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Federal narcotics enforcement agencies use science and technology to improve and augment narcotics enforcement. Of 18 narcotics enforcement research and development projects reviewed, 9 were selected by the Office of Science and Technology (OST) in the Executive Office of the President, 4 by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), and 2 by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The remaining 3 were selected by the OST at the request of the BNDD.

Findings/Conclusions: The availability of records limited the evaluation of the project selection process. All but 1 of primary contracts for the 18 projects were awarded on a sole-source basis. A test of several contracts awarded by DEA showed that it was making greater use of competitive procurements. GAO was unable to determine how \$402,000 provided for 20 additional positions in 1973 supplemental appropriation was spent. The use of research and development funds to support certain projects appeared questionable. It was not possible to determine the total expenditures for individual projects. Ten of the projects produced either information or equipment that was used in Federal narcotics enforcement efforts or led to further research. For the remaining eight projects, the research failed to achieve its objective, produced results too costly to implement, or produced results which were not used because they were not related to the agency's mission. One limit on the use made of research and development project results may have been the lack of a formal policy of technology transfer among Federal agencies, a matter currently under consideration.

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REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

Review Of Selected Narcotics Enforcement Research And Development Projects

Federal narcotics enforcement agencies use science and technology to improve and augment narcotics enforcement. In reviewing 13 projects, GAO found that

- all but one of the primary contracts were awarded on a sole-source basis;
- some of the funds provided for additional personnel positions may have been used for other purposes;
- the use of research and development funds to support certain projects appeared questionable, and
- the lack of a formal policy of technology transfer may have limited the use of project results.

The Department of Justice said actions had been taken to improve contracting procedures and further actions were underway.



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-183363

The Honorable Sam Nunn
Vice Chairman, Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

At the request of your Subcommittee, we reviewed the selection, administration, and use of 18 narcotics enforcement research and development projects. These projects were initiated and/or administered by the former Office of Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

Department of Justice comments on our report are discussed in chapter 5 and included as appendix II.

As arranged with your Subcommittee, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of the report. At that time we will send copies to interested parties and make copies available to others upon request unless you inform us that the Subcommittee will hold hearings at which the report will be used.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Thomas B. Steels".

Comptroller General
of the United States

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTI-
GATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

REVIEW OF SELECTED NARCOTICS
ENFORCEMENT RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

D I G E S T

The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, asked GAO to

- review the selection process and administration of 18 narcotics enforcement research and development projects;
- furnish information on how the projects were used in drug enforcement activities; and
- determine how a \$5 million appropriation to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration for research and development was used and if the transfer of a portion of this appropriation to the Drug Enforcement Administration was proper.

METHODS OF SELECTING
PROJECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT

Of the 18 projects GAO reviewed, 9 were selected by the Office of Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President, 4 by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and 2 by the Drug Enforcement Administration. The remaining three were selected by the Office of Science and Technology at the request of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. All projects were selected according to certain predetermined objectives. The unavailability of records limited GAO's evaluation of the selection process. (See pp. 3 to 5.)

All but one of the primary contracts for the 18 projects were awarded on a sole-source basis. Some were awarded to other Federal agencies that performed all or a portion of the project plan. A test of subsequent contracts awarded by the Drug Enforcement Administration showed that it was making greater use of competitive procurements. (See pp. 5 to 8.)

ACCOUNTING FOR RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDS

GAO was unable to determine how \$402,000 provided for 20 additional positions in the 1973 supplemental appropriation was spent. (See pp. 9 and 10.)

The use of research and development funds to support certain projects appeared questionable. It appeared that these projects should have been funded from budget allocations made to other operating programs. (See pp. 10 to 12.)

It was not possible to determine the total expenditures for individual projects since costs for such items as travel and administrative salaries were not assigned to specific projects. A revised accounting system expected to be operational in fiscal year 1978 will show the total costs for individual projects and make the status of funds immediately accessible. (See pp. 12 and 13.)

USE OF RESEARCH PROJECTS

Ten of the projects produced either information or equipment that was used in Federal narcotics enforcement efforts or led to further research. For the remaining eight projects the research

- failed to achieve its objective,
- produced results too costly to implement, or
- produced results which were not used because they were not related to the agency's mission. (See pp. 14 to 24.)

One limit on the use made of research and development project results may have been the lack of a formal policy of technology transfer among Federal agencies, a matter currently under consideration. (See pp. 24 and 25.)

AGENCY COMMENTS

The Department of Justice generally agreed with the material presented in the report insofar as it related to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. (See app. II.)

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ABBREVIATIONS

BNDD	Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
EPIC	El Paso Intelligence Center
GAO	General Accounting Office
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
LEAA	Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
OST	Office of Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President
R&D	research and development
SPECTRE	Mass Spectrometer Detection of Heroin Project
DAWN	Drug Abuse warning Network
STRIDE	System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence
MOPS	Multispectral Opium Poppy Sensor
CAT	Covert Auto Tracking System

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On April 30, 1976, the Acting Chairman, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, requested that, in furtherance of the Subcommittee's continuing investigation of the operations and effectiveness of Federal narcotics enforcement agencies, we audit the efforts and expenditures begun in 1972 to use science and technology to improve and augment narcotics enforcement.

The Subcommittee furnished a list of specific research projects that it wanted reviewed, and we agreed to respond to the following questions:

- How and why were the specific projects selected and by whom?
- How were the contracts let and administered?
- What criteria were used in the selection of the contractors?
- What were the total costs for the projects?
- How were the projects used in drug enforcement activities?

In addition we agreed to examine whether a \$5 million 1973 supplemental appropriation to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) for research and development (R&D) was spent for the purpose for which it was appropriated, and whether the transfer of a portion of these funds to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was proper.

VARIOUS AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR R&D PROJECTS

Four entities were involved in the administration of the 18 research projects we reviewed--the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), LEAA and DEA within the Department of Justice, and the Office of Science and Technology (OST) in the Executive Office of the President.

On July 1, 1973, DEA was created, and it acquired all these projects for administration until their completion, ending the involvement of BNDD, LEAA, and OST.

DEA created an Office of Science and Technology to control its narcotics interdiction R&D activities. This Office is responsible for developing DEA's research plans and for administering activities sponsored or funded by DEA in the areas of advanced technology, research, development, testing and evaluation programs, forensic sciences, and technical services and operations.

