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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT: 
Wednesday, September 9, 2009: 

Afghanistan And Pakistan: 

Oversight of U.S. Interagency Efforts: 

Statement of Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: Managing Director, 
International Affairs and Trade: 

GAO-09-1015T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-1015T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

GAO has identified Afghanistan and Pakistan as two of the most urgent 
issues facing this Administration and this Congress. In March, the 
President announced a strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with a 
broad strategic goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al-Qaeda 
in Afghanistan; destroying its allies and safe havens in Pakistan; and 
preventing their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan. With additional 
U.S. resources and attention focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
there will be additional oversight to ensure the accountability of U.S. 
efforts. 

This testimony addresses (1) GAOís oversight of U.S. efforts in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan; (2) how GAO coordinates its efforts with its 
colleagues in the accountability community; and (3) some of the 
challenges GAO faces carrying out oversight. 

This testimony is based on past GAO reports and testimonies examining 
U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These reports and testimonies 
contain analysis of documents and information from Afghan and Pakistani 
officials; U.S. officials in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Washington, 
D.C.; and representatives of coalition military forces and command, 
including the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, and 
international organizations, including the United Nations. 

GAO has made recommendations in prior reports, but makes no new ones in 
this statement. 

What GAO Found: 

Since 2003, GAO has issued more than 30 reports and testimonies on U.S. 
efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This work has addressed issues 
such as the costs of the war, the need for better planning, reform of 
the Afghan National Army and Police, accountability over billions of 
U.S. assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan, efforts to improve the 
governmentís management and oversight of contractors, Afghan road 
construction, counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, and the security 
of Pakistanís border region. GAO also has several ongoing reviews 
concerning Afghanistan and Pakistan addressing a wide range of issues, 
such as building the Afghan army and development programs in both 
countries. GAOís past work has identified needed improvements as well 
as many obstacles that affect success and should be considered in 
program planning and implementation. GAO found most U.S. initiatives we 
reviewed needed improved planning. GAO also concluded that several 
existing conditions in Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as worsening 
security, poor infrastructure, and the limited institutional capacity 
of the Afghan government, continue to create challenges to U.S. efforts 
to assist with securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding Afghanistan and 
destroying terrorists and their safe havens in Pakistan. To address 
these concerns, GAO made recommendations in prior reports on issues 
such as the need for better planning, improved coordination of 
interagency efforts, and increased oversight, which led to several 
actions taken by agencies to improve planning and enhance 
accountability procedures. 

While GAOís activities to support the Congress are unique, it consults 
with key members of the accountability community, including the 
inspectors general, the chief financial officers, and the executives of 
other nationsí audit agencies. GAO also participates in formal and 
informal coordination mechanisms pertaining specifically to Afghanistan 
and Pakistan oversight. For example, GAO is a member of the Southwest 
Asia Joint Planning Group, which was created in June 2008. Through the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan Subgroup of this planning group, which was created 
earlier this year and formalized its charter this past July, GAO meets 
at least quarterly with major oversight organizations responsible for 
ensuring accountability and transparency of U.S. programs in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. GAO also meets with individuals in the 
accountability community concerning Afghanistan and Pakistan oversight 
to ensure its work is coordinated and minimizes overlap. 

GAO has faced some challenges to conducting oversight of U.S. 
government efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan due to the unstable 
security environment and limited housing available to temporary duty 
travelers. For example, while in Pakistan earlier this year, a GAO team 
was unable to travel to Peshawar or Pakistanís Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas due to the security situation there. However, GAO takes 
steps to mitigate these limitations, such as by setting up 
teleconferences and videoconferences along with other measures, and is 
still able to perform assessments of the programs. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1015T] or key 
components. For more information, contact Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers 
(202) 512-3101 or williamsbridgersj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO's oversight of U.S. 
interagency efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan; destroy its allies and its safe havens in Pakistan; and 
prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan. In March, the 
President announced a strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Just last 
month, the Administration finalized the United States Government 
Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan, 
and it is our understanding the Administration is completing work on a 
plan for Pakistan. 

