This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-10-614T 
entitled 'Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Use of 
Contract Guards Requires Reassessment and More Oversight' which was 
released on April 14, 2010. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as 
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. 
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data 
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, 
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes 
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, 
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format 
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an 
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your 
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or 
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Testimony: 

Before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, April 14, 2010: 

Homeland Security: 

Federal Protective Service's Use of Contract Guards Requires 
Reassessment and More Oversight: 

Statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Director: 
Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

GAO-10-614T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-614T, a testimony before the Committee on 
Homeland Security, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

To accomplish its mission of protecting about 9,000 federal 
facilities, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) currently has a 
budget of about $1 billion, about 1,225 full-time employees, and about 
15,000 contract security guards. FPS obligated $659 million for guard 
services in fiscal year 2009. 

This testimony is based on our report issued on April 13, 2010, and 
discusses challenges FPS continues to face in (1) managing its guard 
contractors and (2) overseeing guards deployed at federal facilities, 
and (3) the actions FPS has taken to address these challenges. To 
address these objectives, GAO conducted site visits at 6 of FPSs 11 
regions; interviewed FPS officials, guards, and contractors, and 
analyzed FPSs contract files. GAO also reviewed new contract guard 
program guidance issued since our July 2009 report and observed guard 
inspections and penetration testing done by FPS. 

What GAO Found: 

FPS faces a number of challenges in managing its guard contractors 
that hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. FPS requires 
contractors to provide guards who have met training and certification 
requirements. FPSs guard contract also states that a contractor who 
does not comply with the contract is subject to enforcement action. 
GAO reviewed the official contract files for the seven contractors 
who, as GAO testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts 
with expired certification and training requirements to determine what 
action, if any, FPS had taken against these contractors for contract 
noncompliance. These contractors had been awarded several multiyear 
contracts totaling $406 million to provide guards at federal 
facilities in 13 states and Washington, D.C. FPS did not take any 
enforcement actions against these seven contractors for noncompliance. 
In fact, FPS exercised the option to extend their contracts. FPS also 
did not comply with its requirement that a performance evaluation of 
each contractor be completed annually and that these evaluations and 
other performance-related data be included in the contract file. FPS 
plans to provide additional training and hold staff responsible for 
completing these evaluations more accountable. 

FPS also faces challenges in ensuring that many of the 15,000 guards 
have the required training and certification to be deployed at a 
federal facility. In July 2009, GAO reported that since 2004, FPS had 
not provided X-ray and magnetometer training to about 1,500 guards in 
1 region. As of January 2010, these guards had not received this 
training and continued to work at federal facilities in this region. X-
ray and magnetometer training is important because guards control 
access points at federal facilities. FPS currently does not have a 
fully reliable system for monitoring and verifying whether its 15,000 
guards have the certifications and training to stand post at federal 
facilities. FPS developed a new Risk Assessment and Program Management 
system to help monitor and track guard certifications and training. 
However, FPS is experiencing difficulties with this system and has 
suspended its use. In addition, once guards are deployed to a federal 
facility, they are not always complying with assigned responsibilities 
(post orders). Since July 2009, FPS has conducted 53 penetration tests 
in the 6 regions we visited, and in over half of these tests some 
guards did not identify prohibited items, such as guns and knives. 

In response to GAOs July 2009 testimony, FPS has taken a number of 
actions that, once fully implemented, could help address challenges it 
faces in managing its contract guard program. For example, FPS has 
increased the number of guard inspections at federal facilities in 
some metropolitan areas. FPS also revised its X-ray and magnetometer 
training; however, all guards will not be fully trained until the end 
of 2010, although they are deployed at federal facilities. Despite FPS
s recent actions, it continues to face challenges in ensuring that its 
$659 million guard program is effective in protecting federal 
facilities. Thus, among other things, FPS needs to reassess how it 
protects federal facilities and rigorously enforce the terms of the 
contracts. 