Throughout this report references are made to the funding sources for various operational elements of the various narcotics intelligence systems. Questions raised as to the appropriateness of funding sources used relate solely to the issue of agency deviation from planned uses as presented to the Congress in budget submissions supporting appropriation requests. Since the appropriations involved were in lump sum form without legislative mandate for specific undertakings, no inference is to be drawn that the expenditures at issue were in any sense illegal.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

The Subcommittee requested a review of 23 projects. Our report discusses only 18 because

- 2 projects, the Multispectral Opium Poppy Sensor and the Over-the-Horizon Radar projects, were listed twice in the request by different titles;
- 2 projects, the Bioluminescent Device Test and the Radio-Immuno Assay Tests, were never funded; and
- 1 project, the Aircraft Intercept Study, was only a phase of another project listed in the request.

We reviewed contract documents, reports, studies, and other pertinent records of DEA, OST, BNDD, and LEAA in Washington, D.C. We interviewed high-ranking officials of DEA, LEAA, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the United States Customs Service, some of whom were former officials of OST and BNDD and therefore familiar with their operations.

CHAPTER 2

SELECTION METHODS

SELECTION OF PROJECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT

Of the 18 projects we reviewed, 9 were selected by OST, 4 by BNDD, and 2 by DEA. OST also selected three other projects, at the request of BNDD, that formed part of the research on the Mass Spectrometer Detection of Heroin Project (SPECTRE). Because some records were unavailable, we were unable to state with certainty that the selection process used resulted in the best projects being selected.

The selection procedures are discussed below.

OST

In developing a strategy for its R&D program, OST established 11 broad objectives for research projects. Some examples of the objectives were locating crops, tracing licit drugs and raw materials, and improving drug intelligence systems and agent capability. Each objective was given a low, moderate, or high priority ranking as it related to each of four specific criteria:

- The extent to which the objective supported high-priority narcotics control policies.
- The anticipated usefulness if the objective could be achieved.
- The anticipated feasibility of achieving the objective at a reasonable cost.
- The ease of accomplishing the objective in view of political and other constraints.

An average priority for the objectives was then obtained.

Seven of the 11 objectives received moderate, moderate-to-high, or high rankings, and the remaining objectives received low or low-to-moderate rankings. Available documentation indicated that projects which supported objectives in the moderate-to-high or high range of priority were to be supported.

According to a former official of OST, the projects were selected on the basis of internal suggestions, suggestions

from other agencies, and unsolicited proposals. The selected projects were reviewed by OST and outside consultants to determine whether or not they were at the moderate-to-high priority level. Selecting projects for funding was not a problem because of the R&D program's short duration--money was available to fund all projects proposed. The official could recall only one project that was not funded, and that was because the concept was not feasible.

BNDD

A former official of BNDD said that research projects were suggested by the agency's various divisions. The suggested projects were reviewed by a group of research scientists, and funding preference was given to those projects that appeared to be the best and satisfied BNDD objectives--to initiate research programs evaluating the nature and source of dangerous substances and developing information to categorize them according to their potential for abuse.

The research projects we reviewed satisfied BNDD's objectives.

To ascertain whether BNDD's procedures resulted in the most promising projects being selected, we requested information on unselected projects. According to a former BNDD official, BNDD's research division operated on a "shoestring" budget and the agency did not document suggestions for research projects that were not selected for funding.

DEA

DEA's Office of Science and Technology is informed of prospective R&D projects primarily through solicited and unsolicited requirement statements it receives from various DEA divisions. In 1974 the Office contacted other offices within DEA concerning their operational needs which would require R&D support. This process resulted in the identification of approximately 160 separate requirement statements. While most were recapitulations of existing statements, some were new. We were informed that the Office planned to make further solicitations periodically.

Because of the many potential projects suitable for the Office's sponsorship and the limited funds and staff available, it devised a ranking factor to help determine relative priority. For two projects competing for funding, the one having the higher ranking factor would receive funding preference over the other, all other considerations being equal.

For a given project, the value of its ranking factor is dependent on numerical values assigned to each of five subfactors and the weighting assigned to each subfactor. The subfactors and their weighting percentages are shown below.

<u>Subfactor</u>	<u>Weighting (percent)</u>
Reduction of the availability of dangerous drugs in the United States	30
Project support of an operational need	25
Probability of project success	25
Cost	10
Leadtime	10

One of the two DEA projects we reviewed was selected using this system. Several other DEA projects had a ranking higher than the one we reviewed, and we found that all of them had been funded.

The other project reviewed was proposed by DEA's Office of Intelligence. DEA's Office of Science and Technology financed two feasibility studies which showed that the project was not feasible.

CONTRACTOR SELECTION AND ADMINISTRATION

BNDD and DEA were responsible for both technical and administrative monitoring of the projects they awarded. OST monitored the technical aspects of its projects, and LEAA monitored contracting and administrative matters.

For the 18 projects reviewed, some of which were part of larger projects, work was performed under contracts awarded on a competitive or a sole-source basis. In some cases this involved the use of interagency agreements and funds were transferred to another Government agency which had the work done under an existing contract.

For the 18 projects, only one of the primary contracts and/or interagency agreements was awarded competitively. All agencies cited the same legal authority for each of their sole-source selections (41 U.S.C. 252(c) 10): "contracts may be negotiated by the agency head without advertising * * * for property or services for which it is impracticable to secure competitors."

The following table summarizes the most frequent reasons given to justify the 17 instances of sole-source procurement. The table includes projects for which other Federal agencies performed all or a portion of a project's work plan.

<u>Contractor had:</u>	<u>Frequency of use</u>
Unique qualifications and capabilities	7
Technical experience in the review area	6
Operational experience with the contracting agency	2
Current activities in a related technical area	<u>2</u>
Total	<u>17</u>

We did not attempt to determine the appropriateness of the sole-source justifications. All but one of the contracts and/or interagency agreements awarded on this basis were let prior to the June 30, 1973, date of OST and BNDD abolishment.

We noted instances of poor contracting practices and one research project which appeared to be poorly administered. However, because of the limited number of projects reviewed, we are unable to comment on the overall adequacy of the administration of the various R&D programs.