My statement today is based on GAO's extensive body of work examining 
U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which has been bolstered by 
fieldwork in both countries (see appendix I for a list of related GAO 
products). I will address (1) GAO's oversight of U.S. efforts in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan; (2) how we coordinate our efforts with our 
colleagues in the accountability community, including the Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR); and (3) some 
of the challenges we face in carrying out oversight. 

GAO's Oversight of U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan: 

Earlier this year, GAO identified U.S. efforts to secure, stabilize, 
and rebuild Afghanistan and to address the terrorist threat emerging 
from Pakistan as two of the most urgent issues facing this 
Administration and this Congress.[Footnote 1] In Afghanistan, the U.S. 
government faces significant challenges in building capable Afghan 
National Security Forces, combating insurgents and narcotics 
trafficking, developing the Afghan economy and government capacity, and 
improving contractor oversight. Similarly, in Pakistan, the United 
States faces the need to better utilize key elements of national power. 
Our ongoing and planned work continues to focus on these key challenges 
and their alignment with the Administration's strategy and plans. 

Since 2003, we have issued over 30 reports and testimonies on U.S. 
efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These products cover a variety of 
areas and multiple federal departments and agencies, and address a 
number of issues that pertain to the Administration's counterinsurgency 
strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, including: 

* the costs of the war; 

* the need for more comprehensive and better interagency planning; 

* reform of the Afghan National Army and Police; 

* accountability over billions of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan; 

* efforts to improve the government's management and oversight of 
contractors and contractor personnel; 

* road construction and other development efforts; and: 

* counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. 

Over the course of our work, we have identified needed improvements in 
U.S. efforts, as well as many obstacles that have affected success and 
should be considered in the Administration's future program planning 
and implementation. We found that most U.S. initiatives we reviewed, 
such as efforts to build capable Afghan security forces, needed 
improved planning, including the development of coordinated interagency 
plans that include measurable goals, specific time frames, and cost 
estimates. We also identified external factors that have significantly 
affected efforts in key areas such as building roads. For example, last 
year we testified that a shortage of U.S. police mentors has been a key 
impediment to U.S. efforts to train the Afghan National Police. We also 
found that the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) lacked a 
coordinated, detailed, interagency plan for training and equipping the 
Afghan National Security Forces. In addition, in 2009, we again 
reported that the United States lacked a comprehensive plan for 
combating terrorism and closing safe havens in Pakistan's border region 
with Afghanistan. Moreover, there is a lack of acquisition and 
oversight personnel with experience working in contingency operations, 
which we have found strains the agencies' acquisition and oversight 
capacity. We also concluded that several existing conditions in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, such as worsening security, poor 
infrastructure, and the limited institutional capacity of the Afghan 
government, continue to create challenges to U.S. efforts to assist 
with securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding Afghanistan and destroying 
terrorists and their safe havens in Pakistan. For example, attacks 
against Afghan police and other security forces increased six-fold from 
October 2003 to October 2008, according to DOD. The higher level of 
attacks was related to the increased use of the Afghan National Police 
in counterinsurgency operations. We testified on challenges in 
providing U.S. forces, equipment, and infrastructure and factors that 
should be considered in developing the U.S. strategy and plans for 
military operations in Afghanistan.[Footnote 2] 

To address these issues identified in prior reports, we made 
recommendations to DOD, State, and USAID to improve planning, enhance 
interagency coordination, provide additional U.S. mentors, and increase 
oversight of weapons provided to Afghan National Security Forces and 
Coalition Support Funds provided to Pakistan. We are pleased to note 
several accomplishments resulting from our reports. Among them: 

* DOD and State have coordinated, detailed plans for developing and 
sustaining Afghan National Security Forces; 

* the President announced the addition of 4,000 troops for the primary 
purpose of training Afghan security forces; 

* DOD established clearer accountability procedures for tracking 
weapons provided to Afghan security forces; and: 

* DOD took several steps to increase oversight and accountability of 
Coalition Support Funds to Pakistan, resulting in over $170 million in 
denied charges. 

