing expertise of ARCOM personnel, as well as the development of functionally oriented headquarters staffs for the variety of units in the headquarters' geographic areas. (The readiness region headquarters' coordinators and the ARCOM advisors are branch-oriented personnel.)

The Active Army personnel currently assigned as advisors to the major units subordinate to the ARCOMs would remain with but be assigned to their units in key job slots, such as executive officers. They would be evaluated by the unit commanders, and their evaluations would be endorsed by the new headquarters' commanders.

Readiness group responsibilities

The new headquarters' units would continue to receive technical assistance from the readiness groups, except for those units affiliated with Active Army units. Affiliated units should receive much less support from the readiness groups than nonaffiliated units.

The readiness groups, currently under the command of the readiness region headquarters, would be placed under the command of the CONUSAs' training branches. The groups would continue to assist both Army Reserve and Army National Guard units.

Commanding the Active Army advisors

Advisors to the MUSARCs and their major subordinate units would be assimilated into their respective units and evaluated by the MUSARC commanders. The advisors' evaluations would be endorsed by the CONUSA deputy commanders.

Advisors to Army National Guard units would remain with Army Guard Forces and would report to the Senior advisors at the State Guard headquarters. However, the senior Guard advisors would report to the appropriate CONUSA offices, rather than to the readiness region headquarters as is currently done.

Reassigning the remaining ARCOM personnel

Those ARCOM personnel remaining after the 10 new headquarters are staffed could form garrison units for Army installations that would become mobilization stations for Reserve component units. In its proposal for modifying the current management structure, the Forces Command identified unfilled requirements for installation garrison units and proposed assigning this mission to the ARCOMs.

Advantages and disadvantages

This alternative has several advantages over the current Reserve component management structure in that it:

- Streamlines the Army Reserve component management structure.
- Eliminates duplication between the readiness region headquarters' functions and those of the CONUSAs, readiness groups, and advisors.
- Strengthens command and control over Army Reserve units by establishing headquarters with greater branch expertise in the missions of their subordinate units.
- Reduces by 18 the number of headquarters and commands. (All 18 have no identified postmobilization mission.)
- Provides resources to satisfy presently unfilled requirements for installation garrison units.

Also, the 9 readiness region headquarters had combined authorized strengths of 413 as of December 1977, and the 19 ARCOMs' authorized strengths were 2,652--a total of 3,065. Although we did not compute the staffing requirements for the 10 new headquarters, we believe their authorized strengths would be substantially less than 3,065.

There are disadvantages to this alternative, but we believe they are minor when compared with the advantages. The disadvantages are that (1) the new headquarters' geographic spans of control would be somewhat expanded from the present ARCOM boundaries and (2) the CONUSAs' responsibilities would be somewhat expanded by assuming command of the readiness groups and the advisors to Army

National Guard Forces. The latter disadvantage is mitigated somewhat, however, by the fact that the readiness groups and advisors are stationed near or with the units and headquarters they advise and operate fairly autonomously. Thus, day-to-day command responsibilities over these personnel should be lessened.

OPTIONS CONSIDERED IN THE PAST

Numerous options for streamlining the Army and Air Force Reserve component management structures have been proposed or studied in the past. Among these are (1) the merger of the Army Reserve into the Army National Guard, and (2) merger of the Air National Guard into the Air Force Reserve. The circumstances under which these options were proposed or studied, and the outcomes, are discussed below.

Merger of the Army Reserve Into the Army National Guard

On December 12, 1964, the then Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, announced his intention to realign the Army Reserve components by merging the Army Reserve into the Army National Guard. The action was designed, according to Mr. McNamara, to bring the Army's Reserve component structure into balance with contingency war plans and the related equipment program. The Secretary said that in addition to producing increased combat readiness on the part of the remaining units under the realignment plan, it would also streamline the management structure--while saving about \$150 million per year.

The following are excerpts 1/ from the text of Secretary McNamara's December 12, 1964, news conference, at which he announced the proposal.

1/Merger of the Army Reserve Components. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 2 of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 89:1 (March, April, August, and September 1965) pp. 3573-3577.

Secretary McNAMARA.

* * * I have today instructed the Secretary of the Army to prepare plans to realign the Army's Reserve and Guard structure. The primary objective of the realignment is to improve the combat readiness of those forces. In addition, it will bring the structure of the Reserve forces into balance with the contingency war plans and the related equipment program. Furthermore, it will streamline the management of the Reserve organizations and it will result in cost savings approximating \$150 million per year. The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army will develop the program with the advice and assistance of their advisory committees including the Section 5 Committee, the Reserve forces policy board and the senior officials of the Reserve and Guard organizations.

Under the Army's concept the force structure will consist exclusively of units for which there is a clear military requirement. It will require a paid drill strength of approximately 550,000 men, 150,000 men less than the current strength. Five independent brigades will be added to the 11 currently in the force, making a total of 16.

The entire force will be included in the structure for which equipment is purchased and authorized. As a result, equipment will be authorized for two additional divisions and five additional brigades. The unit structure of the Guard and Reserve will be merged under the management of the National Guard. The Army Reserve will consist entirely of individuals rather than units and it will provide individual trainees for summer training and upon mobilization. The individual trainee program will be increased to the extent that improved operational readiness justifies the additional cost.

Question. Can you tell us how this plan would work * * *.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. * * * We will eliminate all of the units in the Reserve. Such of these units as have a clear military requirement and as desire to do so will be transferred to the Guard.

QUESTION. As units

Secretary McNAMARA. As units. This depends, of course, on the willingness of the Reserve unit to transfer and the willingness of the Guard in that particular State to accept that particular unit.

QUESTION. Mr. Secretary, explain that point. How could they be willing or unwilling? Don't you order them to do it?

Secretary McNAMARA. We can't order a Reserve unit to transfer to the Guard organization. It is perfectly clear that the Guard with 400,000 men at the present time can expand to the 550,000 total.

QUESTION. Does this mean then that there will be no more Reserve? Is that what you are saying?

Secretary McNAMARA. It means there will be no more units in the Reserve. There will be individuals serving in the Reserve who will participate in summer training and who will function as individual trainees to be called to fill out these units which have a strength as you see of less than 100 percent in the event of a national emergency.

QUESTION. But as an organization the Reserve will cease to exist?

Secretary McNAMARA. The Reserve as an organization will continue to exist but its units will cease to exist.

QUESTION. Does this have any effect on the administrative, you know, overhead, like corps or anything like that?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. That is one of the reasons we are establishing only one organization in the realigned structure in the place of the two we have at the present time. There is a duplicate administrative organization, 14 corps, for example, in the Reserve or associated with the Reserve, duplicate the administrative structure of the Guard and those will be eliminated.

QUESTION. How many of them, all of them?

Secretary McNAMARA. I believe all of them will be eliminated.

Many Members of Congress expressed serious reservations with the proposal and challenged the authority of the Secretary of Defense to effect implementation of the plan without first obtaining specific Congressional approval. Accordingly, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee directed a comprehensive inquiry into the proposed merger. After exhaustive hearings, the proposal was abandoned.

IS SIMULTANEOUS MERGER OF THE
ARMY RESERVE INTO THE ARMY GUARD
AND THE AIR GUARD INTO THE AIR
FORCE RESERVE A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE?

While considerable attention and study have been given to proposals for merging individual services' Reserve components, we found no evidence that the simultaneous merger of the Army Reserve into the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard into the Air Force Reserve has been seriously considered. We believe the advantages of such a merger are significant enough that it should be given careful consideration in any subsequent reorganization of the Reserve components' management structures. Several factors that we believe support this alternative's consideration follow.

Merger of the Army Reserve into
the Army National Guard

Since Defense Secretary McNamara's proposal to merge the Army's Reserve components, the Army has conducted a major reorganization. The Army Reserve component management structure is now a large and complex combination of Active Army and Army Reserve commands, the National Guard Bureau, and 53 State and territorial Guard headquarters. This structure, exclusive of Army headquarters, consists of over 24,000 authorized personnel whose missions are to provide command and control over, and to deliver needed assistance to Reserve component units.

Under the Constitution, States and territories are entitled to maintain Guard Forces during peacetime. They have established nearly autonomous headquarters, commanded by Adjutants General under their respective Governors, to command and control their respective units. Army Guard units collectively total 3,300 and comprise a wide array of skills and capabilities.

Because of the existence of two separate Reserve components and the peacetime autonomy of State Guard Forces, the Army had to develop a separate structure to command and control the Army Reserve's 3,350 diverse and geographically dispersed units.

Because both components share the same geographic dispersion and contain a wide variety of units, we believe the State Guard organizations could absorb and provide the same command and control over Army Reserve units that they do their own. A more streamlined structure and more effective equivalent to the Army's envisioned wartime alignment would result.

With a single, consolidated Reserve component, there would be continued roles, equivalent to their current responsibilities toward the Guard Forces, for the Forces Command; the CONUSAs; and, depending on the amount of assistance Active units provide through the Affiliation Program, the readiness groups and advisors. The merger would, however, eliminate (1) the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, (2) nine Army readiness region headquarters, and (3) 19 ARCOMs. These headquarters have a combined authorized strength of 3,176 personnel, but none have a postmobilization mission.

With the three CONUSAs relieved of their command and control over Army Reserve units, they could more effectively concentrate on providing necessary training assistance, unit readiness evaluations, and mobilization and deployment planning--including more effective and better coordinated installation mobilization plans. Further, we believe there would be more effective intermediate-level command and control, now provided by the ARCOMs and MUSARCs, over what are now Army Reserve units.