A detailed discussion of the 18 projects' procurement is presented below.

OST/LEAA

All of the 12 projects for which OST and LEAA were responsible were performed on a sole-source basis. In most cases, interagency agreements were used and work was done under an existing contract. The reason given for not seeking competition was the experience the performing firms had gained working on prior contracts.

According to a former official of OST, the same group of scientists that selected the project also selected the contractors. He said that the contractors' proficiency was made known to the scientists through discussions with other scientists throughout the Government.

Our review of available files did not reveal any deficiencies in the technical monitoring or in the contractors' performance. We did, however, observe poor contracting and administrative practices, namely failure to enter into a

definitive contract in a timely manner, requiring the contractor to perform additional work without prior contracting approval, and delays in paying contractors.

BNDD

The four primary contracts and/or interagency agreements for projects initiated by BNDD were all sole-source. A supporting contract for one of these projects was, however, awarded on a competitive basis.

A former official of BNDD said that the division initiating a research project selected the contractor in each of the cases of sole-source procurement. Documentation for the support contract showed that the proposals submitted by the offerors were evaluated by three BNDD employees and a BNDD consultant. Using evaluation criteria contained in the request for proposals, each of the evaluators assigned a numerical score to the offerors' proposals. Those receiving an average score above a preestablished number were selected for negotiations.

We noted no deficiencies in contract award or contractor performance. However, one of the projects appeared to suffer from serious management problems. A consultant to BNDD pointed out that Project SPECTRE had the following problems:

- Lack of written communication.
- Lack of adequate preplanning of the entire operation.
- Inadequate formal procedures for debriefing and post-run analysis.
- Lack of adequate administrative planning and support.

A former OST official who was familiar with the project (OST provided support to the project) agreed that it was poorly managed. We did not attempt to further substantiate those assertions because major control of the project was exercised by the now-nonexistent BNDD.

DEA

Our review of the contracts/purchase orders for the two projects initiated by DEA disclosed that one contractor was selected competitively, while the other was on a sole-source basis. The competitive selection procedures employed by DEA

appeared to be adequate. These procedures involved two separate technical evaluations of the proposals--one performed prior to negotiations to determine which firms were in the competitive range and one performed after negotiations had been held with the qualified firms. We found no deficiencies in the awarding, monitoring, or contractor performance for these two projects.

Because so many of the projects we reviewed involved the use of sole-source contracting, we analyzed how frequently DEA was resorting to sole-source procurements. An analysis of 31 research contracts awarded by DEA in fiscal years 1974-76 disclosed a considerable improvement: 14 were selected competitively and 17 on a sole-source basis. We discussed this matter with a DEA official, who stated that most contracts were currently awarded on a competitive basis. He added that cases existed in which DEA had become "locked in" to a contractor and had to go sole-source because the contractor had already done a lot of work on the project.

CHAPTER 3

ACCOUNTING FOR R&D FUNDS

During fiscal years 1973-76, BNDD, OST, LEAA, and DEA obligated about \$14.3 million for R&D activities. Included in this amount was \$5 million provided to LEAA in a 1973 supplemental appropriation. How this money was used and how DEA accounts for R&D expenditures are discussed below.

1973 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION TO LEAA

The 1973 supplemental appropriation provided LEAA with \$5 million for salaries and expenses. The hearing record on this appropriation request shows that about \$4.6 million was requested for additional R&D on techniques to control the supply of illicit narcotics and \$402,000 for 20 additional positions.

The following table shows the agency or office having primary responsibility for the decisions on how the funds would be used and the amount of funds associated with such decisions.

<u>Costs</u>	<u>Agency</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Personnel	LEAA	\$ 402,000
Contracting	OST	1,434,876
Contracting	DEA's Office of Science and Technology	<u>a/3,163,124</u>
Total		<u>\$5,000,000</u>

a/\$49,000 remained unobligated at June 30, 1976.

We were unable to specifically identify how the \$402,000 provided for personnel costs was spent. In addition, some of the contracting costs charged to R&D funds appeared to be of a type that would normally be financed from funds appropriated for operations. These matters are discussed in detail below.

Personnel costs

We attempted to determine if LEAA had, in fact, used the \$402,000 provided in the supplemental appropriation to pay the personnel costs for 20 new positions. An official of LEAA said that it would be impossible to identify the

expenditures that relate to these funds because the funds were added to the existing "management and operations" budget of LEAA. No specific accounting classification was established for these funds. He believed that four positions were filled and that all of the funds were spent.

When DEA was organized in 1973, 20 positions were transferred from LEAA. Only four people actually went from LEAA to DEA, which agrees with the LEAA official's estimate. Since LEAA nevertheless spent the entire \$402,000, some of it may have been used for purposes other than financing the cost of the 20 new positions provided for in the supplemental appropriation.

Contracting cost

The R&D projects selected by OST resulted in nine contracts and one purchase order being awarded by LEAA. As a result of these projects, obligations of \$1,434,876 were charged against the supplemental appropriation.

The projects concerned technology directed at limiting the supply of illicit drugs.

By a memorandum of agreement, LEAA made available \$3,163,124 to DEA for support of the Narcotics Interdiction Research and Development Program. The agreement states the transfer of these funds is authorized by section 502 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Public Law 90-351, as amended. We found no legal impediments to the transfer.

DEA maintained separate accountability for the funds received from LEAA. This money was used in funding or partially funding more than 150 transactions.

In attempting to learn if the expenditures were for the purpose for which they were appropriated, we considered the question from

--the broad perspective of whether the funds were used to help limit the supply of illicit drugs and

--the narrower perspective of whether they were used for R&D.

On the basis of the projects we reviewed we believe the expenditures were used for purposes that would help in limiting the supply of illicit drugs. On the other hand, two

projects could be questioned from the second standpoint of whether R&D or other operating funds should have been used to finance them. These projects are discussed below.

Intelligence operations

DEA allocated \$550,000 of the supplemental appropriation to the Office of Intelligence. The largest part of this was for the design, development, and implementation of a computer software system for Pathfinder I--the first step in the development of a National Narcotics Intelligence System--and for additional minicomputers for the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).