We also have several ongoing reviews concerning Afghanistan and 
Pakistan addressing the following topics: 

* Afghanistan's security environment; 

* building the Afghan army; 

* counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan; 

* alternative development programs in Afghanistan; 

* the water sector in Afghanistan; 

* U.S. contracting and contractor management; 

* supply and equipment support for U.S. forces in Afghanistan; 

* efforts to counter threats from improvised explosive devices; 

* DOD processes for responding to wartime needs of U.S. forces; 

* availability of U.S. forces for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; 

* development assistance in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas; and: 

* the U.S. Security Development Plan for Pakistan. 

In addition, the Congress has included in various bills potential 
mandates for GAO to assess U.S. efforts to develop a comprehensive plan 
to address the terrorist threat emanating out of Pakistan, evaluate the 
effectiveness of U.S. security assistance to Pakistan, and assess the 
extent to which the U.S. campaign plan for Afghanistan adheres to 
military doctrine, which we are prepared to work on. 

Coordination with Accountability Community: 

Like our colleagues in the accountability community, GAO works to 
improve the performance and accountability of government. GAO's 
authority extends beyond a single department or agency and includes the 
examination of public funds; evaluation of federal programs and 
policies; and provision of analyses, recommendations, and other 
assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and 
funding decisions. 

While our activities to support the Congress are unique, we work 
closely with other members of the U.S. government accountability 
community. Our policy and protocols require us to coordinate our 
efforts with these federal oversight entities to ensure our work 
complements and reinforces the work of others. 

In the course of periodic meetings and other interactions, GAO consults 
with key members of the accountability community, including the 
inspectors general, the chief financial officers, and the executives of 
other nations' audit agencies. We do the same with officials from the 
Office of Management and Budget, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 
the Congressional Research Service (CRS), and other federal agencies. 
For example, we have met with the Commission on Wartime Contracting on 
several occasions to discuss our work. In addition, GAO, CBO, and CRS 
may assist the Congress with work on the same program, but are 
collectively responsible for coordinating and cooperating to avoid 
unnecessary duplication. The three agencies have established a system 
and controls to ensure that (1) cooperative arrangements are working 
well, (2) planned work is not duplicative, and (3) problems are 
promptly resolved. 

We also participate in formal and informal coordination mechanisms 
pertaining specifically to Afghanistan and Pakistan oversight. GAO is a 
member of the Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group, which was created in 
June 2008. Through the Afghanistan-Pakistan Subgroup of this planning 
group, which was created earlier this year and formalized its charter 
this past July, GAO meets at least quarterly with major oversight 
organizations responsible for ensuring accountability and transparency 
of U.S. programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The subgroup--which is 
chaired by the U.S. Agency for International Development's Inspector 
General and includes the DOD Inspector General,[Footnote 3] State 
Inspector General, GAO, and Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR)--facilitates coordination and collaboration 
among the organizations and serves as a central point for coordinating 
planned and ongoing audits, reviews, and inspections, as well as for 
sharing information among the members. The subgroup members are 
expected to minimize overlapping efforts and reduce the burden that the 
oversight process places on program management staff. As a member of 
the subgroup, we support the group's charter to (1) provide the status 
of ongoing and planned projects; (2) highlight key elements of reports 
issued since the last meeting; (3) answer questions from other members; 
and (4) discuss and resolve issues relating to coordination and 
deconfliction of activities among the oversight organizations. GAO's 
ongoing efforts are included in the subgroup's recently completed 
Comprehensive Oversight Plan: Afghanistan-Pakistan for the fourth 
quarter fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2010. Furthermore, GAO 
routinely meets with individuals in the accountability community 
concerning Afghanistan and Pakistan oversight to ensure our work is 
coordinated and minimizes overlap. GAO also provides information on the 
breadth of our work and the status of our ongoing work to SIGAR for its 
quarterly reports. We have developed a strong working relationship with 
SIGAR, and a number of my former colleagues are presently at SIGAR. 