Army studies showed, and our review substantiated, that the 19 geographically oriented ARCOMs are neither organized nor staffed to provide effective command and control--particularly concerning training--over the wide variety of geographically dispersed units. Army officials informed us that an important ingredient to effective command is geographic proximity with subordinate units. Replacing ARCOMs with the 53 State and territorial Guard headquarters would, therefore, greatly reduce the distances between the units and their command and control headquarters. (With the merger, the MUSARCs could continue to command similar subordinate units in their respective States while lending their functional expertise to similar units in other States.)

This reorganization would also eliminate many duplicative functions and programs that currently exist between the two components. (See ch. 8.) These areas include budgeting, logistics, maintenance support, personnel management, and recruiting.

Merger of the Air National Guard Into the Air Force Reserve

Chapter 10 points out the success of the Air Force and its Reserve components in integrating forces, and in developing ready, rapid, and effective mobilization and deployment capabilities in the Reserve components. Obviously, the current Air Reserve component organizational structure has been a success. Why, then, merge two Reserve components that have effectively discharged their responsibilities? Would not such a merger have serious disadvantages? How would a merger of the Air Reserve components improve the Army's Reserves? All are valid questions, which are answered below.

First, as effective as the Air Reserve management structures are, we believe their merger could better use existing resources and capabilities. Second, we believe that though there are disadvantages, significant advantages also exist. And third, we believe that a National Guard consisting only of Army Forces would be more effective than one consisting of two Reserve components of different services.

Appendix IV is an excerpt of the Defense Department's January 1975, report in which the advantages and disadvantages of merging the Air National Guard into the Air Force Reserve are discussed.

Advantages, Disadvantages, and Dollar Savings Attributable to a Simultaneous Merger

We did not do an indepth analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the above described merger nor did we compute the dollar savings that would accrue from such a merger. However, in a November 30, 1978 letter to the Secretary of Defense, we requested the Department's views on the advantages and disadvantages of this merger and an estimate of dollar savings.

In response to our request, Defense officials stated "We believe that continued discussion of a merger of the National Guard and or Air Force Reserve is fruitless." They also said that too many variables were involved to provide cost estimates. Army officials stated that they did not address the issue because of (1) the extensive data required to provide dollar savings, (2) previous studies made in this area, (3) the potentially disruptive nature of such a study proposal, and (4) the limited time available for Army Staff review. Air Force officials reiterated their position that the merger is neither cost effective nor feasible. In their opinion, the merger would not enhance readiness or increase security. They stated that they could not, therefore, support any proposals that they believe "would work to the detriment of the National defense." (Appendix V contains the full text of the Defense, Army, and Air Force officials' comments on this subject.)

Defense, Army, and Air Force comments did not adequately address the advantages, disadvantages, and dollar savings that might result from the merger discussed in this chapter. While we recognize that such a merger has disadvantages, we believe that it also has significant advantages. Accordingly, we believe this merger should receive further consideration as an alternative to the present structure.

CONCLUSIONS

The Army Reserve component management structure contains duplications, inefficiencies, and dissimilarities between peacetime and wartime configurations. Substantial streamlining, improved efficiency, and operational economies would result from altering the structure to reduce or eliminate these deficiencies. Several viable alternatives exist. As recommended on page 49, the Secretary of Defense should streamline the management structure, considering the recommendations and alternatives discussed in this report.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND
OUR EVALUATION

Defense commented that the Army Command and Control Study-82 is addressing the major problems outlined by this report. Defense stated that with the study group's recommendations due to the Army Chief of Staff in August 1979, major structuring actions prior to that time are considered premature. We believe the study group's August 1979 milestone for developing its recommendations allows sufficient time for considering the alternatives discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER 10

THE AIR RESERVE FORCES COULD BE FURTHER INTEGRATED WITH THE ACTIVE AIR FORCE

The Total Force Policy is based on a concept of fully integrated Active and Reserve Forces to form a homogeneous whole. The Air Force has progressed much further than the Army in integrating its Active and Reserve Forces, as evidenced by:

- Air Reserve units routinely fly Active Air Force missions, such as cargo transport and U.S. air defense flights.
- A spirited gaining command concept is applied, whereby Active Air Force commands regularly advise, assist, and evaluate Reserve and Guard units in readying them for mobilization and augmentation responsibilities.
- Eighty-four percent of Reserve flying units and 87 percent of reporting nonflying units were rated at acceptable readiness levels.
- The Air Reserve Forces are capable of fully deploying within 72 hours of mobilization notice.

In fact, Air Force officials commented that the Total Force Policy concept had existed among the Air Force and its Reserve components before the policy was implemented in August, 1970.

The Air Force gaining command concept and the Air Force Associate Program--in which Air Reserve units serve side-by-side with Active Military Airlift Command units in flying and maintaining Active Air Force equipment--have been particularly effective in integrating the Air Reserve components with the Active Force. These concepts have allowed the Air Force to develop a streamlined Air Reserve Force command structure with a minimal number of command layers and overhead personnel.

The Air Force Associate Program, presently used only in the Military Airlift Command, has been praised as a success by the Congress, the Defense Manpower Commission, and Air Force and Reserve officials. The Defense Manpower Commission Report, dated April 1976, stated that the program had proved to be a success and had inherent economic and operational advantages. The Commission concluded:


"The Air Force Associate Program should be expanded to include other missions. It would be possible to associate reservists directly with active-duty tactical fighter or reconnaissance squadrons to provide a portion of the wartime surge capability that is required. The Tactical Air Command could thereby reduce its requirements for increased active force manning."

We agree that opportunities exist for expanding the Associate Program in Active Air Force commands other than the Military Airlift Command, to improve both the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard.


READINESS OF THE AIR RESERVE FORCES

The Air Reserve Forces, representing 14 percent of total Air Force personnel, are organized around 144 flying units, with 1,330 nonflying units supporting them. The distribution of the flying units among the major Air Force commands is shown below to illustrate the large numbers of Air Force Reserve units with airlift missions and the large number of Air National Guard units with combat missions.


RESERVE FORCE FLYING UNITS



AIR NATIONAL GUARD



AIR FORCE RESERVE



TOTAL

KEY:

- MAC: MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND
- TAC: TACTICAL AIR COMMAND
- SAC: STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
- ADC: AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
- PACAF: PACIFIC AIR FORCE

The readiness of the flying units is shown in the following chart. (See p. 22 for a definition of C-ratings.) Ninety-two percent of the rated Air Force Reserve units are rated marginally ready or above, and 82 percent of the rated Air National Guard units have attained those levels.

Readiness as of October 1977

<u>Flying units</u>	<u>C-1</u>	<u>C-2</u>	<u>C-3</u>	<u>ready</u>	<u>C-4</u>	<u>Not rated</u>
Air Force Reserve	6	13	29	48	4	a/ 1
Air National Guard	<u>34</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>b/ 2</u>
Total	<u>40</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>121</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>3</u>

a/A unit at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, is not rated because it is a noncombat unit.

b/Two tactical training schools in McConnell, Kansas, and Tucson, Arizona, are not required to be rated.

The Air Reserve Forces have 764 nonflying units which do not report a C-rating; 159 are medical units which receive readiness inspections by the Air Force Inspector General; and the remaining 605 are evaluated for readiness during operational readiness or other inspections. The Air Reserve Forces are in the process of taking steps so that eventually all units will report their readiness status.

The following table shows the C-ratings of reporting Air Reserve Force nonflying units.

Readiness as of October 1977

<u>Nonflying units</u>	<u>C-1</u>	<u>C-2</u>	<u>C-3</u>	<u>ready</u>	<u>C-4</u>	<u>Not rated</u>
Electronic installation	3	13	3	19	-	-
Combat Communication	8	23	11	42	3	8
Tactical control	2	16	17	35	14	3
Weather	21	10	4	35	4	-
Civil Engineering	24	31	25	80	13	-
Communication (support)	23	33	14	70	8	2
Miscellaneous	<u>5</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>
Total	<u>86</u>	<u>133</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>298</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>13</u>

THE AIR FORCE GAINING COMMAND CONCEPT

Air Force gaining commands provide assistance to the Reserve components that would otherwise have to be provided by expanding the Reserve component command structure.

A "gaining command" is defined as a major command to which units of the Air Reserve Forces are assigned for mobilization and augmentation purposes. Although gaining commands have no direct authority over the Reserve Forces in peacetime (see the organization charts on p. 7), they closely monitor Reserve component units' day-to-day activities. Training and inspections, as discussed below, are the most important aspects of gaining command-Reserve Force relationships. (Others include planning, logistics, and safety.)

--Training: Gaining commands are responsible for establishing Reserve Force units' training standards, setting objectives, and providing training publications and special assistance. Individual units, however, carry out the required training on drill weekends and during the 2 weeks of annual active duty training. We were informed that extra drills are scheduled for aircrews to meet the number of flying hours required by the gaining commands.

Advisors assigned to the units assist in monitoring training to make sure unit commanders meet the requirements.

--Inspections: Using the same inspection criteria that Active units use, gaining commands make operational readiness inspections and management effectiveness inspections of Reserve Force units. The readiness inspections evaluate every aspect of a unit's capability to meet wartime tasking, including the effectiveness of all direct mission support areas. The management effectiveness inspections, which all Air Reserve Force units receive periodically, evaluate day-to-day compliance with administrative procedures. Although Air National Guard State staffs are not gained by one particular command, they are inspected by the gaining command which has responsibility for the closest Air National Guard unit.

Units found to have deficiencies during inspections must take corrective actions approved by their training commands. In addition, the gaining commands assist units in taking the appropriate actions.