We noted that DEA included in its congressional budget submission for fiscal years 1976 and 1977 requests for \$965,000 under the intelligence operation portion of its budget for the EPIC-Pathfinder system. In requesting \$400,000 for fiscal year 1976, DEA explained:

"The initial development stages of the computerized National Narcotics Intelligence System (Drugmaster) and the continued development of the computerized intelligence system to support the El Paso Intelligence Center will require the use of support contracting services and/or equipment which would not be feasible or necessary for DEA to have as permanent resources. These funds will finance the Source Registry System (Drugmaster/SRN) which is the first building block of the National Narcotics Intelligence System under development. The \$400,000 will also be used to move the system at the El Paso Intelligence Center into its second stage of development and for expansion of the system to headquarters' intelligence operations as an analyst file, retrieval and analytical tool."

The above information, together with the fact that a DEA official said that the minicomputers being acquired for EPIC are "off the shelf" items, raises the question of whether R&D supplemental appropriation funds should be used to finance these procurements.

Drug Abuse Warning Network

Since its creation in July 1973, DEA has used R&D funds to finance its share of the cost of the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN). DAWN is a part of the total information system used by agencies to provide data on drug abuse patterns in the United States.

The system has been in existence since July 1972. During fiscal years 1972 through 1974, BNDD and the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention--an office formerly responsible for coordination and direction of Federal drug abuse prevention efforts--spent \$1.6 million and \$2.2 million, respectively, for the concurrent development and operation of DAWN. For fiscal years 1975 and 1976, DEA and the National Institute on Drug Abuse--a Department of Health, Education, and Welfare agency responsible for policy and coordination of drug abuse prevention and treatment efforts--provided \$1.5 million and \$1.7 million, respectively, to finance the system's operation. Of the \$1.5 million provided by DEA from R&D funds, \$55,700 was from the 1975 supplemental appropriation.

The contractor's report on Project DAWN III, which covers the period April 1974 to April 1975, contains the statement that DAWN had been essentially in its current format since July 1973. A review of contract documents supports this statement. According to a DEA official, DAWN had been in an operational stage since the end of fiscal year 1974. He said that there was a small portion that could have been considered to be in the developmental stage. Another DEA official said that R&D funds were used to assist this project because no other DEA program allocation was available to support the significant level of funding required to maintain the system.

DEA's 1978 budget estimates show a reprogramming of DAWN financing from the R&D program to the intelligence program.

DEA'S ACCOUNTING FOR R&D EXPENDITURES

During fiscal years 1974 to 1976 DEA obligated about \$11.1 million for R&D activities, including about \$3.1 million transferred from LEAA. As previously stated DEA maintained separate accountability for the transferred funds. Therefore, it was possible to determine the source of the funding for the various projects financed by DEA. It was not possible to determine, however, the total R&D expenditures for individual projects, because costs for such items as travel and administrative salaries were not assigned to specific projects.

In fiscal year 1976, DEA incurred \$1.2 million in in-house costs to support its R&D program. None of these costs were assigned to specific projects. Cost information provides a common financial denominator for the measurement and evaluation of efficiency and economy in terms of resources used in performance. The lack of total cost information prevents DEA from realistically evaluating the cost effectiveness of its projects.

A DEA official informed us that a task force was currently developing a revised accounting system which would be operational in fiscal year 1978.

The revised system will

- show total costs for individual projects and
- make the status of funds immediately accessible.

CHAPTER 4

USE OF RESEARCH PROJECTS

Ten of the 18 projects we reviewed produced either information or equipment that was used in Federal narcotics enforcement efforts or resulted in the continuation of the research effort. For the remaining eight projects the research (1) failed to achieve its objective, (2) produced results that were determined to be too costly to implement, or (3) produced results that were unrelated to the agency's mission and therefore were not used.

One limit on the use made of R&D project results may have been the lack of a formal policy for technology transfer among Federal agencies. Although we could not establish this conclusively, there were indications of it. To determine the full impact of the lack of such a policy would require an extensive review of the R&D programs of all agencies having similar R&D needs.

The above matter and the 18 projects we reviewed are discussed below.

RESEARCH PROJECTS

Opium-morphine-heroin analysis (\$134,858)

This project sought to demonstrate the feasibility of determining the area of origin of opium, morphine, and heroin from a chemical analysis of these substances. It was felt that such information would help in efficiently allocating resources to areas of high activity and in measuring the effectiveness of enforcement and control measures.

The study determined that the process is feasible; however, DEA believes that additional samples should be analyzed before the technical process is validated. It is in the process of acquiring these additional samples. If enough can be collected, additional tests will be made.

Project STRIDE (System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence) (funding unknown)

Project STRIDE is a series of interrelated computer systems designed to support the enforcement operations of DEA by processing information generated from the analysis of drug evidence by the seven DEA regional laboratories.

According to DEA officials, STRIDE has received no R&D funding. They said the system was developed in-house. Three contracts were awarded--one to provide programs for the batch processing systems and the others to perform research on removal methods for computer terminals and on basic STRIDE data--which were funded through the Computer Services Division's budget.

Examples of the types of information coming out of the STRIDE system are discussed below.

The system can provide information about the analysis of tool marks on tablets. A comparative analysis can determine if tablets are illicit and have been previously encountered, thereby assisting agents in locating illegal tableting operations.

STRIDE also includes a program that provides data on the chemical components of seized or purchased heroin samples. A comparative analysis of similar samples assists agents in identifying particular types of heroin that are prevalent in selected regional areas.

A review of the request made for STRIDE information indicates that the information is being used in narcotics enforcement efforts.

Project DAWN (\$6,972,572)

Project DAWN provides information on the incidence of drug abuse in 29 U.S. metropolitan areas. DAWN's information comes from reports provided by selected hospital emergency rooms, hospital inpatient units, medical examiners, and crisis centers. The information is analyzed, classified regionally and demographically, and presented in monthly, quarterly, and annual reports. The current annual cost of operating the system is approximately \$1.6 million, which is shared by DEA and the National Institute on Drug Abuse.