Challenges to Conducting Oversight of Afghanistan and Pakistan 
Programs: 

U.S. personnel face enormous challenges working in both Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. The security situation limits their movements and ability to 
monitor projects, and a surge of civilian and military personnel has 
strained housing and other logistical support. It is in that 
environment that GAO and our colleagues in the audit community enter 
our embassies and military bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As such, 
we work to minimize the burden our oversight places on program 
management staff. However, with additional U.S. resources and attention 
focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan, there should be additional 
oversight to ensure the accountability of U.S. efforts. 

GAO relies on both documentation, as well as on-site verification, to 
conduct its oversight work. GAO has traveled to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan for most of its reports--over 10 times in the last two years--
to ensure the integrity of our work. Nevertheless, we have faced some 
challenges to conducting oversight of U.S. government efforts in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan due to the unstable security environment and 
limited housing available to temporary duty travelers. GAO is reliant 
on DOD and State for permission and protection to travel to sites where 
U.S. activities are ongoing. For example, a GAO team traveled to 
Afghanistan in August 2008 to review accountability of U.S. provided 
weapons to Afghan security forces. However, the team was unable to 
travel beyond Kabul to visit units to review their weapons 
accountability procedures due to heightened security threats. While in 
Pakistan earlier this year, a GAO team, which I accompanied, was unable 
to travel to Peshawar or the FATA due to the security situation there. 
Housing also poses a problem in Afghanistan. In both countries, hotels 
are generally off limits to official U.S. personnel due to the security 
environment. Quarters are tight and on several occasions, GAO teams 
requesting travel to Afghanistan have had to postpone or limit the 
length of their visits due to lack of housing. We recognize this is not 
the ideal situation and we identify these limitations in the scope and 
methodology sections of our reports. However, we also take steps to 
mitigate these limitations. For example, we try to maximize 
opportunities to meet with key officials in more secure parts of the 
country or when such individuals travel to Washington. We also set up 
interviews via videoconference or telephone. Consequently, we are still 
able to perform assessments of the programs. 

As the Congress is aware, with congressional and State Department 
support, GAO has a presence in Iraq. GAO has three staff stationed at 
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. They provide important on-the-ground 
oversight of U.S. efforts in Iraq and support multiple GAO teams 
completing Iraq related work. We have extensively utilized our staff 
stationed in Baghdad to help us assess, among other things, progress in 
meeting U.S. goals in Iraq, including (1) improving security 
conditions; (2) developing Iraqi security forces' capabilities and 
transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi government; (3) 
facilitating Iraqi government efforts to enact and implement key laws 
and to develop local and national government capacity; and (4) helping 
the Iraqi government provide essential services to its people. We have 
recently initiated an assessment to determine our requirements for 
workspace in the region. This assessment will take into consideration 
our increased work in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as our 
continuing work in Iraq. 

In closing, while we recognize that carrying out responsible oversight 
in active war zones like Afghanistan and Pakistan will never be easy or 
without risk, GAO stands ready to assist the Congress in its oversight 
efforts and will continue to work closely with our colleagues in the 
accountability community to conduct this critical work. We would also 
like to thank Ambassador Holbrooke for his commitment to assist us in 
our oversight work. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my 
prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may 
have. 

[End of section] 

Scope and Methodology: 

To address the objective regarding GAO's oversight of U.S. efforts in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, we reviewed past GAO reports and testimonies 
examining U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our reports and 
testimonies include analysis of documents and other information from 
Afghan and Pakistani officials; U.S. officials in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Washington, D.C., including the Departments of 
Agriculture, Defense, State, Justice, and the Treasury, as well as the 
U.S. Agency for International Development; the Army Corps of Engineers; 
the Defense Intelligence Agency; and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration. In addition, we obtained and analyzed documents and 
other information from representatives of coalition military forces and 
command, including the NATO-led International Security Assistance 
Force, and international organizations, including the United Nations. 
To address the objective regarding GAO's coordination with the 
accountability community, we reviewed GAO policies and protocols and 
reviewed other documents pertaining to our coordination with other 
oversight agencies. To address the objective regarding challenges we 
face carrying out oversight in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we documented 
difficulties that we faced in traveling to and within Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted 
government standards. Those standards required that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A 
list of GAO reports and testimonies related to Afghanistan and Pakistan 
can be found in Appendix I. For further information relating to our 
work on Afghanistan and Pakistan, go to [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-294sp]. 