What GAO Recommends: 

In GAOs report related to this testimony, GAO recommended, among 
other things, that FPS identify other approaches that would be cost-
beneficial to protecting federal facilities. The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) concurred with seven of GAOs eight 
recommendations. DHS did not fully concur with GAOs recommendation to 
issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure that contract 
files have required documentation. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-614T] or key 
components. For more information, contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-
2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

We are pleased to be here to discuss the results of our report on the 
Federal Protective Service's (FPS) contract guard program, issued 
April 13, 2010.[Footnote 1] As you are aware, FPS--within the National 
Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS)--is responsible for protecting the buildings, 
grounds, and property that are under the control and custody of the 
General Services Administration (GSA), as well as the persons on the 
property; authorized to enforce federal laws and regulations aimed at 
protecting GSA buildings and persons on the property; and authorized 
to investigate offenses against these buildings and persons.[Footnote 
2] To accomplish its mission of protecting federal facilities, FPS 
currently has a budget of about $1 billion,[Footnote 3] about 1,225 
full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract security guards 
(guards) deployed at about 2,360 federal facilities across the country. 
[Footnote 4] In fiscal year 2009, FPS obligated $659 million for guard 
services, which represents the single largest item in its budget. 

FPS's contract guard program is the most visible component of its 
operations as well as the first public contact for individuals 
entering a federal facility. FPS relies heavily on its guards and 
considers them to be the agency's "eyes and ears" while performing 
their duties. Guards are primarily responsible for controlling access 
to federal facilities by (1) checking the identification of government 
employees as well as members of the public who work in and visit 
federal facilities, and (2) operating security equipment, such as X-
ray machines and magnetometers to screen for prohibited materials, 
such as firearms, knives, explosives, or items intended to be used to 
fabricate an explosive or incendiary device.[Footnote 5] Guards do not 
have arrest authority but can detain individuals who are being 
disruptive or pose a danger to public safety. 

This testimony, based on our report, discusses challenges FPS 
continues to face in (1) managing its guard contractors, (2) 
overseeing guards deployed at federal facilities, and (3) actions FPS 
has taken to address these challenges. Our methodology included site 
visits to 6 of FPS's 11 regions. To select these 6 regions, we 
considered the number of FPS guards, contractors, and federal 
facilities, and the geographic dispersion of the regions across the 
United States. At each region, we observed FPS's guard inspection 
process and interviewed FPS's regional manager, contract guard program 
managers, inspectors who are responsible for conducting guard 
inspections; guards, and contractors. We also randomly selected 663 
out of approximately 15,000 guard training records that were 
maintained in FPS's Contract Guard Employment Requirements Tracking 
System (CERTS) and/or by the guard contractor and validated them 
against the contractual requirements that were in effect at the time 
of our review. We also reviewed the contract files for 7 of FPS's 38 
guard contractors. We selected these 7 contractors because our 
previous work showed that they had contract compliance issues. In 
addition, we analyzed a random sample of 99 FPS contractor evaluations 
to determine how FPS evaluated the performance of its contractors on 
an annual basis. 

We also reviewed new contract guard program guidance issued since our 
July 2009 testimony and observed guard inspections and covert testing 
done by FPS in August and November 2009.[Footnote 6] Because of the 
sensitivity of some of the information in our report, we cannot 
provide information about the specific locations of the incidents 
discussed. We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 to 
February 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. 

FPS Faces Challenges Managing Its Guard Contractors That Hamper Its 
Ability to Protect Federal Facilities: 

Some FPS Guard Contractors Did Not Always Comply with the Terms of 
Contracts and FPS Has Not Taken Actions against Them: 

FPS has not taken actions against some guard contractors that did not 
comply with the terms of the contracts. According to FPS guard 
contracts, a contractor has not complied with the terms of the 
contract if the contractor has a guard working without valid 
certifications or background suitability investigations, falsifies a 
guard's training records, does not have a guard at a post, or has an 
unarmed guard working at a post at which the guard should be armed. If 
FPS determines that a contractor does not comply with these contract 
requirements, it can--among other things--assess a financial deduction 
for nonperformed work, elect not to exercise a contract option, or 
terminate the contract for default or cause. 

We reviewed the official contract files for the 7 contractors who, as 
we testified in July 2009, had guards performing on contracts with 
expired certification and training requirements to determine what 
action, if any, FPS had taken against these contractors for contract 
noncompliance. The 7 contractors we reviewed had been awarded several 
multiyear contracts totaling $406 million to provide guards at federal 
facilities in 13 states and Washington, D.C. 