DAWN is not and was not intended to be a primary source of drug abuse data. Rather, DAWN's drug abuse data is reviewed in conjunction with information from other DEA systems, such as STRIDE, to determine if a drug abuse trend for a specific drug exists in a particular region. Nor could DAWN be used as a primary source of information. The information it provides is not statistically valid, which precludes its use in comparing various reporting regions or various reporting periods for the same region.

We were informed that work on incorporating alcohol abuse in the DAWN system had been going on for about 2 years. A DEA official estimated that this effort would be three times more costly than if drugs alone were involved.

DEA officials we interviewed had mixed views on the value of the DAWN system in improving Federal narcotics enforcement. These ranged from emphatic support of its value to feelings that it was of little value. Those who expressed reservations regarding the system offered, in addition to questioning its statistical validity, the following reasons:

- The reliability of the information was questionable.
- The information reported under the DAWN system was lacking in completeness.
- The quality of the work performed by the contractor was questionable.

We were informed by a DEA official that a review of DAWN was being made.

Quantitative model of the heroin addiction problem (\$36,500)

The purpose of this contract was to undertake the first phase of an effort toward developing a set of compatible quantitative models of the overall heroin addiction problem. More specifically, the purpose of phase 1 was to outline and recommend a plan of action (phase 2) for the development and use of a reasonable set of models and submodels of the heroin addiction problem. This plan was to include specific recommended objectives and features of at least three submodels of the problem--supply and distribution internationally, internal U.S distribution, and user behavior and treatment.

According to a former OST official, the completed plan has been used as a reference tool by many concerned agencies.

Study of National Narcotics Intelligence Requirements (\$115,991)

The purpose of this study contract was to determine the intelligence needs of the national narcotics control community and examine different means of using existing and

potential intelligence resources to provide an effective national narcotics control intelligence system.

According to the contractor, the report on phase 1 of this study was considered so comprehensive by the prior Administrator of DEA that the phase 2 study was not performed. On the other hand, an official of DEA informed us that when the phase 1 report was submitted, it was felt that the contractor should redo the report. He was not required to do so because its findings were not relevant to the newly created DEA. The DEA official said that some of the contractor's recommendations were adopted in the first stages of establishing DEA's Office of Intelligence. He believed that all of the agencies involved in the study received copies of the report.

System Study for Drug Interception (\$91,000)

This project was undertaken to identify the least expensive techniques and/or procedural alternatives for significantly reducing or eliminating the illegal entry of low-flying aircraft, vehicles, and people transporting narcotics into the United States from Mexico. The investigation was to be carried out only to the point necessary to determine system concepts and establish feasibility.

The investigative report listed five techniques considered acceptable for low-flying aircraft detection and tracking. It pointed out that one of the five--over-the-horizon radar--had the greatest number of technical unknowns. The report suggested that tests be run to verify its potential suitability because of its performance potential and relative low cost. Among ground interdiction methods, the report found the strain-sensitive cable sensor the most promising.

Research contracts testing both of these concepts were subsequently awarded.

Study of Alternatives for Improving the Interdiction of Illicit Narcotics Entering the United States (\$290,000)

The primary objectives of this study were:

- To determine the current modes and routes of illegal transportation of narcotics into the United States, to estimate the quantities entering via these modes and routes, and to describe and evaluate current U.S. methods of limiting illegal importation of narcotics into the United States.

- To characterize and determine the cost and potential effectiveness of technical and procedural alternatives available to the United States for reducing the illegal flow of narcotics into the United States via each known or potential mode of importation.
- To determine the optimal allocation of resources among various border and port control efforts to limit the illegal flow of narcotics into the United States.
- To provide a background for future studies that would determine the appropriate balance between improved border-control measures and other narcotics-control approaches (e.g., improved domestic law enforcement or collection of intelligence internationally).

Other objectives of the study were:

- To identify areas of R&D which have the greatest likelihood of leading to improved U.S. border-control capabilities.
- To determine requirements for intelligence information which would be important for the success of alternative border control strategies.

The contractor furnished a multivolume report which discussed methods by which heroin seizures could be significantly increased in the vicinity of the U.S. borders. The volumes are entitled: "Executive Summary," "Illicit Drug Smuggling: Problems and Possible Solutions," "Operational Analysis of Drug Detecting Sensor Applications," "Air Intercept Model," "Selected Data Processing Applications for Drug Intelligence Analysis," "Random Sample Search Techniques for Use Against Illicit Drug Smuggling at Ports of Entry," and "Allocation Model for Customs Inspection Personnel."

Several R&D projects were initiated as a result of the recommendations contained in this report.

Electro-Optical Sensory System
Recognition and Identification Study (\$20,000)

This contract was for a two-phase study of nighttime surveillance equipment. Phase 1 required the contractor to determine the technical parameters and specifications of equipment that would most likely work in a number of surveillance scenarios. Phase 2 consisted of assembling one

or more electro-optical systems using equipment loaned to the program by interested parties.

DEA has not acquired this night vision system. According to DEA officials, one reason is that the system, estimated to cost \$700,000, is too expensive. A secondary consideration is that many of the improved performance specifications were applicable to long-range surveillance of border points, which is primarily the responsibility of Customs and the Border Patrol.

Multispectral Opium Poppy Sensor
(MOPS) Project (\$3,486,833)

In 1971 BNDD initiated research to develop a system for the remote detection of clandestine fields of opium poppy plants. Control of this project was later assumed by DEA.

Several contracts were awarded for R&D, equipment, supplies, and services in connection with the project. Less than one-third of the costs were for tests and validation of the systems, with this funding being provided by BNDD and DEA from R&D funds. The remaining funding for the equipment, supplies, and services was provided by the State Department.

Tests proved that detection of opium poppy fields is possible from a small plane equipped for multispectral photography. This technique utilizes a four-lens camera with special filters to make four simultaneous black and white pictures of the same scene. The total MOPS system consists of four coordinated subsystems: data acquisition, film processing, data interpretation, and cartography (the production of maps).

Two MOPS systems have been developed and furnished to the Mexican Government for use in its opium poppy eradication program. These systems have proven to be effective.

A DEA official informed us that since the project was now operational there would be no more major expenditures for MOPS.

Project Hytrak (\$13,200)

This project was initially under the control of DEA's Office of Intelligence. The purpose of the project was to use the Landsat satellite imagery to detect opium poppy fields.