[End of section] 

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements: 

GAO Contacts: 

For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jacquelyn 
Williams-Bridgers at (202) 512-3101 or williamsbridgersj@gao.gov or 
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. 

Staff Acknowledgements: 

In addition, the following staff contributed to this testimony: Joseph 
Carney, Thomas M. Costa, David Hancock, Brandon Hunt, Hynek Kalkus, 
Farahnaaz Khakoo, Judy McCloskey, Jim Michels, Sara Olds, and Pierre 
Toureille. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Related GAO Products: 

Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and 
Interagency Coordination for the Commander's Emergency Response Program 
in Afghanistan [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-615], May 
18, 2009. 

Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-473SP], April 21, 2009. 

Afghanistan: U.S.-and Internationally-Funded Roads [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-626SP], an E-supplement to GAO-09-
473SP [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-626SP], April 21, 
2009. 

Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Are Taking Actions to 
Track Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-538T], April 1, 2009. 

Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to 
Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-476T], March 25, 2009. 

Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland 
Security and an Updated Accountability Framework can Further Enhance 
DEA's Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-63], March 20, 2009. 

Global War on Terrorism: DOD Needs to More Accurately Capture and 
Report the Costs of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring 
Freedom [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-302], March 17, 
2009. 

Afghanistan Security: U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of 
Interior and National Police Challenged by Lack of Military Personnel 
and Afghan Cooperation [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-280], March 9, 2009. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan's Border Area with 
Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-263SP], February 23, 2009. 

Afghanistan Security: Corrective Actions Are Needed to Address Serious 
Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National 
Security Forces [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-366T], 
February 12, 2009. 

Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment, and 
Infrastructure Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and 
Plans [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-380T], February 
12, 2009. 

Afghanistan Security: Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises Significant 
Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National 
Security Forces [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-267], 
January 30, 2009. 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-86R], October 1, 2008. 

Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor 
Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19], October 1, 2008. 

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing Roads, but 
Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable Maintenance 
Program Are Needed [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-689], 
July 8, 2008. 

Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed over 
Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-806], June 24, 2008. 

Combating Terrorism: U.S. Oversight of Pakistan Reimbursement Claims 
for Coalition Support Funds [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-932T], June 24, 2008. 

Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police 
Forces Face Challenges and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help 
Ensure Accountability [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-883T], June 18, 2008. 

Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to 
Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable 
Afghan National Security Forces [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661], June 18, 2008. 

Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts to Address the Terrorist Threat in 
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Require a Comprehensive 
Plan and Continued Oversight [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-820T], May 20, 2008. 

Preliminary Observations on the Use and Oversight of U.S. Coalition 
Support Funds Provided to Pakistan [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-735R], May 6, 2008. 

Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to 
Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622], April 17, 2008. 

Questions for the Record Related to the Benefits and Medical Care for 
Federal Civilian Employees Deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-155R], October 16, 2007. 

Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for 
Congressional Oversight [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-801SP], May 24, 2007. 

Military Operations: The Department of Defense's Use of Solatia and 
Condolence Payments in Iraq and Afghanistan [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-699], May 23, 2007. 

Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating 
Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-78], November 15, 2006. 

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating 
Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S. 
Goals [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-742], July 28, 
2005. 

Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made 
Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-575], June 30, 2005. 

Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited 
Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-403], June 2, 2004. 

Foreign Assistance: Observations on Post-Conflict Assistance in Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and Afghanistan [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-980T], July 18, 2003. 

Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to 
Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan's Stability [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-607], June 30, 2003. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-473SP] (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 21, 2009) and Security, Stabilizing, and Developing 
Pakistan's Border Area with Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional 
Oversight, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-263SP] 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2009). 

[2] GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability of Forces, Equipment, and 
Infrastructure Should Be Considered in Developing U.S. Strategy and 
Plans, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-380T] 
(Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2009). 

[3] The Department of Defense Inspector General also includes the 
efforts of the Air Force Audit Agency, the Army Audit Agency, and the 
Naval Audit Service. 

[End of section] 

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