Continuity is provided to the gaining command concept by Air Force advisors assigned at wing and group levels by the gaining commands. Advisors serve as extensions of the gaining command and facilitate communication between Reserve and Active Force units. As of January, 1979, there were a total of 735 advisors assigned to the various Reserve Force units by the Air Force gaining commands.

We believe the Air Force gaining command concept is a highly beneficial program, accomplishing a high degree of integration between Active and Reserve Forces in the spirit of the Total Force. Another program offering similar benefits is the Associate Program.

AIR FORCE ASSOCIATE PROGRAM

Designed specifically for the strategic airlift mission and solely within the Air Force Reserve, the Associate Program grew from a single flying unit in 1968 to its present 18 flying units in 1974. With approximately 20 percent of its present strength assigned to associate units (see app. I), the Air Force Reserve allocated \$65.8 million, or 11.4 percent of its fiscal year 1978 budget, to the Associate Program.

Each associated unit is housed at an Active Military Airlift Command installation where reservists and full-time active duty people--side by side--fly and maintain the same equipment. Using the command's C-5As, C-9s, and C-14ls, Reserve units perform active airlift missions as a byproduct of peacetime training. When fully mobilized, they will provide the Military Airlift Command nearly 50 percent of its total authorized aircrews and about 40 percent of its maintenance force.

The program has the following economical and operational advantages.

- Air Force Reserve units are trained on first-line operational Air Force equipment.
- Air Force Reserve units have a smaller overhead structure and do not require funding for provision or maintenance of additional equipment.
- Air Force Reserve units are productive in both peacetime and wartime.
- The Air Force maintains a needed capability at lower peacetime cost.

Although we did not conduct indepth costs/benefits analyses during this review, we believe cost benefits of involving the Air Reserve Forces in peacetime Active Air Force missions are significant. Operating costs of Reserve units, on the average, are 60 to 75 percent of those of comparable Active units. The Defense Manpower Commission analyzed the relative costs of an A-7D squadron for the Air Force and the estimated costs of such a unit for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve if it were operated in the Air Reserve components. The Commission found that annual unit operating costs in fiscal year 1976 dollars were \$21.2 million for the Air Force, and would have been \$11.0 million and \$10.1 million for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, respectively. (See app. III for a detailed table.)

Air Force officials did not agree with the above cost savings. They pointed out that the 60 to 75 percent figure is based on estimated savings for Capital Equipment, plus 10 years of Annual Operating Costs rather than on annual

operating costs. They also questioned the sharp difference between the Active and Reserve components in Equipment and Facilities Related Annual Costs, as shown in app. III, but stated that they were unable to verify their opinion. In lieu of evidence to the contrary and considering the prestige of the Defense Manpower Commission, we believe the above figures remain valid indicators of cost savings.

Air Force Reserve officials attribute the success of the Associate Program to

- working side-by-side with Active Air Force personnel in flying, maintaining, and supporting first-line aircraft,
- continued management of Reserve personnel by Reserve personnel, and
- continued identity of Reserve units as Reserve units.

As a result of these factors, the Air Force Reserve forces, we were told, feel they are in control of their future, needed, and an equal partner with the Active Force.

We were told that the above factors must be part of any decision to affiliate Reserve units with Active Forces. But personnel needs and the availability of training assets must also be recognized and provided for. That is, units must be placed in geographical areas where enough personnel with the needed skills can be recruited, normally within a 50-mile radius. And to maintain combat readiness, the units must have aircraft available for the aircrews to fly and the maintenance personnel to maintain. The Associate Program has shown that aircrew training is done with a minimum of difficulty but that maintenance training may not be sufficient.

The difficulty with maintenance has been a matter of emphasis. The Active Force is concerned primarily with accomplishing the airlift mission, while the Air Force Reserve is concerned primarily with training. Because of the expertise in the Air Force Reserve, the Active Force sometimes relies on them to support the active mission. As a result, training sometimes suffers. Steps have been taken to correct this situation. For example, at

two bases we visited, Air Force Reserve units are taking over the maintenance complexes during their primary training assemblies and concentrating on maintenance training.

Also, Air Force officials informed us that association with Reserve component units must be balanced with the peacetime needs of the Active Air Force. Such requirements as the Rated Distribution and Training Management System and the ability to call on forces for a show of force must, we were told, remain available within the Active Air Force.

The Rated Distribution and Training Management System, a management tool used to manage its pilot force and a form of career ladder within the Air Force, provides for the orderly progression from flight school through the cockpit to various command levels. According to Air Force officials, the present peacetime force of aircrews is the minimum, allowing for attrition, that can provide an effective Rated Distribution and Training Management System. To take a part of an existing aircrew ratio and give it to the Reserves for affiliation purposes would put the system into an imbalance, we were told. The same principle applies to the Air Force's ability to respond to an emergency. Current aircrew ratios support the peacetime missions of the Active Force. A decrease in these ratios to support affiliation would, we were told, infringe on the Air Force's ability to immediately respond to a contingency. Even when these needs are considered, however, opportunities still exist for greater affiliation.

Commenting on our description of the Rated Distribution and Training Management System, Air Force officials characterized the description as inaccurate. However, we see no material differences between our description and that provided by the Air Force in its comments.

AFFILIATION OF RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS IN TACTICAL FIGHTER MISSIONS

Increased affiliation is not a new idea within the Tactical Air Command. In 1975, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the command initiated its Reserve Augmentation Test and Evaluation Program to determine the feasibility of using Air Force Reserve aircrews and maintenance personnel to fill part of its wartime needs. The command is currently evaluating affiliation in its fighters.

We believe this area offers many affiliation opportunities due to the Tactical Air Command's

--missions,

--the mission capabilities of its aircraft, and

--the Reserve Augmentation Test and Evaluation Program.

Tactical Air Command missions

According to Air Force and Air Reserve officials, one of the drawbacks of affiliating in the tactical environment is the Reserves' inability to take advantage of multirole aircraft capabilities. Because of their limited availability, Reserve aircrews can train only for a single mission, whereas Active aircrews train for a multiple number of missions.

Training of Tactical Air Command aircrews, Active and Reserve alike, is done in accordance with the command's graduate combat capability program. The objective of this program is to improve aircrew training within existing resources by prioritizing the combat mission and capability of each unit. This allows for a mix of capabilities--air superiority, air support, and nuclear--within the Air Force. According to command officials, it is a form of specialization. For example, although the F-4 has multirole capabilities, several Active F-4 units will be dedicated to the air superiority role during the initial days of hostility. This is not very different from the role the Reserves are capable of playing.

Mission capability of aircraft

When the mission of each of the Tactical Air Command's aircraft is analyzed, a mix of multirole and single-role aircraft is seen. The table below shows current and new aircraft and their mission capabilities.

<u>Type of aircraft</u>	<u>Current or new</u>	<u>Multirole or single role</u>
F-4	Current	Multi
F-15	New	Single
F-16	New	Multi
F-111	Current	Single
A-7	Current	Multi
A-10	New	Single
RF-4	Current	Single

Even with Reserve aircrew training a limiting factor, there are enough single-role aircraft within the command to allow affiliation.

Reserve Augmentation Test and Evaluation Program

The Reserve Augmentation Test and Evaluation Program is a 2-year Tactical Air Command test using F-4 aircraft at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia. The program uses no Air Force Reserve unit organization or management structure; instead, Air Force Reserve personnel are an additional layer to the Active personnel of the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing. Originally, the program was to be made up of weekend reservists--no full-time technicians--to be trained on weekends. When the program encountered some difficulties with this approach, changes were made to eliminate the difficulties. According to Air Force officials, the program, as originally conceived, would fail the final evaluation.

The command still plans to use reservists as an additional layer to Active units throughout the United States. Because of the nature of tactical fighters, their use rate and accompanying aircrew ratios are low--currently a standard 1.25 per aircraft. As a result, the number of Reserves involved on a per-squadron basis will also be small. These augmentees will be under the management of the command and without an identifiable unit. Presently, the Air Force Reserve does not believe this is the best approach for affiliating its members with Air Force units.

Association as an alternative

After studying the Air Force's fiscal year 1975 request for additional personnel to increase the strategic airlift crew ratio, Senator Sam Nunn suggested an amendment, subsequently agreed to by both Houses, which directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan for using the less costly resources of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard to increase the crew ratios. In response, the Secretary submitted a study which showed the Air Force could recruit and train adequate Reserve personnel in associate units to increase strategic airlift crew ratios. The Air Force subsequently increased strategic airlift crew ratios through the Associate Program.

We believe similar opportunities exist for expanding the Associate Program in the Tactical Air Command, especially because the command has both multirole and single-role aircraft. The area in which association appears most readily adaptable is in the difference between the command's "standard" aircrew ratios and its new "tailored aircrew" ratios. In the past the Tactical Air Command had one standard aircrew ratio $1/1.25$ per aircraft--for all of its weapon systems. According to Tactical Air Command officials, the Vietnam conflict demonstrated the inappropriateness of having one aircrew ratio for all fighter aircraft. The Tactical Air Command found that each fighter had a different utilization rate, which allowed for different aircrew ratios. Subsequently, the Tactical Air Command studied the utilization rate of its current and pending weapon systems to determine individual ratios for each weapon system. This new aircrew ratio became its "tailored" ratio and new wartime requirement. In all cases, except for the F-111, the tailored aircrew ratio is higher than the previous standard ratio.