Two study contracts were awarded to determine the feasibility of this approach. A DEA official said the results of these studies indicated that the detection of opium poppy fields by the existing satellite was not feasible. The Office of Intelligence wanted to continue the project, but DEA's Office of Science and Technology did not concur in this decision.

Subsequent meetings were held with National Aeronautics and Space Administration officials, who agreed that the present Landsat systems were not capable of providing meaningful information with respect to the identification and location of small poppy fields. They said that Landsat technology of the 1980 time frame would perhaps be capable of meeting the DEA large-scale cultivation survey requirement.

After these meetings it was decided that no additional work would be performed on this project, and responsibility for it was transferred from the Office of Intelligence to DEA's Office of Science and Technology.

An interagency crop detection technology review committee was later formed. Its task was to prepare a detailed plan and cost justification for the development of improved methods for the remote detection of drug-bearing plant cultivation.

Strain-Sensitive Cable Sensor Project (\$153,000)

This project was begun to test the potential effectiveness of a pressure-sensitive underground cable to detect vehicles and personnel that might be involved in importing illicit narcotics into the United States across the Mexican border. The main parts of the test were (1) the collection of basic engineering data necessary for determining the technical feasibility and optimal manner of installing and using the strain-sensitive cable sensor along the U.S.-Mexican border and (2) the actual testing of an installed length of cable along the Mexican border to measure the sensor's effectiveness in an operational environment against simulated targets. These tests were conducted under OST auspices and completed before the establishment of DEA.

Although the test results were quite favorable, this device was not adopted. According to a DEA official, the device was oriented to border control operations, which are the responsibility of Customs and INS, and INS had, in fact, installed several systems.

Land Vehicle Locator and Tracking System (\$700,000)

Under this project the Mitre Corporation investigated improved techniques for tracking and surveillance of boats and land vehicles. The studies performed by Mitre served as the catalyst for several specific research projects.

One such research project was the Covert Auto Tracking System (CAT). The CAT system is composed of three subsystems: a target vehicle, a base station, and a command center. The target vehicle carries a long-range navigation receiver, a data transmitter, and electronic control equipment required to send a coded signal containing vehicle location and status information to a base station at a fixed site. The base station relays this signal over a land line to the command center where the vehicle location data are extracted and displayed on a map.

We witnessed a demonstration of this project which confirmed that it is effective in tracking a vehicle. The system is currently in use at DEA's Washington District Office. We were informed by a DEA official that it would be used in many cities.

A DEA official said that during fiscal years 1974 and 1975 the Mitre study cost allocated to this project was \$191,400.

Over-the-Horizon Radar Test (\$60,000)

The purpose of this contract was to determine the capability of over-the-horizon radar to detect and track small low-flying aircraft that could be used to smuggle narcotics across the U.S.-Mexican border. The contractor was required to:

- Prepare a detailed test plan to measure the ability of the system to detect and track small aircraft under specified conditions.
- Conduct the test, including making any necessary modifications to the radar parameters and recording of all test data.
- Report on the results of the system test.

The DEA official responsible for technical evaluation of the project concluded that (1) the project did not

produce enough data to draw an accurate conclusion as to the validity of the system and (2) the system was not dependable 24 hours a day and therefore must be supplemented by other means. This official said that since the over-the-horizon radar would, at best, be a secondary intelligence device, no further research was being performed on the project.

Pseudonarcotics (\$75,000)

The purpose of this project was to develop the means and procedures for formulating operationally credible, nonnarcotic substitutes for heroin or cocaine. It was intended that these pseudonarcotics would be used for (1) undercover display (an agent might carry the pseudonarcotics to convince drug dealers and users that he was involved with illegal drugs), (2) replacement of seized or intercepted caches for controlled delivery and convoy operations, and (3) training aids.

The project was funded under OST auspices as requested by Customs. The contract was completed under Customs project management, with DEA as an alternate manager.

Our review disclosed that the contractor was successful in fulfilling the purpose of the contract, but that the pseudonarcotics had not yet been used as intended.

DEA officials offered the following reasons:

- Methods must be devised for using simulated heroin as a substitute for real narcotics in drug enforcement work.
- Simulated drugs are only now being used in training agents.
- The substitute drugs have not been approved as being safe for human consumption; therefore, legal problems could result if they were accidentally consumed by drug abusers.

DEA is working to eliminate these problems, and as indicated above has successfully utilized these materials in the training of agents.

Project SPECTRE (\$1,360,592) 1/

Project SPECTRE was begun by BNDD in June 1970. The purpose was to complement conventional investigative techniques with sophisticated scientific and electronic heroin-vapor-detecting equipment in order to locate clandestine heroin-manufacturing laboratories in the Marseilles area of southern France.

Research support for this project was funded by BNDD, LEAA/OST, and DEA as follows:

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Number of contracts or interagency agreements</u>	<u>Estimated amount</u>
BNDD	6	\$ 952,937
LEAA/OST	3	280,850
DEA	5	<u>126,805</u>
Total		<u>\$1,360,592</u>

Under the BNDD contracts prototype models for mass spectrometer detection of heroin-processing effluents were successfully tested in the United States and France using helicopters and land vehicles. Based on the success of the prototype models, additional funding was provided to construct four operational models. Tests of the operational models were not considered successful, and additional research work was performed in an attempt to resolve deficiencies in the program.

DEA assumed responsibility for project SPECTRE when BNDD was abolished in July 1973. From February to October 1974, DEA entered into five contracts or interagency agreements to further evaluate the potential for the detection of clandestine heroin laboratories by using scientific equipment. The results of these tests indicated that a successful detection device did not exist and had low potential for development. Based on the results of the tests and input from the LEAA/OST research efforts, DEA ended the project. This decision was made primarily because:

1/Includes the following projects which were initiated by OST at the request of BNDD to support project SPECTRE: Detection of Trace Organics; Vapor Phase Concentration Device Evaluation; and Study of the Influence of Meteorological Factors on a Vortex Wake.