According to the documentation in the contract files, FPS did not take 
any enforcement action against the 7 contractors for not complying 
with the terms of the contract, a finding consistent with DHS's 
Inspector General's 2009 report.[Footnote 7] In fact, FPS exercised 
the option to extend the contracts of these 7 contractors. FPS 
contracting officials told us that the contracting officer who is 
responsible for enforcing the terms of the contract considers the 
appropriate course of action among the available contractual remedies 
on a case-by-case basis. For example, the decision of whether to 
assess financial deductions is a subjective assessment in which the 
contracting officer and the contracting officer technical 
representative (COTR) take into account the value of the 
nonperformance and the seriousness of the deficiency, according to FPS 
contracting officials. 

FPS Did Not Always Comply with Its Procedures for Completing Annual 
Performance Evaluations of Its Guard Contractors: 

FPS requires an annual performance evaluation of each contractor and 
at the conclusion of contracts exceeding $100,000, and requires that 
these evaluations and other performance-related documentation be 
included in the contract file. Contractor performance evaluations are 
one of the most important tools available for ensuring compliance with 
contract terms. Moreover, given that other federal agencies rely on 
many of the same contractors to provide security services, completing 
accurate evaluations of a contractor's past performance is critical. 
However, we found that FPS's contracting officers and COTRs did not 
always evaluate contractors' performance as required, and some 
evaluations were incomplete and not consistent with contractors' 
performance. 

We reviewed a random sample of 99 contract performance evaluations 
from calendar year 2006 through June 2009. These evaluations were for 
38 contractors. Eighty-two of the 99 contract performance evaluations 
showed that FPS assessed the quality of services provided by the 
majority of its guard contractors as satisfactory, very good, or 
exceptional. For the remaining 17 evaluations, 11 showed that the 
contractor's performance was marginal, 1 as unsatisfactory, and 
assessments for 5 contractors were not complete. According to 
applicable guidance, a contractor must meet contractual requirements 
to obtain a satisfactory evaluation and a contractor should receive an 
unsatisfactory evaluation if its performance does not meet most 
contract requirements and recovery in a timely manner is not likely. 
[Footnote 8] 

Nevertheless, we found instances where some contractors received a 
satisfactory or better rating although they had not met some of the 
terms of the contract. For example, contractors receiving satisfactory 
or better ratings included the 7 contractors discussed above that had 
guards with expired certification and training records working at 
federal facilities. In addition, some performance evaluations that we 
reviewed did not include a justification for the rating and there was 
no other supporting documentation in the official contract file to 
explain the rating. Moreover, there was no information in the contract 
file that indicated that the COTR had communicated any performance 
problems to the contracting officer. 

FPS Continues to Face Challenges with Overseeing Guards That Raise 
Concern about Protection of Federal Facilities: 

FPS Is Not Providing All Guards with X-ray and Magnetometer Training 
in Some Regions: 

As of February 2010, FPS had yet to provide some of its guards with 
all of the required X-ray or magnetometer training. For example, we 
reported in July 2009 that in one region, FPS has not provided the 
required X-ray or magnetometer training to 1,500 guards since 2004. 
FPS officials subsequently told us that the contract for this region 
requires that only guards who are assigned to work on posts that 
contain screening equipment are required to have 8 hours of X-ray and 
magnetometer training. However, in response to our July 2009 
testimony, FPS now requires all guards to receive 16 hours of X-ray 
and magnetometer training. As of February 2010, these 1,500 guards had 
not received the 16 hours of training but continued to work at federal 
facilities in this region. FPS plans to provide X-ray and magnetometer 
training to all guards by December 2010. X-ray and magnetometer 
training is important because the majority of the guards are primarily 
responsible for using this equipment to monitor and control access 
points at federal facilities. Controlling access to a facility helps 
ensure that only authorized personnel, vehicles, and materials are 
allowed to enter, move within, and leave the facility. 