The Tactical Air Command faces a dilemma. According to Tactical Air Command officials, the new aircraft are needed to upgrade the force. To fully utilize the

$1/$ Aircrew ratio is a method of expressing the number of aircrews needed to operate a weapon system at its wartime sustained rate. Example: a 24 aircraft squadron would need 24×1.25 or 30 aircrews to maintain a wartime sustained rate.

capabilities of these new aircraft, the command needs increased personnel funding to staff their squadrons to new wartime requirements. However, because of limited resources, funding appears bleak. Nevertheless, the Air Force is presently seeking increased funding for the F-16 in its fiscal year 1979 Program Objective Memorandum requesting authorization for a 1.31 aircrew ratio, and for further aircrew ratio increases later.

We believe the command could satisfy its new wartime aircrew ratios for the F-16, the A-10, and possibly other weapon systems at less cost by selectively associating with the Air Reserve Forces. When the increase in aircrew ratios is considered on a particular weapon system basis, the number of additional aircrews needed to satisfy the new wartime requirements are substantial, as shown in the discussion on page 12 of the classified supplement to this report.

Would the Tactical Air Command's wartime response be degraded by having Air Reserve Forces affiliated units? We believe not. As pointed out earlier, the Military Airlift Command will rely on its associate units, upon mobilization, to provide the command a wartime surge capability. And Active Military Airlift Command wing officials stated that associate Air Reserve aircrews are fully as competent to fly the command's missions as the Active Force aircrews. Further, Air Reserve Force officials and a September 1977 Rand Corporation effort called Project Air Force both stated that Air Reserve Forces are capable of full deployment within 72 hours of the initiation of mobilization. In fact, Air Force planners said some Air Reserve Force units will be deployed before some Active Air Force units. Even greater assurance of the Reserve units' deployability could be provided by scheduling them as rapid-deploying units.

Commenting on our proposal to use reservists in staffing additional Tactical Air Command aircrew requirements, Air Force officials stated that the proposal is contradictory in that it encourages expansion of the Associate Program, then recommends establishment of equipped Reserve units. We do not agree that the proposal is contradictory. Rather, we believe the proposal is only a variation of the Associate Program since the squadrons of reserve aircrews would be collocated with similar Active Air Force squadrons, thus gaining the benefits of association.

Air Force officials also stated that they believe the true cost of additional aircrew and maintenance requirements for associate squadrons affiliated with the requisite number of Active Force units will be much higher than estimated. However, they provided no cost estimates.

OTHER OPPORTUNITIES TO ASSOCIATE THE RESERVES WITH ACTIVE AIR FORCE COMMANDS

An associate relationship is currently being planned between the Strategic Air Command and the Air Force Reserve for the new KC-10A advanced tanker cargo aircraft. The Strategic Air Command plans to acquire 20 of the aircraft and to have three aircrews per aircraft. The command and the Reserves will, it is planned, each provide 1 1/2 aircrews per airplane (a total of 30 aircrews for the Reserves). Plans call for identifiable Air Force Reserve units to be collocated with Active units, although it has not yet been determined whether there will be one, two, or three squadrons of the aircraft or where they will be located.

We believe opportunities exist to expand the program into other Air Force missions and commands as well. These include, but are not limited to, such missions as the KC-135 refueling aircraft and tactical airlifts.

The primary mission of the KC-135, for example, is to refuel bombers on their way to target areas. The Strategic Air Command's ratio of aircrews per aircraft for this plane is 1.27 to 1. Air Force officials informed us that the air refuelers will also be needed for deploying aircraft in the NATO scenario. This will require decisions on which aircraft will fly which missions.

The Air Force is presently considering several different management actions to bring the KC-135 force more into line with requirements. These include

- refitting the existing fleet with more efficient and powerful engines with resulting increased payload, mission length, and utilization rates;
- repositioning the fleet--aircraft with new engines will not be airfield limited--to increase responsiveness; and
- increase aircrew/aircraft ratios to increase aircraft flying hours.

If the latter action occurs, we believe the Air Reserve components could provide the required aircrews under an associate-type program. (The Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard already fly some KC-135 aircraft with aircraft turned over to them from the Strategic Air Command.)

OPPORTUNITIES FOR ASSOCIATED AIR NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

We believe the Air National Guard is a viable source of units for association with the Active Air Force units. The Air Guard's participation in the Associate Program would, we believe, allow the Air Force to fill aircrew requirements at less cost and would enhance the effectiveness of participating Guard units because they would be training in first-line Air Force aircraft.

Air National Guard personnel represent approximately 9 percent of the total U.S. Air Force, but training of the Guard's 91 flying units involves virtually all of the Air Force's major functional commands. In carrying out its peacetime training mission in the traditional approach of separation of operations, the Guard has not participated in the Associate Program.

The National Guard Bureau's criteria for the Air Guard's participation in the Associate Program is as follows:

- "1. The National Guard Bureau supports participation in missions for the Air National Guard which can meet the following criteria:

- a. There is a valid Air Force requirement.
 - b. It can be accomplished by members of equipped units under existing statutes.
 - c. There is a reasonable probability of success considering the part-time nature of the citizen-soldier.
 - d. It contributes to the capability of the total Air Force.
2. The current associate concept does not adapt to the statutory requirements relating to State authority for command, manning, training, and administration of the units in peacetime. However, should there be a future requirement for additional 'associate' units, the National Guard Bureau would study in detail the feasibility of Air National Guard participation."

We assessed the above criteria on the bases of

- mission requirements,
- ownership of aircraft during peacetime, and
- the State's statutory authority to command and control Guard units in peacetime.

Mission requirements

Air Force Reserve units' participation in the Associate Program has demonstrated the Guard's prerequisites of valid Air Force mission requirements, reasonable probability of successful missions, and contribution to total Air Force capability.

The primary mission of the Air Reserves is training, a valid Air Force requirement. Air Reserve associate units often perform scheduled Active Air Force strategic airlift missions while training, thus satisfying dual missions and optimizing use of the aircraft. For example, in fiscal year 1977, Reserve associate units flew 79,736 hours in C-5, C-141, and C-9 aircraft. Approximately 70 percent of this time was spent in flying productive strategic airlift missions, and most of the time was counted as valid training for the Reserve aircrews. The remaining hours were for training flights.

The Wing Commander of the 60th Military Airlift Wing, Travis Air Force Base, California, whose wing is associated with the Air Reserve's 349th Military Airlift Wing, told us that the associate aircrews and maintenance personnel carryout strategic airlift missions and maintenance responsibilities just as efficiently as his Active Air Force crews.

Guard ownership of aircraft during peacetime

The crux of the National Guard Bureau's position with regard to supporting participation of equipped Guard units is the States' desire to maintain ownership of aircraft during peacetime. This desire, according to Guard officials, is principally to ensure availability of aircraft for training. Mission accomplishment and aircraft ownership are not mutually dependent, however.

In the Air Force Reserve Associate Program, we found that training was not contingent upon the Reserve's ownership of the aircraft they fly. Instead, associate units are given priority for missions to ensure availability of aircraft for training. Air Force Reserve officials said they would prefer possessing their own aircraft but realize that the limited number and high cost of placing the aircraft in the Air Force Reserve inventory is prohibitive.

The States' statutory authority to command Guard units in peacetime

The National Guard Bureau's perception that Air Guard units' participation in the Associate Program would lesson or eliminate the State's command and control over the units is exemplified in the Air National Guard's policy on the matter, quoted (in part) below.

"Command of non-mobilized [Air National Guard] units is vested in State Governors who have no legal authority to assign or permit ANG units or members to be placed, in any manner, under the command or control of any authority external to the State military chain of command, except for those units/members ordered to active duty or called into Federal service by competent authority as prescribed by law." (Underscoring added.)

Many of the policies and regulations governing Air Guard units are provided by the Active Air Force, the Defense Department, and the Congress. For example, training and readiness criteria are established, reviewed, and evaluated by the Air Force gaining command. Air Guard aircraft and equipment and over 90 percent of the State Guard budgets are provided through the Defense Department and the National Guard Bureau. Guard manning authorizations are set by the Congress.

Although the State Governors command their Guard Forces as a policy in peacetime, exceptions exist when Air Guard units perform Active Air Force missions, such as standing strategic Air Command or Air Defense alerts. The Air National Guard presently has flying units equipped with KC-135 air refueller aircraft, and by July 1979, it will have 13 such units. These units are and will be responsible for standing a part of the Strategic Air Command's active alert mission in support of its bomber fleet. This responsibility requires the Guard to have a selected number of aircraft and crews on alert 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. During alert periods, Guard aircrew members serve in an active duty status and 23 State Governors commanding affected Guard units have formally agreed that the aircraft and aircrews come under the operational control of the Strategic Air Command while on alert. The same arrangements have been made for Guard aircraft and crews standing Air Defense alerts.

As noted earlier, important considerations in establishing Reserve associate units are maintaining the units' identities and the concept of Reserves commanding Reserves. Except when Air Guard associate unit personnel fly Active Air Force missions, command and control of the units would remain with the appropriate State Guard Forces. Therefore, the Governors' command authority over Guard associate units would not be unlike their authority over Guard units already performing Strategic Air Command and Air Defense alerts.

One example of the Active-Reserve command relationships for Reserve associate units can be seen at the 349th Military Airlift Wing, which is associated with the Active Air Force's 60th Military Airlift Wing. Both wings fly and maintain C-5 and C-141 cargo aircraft, first-line Air Force equipment not found in the Air Reserve inventories. The 349th's chain of command is through the Air Force

Reserve command structure and is typical of that of non-associated Air Force Reserve units. Personnel of the 349th come under the command of the Active Air Force only when they fly Active Military Airlift Command airlift missions.