- An effective heroin vapor detection device was still not available after several years of intensive research.
- The location of heroin laboratories had changed from the high-volume suburban areas of France to the low-volume open rural areas of Mexico, resulting in a significant drop in the probability of vapor detection and in the cost effectiveness of this method of search.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BETWEEN AGENCIES TO BE ADDRESSED

Two of the projects we reviewed were not continued because they related to border interdiction, the responsibility of Customs and INS. We made a limited attempt to determine what efforts had been made to share technology with agencies having similar missions.

We questioned an official at Customs to find out if he was familiar with the projects we were reviewing. He said he was familiar with some, claiming that Customs had received reports from the contractors who had worked on them. Concerning projects for which reports were not available at Customs, the official reviewed the reports at DEA and said reports on three projects were of interest to him. He said that there was not an adequate transfer of technology between DEA and Customs. He further stated that Customs did receive information from DEA when it was requested.

We also questioned an official of INS on this matter, since it also performs law enforcement operations. He said that DEA had always been very receptive to any of his requests for information. He said, however, that he had never received any reports from DEA except those which he had requested.

According to a DEA official, DEA does not have a formal policy of technology transfer but attempts to keep other agencies aware of its activities on an informal basis. He disagreed with the comments of the Customs official, stating that DEA had furnished two of the three studies in which the official expressed an interest. A DEA official said DEA had a policy of keeping Customs and all other law enforcement agencies briefed on the progress of projects. He did, however, recognize the need for establishing better communications among agencies. Another DEA official has proposed to

the Cabinet Committee on Drugs and Law Enforcement that it establish a subcommittee whose sole purpose would be technology transfer of drug-related R&D projects. An official of this committee informed us that a report was being drafted which would deal with this issue. The Office of Drug Abuse Policy has assumed the responsibilities formerly held by the committee, which has been abolished.

CHAPTER 5

AGENCY COMMENTS

The Department of Justice generally agreed with the material presented in the report insofar as it related to BNDD, DEA, and LEAA. With respect to DEA's contracting practices, Justice believed that DEA had made substantive improvements and expected further improvements when its Internal Audit Staff completed its review of DEA's negotiated procurement activity. Regarding LEAA contracting and administrative deficiencies noted by us, Justice said that these areas were similar to those brought to their attention in 1975 by the Internal Audit Staff and that a followup review was scheduled in December 1977 to determine what corrective actions had been taken. (See app. II.)

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

(PURSUANT TO PUBLIC LAW 93-154, 90TH CONGRESS)
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 30, 1976

Dear Mr. Comptroller General:

The purpose of this letter is to request that the General Accounting Office conduct an additional inquiry and audit in furtherance of the Subcommittee's continuing investigation of the operations and effectiveness of federal narcotics enforcement agencies.

The additional inquiry to which I refer would be directed to the efforts and expenditures begun in 1972 to use science and technology to improve and augment narcotics enforcement. The Subcommittee now wishes for the GAO to determine, to the extent possible, how much money has been spent in the area of science and technology, to whom these funds have gone and how effective these expenditures have been in improving federal narcotics enforcement.

The scope of your inquiry should include those efforts and projects begun in 1972 by the Office of Science and Technology then located in the Executive Office of the President to July 1, 1973 when all such functions were transferred to the Drug Enforcement Administration, and continue to the present day to determine the effectiveness of the Drug Enforcement Administration in this area.

The Subcommittee has been advised that, in October of 1972, supplemental fiscal year 1973 legislation was signed by the President to provide an additional \$5 million for research and development of projects directed against the enforcement or supply side of the narcotics problem.

The purposes of the program were to develop and apply systems and technologies for limiting the supply of illicit drugs in the United States and to undertake studies and analyses to ensure the most effective utilization of these systems.

The responsibility for formulating a strategy and carrying out these tasks was then assigned to the Executive Office of the

April 30, 1976

President. Support for contract administration was provided by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

The principal task at the Office of Science and Technology between December of 1972 and February 1973 was the development of a drug enforcement research and development strategy. This resulted in a set of objectives for research and development, a set of priorities for these objectives and a research program. The research program led to a specific set of projects. It is our understanding that some of these projects were completed during the remaining life of the Office of Science and Technology. Those projects still in progress as of July 1, 1973 were transferred to the Drug Enforcement Administration where continued responsibility for the development of science and technology projects currently resides.

With respect to the above information, it would be most helpful to the Subcommittee's inquiry if the GAO would conduct an in-depth audit of all funds appropriated for these projects beginning with the FY 1973 supplemental appropriations and continuing with every such succeeding appropriation. The main objectives of this audit by GAO should be to determine if this money was spent for the purposes for which it was appropriated and to determine the value of such expenditures in terms of increased effectiveness and efficiency of federal narcotics enforcement.

It would also be helpful to the Subcommittee if GAO auditors would review some specific scientific research and development projects to determine the following:

- (1) How and why was the specific project selected and by whom?
- (2) How was the contract let and administered?
- (3) What criteria was used in the selection of the contractor, especially in the case of a sole source contractor?
- (4) What was the total cost of the project?
- (5) Was the project cost-effective in terms of benefits to the narcotics enforcement effort?

April 30, 1976

The specific projects to be reviewed by GAO in this regard should include, but not necessarily be limited to the following:


PROJECT	CONTRACTOR OR AGENCY
Addict population study	Institute for Defense Analyses
Drug Intelligence and Information Systems	Institute for Defense Analyses
System Study for Drug Interception	Mitre Corporation
Study of methods for improving interdiction of illicit narcotics entering U.S.	Mitre Corporation
Vehicle Tracking Study	Mitre Corporation
Strain Sensitive Cable Sensor Test	MERDC
Night Vision Study and Test	Westinghouse
Bioluminescent Device Test and Evaluation	Los Alamos
Radio Immuno Assay Tests	Hoffman LaPoche
Vapor Detection Device	Hydronautics
Over-the-Horizon Radar Field Test (OTH)	Stanford Research Institute (SRI)
Opium-Morphine-Heroin Analysis	Stanford Research Institute
Study on Detection of Clandestine Heroin Labs	Brookhaven National Lab
Vapor Plume Characteristics Study	Aerovironment, Inc.
Simulation of Heroin Lab.	Stanford Research Institute
Aircraft Intercept Study	Mitre Corporation

April 30, 1976

Airborne Multi-Spectral Photography for Poppy Field Location	OST In-House (This was a detailed review BNDD project SPECTRE)
Brief Study of Requirements for Airborne Radar for Interceptor	OST In-House
Project SPECTRE	BNDD/DEA
Project COMPASS TRIP	BNDD/DEA
Project STRIDE	BNDD/DEA
Project DAWN	BNDD/DEA
Project HYTACK	BNDD/DEA

May I take this opportunity to thank you and your staff, especially Messrs. Victor Lowe, Daniel Stanton, Arnold Jones and Thomas Hagenstad, for the valuable assistance and cooperation the Subcommittee has received during this narcotics investigation.