FPS Lacks Assurance That Its Guards Have Required Certifications and 
Training: 

FPS currently does not have a fully reliable system for monitoring and 
verifying whether its 15,000 guards have the certifications and 
training to stand post at federal facilities. FPS is developing a new 
system--Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP)--to help it 
monitor and verify the status of guard certifications and training. 
However, in our July 2009 report, we raised concerns about the 
accuracy and reliability of the information that will be entered into 
RAMP. Since that time, FPS has taken steps to review and update all 
guard training and certification records. For example, FPS is 
conducting an internal audit of its CERTS database. However, as of 
February 2010, the results of that audit showed that FPS was able to 
verify that about 8,600 of its 15,000 guards met the training and 
certification requirements. FPS is experiencing difficulty verifying 
the status of the remaining 6,400 guards. FPS has also received about 
1,500 complaints from inspectors regarding a number of problems with 
RAMP. For example, some inspectors said it was difficult and sometimes 
impossible to find guard information in RAMP and to download guard 
inspection reports. Thus they were completing the inspections 
manually. Other inspectors have said it takes almost 2 hours to log on 
to RAMP. Consequently, on March 18, 2010, FPS suspended the use of 
RAMP until it resolves these issues. FPS is currently working on 
resolving issues with RAMP. 

FPS Continues to Have Limited Assurance That Guards Are Complying with 
Post Orders once They Are Deployed to Federal Facilities: 

Once guards are deployed to a federal facility, guards are not always 
complying with assigned responsibilities (post orders). As we 
testified in July 2009, we identified substantial security 
vulnerabilities related to FPS's guard program.[Footnote 9] FPS also 
continues to find instances where guards are not complying with post 
orders. For example, 2 days after our July 2009 hearing, a guard fired 
his firearm in a restroom in a level IV facility while practicing 
drawing his weapon. In addition, FPS's own penetration testing--
similar to the covert testing we conducted in May 2009--showed that 
guards continued to experience problems with complying with post 
orders. Since July 2009, FPS conducted 53 similar penetration tests at 
federal facilities in the 6 regions we visited, and in over 66 percent 
of these tests, guards allowed prohibited items into federal 
facilities. We accompanied FPS on two penetration tests in August and 
November 2009, and guards at these level IV facilities failed to 
identify a fake bomb, gun, and knife during X-ray and magnetometer 
screening at access control points. During the first test we observed 
in August 2009, FPS agents placed a bag containing a fake gun and 
knife on the X-ray machine belt. The guard failed to identify the gun 
and knife on the X-ray screen, and the undercover FPS official was 
able to retrieve his bag and proceed to the check-in desk without 
incident. During a second test, a knife was hidden on an FPS officer. 
During the test, the magnetometer detected the knife, as did the hand 
wand, but the guard failed to locate the knife and the FPS officer was 
able to gain access to the facility. According to the FPS officer, the 
guards who failed the test had not been provided the required X-ray 
and magnetometer training. Upon further investigation, only 2 of the 
11 guards at the facility had the required X-ray and magnetometer 
training. In response to the results of this test, FPS debriefed the 
contractor and moved one of the guard posts to improve access control. 

In November 2009, we accompanied FPS on another test of security 
countermeasures at a different level IV facility. As in the previous 
test, an FPS agent placed a bag containing a fake bomb on the X-ray 
machine belt. The guard operating the X-ray machine did not identify 
the fake bomb and the inspector was allowed to enter the facility with 
it. In a second test, an FPS inspector placed a bag containing a fake 
gun on the X-ray belt. The guard identified the gun and the FPS 
inspector was detained. However, the FPS inspector was told to stand 
in a corner and was not handcuffed or searched as required. In 
addition, while all the guards were focusing on the individual with 
the fake gun, a second FPS inspector walked through the security 
checkpoint with two knives without being screened. In response to the 
results of this test, FPS suspended 2 guards and provided additional 
training to 2 guards. 

Recent Actions Taken by FPS May Help Improve Oversight of the Contract 
Guard Program: 

In response to our July 2009 testimony, FPS has taken a number of 
actions that, once fully implemented, could help address the 
challenges the agency faces in managing its contract guard program. 
For example, FPS: 

* Increased guard inspections at facilities in some metropolitan 
areas. FPS has increased the number of guard inspections to two a week 
at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas.[Footnote 10] Prior 
to this new requirement, FPS did not have a national requirement for 
guard inspections, and each region we visited had requirements that 
ranged from no inspection requirements to each inspector having to 
conduct five inspections per month. 

* Increased X-ray and magnetometer training requirements for 
inspectors and guards. FPS has increased its X-ray and magnetometer 
training for inspectors and guards from 8 hours to 16 hours. In July 
2009, FPS also required each guard to watch a government-provided 
digital video disc (DVD) on bomb component detection by August 20, 
2009. According to FPS, as of January 2010, approximately 78 percent, 
or 11,711 of the 15,000 guards had been certified as having watched 
the DVD. 