CONCLUSIONS

We believe the Air Force has progressed further than the Army in integrating its Reserve Forces with the Active Force, consistent with the Total Force Policy.

The gaining command concept has, in our opinion, facilitated such integration. The concept has also developed efficient and streamlined Reserve Force command structures because much of the advice and assistance provided by the gaining commands would otherwise have to be absorbed in the Reserves' command structures. This would undoubtedly add to the size and layering of the structures.

The Congress, the Defense Manpower Commission, and Air Force and Air Force Reserve officials have attested to the success and value of the Air Force Associate Program. We believe the associate concept can be applied in commands other than the Military Airlift Command. One such command is the Tactical Air Command, which is seeking increased aircrew authorizations for its F-16 and A-10 aircraft as a result of recomputed aircrew to aircraft ratios. Since Air Reserve force units are generally combat ready and capable of deploying in an emergency within 72 hours (many earlier), we see little or no loss of Tactical Air Command combat capability with the associate concept. The concept could also be applied to other mission areas, including the Strategic Air Command's KC-135 air refueller aircraft missions. (The Air Force already plans to employ the associate unit concept for its planned KC-10A advanced tanker/cargo aircraft.)

We believe the Air National Guard, with 91 flying units and 9 percent of total Air Force personnel, is a valuable source of aircrews for staffing associate units. Air Guard units' participation in the Associate Program would not, in our opinion, alter or impede the State's statutory authority to command and control Guard units in any manner not already formally agreed to by the 23 Governors whose units now perform Active Air Force missions. Further, we believe that the advantages which the Associate Program offers to both the Active Air

Force and the Air Guard outweigh the National Guard Bureau's and the States' concerns with program participation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to make Air National Guard units available, as necessary, to fill any Active Air Force requirements for Reserve aircrews through the Associate Program.

We also recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force:

- Staff any increases in aircrew ratio requirements for the F-16 and A-10 aircraft, above the 1.25 aircrew to aircraft level, from Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard resources under the Associate unit concept.
- Examine other Air Force mission areas for possible application of the associate concept and consider the concept the norm for staffing new aircrew requirements resulting from increased aircrew ratios or the introduction of new aircraft, consistent with Active aircrew requirements.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

The Air Force did not concur with the first recommendation because it believed that the Associate approach is not readily adaptable to the Air National Guard concept of operations. Officials said that the Associate Program as now practiced would entail overlapping and perhaps conflicting lines of authority, and traditional State/Federal roles of the National Guard would have to be revamped. The Air Force concluded that the current associate concept does not adapt to the statutory requirements relating to State authority for command, manning, training, and administration of Guard units in peacetime, but added that if the requirements were established for additional Associate units, the National Guard Bureau would study the feasibility of Air National Guard participation.

We do not question the State Governors' statutory authorities and responsibilities for commanding, training, and administering National Guard Forces. We also agree that some modification in peacetime command and control would be necessary if Air Guard units were to become Associate units. However, as explained in the text of this chapter, many State Governors already relinquish to the Air Force command over Air Guard units while they are flying Active Air Force missions. Such an arrangement is not unlike command relationships that would exist under the Associate concept. Furthermore, we believe the modifications that would be required would be minor in comparison to benefits the Association would bring to both participating Air Guard units and the Air Force.

The Air Force did not concur with the second recommendation because

- it would not present the potential for any appreciable savings,
- the squadrons owned by the Air Force and manned primarily by "Associate Reservists" would still require daily maintenance and normal base support,
- the squadrons formed would be incapable of a wartime Air Force mission unless the Reserves were mobilized, and
- the Associate units would be incapable of deploying for a "show of force" or an exercise.

The Air Force concluded that in reality such squadrons would be training squadrons for Associate Pilots.

We agree that the squadrons manned primarily by "Associate Reservists" would not have the peacetime deployment flexibility of Active squadrons. The squadrons' inability to participate in shows-of-force is an example. However, given the Tactical Air Command's overall capability, we question the need for such flexibility in these squadrons. Further, we believe the squadrons would be capable of rapid mobilization in the event of war and would be valuable resources at that time. (As noted on page 131, when fully mobilized Associate Air Force Reserve Units will provide the Military Airlift Command nearly 50 percent of its total authorized aircrews.) Finally, we believe

there are inherent economic advantages in staffing squadrons wherever possible with Reservists through the Associate concept, rather than with Active Air Force personnel.

The Air Force partially concurred with the final recommendation. The Air Force commented that it is currently examining the Associate unit concept for application in proposed KC-10 tanker/cargo units, and that it will continue to examine the concept's potential applicability in other areas. It cautioned, however, that any requirement to collocate Associate units with Active units on Air Force bases remote from population centers could adversely affect reserve recruiting and retention. We agree that the establishment of Associate units in sparsely populated areas would be impractical due to reserve recruiting and retention constraints. Application of the concept should be on a selective basis.

PERSONNEL STATISTICS FOR ASSOCIATE WINGS AND GROUPS

AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1977

<u>Air Force base</u>	<u>Reservists (note a)</u>		<u>Percent of authorized</u>	<u>Air Reserve technicians</u>	
	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>		<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
Charleston, South Carolina	2,087	1,665	79.8	298	282
McGuire, New Jersey	2,038	1,652	81.0	298	271
Norton, California	2,101	1,716	81.7	298	280
McChord, Washington	1,432	1,129	78.8	202	197
Travis, California	3,071	2,254	73.4	473	441
Dover, Delaware	1,662	1,323	79.6	281	266
Scott, Illinois	<u>295</u>	<u>276</u>	<u>93.5</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>64</u>
Total	<u>12,686</u>	<u>10,015</u>	<u>78.9</u>	<u>1,919</u>	<u>1,801</u>

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a/The authorized and assigned personnel figures include the Air Reserve technicians who were broken out merely to show the number required within an associate wing.

APPENDIX I

APPENDIX I

OTHER STATISTICS ON AIR FORCE RESERVE ASSOCIATE UNITS

<u>Unit name</u>	<u>Air Force base</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>		<u>Number of units in wing or group</u>
		<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	
514 MALW (note a)	McGuire, New Jersey	C-141	54	3
512 MALW	Dover, Delaware	C-5A	35	2
315 MALW	Charleston, South Carolina	C-141	54	3
445 MALW	Norton, California	C-141	54	3
349 MALW	Travis, California	C-141	36	2
		C-5A	35	2
446 MALW	McChord, Washington	C-141	36	2
932 AAG (note b)	Scott, Illinois	C-9	<u>12</u>	<u>1</u>
Total			<u>316</u>	<u>18</u>

a/MALW: Military Airlift Wing.

b/AAG: Aeromedical Airlift Group.

SUMMARY OF RELATIVE COSTS OF ACTIVE AIR FORCE, GUARD, AND RESERVE UNITS

	A-7D squadron (note a)		
	<u>Active cost</u>	<u>Guard cost (percent of Active)</u>	<u>Reserve cost (percent of Active)</u>
	----- (millions) -----		
Capital equipment cost	\$107.2	\$107.2 (100)	\$107.2 (100)
Total unit annual operating cost	21.2	11.0 (52)	10.1 (48)
Equipment and facilities related annual cost	8.4	5.8 (69)	5.3 (63)
Personnel related annual cost (note b)	12.8	5.2 (41)	4.8 (38)
Capital equipment plus 10 years of annual operating cost	319.2	217.2 (68)	208.2 (65)
Capital equipment plus 15 years of annual operating cost	425.2	272.2 (64)	258.7 (61)

a/In fiscal year 1976 constant dollars.

b/The Air Force Guard and Reserve personnel costs are based on 95 and 98 percent of full strength costs, respectively. The percentages reflect the ratio of fiscal year 1976 average paid drill strength to total spaces in the fiscal year 1976 Reserve Forces Manpower Requirements Report.

ALTERNATIVE 2
MERGING THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD INTO
THE AIR FORCE RESERVE STRUCTURE

ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT

Under this concept all organized units of the Air National Guard of the United States would become a part of the Air Force Reserve. Accordingly, the Directorate, Air National Guard, and federally sponsored Air Guard supervisory structure within each state would cease to exist.

The Office of the Air Force Reserve, an agency on the Air Staff, would continue to serve as the office to advise the Chief of Staff USAF on all reserve matters. This office would remain as presently structured, with assigned functions, and would have its manpower authorizations increased by 36 spaces to take on the added workload resulting from an increased span of control of 208% (189 units to 582 units).

Headquarters, Air Force Reserves (AFRES), a Separate Operating Agency (SOA), would continue to perform with no change in mission. AFRES would continue as presently organized with primary responsibility for command, control, logistics, budget, administrative, and personnel support of all reserve units and individuals. Accordingly, the manpower authorizations for this Headquarters would be increased by 238 authorizations to assume control of the larger reserve force.

The three Air Force Reserve Regions would also be retained as structured with the same mission. Manpower of the regions would also be increased by a total of 285 authorizations for the added workload. Air Guard units would be assigned to the region having geographic responsibility over their location.

SOURCE: "A Report on Merger of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard" (AD-A007 548), Department of Defense, Wash., D.C., January 1975, pp. 65 to 67 and 74 to 76.

This alternative would not affect the responsibilities of the Air Staff with regard to reserve matters. The Air Staff would continue performing its planning, requirements, and programming functions pertaining to reserve forces. Reserve officers would continue to be assigned to the Air Staff, pursuant to Sections 265 and 8033 of Title 10 United States Code.

The Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) would remain a Separate Operating Agency (SOA) under the technical supervision of the Chief, Air Force Reserve. Under this concept, ARPC would be responsible for all reserve records and would be provided additional manpower for this workload.

Active gaining command relationships with the Reserve management structure would remain unchanged. The gaining commands would continue to have responsibility for training and safety programs and inspection of designated Reserve units.

ADVANTAGES

One Management Structure is Eliminated. A single management system with federal command of all forces emanating from the Chief of Staff would replace the current dual structure. A single federally controlled reserve structure would simplify the administrative requirements and details unique to managing two reserve components.

Monetary Savings Accrue. The increase in the management structure of the Air Force Reserve would be less than the total current management structure of the Air National Guard. A savings of \$3.08 would accrue which represents 0.26 of 1 percent of the total Air Reserve Forces estimated budget for FY75 (\$1.2 billion).

Would Strengthen the Position of the Manager of the Air Reserve Forces. The increased responsibilities and span of control of the Chief of Air Force Reserve could well justify an increase in rank. The net impact of elevating the rank would, in the long run, militarily strengthen the position of the office and the Air Force Reserve.

Greater Flexibility in Structure, Equipment, and Location of Units. By statute, Air National Guard units are organized and equipped similarly to units of the Active Air Force and any exception must be approved by the Secretary of the Air Force. However, since the ANG is a State controlled force in peacetime, any changes, such as location, equipment, activation, and inactivation of units must be approved by the State Governor. ^{1/} Under this alternative, with all forces under the Air Force Reserve, the Governor would be eliminated as an approving authority. However, it must be pointed out that gubernatorial approval is not now a real problem and, should differences occur, pressures for or against changes could still be exerted through the Congress.

^{1/}32 USC 104.

ALTERNATIVE
NO.
2

TABLE 3-5
MANPOWER DISTRIBUTION
(Merge the Air National Guard into the Air Force Reserve)

	4/FY 75	EST DIFF	ESTIMATED NEW REQUIREMENT	ESTIMATED COST SAVING (\$M)
State Headquar- ters (Air)				
National Guard	1369	-1369 <u>1/</u>	0	\$-6.06
National Guard Bureau	245	-245	0	-4.73
Office of Air Force Reserve	99	+36	135	+0.66
Air Reserve Personnel Ctr	818	+48	866	+0.55
Hq., Air Force Reserve	314	+238	552	+3.96
Air Reserve Regions <u>3/</u>	591 <u>2/</u>	+285	876	+2.54
	3436	-1007 <u>3/</u>	2429 <u>3/</u>	\$-3.08 <u>3/ 4/</u>

NOTE: Manpower savings/costs are based on providing increased capabilities in those functions relative to Air Force Reserve assuming responsibility for Air National Guard facilities (e.g., comptroller, procurement, civil engineering, etc.)

1/474 of this total are air technicians.

2/498 of total are reservists of which 153 are Air Reserve Technicians. The balance are civilians (66), active duty (27).

3/Subject to validation if implemented.

4/Potential savings could be significantly offset by associated risks to readiness and associated personnel turbulence.

Provide a Greater Selection Pool for Filling Critical Positions. The Air Force Reserve today enjoys a national pool of reservists to fill critical positions. For example, if the reserves have a vacancy for a Wing Commander who would normally be a technician, it can select on a national basis for best qualified. The Air National Guard, which can go nationally if a particular skill is not available in a given state, is generally restricted to the borders of the state in which a vacancy occurs. Merging the Guard into the Reserves would put all skilled talent on a national selection basis.

DISADVANTAGES

Span of Control Enlarged. This alternative would have a much greater impact on span of control than Alternative 1. Air Force Reserve flying units would increase from 53 to 145 (174%), non-flying units from 136 to 437 (221%), and authorized personnel from 60,546 to 163,758 (170%). While the Air Force Reserve organizational structure, similar to the active force, is designed to absorb large influxes, the full impact of an increase of this magnitude cannot be determined without further review. The current management personnel, excluding ARPC, would be increased under this alternative from 1,004 to 1,563 (55.7%). As in Alternative 1, an overextended management structure would reduce the effectiveness of the entire reserve program.

Loss of State Influence and Financial Support. The states presently pay approximately 25 percent of the O&M costs of their Air National Guard units. In addition, many of the states are giving various types and kinds of benefits to their Guardsmen. Under this alternative it would be reasonable to assume that such support and rewards would cease to exist with a financial loss to the Federal Government and a reduction in the "real" pay of the individual. Each of the various states have supported its National Guard to a varying degree; but, in most cases, it has been undeniably positive. Absorbing the Guard into a federal force would see an end to this positive support and the loss would be two fold--financial and political. The loss in prestige to the unit as an entity would be enormous and the loss of state political support to the Total Force would have a similar impact.

Personnel Turbulence. Personnel turbulence in this alternative will exceed that of Alternative 1. Loyalties run higher in smaller, tightly knit societies, and must be weighed when comparing state federal units. The very structure of the Guard system promotes loyalties created by the appeal to the "native son" emanating from the Governor (Commander-in-Chief) through the Adjutant General to the community oriented, hometown armories. Merging state oriented units into a federal organization could represent an insurmountable barrier to many personnel.

Like Alternative 1, possible unit relocations generated by consolidation and elimination of the Air National Guard management structure would further add to personnel turbulence and uncertainty.

Extensive Legislative Action. Legislative action in this alternative would not be as extensive as that required for Alternative 1. This is primarily due to the fact all Guard units are basically designed for federal service. There would be a minor requirement for legislative action regarding manning ceilings, office and rank limitations, etc. Additionally, facility responsibilities, leases, rentals and associated problems would require legal determinations.

As in Alternative 1, possible legislative changes beyond those required for a merger could have considerable impact.

Change in Civil Service Status of Technicians. There would be minimum reluctance by qualified individuals to move from "excepted service" into the competitive Civil Service system. The greatest impact would be borne by the Civil Service in that the technician element would increase from approximately 6,700 to nearly 30,000. Bringing this many individuals into the system would require considerable negotiation as to seniority, rights and privileges, job rights, and a myriad of associated problems.

The proposed legislation indicated in Alternative 1 would have little effect on these technicians employed before enactment.

Reluctance of States to Give Up Control. It might be argued--What need does a State have for a fighter unit or a strategic airlift squadron? In a real sense, there are no valid reasons except the States do have units in being and have and have had flying units for a couple of decades. While not quantifiable, it can be safely assumed that most of the concerned States would be reluctant to surrender control of their flying units. Furthermore, the units are a source of organized disciplined manpower for use in local emergencies, state controlled employment at minimum costs, and are a source of State pride. These and many more similar ingredients make the Air National Guard a valuable asset to the State.

Reduce State's Ability for Control of Local Disturbances/Disputes. The loss of the Air National Guard to the individual State would be substantial in that the air units have many skills that are particularly useful in emergency situations: hydraulics, electronics, metal workers, communicators, and others. State controlled units can be partially mobilized to restrict emergency use of personnel to essential needs. These assets would be lost to the State unless the State qualified for Federal assistance.

Risk to Readiness. The risk to readiness in this alternative can be likened to the risk in Alternative 1. The crew members will go where the equipment is and, to a degree, this can also be said of a limited number of specially skilled technician personnel. However, in the main, there would be a loss of considerable proportions in the combat support element. This loss would be extensive enough to have an adverse effect on present combat readiness of the Reserve forces. Although no measure can be made, before the fact, accepted behavioral patterns would indicate a significant loss in qualified manpower and a resultant loss in readiness.



MANPOWER,
RESERVE AFFAIRS
AND LOGISTICS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

22 FEB 1979

Mr. R. W. Gutmann, Director
Logistics and Communications Division
U. S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548


Dear Mr. Gutmann:

This is in reply to your letter to the Secretary of Defense of 30 November 1978 concerning a draft GAO report entitled, "The Army and Air Force Selected Reserve Components--Better Readiness and Deployability Through Organizational Changes" (Code 947279, OSD Case 5037). Enclosed are the Departments of the Army (Tab A) and Air Force (Tab B) comments.

We believe that continued discussion of a merger of the National Guard and Army or Air Force Reserve is fruitless. We are unable to provide cost estimates of such mergers because too many variables are involved. There has been a lot of work done on this in the past, and we would be glad to help you research these past efforts.

We will be available to discuss all matters pertaining to our comments and the draft report with you or your representatives.

Sincerely,


Richard Danzig
Acting Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary (MRA&L)

Enclosures



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

9 JAN 1979


MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER,
RESERVE AFFAIRS AND LOGISTICS)

SUBJECT: General Accounting Office Draft Report: The Army and Air
Force Selected Reserve Components -- Better Readiness and
Deployability Through Organizational Changes

Reference GAO Draft Report, subject as above, dated 2 November
1978. Attached at Inclosure 1 are comments addressing specific recom-
mendations of the report.

The GAO transmittal letter requests the advantages/disadvantages
of a merger of the USAR and ARNG to include "an estimate of dollar
savings that would result from these actions." Based on the extensive
data required to provide dollar savings, the previous studies conducted
in this area, the potentially disruptive nature of such a study proposal,
and the limited time available for Army Staff review, this issue has
not been addressed. Copies of previous studies on merging the Guard
and Reserve forces could be provided to the GAO upon request.

1 Incl
as


William D. Clark
Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Reserve Affairs)

Comments on
GAO Recommendations

1. Chapter 3. GAO recommends:

-- That the Secretary of Defense direct the streamlining of the Army's Reserve Component management structure, with consideration being given the recommendations and alternatives discussed in this report.