(Sincerely yours,



Sam Nunn
Acting Chairman

Honorable Elmer B. Staats
Comptroller General of the United States



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

OCT 28 1977

Address Reply to the
Division Indicated
and Refer to Initials and Number

Mr. Victor L. Lowe
Director
General Government Division
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Lowe:

This is in response to your request for comments on the draft report entitled "Review of Selected Narcotic Enforcement Research and Development Projects."

We have reviewed the draft report and generally agree with the material presented insofar as it relates to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).

While reviewing DEA contracts, GAO stated that "Because so many of the projects we reviewed involved the use of sole-source contracting, we analyzed how frequently DEA was resorting to sole-source procurements." As a result of their analysis, GAO specifically noted that "A test of subsequent contracts awarded by the Drug Enforcement Administration showed it is making greater use of competitive procurements." As is indicative of this statement, we believe DEA has made substantive improvement in its contracting procedures. Also germane to GAO's comments in this report is the fact that an audit of DEA's negotiated procurement activity by the Department's Internal Audit Staff is currently in progress. The results of this audit will also provide management with recommendations to further strengthen its procurement activity.

With respect to their review of LEAA contracts, GAO stated that:

"Our review of available files did not reveal any deficiencies in the technical monitoring or in the contractor's performance. We did, however, note some poor contracting and administrative practices, namely, failure to enter into a definitized contract in a timely manner, requiring the contractor to perform additional work without prior contracting approval and delays in paying contractors."

The report does not cite specific examples relating to these conditions, therefore we are unable to provide detailed comments. However, as the report aptly notes, in most instances the projects were carried out using interagency agreements and work was performed under existing contracts. LEAA undertook the responsibility of awarding the work through existing contracts after (1) budget office certification of fund availability, (2) administrative approval of fund expenditures, and (3) concurrence of the Office of General Counsel as to legality. Of particular significance to GAO's findings is the fact that an audit of LEAA procurement activities was conducted by the Department's Internal Audit Staff in fiscal year 1975 and issued October 10, 1975. The areas of deficiency mentioned in GAO's report were similar to those brought to management's attention in our report. A follow-up audit is scheduled to begin in December 1977 to ascertain the extent to which corrective actions have been taken by management on the recommendations contained in our 1975 report.

There are several statements in the report, some technical in nature, which we believe should be revised or expanded to add clarity to the report and improve its technical accuracy. These changes are presented below and the specific areas of change underscored.

Page 26, First Full Paragraph, Second Sentence

We suggest this sentence be revised to read:

"Phase I required the contractor to determine the technical parameters and specifications of equipment which will provide observers with a high probability

of meeting requirements of a number of distinct terrestrial area surveillance scenarios."

Page 26, Second Full Paragraph

A revision in this paragraph is suggested to read:

"DEA has not acquired this night vision system. According to DEA officials, one reason is that the system, estimated to cost \$700,000, is too expensive. A secondary consideration is that much of the improved performance specifications were applicable to long-range surveillance of border points which is primarily the responsibility of Customs and the Border Patrol."

Page 28, Third Full Paragraph

Addition of a final sentence to this paragraph is suggested to read:

"These tests were conducted under OST auspices and completed before the establishment of DEA."

Page 28, Last Paragraph

We suggest the last sentence be expanded to state:

"A DEA official informed us that the device was oriented to border control operations which are the responsibility of Customs and INS, and that INS had, in fact, installed several systems."

Page 30

An additional paragraph at the bottom of page 30 is suggested to read:

"The project was funded under OST auspices as requested by Customs. The contract was completed under Customs project management with a DEA alternate."

Page 31, Second Full Paragraph

We suggest the first reason be revised to state:

"Methods must be devised for controlling the use of heroin in DEA drug enforcement work."

Page 31, Third Paragraph

We suggest the third paragraph be revised to state:

"DEA is working to eliminate these problems, and has successfully utilized these materials in the training of agents."

Page 31, Footnote 1/, Last Line

This line should be revised to read:

"Study of the Influence of Meteorological Factors on a Vortex Wake."

We appreciate the opportunity given us to comment on the report. Should you have any further questions, please feel free to contact us.

Sincerely,



Kevin D. Rooney
Assistant Attorney General
for Administration

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE
FOR ADMINISTERING ACTIVITIES
DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

Tenure of office

From To

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES:

Griffin B. Bell	Jan. 1977	Present
Richard L. Thornburgh (acting)	Jan. 1977	Jan. 1977
Edward H. Levi	Feb. 1975	Jan. 1977
William B. Saxbe	Jan. 1974	Feb. 1975
Robert H. Bork, Jr. (acting)	Oct. 1973	Jan. 1974
Elliot L. Richardson	May 1973	Oct. 1973
Richard G. Kleindienst	June 1972	Apr. 1973
Richard G. Kleindienst (acting)	Feb. 1972	June 1972
John N. Mitchell	Jan. 1969	Feb. 1972

ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION:

Peter B. Bensinger	Feb. 1975	Present
Peter B. Bensinger (acting)	Jan. 1975	Feb. 1975
Henry S. Dogin (acting)	June 1975	Jan. 1975
John R. Bartels, Jr.	Oct. 1973	May 1975
John R. Bartels, Jr. (acting)	July 1973	Oct. 1973

ADMINISTRATOR, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION:

James Gregg (acting)	Feb. 1977	Present
Richard W. Velde	Sept. 1974	Feb. 1977
Donald E. Santarelli	Apr. 1973	Aug. 1974
Jerris Leonard	May 1971	Mar. 1973
Vacant	June 1970	May 1971
Charles H. Rogovin	Mar. 1969	June 1970