* Implementing a new system to monitor guard training and 
certifications. As mentioned earlier, FPS is also implementing RAMP. 
According to FPS, RAMP will provide it with the capability to monitor 
and track guard training and certifications and enhance its ability to 
conduct and track guard inspections. RAMP is also designed to be a 
central database for capturing and managing facility security 
information, including the risks posed to federal facilities and the 
countermeasures that are in place to mitigate risk. It is also 
expected to enable FPS to manage guard certifications and to conduct 
and track guard inspections electronically as opposed to manually. 
However, as mentioned earlier, as of March 18, 2010, FPS suspended the 
use of RAMP until it can resolve existing issues. 

Despite FPS's recent actions, it continues to face challenges in 
ensuring that its $659 million guard program is effective in 
protecting federal facilities. While the changes FPS has made to its X-
ray and magnetometer training will help to address some of the 
problems we found, there are some weaknesses in the guard training. 
For example, many of the 15,000 guards will not be fully trained until 
the end of 2010. In addition, one contractor told us that one of the 
weaknesses associated with FPS's guard training program is that it 
focuses primarily on prevention and detection but does not adequately 
address challenge and response.[Footnote 11] This contractor has 
developed specific scenario training and provides its guards on other 
contracts with an additional 12 hours of training on scenario-based 
examples, such as how to control a suicide bomber or active shooter 
situation, evacuation, and shelter in place. The contractor, who has 
multiple contracts with government agencies, does not provide this 
scenario-based training to its guards on FPS contracts because FPS 
does not require it. We also found that some guards were still not 
provided building-specific training, such as what actions to take 
during a building evacuation or a building emergency. According to 
guards we spoke to in one region, guards receive very little training 
on building emergency procedures during basic training or the 
refresher training. These guards also said that the only time they 
receive building emergency training is once they are on post. 
Consequently, some guards do not know how to operate basic building 
equipment, such as the locks or the building ventilation system, which 
is important in a building evacuation or building emergency. 

FPS's decision to increase guard inspections at federal facilities in 
metropolitan areas is a step in the right direction. However, it does 
not address issues with guard inspections at federal facilities 
outside metropolitan areas, which are equally vulnerable. Thus, 
without routine inspections of guards at these facilities, FPS has no 
assurance that guards are complying with their post orders. 

We believe that FPS continues to struggle with managing its contract 
guard program in part because, although it has used guards to 
supplement the agency's workforce since the 1995 bombing of the Alfred 
P. Murrah Federal Building, it has not undertaken a comprehensive 
review of its use of guards to protect federal facilities to determine 
whether other options and approaches would be more cost-beneficial. 
FPS also has not acted diligently in ensuring that its guard 
contractors meet the terms of the contract and taking enforcement 
action when noncompliance occurs. We also believe that completing the 
required contract performance evaluations for its contractors and 
maintaining contract files will put FPS in a better position to 
determine whether it should continue to exercise contract options with 
some contractors. Moreover, maintaining accurate and reliable data on 
whether the 15,000 guards deployed at federal facilities have met the 
training and certification requirements is important for a number of 
reasons. First, without accurate and reliable data, FPS cannot 
consistently ensure compliance with contract requirements and lacks 
information critical for effective oversight of its guard program. 
Second, given that other federal agencies rely on many of the same 
contractors to provide security services, completing accurate 
evaluations of a contractor's past performance is critical to future 
contract awards. 

Thus, in our report we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security direct the Under Secretary of NPPD and the Director of FPS to 
take the following eight actions: 

* identify other approaches and options that would be most beneficial 
and financially feasible for protecting federal buildings; 

* rigorously and consistently monitor guard contractors' and guards' 
performance and step up enforcement against contractors that are not 
complying with the terms of the contract; 

* complete all contract performance evaluations in accordance with FPS 
and Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements; 

* issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure that contract 
files have required documentation; 

* develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards at federal 
facilities outside metropolitan areas; 

* provide building-specific and scenario-based training and guidance 
to its contract guards; 

* develop and implement a management tool for ensuring that reliable, 
comprehensive data on the contract guard program are available on a 
real-time basis; and: 

* verify the accuracy of all guard certification and training data 
before entering them into RAMP, and periodically test the accuracy and 
reliability of RAMP data to ensure that FPS management has the 
information needed to effectively oversee its guard program. 