-- That the Secretary of the Army direct the reevaluation of, and reductions as appropriate in, the Readiness Groups' staffing.

a. HQDA agrees with the necessity of streamlining of the RC management structure having recognized this need previously. As indicated on page 2-18a of the report, the Army directed in September 1978, a major study effort, under supervision of the Office of Chief of Staff, United States Army. Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82), scheduled for completion in August 1979, was directed with the objectives to determine the CONUS command and control necessary to:

(1) Provide for an orderly and rapid transition from peace to war during mobilization.

(2) Reduce to a minimum reorganizational turmoil immediately following mobilization.

(3) Assure proper command and control of Active, National Guard, and Reserve units in peacetime and in war.

(4) Assure that appropriate attention is paid to readiness, training, and war planning in competition with the necessary day-to-day functions during peacetime.

(5) Continue to stimulate Active Army interest in the readiness and training of National Guard and Reserve Units.

(6) Utilize appropriately the National Guard and Reserve chains of command.

(7) Integrate National Guard and Reserve units ultimately into a total Army command and control system upon mobilization.

(8) Streamline the present organization by eliminating any excessive layering.

b. The study group is addressing the major problems outlined by the Report. With final recommendations due to the Chief of Staff in August 1979, major structuring actions prior to that time are considered premature with significant potential for unnecessary turbulence.

c. Reevaluation of the Readiness Group's Mission, organization and staffing is being conducted by ACCS-82.

2. Chapter 4. GAO recommends:

-- That the Secretary of the Army require those Army Reserve Component units scheduled for transfer to other US based Major Army Commands upon full mobilization be formally affiliated, to the extent possible, with their appropriate gaining commands.

-- That the Army's Affiliation Program be expanded to include affiliation of as many deployable Reserve Components with like Active Army units as possible. Priority should be given early deploying Reserve Component units.

a. Affiliation of units transferring to other MACOM's upon mobilization has been addressed by HQDA and approved for implementation in 3rd Quarter, FY 79.

b. Affiliation of deploying RC unit with like AC units has proven successful since its implementation in 1974. To trace the background of this program, the original 26 RC battalions in 1974 was expanded to 79 units in March 1975. Further increases to 97 units scheduled for 1977 was accelerated and accomplished in the summer 1975. Three additional phases are currently scheduled:

- (1) Phase I. FY 79 Affiliate all feasible D to D+30 units.
- (2) Phase II. FY 80-81 Affiliate all feasible D+31 to D+45 units.
- (3) Phase III. FY 82-83 Affiliate all feasible D+46 to D+60 units.

Currently, 76 units have been selected for Phase I and the proposal is undergoing final staffing at HQDA.

c. While it is agreed that Affiliation is an extremely successful program, several disadvantages do exist. In some cases sufficient numbers of like-type AC units are not available for affiliation on a one-for-one basis. This constraint becomes more significant when geographical separation of affiliated units is considered. With increased emphasis being placed on early deployability of AC units, combined with decreased levels of equipment fill (created by increased POMCUS), increased training demands on AC units decrease their ability to fully support the RC affiliation. In short, while the affiliation program is successful and fully supported, it should not be considered the panacea to RC readiness.

3. Chapter 6. GAO recommends:

-- Secretary of the Army direct those deployable Army Reserve Component units having no firm assigned deployment scheduled after completion of the Army's 1978 Operations Plans assessment be eliminated. The resources thus saved should be reallocated to upgrade the readiness of early deploying Reserve Component units.

-- The Army develop a comprehensive plan to identify and provide disposition actions on nonsupportable Reserve Component units/detachments. In developing the plan, consideration should be given to those recommendations developed by the Sixth Army for addressing the problem of unsupported units.

a. The first recommendation tends to focus on current force requirements and ignores programmed force requirements. Total Army Analysis (TAA) is conducted and updated annually to review and analyze the total force structure. Every effort is made to insure that each unit retained has a readily identifiable mission within the span of the program years. Units scheduled for reorganization may appear not to have current valid missions. However, those units will be assigned appropriate missions as their structural changes are completed. Examples of these are Army Security Agency and Military Intelligence units which are currently in the force but which are programmed to reorganize to conform to new doctrine. Such a reorganization is complex and requires time to execute. Current plans for reorganization of the Reserve Intelligence Force will require and use all existing structure. The large number of units and dynamic nature of force structuring compounds this situation. An additional consideration is retention of non-deploying units in the force structure. As previous exercises have highlighted, a major problem area is that of adequate manning at mobilization stations to effectively manage mobilization and deployment activities. A major study, Total Army Mobilization Base Force Requirements Model (MOBFORM), has been initiated which would incorporate base operations into the Total Army Analysis. Although the total force required to remain in CONUS to conduct training and support deployment is not completely identified at this time, requirements for this force will remain.

b. It is readily agreed that selected units within the RC are difficult to support from both a personnel and readiness viewpoint. However, the fact that units are difficult to maintain does not alleviate the requirement for the unit. There are over one hundred thousand structure spaces in the unmanned force structure (required units whose activation has been deferred for essentially the rationale contained in the GAO recommendation) without considering the mobilization TDA's and units whose ALO would require increase upon mobilization. There are several units organized at cadre strength due, in part, to their low

grade/skill positions; however, units which are required for deployment during the period prior to the effective utilization of the Individual Ready Reserve and draft/training base output must be manned at a higher ALO. The difficulty of manning due to low career enhancement is acknowledged; however, the early wartime requirement remains. All uniquely military hard skills and expensive, complex and sensitive equipment type units cannot be placed into the Active Component due to practical resource constraints. The Active Component must be structured to meet peacetime requirements, contingency plans, and fill the most critical early wartime requirements. Finally, the transfer of total personnel assets to other units upon inactivation of a RC unit should not be assumed. Geographically dispersed unit inactivations will create a loss through inability to assign individuals to another unit, particularly within the same skill area.

4. Chapter 6. GAO recommends:

-- The Secretary of the Army direct the immediate definition and clarification of Active Army and Reserve Component elements' roles and command relationships at mobilization--particularly between Army installations and the CONUSA's.

--The Secretary of the Army require the review and strengthening of active and semi-active installations plans for operating as mobilization stations upon initiation of a full mobilization. The review of semi-active installation mobilization plans should include an assessment of, and judgment on, the adequacy of the installation to serve as mobilization stations.

a. The ill-defined roles of installations and CONUSA's, although improved somewhat by facets of FORSCOM's Command Relationship Study (CRS) are recognized and are being addressed by ACCS-82, discussed in paragraph 1 above.

b. The second recommendation re-surfaces a problem area that has been addressed at several different times. FORSCOM's CRS proposal to give CONUSA's concurrence authority for installations' mobilization plans was approved by HQDA and, although not a panacea, is a step in the appropriate direction. Since approval was granted in mid-1978, it is too early to fully assess the full impact of the action. Further action is certainly needed in this area and will be provided by ACCS-82. Other actions have been taken to alleviate problems created by lack of an adequate planning staff at semi-active installations. Each of these semi-active installations is affiliated with an active installation assigned primary responsibility for mobilization planning. Second, recognizing problems inherent in initial expansion of semi-active installation, plans are on-going to assign units with LAD of D to D+60 to active installations as mobilization stations to extent feasible.

5. Chapter 7. GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Army direct:

--The Department of the Army strengthen its organization for, and management of, Reserve Component Mobilization planning by decentralizing mobilization coordination responsibilities to subordinate command levels and Active Army gaining commands.

--The Continental Armies be given review and approval authority over installations' mobilization planning, and that sufficient qualified personnel be identified at the CONUSA's and installations to effectively coordinate mobilization planning.

--FORSCOM organization for mobilization planning be strengthened to carry out its management functions of overall control of the mobilization planning process.

a. This chapter is generally an accurate analysis of the state of mobilization planning but fails to bring out the many advancements that have been made since MOBEX 76 and the importance of MOBEX 78 in keeping the issue on the "front burner", even though immediate solutions to all problems have not been implemented.

b. Issues outlined above have been addressed by the Command Relationship Study with most recommendations approved for implementation and are being further addressed by Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82).

c. Problems in mobilization will be addressed by POM 81-85.

6. Chapter 8, GAO recommends:

--The Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to institute the policy that Army National Guard and Army Reserve units seek direct and general level maintenance support from the nearest appropriate Active Army and Army Guard facility.

a. (See GAO note 1, p. 173.)

The Army recognized the need for improved maintenance support among and between the components and initiated a study of the issue in 1975. Recommendations of the study are being evaluated individually and implemented on a case-by-case basis.

b. Examples of implemented actions include:

(1) Memorandum of Understanding completed between NGB, TRADOC, FORSCOM and ACCOM on negotiating support agreements.

(2) Intraservice support agreement completed for ARNG equipment support at Fort Bliss, TX. In addition, ARNG communication security and chemical equipment maintenance is being accomplished at various Active Army installations on a job order basis.

(3) Intraservice support agreements completed with ARNG to support selected USAR equipment in Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, New York and Texas.

c. Subject study identified 70 AMSAs located closer to National Guard Activities than their supporting installation. FORSCOM DCSLOG directed CONUSA to develop Direct Support (DS) costing data and submit to coordinating installations with a request that ISSAs be investigated/negotiated with National Guard (NG) or other DOD/Federal activities. The results in this area are not encouraging. In most cases the NG has requested supplemental personnel resources to accomplish USAR DS/GS Maintenance support.

7. Chapter 9. GAO recommends:

-- The Secretary of Defense direct the streamlining of the Army's Reserve Component management structure, with consideration being given the recommendations and alternatives discussed in this report.

(1) This recommendation is a repeat of Chapter 3 and is discussed above.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 20330

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

12 JAN 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (RESERVE
AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: GAO Draft Report, dated November 30, 1978, "The Army and Air Force Selected Reserve Components - Better Readiness and Deployability through Organization Changes" (OSD Case #5037) (Code 947279) - Information Memorandum

The Air Force has been requested to provide comments to your office on the subject report.

We have serious reservations over the conclusions and recommendations contained in this draft report. We do not concur with the recommendation that increases in aircrew requirements for the F-16 and A-10 aircraft should be accomplished under an associate unit concept. We agree in principle with the recommendation that other mission areas be examined for application of the associate unit concept; however, we do not view the potential with the same degree of optimism as the GAO. Consequently, we nonconcur with the recommendation which would force the Air National Guard into the associate unit concept.

In addition, we are most concerned over the proposal to merge the Air National Guard into the Air Force Reserve. Previous studies have concluded that the merger of these two Reserve components is neither cost effective nor feasible. The negative factors, such as increased overhead to manage the resultant organization, questionable cost savings, loss of readiness, personnel turbulence, loss of skilled technician personnel, and the unalterable opposition by affected individuals, government officials and legislators are as true today as in the past. Detailed remarks on the merger issue, recommendations made in Chapter 10, and on the Chapter itself are attached.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "George B. Kutche".

GEORGE B. KUTCHE
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Reserve Affairs

COMMENT ON SIMULTANEOUS MERGER OF THE ARMY RESERVE
INTO THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD
INTO THE AIR FORCE RESERVE

Careful review of the study has provided us with an appreciation for the depth of the problems being experienced by the Army reserve components, and we understand your interest in exploring the merging of Guard and Reserve forces.

However, successive studies on various aspects of the Air Reserve Forces by DOD, GAO and RAND have been consistent in their findings that the measured readiness of these two reserve components compares favorably with that of the Active force, and that the Air Force has developed the best managed and most capable reserve program, with shared responsibilities between Active and Reserve forces. The management structure of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve is designed, and responds specifically to gaining command over all organizational readiness goals. The structure of both of these organizations is unique, evolutionary in its adoption, and deliberate in development. It provides the cornerstone of strength that has set the Air Reserve Forces apart from the other reserve components. We must also recognize that proposals to merge any of the Reserve components may require widespread changes to Federal statutes.

We are proud of the successful operation of our Air Reserve Forces. The Air Force has been the vanguard in development and integration of Total Force policy. Our system works extremely well, and we strongly support the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve as they are presently structured. In our view, the GAO proposal would not enhance readiness or increase security. Therefore, we cannot support any proposal which we feel would work to the detriment of the National defense.

AIR STAFF COMMENTS ON TEXT OF GAO DRAFT REPORT
"THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE SELECTED RESERVE...."
GAO CASE 947279-LCD-79-404

1. Page vii, Digest, Opportunities for greater Integration of the Active and Reserve Forces.

(See GAO note 1, p. 173.)

c. The statement that the "Guard--desires to maintain possession of their aircraft--principally to assure aircraft are available for training", is incorrect. Equipage of the ANG is IAW 10 U.S.C. 264(b) and DoD Directive 1225.6 for the purpose of furnishing CAT A, fully equipped units as a Reserve component of the Active Air Force.

(See GAO note 1, p. 173.)

(See GAO note 1, p. 173.)

11. Page 10.9. We do not agree with the purported cost savings depicted at the bottom of the page and the top of the next. The report should first make it clear that the Air Force Reserve A-7D squadrons were estimates for a hypothetical unit, as the component has never been equipped with that weapon system. In addition, the 60-75% figure is based on estimated savings for

Capital Equipment plus 10 years of Annual Operating Cost (See Appendix III), not Annual Operating Costs. With respect to Appendix III, we question the sharp difference between the Active and Reserve components in Equipment and Facilities Related Annual Costs but are unable to verify it.

(See GAO note 1, p. 173.)

12. Page 10.15. Association as an Alternative to the TAC Program. This section is contradictory in that it encourages expansion of the Associate Program, then recommends establishment of equipped Reserve units. Additionally, we believe that the true cost of additional aircrew and maintenance requirements for associate squadrons affiliated with the requisite number of Active Force units will be much higher than estimated.

(See GAO note 1, p. 173.)

13. The report inaccurately describes the relationship of the Rated Distribution and Training Management (RDTM) system with the pilot force. In fact, RDTM is a management tool which uses analytical processes to assess the impacts of force structure changes, UPT rates, crew force experience requirements, pilot manning requirements, etc. This data is used by senior Air Force leadership in making decisions on management of the rated force. As part of this analytical capability, changes in the crew force as a result of varying crew ratios and expanding the associate reserve program could be examined.

In presenting the results of this particular analysis, the crew force could be described as a "factory" producing a finished product which is a qualified, experienced pilot. Changes in this "factory" affect the Air Force's capability to provide qualified pilots in adequate numbers and quality to fill needs.

A detailed RDTM analysis has not been accomplished on any options which increase the scope of the associate reserve program. However, analysis which has been done indicates that the current and programmed force structure confronts the Air Force with a serious problem in training an adequate number of pilots to meet all requirements and at the same time maintain the minimum experience required in the crew force. Deductively we can draw the conclusion that expansion of the crew force (i.e., the "factory") will help solve the problem by expanding our capability to produce adequate numbers of pilots. Conversely, any constraint or reduction in that capability will exacerbate the problem.

We would suggest that before any recommendations are seriously considered a detailed analysis be performed to determine the impacts of implementation.

GAO RECOMMENDATION #1

GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Air Force direct that increases in aircrew ratio requirements for the F-16 and A-10 aircraft, above the 1.25 aircrew to aircraft level, be staffed from Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard Resources under the Associate Reserve Concept.

Answer: Do not concur. The AF has established the requirement for increased crew ratio in some weapon systems, and expansion of the associate concept into these areas may be a viable option which should be examined. (TAC is just now finishing a two year test of the "Association Concept" in fighters at Moody AFB - Report due in Feb 79). However, the concept as presented in this draft proposal wherein "The remaining 14th squadron of 24 aircraft could be made available for Reserve Force affiliate units", would not present the potential for any appreciable savings. One squadron, owned by the Air Force and manned primarily by "Associate Reservists" would still have to be maintained on a daily basis, with all normal base support. The unit would be incapable of a wartime Air Force mission unless the Reserves were mobilized. In reality this squadron would be a training squadron for Associate Pilots. If it were also manned by Active duty aircrews, so as to have a war capability, the reservists would have nothing to fly when the unit was deployed for a "Show of Force" or an exercise. Much of the money used for training of the "Associates" would be wasted as they go non-current for lack of aircraft. In addition, augmentation may adversely affect unit integrity, impairing not only morale and recruiting, but also overall combat effectiveness.

Recommend that if a 24UE squadron of F-16s could be made available for Air Reserve Force flying, it should be put into the reserve as a conversion from an older weapon system, and flown under present, proven structure. In this way the aircraft would be located in areas with an established recruiting base rather than at the relatively remote locations now occupied by the Active Force units.

GAO RECOMMENDATION #2

GAO also recommends that the Secretary of the Air Force require that other Air Force mission areas be examined for possible application of the Associate unit concept, and that the concept be considered the norm for staffing new aircrew requirements resulting from increased aircrew ratios or the introduction of new aircraft - consistent with active aircrew requirements.

Answer: Partially Concur. The associate program has been, and continues to be effective in units where wartime activity levels are expected to be significantly greater than their peacetime activity levels. This is the case today for the Strategic airlift and aeromedical evacuation units in the Air Force Reserve. We are examining the use of this concept in the proposed KC-10 tanker/cargo units; however, our present and forecast force structure requirements call for full utilization of both Active and Reserve airframes in wartime. For this reason, bringing more Reserve flying units into the associate program would neither reduce the number of assigned aircraft or the manpower for aircrews and maintenance. In fact, the requirement to collocate the associate unit with its Active counterpart on an Air Force base, many of which are remote from population centers, could adversely impact reserve recruiting and retention. We will continue to examine areas where use of some form of the associate program is operationally practical, and provides the potential for reduced costs.

GAO RECOMMENDATION #3

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense require the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to make Air National Guard units available, as necessary, to fill any Active Air Force requirements for Reserve aircrews resulting from application of the associate unit concept.

Answer: Do not concur. The Associate approach is not readily adaptable to the Air National Guard concept of operations. The mission of the Air National Guard is to provide complete equipped units for augmentation of the Active Forces when needed. (Ref: Title 10, U.S.C. 264(b); 672(c))

State Governors have statutory responsibility for the manning, training, command, and administration of National Guard forces. The Associate Program as now practiced would entail overlapping and perhaps conflicting lines of authority and the traditional and long established dual state/federal roles of the National Guard would have to be revamped.


The National Guard Bureau supports participation in missions for the Air National Guard which can meet the following criteria:

- a. There is a valid Air Force requirement.
- b. It can be accomplished by members of equipped units under existing statutes.
- c. There is a reasonable probability of success considering the part-time nature of the citizen-soldier.
- d. It contributes to the capability of the total Air Force.

The current associate concept does not adapt to the statutory requirements relating to State authority for command, manning, training and administration of the units in peacetime. If a requirement were established for additional Associate units, NGB would study in detail the feasibility of ANG participation.

GAO note 1: Deleted material relates to data in our draft report which has been considered and/or revised in this final report to reflect the agency's comments.

GAO note 2: The page references in our draft report may not correspond to those in this final report.



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