DHS concurred with seven of our eight recommendations. Regarding our 
recommendation to issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure 
that contract files have required documentation, DHS concurred that 
contract files must have required documentation but did not concur 
that a new record-keeping format should be issued. DHS commented that 
written procedures already exist and are required for use by all DHS's 
Office of Procurement Operations staff and the components it serves, 
including NPPD. We believe that the policies referenced by DHS are a 
step in the right direction in ensuring that contract files have 
required documentation; however, although these policies exist, we 
found a lack of standardization and consistency in the contract files 
we reviewed among the three Consolidated Contract Groups. 

Overall, we are also concerned about some of the steps FPS plans to 
take to address our recommendations. For example, FPS commented that 
to provide routine oversight of guards in remote regions it will use 
an employee of a tenant agency (referred to as an Agency Technical 
Representative) who has authority to act as a representative of a COTR 
for day-to-day monitoring of contract guards. However, several FPS 
regional officials told us that the Agency Technical Representatives 
were not fully trained and did not have an understanding of the 
guards' roles and responsibilities. These officials also said that the 
program may not be appropriate for all federal facilities. We believe 
that if FPS plans to use Agency Tenant Representatives to oversee 
guards, it is important that the agency ensure that the 
representatives are knowledgeable of the guard's responsibilities and 
are trained on how and when to conduct guard inspections as well as 
how to evacuate facilities during an emergency. Furthermore, while we 
support FPS's overall plans to better manage its contract guard 
program, we believe it is also important for FPS to have appropriate 
performance metrics to evaluate whether its planned actions are fully 
implemented and are effective in addressing the challenges it faces 
managing its contract guard program. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony. We are pleased to answer 
any questions you might have. 

Contact Information: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Mark L. 
Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or by e-mail at goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making 
key contributions to this testimony include Tammy Conquest, Assistant 
Director; Tida Barakat; and Jonathan Carver. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service's Contract 
Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of 
Contract Guards, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-341] 
(Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2010). 

[2] 40 U.S.C.  1315. 

[3] Funding for FPS is provided through revenues and collections 
charged to building tenants of properties protected by FPS. The 
revenues and collections are credited to FPS's appropriation and are 
available until expended for the protection of federally owned and 
leased buildings and for FPS operations. 

[4] While FPS does not use guards at the remaining 6,700 facilities 
under its protection, it uses other security countermeasures such as 
cameras and perimeter lighting to help protect these facilities. 

[5] Title 41 CFR Sections 102-74.435 and 102-74-440 identify and list 
items that are prohibited by law from being introduced into a federal 
facility except for law enforcement purposes and other limited 
circumstances. Those items are explosives, firearms, or other 
dangerous weapons. In addition, Facility Security Committees, which 
are composed of representatives of tenant agencies at federal 
facilities, have broad latitude in determining items in addition to 
those specifically prohibited by statute that can be prohibited in 
their facilities. 

[6] GAO, Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal 
Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities is Hampered 
by Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T] (Washington, D.C.: July 8, 
2009). 

[7] The Inspector General found that FPS does not always take 
deductions against a contractor for services that are not provided in 
accordance with contract requirements. Department of Homeland 
Security, Office of Inspector General, Federal Protective Service 
Contract Guard Procurement and Oversight Process, OIG-09-51 
(Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2009). 

[8] As part of DHS, FPS is required to use the Department of Defense 
Contractor Performance Assessment System (CPARS) to officially 
document its performance evaluations. CPARS requires the use of an 
adjectival rating scale by evaluators that includes ratings of 
exceptional, very good, satisfactory, marginal, and unsatisfactory. 

[9] As we testified in July 2009, each time they tried, our 
investigators successfully passed undetected through security 
checkpoints monitored by FPS guards with the components for an 
improvised explosive device (IED) concealed on their persons at 10 
level IV facilities in four cities in major metropolitan areas. We 
planned additional tests but suspended them after achieving 100 
percent test results, which highlighted the vulnerabilities federal 
facilities face. A level IV facility has over 450 employees and a high 
volume of public contact. 

[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T]. 

[11] Challenge and response refers to being proactive instead of 
reactive to an incident. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAOs actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAOs Web site, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: